RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
condition that the defendant should not pursue his counterclaim in the
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127578. February 15, 1999]
MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T.
HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC, Kalookan City and GLEN CAMIL
ANDRES DE ASIS represented by her mother/guardian VIRCEL D.
ANDRES, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking
to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts
Orders, dated November 25, 1993 and February 4, 1994, respectively, denying
petitioners Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in Civil Case No. C-16107,
entitled Glen Camil Andres de Asis, etc. vs. Manuel de Asis, and the motion for
reconsideration.
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the petition at bar are, as follows:
On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres, (the herein private respondent) in
her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis,
brought an action for maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis, docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-88-935 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 94, alleging that the defendant Manuel de Asis (the petitioner here) is the
father of subject minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, and the former refused and/or
failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands.
In his Answer, petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor and theorized
that he cannot therefore be required to provide support for him.
On July 4, 1989, private respondent Vircel D. Andres, through counsel, sent
in a manifestation the pertinent portion of which, reads;
1. That in his proposed Amended Answer, defendant (herein petitioner) has
made a judicial admission/declaration that 1) defendant denies that the said
minor child (Glen Camil) is his child; 2) he (petitioner) has no obligation to
the plaintiff Glen Camil xxx.
2. That with the aforesaid judicial admissions/declarations by the defendant,
it seems futile and a useless exercise to claim support from said defendant.
3. That under the foregoing circumstances it would be more practical that
plaintiff withdraws the complaint against the defendant subject to the
above-entitled case, xxx.[1]
By virtue of the said manifestation, both the plaintiff and the defendant
agreed to move for the dismissal of the case. Acting thereupon, the Regional Trial
Court a quo issued the following Order of August 8, 1989, dismissing Civil Case
No. Q-88-935 with prejudice, to wit:
Acting on the manifestation of Atty. Romualdo C. delos Santos, counsel for the
defendant, that counsel for the plaintiff Atty. Ismael J. Andres has no objection
that this case be withdrawn provided that the defendant will withdraw the
counterclaim, as prayed for, let the case be dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On September 7, 1995, another Complaint for maintenance and support
was brought against Manuel A. de Asis, this time in the name of Glen Camil
Andres de Asis, represented by her legal guardian/mother, Vircel D.
Andres. Docketed as Civil Case No. C-16107 before Branch 130 of the Regional
Trial Court of Kalookan, the said Complaint prayed, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be
rendered ordering defendant:
1. To pay plaintiff the sum of not less than P2,000.00 per month for every month
since June 1, 1987 as support in arrears which defendant failed to provide plaintiff
shortly after her birth in June 1987 up to the present;
2. To give plaintiff a monthly allowance of P5,000.00 to be paid in advance on or
before the 5th of each and every month;
3. To give plaintiff by way of support pendente lite, a monthly allowance
of P5,000.00 per month, the first monthly allowance to start retroactively from the
first day of this month and the subsequent ones to be paid in advance on or before
the 5th of each succeeding month;
4. To pay the costs of suit.
Plaintiff prays for such other relief just and equitable under the premises. [3]
On October 8, 1993, petitioner moved to dismiss the Complaint on the
ground of res judicata, alleging that Civil Case C-16107 is barred by the prior
judgment which dismissed with prejudice Civil Case Q-88-935.
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RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
In the Order dated November 25, 1993 denying subject motion to dismiss,
the trial court ruled that res judicata is inapplicable in an action for support for the
reason that renunciation or waiver of future support is prohibited by law.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said Order met the same fate. It was
likewise denied.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari. But on June
7, 1996, the Court of Appeals found the said Petition devoid of merit and
dismissed the same.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this court via the present petition,
posing the question whether or not the public respondent acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the denial of
the motion to dismiss by the trial court, and holding that an action for support
cannot be barred by res judicata.
To buttress his submission, petitioner invokes the previous dismissal of the
Complaint for maintenance and support, Civil Case Q-88-935, filed by the mother
and guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, (the herein private
respondent). In said case, the complainant manifested that because of the
defendants judicial declaration denying that he is the father of subject minor child,
it was futile and a useless exercise to claim support from defendant. Because of
such manifestation, and defendants assurance that he would not pursue his
counterclaim anymore, the parties mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of
the complaint. The motion was granted by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court,
which then dismissed the case with prejudice.
Petitioner contends that the aforecited manifestation, in effect, admitted the
lack of filiation between him and the minor child, which admission binds the
complainant, and since the obligation to give support is based on the existence of
paternity and filiation between the child and the putative parent, the lack thereof
negates the right to claim for support. Thus, petitioner maintains that the dismissal
of the Complaint by the lower court on the basis of the said manifestation bars the
present action for support, especially so because the order of the trial court
explicitly stated that the dismissal of the case was with prejudice.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a
third person. Article 301 of the Civil Code, the law in point, reads:
Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it be
transmitted to a third person. Neither can it be compensated with what the
recipient owes the obligor. xxx
Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise.
Article 2035, ibid, provides, that:
No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.
The raison d etre behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission
and/or compromise of the right to support is stated, thus:
The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his
existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean
sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to life cannot be
renounced; hence, support, which is the means to attain the former, cannot be
renounced.
xxx
To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a
person to support is virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the
recipient to a public burden. This is contrary to public policy.[4]
In the case at bar, respondent minors mother, who was the plaintiff in the
first case, manifested that she was withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to
claim support from petitioner who denied his paternity over the child. Since the
right to claim for support is predicated on the existence of filiation between the
minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to believe that such
manifestation admitting the futility of claiming support from him puts the issue to
rest and bars any and all future complaint for support.
The manifestation sent in by respondents mother in the first case, which
acknowledged that it would be useless to pursue its complaint for support,
amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the minor, Glen
Camil, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the
petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and
respondents mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and
support conditioned upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a
Page 2 of 36
RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates the prohibition against any
compromise of the right to support.
Thus, the admission made by counsel for the wife of the facts alleged in a motion
of the husband, in which the latter prayed that his obligation to support be
extinguished cannot be considered as an assent to the prayer, and much less, as
a waiver of the right to claim for support.[5]
It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be
shown between the claimant and the parent. However, paternity and filiation or
the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is
for the court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or
agreement of the parties.
The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from which the
right to support is derived being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be given
to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the
existence of the cause.[6]
Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be binding upon the
respondent, such an admission is at most evidentiary and does not conclusively
establish the lack of filiation.
Neither are we persuaded by petitioners theory that the dismissal with
prejudice of Civil Case Q-88-935 has the effect of res judicata on the subsequent
case for support. The case of Advincula vs. Advincula[7] comes to the fore. In
Advincula, the minor, Manuela Advincula, instituted a case for acknowledgment
and support against her putative father, Manuel Advincula. On motion of both
parties and for the reason that the plaintiff has lost interest and is no longer
interested in continuing the case against the defendant and has no further
evidence to introduce in support of the complaint, the case was
dismissed. Thereafter, a similar case was instituted by Manuela, which the
defendant moved to dismiss, theorizing that the dismissal of the first case
precluded the filing of the second case.
In disposing such case, this Court ruled, thus:
the fact the previous case filed against the same defendant was dismissed. And
it also appearing that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3553, was not an
adjudication upon the merits, as heretofore shown, the right of herein plaintiff-
appellant to reiterate her suit for support and acknowledgment is available, as her
needs arise. Once the needs of plaintiff arise, she has the right to bring an action
for support, for it is only then that her cause of action accrues.xxx
xxx
It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon a
compromise. Acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil status of persons and
future support, cannot be the subject of compromise. (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil
Code). Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and can not
bar the filing of another action, asking for the same relief against the same
defendant.(emphasis supplied)
Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case 88-935 and the
lower courts pronouncement that such dismissal was with prejudice, the second
action for support may still prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED and
the decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 128157. September 29, 1999]

The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is provisional because
the amount may be increased or decreased depending upon the means of the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL MANAHAN,
giver and the needs of the recipient (Art. 297); and that the right to receive support alias Maning, defendant-appellant.
cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person; neither can it be
compensated with what the recipient owes the obligator (Art. 301). Furthermore, DECISION
the right to support can not be waived or transferred to third parties and future
support cannot be the subject of compromise (Art. 2035; Coral v. Gallego, 38 O.G. BELLOSILLO, J.:
3135, cited in IV Civil Code by Padilla, p. 648, 1956 Ed.). This being true, it is
indisputable that the present action for support can be brought, notwithstanding

Page 3 of 36
RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
MANUEL MANAHAN alias Maning was found guilty of rape and sentenced
to death by the court a quo. He was also ordered to indemnify the
victim P50,000.00 as moral damages, pay the costs, and acknowledge and
support the offspring of his indiscretion.[1] This case is now before us on automatic
review.
Complainant Teresita Tibigar, 16 years old, worked at the Espiritu
Canteen in Dagupan City. As a stay-in waitress she slept at the second floor of
the canteen. Manuel Manahan is the brother-in-law of Josefina Espiritu, owner of
the canteen. His wife Primadonna is the sister of Josefina Espiritu. Manuel and
Primadonna temporarily reside at the canteen together with the family of Josefina
as Primadonna was then pregnant.
On 5 January 1995, at about two oclock in the morning, Teresita who was
asleep was suddenly awakened when she felt someone beside her. Upon
opening her eyes she saw accused Manuel Manahan as he immediately placed
himself on top of her. She tried to shout but the accused covered her mouth. He
then forcibly spread her legs. She cried; she pushed and kicked him many times
in an effort to free herself but the accused proved too strong for her. Soon enough
she became weary and exhausted. Her condition enabled the accused to pursue
his immoral intentions. He lifted her skirt, removed her panty and then inserted
his penis into her vagina. He succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. After
satisfying his lust, the accused warned the victim not to report the incident to
anyone and threatened her that should she squeal he would kill her and her
family. Thereafter, he left her. She was terribly afraid and shaken and could do
nothing but cry until dawn.[2]
Within the month Teresita left the canteen and returned home to her parents
in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The sexual encounter resulted in her
pregnancy. When her parents discovered it and learned of her story, they brought
her to the hospital where she was examined by Dr. Casimero Bacugan. From
there they proceeded to the police station where a statement of Teresita was
taken by SPO1 Isagani L. Ico.Police Chief Inspector Wendy G. Rosario later
endorsed the complaining witness to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan
City for appropriate legal action. Thereafter, with the assistance of her mother,
Teresita filed a criminal complaint accusing Manuel Manahan alias Maning of
rape.[3]
Meanwhile, on 2 October 1995, she gave birth to a healthy baby girl and
christened her Melanie Tibigar.
Accused Manuel Manahan has a different story. He denied having raped
Teresita. He claimed they were lovers. According to him, he met Teresita at
the Espiritu Canteen in August 1994 and began courting her. Subsequently, they
became sweethearts and their first sexual intercourse occurred on 27 December
1994 followed by another on 28 December 1994. In the first week of January 1995
they again had a tryst in the house of Teresitas Aunt Fely, their last intercourse
being on 7 May 1995 in the house of one Maura Manahan-Quinto, his sister.
Manuel further alleged that even after Teresita left the Espiritu
Canteen there were several occasions when they saw each other in front of the
DBP in Dagupan City. In one of those assignations Teresita allegedly told him
that she wanted to have the child aborted as her father might kill her if he
discovered she was pregnant, but accused did not agree.
In September 1995, the accused was arrested in connection with the case
filed by Teresita but was later released. We fail to discern from the records the
reason for his release. But on 15 March 1996 he was again arrested and detained
at the Dagupan City Jail where Estrella, Teresitas mother, supposedly visited him
at least five (5) times to ask about his condition and whether he was tortured in
detention. The accused maintained that Estrella was trying to conceal Teresitas
condition from her father. She purportedly proposed to the accused to sell his land
and give the proceeds to Teresitas father as a form of settlement.
The accused assails in his appeal brief the credibility of the complaining
witness. He asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and reiterates that he and the complaining witness were lovers,
and that their sexual congress was consensual.
We have painstakingly reviewed the records and we sustain the conviction
of the accused. The prosecution for rape almost always involves sharply
contrasting and irreconcilable declarations of the victim and the accused. At the
heart of almost all rape cases is the issue of credibility of the witnesses, to be
resolved primarily by the trial court which is in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner
of testifying. Accordingly, its findings are entitled to the highest degree of respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial
court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight or substance which would otherwise affect the result of the case. The
exception is nowhere perceivable in the present case.
The accused banks heavily on his "sweetheart theory," a usual defense in
rape cases, and vigorously maintains that the sexual intercourse between him
and Teresita was but the culmination of a mutual passion. But we find otherwise
primarily because the accused miserably failed to prove that he and the
complaining witness indeed had a romantic liaison as this claim was categorically
denied by her.Moreover, there was no substantial evidence, e.g., love notes,
mementos or pictures, presented to support it.
The testimony of defense witnesses Nelson de Venecia and Arvin Sereban
that they used to see Manuel and Teresita together in front of the DBP in Dagupan
City, even if true, did not confirm that there was indeed an amorous relationship
between the two.[4] Likewise, the testimony of Isabel Remandaban, another
defense witness, that she saw the accused and the complaining witness
embracing each other in the house of Maura Manahan-Quinto can hardly be given
weight. The trifling manner by which she answered the questions propounded to
her at the witness stand even prompted the trial court to remark that she was not
serious with her testimony. Thus -
Page 4 of 36
RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
COURT: This is not a joke. The penalty [for] the accused [if convicted] is
death. Do not testify here as if you are joking, or you will be the one to
[be] sen[t] to jail ahead of Manahan. You want to be sent to jail?
WITNESS: No sir.
COURT: Why are you smiling? This is a serious matter. Put that on record the
witness is smiling. Not serious about her testimony (underscoring
supplied).
Ultimately, the trial court disregarded altogether, and rightly so, the
testimony of Isabel Remandaban. To emphasize, the task of assigning values to
the testimonies of witnesses in the stand and weighing their credibility is best left
to the trial court which forms first-hand impressions of the witnesses testifying
before it, and therefore more competent to discriminate between the true and the
false.[5] We find no trace of whim or arbitrariness on the court a quo in its
assessment of the testimony of this witness.
Also, Exh. "1" of the defense, a photograph showing Estrella talking to the
accused while carrying Melanie, the offspring of Teresita and Manuel, does not
establish anything. As Estrella explained, she visited the accused in jail not to
show him Melanie but to ascertain that he was in fact incarcerated,[6] and that she
only brought the child with her incidentally during her visit because Teresita was
sick at that time and there was no one else to take care of the baby.[7]
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the accused and the victim were
really lovers, that fact alone would not negate the commission of rape. A
sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will.Definitely, a man cannot
demand sexual gratification from a fiancee and, worse, employ violence upon her
on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust.[8]
Equally untenable is the accused's contention that there can be no rape
since the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the element of
intimidation. One of the modes of committing the crime of rape is by having carnal
knowledge of a woman using force and intimidation. Even if we concede the
absence of intimidation in this case, the fact remains that the accused employed
force against his victim. Thus, testifying in a clear, definitive and convincing
manner as concluded by the trial court, Teresita established beyond any scintilla
of doubt the presence of force essential in rape -
Q: What were you doing then when Manuel Manahan accosted you?
A: I was sleeping, then suddenly I felt somebody near me and when I opened
my eyes I saw Manuel Manahan and then he immediately laid on top of
me, sir.
Q: How did you come to know that it was Manuel Manahan who went, who
laid on top of you?
A: I know him, sir.
Q: What did you do when Manuel Manahan laid on top of you?
A: I was about to shout but he covered my mouth and then he immediately
spread my legs, sir.
Q: What did you do when he did that to you?
A: I cried, sir.
Q: Before Manuel Manahan spread your legs, what did you do? Before he
was able to spread your legs?
A: I pushed him and I kicked him several times, sir.
Q: What happened when you pushed him and kicked him several times?
A: I got weakened because he was strong that is why he was able to abuse
me, sir.
Q: After Manuel Manahan was able to spread your legs, what did he do?
A: And then he inserted his penis, sir x x x x[9]
Again, during the cross-examination the victim recounted how she was
forced to have sexual intercourse with the accused, thus -
Q: Did you spread your legs voluntarily or did he force open your legs?
A: He forced me, sir.
Q: What did he do to force open your legs?
A: By the use of his legs, sir.
Q: He did that while he was on top of you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What legs did he use, was it the right leg or both legs?
A: Both legs, sir.
Q: You mentioned about crossing his legs and then forced open your legs, will
you please demonstrate how he forced open your legs by the use of this
pencil and ballpen illustrate your legs with these two other ballpens
where the legs of Manuel Manahan, will you please demonstrate how he
forced open his legs when you said first he put together his legs and then
open your legs, will you please do it?
A: He went on top of me and he put his legs between my legs and also his
legs, sir.
INTERPRETER: Witness demonstrating by spreading both ends of the
ballpen.
Page 5 of 36
RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
Q: And then by doing so, by spreading his legs between your legs, he was
able to insert his penis?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At that precise moment when he was on top of you and also your legs,
where was the right hand of Manuel Manahan?
A: He closed my mouth with his right hand.
Q: What about his left hand?
A: He used his left hand in pulling up my dress.
Q: At that precise moment when he was doing the push and pull, was his right
hand still with your mouth?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What about his left hand after raising your skirt, what was his left hand
doing?
A: He was squeezing my neck, sir x x x x
Q: During your direct testimony you mentioned about having resisted him,
now, at what precise moment did you try to resist him?
A: When he went on top of me I struggled, sir.
Q: Were you able to dislodge him from being on top of you?
A: Yes, sir.
COURT: Then what did he do when you were able to dislodge him on top of
you?
A: He went again on top of me, sir.
Q: Did you again struggle to resist him or no more?
A: No more because I already felt weak, sir x x x x[10]
Evidently, complainant offered a tenacious resistance to the criminal acts of
the accused, but the serious determination of the latter to accomplish what he
intended to do eventually weakened complainant and shocked her into
insensibility. It is quite understandable that, at a tender age of 16 and innocent in
the ways of the world, complainant is no match to the accused, a 28-year old
married man endowed with physical strength she could not possibly overcome.
Neither could she shout to alert the other occupants of the house as the
accused prevented her by covering her mouth with his right hand. The accused
however claims that complainant had the opportunity to shout for help at that
precise moment he was removing his pants and brief, but she did not. Suffice it
to say, in this connection, that not every victim of a crime can be expected to act
reasonably and conformably with the expectations of mankind. Different people
react to similar situations dissimilarly. While the normal response of a woman
about to be defiled may be to shout and put up a wild struggle, others become
virtually catatonic because of the mental shock they experience and the fear
engendered by the unexpected occurrence. Yet it can never be successfully
argued that the latter are any less sexual victims than the former.[11]
The failure of complainant to disclose the outrage on her person to anybody,
including her parents, is due to the threats on her life and that of her
family. Indeed, one cannot expect her to act like an adult or a mature experienced
woman who would have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat to
her life and complain immediately that she had been sexually assaulted. It is not
uncommon for young girls to conceal for sometime the assaults on their virtue
because of the rapists threats to their lives. Delay or vacillation in making a
criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the credibility of the witness if
such delay is satisfactorily explained, as in this case.[12]
In the instant case, the complaining witness may not have even filed the
rape charge had she not become pregnant. This Court has taken cognizance of
the fact that many of the victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges
against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy in painful silence rather than
reveal their shame to the world and risk the rapists making good their threats to
kill or hurt their victims.[13]
That accused also asserts that the rape case is a mere face-saving device
of the victim to escape the anger of her father. Again, we are not convinced. It
taxes credulity that a simple barrio lass[14] like the victim, a minor and a mere
elementary graduate at that, could contrive such an unthinkable solution to save
herself from the imagined wrath of her father; what is more, concoct such a good
rape story convincing enough to withstand the rigors of cross-examination, and
sway the judge to impose on the accused the extreme penalty of death.
Indeed, it is very unlikely that the victim would make up a story of rape with
all its attendant scandal and humiliation. Considering the modesty and timidity of
a typical Filipina, especially one from the rural areas, it is hard to accept that the
victim would fabricate facts which would seriously cast dishonor on her
maidenhood. No young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit she had
been raped unless that was the truth. It is her natural instinct to protect her
honor. As we have long held, when a woman says that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed. Her
testimony is credible where she has no motive to testify against the accused.[15]
On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a correction of
the view of the court a quo is in order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal
Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be sentenced to
"acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing
so," and "in every case to support the offspring." In the case before us,
compulsory acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being
Page 6 of 36
RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
a legal impediment in doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man. As S. LIM, III,
pronounced by this Court in People v. Guerrero,[16] "the rule is that if the rapist is Respondents. October 30, 2009
a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate."
Consequently, that portion of the judgment under review is accordingly deleted. In DECISION
any case, we sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child as it is in
accordance with law. CARPIO, J.:
Finally, we do not agree with the trial court that the proper penalty to be The Case
imposed on the accused is death, it appearing that the crime committed was
merely simple rape, i.e., not committed with or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances enumerated under Art. 335 of The Revised Penal Code, as For review[1] is the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals, dated 28 April 2003,
amended by Sec. 11, RA 7659, under which the death penalty is authorized. [17] In ordering petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim (petitioners) to provide legal
this case, the proper imposable penalty should only be reclusion perpetua. support to respondents Cheryl, Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III,
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, all surnamed Lim (respondents).
Branch 40, dated 28 November 1996, convicting accused MANUEL MANAHAN
alias Maning of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED subject however to the The Facts
modification that the death sentence imposed on the accused is reduced
to reclusion perpetua. The portion of the decision of the trial court ordering the
accused, a married man, to acknowledge the child Melanie Tibigar is DELETED In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim
being contrary to law and jurisprudence. (Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents
Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children
SO ORDERED. resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with
Edwards ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano).
Davide, Jr. C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Edwards family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.
JJ., concur.
On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence,
bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation with
Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial
court described a very compromising situation.[3]
THIRD DIVISION
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and
Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial
SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and G.R. No. 163209
court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support
FILOMENA LIM,
of P6,000 pendente lite.[4]
Petitioners,
The Ruling of the Trial Court
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
QUISUMBING,*
On 31 January 1996, the trial court rendered judgment ordering Edward
CHICO-NAZARIO,
and petitioners to jointly provide P40,000 monthly support to respondents, with
- versus - PERALTA, and
Edward shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the balance of P34,000 subject to
ABAD,** JJ.
Chua Giaks subsidiary liability.[5]
MA. CHERYL S. LIM,
for herself and on behalf of
The defendants sought reconsideration, questioning their liability. The
her minor children LESTER
trial court, while denying reconsideration, clarified that petitioners and Chua Giak
EDWARD S. LIM, CANDICE
GRACE S. LIM, and MARIANO Promulgated:
Page 7 of 36
RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
were held jointly liable with Edward because of the latters inability x x x to give
sufficient support x x x.[6]
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing, among others, their liability
to support respondents. Petitioners argued that while Edwards income is
insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by providing that legal support
should be in keeping with the financial capacity of the family under Article 194 of
the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the
Philippines).[7]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 28 April 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
On the issue material to this appeal, that is, whether there is basis to hold
petitioners, as Edwards parents, liable with him to support respondents, the Court
of Appeals held:
The law on support under Article 195 of the Family Code is
clear on this matter. Parents and their legitimate children are
obliged to mutually support one another and this obligation
extends down to the legitimate grandchildren and great
grandchildren.
In connection with this provision, Article 200 paragraph (3) of
the Family Code clearly provides that should the person obliged
to give support does not have sufficient means to satisfy all
claims, the other persons enumerated in Article 199 in its order
shall provide the necessary support. This is because the closer
the relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds
them. Thus, the obligation to support is imposed first upon the
shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the
obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so on. [8]
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion
in the Resolution dated 12 April 2004.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The issue is whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide
support to respondents.
The Ruling of the Court
We rule in the affirmative. However, we modify the appealed judgment by limiting
petitioners liability to the amount of monthly support needed by
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III only.
Petitioners Liable to Provide Support
but only to their Grandchildren
By statutory[9] and jurisprudential mandate,[10] the liability of ascendants to provide
legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit
as much they limit their petition to the narrow question of when their liability is
triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on provisions [11] found in Title IX of the
Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their
liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by
its termination[12] or suspension[13]during the childrens minority. Because at the
time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental
authority over their children,[14] petitioners submit that the obligation to support the
latters offspring ends with them.
Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports this severe
constriction of the scope of familial obligation to give support. In the first place,
the governing text are the relevant provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as
amended, on Support, not the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. While
both areas share a common ground in that parental authority encompasses the
obligation to provide legal support,[15] they differ in other concerns including
the duration of the obligation and its concurrence among relatives of differing
degrees.[16] Thus, although the obligation to provide support arising from parental
authority ends upon the emancipation of the child,[17] the same obligation arising
from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee's
lifetime.. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental
rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or
suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not
only upon default of the parents but also for the latters inability to provide sufficient
support. As we observed in another case raising the ancillary issue of an
ascendants obligation to give support in light of the fathers sufficient means:
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot
demand support directly from their grandparents if they have
parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of
supporting them. This is so because we have to follow the
order of support under Art. 199. We agree with this view.
xxxx
There is no showing that private respondent is without means
to support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove that
Page 8 of 36
RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to
voluntarily provide for her grandson's legal support. x x
x[18] (Emphasis supplied; internal citations omitted)
Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to
provide sufficient legal support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also
undisputed that the amount of support Edward is able to give to
respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents basic needs.
This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts
a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the
paternal (petitioners) and maternal[19] lines, following the ordering in Article 199.
To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners theory, is to sanction the
anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children
because of parental inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one
degree removed are more than able to fill the void.
However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to
their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by
blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by blood, only
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this
category. Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim family extends
only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond. [20] Unfortunately,
Cheryls share from the amount of monthly support the trial court awarded cannot
be determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to
the trial court for this limited purpose.[21]
Petitioners Precluded from Availing
of the Alternative Option Under
Article 204 of the Civil Code, as Amended
As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in Article 204
of the Civil Code, as amended, and pray that they be allowed to fulfill their
obligation by maintaining respondents at petitioners Makati residence. The option
is unavailable to petitioners.
The application of Article 204 which provides that
The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill
the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by
receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who
has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot
be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle
thereto. (Emphasis supplied)
is subject to its exception clause. Here, the persons entitled to receive support
are petitioners grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the option
in Article 204 will secure to the grandchildren a well-provided future; however, it
will also force Cheryl to return to the house which, for her, is the scene of her
husbands infidelity. While not rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as indeed,
Cheryls charge against Edward for concubinage did not prosper for insufficient
evidence, her steadfast insistence on its occurrence amounts to
a moral impediment bringing the case within the ambit of the exception clause of
Article 204, precluding its application.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 28 April 2003, and its Resolution dated 12 April 2004 with
the MODIFICATION that petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim are liable to
provide support only to respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano
III, all surnamed Lim. We REMAND the case to the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 140, for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012
CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner,
vs.
DIVINA BULING, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari, 1 filed by petitioner Charles
Gotardo, to challenge the March 5, 2004 decision 2 and the July 27, 2004
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA GR CV No. 76326. The CA decision
ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son,
Gliffze 0. Buling. The CA resolution denied the petitioner's subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Page 9 of 36
RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory
recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of
her child Gliffze.4
In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze. 5 For the
parties’ failure to amicably settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial
proceedings.6 Trial on the merits ensued.
The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness.
Evidence for the respondent showed that she met the petitioner on December 1,
1992 at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte
branch where she had been hired as a casual employee, while the petitioner
worked as accounting supervisor.7 The petitioner started courting the respondent
in the third week of December 1992 and they became sweethearts in the last
week of January 1993.8 The petitioner gave the respondent greeting cards on
special occasions, such as on Valentine’s Day and her birthday; she reciprocated
his love and took care of him when he was ill.9
Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with
the respondent in the former’s rented room in the boarding house managed by
Rodulfo, the respondent’s uncle, on Tomas Oppus St., Agbao, Maasin, Southern
Leyte.10 The petitioner rented the room from March 1, 1993 to August 30,
1994.11 The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became more
frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the respondent found out
that she was pregnant.12 When told of the pregnancy, the petitioner was happy
and made plans to marry the respondent. 13 They in fact applied for a marriage
license.14 The petitioner even inquired about the costs of a wedding reception and
the bridal gown.15 Subsequently, however, the petitioner backed out of the
wedding plans.16
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of
Maasin, Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise
to marry.17 Later, however, the petitioner and the respondent amicably settled the
case.18
The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. 19 When the
petitioner did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent
sent him a letter on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of and support for their
child.20 When the petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed her
complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite.21
The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the
imputed paternity,22 claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent
in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve
(12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was informed of the pregnancy on
September 15, 1994.23
During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondent’s motion, 24 granted
a ₱2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995.25
THE RTC RULING
In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency
of evidence proving Gliffze’s filiation. It found the respondent’s testimony
inconsistent on the question of when she had her first sexual contact with the
petitioner, i.e., "September 1993" in her direct testimony while "last week of
January 1993" during her cross-testimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual
contact even after she had refused the petitioner’s initial marriage proposal. It
ordered the respondent to return the amount of support pendente lite erroneously
awarded, and to pay ₱ 10,000.00 as attorney’s fees. 26
The respondent appealed the RTC ruling to the CA.27
THE CA RULING
In its March 5, 2004 decision, the CA departed from the RTC's appreciation of the
respondent’s testimony, concluding that the latter merely made an honest mistake
in her understanding of the questions of the petitioner’s counsel. It noted that the
petitioner and the respondent had sexual relationship even before August 1994;
that the respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to
August 1994; and that the petitioner’s allegation that the respondent had previous
relationships with other men remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set
aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son
Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order granting a ₱ 2,000.00 monthly child
support.28
When the CA denied29 the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,30 the petitioner
filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the
RTC’s appreciation of the respondent’s testimony, and that the evidence on
record is insufficient to prove paternity.
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT
Page 10 of 36
RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
The respondent submits that the CA correctly explained that the inconsistency in
the respondent’s testimony was due to an incorrect appreciation of the questions
asked, and that the record is replete with evidence proving that the petitioner was
her lover and that they had several intimate sexual encounters during their
relationship, resulting in her pregnancy and Gliffze’s birth on March 9, 1995.
THE ISSUE
The sole issue before us is whether the CA committed a reversible error when it
set aside the RTC’s findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide
legal support to his minor son Gliffze.
OUR RULING
We do not find any reversible error in the CA’s ruling.
We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to
adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such
as citizenship, support (as in this case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases, the
burden of proof] is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the
biological father of the child."31
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.32 We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the
[testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court."33
In Herrera v. Alba,34 we stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects
of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie case,
affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and the child.35 We explained that a prima facie case
exists if a woman declares — supported by corroborative proof — that she had
sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts
to the putative father.36 We explained further that the two affirmative defenses
available to the putative father are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the
mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother had
sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.37
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is
the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually
involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception.38Rodulfo
corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate
relationship.39
On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with
the respondent, only that it occurred on a much later date than the respondent
asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the respondent to have been
three (3) months pregnant already in September 1994 when he was informed of
the pregnancy.40 However, the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of
infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be
given credence for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioner’s denial cannot
overcome the respondent’s clear and categorical assertions.
The petitioner, as the RTC did, made much of the variance between the
respondent’s direct testimony regarding their first sexual contact as "sometime in
September 1993" and her cross-testimony when she stated that their first sexual
contact was "last week of January 1993," as follows:
ATTY. GO CINCO:
When did the defendant, according to you, start courting you?
A Third week of December 1992.
Q And you accepted him?
A Last week of January 1993.
Q And by October you already had your sexual intercourse?
A Last week of January 1993.
COURT: What do you mean by accepting?
A I accepted his offer of love.41
We find that the contradictions are for the most part more apparent than real,
having resulted from the failure of the respondent to comprehend the question
posed, but this misunderstanding was later corrected and satisfactorily explained.
Indeed, when confronted for her contradictory statements, the respondent
explained that that portion of the transcript of stenographic notes was incorrect
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RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
and she had brought it to the attention of Atty. Josefino Go Cinco (her former
counsel) but the latter took no action on the matter.42
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony
must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in
deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and to anchor a
conclusion based on these parts. "In ascertaining the facts established by a
witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must
be calibrated and considered."43 Evidently, the totality of the respondent's
testimony positively and convincingly shows that no real inconsistency exists. The
respondent has consistently asserted that she started intimate sexual relations
with the petitioner sometime in September 1993.44
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a
parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. 45 Support
consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity
of the family.46 Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no
final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient.47 It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to support.48
In this case, we sustain the award of ₱ 2,000.00 monthly child support, without
prejudice to the filing of the proper motion in the RTC for the determination of any
support in arrears, considering the needs of the child, Gliffze, during the pendency
of this case.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The March 5, 2004
decision and the July 27, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV
No. 76326 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013
SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner seeks to set aside
the Decision1 dated April 20, 2006 and Resolution2 dated October 26, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing her petition for contempt (CA-G.R. SP No.
01154) and granting respondent's petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 01315).
The factual background is as follows:
On September 3, 2003,3 petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-29346 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch
14.
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner
sought the amount of ₱500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondent’s huge
earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here
and abroad.4
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order5 dated March
31, 2004 granting support pendente lite, as follows:
From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount of Two Hundred
Fifty (₱250,000.00) Thousand Pesos would be sufficient to take care of the needs
of the plaintiff. This amount excludes the One hundred thirty-five (₱135,000.00)
Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses needed by plaintiff for the
operation of both her eyes which is demandable upon the conduct of such
operation. The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a
commendable act of defendant, should be continued by him considering the vast
financial resources at his disposal.
According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the time
plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial
demand. Since the instant complaint was filed on 03 September 2003, the amount
of Two Hundred Fifty (₱250,000.00) Thousand should be paid by defendant to
plaintiff retroactively to such date until the hearing of the support pendente lite.
₱250,000.00 x 7 corresponding to the seven (7) months that lapsed from
September, 2003 to March 2004 would tantamount to a total of One Million Seven
Hundred Fifty (₱1,750,000.00) Thousand Pesos. Thereafter, starting the month
of April 2004, until otherwise ordered by this Court, defendant is ordered to pay a
monthly support of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (₱250,000.00) Pesos payable
within the first five (5) days of each corresponding month pursuant to the third
paragraph of Art. 203 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The monthly support
of ₱250,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that this
Court may grant plaintiff as the circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on the
Page 12 of 36
RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
proof submitted by the parties during the proceedings for the main action for
support.6
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,7asserting that petitioner is not
entitled to spousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself a
separate dwelling from their children and respondent has continued to support the
family for their sustenance and well-being in accordance with family’s social and
financial standing. As to the ₱250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly
support pendente lite, as well as the ₱1,750,000.00 retroactive support,
respondent found it unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not
having considered the needs of the respondent.
In its May 13, 2004 Order, the trial court stated that the March 31, 2004 Order had
become final and executory since respondent’s motion for reconsideration is
treated as a mere scrap of paper for violation of the threeday notice period under
Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, and
therefore did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal. Respondent was
given ten (10) days to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of the
court for disregarding the March 31, 2004 order granting support pendente lite. 8
His second motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a
petition for certiorari in the CA.
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision, 9 finding merit in respondent’s
contention that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting
₱250,000.00 monthly support to petitioner without evidence to prove his actual
income. The said court thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this petition is given due course.
The assailed Orders dated March 31, 2004, May 13, 2004, June 4, 2004 and June
18, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case
No. CEB No. 29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua" are hereby
nullified and set aside and instead a new one is entered ordering herein petitioner:
a) to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite of
₱115,000.00 beginning the month of April 2005 and every month
thereafter within the first five (5) days thereof;
b) to pay the private respondent the amount of ₱115,000.00 a month
multiplied by the number of months starting from September 2003 until
March 2005 less than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to the
private respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly support; and
c) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Neither of the parties appealed this decision of the CA. In a Compliance 11 dated
June 28, 2005, respondent attached a copy of a check he issued in the amount
of ₱162,651.90 payable to petitioner. Respondent explained that, as decreed in
the CA decision, he deducted from the amount of support in arrears (September
3, 2003 to March 2005) ordered by the CA -- ₱2,185,000.00 -- plus ₱460,000.00
(April, May, June and July 2005), totaling ₱2,645,000.00, the advances given by
him to his children and petitioner in the sum of ₱2,482,348.16 (with attached
photocopies of receipts/billings).
In her Comment to Compliance with Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Execution,12 petitioner asserted that none of the expenses deducted by
respondent may be chargeable as part of the monthly support contemplated by
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
On September 27, 2005, the trial court issued an Order13 granting petitioner’s
motion for issuance of a writ of execution as it rejected respondent’s interpretation
of the CA decision. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and
subsequently also filed a motion for inhibition of Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr.
On November 25, 2005, Judge Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order 14 denying both
motions.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, both motions are DENIED.
Since a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited under the Rules, this
denial has attained finality; let, therefore, a writ of execution be issued in favor of
plaintiff as against defendant for the accumulated support in arrears pendente lite.
Notify both parties of this Order.
SO ORDERED.15
Since respondent still failed and refused to pay the support in arrears pendente
lite, petitioner filed in the CA a Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 01154 ("Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua").
Respondent, on the other hand, filed CA-G.R. SP No. 01315, a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court ("Danilo Y. Lua versus Hon.
Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, Branch 14, and Susan Lim Lua"). The two cases were
consolidated.
By Decision dated April 20, 2006, the CA set aside the assailed orders of the trial
court, as follows:
Page 13 of 36
RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of
Court with Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua against Danilo Y. Lua with
docket no. SP. CA-GR No. 01154;
b) GRANTING Danilo Y. Lua’s Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP.
CA-GR No. 01315. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated 27
September 2005 and 25 November 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB-29346 entitled
"Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE, and instead a new one is entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Ph₱2,482,348.16
plus 946,465.64, or a total of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current
total support in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim
Lua and their two (2) children;
ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly
support of Ph₱115,000.00 pesos starting from the time
payment of this amount was deferred by him subject to the
deductions aforementioned.
iii. DIRECTING the issuance of a permanent writ of preliminary
injunction.
SO ORDERED.16
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely
disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase and
maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and the
credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly
inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but their mother (petitioner) as
well. It held that respondent’s act of deferring the monthly support adjudged in
CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 was not contumacious as it was anchored on valid and
justifiable reasons. Respondent said he just wanted the issue of whether to deduct
his advances be settled first in view of the different interpretation by the trial court
of the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. It also noted the lack
of contribution from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to support their
children.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition raising the following errors allegedly committed by the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING RESPONDENT
GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEDUCTION
OF THE AMOUNT OF PH₱2,482,348.16 PLUS 946,465.64, OR A
TOTAL OF PH₱3,428,813.80 FROM THE CURRENT TOTAL
SUPPORT IN ARREARS OF THE RESPONDENT TO THE
PETITIONER AND THEIR CHILDREN.17
The main issue is whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent
may be deducted from the total support in arrears owing to petitioner and her
children pursuant to the Decision dated April 12, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
The pertinent provision of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:
Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or
vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses
in going to and from school, or to and from place of work. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner argues that it was patently erroneous for the CA to have allowed the
deduction of the value of the two cars and their maintenance costs from the
support in arrears, as these items are not indispensable to the sustenance of the
family or in keeping them alive. She points out that in the Decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 84740, the CA already considered the said items which it deemed chargeable
to respondent, while the monthly support pendente lite (₱115,000.00) was fixed
on the basis of the documentary evidence of respondent’s alleged income from
various businesses and petitioner’s testimony that she needed ₱113,000.00 for
the maintenance of the household and other miscellaneous expenses excluding
the ₱135,000.00 medical attendance expenses of petitioner.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that disallowing the subject deductions
would result in unjust enrichment, thus making him pay for the same obligation
twice. Since petitioner and the children resided in one residence, the groceries
and dry goods purchased by the children using respondent’s credit card, totalling
₱594,151.58 for the period September 2003 to June 2005 were not consumed by
Page 14 of 36
RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
the children alone but shared with their mother. As to the Volkswagen Beetle and ATTY. ZOSA:
BMW 316i respondent bought for his daughter Angelli Suzanne Lua and Daniel
Ryan Lua, respectively, these, too, are to be considered advances for support, in Yes.
keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Respondent stressed that being
children of parents belonging to the upper-class society, Angelli and Daniel Ryan
had never in their entire life commuted from one place to another, nor do they eat A For the food alone, I spend not over ₱40,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 a month for the
their meals at "carinderias". Hence, the cars and their maintenance are food alone.
indispensable to the children’s day-to-day living, the value of which were properly
deducted from the arrearages in support pendente lite ordered by the trial and xxxx
appellate courts.
ATTY. ZOSA:
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and
family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to Q What other expenses do you incur in living in that place?
the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. 18 Such
support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial A The normal household and the normal expenses for a family to have a decent
capacity of the family. living, Sir.

Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void Q How much other expenses do you incur?
marriage or for annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at
any time during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon verified WITNESS:
application of any of the parties, guardian or designated custodian, may
temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final
A For other expenses, is around over a ₱100,000.00, Sir.
order.19 Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into
the merits of the case before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a
court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence which may Q Why do you incur that much amount?
suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be
established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. 20 A For the clothing for the three (3) of us, for the vitamins and medicines. And also
I am having a special therapy to straighten my back because I am scoliotic. I am
In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and her advised by the Doctor to hire a driver, but I cannot still afford it now. Because my
two children was determined after due hearing and submission of documentary eyesight is not reliable for driving. And I still need another househelp to
evidence by the parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court was reduced accompany me whenever I go marketing because for my age, I cannot carry
on appeal, it is clear that the monthly support pendente lite of ₱115,000.00 anymore heavy loads.
ordered by the CA was intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her
children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house helpers, and other xxxx
household expenses. Petitioner’s testimony also mentioned the cost of regular
therapy for her scoliosis and vitamins/medicines.
ATTY. FLORES:

ATTY. ZOSA:
xxxx

xxxx
Q On the issue of the food for you and the two (2) children, you mentioned
₱40,000.00 to ₱50,000.00?
Q How much do you spend for your food and your two (2) children every month?
A Yes, for the food alone.
A Presently, Sir?
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RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
Q Okay, what other possible expenses that you would like to include in those two
(2) items? You mentioned of a driver, am I correct?
A Yes, I might need two (2) drivers, Sir for me and my children.
Q Okay. How much would you like possibly to pay for those two (2) drivers?
A I think ₱10,000.00 a month for one (1) driver. So I need two (2) drivers. And I
need another househelp.
Q You need another househelp. The househelp nowadays would charge you
something between ₱3,000.00 to ₱4,000.00. That’s quite…
A Right now, my househelp is receiving ₱8,000.00. I need another which I will
give a compensation of ₱5,000.00.
Q Other than that, do you still have other expenses?
A My clothing.
COURT:
How about the schooling for your children?
WITNESS:
A The schooling is shouldered by my husband, Your Honor.
COURT:
Everything?
A Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
ATTY. FLORES:
Q Madam witness, let us talk of the present needs. x x x. What else, what specific
need that you would like to add so I can tell my client, the defendant.
WITNESS:
A I need to have an operation both of my eyes. I also need a special therapy for
my back because I am scoliotic, three (3) times a week.
Q That is very reasonable. [W]ould you care to please repeat that?
A Therapy for my scoliotic back and then also for the operation both of my eyes.
And I am also taking some vitamins from excel that will cost ₱20,000.00 a month.
Q Okay. Let’s have piece by piece. Have you asked the Doctor how much would
it cost you for the operation of that scoliotic?
A Yes before because I was already due last year. Before, this eye will cost
₱60,000.00 and the other eyes ₱75,000.00.
Q So for both eyes, you are talking of ₱60,000.00 plus ₱75,000.00 is
₱135,000.00?
A Yes.
xxxx
Q You talk of therapy?
A Yes.
Q So how much is that?
A Around ₱5,000.00 a week.21
As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt that he can solely
provide for the subsistence, education, transportation, health/medical needs and
recreational activities of his children, as well as those of petitioner who was then
unemployed and a full-time housewife. Despite this, respondent’s counsel
manifested during the same hearing that respondent was willing to grant the
amount of only ₱75,000.00 as monthly support pendente lite both for the children
and petitioner as spousal support. Though the receipts of expenses submitted in
court unmistakably show how much respondent lavished on his children, it
appears that the matter of spousal support was a different matter altogether.
Rejecting petitioner’s prayer for ₱500,000.00 monthly support and finding the
₱75,000.00 monthly support offered by respondent as insufficient, the trial court
fixed the monthly support pendente lite at ₱250,000.00. However, since the
Page 16 of 36
RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
supposed income in millions of respondent was based merely on the allegations
Salon and travel expenses of Angelli 87,112.70
of petitioner in her complaint and registration documents of various corporations
Suzanne
which respondent insisted are owned not by him but his parents and siblings, the
CA reduced the amount of support pendente lite to ₱115,000.00, which ruling was School expenses of Daniel Ryan Lua 260,900.00
no longer questioned by both parties.
Cash given to Daniel and Angelli 121,000.00
Controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondent’s compliance with
the final CA decision indicated that he deducted from the total amount in arrears
(₱2,645,000.00) the sum of ₱2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two cars TOTAL - Php 946,465.64
for the children, their cost of maintenance and advances given to petitioner and
his children. Respondent explained that the deductions were made consistent
GRAND TOTAL - Php 3,428,813.80
with the fallo of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordering him to pay
support pendente lite in arrears less the amount supposedly given by him to
petitioner as her and their two children’s monthly support. The CA, in ruling for the respondent said that all the foregoing expenses already
incurred by the respondent should, in equity, be considered advances which may
The following is a summary of the subject deductions under Compliance dated be properly deducted from the support in arrears due to the petitioner and the two
June 28, 2005, duly supported by receipts22: children. Said court also noted the absence of petitioner’s contribution to the joint
obligation of support for their children.

Car purchases for Angelli Suzanne - Php1,350,000.00

We reverse in part the decision of the CA.
and Daniel Ryan - 613,472.86
Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases of legal separation and
Car Maintenance fees of Angelli - 51,232.50 petitions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage are guided by the
Suzanne following provisions of the Rule on Provisional Orders 24
Credit card statements of Daniel Ryan - 348,682.28
Sec. 2. Spousal Support.–In determining support for the spouses, the court may
Car Maintenance fees of Daniel Ryan - 118,960.52 be guided by the following rules:

(a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement

Php2,482,348.16
After the trial court disallowed the foregoing deductions, respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration further asserting that the following amounts, likewise with
supporting receipts, be considered as additional advances given to petitioner and
the children23:
between the spouses, the spouses may be supported from the
properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership.
(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such amount and
for such period of time as the court may deem just and reasonable based
on their standard of living during the marriage.

Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua
Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan
Travel expenses of Susan Lim-Lua
Credit card purchases of Angelli
Suzanne
(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) whether the
Php 42,450.71 spouse seeking support is the custodian of a child whose circumstances
make it appropriate for that spouse not to seek outside employment; (2)
11,500.00 the time necessary to acquire sufficient education and training to enable
the spouse seeking support to find appropriate employment, and that
14,611.15
spouse’s future earning capacity; (3) the duration of the marriage; (4) the
408,891.08 comparative financial resources of the spouses, including their
comparative earning abilities in the labor market; (5) the needs and

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RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
obligations of each spouse; (6) the contribution of each spouse to the
marriage, including services rendered in home-making, child care,
education, and career building of the other spouse; (7) the age and
health of the spouses; (8) the physical and emotional conditions of the
spouses; (9) the ability of the supporting spouse to give support, taking
into account that spouse’s earning capacity, earned and unearned
income, assets, and standard of living; and (10) any other factor the court
may deem just and equitable.
(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support
from the salary of the spouse.
Sec. 3. Child Support.–The common children of the spouses shall be supported
from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership.
Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both may be ordered
to give an amount necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of the
child. It shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the
necessities of the recipient.
In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise consider
the following factors: (1) the financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial
parent and those of the child; (2) the physical and emotional health of the child
and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3) the standard of living the child has
been accustomed to; (4) the non-monetary contributions that the parents will
make toward the care and well-being of the child.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the
salary of the parent.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not
appealed by either party, there is no controversy as to its sufficiency and
reasonableness. The dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in
settling the support in arrears.
On the issue of crediting of money payments or expenses against accrued
support, we find as relevant the following rulings by US courts.
In Bradford v. Futrell,25 appellant sought review of the decision of the Circuit Court
which found him in arrears with his child support payments and entered a decree
in favor of appellee wife. He complained that in determining the arrearage figure,
he should have been allowed full credit for all money and items of personal
property given by him to the children themselves, even though he referred to them
as gifts. The Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled that in the suit to determine
amount of arrears due the divorced wife under decree for support of minor
children, the husband (appellant) was not entitled to credit for checks which he
had clearly designated as gifts, nor was he entitled to credit for an automobile
given to the oldest son or a television set given to the children. Thus, if the children
remain in the custody of the mother, the father is not entitled to credit for money
paid directly to the children if such was paid without any relation to the decree.
In the absence of some finding of consent by the mother, most courts refuse to
allow a husband to dictate how he will meet the requirements for support
payments when the mode of payment is fixed by a decree of court. Thus he will
not be credited for payments made when he unnecessarily interposed himself as
a volunteer and made payments direct to the children of his own accord. Wills v.
Baker, 214 S. W. 2d 748 (Mo. 1948); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 42 P. 2d 191 (Utah
1935). In the latter case the court said in part: "The payments to the children
themselves do not appear to have been made as payments upon alimony, but
were rather the result of his fatherly interest in the welfare of those children. We
do not believe he should be permitted to charge them to plaintiff. By so doing he
would be determining for Mrs. Openshaw the manner in which she should expend
her allowances. It is a very easy thing for children to say their mother will not give
them money, especially as they may realize that such a plea is effective in
attaining their ends. If she is not treating them right the courts are open to the
father for redress."26
In Martin, Jr. v. Martin,27 the Supreme Court of Washington held that a father, who
is required by a divorce decree to make child support payments directly to the
mother, cannot claim credit for payments voluntarily made directly to the children.
However, special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in
crediting such payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when such can be
done without injustice to her.
The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree
to pay to the mother money for the support of their dependent children and the
unpaid and accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a
matter of law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily made directly to the
children. Koon v. Koon, supra; Briggs v. Briggs, supra. However, special
considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such
payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when that can be done without
injustice to her. Briggs v. Briggs, supra. The courts are justifiably reluctant to lay
down any general rules as to when such credits may be allowed. 28 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to
be credited against the accrued support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the
monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended primarily for
food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and
also petitioner’s scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive
cars bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel
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RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
expenses of petitioner and Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other
than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these
bear no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite. While it is true
that the dispositive portion of the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740
ordered herein respondent to pay the support in arrears "less than the amount
supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as her and their two (2)
children monthly support," the deductions should be limited to those basic needs
and expenses considered by the trial and appellate courts. The assailed ruling of
the CA allowing huge deductions from the accrued monthly support of petitioner
and her children, while correct insofar as it commends the generosity of the
respondent to his children, is clearly inconsistent with the executory decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. More important, it completely ignores the unfair
consequences to petitioner whose sustenance and well-being, was given due
regard by the trial and appellate courts. This is evident from the March 31, 2004
Order granting support pendente lite to petitioner and her children, when the trial
court observed:
While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving some forms of
financial assistance to his two (2) children via their credit cards and paying for
their school expenses, the same is, however, devoid of any form of spousal
support to the plaintiff, for, at this point in time, while the action for nullity of
marriage is still to be heard, it is incumbent upon the defendant, considering the
physical and financial condition of the plaintiff and the overwhelming capacity of
defendant, to extend support unto the latter. x x x29
On appeal, while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 reduced the amount of
monthly support fixed by the trial court, it nevertheless held that considering
respondent’s financial resources, it is but fair and just that he give a monthly
support for the sustenance and basic necessities of petitioner and his children.
This would imply that any amount respondent seeks to be credited as monthly
support should only cover those incurred for sustenance and household
expenses.1avvphi1
In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has been admitted by petitioner
that aside from paying the expenses of their two (2) children’s schooling, he gave
his two (2) children two (2) cars and credit cards of which the expenses for various
items namely: clothes, grocery items and repairs of their cars were chargeable to
him which totaled an amount of more than One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00)
for each of them and considering that as testified by the private respondent that
she needs the total amount of ₱113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household
and other miscellaneous expenses and considering further that petitioner can
afford to buy cars for his two (2) children, and to pay the expenses incurred by
them which are chargeable to him through the credit cards he provided them in
the amount of ₱100,000.00 each, it is but fair and just that the monthly support
pendente lite for his wife, herein private respondent, be fixed as of the present in
the amount of ₱115,000.00 which would be sufficient enough to take care of the
household and other needs. This monthly support pendente lite to private
respondent in the amount of ₱115,000.00 excludes the amount of One Hundred
ThirtyFive (₱135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses
needed by private respondent for the operation of both her eyes which is
demandable upon the conduct of such operation. Likewise, this monthly support
of ₱115,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that the
trial court may grant private respondent as the circumstances may warrant i.e.
depending on the proof submitted by the parties during the proceedings for the
main action for support.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act
of petitioner, should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources
at his disposal.30 (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent may be allowed as
deductions from the accrued support pendente lite for petitioner and her children:
1âwphi1
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua Php 42,450.71
Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00
Credit card purchases of Angelli 365,282.20
(Groceries and Dry Goods) 228,869.38
Credit Card purchases of Daniel Ryan
TOTAL Php 648,102.29
As to the contempt charge, we sustain the CA in holding that respondent is not
guilty of indirect contempt.
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition
to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or
disobedience of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some
manner, to impede the due administration of justice.31 To constitute contempt, the
act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose. 32 The good
faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered. 33
Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of monthly support
pendente lite granted by the trial court, which is immediately executory. However,
we agree with the CA that respondent’s act was not contumacious considering
that he had not been remiss in actually providing for the needs of his children. It
is a matter of record that respondent continued shouldering the full cost of their
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RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
education and even beyond their basic necessities in keeping with the family’s
social status. Moreover, respondent believed in good faith that the trial and
appellate courts, upon equitable grounds, would allow him to offset the substantial
amounts he had spent or paid directly to his children.
ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly
support of Ph₱115,000.00 pesos starting from the time
payment of this amount was deferred by him subject to the
deduction aforementioned.

Respondent complains that petitioner is very much capacitated to generate iii. DIRECTING the immediate execution of this judgment.
income on her own because she presently maintains a boutique at the Ayala
Center Mall in Cebu City and at the same time engages in the business of lending SO ORDERED."
money. He also claims that the two children have finished their education and are
now employed in the family business earning their own salaries.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of support should be
submitted to the trial court in which the action for declaration for nullity of marriage SO ORDERED.
was filed, as this Court is not a trier of facts. The amount of support may be
reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the FIRST DIVISION
necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to
support.34 As we held in Advincula v. Advincula35 G.R. No. 201043 June 16, 2014

…Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Armed Forces of the
nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC), Petitioner,
a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, vs.
in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the DAISY R. YAHON, Respondent.
giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.36

DECISION
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated April 20,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 01154 and 01315 is hereby
MODIFIED to read as follows: VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of
Court with Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua against Danilo Y. Lua with
docket no. SP. CA-G.R. No. 01154;
b) GRANTING IN PART Danilo Y. Lua's Petition for Certiorari docketed
as SP. CA-G.R. No. 01315. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated 27
September 2005 and 25 November 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB-29346 entitled
"Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE, and instead a new one is entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Php 648,102.29
from the support pendente lite in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his
wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2) children;
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks
to nullify and set aside the Decision1 dated November 29, 2011 and
Resolution2 dated March 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station
in CA-G.R. SP No. 02953-MIN. The CA affirmed the orders and decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22 granting temporary
and permanent protection orders, and denying the motion to lift the said temporary
protection order (TPO).
Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance of protection order
under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,3 otherwise known as the
"Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," against her
husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon), an enlisted personnel of the
Philippine Army who retired in January 2006. Respondent and S/Sgt. Yahon were
married on June 8, 2003. The couple did not have any child but respondent has
a daughter with her previous live-in partner.
On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, as follows:

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Finding the herein petition for the Issuance of Protection Order to be sufficient in
form and substance and to prevent great and irreparable injury to the petitioner,
a TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER is forthwith issued to respondent,
S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON directing him to do the following acts:
1. Respondent is enjoined from threatening to commit or committing
further acts of physical abuse and violence against the petitioner;
2. To stay away at a distance of at least 500 meters from petitioner, her
residence or her place of work;
3. To refrain from harassing, annoying, intimidating, contacting or
communicating with petitioner; 4. Respondent is prohibited from using or
possessing any firearm or deadly weapon on occasions not related to
his job;
5. To provide reasonable financial spousal support to the petitioner.
The Local Police Officers and the Barangay Officials through the Chairman in the
area where the petitioner and respondent live at Poblacion, Claveria, Misamis
Oriental and Bobuntogan, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental are directed to respond to
any request for assistance from the petitioner for the implementation of this order.
They are also directed to accompany the petitioner to their conjugal abode at
Purok 2, Bobuntogan, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental to get her personal belongings in
order to insure the safety of the petitioner.
The Deputy Sheriff of this Court is ordered to immediately serve the Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) upon the respondent personally and to seek and obtain
the assistance of law enforcement agents, if needed, for purposes of effecting the
smooth implementation of this order.
In the meantime, let copy of this order and petition be served upon the respondent
for him to file an OPPOSITION within a period of five (5) days from receipt hereof
and let a Preliminary Conference and hearing on the merits be set on October 17,
2006 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
To insure that petitioner can receive a fair share of respondent’s retirement and
other benefits, the following agencies thru their heads are directed to WITHHOLD
any retirement, pension and other benefits of respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A.
YAHON, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned at 4ID, Camp
Evangelista, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City until further orders from the court:
1. Commanding General/Officer of the Finance Center of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
2. The Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
3. The Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro
City.
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.
IF THE RESPONDENT APPEARS WITHOUT COUNSEL ON THE DATE OF
THE PRELIMINARYCONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS OF THE
ISSUANCE OF A PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER, THE COURT SHALL
NOT RESCHEDULE OR POSTPONE THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND
HEARING BUT SHALL APPOINT A LAWYER FOR THE RESPONDENT AND
IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE SAID HEARING.
IF THE RESPONDENT FAILS TO APPEAR ON THE DATE OF THE
PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS DESPITE
PROPER NOTICE, THE COURT SHALL ALLOW EX-PARTE PRESENTATION
OF EVIDENCE BY THE PETITIONER AND RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE
BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD. NO DELEGATION
OF THE RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE SHALL BE ALLOWED.
SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis supplied.)
S/Sgt. Yahon, having been personally served with copy of the TPO, appeared
during the scheduled pre-trial but informed the court that he did not yet have a
counsel and requested for time to hire his own counsel. However, he did not hire
a counsel nor file an opposition or answer to the petition. Because of his failure to
appear in the subsequent hearings of the case, the RTC allowed the ex-parte
presentation of evidence to determine the necessity of issuance of a Permanent
Protection Order (PPO).
Meanwhile, as prayed for by respondent who manifested that S/Sgt. Yahon
deliberately refused to give her spousal support as directed in the TPO (she
claimed that she had no source of livelihood since he had told her to resign from
her job and concentrate on keeping their house), the RTC issued another order
directing S/Sgt. Yahon to give respondent spousal support in the amount of
₱4,000.00 per month and fifty percent (50%) of his retirement benefits which shall
be automatically deducted and given directly to respondent.5
In her testimony, respondent also said that S/Sgt. Yahon never complied with the
TPO as he continued making threats and inflicting physical abuse on her person,
and failed to give her spousal support as ordered by the court.
On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision,6 as follows:
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RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
After careful review and scrutiny of the evidence presented in this case, this court
finds that there is a need to permanently protect the applicant, Daisy R. Yahon
from further acts of violence that might be committed by respondent against her.
Evidences showed that respondent who was a member of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines assigned at the Headquarters 4ID Camp Evangelista, Cagayan de
Oro City had been repeatedly inflicting physical, verbal, emotional and economic
abuse and violence upon the petitioner. Respondent in several instances had
slapped, mauled and punched petitioner causing her physical harm. Exhibits G
and D are medical certificates showing physical injuries suffered by petitioner
inflicted by the respondent at instances of their marital altercations. Respondent
at the height of his anger often poked a gun on petitioner and threatened to
massacre her and her child causing them to flee for their lives and sought refuge
from other people. He had demanded sex from petitioner at an unreasonable time
when she was sick and chilling and when refused poked a gun at her. Several
police blotters were offered as evidence by petitioner documenting the incidents
when she was subjected to respondent’s ill temper and ill treatment. Verbally,
petitioner was not spared from respondent’s abuses by shouting at her that he
was wishing she would die and he would celebrate if it happens and by calling
and sending her threatening text messages. These incidents had caused
petitioner great psychological trauma causing her [to] fear for her life and these
forced her to seek refuge from the court for protection. Economically, petitioner
was also deprived by respondent of her spousal support despite order of the court
directing him to give a monthly support of Php4,000.00. In view of the foregoing,
this court finds a need to protect the life of the petitioner not only physically but
also emotionally and psychologically.
Based on the evidence presented, both oral and documentary, and there being
no controverting evidence presented by respondent, this Court finds that the
applicant has established her case by preponderance of evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING
the petition, thus, pursuant to Sec. 30 of A.M. No. 04-10-1-SC, let a PERMANENT
PROTECTION ORDER be issued immediately and respondent, S/Sgt. CHARLES
A.YAHON is ordered to give to petitioner, DAISY R. YAHON the amount of FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (Php4,000.00) per month by way of spousal support.
Pursuant to the order of the court dated February 6, 2007, respondent, S/Sgt.
Charles A. Yahon is directed to give it to petitioner 50% of whatever retirement
benefits and other claims that may be due or released to him from the government
and the said share of petitioner shall be automatically deducted from respondent’s
benefits and claims and be given directly to the petitioner, Daisy R. Yahon.
Let copy of this decision be sent to the Commanding General/Officer of Finance
Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon
City; the Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City and the
Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City for their
guidance and strict compliance.
SO ORDERED.7 (Emphasis supplied.)
Herein petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC),
assisted by the Office of the Judge Advocate General (OTJAG), AFP, filed before
the RTC a Manifestation and Motion (To Lift Temporary Protection Order Against
the AFP)8 dated November 10, 2008. Stating that it was making a limited and
special appearance, petitioner manifested that on August 29, 2008, it furnished
the AFP Pension and Gratuity Management Center (PGMC) copy of the TPO for
appropriate action. The PGMC, on September 2, 2008, requested the Chief,
AFPFC the temporary withholding of the thirty-six (36) Months Lump Sum (MLS)
due to S/Sgt. Yahon. Thereafter, on October 29, 2008, PGMC forwarded a letter
to the Chief of Staff, AFP for the OTJAG for appropriate action on the TPO, and
requesting for legal opinion as to the propriety of releasing the 36 MLS of S/Sgt.
Yahon. Petitioner informed the RTC that S/Sgt. Yahon’s check representing his
36 MLS had been processed and is ready for payment by the AFPFC, but to date
said check has not been claimed by respondent.
Petitioner further asserted that while it has initially discharged its obligation under
the TPO, the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over the military institution due to
lack of summons, and hence the AFPFC cannot be bound by the said court order.
Additionally, petitioner contended that the AFPFC is not a party-in-interest and is
a complete stranger to the proceedings before the RTC on the issuance of
TPO/PPO. Not being impleaded in the case, petitioner lamented that it was not
afforded due process and it was thus improper to issue execution against the
AFPFC. Consequently, petitioner emphasized its position that the AFPFC cannot
be directed to comply with the TPO without violating its right to procedural due
process.
In its Order9 dated December 17, 2008, the RTC denied the aforesaid motion for
having been filed out of time. It noted that the September 28, 2006 TPO and July
23, 2007 Decision granting Permanent Protection Order (PPO) to respondent had
long become final and executory.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied under the RTC’s
Order10 dated March 6, 2009.
On May 27, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA praying for
the nullification of the aforesaid orders and decision insofar as it directs the
AFPFC to automatically deduct from S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement and pension
benefits and directly give the same to respondent as spousal support, allegedly
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent filed her Comment with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction,
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manifesting that there is no information as to whether S/Sgt. Yahon already
received his retirement benefit and that the latter has repeatedly violated the TPO,
particularly on the provision of spousal support.
After due hearing, the CA‘s Twenty-Second Division issued a (b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning,
Resolution11 granting respondent’s application, viz:
Upon perusal of the respective pleadings filed by the parties, the Court finds
meritorious private respondent’s application for the issuance of an injunctive
relief. While the 36-month lump sum retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles A.
Yahon has already been given to him, yet as admitted by petitioner itself, the
monthly pension after the mentioned retirement benefits has not yet been
released to him. It appears that the release of such pension could render
ineffectual the eventual ruling of the Court in this Petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
issue enjoining the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center, its
employees, agents, representatives, and any all persons acting on its behalf, from
releasing the remaining pension that may be due to S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon.
SO ORDERED.12
By Decision dated November 29, 2011, the CA denied the petition for certiorari
and affirmed the assailed orders and decision of the RTC. The CA likewise denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
In this petition, the question of law presented is whether petitioner military
institution may be ordered to automatically deduct a percentage from the
retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel, and to give the same directly to the
latter’s lawful wife as spousal support in compliance with a protection order issued
by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.
A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of
violence against women and their children, their family or household members,
and to grant other necessary relief. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended
parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate
the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. 13 The protection orders
issued by the court may be a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or a Permanent
Protection Order (PPO), while a protection order that may be issued by the
barangay shall be known as a Barangay Protection Order (BPO). 14
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs that may be included in the
TPO, PPO or BPO, to wit:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or
committing, personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned in
Section 5 of this Act;
contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or
indirectly;
(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the
petitioner, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily
for the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no
property rights are violated, and if respondent must remove personal
effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent
to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until
respondent has gathered his things and escort respondent from the
residence;
(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and any
designated family or household member at a distance specified by the
court, and to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment,
or any specified place frequented by the petitioner and any designated
family or household member;
(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile
and other essential personal effects, regardless of ownership, and
directing the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the
petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is
safely restored to the possession of the automobile and other essential
personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner’s or respondent’s removal
of personal belongings;
(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the
petitioner;
(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her
child if entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the
contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income
or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondent's
employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the
woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance
of support to the woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall
render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of
court;
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(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any
firearm or deadly weapon and order him to surrender the same to the
court for appropriate disposition by the court, including revocation of
license and disqualification to apply for any license to use or possess a
firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall order
the offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate
authority to investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on
matter;
(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted,
including, but not limited to, property damage, medical expenses, child
care expenses and loss of income;
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner
temporary shelter and other social services that the petitioner may need;
and
(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary
to protect and provide for the safety of the petitioner and any designated
family or household member, provided petitioner and any designated
family or household member consents to such relief. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTC’s directive for the automatic
deduction of 50% from S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement benefits and pension to be given
directly to respondent, as it contravenes an explicit mandate under the law
governing the retirement and separation of military personnel.
The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1638, 15 which
states: Section 31. The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided
herein, shall not be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax
whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third
person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted man who is
entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or property
accountabilities incurred while in the active service, not more than fifty per centum
of the pension gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man or his
survivors under this Decree may be withheld and be applied to settle such
accountabilities. (Emphasis supplied.)
A similar provision is found in R.A. No. 8291, otherwise known as the
"Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997," which reads:
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien -- x x x
xxxx
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums
or monies corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts,
quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including Commission on Audit
(COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, including
his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise
or performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in
connection with his position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual
or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.
In Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court,16 we held that a court order directing
the Philippine National Bank to refrain from releasing to petitioner all his
retirement benefits and to deliver one-half of such monetary benefits to plaintiff
as the latter’s conjugal share is illegal and improper, as it violates Section 26 of
CA 186 (old GSIS Law) which exempts retirement benefits from execution.
The foregoing exemptions have been incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, which governs execution of judgments and court orders.
Section 13 of Rule 39 enumerates those properties which are exempt from
execution:
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution.– Except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from
execution:
xxxx
(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such
support, or any pension or gratuity from the Government;(Emphasis supplied.)
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between
two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of
legislative will.17 Statutes must be so construed and harmonized with other
statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.18 However, if several laws
cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the later enactment. The
later law is the latest expression of the legislative will. 19
We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be
construed as laying down an exception to the general rule above-stated that
retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself declares that the
court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of the
respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to the
woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."
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Petitioner further contends that the directive under the TPO to segregate a portion
of S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement benefits was illegal because said moneys remain as
public funds, citing the case of Pacific Products v. Ong. 20 In that case, this Court
sustained the CA when it held that the garnishment of the amount of ₱10,500
payable to BML Trading and Supply while it was still in the possession of the
Bureau of Telecommunications was illegal and therefore, null and void. The CA
therein relied on the previous rulings in Director of Commerce and Industry v.
Concepcion21 and Avendano v. Alikpala, et al.22 wherein this Court declared null
and void the garnishment of the salaries of government employees.
Citing the two aforementioned cases, we thus declared in Pacific Products:
A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of
public officers, although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the
creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that
the State, by virtue of its sovereignty may not be sued in its own courts except by
express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment
would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that
moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the
disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant
in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another
reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public
policy forbids it.23
We disagree.
Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes
in its coverage the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon’s employer. Where the law
does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to
all employers, whether private or government.
It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is a
support enforcement legislation.1âwphi1 In the United States, provisions of the
Child Support Enforcement Act24 allow garnishment of certain federal funds where
the intended recipient has failed to satisfy a legal obligation of child support. As
these provisions were designed "to avoid sovereign immunity problems" and
provide that "moneys payable by the Government to any individual are subject to
child support enforcement proceedings," the law is clearly intended to "create a
limited waiver of sovereign immunity so that state courts could issue valid orders
directed against Government agencies attaching funds in their possession." 25
This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not
violate the equal protection clause. In Garcia v. Drilon 26 the issue of
constitutionality was raised by a husband after the latter failed to obtain an
injunction from the CA to enjoin the implementation of a protection order issued
against him by the RTC. We ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial
distinctions which justify the classification under the law: the unequal power
relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than
men to be victims of violence; and the widespread bias and prejudice against
women.
We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane to the purpose of the
law, viz:
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262,
which is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out
in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.– It is hereby declared that the State values the
dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The
State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly
women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed
against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international
human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party. 27
Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically
address one form of violence committed against women – economic abuse.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman
financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging
in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in
cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and
moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right
to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned
in common;
3. Destroying household property;
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4. Controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling
the conjugal money or properties.28
The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of restoring the dignity
of women who are victims of domestic violence and provide them continued
protection against threats to their personal safety and security.
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim
or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a
perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of
violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member
safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts
that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court
to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence,
to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial
support."29
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
November 29, 2011 and Resolution dated March 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals
Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP No. 02953-MIN are AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013
NARCISO SALAS, Petitioners, v.ANNABELLE MATUSALEM, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and
set aside the Decision1dated July 18, 2006 and Resolution2 dated October 19,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64379.
The factual antecedents:
On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for
Support/Damages against Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) ofCabanatuan City (Civil Case No. 2124-AF).
Respondent claimed that petitioner is. the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas
who was born on December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time,
enticed her as she was then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a
widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and
shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of
caesarian operation and hospital confinement. However, when respondent
refused the offer of petitioner’s family to take the child from her, petitioner
abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and
friends. Respondent further alleged that she attempted suicide due to depression
but still petitioner refused to support her and their child.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the
amount of P20,000.00, as well as actual, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees.
Petitioner filed his answer4 with special and affirmative defenses and
counterclaims. He described respondent as a woman of loose morals, having
borne her first child also out of wedlock when she went to work in Italy. Jobless
upon her return to the country, respondent spent time riding on petitioner’s
jeepney which was then being utilized by a female real estate agent named
Felicisima de Guzman. Respondent had seduced a senior police officer in San
Isidro and her charge of sexual abuse against said police officer was later
withdrawn in exchange for the quashing of drug charges against respondent’s
brother-in-law who was then detained at the municipal jail. It was at that time
respondent introduced herself to petitioner whom she pleaded for charity as she
was pregnant with another child. Petitioner denied paternity of the child Christian
Paulo; he was motivated by no other reason except genuine altruism when he
agreed to shoulder the expenses for the delivery of said child, unaware of
respondent’s chicanery and deceit designed to “scandalize” him in exchange for
financial favor.
At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Petitioner was
declared to have waived his right to present evidence and the case was
considered submitted for decision based on respondent’s evidence.
Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house of his “kumadre”
Felicisima de Guzman at Bgy. Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. During their
subsequent meeting, petitioner told her he is already a widower and he has no
more companion in life because his children are all grown-up. She also learned
that petitioner owns a rice mill, a construction business and a housing subdivision
(petitioner offered her a job at their family-owned Ma. Cristina Village). Petitioner
at the time already knows that she is a single mother as she had a child by her
former boyfriend in Italy. He then brought her to a motel, promising that he will
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take care of her and marry her. She believed him and yielded to his advances,
with the thought that she and her child will have a better life. Thereafter, they saw
each other weekly and petitioner gave her money for her child. When she became
pregnant with petitioner’s child, it was only then she learned that he is in fact not
a widower. She wanted to abort the baby but petitioner opposed it because he
wanted to have another child.5
On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an apartment where she
stayed with a housemaid; he also provided for all their expenses. She gave birth
to their child on December 28, 1994 at the Good Samaritan Hospital in
Cabanatuan City. Before delivery, petitioner even walked her at the hospital room
and massaged her stomach, saying he had not done this to his wife. She filled
out the form for the child’s birth certificate and wrote all the information supplied
by petitioner himself. It was also petitioner who paid the hospital bills and drove
her baby home. He was excited and happy to have a son at his advanced age
who is his “look-alike,” and this was witnessed by other boarders, visitors and
Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment unit petitioner rented. However, on the
18th day after the baby’s birth, petitioner went to Baguio City for a medical check-
up. He confessed to her daughter and eventually his wife was also informed about
his having sired an illegitimate child. His family then decided to adopt the baby
and just give respondent money so she can go abroad. When she refused this
offer, petitioner stopped seeing her and sending money to her. She and her baby
survived through the help of relatives and friends. Depressed, she tried to commit
suicide by drug overdose and was brought to the hospital by Murillo who paid the
bill. Murillo sought the help of the Cabanatuan City Police Station which set their
meeting with petitioner. However, it was only petitioner’s wife who showed up and
she was very mad, uttering unsavory words against respondent. 6
Murillo corroborated respondent’s testimony as to the payment by petitioner of
apartment rental, his weekly visits to respondent and financial support to her, his
presence during and after delivery of respondent’s baby, respondent’s attempted
suicide through sleeping pills overdose and hospitalization for which she paid the
bill, her complaint before the police authorities and meeting with petitioner’s wife
at the headquarters.7
On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision 8 in favor of respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant to give as monthly support of
TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS for the child
Christian Paulo through the mother;
2. Directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P20,000.00 by way of litigation expenses; and
3. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) the trial court decided the case
without affording him the right to introduce evidence on his defense; and (2) the
trial court erred in finding that petitioner is the putative father of Christian Paulo
and ordering him to give monthly support.
By Decision dated July 18, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal. The
appellate court found no reason to disturb the trial court’s exercise of discretion in
denying petitioner’s motion for postponement on April 17, 1998, the scheduled
hearing for the initial presentation of defendant’s evidence, and the motion for
reconsideration of the said order denying the motion for postponement and
submitting the case for decision.
On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling that respondent
satisfactorily established the illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo, and
consequently no error was committed by the trial court in granting respondent’s
prayer for support. The appellate court thus held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Christian Paulo, in instant case, does not enjoy the benefit of a record of birth in
the civil registry which bears acknowledgment signed by Narciso Salas. He
cannot claim open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
It had been established by plaintiff’s evidence, however, that during her
pregnancy, Annabelle was provided by Narciso Salas with an apartment at a
rental of P1,500.00 which he paid for (TSN, October 6, 1995, p. 18). Narciso
provided her with a household help with a salary of P1,500.00 a month (TSN,
October 6, 1995, ibid). He also provided her a monthly food allowance of
P1,500.00 (Ibid, p. 18). Narciso was with Annabelle at the hospital while the latter
was in labor, “walking” her around and massaging her belly (Ibid, p. 11). Narciso
brought home Christian Paulo to the rented apartment after Annabelle’s discharge
from the hospital. People living in the same apartment units were witnesses to
Narciso’s delight to father a son at his age which was his “look alike”. It was only
after the 18th day when Annabelle refused to give him Christian Paulo that Narciso
withdrew his support to him and his mother.
Said testimony of Annabelle aside from having been corroborated by Grace
Murillo, the owner of the apartment which Narciso rented, was never rebutted on
record. Narciso did not present any evidence, verbal or documentary, to repudiate
plaintiff’s evidence.
In the cases of Lim vs. CA (270 SCRA 1) and Rodriguez vs. CA (245 SCRA 150),
the Supreme Court made it clear that Article 172 of the Family Code is an
adaptation of Article 283 of the Civil Code. Said legal provision provides that the
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father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child x x “3) when the child
has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father”.
In fact, in Ilano vs. CA (230 SCRA 242, 258-259), it was held that–
“The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically
covers all the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. ‘Any other evidence or
proof’ that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the
other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for
compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet [the] requirements of the first three
paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph
permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with
respect to illegitimate filiation.”
As a necessary consequence of the finding that Christian Paulo is the son of
defendant Narciso Salas, he is entitled to support from the latter (Ilano vs.
CA, supra).
It “shall be demandable from the time the person who has the right to recover the
same needs it for maintenance x x.” (Art. 203, Family Code of the Philippines).10
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition submitting the following
arguments:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. THE VENUE OF THE CASE WAS IMPROPERLY LAID BEFORE THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY CONSIDERING THAT
BOTH PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT ARE ACTUAL RESIDENTS OF
BRGY. MALAPIT, SAN ISIDRO, NUEVA ECIJA.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PRONOUNCING THAT
PETITIONER WAS AFFORDED THE FULL MEASURE OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW AND IN UPHOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
GRAVELY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECIDED THE INSTANT CASE WITHOUT
AFFORDING PETITIONER THE RIGHT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE IN HIS
DEFENSE.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
FILIATION OF CHRISTIAN PAULO WAS DULY ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE 175 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE AND
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AND THEREFORE ENTITLED TO SUPPORT
FROM THE PETITIONER.11
We grant the petition.
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the
convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the
principle that choosing the venue of an action is not left to a plaintiff’s caprice; the
matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. 12
In personal actions such as the instant case, the Rules give the plaintiff the option
of choosing where to file his complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he
himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found.13 The plaintiff or the defendant must be
residents of the place where the action has been instituted at the time the action
is commenced.14
However, petitioner raised the issue of improper venue for the first time in the
Answer itself and no prior motion to dismiss based on such ground was filed.
Under the Rules of Court before the 1997 amendments, an objection to an
improper venue must be made before a responsive pleading is filed. Otherwise,
it will be deemed waived.15 Not having been timely raised, petitioner’s objection
on venue is therefore deemed waived.
As to the denial of the motion for postponement filed by his counsel for the
resetting of the initial presentation of defense evidence on April 17, 1998, we find
that it was not the first time petitioner’s motion for postponement was denied by
the trial court.
Records disclosed that after the termination of the testimony of respondent’s last
witness on November 29, 1996, the trial court as prayed for by the parties, set the
continuation of hearing for the reception of evidence for the defendant (petitioner)
on January 27, February 3, and February 10, 1997. In the Order dated December
17, 1996, petitioner was advised to be ready with his evidence at those hearing
dates earlier scheduled. At the hearing on January 27, 1997, petitioner’s former
counsel, Atty. Rolando S. Bala, requested for the cancellation of the February 3
and 10, 1997 hearings in order to give him time to prepare for his defense, which
request was granted by the trial court which thus reset the hearing dates to March
3, 14 and 17, 1997. On March 3, 1997, upon oral manifestation by Atty. Bala and
without objection from respondent’s counsel, Atty. Feliciano Wycoco, the trial
court again reset the hearing to March 14 and 17, 1997. With the non-appearance
of both petitioner and Atty. Bala on March 14, 1997, the trial court upon oral
manifestation by Atty. Wycoco declared their absence as a waiver of their right to
present evidence and accordingly deemed the case submitted for decision. 16
On July 4, 1997, Atty. Bala withdrew as counsel for petitioner and Atty. Rafael E.
Villarosa filed his appearance as his new counsel on July 21, 1997. On the same
date he filed entry of appearance, Atty. Villarosa filed a motion for reconsideration
of the March 14, 1997 Order pleading for liberality and magnanimity of the trial
court, without offering any explanation for Atty. Bala’s failure to appear for the
initial presentation of their evidence. The trial court thereupon reconsidered its
March 14, 1997 Order, finding it better to give petitioner a chance to present his
evidence. On August 26, 1997, Atty. Villarosa received a notice of hearing for the
Page 28 of 36
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presentation of their evidence scheduled on September 22, 1997. On August 29, mind that a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence and mistakes in
1997, the trial court received his motion requesting that the said hearing be re-set handling the case.22
to October 10, 1997 for the reason that he had requested the postponement of a
hearing in another case which was incidentally scheduled on September 22, 23
With our finding that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of
and 24, 1997. As prayed for, the trial court reset the hearing to October 10, 1997.
the motion for postponement filed by petitioner’s counsel, petitioner’s contention
On said date, however, the hearing was again moved to December 15, 1997. On
that he was deprived of his day in court must likewise fail. The essence of due
February 16, 1998, the trial court itself reset the hearing to April 17, 1998 since it
process is that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
was unclear whether Atty. Wycoco received a copy of the motion. 17
any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. Where a party was
afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he
On April 17, 1998, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear but the trial court
cannot complain of deprivation of due process. If the opportunity is not availed of,
received on April 16, 1998 an urgent motion to cancel hearing filed by Atty.
it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee. 23
Villarosa. The reason given by the latter was the scheduled hearing on the
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction in another case under the April 8, 1998
We now proceed to the main issue of whether the trial and appellate courts erred
Order issued by the RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 36 in Civil Case No.
in ruling that respondent’s evidence sufficiently proved that her son Christian
1946. But as clearly stated in the said order, it was the plaintiffs therein who
Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner.
requested the postponement of the hearing and it behoved Atty. Villarosa to
inform the RTC of Gapan that he had a previous commitment considering that the
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may
April 17, 1998 hearing was scheduled as early as February 16, 1998. Acting on
be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
the motion for postponement, the trial court denied for the second time petitioner’s
motion for postponement. Even at the hearing of their motion for reconsideration
Article 172 of the Family Code of the
of the April 17, 1998 Order on September 21, 1998, Atty. Villarosa failed to appear
Philippines states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
and instead filed another motion for postponement. The trial court thus ordered
that the case be submitted for decision stressing that the case had long been
pending and that petitioner and his counsel have been given opportunities to The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
present their evidence. It likewise denied a second motion for reconsideration filed
by Atty. Villarosa, who arrived late during the hearing thereof on December 4, (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
1998.18
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a request handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Parties asking for postponement
have absolutely no right to assume that their motions would be granted. Thus, In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
they must be prepared on the day of the hearing. 19 Indeed, an order declaring a by:
party to have waived the right to present evidence for performing dilatory actions
upholds the trial court’s duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party. 20
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Atty. Villarosa’s plea for liberality was correctly rejected by the trial court in view (Underscoring supplied.)
of his own negligence in failing to ensure there will be no conflict in his trial
schedules. As we held in Tiomico v. Court of Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth 24 (Exhibit “A-1”) of Christian
Appeals21:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not
signed by him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the entries and
Motions for postponement are generally frowned upon by Courts if there is signed the said document though she claims it was petitioner who supplied the
evidence of bad faith, malice or inexcusable negligence on the part of the movant. information she wrote therein.
The inadvertence of the defense counsel in failing to take note of the trial dates
and in belatedly informing the trial court of any conflict in his schedules of trial or We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
court appearances, constitutes inexcusable negligence. It should be borne in father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate.25 Thus, if the father

Page 29 of 36
RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor,
registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. 26 Neither can such
birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument27 and it has no
probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father. 28
As to the Baptismal Certificate29 (Exhibit “B”) of Christian Paulo Salas also
indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates
may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to
the child’s paternity.30
The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and
letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside
their rented apartment unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are
inconclusive evidence to prove paternity.31 Exhibits “E” and “F”32 showing
petitioner and respondent inside the rented apartment unit thus have scant
evidentiary value. The Statement of Account33 (Exhibit “C”) from the Good
Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself was indicated as the payee
is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child
notwithstanding petitioner’s admission in his answer that he shouldered the
expenses in the delivery of respondent’s child as an act of charity.
As to the handwritten notes34 (Exhibits “D” to “D-13”) of petitioner and respondent
showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are
not sufficient to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not
signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by petitioner that
he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do
not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which
admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. 35
Petitioner’s reliance on our ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals36 is misplaced. In the
said case, the handwritten letters of petitioner contained a clear admission that
he is the father of private respondent’s daughter and were signed by him. The
Court therein considered the totality of evidence which established beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner was indeed the father of private respondent’s
daughter. On the other hand, in Ilano v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court sustained
the appellate court’s finding that private respondent’s evidence to establish her
filiation with and paternity of petitioner was overwhelming, particularly the latter’s
public acknowledgment of his amorous relationship with private respondent’s
mother, and private respondent as his own child through acts and words, her
testimonial evidence to that effect was fully supported by documentary evidence.
The Court thus ruled that respondent had adduced sufficient proof of continuous
possession of status of a spurious child.
Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim open and
continuous possession of status of an illegitimate child, it nevertheless considered
the testimonial evidence sufficient proof to establish his filiation to petitioner.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,” like his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.38Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent’s
evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of
Christian Paulo, petitioner’s financial support while respondent lived in Murillo’s
apartment and his regular visits to her at the said apartment, though replete with
details, do not approximate the “overwhelming evidence, documentary and
testimonial” presented in Ilano. In that case, we sustained the appellate court’s
ruling anchored on the following factual findings by the appellate court which was
quoted at length in the ponencia:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic) at the
Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal
examination accompanied by Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they
went home to their residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven by Artemio
himself (id. p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of “Ilano” since birth without any objection on
the part of Artemio, the fact that since Merceditas (sic) had her discernment she
had always known and called Artemio as her “Daddy” (TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74);
the fact that each time Artemio was at home, he would play with Merceditas (sic),
take her for a ride or restaurants to eat, and sometimes sleeping with Merceditas
(sic) (id. p. 34) and does all what a father should do for his child — bringing home
goodies, candies, toys and whatever he can bring her which a child enjoys which
Artemio gives to Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) are positive evidence
that Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio and recognized by Artemio as such.
Special attention is called to Exh. “E-7” where Artemio was telling Leoncia the
need for a “frog test” to know the status of Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and Merceditas (sic)
was sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered to her by Artemio, thru
Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. “E-2” and “E-3”, and “D-6”), or thru Merceditas (sic)
herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74) and sometimes in the form of a check as the Manila
Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. “G”) and the signature appearing
therein which was identified by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio often
gives her checks and Artemio would write the check at home and saw Artemio
sign the check (TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the
Page 30 of 36
RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
check and signature were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77; TSN, p. 19, to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and
10/9/78). to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives.
Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife,
Artemio has shown concern as the father of Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
(sic) was in Grade 1 at the St. Joseph Parochial School, Artemio signed the when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case
Report Card of Merceditas (sic) (Exh. “H”) for the fourth and fifth grading period(s) the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
(Exh. “H-1” and “H-2”) as the parent of Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of
Artemio [were] both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) because Artemio The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
signed Exh. “H-1” and “H-2” at their residence in the presence of Leoncia, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
Merceditas (sic) and of Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). x x x. may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

xxx xxx xxx The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to
appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite[,] Artemio gave
Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: “To Nene, with best regards, If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the
Temiong”. (Exh. “I”). (pp. 19-20, Appellant’s Brief) one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order
the opposing party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of an
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
of the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in
The entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered
stated therein as married does not mean that Leoncia is not appellee’s daughter. as costs.
This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid
embarrassment.39 WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision
dated July 18, 2006 and Resolution dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 64379 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil
not competent proof of paternity and the totality of respondent’s evidence failed Case No. 2124-AF of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26
to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner. is DISMISSED.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to No pronouncement as to costs. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create
an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the SO ORDERED.
parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear
and convincing evidence.40 Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.
Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion41 filed by petitioner’s counsel
informing this Court that petitioner had died on May 6, 2010.
THIRD DIVISION
The action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was still
alive, it is not barred under Article 175 (2) 42 of the Family Code. We have also
held that the death of the putative father is not a bar to the action commenced G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
during his lifetime by one claiming to be his illegitimate child. 43 The rule on
substitution of parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO
Procedure, thus applies. NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel
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RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders 1 dated February 19, 2010
and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
(RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines
v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-
85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van
Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19,
1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at
the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was
only eighteen (18) months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to
the Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support
to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is
equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner
and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son,
Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in
Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. 9 Respondent
and his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located at
Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the
parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City. 11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for
support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with
the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section
5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his
minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto,
to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an
information for the crime charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20
thereof, states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the
Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his
son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of
financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold
Departure Order against respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested
and, subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of
Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his Opposition. 18 Pending
the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the
RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed
Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal case against respondent on the ground
that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect
to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and
accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his
provisional liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating
respondent’s obligation to support their child under Article 195 23 of the Family
Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally
applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor
children regardless of the obligor’s nationality." 24
Page 32 of 36
RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order 25 denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced
earlier in the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates
its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our
national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to
givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A.
9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively
established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis
child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates
a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no
prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his
minor child under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant
petition despite the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court,
consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development
Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may
be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule
45 Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved.
This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed
the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the
Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by
ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was
rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was
rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The
first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA
on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of
appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis
supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts
being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the
response thereto concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a
given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to
support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held
criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel
question of law concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits
acts and omissions punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation
to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present
case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually
serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition
and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and
resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency
and economy in the administration of justice should prevail over the observance
of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious.
Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it
is imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s
obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the
existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family
Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support
his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis
presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial
Page 33 of 36
RemRev 2 – Rule 61 Cases
support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not
obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article
19534 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a
foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of
nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically
the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino
citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights
and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we
agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as
the consequences of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family
rights and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to
which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article
15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the
Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute
or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. 40 In the present case,
respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child
(either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente
v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved.43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his
favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if
the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal
law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support
has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to
be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to
support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained
in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce
Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is notliable
to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed
on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant,
respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated, 46 which was not
disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of
respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that
such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability,in
light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty
Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were
properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said
foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall
not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle
imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
—
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If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the
filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for
the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the
forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or
judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles
of Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a
parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith,
such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of
great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is
entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer
liable to support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San
Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should
no longerbe considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be
required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to
be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
(Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made
liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to
give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the
following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in
conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from
conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to
restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct
by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other
harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of
controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial
support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's
children insufficient financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the
woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional
abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor childrenof access to the
woman's child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to
the child is considered anact of violence against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we
find strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in
relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which
provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is
indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support
his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties
herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have
territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise
irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not
admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the
instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of
prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall
prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall
prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No.
9262 is a continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present.
Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
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Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to
petitioner’s child calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand
the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the
case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010
and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of
Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.

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