1

12 Alba vs. De La Cruz 1864. They believed that it was not necessary nor required that they include in their
(G.R. No. 5246| September 16, 1910) application the names of their tenants.

FACTS:
 The petitioners, Manuela, Jose, Juan and Francisco, all surnamed Alba are
the only heirs of Dona Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey. Their
sister Remedio died without leaving any heir except her husband Vicente
Reyes.
 The four petitioners, as co-owners, sought to have their parcel of land in
Bulacan registered. The parcel of agricultural land was used for planting rice
and sugar. They filed the petition which was accompanied by a plan and
technical description of the land. After hearing, the court directed that the
land be registered in the names of the four petitioners, as co-owners, subject
to the usufructuary right of Vicente Reyes.
 Later on, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land
Registration asking for a revision of the case. He alleged that he is the
absolute owner of the two parcels of lands which were included in the lands
decreed to the petitioners. He further alleged that such decree was obtained
maliciously and fraudulently by the petitioners. He therefore asked, under
the provisions of Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496), a
revision of the case and to exclude the two parcels of land.
 The Land Court reopened the case and ruled in favor of Anacleto and
modified the former decree, excluding from the same the two parcels of land
claimed by Anacleto.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Land Court erred in modifying the former decree and in
ruling in favor of respondent in excluding the two parcels of land. (YES)
HELD:
The petitioners inherited this land from their parents, who acquired the same,
including the two small parcels in question, by purchase, as is evidenced by a public
document dated the 26th of November, 1864. Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the
appellee, obtained in march, 1895, a state grant for several parcels of land, including
the two parcels in question.
The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by the
applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contain an accurate
description of the land. It shall contain the name in full and the address of the
applicant, and also the names and addresses of all occupants of land and of all
adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known, it shall state what search has been
made to find them. In the form of notice given by statute, which shall be sworn to, the
applicant is required to state and set forth clearly all mortgages or encumbrances
affecting said land, if any, the rights and interests, legal or equitable, in the
possession, remainder, reversion, or expectancy of all persons, with their names in
full, together with their place of residence and post office addresses.
Before examining the validity of this part of the Act it might be well to note the history
and purpose of what is known as the "Torrens Land Registration System." This
system was introduced in South Australia by Sir Robert Torrens in 1857 and was
there worked out in its practicable form.
The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. As we have
said, upon the presentation in the Court of Land Registration of an application for the
registration of the title to lands, under this system, the theory of the law is that all
occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants, and other interested persons are
notified of the proceedings, and have have a right to appear in opposition to such
application. In other words, the proceeding is against the whole word. This system
was evidently considered by the Legislature to be a public project when it passed Act
No. 496. The interest of the community at large was considered to be preferred to that
of private individuals.
For these reasons we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment appealed
from should be, and the same is hereby reversed and judgment entered in favor of
the petitioners in conformity with the decree of the lower court of February 12, 1908,
without special ruling as to costs. It is so ordered.

It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented their petition in this case the
appellee was occupying the two parcels of land now in question. It is also admitted
that the name of the appellee does not appear in the said petition as an occupant of
the said two parcels. The petitioners insist that the appellee was occupying these
parcels as their tenant and for this reason they did not include his name in their
petition, as an occupant, while the appellee contends that he was occupying the said
parcels as the absolute owner under the estate grant by inheritance.

The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the name
of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land, was a
violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this constituted fraud within the
meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act. The trial court further held that
the grant from the estate should prevail over the public document of purchase of
I.
2
13 Duran vs. Olivia
II. G.R. No. L-16589 September 29, 1961 | Labrador, J. | Torrens Title
III. Doctrine
The Rules of Court applicable to land and cadastral cases in a suppletory
character. By express provision of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the rules
contained therein apply to land registration and cadastral cases in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
A patent once registered under Act No. 496 becomes indefeasible as a
torrens title. The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens System of
registration is to finally settle the titles to land; to put to stop any question of
legality of title thereto. That being the purpose of the law, there would be no
end to litigation if every property covered by torrens title may still be
relitigated in a subsequent land registration proceedings.
IV. Facts
 Jose & Teresa Duran (Durans) filed an application for registration in
their names of sixteen lots (denominated as Lot 1-16) with CFI.
Oppositors, herein defendants (Olivia), filed their opposition to the
application and later filed a motion to dismiss the application on the
ground that the court has no jurisdiction to decree registration of the lots
respectively claimed by them, since said lots (Lots 3, 6, 7, 9, 12, 15 &
16) are already registered and certificates of title have been issued in
their names.
 Durans objected the motion alleging that the reasons for the motion to
dismiss do not appear in the application but are mere assertions of the
parties and that the trial court has jurisdiction to consider the application
even though the lots are already covered by certificates of title.
 CFI: granted the motion to dismiss. Hence, this appeal where Durans
alleged: 1) lots were not similar 2) that a certificate of title based upon a
mere homestead, sales or free patent covering private land is null and
void; that it is the decree of registration, not the certificate of title which
confers the character of incontestability of title.
V. Issues
(1) Whether CFI erred in granting the motion to dismiss the application for
registration. (NO)
(2) Whether CFI erred in dismissing the application for lack of jurisdiction on
the ground that the lots are already covered by certificate of titles based on
Public Land Patents granted them. (NO)
(3) Whether CFI has jurisdiction to entertain the application. (NO)
VI. Held
(1) By express provision of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the rules
contained therein apply to land registration and cadastral cases in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
The Land Registration Act does not provide for a pleading similar or
corresponding to a motion to dismiss. As a motion to dismiss is necessary
for the expeditious termination of land registration cases, said motion
contained in the Rules of Court can be availed of by the parties.
(2) A patent once registered under Act No. 496 becomes indefeasible as a
torrens title.1 The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens System
of registration is to finally settle the titles to land; to put to stop any question
of legality of title thereto. That being the purpose of the law, there would be
no end to litigation if every property covered by torrens title may still be
relitigated in a subsequent land registration proceedings.
A homestead patent once registered under the Land Registration Act can
not be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding and that any title issued
thereon is null and void. The same may be said of a sales patent. Once a
certificate of title is issued under the Land Registration Act in lieu of a sales
patent, the land is considered registered under the Torrens system and the
title of the patentee becomes indefeasible.
(3) Court of First Instance without power to decree again registration of land
already decreed. As the title of Olivia, who hold certificates of title under the
Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows that the CFI has no
power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the registration of the same
parcels of land covered by the certificates of title of Olivia.
To declare the later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens
system which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its indefeasibility.
It would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the efficacy of
the registration law. CFI affirmed.2
14 Averia vs. Caguioa
G.R. NO. 65129, DECEMBER 29, 1986, CRUZ, J.:
TORRENS SYSTEM
1 Sec. 122.—Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United
States or to the Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to
public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall
become registered lands. x x x After due registration and issue of the certificate and owner’s duplicate, such
land shall be registered land for all purposes under this Act.
2 Simagala
3

DOCTRINE/S: the court is no longer fettered by its former limited jurisdiction
which enabled it to grant relief only in cases where there was "unanimity
among the parties" or none of them raised any "adverse claim or serious objection."
Under the amended law, the court is now authorized to hear and decide not only
such non-controversial cases but even the contentious and substantial issues,
such as the question at bar, which were beyond its competence before.
FACTS:
Tomas Averia Jr. refused to participate in the hearing of the registration proceedings,
claiming CFI acting as a cadastral court, had no competence to act upon the said
case under Section 112 of Act 496, the "Land Registration Act." CFI then held the
hearing ex parte and rendered a decision ordering the registration prayed for on the
basis of the evidence presented by Veronica Padillo.
Averia then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction,
arguing that CFI had no competence to act on the registration sought because of the
absence of unanimity among the parties as required under Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act, citing Fojas v. Grey: "it has been held that summary relief under
Section 112 of Land Registration Act can only be granted if there, is unanimity among
the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party
in interest; otherwise, the case becomes contentious and controversial which should
be threshed out in an ordinary action or in any case where the incident properly
belongs."
ISSUE/S: Whether or not CFI has jurisdiction to order the registration of a deed of
sale which is opposed on the ground of an antecedent contract to sell. (YES)
Consequently, and specifically with reference to Section 112 of the Land Registration
Act (now Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529), the court is no longer fettered by its
former limited jurisdiction which enabled it to grant relief only in cases where
there was "unanimity among the parties" or none of them raised any "adverse
claim or serious objection." Under the amended law, the court is now authorized to
hear and decide not only such non-controversial cases but even the
contentious and substantial issues, such as the question at bar, which were
beyond its competence before.
It appears that the respondent court proceeded to hear the case below
notwithstanding the manifestation by the petitioner of his intention to elevate to this
Court the question of jurisdiction he had raised. The trial court should have given him
the opportunity to do so in the interest of due process, pending a categorical ruling on
the issue. As it happened, it arrived at its decision after considering only the evidence
of the private respondent and without regard to the evidence of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated September 23, 1983, is
set aside. Let a new trial of Cadastral Case No. 1, GLRO Cad. Record No. 202, Lot
No. 2810-B, Lucena Cadastre, M.C. No. 374-82, be held, at which the petitioner, as
well as other interested parties, shall be given the opportunity to be heard. Our
temporary restraining order of October. 5, 1983, is hereby lifted except as to the
registration of the questioned deed of sale which shall depend on the outcome of the
said case.
SO ORDERED.

HELD:
While this was a correct interpretation of the said provision, the same is, however, not
applicable to the instant case. The reason is that this case arose in 1982, after
the Land Registration Act had been superseded by the Property Registration
Decree, which became effective on June 11, 1979.

In Section 2 of the said P.D. No. 1529, it is clearly provided that: "Courts of First
Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original
registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and
over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions.

The above provision has eliminated the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court.
Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration
proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not
only on applications for "original registration" but also "over all petitions filed
after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions."
4

15 Almirol v. Register of Deeds of Agusan xxx

G.R. NO. L-22486, MARCH 10, 1968, CASTRO, J.: SO ORDERED.
TORRENS SYSTEM UNDER THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT

DOCTRINE/S:
Mandamus does not lie to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale
in question, because pursuant to Sec. 4, of Rep. Act 1151, where any party in interest
does not agree with the RD, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of
Land Registration;

Register of Deeds has no power to determine the validity of a document. It may not
validly refuse to register a document for registration. Whether a document is valid or
not, is not for the Register of Feeds to decide.

FACTS:
Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land in Agusan. Title of the
land was in the name of “Arcenio Abalo married to Nicolasa M. Abalo”. When Almirol
went to the Register of Deeds in Agusan, the latter refused to register his title. The
grounds were: (1) that the land was conjugal property; (2) that in such instance, both
spouses must sign the document; and (3) that since the wife is dead when the sale
was made, husband cannot dispose of the whole property.

Almirol went to the CFI and filed a petition for mandamus, compelling the RD to
register his title and stating that he had no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
The lower court however said that the mandamus will not lie because the adequate
remedy is provided by Sec. 4 of Rep. Act 1151.

Hence petition.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the mandamus will lie to compel the respondent to register the deed

HELD:

NO, mandamus will not lie. The correct remedy, as ruled by the lower court, is under
Sec. 4 of Rep. Act 1151. The said section provides that “where any party in interest
does not agree with the RD, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of
Land Registration”, who shall then prescribe the step to be taken. This step must be
taken by the petitioner before he could resort to the courts.

Also, the grounds taken up by the RD do not constitute legal grounds to refuse to
register a document. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the RD to
determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. The
same section and act provides for the steps to be taken by the RD in case of
problems or doubts in a document. He is supposed to submit and certify the question
to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter
an order, prescribing the steps to be taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. Accordingly, the Resolution of the lower
court is affirmed, at petitioner’s cost.
5

16 Aurelio Balbin and Francisco Balbin vs. Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur
GR No. L-20611 Makalintal, J.
Topic: Torrens System
Doctrine: Where three co-owner’s duplicate certificates of title are issued under
Section 43 of Act 496, a voluntary instrument cannot be registered without
surrendering all the copies of the same title to the Register of Deeds so that every
copy thereof would contain identical entries of transactions affecting the land covered
by the title.
Facts:
Petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy
of the registered owner’s certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an instrument entitled
“Deed of Donation inter-vivos” with the request that the same be annotated on the
title. The instrument contains that, Cornelio Balbin, the registered owner of the parcel
of land donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds portion thereof in favor of the
petitioners. (Entire area of the land is 11.2225 hectares)
The Register of Deeds denied the requested annotation for being legally
defective or otherwise not sufficient in law. It appears that previously annotated in the
memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three separate sales of
undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three
different buyers. Three co-owner's duplicate certificates of title No. 548 have been
issued in the name of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan upon
verbal request of Mr. Andres Cabeldo, Notary Public of Caoayan, Ilocos Sur. Because
the three other co-owner’s certificate copies of the certificate of title No. 548 had not
been presented by the petitioners, the Register of Deeds refused to make the
requested annotation.
vendees-co-owners in this case; and secondly, because the issuance of the duplicate
copies in their favor was illegal or unauthorized.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s request for annotation should be granted?
HELD: NO. Section 55 obviously assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the
title in question, namely, that of the registered owner himself, such that its production
whenever a voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him
for the register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of registration. In
the case at bar, the three other copies of the title were in existence, presumably
issued under section 43 of Act 496. As correctly observed by the Land Registration
Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the issuance of those copies was unauthorized
or illegal is beside the point, its legality being presumed until otherwise declared by a
court of competent jurisdiction. There being several copies of the same title in
existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely affected if an
encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the
others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of
the original, which means that both must contain identical entries of the transactions,
particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the title. If this were not so, if
different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the whole system of
Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur
and that of the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No pronouncement
as to costs.

Petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration, but

it upheld the decision of the Register of Deeds. It held that the donor is now merely a
co-owner of the property, having previously sold undivided portions thereof on three
different occasions in favor of three different buyers. Consequently, aside from the
owner's duplicate issued to Cornelio Balbin, there are now three co-owner's
duplicates which are presumably in the possession of the three buyers. In addition to
the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 548, the three co-owner's
duplicates must likewise be surrendered. Unless and until a court of competent
jurisdiction rules to the contrary, these titles are presumed to have been lawfully
issued.

Without presenting the three other duplicates of the title, petitioners

petitioners would want to compel annotation of the deed of donation upon the copy in
their possession, citing section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the production of
the owner's duplicate certificate of title whenever any voluntary instrument is
presented for registration shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to
the register of deeds to make a memorandum of registration in accordance with such
instrument." Petitioners contend that the presentation of other copies of the title is not
required, first, because it speaks of "registered owner" and not one whose claim to or
interest in the property is merely annotated on the title, such as the three
6
18 Republic v. Heirs of Abrille
DOCTRINE/S:
FACTS:
1. The increase in area of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
5609 of the Register of Deeds of Davao in the name of Francisco Villa
Abrille Lim Juna and subsequently by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T.
1439 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille and finally, based on subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-71236, by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725 in the name
of Milagros Huang, T20701 in the name of Josefino Huang, T-20713 in the
name of Miguel Huang and T-20690 in the name of Huang Siu Sin, is from
525,652 square meters to 607,779 square meters, or 82,127 square meters.
2. The remedy sought by the heirs in order to include the increase in area was
a PETITION FOR APPROVAL OF SUBDIVISION PLAN RECOMMENDED
BY THE COMMISSIONER OF LAND REGISTRATION IN HIS REPORT,
and for ISSUANCE OF NEW TITLE (Section 44, Act 496)
a. Section 44 of Act 496: notice before the hearing is required.
b. Parties admit that there was NO NOTICE to the persons interested,
including the Director of Lands, before the petition was heard.
3. Increase in area could not have been included in TCTs because a
subdivision of a registered land under Section 44 of Act 496 does not
authorise the inclusion of land or area not embraced in the titled or in excess
of what is stated in the title. A subsequent approval by the Court of such
subdivision plan does not lend validity to it. The subdivision must be limited
to the area stated in the title.
4. To bring the land under the operation of the Land Registration Act, a petition
for registration under Act 496 should have been filed.
5. Even assuming that the land is an accretion, the fact that the riparian estate
is registered does not bring ipso facto effect its accretion thereto under the
operation of the Land Registration Act.
6. No decree of registration of the land based upon final judgment promulgated
by a court of competent jurisdiction after due publication, notice and hearing,
has been issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration and transcribed
by the Register of Deeds of Davao in the registry, for the reason that no
initial or original registration proceedings have been instituted by the owner.
7. The only way a title can be issued for the first time is for the Land
Registration Commissioner to issue a decree of registration based upon final
judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction after trial.
8. TC: Cancelled TCTs and directed the Register of Deeds of Davao to issue
new certificates of title in lieu thereof after the portions consisting of 82,127
square meters.
9. CA : it was appealed
a. DEFENDANT contention : LC erred in holding the approval of
Subdivision Plan of no legal effect merely on ground of lack of
notice to interested persons. Since the Govt Agencies concerned
tolerated the ultimate inclusion of the increase in area. And that it is
their honest belief that the legal remedy taken by them in seeking
the approval of their subdivision plan concerned was well within the
law.
b. PLAINTIFF: Approval of the plan with the increased are bt the Land
Registration Commission does not lend validity to the said
subdivision plan and the isuace of the TCTS were improper and
invalid notwithstanding the conformity of the Land Registration
Commissioner and the subsequent order of the CFI, approving the
subdivision plan concerned, as the required giving of notice to all
parties interested in defendant-appellant's petition for approval of
subdivision plan was not at all followed.
ISSUE/S:
WON the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of TCTS, which covered the
increased area in question totalling 82,127 sqm.
HELD:
1. NO lower court acted correctly in ordering the cancellation of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which
admittedly covered the increased area of 82,127 square meters under
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-71236 (and formerly under Psd-69322) for the
City of Davao. LC was correct in cancelling the TCT, which covered the
increased area.
2. The steps taken by the defendant was unwarranted and irregular. The
increased area in question (not a registered land but formerly a river bed), is
big as to gove allowance for mere mistake in area of the orgininal
registration formerly belonging and registered under their grandfather,
Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna.
3. To bring an increase in area, proceedings in registrations of land title should
have been filed Instead of an ordinary approval of subdivision plan (Land
Registration Law Act 496).
4. Recourse under Section 44 of Act 496 is good only if it covers previously
registered lands.
In the present case, land was NOT under the operation of the Torrens System.
Also, approval of Subdivision Plans was without notice to all parties in interest, more
particularly the Director of Lands.
REQUISITES: For an applicant to have his imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a
land to be originally registered under Act 496, the following requisites should all be
satisfied:
a. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor;
b. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;
c. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court;
d. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together with all
the documents or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to
the Land Registration Commission;
e. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place of
the hearing in the Official Gazette;
f. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known to
have interests in the property by the sheriff;
7

g. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the

notice/ not;
h. Hearing of the case by the Court;
i. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;
j. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and
instructing the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of
confirmation and registration;
k. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration Commission;
l. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding Register
of Deeds, and
m. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and the
issuance of the owner's duplicate original certificate of title to the applicant
by the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto

xxx
SO ORDERED.
8
19 G.R. No. 147928 January 11, 2005
EMMANUEL F. CONCEPCION, HEIRS OF JESUS F. CONCEPCION, Namely:
BETTY CONCEPCION and JIMMY CONCEPCION; and HEIRS OF REGINO F.
CONCEPCION, JR. Namely: ROSARIO VDA. DE CONCEPCION and JERNIE
CONCEPCION, petitioners, defendants
vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE F. CONCEPCION, Namely: ANTONIO CONCEPCION, LOURDES
C. WATTS and IDA C. HORVAT, (and HON. COURT OF APPEALS), respondents,
plaintiffs
Facts:
All the parties in this case are descendants of the late spouses Regino Concepcion,
Sr. and Concepcion Famador. Petitioner Emmanuel is a son of the late spouses while
the other petitioners Betty, Jimmy, Rosario and Jernie AND respondents Antonio
Concepcion, Lourdes C. Watts and Ida C. Horvat are grandchildren of the spouses.
Deceased spouses Regino Concepcion, Sr. and Concepcion Famador had 7 children
namely: Jose (father of respondents Antonio Concepcion, Lourdes Watts and Ida
Horvat), Jesus (father of petitioners Betty Concepcion and Jimmy Concepcion),
Maria, Vicente, Regino, Jr. (father of petitioners Rosario Vda. De Concepcion and
Jernie Concepcion), Elena and Emmanuel. During their marriage, the couple acquired
real properties situated at Zulueta Street, Cebu City, referred to as the Zulueta
property; and Lot No. 10110, Lot No. 10132, Lot No. 10129 all situated in Pit-os
Cebu City.
Upon death of the spouses, Concepcion Famador, left a will disposing her
paraphernal properties and her share in the CPG.
The will was probated. However, Jose, one of the sons of the late spouses and father
of the respondents, contested the probate on the ground that the disposition made
therein impaired his legitime.
The probate court dismissed the probate proceedings because Jesus, as the estate’s
executor, neglected to perform his duties after the will was probated. Consequently,
the probate court was not able to adjudicate to the heirs their respective shares.
Hence, Jose filed a complaint for partition against his 6 siblings docketed as Civil
Case No. R-13850.
In a decision, CFI declared plaintiff Jose entitled to a share of 1,183.57 sqm. as his
legitime from his mother’s estate and 1,829 sqm as his intestate share from the estate
of Regino Concepcion, Sr. and ordered defendants Regino, Jesus and Emmanuel
Concepcion to contribute proportionately to the completion of plaintiff’s legitime.
Inasmuch as respondents have not yet complied with the decision, the same court
(CFI) issued an Order directing the sheriff to execute a deed of conveyance covering
the Zulueta property in favor of Jose.
Deed of Conveyance over the Zulueta property was executed in favor of Jose. But,
when Jose presented the same deed for registration, the Register of Deeds required
him to surrender the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-52227 which title was in
possession of petitioners. Despite demands, petitioners refused delivery of the
title.1awphi1.nét
Hence, Jose filed with the RTC (sitting as land registration court) a petition for the
Cancellation of TCT No. T-52227. Which was granted and ordered defendant Mr.
Jesus Concepcion to deliver to he Register of Deeds the owner’s copy of TCT No.
52227 covering the Zulueta Property. Which was affirmed by CA.
Issue:
WON the cadastral court (RTC) is without jurisdiction to entertain and resolve the
opposition filed by the petitioners.
Ruling: No, it has jurisdiction.
SC said that, in the proceedings before the cadastral court (RTC), petitioners filed an
opposition claiming that the action of the Sheriff in levying the Zulueta property was
with grave abuse of authority since said property is not within the scope of the
decision CFI in the Civil Case No. R-13850 (partition).
In dismissing said opposition and ordering the title covering the Zulueta property, the
cadastral court explained that the matters brought out by the oppositors are not within
its jurisdiction and that the oppositors complaint should have been filed before the
Court (CFI) which tried the civil case (partition) and which have already resolved the
issue of ownership between the parties therein.
However, SC applied the case of Ligon vs. CA which said that Under Sec. 2 of P.D.
1529, Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of titles to lands, including
improvements and interest therein and over all petitions filed after original registration
of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications
or petitions.’ The above provision has eliminated the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the
former law when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of
suits the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the RTC
the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also over all
petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions.
From the forgoing it is clear that both the cadastral court and CA erred in holding that
the former is without jurisdiction to entertain and resolve the opposition thereat filed
by the petitioners.
It follows that, it is improper for the cadastral court to issue its order directing the
petitioners to deliver the title covering the Zulueta property. That order is void and
without force and effect. (not mentioned in the case: but there must be a hearing
before the issuance of the order)
9

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals VACATED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.