Qa Torts Week 11 and 12

imgarcia Saturday, January 27, 2018
TORTS: Week 11 AND 12
A. What are actual or compensatory damages?
- These are those awarded to the aggrieved party as the adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he alleged and duly proved. Pecuniary loss is a measurement in
terms of money.
B. When will actual or compensatory damages be awarded?
- For actual damages to be received, it is necessary that the claimant produce competent proof or the
best evidence obtainable such as receipts that justify an award therefor.
The justify an award of actual damages there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss --
credence can only be given to claims which are duly supported by receipts
C. What is the purpose of actual damages?

- Simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong.
D. Distinguish between civil liability ex delicto and actual or compensatory damages
- This two species of damages differ basically in that civil indemnity ex can delicto be awarded without
the need of further proof then the fact of the commission of the felony itself while the actual or
compensatory damages the be recoverable must be additionally be established with a reasonable
degree of certainty
E. What is Art. 2200
- Art. 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but
also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. (1106)
F. What are kinds of actual or compensatory damages? **
- General damages – natural, necessary and logical consequences of a particular wrongful act which
result in injury; need not be specifically pleaded because the law itself implies or presumes that they
resulted from the wrongful act.
- Special damages – damages which are the natural, but not the necessary and inevitable result of the
wrongful act; an example would be attorney’s fees.
G. What is Art. 2202
- Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such
damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
H. What is Art. 2203
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- Art. 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to
minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question.
I. What is Art. 2205
- Art. 2205. Damages may be recovered:

(1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury;
(2) For injury to the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.
J. What is loss of earning capacity?
- The indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages which must
be duly proven.
K. What are the factors in determining the loss of earning capacity?
- Two factors to determine the amount responding to the loss of earning capacity are: (a) the number of
years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed and, (b) the rate at which losses
sustained by the widow and her children should be fixed
The net, and not the gross income is considered. Living another ordinary expenses must be the
deducted first.
For lost income due to death, there must be unbiased proof of the deceased's average income.
However, earning capacity will not be considered if the deceased had no earning capacity at the time of
his death. The reason for the lack of earning capacity however must not be due to the defendants fault.
The fact that the prosecution did not present documentary evidence to support its claim for damages
for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of the same
The indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages which must
be duly proven
L. Discuss PEOPLE V. GONZALES

Many unfortunate tragedies would not have happened if the improvident use of a firearm did not
exacerbate a simple altercation over traffic. This is one of them.
On a day intended to pay homage to the dead, a pregnant woman was shot to death in the course of her
husbands altercation with the accused-appellant and his son along the Garden of Remembrance within
the Loyola Memorial Park in Marikina. The trial court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of
murder and two counts of frustrated murder and accordingly sentenced him to death. This case is before
us on automatic review.
The details of what actually transpired in the few seconds immediately preceding the shooting are
controverted by both parties but the events leading to this tragedy are not disputed.
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In the afternoon of October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m. both the families of the private complainant Noel
Andres and that of the accused-appellant Inocencio Gonzalez were on their way to the exit of the Loyola
Memorial Park. The appellant was driving a white Isuzu Esteem with his grandson and three housemaids,
while the private complainant was driving a maroon Toyota FX with his pregnant wife Feliber Andres, his
two year old son, Kenneth, his nephew Kevin and his sister-in-law, Francar Valdez. At the intersection
near the Garden of Remembrance, while the accused-appellant Gonzalez was turning left towards the
exit and the complainant Noel Andres was headed straight along the road to the exit their two vehicles
almost collided. Noel Andres was able to timely step on the brakes. The appellant continued driving along
his way while Noel Andres drove behind the appellants vehicle for some time and cut him off when he
found the opportunity to do so.[1] Noel Andres then got out of his vehicle and knocked on the appellants
car window.[2] This is as far as their versions of the incident coincide.
The prosecutions version of the incident is that Noel Andres calmly told the appellant to be careful with
his driving and informed the latter that he, Andres, is with his family and to this Gonzalez allegedly
replied, Accidents are accidents, whats your problem. Andres stated that he saw the appellant turning red
in anger so he decided to go back to his vehicle when he was blocked by the appellants son who said,
Anong problema mo sa erpat ko. Andres testified that he felt threatened and so he immediately boarded
his vehicle, sat at the drivers seat, closed the door, and partially opened the car window just wide enough
to talk back to appellants son, Dino. Suddenly, one of his passengers said Binaril kami. He turned to his
wife Feliber Andres and saw her bloodied and unconscious. He turned around and saw his son Kenneth
and nephew Kevin were also wounded. Andres admitted in court that he and Dino were shouting at each
other so that he did not hear the shot. Andres then got out of his vehicle to warn the appellant not to flee.
He then took the wounded members of his family to the exit where there was an ambulance standing by.
The three were then taken to the Sta. Monica Hospital and were later transferred to the Quezon City
Medical Center.
The defenses version of the incident is that Andres cut the appellants path by positioning his FX obliquely
along the appellants lane from the latters left side. Andres then got out of his vehicle, stood beside the
appellants car window, and repeatedly cursed the appellant, Putang ina mo, ang tanda-tanda mo na hindi
ka pa marunong magmaneho. Ang bobo-bobo mo.[3] The appellant stayed inside his car and allegedly
replied, Pasensiya ka na hindi kita nakita, nasilaw ako. Aksidente lang. The appellant Gonzalez and
another witness for the defense, Quidic, testified that Noel Andres went back to his vehicle to move it in
such a way that it is straight in front of the appellants car. Andres allegedly got out of his vehicle again
and continued shouting and cursing at the appellant.[4] Dino, the appellants son, who rode in another
vehicle decided to go back when he did not see his fathers car behind him. When Dino arrived at the
scene he confronted Andres and the two had an altercation. Both Dino and the appellant stated that
Andres remained outside his vehicle during the altercation with Dino. When Andres suddenly reached for
something inside his vehicle, Dino froze on the spot where he stood. This prompted the appellant to get
his gun from the glove compartment and feeling that his son was threatened he got out of his car ready to
shoot. When he saw that Andres did not have a weapon he put down his hand holding the gun. This is
when the appellants daughter Trisha who was riding in Dinos car arrived at the scene, walked past Dino
and Andres, and pushed the appellant away. She hugged her father and in the process held his hand
holding the gun. The appellant tried to free his hand and with Trishas substantial body weight pushing
against him the appellant lost his balance and the gun accidentally fired. The accused stated that he did
not know he shot somebody until the private complainants sister-in-law, Francar Valdez, got out of the
vehicle carrying a bloodied small boy. The defense claims that the appellant did not try to flee and even
told the complainants sister-in-law to take the wounded to the hospital.
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On November 4, 1998 an Information for the complex crime of Murder, Double Frustrated Murder and
Attempted Murder was filed against herein accused-appellant:
That on or about the 31st day of October 1998, in the city of Marikina, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill, attack, assault and employ personal violence by means of treachery and
abuse of superior strength upon the person of Noel Andres y Tomas, by then and there shooting him with
a Glock cal. 9mm pistol but instead hitting one Feliber Andres y Ordoo, on the left back portion of her
head, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wound which directly caused her death, as well as
hitting John Kenneth Andres y Ordoo and Kevin Valdez y Ordoo physical injuries which ordinarily would
have caused their death, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime
of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some cause or causes,
independent of their will, that is, the timely and able medical assistance rendered to John Kenneth Andres
y Ordoo and Kevin Valdez y Ordoo to their damage and prejudice as well as to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of Feliber Andres y Ordoo.
On arraignment the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.
The case records show that Feliber Andres, the wife of Noel Andres did not die instantaneously. She lived
to give birth to a baby girl[5] by caesarian section and died the following morning on November 1, 1998.
The Autopsy Report[6] states:
FINDINGS: Fairly nourished, fairly developed female cadaver, with post mortem lividity. Conjunctivae are
pale. Lips and nail beds are cyanotic. Surgical incisions were noted at left tempero-parietal region.
Surgical incisions is also noted at the abdominal region secondary to a caesarian section.
HEAD: (1) gunshot wound, point of entry, left fronto-temporal region, measuring 1 by 0.9 cm, 9 cm from
the anterior midline, with a uniform abraided collar measuring 0.2 cm., directed posteriorwards, slightly
downwards, and medialwards, fracturing the frontal, and left temporal bones, lacerating the left cerebral
hemisphere, with a deformed slug fragment embedded and recovered at the posterior lobe of the left
cerebral hemisphere. (2) hematoma, left orbital region, measuring 4.5 by 2 cm, 4 cm from the anterior
midline. There are subdural and subarachnoidal hemorrages. Stomach contains 1 glassful of partially
digested food particles mostly rice and meaty material.
CONCLUSION: Cause of death is gunshot wound on the head.
Kenneth and Kevin were treated for extraction of metallic fragments on their faces. They were discharged
from the hospital six days later or on November 6, 1998.
On June 25, 1999 the trial court rendered judgement finding that the shooting was attended by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and held the appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder for the
death of Feliber Andres and for two counts of frustrated murder for the injuries sustained by Kenneth
Andres and Kevin Valdez and sentenced the appellant to the maximum of the imposable penalty which is
death. The trial court held:
Beforehand, the Court takes note of the judicial admissions on the verbal declarations of the accused that
the court a quo has jurisdiction over the case; that he owns the black Gluck 9 mm. automatic pistol; that
the said gun will never fire even if he drops it; that only one bullet was fired from his gun; and that the
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victim Feliber Andres is already dead. With this exegesis and the declarations in open court of the
eyewitness of both the prosecution and some of the defense, there is no real dispute on the antecedent
facts showing that the accused fired on Noel Andres but instead hit and caused the fatal injuries to the
victims John Kenneth Andres, Kevin Valdez and Feliber Andres resulting to the ultimate death of the
latter. The court takes further judicial admissions of the accused made in their memorandum
demonstrating the existence of five (5) sequences of events leading to the death of Feliber Andres and
the wounding of John Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez which are as follows: First is when Noel Andres
overtook the car driven of the accused and cut cross his path; Second is when Noel Andres alighted from
his vehicle and confronted Inocencio; Third is when Noel had an argument with Dino Gonzalez, the son of
the accused; Forth is when, Inocencio seeing his son having confrontation with Noel, got his gun to
protect Dino; and Fifth is when Inocencio had a struggle with his daughter. Trisha Gonzalez, who tried to
reach for the gun and as a result of which Inocencio lost his balance and as he was falling backward to
his side, his right arm holding the gun hit the rear window of the Tamaraw FX van and the gun
accidentally went off hitting the victim, who were all then inside the van.
The court likewise take judicial notice on the feature of the automatic pistol used in this case which is
capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. Practically, the stages before an automatic firearm would be capable of firing are as follows: 1)
the loading of a bullet into the chamber of the gun; 2) the cocking of the hammer, if uncocked; 3) the
releasing of the safety pin; 4) the pressing of the trigger to unleash the hammer so that the firing pin will
hit the cartridge to propel the bullet out to hit the target. Realistically, it demonstrates that a gun will not
fire even if the bullet is loaded in its chamber if the hammer is uncocked; or even if cocked if the safety
pin is engaged; or even if the safety pin is disengaged if the trigger will not be pressed. However, even if
the gun is fired if it is not aimed and leveled to the target, the purpose of firing it shall not be achieved.
Contrarily, once a gun is drawn against a person, the means methods and forms employed for its
execution is already conceived. And once it is tended directly and specifically to insure its execution, it
consequently produces the conscious and deliberate intention. Finally if all the acts of execution had been
effectively done without risk on the part of the offender arising from any defense coming from the
offended party, treachery results. In brief, there is treachery when the offender commits any crime against
persons, employing means, methods and forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might
make (People vs. Mesa 276 SCRA 407; People vs. Carlos Patrolla, Jr. G. R. No. 112445, March 7, 1996).
To appreciate treachery two (2) conditions must be present, to wit: 1) the employment of means of
execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and 2) the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. (People vs. Azugue, 268 SCRA 711; People vs. Pea,
G. R. No. 116022, July 1, 1998, p. 1)
In the case at bar and guided with the above-quoted doctrinal cases, logically, the accused is positive of
the crime charged against him. When he alighted with a drawn gun to protect his son and released all the
safety measures of his gun as he fired and missed at Noel who was then unarmed, but instead hit Kevin
Valdez, John Kenneth Andres and Feliber Andres which resulted to the death of the latter, demonstrate
that the accused has executed the two (2) conditions to generate treachery enough to qualify the crime
committed to murder.
XXXX XXXXX XXXX
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the accused Inocencio Gonzalez, Jr., y Esquivel is
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with Double Frustrated
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Murder and Attempted Murder penalized under Art. 248, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of Death
by lethal injection.
The accused is further ordered to pay the following civil liabilities:
1. To the private complainant Noel Andres:
a) the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Feliber Andres;
b) the amount of P3,363,663.60 as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased Feliber
Andres;
c) the amount of P98,384.19 as funeral expenses;
d) the amount of P271,800.56 for the hospitalization expenses incurred for the injuries sustained by the
deceased Feliber Andres and the amount of P23,622.58 representing the expenses for the untimely
delivery of the child Ma. Clarisse Andres;
e) the amount of P51,566.00 representing the hospitalization expenses for the injuries sustained by the
victim John Kenneth Andres;
f) the amount of P150,000.00 as moral damages suffered for the untimely death of his wife Feliber Andres
and for the injuries caused to his son John Kenneth Andres;
g) the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees and a fee of P2,000.00 per appearance;
and
h) the costs of the suit.
2. To the private complainant Nicasio Valdez:
a) the amount of P73,824.75 as actual damages for the injuries sustained by the victim Kevin Valdez; and
b) the amount of P75,000.00 as and by way of moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
In his appeal, Gonzalez submits the following assignments of error:
1. The trial court committed reversible error when it found that treachery was present.
2. The trial court committed reversible error when it presumed that there was treachery by taking judicial
notice of the feature of the automatic pistol involved in this case.
3. The trial court committed reversible error when it violated the constitutional right of the accused-
appellant to due process when it took judicial notice of the feature of the automatic pistol involved in this
case without notice.
4. The trial court committed reversible error when it found Accused-Appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder.
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5. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstances of
passion or obfuscation, lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, provocation or threat on the part of
the offended party immediately preceded the act, incomplete defense of relative, and voluntary surrender.
6. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to find that the shooting incident was accidental.
7. The trial court committed reversible error when it gave credence to the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Elmer Ramos and Moises Castro.
8. The trial court committed reversible error when it disregarded the basic principle that the accused is
presumed innocent and his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
9. The trial court committed reversible error when it ordered Accused-Appellant to pay for the civil
liabilities.
The appellant seeks a reversal and prays that judgment be rendered exempting him from criminal and
civil liabilities. Appellant declared that he had no intention to shoot Noel Andres much less his wife nor the
children. He lost his balance when his daughter Trisha approached and pushed him backwards to stop
him from joining Dino and Noel Andres but the appellant tried to free his right hand holding the gun and it
accidentally fired. The single bullet fired hit the last window on the left side of the Tamaraw FX. The
appellant claims that he did not see the passengers inside the vehicle at the time of the shooting. This is
corroborated by the testimony of two witnesses for the prosecution who testified that the windows of
Andres vehicle are heavily tinted so that a person outside the vehicle would not be able to see if there are
people inside. It is also argued that had the appellant intended to shoot Noel Andres he could have simply
done so by shooting at him directly. The defense asserts that the evidence for the prosecution failed to
establish the attendance of treachery and without the attendance of the said qualifying circumstance the
crime committed is homicide, not murder.
The appellant also points out that the trial court made the factual finding that the shooting happened in a
matter of seconds and that it was preceded by a heated argument between the parties. Such being the
case, it is argued that the shooting could not have been attended by treachery. There was no time for the
appellant to consciously and deliberately employ the mode of attack against Noel Andres, nor against any
one of the actual victims, to insure its execution and at the same time to eliminate any form of retaliation
from the alleged intended victim. And yet, the trial court, contrary to the evidence on record, held that the
loading of the bullet into the chamber of the gun, the cocking of the hammer, the release of the safety pin
and the pulling of the trigger by the appellant of his automatic pistol constitute conscious and deliberate
effort to employ the gun as a means of committing the crime and resultantly, qualified its commission by
treachery. Such a finding presupposes that the appellant loaded the gun to shoot Noel Andres only that
very moment when his son Dino and Noel Andres were arguing. This conclusion has no basis on record.
The appellant testified that his gun was loaded before he left the house and two witnesses for prosecution
stated in court that a few seconds after Noel Andres and Dino started shouting at each other, the
appellant got out of his car and shot at the last window on the left side of the complainants vehicle.
Further, the appellant assigns as error the procedure adopted by the trial court in taking judicial notice
that the gun used by the appellant is an automatic pistol and as such, it will not fire unless aimed at the
intended target. The procedure taken by the trial court is contrary to Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court.[7] The trial court should have given both parties the opportunity to present evidence, expert
evidence, if necessary, to inform the court on the subject matter. The appellant argues that the factual
finding borne by such erroneous procedure is equally erroneous. The gun used by the appellant is a
semi-automatic and not an automatic pistol which means that the pistol used has no external safety pin to
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be released and that the hammer need not be cocked. The pulling of the trigger, intentional or not, will fire
the gun. The use of a semi-automatic pistol does not necessarily imply treachery.
Appellant also argues that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Castro and Ramos were improperly
given credence by the trial court. The appellant contends that a reading of their testimonies would show
that their narration of the incident is rather absurd and would show that they did not witness the actual
shooting. Defense witnesses, Gonzalez and his daughter, Trisha, on the other hand, testified that Castro
and Ramos arrived at the scene only after the shooting.
As regards the injuries sustained by Kevin and Kenneth, it is argued that considering that there was no
intent to kill and that they stayed in the hospital only for six days, the crime committed is physical injuries.
It is argued that the trial court erred in awarding damages. The bunch of receipts allegedly representing
the medical expenses incurred for the injuries sustained by the victims was erroneously admitted in
evidence, without first requiring the prosecution to establish the authenticity of the receipts. The appellant
also points out that the award for loss of earning capacity has no basis as the deceased was unemployed
at the time of the incident.
Finally, the appellant assigns as error the trial courts rejection of the mitigating circumstances pleaded by
the defense which allegedly attended the commission of the crime, i.e., lack of intent to commit so grave
a wrong, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and voluntary surrender. The
appellant asserts that these mitigating circumstances were duly proven during the trial and are supported
by the evidence on record. The private complainant Noel Andres testified that he saw the appellant
getting red in anger after they, Andres and the appellant, had a heated argument immediately prior to the
shooting. These admitted circumstances show that the appellant was not in his proper state of mind at the
time of the shooting. First, he was angered by Andres abusive language and later he got out of his car
with a loaded gun to protect his son from a perceived danger. The appellant clams that his willingness to
help the injured and his voluntary surrender to the police should likewise be considered as mitigating
circumstances in the imposition of penalties.
The Solicitor-General agrees with the appellant that the crime was not attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and hence the crime committed by the appellant for the death of Feliber
Andres is homicide, not murder. The appellee takes into consideration that the shooting was preceded by
a heated argument and that the supposed victim was placed on guard that attack was imminent. It also
appears that the shooting was done impulsively. There is no evidence that the appellant deliberately
employed the means of attack to insure execution of the crime and at the same time eliminate the risk of
retaliation from the private complainant. The appellee also agrees with the appellant that the trial court
erred in equating the use of an automatic pistol with treachery. The trial court made the factual finding
that the appellants automatic pistol would not fire unless aimed and the trigger is deliberately pulled and
hence treachery attended the shooting. The appellee submits that if we follow the reasoning of the trial
court it would appear that the appellant intended to shoot at the complainants vehicle only as the shot
was fired at the last window on the left side of the FX away from where Andres was allegedly seated. The
fact that the gun was drawn and fired does not mean that the mode of attack was consciously and
deliberately employed.
However, with respect to the injuries sustained by Kevin and Kenneth, the appellee disagrees with the
contention that the appellant is liable only for slight physical injuries. The injuries sustained by both
children are head injuries and could have caused their death if not for the immediate medical attention
given them. The number of days spent in the hospital is not determinative of the severity of the wounds.
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Their nature and location should instead be considered. The appellant cannot escape liability for
frustrated homicide for the injuries of the two children on the ground that he fired a single shot at the
vehicle of Noel Andres. He is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act even if the crime
committed is different from that intended.
As regards the pleaded mitigating circumstances, appellee asserts that none can be considered in favor
of the appellant. There is evidence on record that the appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police
and it appears from the testimonies of witnesses that he entertained the possibility of flight but his car was
stuck in traffic along the exit of the memorial park. His pretense of incomplete defense of a relative is
belied by his own admission that when he saw that Noel Andres did not have a gun he lowered his hand
holding the gun. There was allegedly no threat on the life of his son at the time of the shooting, no
uncontrollable fear nor irresistible force that would mitigate the commission of the offense.
The Solicitor-General also seeks to uphold the pecuniary awards granted by the trial court. The appellee
alleges that it is not denied by the appellant that Feliber Andres was a 38 year old registered nurse at the
time of the shooting. Although she was then unemployed on account of her pregnancy, she still had
earning capacity and the trial court properly applied the salary of a government nurse under the salary
standardization scheme in the computation of damages for the loss of earning capacity. The receipts
presented in evidence by the prosecution to establish hospitalization and other medical expenses
incurred by the private complainants by reason of the injuries suffered by the victims were duly
authenticated by the prosecution witnesses and there is no dispute that they are exact copies of the
original receipts presented in court. The objections raised by the appellant in this regard were duly met by
the evidence presented by the private complainants.
In sum, the appellee asserts that considering that the appellant fired a single shot and in the process
committed four offenses the appellant should be held liable for the complex crime of homicide for the
death of Feliber Andres, double frustrated homicide against Kevin and Kenneth and attempted homicide
against Noel Andres. Under the rules on complex crimes the penalty for the gravest offense, i.e.,
reclusion temporal for homicide, should be imposed in its maximum period.
The appeal has merit.
Treachery under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the deliberate employment
of means, methods or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the intended victim
might raise. For treachery to be appreciated two elements must concur: 1) the employment of means of
execution that would insure the safety of the accused from retaliatory acts of the intended victim and
leaving the latter without an opportunity to defend himself and 2) the means employed were deliberately
or consciously adopted by the offender.[8] The suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the wound from
behind the victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the time the attack was made or the fact that the
victim was unarmed do not by themselves render the attack as treacherous.[9] This is of particular
significance in a case of an instantaneous attack made by the accused whereby he gained an
advantageous position over the victim when the latter accidentally fell and was rendered defenseless.[10]
The means employed for the commission of the crime or the mode of attack must be shown to have been
consciously or deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the consummation of the crime and at the
same time eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation from the intended victim.[11] Accordingly, it has been
consistently held by this court that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the spur of
the moment or that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery for lack
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of opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a treacherous mode of attack.[12] Thus, the sudden
attack made by the accused due to his infuriation by reason of the victims provocation was held to be
without treachery. Sudden attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and insults by the victim or
acts taunting the accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive behavior of the victim were held to
be without treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned of reprisal.[13] For the rules on treachery to
apply the sudden attack must have been preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim and
without provocation on the part of the latter.[14]
This Court has also had occasion to state that whether or not the attack succeeds against its intended
victim or injures another or whether the crime committed is graver than that intended is immaterial, as
long as it is shown that the attack is attended by treachery, the said qualifying circumstance may still be
considered by the court.[15] Thus, the determining factor on whether or not the commission of a crime is
attended by treachery is not the resulting crime committed but the mode of attack employed in its
execution.[16]
Treachery is never presumed. It is required that the manner of attack must be shown to have been
attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime itself. [17]
We affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the shooting was not attended by treachery
and accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder.
The encounter between Noel Andres and the appellant was a chance encounter. They were total
strangers before their vehicles almost collided at an intersection inside the memorial park. Unfortunately,
heated exchange of remarks that followed the near collision was fanned by a short temper, which in the
case of the appellant, was augmented by the improvident use of a firearm.
From a reading of the transcript of the testimonies of the witnesses, it would appear that Noel Andres,
who had his pregnant wife and child with him, among others, on board the Tamaraw FX provoked the
altercation. After the near collision of his vehicle with that of the appellant, he tailed behind the latters car
towards the exit until he had the chance to cut him off to scold him for his failure to observe traffic
rules.[18] Andres stated in court that he calmly told the appellant to be careful with his driving and denied
that he was angry when he alighted from his vehicle to confront the appellant.[19] His statement is belied
by the witnesses, two prosecution witnesses included, who uniformly testified that Andres quarreled with
or shouted and cursed at the appellant for the latters recklessness at the intersection.[20] The appellant
narrated in court that Andres repeatedly shouted at him, Putang ina mo, ang tanda-tanda mo na gago ka
pa.[21] Andres hostile behavior towards the appellant is evident from his statement in court that he
noticed the appellant turning red in anger.[22] It is highly improbable for Gonzalez to have turned red in
anger had Andres been polite, as he claims he was, in scolding Gonzalez. Andres could have simply
communicated to the appellant his disgust for the latters bad driving when he overtook the appellants car
near the scene of the shooting but instead he chose to block the appellants path, insult and virtually
provoke the appellant to retaliate.
Andres stated in court that when he noticed Gonzalez infuriation he immediately walked towards his
vehicle, because according to him the altercation was over. On his way to his FX he met another man,
whom he later found out to be the appellants son, Dino. It appears that the altercation was far from over
because again Andres had a shouting match this time with Dino.[23] In a matter of seconds, the appellant
alighted from his car and fired a single shot at the last window on the left side of Andres vehicle at an
angle away from Noel Andres. The single bullet fired hit Feliber Andres on the forehead near the temporal
10
region above the left eye and the two children with metallic fragments of the bullet on their faces, one at
the cheek and the other below his left eye.
The prosecution did not present evidence as to the exact seating arrangement of the victims inside the
vehicle; suffice it to say, that an examination of the pictures of the vehicle[24] one of which shows a mass
of blood stains on the left side (towards the drivers seat) of the white seat cover below the head rest[25],
would show that the deceased Feliber must have been seated at the front passengers seat and the
children at the middle row behind the drivers seat.[26] Another picture shows a bullet hole on the last
window on the left side of the vehicle[27] and another shows that the front windshield appears
undamaged.[28] A ballistics expert appeared in court for the prosecution and testified that the bullet fired
at the FX came from the appellants gun, which fact was admitted by the defense. The prosecution did not
inquire from the ballistics expert regarding the trajectory of the bullet or the approximate distance of the
appellant from the FX when he fired his gun to establish whether or not the appellant aimed for Noel or
Feliber or simply fired indiscriminately at the latters vehicle.[29]
At first blush it would seem that the shooting of Feliber Andres was attended by treachery as she was
inside the FX witnessing her husbands altercation, first, with the appellant then with the appellants son,
totally defenseless from the shot that came suddenly from her left side. Public outrage over the death of
Feliber was heightened by the fact that she was then pregnant with her second child and her death left a
new born baby girl and a two year old boy motherless.
However, a meticulous review of the evidence prevents a conclusive finding of treachery and any doubt
must be resolved, like the fact of the commission of an offense, in favor of the accused. The pictures
indicate that Gonzalez fired at the FX at an angle away from Noel Andres and that Gonzalez was not
aiming at anybody in particular. It is not disputed that the appellants car was directly behind the
complainants FX and that Gonzalez who was then seated at the drivers seat alighted from his car, took a
few steps then fired at the left side of the FX. Whether Noel Andres was seated at the drivers seat inside
his vehicle when Gonzalez fired at the FX, as the prosecution asserts, or was standing by the door of the
drivers seat outside his vehicle, as the defense submits, it is clear that the shot was fired away from Noel
Andres. The bullet hit Feliber near her temple above the left eye indicating that she was facing left
towards her husband when the shot was fired.[30] The direct hit on Felibers head shows that the angle of
the shot was indeed away from Noel Andres. Even the eyewitness for the prosecution testified that had
the appellant intended to kill Noel Andres he could have shot directly at him, considering that Noel Andres
was just a few steps away from him[31] and that Noel Andres was visible from the outside because his
window was partially open.[32] The pictures show that the bullet hole was on the third window on the left
side of the Tamaraw FX[33] belying any attempt to shoot Noel Andres. Two prosecution witnesses
Ramos and Castro unequivocally declared that nothing or no one prevented Gonzalez from shooting
directly at Noel Andres and that Gonzalez could have simply done so if he wanted to. But after alighting
from his car, Gonzalez took a few steps and shot at the left side window of the FX.[34]
The fact that the appellant fired his gun from behind the victim does not by itself amount to treachery.
There is no evidence on record that the appellant deliberately positioned himself behind the victim to gain
advantage over him when he fired the shot. On the contrary, the evidence before us reveals that the
position of the appellants car was not of his own doing but it became so when Noel Andres overtook his
car and cut off his path.
We note further, that the appellant did not act belligerently towards Noel Andres even after the latter cut
off the appellants path. Andres stated in court that the appellant did not alight from his car nor opened his
11
window until he, Andres, tapped on it.[35] For his part Gonzalez categorically stated in court that he did
not point his gun nor threatened Andres during their short spat.[36] Gonzalez, although he had his gun in
his car, did not react to Andres cursing until the latter was having an altercation with the appellants son,
Dino. Gonzalez claimed that he perceived that his son was in imminent danger.[37] Whether he
overreacted or he shot at Andres vehicle out of rage over Andres aggressive behavior, one thing appears
clear to us, that the shooting was not done in cold blood. It is undisputed that the windows of the FX are
heavily or darkly tinted so that a person outside would not see if anybody was inside.[38] The pictures of
the FX[39] on record confirm the testimonies of both prosecution and defense witnesses that the other
passengers of the FX were not visible from the outside. Gonzalez admitted in court that Noel Andres
mentioned that he has passengers with him while he was shouting and cursing at Gonzalez but there is
no indication that Gonzalez had any opportunity to see the passengers when he fired the shot. The
totality of the evidence on record fails to support a conclusion that Gonzalez deliberately employed the
mode of attack to gain undue advantage over the intended nor the actual victim. Without any decisive
evidence to the contrary, treachery cannot be considered; thus the crime committed is homicide.[40]
The trial courts finding that the loading of the gun, the cocking of the hammer and finally the pulling of the
trigger constitute a deliberate effort on the part of appellant to use the gun as a means of a treacherous
attack is patently erroneous. A single and continuous attack cannot be divided into stages to make it
appear that treachery was involved.[41] The entire incident happened in a matter of minutes, as testified
to by witnesses, and as noted by the trial court.[42] It was error to our mind for the trial court to divide the
assault in stages to arrive at the conclusion that the mode of attack was consciously employed by the
appellant. Contrary to the finding of the trial court that the appellant prepared the gun before getting out of
his car, the appellant testified that he loaded his gun before he left the house and that it was ready to fire
when he alighted his car. There was no time for him to reflect on the mode of attack since he just picked
up his gun and alighted from his car and shot at the FX a few seconds after Dino and Noel Andres started
shouting at each other.[43] We note further that the trial court pointed out that from the fact that the
appellant prepared his gun to shoot, this was an indication of the deliberate employment of the gun as a
means to kill; i.e. that the use of an automatic pistol shows that the shooting was attended by treachery.
We do not agree that the weapon used, by itself, is determinative of treachery, unless it is shown, and it is
not herein shown, that the appellant deliberately used the gun to insure the commission of the crime and
to render the unarmed victim defenseless. As discussed above, the encounter between the appellant and
the Andresses was a chance encounter and the appellants gun was in the glove compartment of his car
even before he left his house. The shooting was clearly a spur of the moment or impulsive decision made
by the appellant preceded by a heated altercation at the instance of the private complainant.
Jurisprudence teaches us that under the circumstances, treachery is not obtaining. In the case of People
vs. Valles,[44] the accused, a security guard, fired his Armalite and mortally wounded the victim when the
latter approached the accused four times insisting on entering the workplace wearing improper uniform,
then cursed and insulted and challenged the accused to a fight. We held that the shooting was not
attended by treachery as the shooting was preceded by a heated altercation at the instance of the victim.
It is to be noted that the kind of weapon used against an unarmed victim was not taken into consideration
in determining the attendance of treachery; it is the mode of attack employed by the accused under the
particular circumstances of a case that determines its attendance in the commission of a crime. We find
that the prosecution has not discharged its burden to show that the shooting was attended by treachery
and we are convinced that the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide.
12
As regards the injuries sustained by the two children we find that the crime committed are two counts of
slight physical injuries. The intent to kill determines whether the crime committed is physical injuries or
homicide and such intent is made manifest by the acts of the accused which are undoubtedly intended to
kill the victim.[45] In a case wherein the accused did not know that a person was hiding behind a table
who was hit by a stray bullet causing superficial injuries requiring treatment for three days, the crime
committed is slight physical injuries.[46] In case of doubt as to the homicidal intent of the accused, he
should be convicted of the lesser offense of physical injuries.[47] We have earlier pointed out that the
intent to kill is absent in this case. It was also found that one small metallic fragment was extracted from
Kenneth below his left eye while another fragment was extracted from Kevin immediately below the level
of his skin before the cheek bone.[48] An examination of the testimonies of the attending physicians,
showed that the wounds sustained by the two children from the metallic fragments are not in themselves
fatal but may cause death if left untreated. One of the attending physician testified in court that the
fragments themselves will not cause complication, it is the entry of the fragment or the open wound that is
susceptible to infection.[49] Two small fragments were no longer extracted from the face of Kevin Valdez,
as the doctor deemed it to be without danger of complication.[50] We note that the various sizes of the
metallic fragments were not established, at least to give an indication of the severity of the wounds
sustained. Both children were discharged after six days of treatment and there is no showing that they
required subsequent treatment or that they were immobilized for a greater number of days by reason of
the injuries sustained. Considering the nature and location of their injuries and the number of days
required for their treatment, we find that the crime committed for the injuries sustained by the children are
two counts of slight physical injuries under Art. 266 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes a penalty
of arresto menor or imprisonment for 1 to 30 days for injuries sustained that has incapacitated the victim
for one to nine days or required medical attendance for the same period. For evident lack of criminal
intent to kill the complainant, Noel Andres, as above stated, the information for attempted homicide must
fail.
The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a
relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, pleaded by the defense, were not convincingly
proved and none can be considered in the imposition of penalties. The testimony of prosecution witness
contradicts the appellants pretense of voluntary surrender. Witness Ramos testified that the appellant
drove away towards the gate of the memorial park while he was questioning him after the shooting and
had not Noel Andres and onlookers blocked his path the appellant could have fled the scene of the crime.
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining. For this mitigating
circumstance to be considered, it must be shown that (1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce passion
and obfuscation was committed by the intended victim; (2) that the crime was committed within a
reasonable length of time from the commission of the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the
accuseds mind; and that (3) the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a
spirit of lawlessness or revenge.[52] Noel Andres act of shouting at the appellants son, who was then a
nurse and of legal age, is not sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation as it is claimed by the
accused. Besides, the appellants son, Dino was shouting back at Noel Andres. It was not a case wherein
the appellants son appeared helpless and oppressed that the appellant lost his reason and shot at the FX
of Noel Andres. The same holds true for the appellants claim of provocation on the part of Noel Andres.
Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong committed and that the provocation
must be commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency of provocation varies according to the
13
circumstances of the case.[53] The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres towards the appellant and his
son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient provocation to shoot at the complainants
vehicle.
The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative is also
unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and shouting at the appellant and his son do not amount
to an unlawful aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez. Finally, the plea for the appreciation of the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit. This
mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by
the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the
time of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed
and the injury sustained by the victim.[54] The appellants use of a gun, although not deliberately sought
nor employed in the shooting, should have reasonably placed the appellant on guard of the possible
consequences of his act. The use of a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed.
For the death of Feliber Andres, and in the absence of any mitigating circumstance, the appellant is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, in its medium
period, as minimum to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum. For each count of the slight physical injuries committed against Kenneth Andres and Kevin
Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor in its medium period.
The rules on the imposition of penalties for complex crimes under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code are
not applicable in this case. Art. 48 applies if a single act constitutes two or more grave and less grave
felonies or when an offense is a necessary means of committing another; in such a case, the penalty for
the most serious offense shall be imposed in its maximum period. Art. 9 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Art. 25 defines grave felonies as those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or
afflictive penalties from reclusion perpetua to prision mayor; less grave felonies are those to which the law
attaches a penalty which in its maximum period falls under correctional penalties; and light felonies are
those punishable by arresto menor or fine not exceeding two hundred pesos. Considering that the
offenses committed by the act of the appellant of firing a single shot are one count of homicide, a grave
felony, and two counts of slight physical injuries, a light felony, the rules on the imposition of penalties for
complex crimes, which requires two or more grave and/or less grave felonies, will not apply.
The pecuniary award granted by the trial court for actual damages was duly established by the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as supported by the original receipts for hospitalization and
other medical expenses presented in evidence by the prosecution. The award for loss of earning capacity
is likewise sustained for the reason that while Feliber Andres was pregnant and was unemployed at the
time of death, it is not disputed that she was a registered nurse and had earning capacity. Noel Andres
also testified that he and his wife had plans to go back to Saudi Arabia to work after Feliber had given
birth to their second baby. While there is no evidence as to Felibers actual income at the time of her
death, in view of her temporary separation from work because of her pregnancy, we do not consider it
reversible error for the trial court to peg her earning capacity to that of the salary of a government nurse
under the salary standardization law, as a fair estimate or reasonable assessment of her earning capacity
at the time of her death. It would be grossly inequitous to deny her spouse and her minor children
damages for the support that they would have received, considering clear evidence on record that she did
have earning capacity at the time of her death.
14
The awards for moral damages for the death of Feliber Andres and for the injuries sustained by the two
children, which under the circumstances are reasonable, are likewise sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED. The appellant is hereby found guilty of
homicide for the death of Feliber Andres and is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1
day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as maximum. For each count of the slight physical injuries committed
against Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced to 20 days of arresto
menor.
The pecuniary awards granted by the trial court are hereby sustained.
SO ORDERED.
M. What is the formula for computation of unearned income

Net Earning Capacity (x) = Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income - Living Expenses (50% of GAI) ]
LE = 2/3 x (80 - Age of deceased)
N. What is Art. 2206
- Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding
five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
O. What is Art. 2208
- Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons
or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
15
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's
plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
P. What are the two concepts of attorney's fees?
- Ordinary concept: An attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer for the legal
services he has rendered to a client who has engaged him. The basis of this compensation is the fact
of employment of the lawyer by the client
- Extraordinary concept: An attorney's fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid
by the losing party to the prevailing party any litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases authorized
by law and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client -- unless they have a greed that the award
show pertain to the lawyer as an additional compensation or as part thereof
Q. Discuss AGUSTIN V. CA
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is accordingly resolved deleting the adjudicated award of P20,000.00
as exemplary damages, and otherwise by AFFIRMING the Decision dated October 10, 1985 in Civil Case
No. Q-42390 entitled "Labrador Development Corporation vs. Sps. Eduardo Agustin, et al." in all other
respects.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
Said judgment of respondent court is based on the findings of fact set out in its decision thus:
Plaintiff-appellee, being a subdivision developer, owned Lot 14, Block 1 of the San Pedro Compound IV
at Tandang Sora, Quezon City, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 277209. On November 7, 1981,
plaintiff-appellee agreed to sell said parcel of land to defendants-appellants on a package deal together
with a residential house per House Plan Model B-203 to be constructed thereon for the sum of
P202,980.00 (Exh. 'B'). As therein stipulated, the defendants-appellants were to pay P42,980.00 as
equity-P30,133.00 as down payment and the balance of P12,847.00 upon completion and de very of the
property, the other P160,000.00 to have been funded through a Pag-Ibig Fund loan to be applied for by
defendants-appellants. Central to the above was a stipulation that in the event the housing loan be
insufficient to pay the full contract price owing, they shall pay the same in cash on or before occupancy
and acceptance of the housing unit (ref. Exh. 'B', para. [e]). The agreement further provided —
16
(f) Failure of the Vendee to comply with any or all of the above stipulations shall ipso facto cancel
this contract to sell; and thereupon, this contract to sell or any other contract executed in connection
thereof, shall be of no further force and effect; and the title to the property, if already transferred in the
name of the Vendee, shall automatically revert to the Vendor.
The foregoing stipulation encompassed the necessity of transferring title to the lot to defendants-
appellants as an accommodation to enable their application for a housing loan in their names.
Hence, plaintiff-appellee executed a deed of sale over the lot (Exh. 'C') in favor of defendants-appellants,
without additional consideration beyond the P30,133.00 down payment adverted to, and the issuance to
said defendants-appellants of Transfer Certificate of title No. 29435 * (Exh. 'D'). Thusly accommodated,
defendants-appellants applied for a P160,000.00 housing loan with the First Summa Savings and
Mortgage Bank as an accredited financing institution.
After initial approval in the amount applied for, the Pag-ibig housing loan was downgraded to
P128,000.00 after reassessment. Under date of December 18, 1982, plaintiff-appellee apprised
defendants-appellants of said development (Exh. 'F') enclosing the formal bank December 16, 1982 letter
(Exh. 'E') requiring a co-borrower related within the fourth degree of consanguinity should the defendants-
appellants desire approval of an increased loan amount.
Defendants-appellants appear to have disdained a reply to plaintiff-appellee's said letter. Thus, under
date of December 28, 1982, plaintiff-appellee again wrote a follow- up letter to defendants-appellants
(Exh. 'G') affording the latter time to decide on their options, on pain of enforcement of the terms of the
contract to sell.
Failing reaction from defendants-appellants thereto, plaintiff-appellee resorted to enforcement of the

contractual stipulations under date of March 1, 1983 (Exh. 'H') and remitted an enclosed check for
P30,133.00 (Exh. 'I') representing the equity paid in by defendants-appellants. The latter accepted said
check and deposited same into their account.
Instead of reconveyance of title to the lot, defendants-appellants however sought time to buy the property;
plaintiff-appellee agreed provided that payment be effected in cash. Defendants-appellants failed to make
such payment in cash, despite the lapse of a second 30-day period afforded therefor. Thereupon, plaintiff-
appellee demanded anew for reconveyance in a July 27, 1984 letter (Exh. 'J').
On August 8, 1984, plaintiff-appellee filed Civil Case No. Q42390 for reconveyance and damage. In
answer, defendants-appellants maintained inter alia that approval of a P160,000.00 housing loan had
been assured upon completion of the house with proof of its delivery and acceptance, but that
acceptance could not be reasonably given by them in that certain specifications for the housing unit had
not been complied with. 2
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, the dispositive
part whereof reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants, jointly and severally:
a) to reconvey to plaintiff the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 284735 ** of
the Register of Deeds, Quezon City;
17
b) to pay plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) to pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs of the suit.
which judgment, as earlier stated, was affirmed by respondent court but with the deletion of the award of
exemplary damages.
On August 22, 1988, respondent court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration, hence this present
petition raising the following issues:
I. The 'Contract to Sell' dated November 7, 1981 creates a reciprocal obligation between Labrador
Development Corporation, as seller, and spouses Eduardo and Ann Agustin, as buyer, of the questioned
house and lot.
II. The failure of Labrador Development Corporation (LADECO) to complete construction of the housing
unit pursuant to the 'Contract to Sell' constitutes a substantial and serious breach thereof as would bar
LADECO from executing the option of cancellation (rescission) of the 'Contract to Sell' under Article 1191
of the Civil Code.
III. The justifiable refusal of Spouses Agustin to sign the 'House Acceptance Form' certifying that they
accept the house as 100% complete constitutes merely a slight or casual breach of the 'Contract to Sell'
which does not warrant the unilateral cancellation (rescission,) of the contract under par. 4 (f) thereof and
Article 1191 of the Civil Code.
IV. The remedy of reconveyance of title of the property in question cannot be availed of by LADECO as
there was no valid, binding and effective cancellation (rescission) of the 'Contract to Sell'.
V. Private respondent LADECO is not entitled to attorney's fees of P5,000.00 under the facts and
circumstances of the case.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that reconveyance is proper in this case. Herein petitioners are
already barred from questioning the validity of the cancellation of the contract to sell by their
acquiescence thereto. Their acceptance and encashment of the checks representing the total amount
paid by them to private respondent as equity, coupled by their failure to object or file an action, despite
due notice, to question the validity of the extrajudicial cancellation of said contract and to ask for specific
performance for more than one year, clearly show that they assented to the same.
Furthermore, after receiving the check refunding their equity payment incident to the reconveyance
desired by private respondents, petitioners, disregarding the original agreement of the parties, offered to
purchase anew the property in question to which private respondent agreed. This novatory agreement,
however, was not consummated as petitioners again failed to raise and pay the purchase price despite
two 30-day extensions. They never at that juncture questioned the propriety of the rescission and
reconveyance desired by private respondent. Obviously, extrajudicial rescission produces legal effects
where the other party does not oppose it.
Moreover, even assuming that there was no implied assent to the cancellation of the contract to sell,
reconveyance is still proper. The non-fulfillment by petitioners of their obligation to pay, which is a
suspensive condition to the obligation of private respondent to sell and deliver the house and lot,
rendered the contract to sell and the subsequent contract executed pursuant thereto ineffective and
without force and effect.
18
The contract between petitioners and private respondent is not an absolute sale but a conditional sale or
contract to sell, whereby ownership is retained by the vender until full payment of the purchase price.
Without such full payment, there is no obligation to sell and deliver. The subsequent execution of the
deed of absolute sale and the transfer and registration of the title of the lot in the name of petitioners is of
no moment, considering that the same, by mutual agreement of the parties, was made without
consideration and solely for the purpose of facilitating the approval and release of the PAG-IBIG loan and
not for the purpose of actually transferring ownership.
Under the contract to sell, the obligation of petitioners to completely pay the purchase price is a condition
precedent to the obligation of private respondent to sell and deliver the house as provided in the contract
to sell, which specifically states:
5. Upon complete payment of the VENDEE/S of the purchase price herein above stated, and faithful
compliance with all his obligations stipulated therein, the VENDOR, agrees to execute a valid deed of
sale in favor of the VENDEE/S and cause the issuance of the Certificate of Title in the name of the latter,
free from all liens and encumbrances except those provided for in the Land Registration Act and other
laws, Presidential Decrees, General Orders, Letters of Instruction, Zoning Ordinances, and the attached
Deed of Restrictions, which form part of this Contract; ...
The repeated failure and refusal of petitioners, despite due notice, to look for a co- borrower related to
them within the fourth degree of consanguinity as required by the bank in order to prevent the
downgrading of the loan, nor to communicate to private respondent the arrangement they intended to
make regarding the difference between the approved loan of P128,000.00 and the unpaid amount of
P160,000.00, clearly indicate their intention not to perform their obligations under the contract. This
constituted not only a substantial or serious breach, but prevented the happening of the condition
precedent which would give rise to the obligation of private respondent to sell and transfer ownership of
the house and lot to petitioners.
We have repeatedly ruled that:
In contracts to sell, where ownership is retained by the seller and is not to pass until the full payment of
the price, such payment, as we said is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a
breach, casual or serious, but simply an event that prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey title
from acquiring binding force, in accordance with Article 1117 of the Old Civil Code. To argue that there
was only a casual breach is to proceed from the assumption that the contract is one of absolute sale,
where non-payment is a resolutory condition, which is not the case.
... appellant overlooks that its contract with appellee Myers is not the ordinary sale envisaged by Article
1592, transferring ownership simultaneously with the delivery of the real property sold, but one in which
the vendor retained ownership of the immovable object of the sale, merely undertaking to convey it
provided the buyer strictly complied with the terms of the contract (see paragraph [d], ante, page 5). In
suing to recover possession of the building from Maritime, appellee Myers is not after the resolution or
setting aside of the contract and the restoration of the parties to the status quo ante, as contemplated by
Article 1592, but precisely enforcing the provisions of the agreement that it is no longer obligated to part
with the ownership or possession of the property because Maritime failed to comply with the specific
condition precedent, which is to pay the installment as they fell due.
The distinction between contracts of sale and contracts to sell with reserved title has been recognized by
this Court in repeated decisions upholding the power of promissors under contracts to sell in case of
19
failure of the other party to complete payment, to extrajudicially terminate the operation of the contract,
refuse conveyance and retain the sums or installments already received, where such rights are expressly
provided for, as in the case at bar.
We repeat, the obligation of petitioners to fully comply with their undertakings was necessarily
determinative of the obligation of private respondent to complete the construction of the house. Where
one of the parties to a contract did not perform the undertaking which he was bound by the terms of the
agreement to perform, he is not entitled to insist upon the performance of the other party. 8 For failure of
one party to assume and perform the obligation imposed on him, the other patty does not incur in delay. 9
Correspondingly, we reject the argument of petitioners that the failure of private respondent to complete
the construction of the house constitutes a substantial breach as would bar the latter from cancelling the
contract. Instead, the facts of this case persuade us to hold that petitioners were merely posturing when,
after being required to reconvey the premises, they came up with belated complaints about the
imperfections or incompleteness of the house involved, in the same manner that they also pretended to
be interested in purchasing the property but failed to do so after importuning private respondents to grant
them extensions of time for that purpose.
With the foregoing circumstances, reconveyance is proper and exigible pursuant to Paragraph 4 (f) of the
contract to sell quoted in the decision of respondent court, supra, and on the basic principle that when an
obligation has been extinguished or resolved, it is the duty of the court to require the parties to surrender
whatever they may have received from the other, and the parties must be restored, as far as practicable,
to their original situation.
The award to private respondent of attorney's fees, however, must be disallowed considering that the
award of exemplary damages was eliminated by respondent court and the text of the decision of the trial
court, which was aimed by the Court of Appeals, is bereft of any findings of fact and law to justify such
award. The accepted rule is that the reason for the award of attorney's fees must be stated in the text of
the court's decision; otherwise, if it is stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the same must
be disallowed on appeal. The award of attorney's fees being an exception rather than the general rule, it
is necessary for the court to make findings of facts and law that would bring the case within the exception
and justify the grant of such award.
WHEREFORE, except for the award of attorney's fees which is hereby deleted, the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
R. What is quantum meruit
- As much as one deserves
- When the stipulated attorney's fees appear to be excessive, unconscionable or unreasonable they
should be fixed on a quantum meruit basis because a lawyer is primarily a court officer, charged with
the duty of administering impartial justice between the parties and his fees should be subject to judicial
control. Moreove,r sound public policy demands that courts should disregard stipulations for counsel
fees whenever they appear to be a source of speculative profit at the expense of the debtor or the
mortgagor.
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S. What is Art. 2209
- Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay,
the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the
interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per
annum. (1108)
T. Discuss NACAR V. GALLERY FRAMES
NACAR V. GALLERY FRAMES (1)

Dario Nacar filed a labor case against Gallery Frames and its owner Felipe Bordey, Jr. Nacar alleged that
he was dismissed without cause by Gallery Frames on January 24, 1997. On October 15, 1998, the
Labor Arbiter (LA) found Gallery Frames guilty of illegal dismissal hence the Arbiter awarded Nacar
P158,919.92 in damages consisting of backwages and separation pay.
Gallery Frames appealed all the way to the Supreme Court (SC). The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and the decision became final on May 27, 2002.
After the finality of the SC decision, Nacar filed a motion before the LA for recomputation as he alleged
that his backwages should be computed from the time of his illegal dismissal (January 24, 1997) until the
finality of the SC decision (May 27, 2002) with interest. The LA denied the motion as he ruled that the
reckoning point of the computation should only be from the time Nacar was illegally dismissed (January
24, 1997) until the decision of the LA (October 15, 1998). The LA reasoned that the said date should be
the reckoning point because Nacar did not appeal hence as to him, that decision became final and
executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter is correct.
HELD: No. There are two parts of a decision when it comes to illegal dismissal cases (referring to cases
where the dismissed employee wins, or loses but wins on appeal). The first part is the ruling that the
employee was illegally dismissed. This is immediately final even if the employer appeals – but will be
reversed if employer wins on appeal. The second part is the ruling on the award of backwages and/or
separation pay. For backwages, it will be computed from the date of illegal dismissal until the date of the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. But if the employer appeals, then the end date shall be extended until the
day when the appellate court’s decision shall become final. Hence, as a consequence, the liability of the
employer, if he loses on appeal, will increase – this is just but a risk that the employer cannot avoid when
it continued to seek recourses against the Labor Arbiter’s decision. This is also in accordance with Article
279 of the Labor Code.
Anent the issue of award of interest in the form of actual or compensatory damages, the Supreme Court
ruled that the old case of Eastern Shipping Lines vs CA is already modified by the promulgation of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Resolution No. 796 which lowered the legal rate of interest
from 12% to 6%. Specifically, the rules on interest are now as follows:
1. Monetary Obligations ex. Loans
a. If stipulated in writing
a.1. shall run from date of judicial demand (filing of the case)
21
a.2. rate of interest shall be that amount stipulated
b. If not stipulated in writing
b.1. shall run from date of default (either failure to pay upon extra-judicial demand or upon judicial
demand whichever is appropriate and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code)
b.2. rate of interest shall be 6% per annum
2. Non-Monetary Obligations (such as the case at bar)
a. If already liquidated, rate of interest shall be 6% per annum, demandable from date of judicial or extra-
judicial demand (Art. 1169, Civil Code)
b. If unliquidated, no interest
Except: When later on established with certainty. Interest shall still be 6% per annum demandable from
the date of judgment because such on such date, it is already deemed that the amount of damages is
already ascertained.
3. Compounded Interest
– This is applicable to both monetary and non-monetary obligations
– 6% per annum computed against award of damages (interest) granted by the court. To be computed
from the date when the court’s decision becomes final and executory until the award is fully satisfied by
the losing party.
4. The 6% per annum rate of legal interest shall be applied prospectively:
– Final and executory judgments awarding damages prior to July 1, 2013 shall apply the 12% rate;
– Final and executory judgments awarding damages on or after July 1, 2013 shall apply the 12% rate for
unpaid obligations until June 30, 2013; unpaid obligations with respect to said judgments on or after July
1, 2013 shall still incur the 6% rate.
NACAR V. GALLERY FRAMES (2)

FACTS:
On October 15, 1998, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decisionin favor of petitioner and found that he was
dismissed from employment without a valid or just cause. Thus, petitioner was awarded backwages and
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in the amount ofP158,919.92.
Respondents appealed to the NLRC, but it was dismissed for lack of merit. Accordingly, the NLRC
sustained the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied. Dissatisfied, respondents filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the CA but it was
likewise denied. Respondents then sought relief before the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error on
the part of the CA, this Court denied the petition in the Resolution dated April 17, 2002.
An Entry of Judgment was later issued certifying that the resolution became final and executory on May
27, 2002. The case was, thereafter, referred back to the Labor Arbiter for execution. Petitioner filed a
22
Motion for Correct Computation, praying that his backwages be computed from the date of his dismissal
on January 24, 1997 up to the finality of the Resolution of the Supreme Court on May 27, 2002. Upon
recomputation, the Computation and Examination Unit of the NLRC arrived at an updated amount in the
sum ofP471,320.31.
Respondents filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution, arguing, among other things, that since the Labor
Arbiter awarded separation pay ofP62,986.56 and limited backwages ofP95,933.36, no more
recomputation is required to be made of the said awards. They claimed that after the decision becomes
final and executory, the same cannot be altered or amended anymore. LA denied the motion but the
decision was reversed by the NLRC on appeal.
Petitioner appealed to the CA but was denied, stating that since petitioner no longer appealed the
October 15, 1998 Decision of the Labor Arbiter, which already became final and executory, a belated
correction thereof is no longer allowed. The CA stated that there is nothing left to be done except to
enforce the said judgment. Consequently, it can no longer be modified in any respect, except to correct
clerical errors or mistakes. Thus, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not a re-computation in the course of execution of the labor arbiter's original
computation of the awards made is legally proper.
HELD: Yes.
Labor Law- computation of backwages
A source of misunderstanding in implementing the final decision in this case proceeds from the way the
original labor arbiter framed his decision. The decision consists essentially of two parts.
The first is that part of the decision that cannot now be disputed because it has been confirmed with
finality. This is the finding of the illegality of the dismissal and the awards of separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement, backwages, attorney's fees, and legal interests. The second part is the computation of the
awards made.
Clearly implied from this original computation is its currency up to the finality of the labor arbiter's
decision. As we noted above, this implication is apparent from the terms of the computation itself, and no
question would have arisen had the parties terminated the case and implemented the decision at that
point.
However, the petitioner disagreed with the labor arbiter's findings on all counts - i.e., on the finding of
illegality as well as on all the consequent awards made. Hence, the petitioner appealed the case to the
NLRC which, in turn, affirmed the labor arbiter's decision. By law, the NLRC decision is final, reviewable
only by the CA on jurisdictional grounds.
The petitioner appropriately sought to nullify the NLRC decision on jurisdictional grounds through a timely
filed Rule 65 petition for certiorari. The CA decision, finding that NLRC exceeded its authority in affirming
the payment of 13th month pay and indemnity, lapsed to finality and was subsequently returned to the
labor arbiter of origin for execution.
It was at this point that the present case arose. Focusing on the core illegal dismissal portion of the
original labor arbiter's decision, the implementing labor arbiter ordered the award re-computed; he
apparently read the figures originally ordered to be paid to be the computation due had the case been
terminated and implemented at the labor arbiter's level. It was at this point that the present case arose.
23
Focusing on the core illegal dismissal portion of the original labor arbiter's decision, the implementing
labor arbiter ordered the award re-computed; he apparently read the figures originally ordered to be paid
to be the computation due had the case been terminated and implemented at the labor arbiter's level.
Thus, the labor arbiter re-computed the award to include the separation pay and the backwages due up to
the finality of the CA decision that fully terminated the case on the merits. Unfortunately, the labor arbiter's
approved computation went beyond the finality of the CA decision (July 29, 2003) and included as well
the payment for awards the final CA decision had deleted - specifically, the proportionate 13th month pay
and the indemnity awards. Hence, the CA issued the decision now questioned in the present petition.
We see no error in the CA decision confirming that a re-computation is necessary as it essentially

considered the labor arbiter's original decision in accordance with its basic component parts as we
discussed above. To reiterate, the first part contains the finding of illegality and its monetary
consequences; the second part is the computation of the awards or monetary consequences of the illegal
dismissal, computed as of the time of the labor arbiter's original decision.
By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add up until full satisfaction, as
expressed under Article 279 of the Labor Code. The recomputation of the consequences of illegal
dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final
decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary
consequences of this dismissal is affected, and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of
final judgments. That the amount respondents shall now pay has greatly increased is a consequence that
it cannot avoid as it is the risk that it ran when it continued to seek recourses against the Labor Arbiter's
decision.
U. What is Art. 2212
- Art. 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the
obligation may be silent upon this point. (1109a)
V. What is Art. 2214
- Art. 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he
may recover.
W. What is Art. 2216
- Art. 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or
exemplary damages, may be adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones,
is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case.
X. What is Art. 2217
- Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result
of the defendant's wrongful act for omission.
Y. What is the nature of Moral Damages?
24
- Moral damages, through in capable pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. It
does not intend to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to
enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusement that will serve the alleviate the mora
suffering he has undergone by reason of the defendant culpable action
Z. When are moral damages recoverable?
- Moral damages cannot be awarded if the case is filed do not fall within Article 2219 and Article 2220 as
a rule. Further, it must be established that the act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause
of the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff
- Moral damages cannot be recovered in the absence of wrongful act or omission or front or bad faith
- It's not enough that such injuries have arise; it is essential that they have sprung from a wrongful act or
omission, fraud, malice or bad faith which was the proximate cause thereof
AA. What is Art. 2218
- Art. 2218. In the adjudication of moral damages, the sentimental value of property, real or personal,
may be considered.
BB. What is Art. 2219
- Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may
also recover moral damages.
25
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No.
9 of this article, in the order named.
CC. What is Art. 2220
- Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
DD. Are juridical persons entitled to moral damages**
- The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an artificial
person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses. It
cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish which can be experienced only by
one having a nervous system.
EE. Discuss FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC V. AGO MEDIAL AND

EDUCATIONAL CENTER
FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC V. AGO MEDIAL AND EDUCATIONAL

CENTER (1)
Facts:
Expos is a radio documentary program hosted by Carmelo Mel Rima (Rima) and Hermogenes Jun
Alegre (Alegre). Expos is aired every morning over DZRC-AM which is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting
Network, Inc. (FBNI). Expos is heard over Legazpi City, the Albay municipalities and other Bicol areas.
In the morning of 14 and 15 December 1989, Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints
from students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College
of Medicine (AMEC) and its administrators. Claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and
Angelita Ago (Ago), as Dean of AMECs College of Medicine, filed a complaint for damages against FBNI,
Rima and Alegre on 27 February 1990.
The complaint further alleged that AMEC is a reputable learning institution. With the supposed expose,
FBNI, Rima and Alegre transmitted malicious imputations, and as such, destroyed plaintiffs (AMEC and
Ago) reputation. AMEC and Ago included FBNI as defendant for allegedly failing to exercise due diligence
in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre.
On 14 December 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision] finding FBNI and Alegre liable for libel
except Rima. In holding FBNI liable for libel, the trial court found that FBNI failed to exercise diligence in
the selection and supervision of its employees.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment with modification. The appellate court made
Rima solidarily liable with FBNI and Alegre.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the broadcasts are libelous.
2. Whether or not AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
26
3. Whether or not the award of attorneys fees is proper.
Ruling:
1. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or
any act or omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious. Rima and Alegre failed to show adequately their
good intention and justifiable motive in airing the supposed gripes of the students. As hosts of a
documentary or public affairs program, Rima and Alegre should have presented the public issues free
from inaccurate and misleading information. Hearing the students alleged complaints a month before the
expos, they had sufficient time to verify their sources and information. However, Rima and Alegre hardly
made a thorough investigation of the students alleged gripes. Neither did they inquire about nor confirm the
purported irregularities in AMEC from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Alegre testified
that he merely went to AMEC to verify his report from an alleged AMEC official who refused to disclose any
information. Alegre simply relied on the words of the students because they were many and not because
there is proof that what they are saying is true. This plainly shows Rima and Alegres reckless disregard of
whether their report was true or not.
Had the comments been an expression of opinion based on established facts, it is immaterial that the
opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. However, the
comments of Rima and Alegre were not backed up by facts. Therefore, the broadcasts are not privileged
and remain libelous per se.
The broadcasts also violate the Radio Code of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas,
Ink. (Radio Code). Item I(B) of the Radio Code provides:
B. PUBLIC AFFAIRS, PUBLIC ISSUES AND COMMENTARIES
1. x x x
4. Public affairs program shall present public issues free from personal bias, prejudice
and inaccurate and misleading information. x x x Furthermore, the station shall strive to
present balanced discussion of issues. x x x.
xxx
7. The station shall be responsible at all times in the supervision of public affairs, public issues and
commentary programs so that they conform to the provisions and standards of this code.
8. It shall be the responsibility of the newscaster, commentator, host and announcer to protect
public interest, general welfare and good order in the presentation of public affairs and public
issues.[36]
The broadcasts fail to meet the standards prescribed in the Radio Code, which lays down the code of
ethical conduct governing practitioners in the radio broadcast industry. The Radio Code is a voluntary code
of conduct imposed by the radio broadcast industry on its own members. The Radio Code is a public
warranty by the radio broadcast industry that radio broadcast practitioners are subject to a code by which
their conduct are measured for lapses, liability and sanctions.
The public has a right to expect and demand that radio broadcast practitioners live up to the code of
conduct of their profession, just like other professionals. A professional code of conduct provides the
standards for determining whether a person has acted justly, honestly and with good faith in the exercise
of his rights and performance of his duties as required by Article 19 of the Civil Code. A professional code
27
of conduct also provides the standards for determining whether a person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another has acted in a manner contrary to morals or good customs under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
2. FBNI contends that AMEC is not entitled to moral damages because it is a corporation.
A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot
experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or
moral shock. The Court of Appeals cites Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB, et al. to justify the award of moral
damages. However, the Courts statement in Mambulao that a corporation may have a good reputation
which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the award of moral damages is an obiter dictum.
Nevertheless, AMECs claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other
form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person.
Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of
defamation and claim for moral damages.
Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implies damages. In such a case, evidence
of an honest mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party libeled goes only in mitigation of
damages.[46] Neither in such a case is the plaintiff required to introduce evidence of actual damages as a
condition precedent to the recovery of some damages. In this case, the broadcasts are libelousper se.
Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
However, we find the award of P300,000 moral damages unreasonable. The record shows that even
though the broadcasts were libelous per se, AMEC has not suffered any substantial or material damage to
its reputation. Therefore, we reduce the award of moral damages from P300,000 to P150,000.
3. The award of attorney’s fees is not proper.
AMEC failed to justify satisfactorily its claim for attorney’s fees. AMEC did not adduce evidence to
warrant the award of attorney’s fees. Moreover, both the trial and appellate courts failed to explicitly state
in their respective decisions the rationale for the award of attorney’s fees.
In Inter-Asia Investment Industries, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that:
[I]t is an accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item of damages is the exception rather than the
rule, and counsels fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to
award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification,
without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and
conjecture. In all events, the court must explicitly state in the text of the decision, and not only in the decretal
portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of attorney’s fees.[51] (Emphasis supplied)
Petition denied.
FF. Discuss CRYSTAL V. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
CRYSTAL V. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS(1)

Facts: On 28 March 1978, spouses Crystal obtained a P300, 000.00 loan in behalf of the Cebu Contractors
Consortium Co. (CCCC) from the BPI-Butuan. The loan was secured by a chattel mortgage on heavy
equipment and machinery of CCCC. On the same date, the spouses executed in favor of BPI-Butuan a
Continuing Suretyship where they bound themselves as surety of CCCC in the aggregate principal sum of
not exceeding P300, 000.00. Thereafter, or on 29 March 1979, Raymundo Crystal executed a promissory
note for the amount of P300, 000.00, also in favor of BPI-Butuan. Sometime in August 1979, CCCC
renewed a previous loan, this time from BPI, Cebu City branch (BPI-Cebu City). However, CCCC had no
real property to offer as security for the loan; hence, the spouses executed a real estate mortgage over
their own real property. They executed another real estate mortgage over the same lot in favor of BPI-Cebu
City, to secure an additional loan of P20,000.00 of CCCC. CCCC failed to pay its loans to both BPI-Butuan
28
and BPI-Cebu City when they became due. CCCC, as well as the spouses, failed to pay their obligations
despite demands. Thus, BPI resorted to the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage and the real estate
mortgage. The foreclosure sale on the chattel mortgage was initially stalled and done. BPI filed a complaint
for sum of money against CCCC and the spouses before the Regional Trial Court, seeking to recover the
deficiency of the loan of CCCC and the spouses with BPI-Butuan Before the Court, petitioners who are the
heirs of the spouses argue that the failure of the spouses to pay the BPI-Cebu City loan of P120,000.00
was due to BPI’s illegal refusal to accept payment for the loan unless the P300,000.00 loan from BPI-
Butuan would also be paid. Consequently, in view of BPI’s unjust refusal to accept payment of the BPI-
Cebu City loan, the loan obligation of the spouses was extinguished, petitioners contend.
Issues: Whether or not the obligation of the spouses is extinguished
Whether or not BPI is entitled to moral damages
Held: No, the obligation is not yet extinguished. Under Art. 1236 of the Civil Code, the creditor is not bound
to accept payment or performance by a third person who has no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation,
unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. The Court sees no stipulation in the promissory note which
states that a third person may fulfill the spouses’ obligation. Thus, it is clear that the spouses alone bear
responsibility for the same. A solidary obligation is one in which each of the debtors is liable for the entire
obligation, and each of the creditors is entitled to demand the satisfaction of the whole obligation from any
or all of the debtors. A liability is solidary "only when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so
provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires."24 Thus, when the obligor undertakes to be
"jointly and severally" liable, it means that the obligation is solidary. More importantly, the promissory note,
wherein the spouses undertook to be solidarily liable for the principal loan, partakes the nature of a
suretyship and therefore is an additional security for the loan.
No, they are not entitled to moral damages. BPI is not entitled to moral damages. A juridical person is
generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical
suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock. The
Court of Appeals found BPI as "being famous and having gained its familiarity and respect not only in the
Philippines but also in the whole world because of its good will and good reputation must protect and defend
the same against any unwarranted suit such as the case at bench. Obviously, an artificial person like herein
appellant corporation cannot experience physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings, moral shock or social humiliation which are basis of moral damages. A corporation may
have good reputation which, if besmirched may also be a ground for the award of moral damages. Indeed,
while the Court may allow the grant of moral damages to corporations, it is not automatically granted; there
must still be proof of the existence of the factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to the
defendant’s acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the
category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a
penalty on the wrongdoer.
GG. What is Art. 2221
- Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
29
HH. What is the nature and the purpose of nominal damages?
- Nominal damages are not for indemnification of loss but for vindication of the rights violated.
II. May nominal damages and actual/compensatory damages be awarded at the same time
- Nominal damages cannot co‐ exist with actual or compensatory damages because nominal damages
are recoverable when the damages suffered cannot be proved with reasonable certainty. The law
presumes damage although actual or compensatory damages are not proven. Award of actual, moral,
temperate or moderate damages preclude nominal damages. But it may be awarded together with
attorney’s fees.
JJ. May nominal damages and exemplary damages be awarded at the same time
- Nominal damages cannot be awarded together with compensatory damages. Where the court has
already awarded compensatory and exemplary damages that is already a judicial recognition that the
plaintiff's right was violated. Hence, the award of nominal damages is unnecessary and improper
Awards for actual, moral, temperate or moderate damages precludes nominal damages
KK. What is Art. 2224
- Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory
damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount can not, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.
LL. What is the rationale for award of temperate damages
- In some states of the American union, temperate damages are allowed. There are cases wherefrom
the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is
convinced that there has been such loss. For instance, injury to one's commercial credit or to the
Goodwill of the business firm is often hard to show with certainty in terms of money. Should damages
be denied for that reason? The judge should be empowered to calculate moderate damages in such
cases ,rather than the plaintiff should suffer without address from the defendant's wrongful act.
MM. What is the requisite to justify award of temperate damages
- It is essential that some pecuniary loss had been suffered but its exact amount cannot, from the nature
of the case, be proved with certainty. The court is allowed to calculate the amount
NN. What is Art. 2226
- Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of
breach thereof.
OO. What is the nature of liquidated damages
- These are fixed damages previously agreed by the parties to the contract and payable to the innocent
party in case of breach by the other.
PP. Distinguish between penalty and liquidated damages
30
- A penalty is there sum inserted in a contract, not a measure of compensation for its breach, but rather
as a punishment for default or by way of security for actual damages which may be sustained by
reason of non-performance and it involves the idea of punishment. if there's an agreement to pay is the
belated some on which of contract irrespective of the damages sustained. Its essence is a payment of
money stipulated as a terrorem of the offending party while the essence of liquidated damages is a
genuine covenanted pre-estimate of damages. The amount is fixed and is not subject to change;
however if the stipulated sum is deemed to be a penalty, it is not enforceable in the nondefaulting party
is left to recover such actual damages as he can prove
A provision for payment of a special sum as a compensation for acts contemplated by the contract as
opposed to compensation for injury resulting from breach of contract, is neither a penalty nor liquidated
damages. Also to be distinguished from both a penalty and liquidated damages is a contractual
limitation of liability.
QQ. What is Art. 2229
- Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
RR. What is the rationale for award of exemplary damages
- Exemplary damages are required by public policy for wanton acts must be suppressed. They are an
antidote so that the poison of wickedness may not run through the body politic
SS. What is the nature of exemplary damages
- They are mere accessories to other forms of damages except nominal damages. They are mere
additions to actual, moral, temperate and liquidated damages which may or may not be granted at all
depending upon the necessity of setting an example for the public good as form of deterrent to the
petition of the same act by one
TT. What is Art. 2230
- Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate
and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
UU. What is Art. 2231
- Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.
VV. What is Art. 2233
- Art. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether
or not they should be adjudicated.
WW. What are the conditions for the grant of exemplary damages
31
XX. What is Art. 2235
- Art. 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are renounced in advance shall be null and void.
32

Qa Torts Week 11 and 12

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Qa Torts Week 11 and 12

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imgarcia Saturday, January 27, 2018

TORTS: Week 11 AND 12

A. What are actual or compensatory damages?

B. When will actual or compensatory damages be awarded?

C. What is the purpose of actual damages?

E. What is Art. 2200

F. What are kinds of actual or compensatory damages? **

G. What is Art. 2202

H. What is Art. 2203

I. What is Art. 2205

- Art. 2205. Damages may be recovered:

(2) For injury to the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.

J. What is loss of earning capacity?

K. What are the factors in determining the loss of earning capacity?

L. Discuss PEOPLE V. GONZALES

On arraignment the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.

CONCLUSION: Cause of death is gunshot wound on the head.

XXXX XXXXX XXXX

The accused is further ordered to pay the following civil liabilities:

1. To the private complainant Noel Andres:

a) the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Feliber Andres;

c) the amount of P98,384.19 as funeral expenses;

h) the costs of the suit.

2. To the private complainant Nicasio Valdez:

b) the amount of P75,000.00 as and by way of moral damages.

In his appeal, Gonzalez submits the following assignments of error:

The appeal has merit.

M. What is the formula for computation of unearned income

LE = 2/3 x (80 - Age of deceased)

N. What is Art. 2206

O. What is Art. 2208

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

P. What are the two concepts of attorney's fees?

Without pronouncement as to costs.

Failing reaction from defendants-appellants thereto, plaintiff-appellee resorted to enforcement of the

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants, jointly and severally:

We have repeatedly ruled that:

R. What is quantum meruit

- As much as one deserves

T. Discuss NACAR V. GALLERY FRAMES

NACAR V. GALLERY FRAMES (1)

ISSUE: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter is correct.

1. Monetary Obligations ex. Loans

b. If not stipulated in writing

b.2. rate of interest shall be 6% per annum

2. Non-Monetary Obligations (such as the case at bar)

– This is applicable to both monetary and non-monetary obligations

4. The 6% per annum rate of legal interest shall be applied prospectively:

NACAR V. GALLERY FRAMES (2)

Labor Law- computation of backwages

We see no error in the CA decision confirming that a re-computation is necessary as it essentially

U. What is Art. 2212

V. What is Art. 2214

W. What is Art. 2216

X. What is Art. 2217

Y. What is the nature of Moral Damages?

Z. When are moral damages recoverable?

AA. What is Art. 2218

BB. What is Art. 2219

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;