POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

BERSAMIN DOCTRINES

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

 The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the
State, provides that the State may not be sued without its consent.

 Unincorporated government agency performing governmental function can invoke immunity from suit because its
function is governmental or incidental to such function; Unincorporated government agency performing proprietary
functions cannot invoke immunity from suit because its function is not governmental but was essentially a business.

 The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim arising from the taking
without the payment of just compensation or without the proper expropriation proceeding. Such doctrine cannot be
an instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen.

 The NHA could sue or be sued.

 The power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered because the government funds or property may not be
seized pursuant to writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgment.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

 Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable
cause for the purpose of filing the information unless there is grave abuse of discretion because it is a full
discretionary authority of the Executive which is represented by DOJ.

DELEGATION OF POWERS

 The Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards the authority to adopt and promulgate
IRRs since it is not legislative in character

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

 The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, must be
made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:

1. There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within
their respective offices;
2. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and
3. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.

 The Constitution provides that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law. The court held that the provisions of the GAA were not self-executory. This meant that the execution of
the GAA was still subject to a program of expenditure to be approved by the President, and such approved program
of expenditure was the basis for the release of funds

Indeed, an appropriation by Congress was required before the judgment that rendered the UP liable for moral and actual
damages including attorney’s fees would be satisfied considering that such monetary liabilities were not covered by the
“appropriations earmarked for the said project.” The Constitution strictly mandated that “no money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” (University of the Philippines vs. Dizon, 679 SCRA
54, G.R. No. 171182 August 23, 2012)
The Legislature deprived the party-list organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees
once the list is submitted to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), except when:
(a) the nominee dies;
(b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or
(c) the nominee becomes incapacitated.

The COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the real intended nominees of the party-list
organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all the requirements prescribed by the law and whether
or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees
will be published in newspapers of general circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a
party-list system of election, not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of any
particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list nominees in newspapers of general
circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed choices. (Lokin, Jr.
Commission on Elections, 621 SCRA 385, G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010)

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. The
Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department.
(Vinuya vs. Romulo, 732 SCRA 595, G.R. No. 162230 August 12, 2014)

Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is
the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type. Impoundment under the GAA is understood to mean the
retention or deduction of appropriations. The 2011 GAA authorized impoundment only in case of unmanageable
National Government budget deficit.

The implementation of the DAP resulted into the use of savings pooled by the Executive to finance the PAPs that were
not covered in the GAA, or that did not have proper appropriation covers, as well as to augment items pertaining to other
departments of the Government in clear violation of the Constitution. (Araullo vs. Aquino III, 728 SCRA 1, G.R. No.
209569 July 1, 2014)

The text of Section 13, 1987 Constitution, plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose
a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in
the Government or in government-owned or government controlled-corporations was concerned. In this regard, to hold
an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the office, which implies
nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself,
1987 Constitution, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition
against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or
designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of Section 13, 1987
Constitution, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President,
the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.

According to Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, 494 SCRA 53 (2006), the only two exceptions against the holding of
multiple offices are:
(1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice President to become
a member of the Cabinet; and
(2) posts occupied by Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in ex
officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the officials’ offices.

In this regard, the Court held that the phrase “the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants” found in
Section 13, 1987 Constitution, referred only to the heads of the various executive departments, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries, and did not extend to other public officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant
Secretary. Hence, in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, 494 SCRA 53 (2006), the Court opined that the prohibition under
Section 13 did not cover Elma, a Presidential Assistant with the rank of Undersecretary. (Funa vs. Agra, 691 SCRA 196,
G.R. No. 191644 February 19, 2013)

The prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the
Judiciary. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President
upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill
the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court. The usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall—an imperative, operating to impose a duty that
may be enforced—should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to
make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure
by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.

Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days
from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts. The
90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates
to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the vacancy. Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for
the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the
President to appoint one of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion
to submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the
Constitution for the President to make the appointment. (De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), 615 SCRA 666,
G.R. No. 191002 March 17, 2010)

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit:

(1) there must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the Court;
(2) the person challenging the act must be a proper party;
(3) the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication;
(4) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and must be the very litis mota of the
case. (Funa vs. Duque III, 742 SCRA 166, G.R. No. 191672 November 25, 2014) (Araullo vs. Aquino III, 728
SCRA 1, G.R. No. 209569 July 1, 2014) (Funa vs. Agra, 691 SCRA 196, G.R. No. 191644 February 19, 2013)

The Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Only the Court
is a constitutionally created court, the rest being created by Congress in its exercise of the legislative power. The
Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only “to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”

The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its
unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or
disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. We find the doctrine of operative
fact applicable to the adoption and implementation of the DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair
play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be
undone. To be clear, the doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or unconstitutional executive act.

The Court likewise declared that “for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a ‘legislative or executive
measure,’ meaning a law or executive issuance.” Thus, the Court opined there that the operative fact doctrine did not
apply to a mere administrative practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, viz.: Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely
upon a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner from the time the rule or ruling is issued up to its reversal by the
Commissioner or this Court. The reversal is not given retroactive effect. This, in essence, is the doctrine of operative fact.
There must, however, be a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner that is relied upon by the taxpayer in good faith..
(Araullo vs. Aquino III, 728 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 209569 July 1, 2014)

This Court has exercised its power of judicial review in cases otherwise rendered moot and academic by supervening
events on the basis of certain recognized exceptions, namely:
(1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(2) the case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest;
(3) the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and
the public; and
(4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. (Funa vs. Duque III, 742 SCRA 166, G.R. No. 191672
 November 25, 2014)

Suntay is also incorrect to insinuate that a modification or reversal of a final and executory decision rendered by a
division of the Court would be valid only if done by the Court en bancMoreover, although Article VIII, Section 4 (1) of the
Constitution gives the Court the discretion to sit either en banc or in divisions of three, five, or seven Members, the
divisions are not considered separate and distinct courts. Nor is a hierarchy of courts thereby established within the
Supreme Court, which remains a unit notwithstanding that it also works in divisions. The actions taken and the
decisions rendered by any of the divisions are those of the Court itself, considering that the divisions are not
considered separate and distinct courts but as divisions of one and the same court. Lastly, the only thing that the
Constitution allows the banc to do in this regard is to reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court en
banc or in division. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Suntay, 662 SCRA 614, G.R. No. 188376 December 14, 2011)

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION

The audit jurisdiction of the COA extends to all government-owned or -controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, and
other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, as well as to all nongovernmental entities
subsidized by the Government, or funded by donations through the Government, or required to pay levies or
government share, or for which the Government has put up a counterpart fund, or those partly funded by the
Government. (National Housing Authority vs. Roxas, 773 SCRA 358, G.R. No. 171953 October 21, 2015)

The Constitution has made the COA “the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts
pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property, including the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations.” Thus, the COA is generally accorded complete discretion in
the exercise of its constitutional duty and responsibility to examine and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly
those which are perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by law. (Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA) vs. Commission on Audit, 750 SCRA 247, G.R. No. 196418 February 10, 2015)

BILL OF RIGHTS

POLICE POWER

In particular, police power is regarded as “the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it
does ‘to all the great public needs.’ ” It is unquestionably “the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make,
ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and
of the subject of the same.” (Legaspi vs. City of Cebu, 711 SCRA 771, G.R. No. 159692 December 10, 2013)

EMINENT DOMAIN

The right of eminent domain is “the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public but the
private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, to public purpose.” But the exercise of such right is not
unlimited, for two mandatory requirements should underlie the Government’s exercise of the power of eminent domain,
namely:
(1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and
(2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner.

Public use, in common acceptation, means “use by the public”. To be valid, the taking must be for public use. The
meaning of the term “public use” has evolved over time in response to changing public needs and exigencies. “Public
use” has now been held to be synonymous with “public interest,” “public benefit,” and “public convenience.”

With respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose
stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is
then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the
same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for
the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be
devoted.
Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of the element of public
use. To continue with the expropriation proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public purpose of the project
would result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the expropriator due to the absence of the essential
element of public use.

NAPOCOR entered the property without the owners’ consent and without paying just compensation to the respondents.
Neither did it deposit any amount as required by law prior to its entry. The Constitution is explicit in obliging the
Government and its entities to pay just compensation before depriving any person of his or her property for public use.
Considering that in the process of installing transmission lines, NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit trees and plants without
payment, and the installation of the transmission lines went through the middle of the land as to divide the property into
three lots, thereby effectively rendering the entire property inutile for any future use, it would be unfair for NAPOCOR
not to be made liable to the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry until the time
of restoration of the possession of the property.

In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to the respondents, there is no
need to pay “just compensation” to them because their property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full market
value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their property
rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the time of restoration of the possession by paying to them actual or
other compensatory damages. (Republic vs. Heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon, 745 SCRA 40, G.R. No. 165354 January 12,
2015)

The limited access imposed on the petitioner’s property did not partake of a compensable taking due to the exercise of the
power of eminent domain. Instead, the property was subjected to a certain restraint, in order to secure the general safety
and welfare of the motorists using the NLEX. There being a clear and valid exercise of police power, the petitioner was
certainly not entitled to any just compensation. (Hermano Oil Manufacturing & Sugar Corporation vs. Toll Regulatory
Board, 742 SCRA 395, G.R. No. 167290 November 26, 2014)

The Congress has thereby required that any determination of just compensation should consider the following factors,
namely:
(a) the cost of the acquisition of the land;
(b) the current value of like properties;
(c) the nature, actual use and income of the land;
(d) the sworn valuation by the owner;
(e) the tax declarations;
(f) the assessment made by government assessors;
(g) the social and economic benefits contributed to the property by the farmers and farmworkers and by the
Government; and
(h) the fact of the non-payment of any taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the land.
(Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Nable, 675 SCRA 253, G.R. No. 176692 June 27, 2012)

The prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an action for damages,
and does not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC cannot thereby bar the
right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their land.

There was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually
dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual
physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the expropriator’s action may be short of acquisition of title, physical
possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction,
diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property
in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use
of his property, nor material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes
hands. As a result, NPC should pay just compensation for the entire land (National Corporation vs. Heirs of
Macabangkit Sangkay, 656 SCRA 60, G.R. No. 165828 August 24, 2011)

The taking of property under CARL is an exercise by the State of the power of eminent domain. Just compensation is
fixed at the time of the actual taking by the State. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is
deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value,
to be computed from the time the property is taken up to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with
the court. (Apo Fruits Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 607 SCRA 200, G.R. No. 164195 December 4, 2009)

The power of eminent domain is not an unlimited power. Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution sets down the
essential limitations upon this inherent right of the State to take private property, namely:
(a) that the taking must be for a public purpose; and
(b) that just compensation must be paid to the owner.

In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank, 632 SCRA 727 (2010), the Court has held that compensation cannot be just to the
owner in the case of property that is immediately taken unless there is prompt payment, considering that the owner
thereby immediately suffers not only the loss of his property but also the loss of its fruits or income. Thus, in addition, the
owner is entitled to legal interest from the time of the taking of the property until the actual payment in order to place the
owner in a position as good as, but not better than, the position he was in before the taking occurred. (Export Processing
Zone Authority (now Philippine Export Zone Authority)vs. Pulido, 656 SCRA 315, G.R. No. 188995 August 24, 2011)

Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, the power of judicial review becomes limited in scope,
and the courts will be left to determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the affected
landowners. Only when the landowners are not given their just compensation for the taking of their property or when
there has been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may the remedy of prohibition become available.
(Yusay vs. Court of Appeals, 647 SCRA 269, G.R. No. 156684 April 6, 2011)

DUE PROCESS – THE RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY & PROPERTY

The guaranty of due process of law is a constitutional safeguard against any arbitrariness on the part of the Government,
whether committed by the Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary. It is a protection essential to every inhabitant of the
country, for, as a commentator on Constitutional Law has vividly written: x x x. If the law itself unreasonably deprives a
person of his life, liberty, or property, he is denied the protection of due process. If the enjoyment of his rights is
conditioned on an unreasonable requirement, due process is likewise violated. (Legaspi vs. City of Cebu, 711 SCRA 771,
G.R. No. 159692 December 10, 2013)

Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural due process. Yet, there are many instances under our
laws in which the absence of one or both of such requirements is not necessarily a denial or deprivation of due process.
Among the instances are the cancellation of the passport of a person being sought for the commission of a crime, the
preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative charges, the distraint of properties to answer for tax
delinquencies, the padlocking of restaurants found to be unsanitary or of theaters showing obscene movies, and the
abatement of nuisance per se. Add to them the arrest of a person in flagrante delicto. The clamping of the petitioners’
vehicles pursuant to Ordinance No. 1664 was of the same character as the aforecited established exceptions dispensing
with notice and hearing. In other words, the prior intervention of a court of law was not indispensable to ensure a
compliance with the guaranty of due process. (Legaspi vs. City of Cebu, 711 SCRA 771, G.R. No. 159692 December 10,
2013)

The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process. Due process
is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In
administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer
the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to
be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. (Vivo vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR), 709 SCRA 276, G.R. No. 187854 November 12, 2013)

The requirements of due process in an administrative context are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy, for the essence of due process is an
opportunity to be heard. (Barayuga vs. Adventist University of the Philippines, 655 SCRA 640, G.R. No. 168008 August
17, 2011)

A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned
upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing. (Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, 617 SCRA 575, G.R. Nos. 187958,
187961, and 187962  April 7, 2010)

In criminal cases, where the life and liberty of the accused is at stake, due process requires that the accused be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him; hence, any accused not clearly charged in the complaint or
information for the offense could not be convicted of it, for to convict him so would be to violate his constitutional right.
In view of his innocence being presumed, he should likewise be presumed not to know anything about the crime he was
being charged of committing. The information must then aver the facts and circumstances bearing on the culpability and
liability of the accused so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. However, it is not necessary for the
information to allege the date and time of the commission of the crime with exactitude unless such date and time are
essential ingredients of the offenses charged. (People vs. Nuyok, 757 SCRA 480, G.R. No. 195424 June 15, 2015)

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for
its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is
involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. (Sesbreño vs.
Court of Appeals, 720 SCRA 57, G.R. No. 160689 March 26, 2014)
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

BAIL

Bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. (Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third
Division), 767 SCRA 282, G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015)

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The presumption of
innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail,
and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused. (Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan
(Third Division), 767 SCRA 282, G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015)
The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty could not prevail over the stronger presumption of innocence
favoring the accused. Otherwise, the constitutional guarantee of the accused being presumed innocent would be held
subordinate to a mere rule of evidence allocating the burden of evidence.

Moreover, the regularity of the performance of their duty could not be properly presumed in favor of the policemen
because the records were replete with indicia of their serious lapses. As a rule, a presumed fact like the regularity of
performance by a police officer must be inferred only from an established basic fact, not plucked out from thin air.

The constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary importance, and the conviction
of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense he put up but on the strength of the evidence for the
Prosecution. (People vs. Caliso, 659 SCRA 666, G.R. No. 183830 October 19, 2011)

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED

The illegal possession of marijuana was “a crime that is necessarily included in the crime of drug pushing or dealing, for
which the accused have been charged with.” The right of Manansala to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him enunciated in Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution was not violated simply because
the information had precisely charged him with selling, delivering, giving away and distributing more or less 750 grams
of dried marijuana leaves. As such, the crime of illegal sale included or absorbed the crime of illegal possession. The rule
is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or
established by the evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged. (People vs. Manansala, 695 SCRA 70, G.R. No. 175939
April 3, 2013)
The Bill of Rights guarantees some rights to every person accused of a crime, among them the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation, viz.: Section 14.
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Patula vs. People, 669 SCRA 135, G.R. No. 164457 April 11, 2012)

The constitutional guarantee of the right to information on matters of public concern enunciated in Section 7 of Article III
of the 1987 Constitution complements the State’s policy of full public disclosure in all transactions involving public
interest expressed in Section 28 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions are aimed at ensuring transparency
in policy-making as well as in the operations of the Government, and at safeguarding the exercise by the people of the
freedom of expression. But the people’s right to information is not absolute. The constitutional guarantee to information
“does not open every door to any and all information.” It is limited to matters of public concern, and is subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.

The Supreme Court (SC) has already declared that the constitutional guarantee of the people’s right to information does
not cover national security matters and intelligence information, trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal
matters. The Court has ruled that the right to information does not extend to matters acknowledged as “privileged
information under the separation of powers,” which include “Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions
during closed-door Cabinet meetings.” Likewise exempted from the right to information are “information on military and
diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused.” (Sereno vs. Committee on Trade and Related Matters
(CTRM) of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), 782 SCRA 486, G.R. No. 175210 February 1,
2016)

RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

The 90-day period within which a sitting trial Judge should decide a case or resolve a pending matter is mandatory. The
period is reckoned from the date of the filing of the last pleading. If the Judge cannot decide or resolve within the period,
she can be allowed additional time to do so, provided she files a written request for the extension of her time to decide the
case or resolve the pending matter. Only a valid reason may excuse a delay. (Lubaton vs. Lazaro, 704 SCRA 404, A.M.
No. RTJ-12-2320 September 2, 2013)

Although the Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy disposition of cases, such speedy disposition is a flexible
concept. There occurs a violation of the right to a speedy disposition of a case only
(1) when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or
(2) when unjustified postponements of the trial are sought and secured, or
(3) when, without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried. It is cogent to mention that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not determinant of
the concept. (Dacudao vs. Gonzales, 688 SCRA 109, G.R. No. 188056 January 8, 2013)

Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution requires that all cases or matters filed after the effectivity of the
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court,
and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other
lower courts. Thereby, the Constitution mandates all justices and judges to be efficient and speedy in the disposition of
the cases or matters pending in their courts. (Maturan vs. Gutierrez-Torres, 681 SCRA 311, A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1606-
MTJ September 19, 2012)

The ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall commence to run from submission of the case for decision without
memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its filing, the case shall be considered submitted for decision upon the
filing of the last memorandum or upon the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier. Lack of transcript of
stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend the period for deciding the case unless the case was
previously heard by another judge not the deciding judge in which case the latter shall have the full period of ninety (90)
days for the completion of the transcripts within which to decide the same.” (Olaguer vs. Ampuan, 632 SCRA 226, A.M.
No. MTJ-10-1769 October 6, 2010)
 WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be
illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not issue where the person
in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge
with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. (Mangila vs. Pangilinan, 701 SCRA 355, G.R.
No. 160739 July 17, 2013)

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

It is axiomatic that by appealing he waived the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, leaving him open to
being convicted of whatever crimes the Court would ultimately conclude from the records to have been actually
committed by him within the terms of the allegations in the informations under which he had been arraigned. (Zafra vs.
People, 730 SCRA 465, G.R. No. 176317 July 23, 2014)

CITIZENSHIP

The petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on March 9, 2012 and executed his Affidavit of Renunciation on October 2,
2012. By his Oath of Allegiance and his renunciation of his USA citizenship, he reverted to the status of an exclusively
Filipino citizen. On October 5, 2012, the date he filed his CoC he was, therefore, exclusively a Filipino citizen, rendering
him eligible to run for public office. His CoC was valid for all intents and purposes of the election laws because he did not
make therein any material misrepresentation of his eligibility to run as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.

We uphold the declaration by the COMELEC En Banc that the petitioner was ineligible to run and be voted for as Mayor
of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. It is not disputed that on October 6, 2012, after having renounced his USA
citizenship and having already filed his CoC, he travelled abroad using his USA passport, thereby representing himself as
a citizen of the USA. He continued using his USA passport in his subsequent travels abroad despite having been already
issued his Philippine passport on August 23, 2012. He thereby effectively repudiated his oath of renunciation on October
6, 2012, the first time he used his USA passport after renouncing his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012. Consequently,
he could be considered an exclusively Filipino citizen only for the four days from October 2, 2012 until October 6,
2012. The petitioner’s continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of the USA through using his USA passport after the
renunciation of his USA citizenship reverted him to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion disqualified him
from being elected to public office in the Philippines pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
(Agustin vs. Commission on Elections, 774 SCRA 353, G.R. No. 207105 November 10, 2015)

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.”
Although their respective functions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of
the Philippines in the discharge of such functions. Each of the Constitutional Commissions conducts its own proceedings
under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are
subject only to review on certiorari by the Court as provided by Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution describes the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government and
is principally mandated to establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service; to strengthen the merit and rewards system; to
integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks; and to institutionalize a management
climate conducive to public accountability.

A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not
expired.

A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an
appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as
valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, insofar as the public or third persons who are interested therein are
concerned. (Funa vs. Duque III, 742 SCRA 166, G.R. No. 191672 November 25, 2014) (Funa vs. Agra, 691 SCRA 196, G.R.
No. 191644 February 19, 2013)
In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of Justice,
assuming that was his later designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally
appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity of the dealings by the
public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State. (Funa vs. Agra, 691 SCRA 196, G.R. No. 191644
February 19, 2013)

Catena’s resignation from the service did not cause the Court to lose its jurisdiction to proceed against her in this
administrative case. Her cessation from office by virtue of her intervening resignation did not warrant the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against her, for the act complained of had been committed when she was still in the service.

Catena’s intervening resignation necessarily means that the penalty of dismissal could no longer be implemented against
her. Instead, fine is imposed, the determination of the amount of which is subject to the sound discretion of the Court.
(Concerned Citizen vs. Catena, 701 SCRA 255, A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1321-P July 16, 2013)

Indeed, the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate extends to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
non-feasance that have been committed during his tenure of office by any officer or employee of the Government, or of
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations. The Office
of the Ombudsman also has the power to act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions that:
(1) are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s functions, though in accordance with law;
(4) proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

At the same time, the Office of the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority, can impose
the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at
fault. The exercise of all such powers is well founded on the Constitution and on Republic Act No. 6770. (Office of the
Ombudsman vs. De Leon, 692 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 154083 February 27, 2013)

The objective of disciplining an officer or employee is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the
improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in the Government. Judge
Asuncion is reminded, therefore, that the Constitution stresses that a public office is a public trust and public officers
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. (Rosqueta vs. Asuncion, 719 SCRA 395, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1823 March
19, 2014) (Re: Employees Incurring Habitual Tardiness in the Second Semester of 2009, 645 SCRA 309, A.M. No. 2010-
11-SC March 15, 2011)

As a court employee, he must comply with his valid contractual obligation, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards
to preserve the Judiciary’s integrity and reputation. Unfortunately, he failed to prove that he had adequately discharged
his obligation. Hence, his actuations warrant condign disciplinary action.

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which pertinently states: Sec. 46. Discipline: General Provisions.
(a) No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law
and after due process.
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action: x x x
(22) Willful failure to pay just debts or willful failure to pay taxes due to the government; (Tan vs. Hernando, 597
SCRA 375, A.M. No. P-08-2501 August 28, 2009)

The next-in-rank status of a government employee is not a guarantee to one’s fitness to the position aspired for, and the
applicant must go through the rigors of a screening and selection process as determined and conducted by a department
or agency, subject only to the standards and guidelines set by the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

The screening process is that which each department or agency formulates and administers in accordance with the law,
rules, regulations, and standards set by the CSC. If neither the law nor the implementing rules and regulations define in
specific terms or criteria the particulars of the screening process, then each agency or department is empowered to
formulate its own screening processes subject to the standards and guidelines set by the CSC. The CA thus correctly
concluded that the appointing authority exercised the right of choice, freely exercising its best judgment, in determining
the best qualified applicants from those who had the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.

Any or all of the following would constitute as a meritorious case, excepted from the 3-salary grade limitation on
promotion and transfer:
1. The position occupied by the person is next-in-rank to the vacant position, as identified in Merit Promotion Plan
and the System of Ranking Positions (SRP) of the agency;
2. The position is a lone, or entrance position, as indicated in the agency staffing pattern;
3. The position belongs to the dearth cate positions and Attorney positions;
4. The positions is unique and/or highly specialized, such as Actuarial positions and Airways Communicator;
5. The candidates passed through a deep selection process, taking into consideration the candidates’ superior
qualifications in regard to: Educational achievements, Highly specialized trainings, Relevant work experience,
Consistent high performance rating/ranking;
6. The vacant position belongs to the closed career system.

In connection with the foregoing, the CSC Regional Director concerned will be the one who will approve and grant any
exception in accordance with the above guidelines. (underlining supplied) After the LTO-CO-SPB considered Se’s
appointment to fall under the fifth exception, the petitioners challenged the promotion, but the CSC-NCR affirmed the
promotion by opining that “the aforementioned rule should not be interpreted in its strict sense and the circumstances on
the appointment of Se would fit in the term very ‘meritorious cases.’” In respect of Borja, the CSC-NCR declared that: “It
cannot be denied that (Se) has completed the academic requirements in Master’s in Business Administration (MBA),
which was rated 13% as against 10% for Ms. Borja not to mention that he was rated a maximum of 5% under Outstanding
Accomplishment while there was none for Ms. Borja.”

The CSC fittingly stressed that “the three-salary grade limitation should not be the sole basis for the disapproval of an
appointment but should be taken as an indicator of possible abuse of discretion in the appointment process.” A relevant
inquiry into the qualifications of Borja and Se has convinced us to hold that Se’s appointment should be upheld because
he was better qualified than Borja despite the fact that he was not the next-in-rank or that his promotion would require
moving him to six-salary grades higher. (Estrellado vs. David, 784 SCRA 96, G.R. No. 184288 February 16, 2016)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Misconduct in office is such misconduct that affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects
his character as a private individual. To warrant removal from office, it must have direct relation to and be connected
with the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to
discharge the duties of the office.

The respondent’s preventive suspension was done pending investigation. In this regard, an employee who is placed
under preventive suspension pending investigation is not entitled to compensation because such suspension is not a
penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. (Garcia vs.
Molina, 778 SCRA 71, G.R. No. 165223 January 11, 2016)

Under this provision of the Rules of Court, Monteroso could enforce the writ of execution only “according to its terms, in
the manner herein after provided.” However, he was remiss in his duty to enforce the writ by collecting only P25,000.00.
Even assuming that he had only been successful in collecting P25,000.00 from the defendant, he still exceeded his
authority in requesting Marsada to sign the typewritten acknowledgment receipt reflecting the P25,000.00 as the full and
complete satisfaction of the writ of execution. He had neither basis nor reason to have Marsada sign the receipt in that
tenor because the text and tenor of the writ of execution expressly required the recovery of P35,000.00 from the losing
party. Also, Marsada claimed that Monteroso had represented to him that the defendant could no longer pay the balance.
The representation, even if true, did not justify Monteroso’s unilateral decision to discontinue the effort to recover the
balance. It clearly devolved upon him as the sheriff to levy upon the execution debtor’s properties, if any, as well as to
garnish the debts due to the latter and the credits belonging to the latter. The duty to exhaust all efforts to recover the
balance was laid down in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Marsada did not establish that the act complained of was tainted with corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or
disregard of established rules. Consequently, Monteroso’s liability only amounted to simple misconduct, which is
classified under Section 46(D), of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service as a less grave
offense punishable by suspension from one month and one day to six months for the first offense, and dismissal from the
service for the second offense. As earlier mentioned, Monteroso had previously been sanctioned twice. In A.M. No. P-08-
2461 (Cebrian v. Monteroso, April 23, 2008), he was found guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service for failure to implement the writs of execution assigned to him, and was
meted the penalty of suspension without pay for six (6) months. In A.M. No. P-06-2237 (Beltran v. Monteroso, December
4, 2008, 573 SCRA 1), he was declared liable for grave misconduct, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service for persistently disregarding the basic rules on execution, and was suspended for one (1) year without pay
and other benefits, with a stern warning that another transgression of a similar nature would merit his dismissal from the
service. Although his dismissal from the service would have already been warranted under the circumstances, he is only
being fined in the amount of P10,000.00 because he had meanwhile retired from the service as of December 7, 2007. The
fine shall be paid out of his accrued leaves. In addition, his entire retirement benefits are hereby forfeited. (Marsada vs.
Monteroso, 785 SCRA 599, A.M. No. P-10-2793 March 8, 2016)

The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that the heads of the various executive departments are
the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads in the performance of their official duties are
deemed the acts of the President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts. This doctrine is in recognition
of the fact that in our presidential form of government, all executive organizations are adjuncts of a single Chief
Executive; that the heads of the Executive Departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and that the
multiple executive functions of the President as the Chief Executive are performed through the Executive Departments.

In said case, the Department of Justice, upon the request of the Secretary of Interior, investigated Makati Mayor Jose D.
Villena and found him guilty of bribery, extortion, and abuse of authority. The Secretary of Interior then recommended to
the President the suspension from office of Mayor Villena. Upon approval by the President of the recommendation, the
Secretary of Interior suspended Mayor Villena. Unyielding, Mayor Villena challenged his suspension, asserting that the
Secretary of Interior had no authority to suspend him from office because there was no specific law granting such power
to the Secretary of Interior; and that it was the President alone who was empowered to suspend local government
officials. The Court disagreed with Mayor Villena and upheld his suspension, holding that the doctrine of qualified
political agency warranted the suspension by the Secretary of Interior. (Manalang-Demigillo vs. Trade and Investment
Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP), 692 SCRA 359, G.R. No. 168613 March 5, 2013)

Indeed, the powers and functions of the OSG are neither required by the primary functions nor included by the powers of
the DOJ, and vice versa. The OSG, while attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent unit of the latter, as, in fact, the
Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that the OSG is independent and autonomous. With the enactment of Republic Act
No. 9417, the Solicitor General is now vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications for appointment, rank,
prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and privileges as those of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals.

Clearly, the primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are not related or necessary to the primary functions of
the Department of Justice. Considering that the nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper,
from considerations of public policy, for one person to retain both, an incompatibility between the offices exists, further
warranting the declaration of Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation as
the Acting Solicitor General, to be void for being in violation of the express provisions of the Constitution. (Funa vs. Agra,
691 SCRA 196, G.R. No. 191644 February 19, 2013)

It is axiomatic, to begin with, that a party who seeks the intervention of a court of law upon an administrative concern
should first avail himself of all the remedies afforded by administrative processes. The issues that an administrative
agency is authorized to decide should not be summarily taken away from it and submitted to a court of law without first
giving the agency the opportunity to dispose of the issues upon due deliberation. The court of law must allow the
administrative agency to carry out its functions and discharge its responsibilities within the specialized areas of its
competence. This rests on the theory that the administrative authority is in a better position to resolve questions
addressed to its particular expertise, and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by
their superiors if given a chance to do so. (Special People, Inc. Foundation vs. Canda, 688 SCRA 403, G.R. No. 160932
January 14, 2013)

The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency.
Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial
function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, stating that the prosecutor in a
preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor
rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It
is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the
accused, not the fiscal.

For sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court of law or a legislative office that affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making; it performs adjudicatory functions, and its awards
and adjudications determine the rights of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same effect as the judgments
of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect whenever a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to
determine probable cause in order to file a criminal information against a person properly charged with the offense, or
whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public prosecutor’s orders or resolutions. (Dacudao vs. Gonzales, 688
SCRA 109, G.R. No. 188056 January 8, 2013)

Under Section 51, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the imposition of preventive suspension by the proper
disciplining authority is authorized provided the charge involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct, or neglect
in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant
his removal from the service. Section 51 nowhere states or implies that before a preventive suspension may issue, there
must be proof that the subordinate may unduly influence the witnesses against him or may tamper the documentary
evidence on file in her office.

It is clear from Section 19, supra, that before an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation may validly
issue, only two prerequisites need be shown, namely:
(1) that the proper disciplining authority has served a formal charge to the affected officer or employee; and
(2) that the charge involves either dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or if
there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of the charges which would warrant her removal from
the service.
Proof showing that the subordinate officer or employee may unduly influence the witnesses against her or may tamper
the documentary evidence on file in her office is not among the prerequisites. (Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines vs. Manalang-Demigillo, 681 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 176343 September 18, 2012)

Government-owned or controlled corporations refer to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested
with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the government
directly or indirectly through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations
to the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock. It is clear, therefore, that a corporation is considered a government-owned
or -controlled corporation only when the Government directly or indirectly owns or controls at least a majority or 51%
share of the capital stock. Consequently, RPN was neither a government-owned nor a controlled corporation because of
the Government’s total share in RPN’s capital stock being only 32.4%. (Carandang vs. Desierto, 639 SCRA 293, G.R. No.
148076 January 12, 2011)

Even an appointment initially approved by the CSC may be subsequently recalled when found to be invalid. R.A. No.
6850 was never meant to cure an appointment void from the very beginning for being based on a false representation of
eligibility.(Maniebo vs. Court of Appeals, 627 SCRA 569, G.R. No. 158708 August 10, 2010)

ELECTION LAW

A valid CoC arises upon the timely filing of a person’s declaration of his intention to run for public office and his
affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume. The valid CoC renders the person making
the declaration a valid or official candidate.

There are two remedies available under existing laws to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race:
1. by petition for disqualification, or
2. by petition to deny due course to or to cancel his certificate of candidacy.

The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code involves a
finding not only that a person lacked a qualification for the office he is vying for but also that such he made a material
representation in the CoC that was false. The Court has stressed in Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 622 SCRA 744
(2010), that in addition to materiality there must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would
otherwise render the candidate ineligible. (Agustin vs. Commission on Elections, 774 SCRA 353, G.R. No. 207105
November 10, 2015)

The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the equivalents of the original official
ballots themselves. The Court held that “the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are
likewise ‘official ballots’ that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of
R.A. No. 9369. That the two documents—the official ballot and its picture image—are considered “original documents”
simply means that both of them are given equal probative weight. In short, when either is presented as evidence, one is
not considered as weightier than the other.

But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and
unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice
to the parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of their picture images,
the rules for the revision of ballots adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the
primary or best evidence of the voters’ will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots are to be used only when it is
first shown that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been compromised. (Maliksi vs. Commission on
Elections, 696 SCRA 272, G.R. No. 203302 April 11, 2013)

The evident purposes of the requirement for the filing of CoCs and in fixing the time limit for filing them are, namely:
(a) to enable the voters to know, at least 60 days prior to the regular election, the candidates from among whom they
are to make the choice; and
(b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast.

If the law does not confine to the duly-registered candidates the choice by the voters, there may be as many persons voted
for as there are voters, and votes may be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in
favor of a candidate for another office in the same election.

There are two remedies available under existing laws to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. The Court
differentiated the two remedies in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, 574 SCRA 782 (2008),
1. A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,
or Section 40 of the Local Government Code.
2. A petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation
in the said certificate that is false.

The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to
continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.

Substitution of Candidates—If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered
or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by,
the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for
the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death,
withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of Election Day, said
certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the
case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.

The COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City. To
begin with, there was no valid candidate for her to substitute due to Ramon’s ineligibility. Also, Ramon did not
voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the elections in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. Lastly,
she was not an additional candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of her CoC on May 4, 2010
was beyond the period fixed by law. Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a candidate. A permanent vacancy in the
office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined
in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit: Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor,
and Vice-Mayor.—If a permanent vacancy occurs in the Office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor.

Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the
candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a
valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much
the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate. Likewise, a candidate who has not
withdrawn his CoC in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code may not be substituted. A withdrawal of
candidacy can only give effect to a substitution if the substitute candidate submits prior to the election a sworn CoC as
required by Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. (Talaga vs. Commission on Elections, 683 SCRA 197, G.R. No.
196804 October 9, 2012)

Three-Term Limit Rule.—To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced both by the
Constitution and statutory law. Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Section 8. The term of office of
elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected . Section 43
of the Local Government Code reiterates the constitutional three-term limit for all elective local officials, to wit: Section
43. Term of Office.—(a) x x x (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was “to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power
over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office.” To allow petitioner Latasa to vie
for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously
defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive
terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same
territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years.

Second-Placer Doctrine —Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer. Labo, Jr. should be applied.
There, the Court emphasized that the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes for the contested office
could not assume the office despite the disqualification of the first placer because the second placer was “not the choice of
the sovereign will.” No law imposed upon and compelled the people of Lucena City to accept a loser to be their political
leader or their representative.

The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate is when two requisites
concur, namely:
(a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and
(b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s disqualification as to bring such awareness
within the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate.

Under this sole exception, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously
misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with the second highest
number of votes may be deemed elected. (Talaga vs. Commission on Elections, 683 SCRA 197, G.R. No. 196804 October
9, 2012)

Election Protests - Failure to indicate the total number of precincts in the municipality in the election protest rendered the
protest insufficient in form and substance which warrants its summary dismissal.

Certiorari, not an election protest or quo warranto, is the proper recourse to review a Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) resolution approving the withdrawal the nomination of its original nominees and substituting them with
others, even if the substitute nominees have already been proclaimed and have taken their oath of office. (Lokin, Jr.
Commission on Elections, 621 SCRA 385, G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010)

The 1987 Constitution vested in the COMELEC broad powers involving not only the enforcement and administration of
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections but also the resolution and determination of election
controversies. (Cagas vs. Commission on Elections, 663 SCRA 645, G.R. No. 194139 January 24, 2012)

“Election Protest,” and “Quo Warranto,” Distinguished.—An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from
office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds
and irregularities, to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled
to hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for
in the preceding elections. A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of
ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not
to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the
parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated. (Lokin, Jr.
Commission on Elections, 621 SCRA 385, G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010)

In regular election contests, the general averment of fraud or irregularities in the counting of votes justifies the
examination of the ballots and recounting of votes.

The COMELEC does not lose jurisdiction over the provincial election contest by reason of the transmittal of the provincial
ballot boxes and other election materials to the SET, because its jurisdiction over provincial election contest exists side by
side with the jurisdiction of the SET, with each tribunal being supreme in its respective areas of concern, with neither
being higher than the other in terms of precedence; hence, the jurisdiction of one must yield to the other. (Tolentino vs.
Commission on Elections, 617 SCRA 575, G.R. Nos. 187958, 187961, and 187962 April 7, 2010)

Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code enumerates the scope of a pre-proclamation controversy, as follows: Sec.  243.
Issue that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy—The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a
pre-proclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified,
or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously
manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which
materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.

In a pre-proclamation controversy, the Commission on Elections is restricted to an examination of the election returns and
is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind the election returns and to investigate election irregularities.

The doctrine of statistical improbability is applied only where the unique uniformity of tally of all the votes cast in favor
of all the candidates belonging to one party and the systematic blanking of all the candidates of all the opposing parties
appear in the election return.

The powers of the COMELEC are essentially executive and administrative in nature. This is the reason why the question
of whether or not there was terrorism, vote-buying and other irregularities in the elections should be ventilated in regular
election protests. The COMELEC is not the proper forum for deciding such protests. Accordingly, a party seeking to raise
issues, the resolution of which compels or necessitates the COMELEC’s piercing the veil of election returns that appear
prima facie to be regular on their face, has his proper remedy in a regular election contest. (Suhuri vs. Commission on
Elections, 602 SCRA 633, G.R. No. 181869 October 2, 2009)

Election Offenses; Violation of Sec. 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Law; Elements.—As the legal provision shows, the
prohibition of the release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds for any and all kinds of public works depends on
the following elements:
(a) a public official or employee releases, disburses or spends public funds;
(b) the release, disbursement and expenditure is made within 45 days before a regular election or 30 days before a
special election; and
(c) the public funds are intended for any and all kinds of public works except the four situations enumerated in
paragraph (v) of Section 261. (Guzman vs. Commission on Elections, 597 SCRA 499, G.R. No. 182380 August 28,
2009)

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Under Republic Act No. 7160, local government units, such as the Municipality of Malolos, Bulacan, are vested with the
power to reclassify lands. However, Section 20, Chapter II, Title I of Republic Act No. 7160 ordains: Section 20.
Reclassification of Lands.—(a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after
conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the
manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases:
 (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the
Department of Agriculture or
(2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial
purposes, as determined by the sanggunian concerned: x x x. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, an ordinance is
required in order to reclassify agricultural lands, and such may only be passed after the conduct of public
hearings. (Holy Trinity Realty & Development Corporation vs. Dela Cruz, 739 SCRA 229, G.R. No. 200454
October 22, 2014)

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.

Was the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664 within the corporate powers of the LGU of the City of Cebu? The answer is in
the affirmative. Indeed, with no issues being hereby raised against the formalities attendant to the enactment of
Ordinance No. 1664, we presume its full compliance with the test in that regard. Congress enacted the LGC as the
implementing law for the delegation to the various LGUs of the State’s great powers, namely: the police power, the power
of eminent domain, and the power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to delineate the specific parameters and
limitations to be complied with by each LGU in the exercise of these delegated powers with the view of making each LGU
a fully functioning subdivision of the State subject to the constitutional and statutory limitations. (Legaspi vs. City of
Cebu, 711 SCRA 771, G.R. No. 159692 December 10, 2013)

Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter or
modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress
enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of economic
viability for the creation of local government units—income, population, and land area. Congress deemed it fit to modify
the income requirement with respect to the conversion of municipalities into component cities when it enacted R.A. No.
9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only from locally-generated sources. However, Congress deemed it
wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to
uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside
development and autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic growth in their
respective provinces. Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws
amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the
concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the
LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their
strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption clauses, are not found in the LGC.

Assuming an improper classification in the case of the sixteen cities, petitioner League of Cities cannot invoke the equal
protection clause since it has failed to show that it will suffer deprivation of life, liberty, or property by reason of such
classification. Actually, the existing cities would not cease to exist nor would their liberties suffer by reason of the
enactment of the sixteen cityhood laws. That their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) will be diminished does not amount
to deprivation of property since the IRA is not their property until it has been automatically released. Mere expectancy in
the receipt of IRA cannot be regarded as the “property” envisioned in the Bill of Rights. (League of Cities of the
Philippines (LCP) vs. Commission on Elections, 643 SCRA 150, G.R. No. 176951 February 15, 2011)

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Verily, the basic condition for land to be placed under the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 is that it must either be
primarily devoted to or be suitable for agriculture. Land that is not devoted to agricultural activity is outside the coverage
of Republic Act No. 6657. According to Republic Act No. 6657, an agricultural land is one that is devoted to agricultural
activity and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. Agricultural activity includes the
“cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting
of such farm products; and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.” (Holy Trinity Realty & Development Corporation vs. Dela
Cruz, 739 SCRA 229, G.R. No. 200454 October 22, 2014)
Land of the public domain, to be the subject of appropriation, must be declared alienable and disposable either by the
President or the Secretary of the DENR. In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 555 SCRA 477 (2008), we explicitly ruled:
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released
the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls
within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. This doctrine unavoidably means that the mere certification issued by the CENRO or PENRO did not suffice
to support the application for registration, because the applicant must also submit a copy of the original classification of
the land as alienable and disposable as approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. (Republic vs. De Guzman Vda. de Joson, 718 SCRA 228, G.R. No. 163767 March 10,
2014)
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), all lands of the public domain belong to the State. This means that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All
lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain
part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to
private persons.
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands
made under the Constitution. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into
agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks. Agricultural lands may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. The identification of lands according to their legal classification is
done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit:
(a) Patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil
Code, without limitation; and
(b) Lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the
lands must only be agricultural.

Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or
disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive
Department, not in the courts. If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must
be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law to that effect. Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or
reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public
service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable. (Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 704 SCRA 561, G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013)

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State. Occupation of public land in
the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. (Republic vs. Santos
III, 685 SCRA 51, G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHT

Section 4, Article XIII, of the Constitution has mandated the implementation of an agrarian reform program for the
distribution of agricultural lands to landless farmers subject to the payment of just compensation to the landowners.
(Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Nable, 675 SCRA 253, G.R. No. 176692 June 27, 2012)
 EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS

UP is a government instrumentality, performing the State’s constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible
education. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such
funds in any banking institution, constitute a “special trust fund,” the disbursement of which should always be aligned
with the UP’s mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. (University of the Philippines
vs. Dizon, 679 SCRA 54, G.R. No. 171182 August 23, 2012)