Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
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8 November 2016
Doc. No.: J-000223-REP-PHA
Revision: B
Sydney Melbourne
Arriscar Pty Limited Level 26 Level 2 Riverside Quay
ACN 162 867 763 44 Market Street 1 Southbank Boulevard
www.arriscar.com.au Sydney NSW 2000 Southbank VIC 3006
T: +61 2 9089 8804 T: +61 3 9982 4535
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Distribution List
From To
Name Organisation
(Issue) (Issue)
John Sneddon FOY Group Limited A B
Arriscar Pty Limited, and its respective officers, employees or agents are individually and collectively referred to in this
clause as 'Arriscar'. Arriscar assumes no responsibility, and shall not be liable to any person, for any loss, damage or
expense caused by reliance on the information or advice in this document or howsoever provided, unless that person has
signed a contract with Arriscar for the provision of this information or advice and in that case any responsibility or liability
is exclusively on the terms and conditions set out in that contract.
© Arriscar Pty Ltd.
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Summary
Overview
Arriscar Pty Ltd (Arriscar) was engaged by FOY Group Limited (FOY) to undertake a Preliminary
Hazard Analysis (PHA) of a proposed waste plastic to fuel facility at Hume in the Australian Capital
Territory (ACT).
This PHA has been undertaken in accordance with the guidance provided in HIPAP No. 6 - Hazard
Analysis (2011) [Ref. 2]. A quantitative assessment of the risk (including quantification of the
likelihood and consequences of identified failure scenarios) has been undertaken to demonstrate
compliance with the criteria published in HIPAP No. 4 - Risk Criteria for Land Use Safety Planning
(2011) [Ref. 1].
Findings
Based on the results of this QRA, the proposed development complies with the relevant land use
safety planning risk criteria for new industrial developments (As published in HIPAP No. 4), and is an
acceptable land use at this location.
Recommendations
A total of 11 recommendations were made during the HAZID workshop (Refer to Table 6).
1. Ensure the plastics store building is designed to the requirements set out in the building
assessment.
2. Ensure the feedstock management procedure adequately addresses the checks for PVC
and PET.
3. Consider suitable checks of people and vehicles before granting access to the site.
4. Ensure the Fire Safety Study considers the appropriate prevention/detection measures for
releases from the process.
5. Ensure vehicle access to site is restricted for over height vehicles to avoid contact with
structures.
6. Ensure the Fire Safety Study considers the firewater requirements for the site.
7. Ensure the tank farm bunding arrangement compiles with AS1940.
8. Ensure the storage tanks have adequate overfill protection.
9. Ensure the system provides adequate overfill protection of the product road tankers.
10. Ensure adequate drive away protection is provided.
11. Ensure the tank farm arrangement compiles with AS1596 for the LPG vessel and associated
pipework.
Furthermore, the following recommendation have been made:
12. Ensure that a hazardous area classification is undertaken as a part of the detailed design.
13. Consider undertaking a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Assessment as per IEC61508/61511 to
ensure that all process and operational hazards are adequately safeguarded against.
14. A Safety Management System should be developed, implemented and maintained for the
proposed facility. This should be consistent with Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory
Paper No. 9 - Safety Management.
Summary ............................................................................................................................... 3
Notation ................................................................................................................................ 9
1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 10
1.1 Background ............................................................................................................ 10
1.2 Scope ...................................................................................................................... 11
1.2.1 Scope of Facilities Covered in the PHA ................................................................... 11
1.2.2 Scope of Analysis .................................................................................................... 11
1.3 Objectives .............................................................................................................. 12
2 Methodology ............................................................................................................. 13
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 13
2.2 Methodology Overview ......................................................................................... 14
2.2.1 Description of Facilities, Operations and Surroundings ......................................... 14
2.2.2 Hazard Identification and Register of Major Accident Events ............................... 14
2.2.3 Consequence Analysis ............................................................................................ 15
2.2.4 Impairment Criteria ................................................................................................ 15
2.2.5 Frequency and Likelihood Analysis ........................................................................ 17
2.2.6 Risk Analysis and Assessment ................................................................................ 18
2.3 Study Assumptions ................................................................................................. 18
2.4 Software Used ........................................................................................................ 18
2.5 Quantitative Risk Criteria ....................................................................................... 19
2.5.1 Individual Fatality Risk ........................................................................................... 19
2.5.2 Injury Risk ............................................................................................................... 19
2.5.3 Risk of Property Damage and Accident Propagation ............................................. 20
2.5.4 Societal Risk ........................................................................................................... 20
2.6 Risk to Biophysical Environment ............................................................................ 20
2.7 Qualitative Risk Criteria .......................................................................................... 21
10 References ................................................................................................................. 48
Notation
Abbreviation Description
ACT Australian Capital Territory
Arriscar Arriscar Pty Limited
BoM Bureau of Meteorology
DG Dangerous Good
DP&E NSW Department of Planning and Environment
EPA ACT Environment Protection Authority
ERPG Emergency Response Planning Guidelines
FMECA Failure Modes Effects Criticality Analysis
FOY FOY Group Limited
HAZID Hazard Identification
HAZOP Hazard and Operability
HIPAP Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper
HIWD Hazard Identification Word Diagram
IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health
LFL Lower Flammability Limit
LSIR Location-Specific Individual Risk
MAE Major Accident Event
NIOSH US National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
NSW New South Wales
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment
SEPP State Environment Planning Policy
SMS Safety Management System
STEL Short-term exposure limit
t tonne
TNO Netherlands Organisation of Applied Scientific Research
tpa tonnes per annum
tpd tonnes per day
UK HSE United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive
TASK 2
Familiarisation, and
Data Collection.
(System Description)
TASK 4 TASK 3
Hazard Identification Background Data,
(Accident Case Collection and Analysis
Development)
TASK 5 TASK 6
Frequency Analysis Consequence Analysis
TASK 7
Risk Calculations
TASK 11
Risk Mitigation
TASK 12
Report Production
and Results
Presentation
A fatality risk criterion of 1 x 10-6 p.a. (or 1 chance of fatality per million per year) applies for
residential area exposure because this risk is very low in relation to typical background risks.
~ 820 m
~ 350 m
~ 780 m
~ 1,150 m ~ 600 m
Vacuum dryer
Diesel
4.6 Staffing
The workforce at full plant capacity will include:
• One facility manager;
• Fourteen facility operators;
• One logistics manager;
• One plant engineer;
• Three logistics operators;
• One fitter;
• One engineer;
• Three maintenance staff;
• One lab supervisor;
• One lab technician;
• One admin assistant; and
• One accounts clerk.
4.7 Security
The site security system will include:
• Physical Barriers – The site will be fenced with a 1.8 m high chain mesh (cyclone) security
fence with triple barbed wire along the top;
• Signage;
• Shift security checks;
• Emergency action plans; and
• Background checks on employees prior to employment.
Hazardous
Unit Hazardous Property Consequence Type
Material
1 Diesel Combustible Pool fire, Jet fire*, Flash Fire*
2 Gasoline Flammable Pool fire, Jet fire*, VCE, Flash Fire
3 LPG Flammable Jet fire, Flash Fire, VCE
4 Seal Gas Flammable Jet fire, VCE
* Only applicable for processing area where material is present at elevated temperature.
5.3.1 Diesel
Diesel is a combustible hydrocarbon liquid. It consists of a range of straight chain petroleum
components with molecular weights around 130 – 330 g/mol. Modelling was based on the
following properties:
5.3.4 Methane
Methane is a colourless flammable gas. Modelling was based on the following properties:
3. Consider suitable checks of people and vehicles before FOY Causes: 5.1.1.1
granting access to the site.
4. Ensure the Fire Safety Study considers the appropriate FOY Causes: 2.2.1.1, 2.2.1.2, 2.2.2.1,
prevention/detection measures for releases from the 2.2.2.2, 2.2.3.1, 2.2.3.2, 2.2.4.1,
process. 2.2.4.2, 2.2.5.1, 2.2.5.2, 3.3.1.1,
4.1.1.1, 4.1.1.2
5. Ensure vehicle access to site is restricted for over FOY Causes: 3.1.1.1, 3.2.1.1
height vehicles to avoid contact with structures.
6. Ensure the Fire Safety Study considers the firewater FOY Causes: 3.1.1.1, 3.2.1.1
requirements for the site.
7. Ensure the tank farm bunding arrangement compiles FOY Causes: 3.1.2.1, 3.2.2.1
with AS1940.
8. Ensure the storage tanks have adequate overfill FOY Causes: 3.1.2.3, 3.2.2.3
protection.
9. Ensure the system provides adequate overfill FOY Causes: 3.1.3.2, 3.1.3.3, 3.2.3.2,
protection of the product road tankers 3.2.3.3
10. Ensure adequate drive away protection is provided FOY Causes: 3.1.3.4, 3.2.3.4
6.5 BLEVE
A Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) may occur following impingement of a jet fire
on the unwetted surface of a vessel containing a liquefied gas such as propane. In this case, there
is usually time available for on-site personnel to evacuate.
km
9.2 Recommendations
A total of 11 recommendations were made during the HAZID workshop (Refer to Table 6).
1. Ensure the plastics store building is designed to the requirements set out in the building
assessment.
2. Ensure the feedstock management procedure adequately addresses the checks for PVC and
PET.
3. Consider suitable checks of people and vehicles before granting access to the site.
4. Ensure the Fire Safety Study considers the appropriate prevention/detection measures for
releases from the process.
5. Ensure vehicle access to site is restricted for over height vehicles to avoid contact with
structures.
6. Ensure the Fire Safety Study considers the firewater requirements for the site.
7. Ensure the tank farm bunding arrangement compiles with AS1940.
8. Ensure the storage tanks have adequate overfill protection.
9. Ensure the system provides adequate overfill protection of the product road tankers.
10. Ensure adequate drive away protection is provided.
11. Ensure the tank farm arrangement compiles with AS1596 for the LPG vessel and associated
pipework.
Furthermore, the following recommendation have been made:
12. Ensure that a hazardous area classification is undertaken as a part of the detailed design.
13. Consider undertaking a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Assessment as per IEC61508/61511 to
ensure that all process and operational hazards are adequately safeguarded against.
14. A Safety Management System should be developed, implemented and maintained for the
proposed facility. This should be consistent with Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory
Paper No. 9 - Safety Management.
15. A comprehensive Hazard Audit of the proposed development should be undertaken twelve
months after the commencement of operations of the proposed development and every
three years thereafter. This Hazard Audit should comply with the Hazardous Industry
Planning Advisory Paper No. 5 - Hazard Audit Guidelines and be carried out by a qualified
person or team, independent of the development.
Appendices
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
• The proposed throughput for the facility was provided by FOY in EIS.
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
• The P&IDs as provided by FOY
Assumption No. 3: Representative Wind Speeds, Wind Directions and Stability Classes
Subject: Locational Data
Assumption:
• The predominant wind directions are shown in Table 7.
• The probability distributions for each wind stability class – speed category (e.g. F2.5) are
shown in Table 7.
• Note: The wind direction in Table 7 is the direction the wind is blowing from.
MAE/s Affected:
• All MAEs.
Reference/s:
• Tuggeranong Weather Data BOM.
Wind
Stab.
Speed N NNE NE ENE E ESE SE SSE S SSW SW WSW W WNW NW NWW Total
Class
(m/s)
B 1.8 1.05% 0.52% 0.50% 0.46% 0.57% 0.36% 0.31% 0.26% 0.40% 0.36% 0.51% 0.58% 0.99% 0.98% 0.96% 0.85% 9.64%
D-High 7.5 0.37% 0.07% 0.52% 1.09% 0.99% 1.75% 2.45% 2.53% 1.93% 0.41% 0.54% 1.08% 1.59% 1.05% 0.49% 0.41% 17.28%
D-Med 3.9 2.71% 1.31% 2.86% 2.95% 3.38% 3.24% 3.21% 2.81% 3.84% 2.00% 3.35% 3.34% 3.55% 2.54% 2.72% 2.70% 46.52%
D-Low 0.8 1.68% 0.74% 0.87% 0.76% 0.85% 0.66% 0.69% 0.61% 1.37% 1.23% 1.71% 1.74% 2.32% 1.86% 2.12% 1.85% 21.06%
E 2.6 0.08% 0.06% 0.11% 0.10% 0.11% 0.09% 0.07% 0.04% 0.07% 0.07% 0.10% 0.10% 0.11% 0.07% 0.09% 0.13% 1.41%
F 0.7 0.35% 0.12% 0.18% 0.17% 0.18% 0.16% 0.12% 0.12% 0.25% 0.20% 0.30% 0.31% 0.47% 0.29% 0.41% 0.47% 4.10%
Total 6.23% 2.82% 5.04% 5.53% 6.08% 6.26% 6.85% 6.36% 7.87% 4.27% 6.51% 7.17% 9.02% 6.80% 6.79% 6.40% 100.00%
Parameter Value
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
• Tuggeranong Weather Data BOM.
Roughness
Surface Type
Length (m)
MAE/s Affected:
• All MAEs.
Reference/s:
• PHAST user manual.
MAE/s Affected:
• All (Note: This assumption is only applicable to the calculation of societal risk).
Reference/s:
• TNO, VROM, Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, 'Purple Book', CPR18E, 3rd
Edition.
Assumption No. 7: Basis for Excluding an MAE from a Subsequent QRA Step
Subject: QRA Methodology
Assumption:
• An MAE was included in the QRA if: (1) the estimated frequency of occurrence was equal
to or greater than 10-8 per year; AND, (2) the probability of any potentially hazardous
impact (e.g. injury or fatality) was greater than or equal to 0.01 at any location beyond
the boundary of the proposed site.
• MAEs were not excluded if there was a potential for escalation, even when the direct
consequences were insufficient to cause a credible off-site risk.
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
• TNO, VROM, Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, 'Purple Book', CPR18E, 3rd
Edition.
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
• The isolatable sections were defined using the P&IDs supplied by FOY.
MAE/s Affected:
• All events.
Reference/s:
• Assumption based on mass balances [CAN_IGE_EnergyMassBalance].
MAE/s Affected:
• All events.
Reference/s:
• Stream compositions received from FOY in H&M Balance [CAN_IGE_EnergyMassBalance]
and engineering judgement.
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
• Site layout locating equipment items and P&IDs defining potential points of isolation for
each process unit.
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
• Site plan drawings.
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
• TNO, VROM, Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, 'Purple Book', CPR18E, 3rd
Edition.
MAE/s Affected:
• All Jet Fire scenarios.
Reference/s:
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
• Centre for Chemical Process Safety, Estimating the flammable mass of vapour clouds”,
American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1999.
• TNO Yellow Book.
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
• Lees’ Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Editor: S.Mannan, Edition 3, pp.16/174,
Butterworths Heinemann, 2005.
• Exposure to a peak side-on overpressure of 7 kPa (or greater) is potentially injurious for
an individual located outdoors.
MAE/s Affected:
• All AN explosion events.
Reference/s:
• NSW Department of Planning and Infrastructure, Jan 2011, Hazardous Industry Planning
Advisory Paper (HIPAP) No. 6, Hazard Analysis.
• Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 3rd Edition, Oxford, 2005.
• VROM, Methods for the Determination of Possible Damage (TNO ‘Green Book’), CPR16E.
Figure 11 Tolerance times to burn-injury level for varioius incident heat fluxes [Ref. 15]
Justification and Impact/s of Assumption:
MAE/s Affected:
• All MAEs.
Reference/s:
• Department of Planning and Environment, January 2011, Hazardous Industry Planning
Advisory Paper (HIPAP) 4: Risk Criteria for Land Use Safety Planning.
• CCPS Guidelines for Evaluation the Characteristics of Vapor Cloud Explosions, Flash Fire,
and BLEVEs, 1994.
Reference/s:
MAE/s Affected:
• All fire and explosion events.
Reference/s:
B.1 Introduction
The following isolatable sections have been carried forward into the QRA
Table 14 Isolatable Sections
H&M Press Temp
ID Release Case P&ID Material
Stream (kPag) (oC)
KL-1 [M1-4] Depolymerisation Kiln 1001 1001-0004 0.15 400 Diesel
Scrubber Vapour feed to
1003 1003-0002 0.15 300
KL-2 [M1-4] Fractionator Diesel
Fractionator FT1101 Light Ends
1002 1002-0002 10 120
FR-1 [M1-4] to condenser CD1201 Petrol
Petrol from TK201 to day tank
1002 1002-0009 600 30
GS-1 [M1-4] (at Module) Petrol
Petrol reflux to Fractionation
1002 1002-0009 600 30
GS-2 [M1-4] Tower FT1101 Petrol
GS-3 [M1-4] Petrol Treatment 1002 1002-0009 600 30 Petrol
Condensate from VC1501 to
1005/1002 10 40
GS-4 [M1-4] Petrol Water Separator Petrol
GS-5 [M1-4] Petrol from PWS1201 o TK1201 1002 1002-0008 10 30 Petrol
LPG-1 [M1-4] LPG Vapour Release 1004 1004-0002 500 12 LPG
Vapour from VC1501 to Light
1005/1002 10 30
LPG-2 [M1-4] Ends Condenser CD1201 LPG
Diesel from TK130 to
1003 1005-0005 50 80
DS-1 [M1-4] Fractionation Tower FT1101 Diesel
Diesel through DH1501,
1005/1003 1005-0004 100 120
DS-2 [M1-4] DT1501, and HE1501 (drying) Diesel
DS-3 [M1-4] Diesel to reboiler RB1201 1003/1002 1005-0005 50 80 Diesel
Diesel to reflux to Scrubber
1003/1002 1005-0005 50 80
DS-4 [M1-4] SR1101 Diesel
KL-3 Kiln Seal Gas 1002 - 50 50 Methane
TF_1 Diesel pipework at Tank Farm 1008 - 600 30 Diesel
TF_2 Petrol pipework at Tank Farm 1008 - 600 30 Petrol
TF_3 LPG Pipe work at Tank Farm 1008 - 600 30 LPG
TF_4 Slops pipework at Tank Farm 1008 - 600 30 Diesel
TF_5 290 Kl vertical diesel tank A 1008 Atmospheric Storage 25 Diesel
TF_6 290 Kl vertical diesel tank B 1008 Atmospheric Storage 25 Diesel
TF_7 290 Kl vertical diesel tank C 1008 Atmospheric Storage 25 Diesel
TF_8 290 Kl vertical Petrol Tank A 1008 Atmospheric Storage 25 Petrol
TF_9 290 Kl vertical Petrol Tank B 1008 Atmospheric Storage 25 Petrol
TF_10 80 Kl vertical rework Tank 1008 Atmospheric Storage 25 Diesel
TF_11 150 Kl vertical day Diesel Tank 1008 Atmospheric Storage 25 Diesel
80Kl vertical day marine Diesel
1008 Atmospheric Storage 25
TF_12 Tank Diesel
TF_13 80 Kl vertical day Petrol Tank 1008 Atmospheric Storage 25 Petrol
TF_14 LPG Tank 27Kl Vertical Tank 1008 Saturated Liquid 20 LPG
KL-3 [M1-4] Slops pipework at Kiln 1001 600 30 Diesel
LB_1 Diesel Tanker loading 1008 - 600 30 Petrol
2. Service Supplier
Controls
3. Vehicle
inspections
2. Human Error - load not 1. Plastics fall to the road 1. Service Supplier 1. Clean up
secured Controls
2. Licensed Drivers
3. Vehicle
inspections
2. Licensed Drivers
3. Service Supplier
Controls
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Processes: 1. Raw Material Handling
Nodes: 2. On site movements
Prevention Mitigation
Scenario Causes Consequence Recommendations Responsibility
Control Control
1. Fire in Plastics store 1. Local ignition sources 1. Fire in plastic s store 1. Ignition control
on site
2. Hazardous Area
Classification
3. PTW System
4. General House
keeping
5. Electrical
testing/ Tags
2. Fire escalation from 1. Fire in plastic s store 1. Hazardous Area 1. Ensure the plastics FOY
adjoining plant Classification store building is
designed to the
2. Ignition control
requirements set out
on site
in the building
3. Plastic store is assessment
within a
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
sealing the
with HC
2. Contaminated feed 1. Excess PVC 1. PVC creates HCL in the 1. Feed stock 2. Ensure the feedstock FOY
kiln with potential for quality management
2. Onsite feed
stock
monitoring and
rejection of
contaminated
feedstock
agreement with
supplier
rejection of
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
design to appropriate
relevant prevention/detection
standards measures for releases
from the process
2. Planned 2. Ignition
Maintenance
weekly/monthly
system
checks (1month
per year
allocated for
each module)
2. Corrosion 1. Release of HC vapour to 1. Material 1. Ignition 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY
atmosphere selection and Study considers the
design to appropriate
relevant prevention/detection
standards measures for releases
from the process
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
checks (1month
per year
allocated for
each module)
2. Release from Scrubber 1. Flange/Fitting failure 1. Release of HC vapour to 1. Material 1. HAC 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY
atmosphere selection and Study considers the
design to appropriate
relevant prevention/detection
standards measures for releases
from the process
2. Planned 2. Ignition
Maintenance
weekly/monthly
system
checks (1month
per year
allocated for
each module)
2. Corrosion 1. Release of HC vapour to 1. Material 1. Ignition 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY
atmosphere selection and Study considers the
design to appropriate
relevant prevention/detection
standards measures for releases
from the process
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
checks (1month
per year
allocated for
each module)
3. Release from 1. Flange/Fitting failure 1. Release of HC vapour to 1. Material 1. HAC 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY
fractionator atmosphere selection and Study considers the
design to appropriate
relevant prevention/detection
standards measures for releases
from the process
2. Planned 2. Ignition
Maintenance
checks (1month
2. Bunding
around
Modules
2. Corrosion 1. Release of HC vapour to 1. Material 1. Ignition 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY
atmosphere selection and Study considers the
design to appropriate
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
weekly/monthly
allocated for
system
4. Release from Diesel 1. Flange/Fitting failure 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Material 1. Firewater 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY
Processing and pool fire selection and Deluge Study considers the
relevant prevention/detection
2. Planned 2. Bunding
Maintenance around
Program with Modules
weekly/monthly
checks (1month
per year
allocated for
each module)
2. Corrosion 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Material 1. Bunding 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY
and pool fire selection and around Study considers the
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
2. Planned 2. Firewater
Maintenance Deluge
Program with system
weekly/monthly
checks (1month
per year
allocated for
each module)
5. Release from Petrol 1. Flange/Fitting failure 1. Release of LPG to 1. Material 1. HAC 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY
Processing atmosphere selection and Study considers the
design to appropriate
relevant prevention/detection
standards measures for releases
from the process
2. Planned 2. Ignition
Maintenance
checks (1month
2. Bunding
around
Modules
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
2. Planned 2. Ignition
Maintenance
checks (1month
2. Firewater
Deluge
system
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
design to
relevant
standards
2. Preventative 2. HAC
maintain
3. Firewater
System on
Site
2. Release of Diesel from 1. Vehicle impact with tank 1. Potential for liquid release 1. On-site Traffic 1. HAC 7. Ensure the tank farm FOY
storage tanks and pool fire Management bunding arrangement
4. Tank farm is
bunded
Site
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
3. HAC
relevant
standards
3. Tank overfill 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Level control 1. Firewater 8. Ensure the storage
and pool fire system System on tanks have adequate
2. Ignition
Control
3. HAC
3. Release of Diesel 1. Vehicle impact with tank 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Pipe bridge
during tanker fill and pool fire design
2. On-site Traffic
Management
Plan
2. Flange Fitting Failures 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Preventative 9. Ensure the system FOY
and pool fire maintenance provides adequate
overfill protection of
2. Material
the product road
selection and
tankers
design to
relevant
standards
3. Overfill of tank road 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Procedures 9. Ensure the system FOY
tanker and pool fire provides adequate
overfill protection of
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
4. Tanker drive away 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Procedures 10 Ensure adequate FOY
and pool fire . drive away
protection is
provided
3. Firewater
requirements for the
System on
site
Site
design to
relevant
standards
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
3. Firewater
System on
Site
2. Release of Petrol from 1. Vehicle impact with tank 1. Potential for liquid release 1. On-site Traffic 1. HAC 7. Ensure the tank farm FOY
storage tanks and pool fire Management bunding arrangement
4. Tank farm is
bunded
Site
2. Material 2. Ignition
selection and Control
design to
3. HAC
relevant
standards
3. Tank overfill 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Level control 1. Firewater 8. Ensure the storage
and pool fire system System on tanks have adequate
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
3. HAC
3. Release of Petrol 1. Vehicle impact with tank 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Pipe bridge
during tanker fill and pool fire design
2. On-site Traffic
Management
Plan
2. Flange Fitting Failures 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Preventative 9. Ensure the system FOY
and pool fire Maintenance provides adequate
overfill protection of
2. Material
the product road
selection and
tankers
design to
relevant
standards
3. Overfill of tank road 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Procedures 9. Ensure the system FOY
tanker and pool fire provides adequate
overfill protection of
4. Tanker drive away 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Procedures 10 Ensure adequate FOY
and pool fire . drive away
protection is
provided
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
design to appropriate
relevant prevention/detection
standards measures for releases
from the process
2. Planned 2. Ignition
Maintenance
checks (1month
2. Bunding
around
Modules
2. Ignition
Processes: 4. LPGs
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
design to appropriate
relevant prevention/detection
standards measures for releases
from the process
2. Planned 2. Ignition
Maintenance
checks (1month
2. Bunding
around
Modules
2. Corrosion 1. Release of LPG to 1. Material 1. HAC 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY
atmosphere selection and Study considers the
design to appropriate
relevant prevention/detection
standards measures for releases
from the process
2. Ignition
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
weekly/monthly
allocated for
system
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Processes: 5. General
Nodes: 1. Sabotage
Prevention Mitigation
Scenario Causes Consequence Recommendations Responsibility
Control Control
1. Intentional Miss 1. Incompatibly material 1. Potential for fire or 1. CCTV 3. Consider suitable FOY
use/Terrorism brought on site (i.e. explosion checks of people and
2. Motion sensors
fertiliser) vehicles before
on the
granting access to the
perimeter
site
3. perimeter fence
with cyclone
barbwire
4. perimeter
lighting
5. Police Checks
for all staff
6. Car parking is
offsite
7. Contractor
management
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Downwind Distance [m] to Heat Radiation
2
ID Hole Size [mm] Pool Diameter [m] [kW/m ]
4.7 12.6 23 35
50 15.96 39.5 21.7 11.8 10
9 15.96 39.5 21.7 11.8 10
TF_4 20 15.96 39.5 21.7 11.8 10
50 15.96 39.5 21.7 11.8 10
9 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
TF_5 20 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
50 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
9 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
TF_6 20 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
50 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
9 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
TF_7 20 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
50 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
9 17.9 41.5 21.3 11.9 N.R.
TF_8 20 21.1 44.6 20.9 12.6 N.R.
50 21.1 44.6 20.9 12.6 N.R.
9 17.9 41.5 21.3 11.9 N.R.
TF_9 20 21.1 44.6 20.9 12.6 N.R.
50 21.1 44.6 20.9 12.6 N.R.
9 17.9 41.5 21.3 11.9 N.R.
TF_10 20 21.1 44.6 20.9 12.6 N.R.
50 21.1 44.6 20.9 12.6 N.R.
9 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
TF_11 20 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
50 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
9 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
TF_12 20 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
50 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
9 17.9 41.5 21.3 11.9 N.R.
TF_13 20 21.1 44.6 20.9 12.6 N.R.
50 21.1 44.6 20.9 12.6 N.R.
9 11.3 31.1 21.2 12.2 8.1
LB_1 20 11.3 31.1 21.2 12.2 8.1
50 11.3 31.1 21.2 12.2 8.1
9 11.3 33.6 22.2 12.1 8.1
LB_2 20 11.3 33.6 22.2 12.1 8.1
50 11.3 33.6 22.2 12.1 8.1
*N.R denotes level not reached
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
E.2 Jet Fire
Table 17 Heat Radiation from a Jet Fire
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
E.4 VCE
The TNO Multi Energy ‘3D Obstructed’ model was used within PhastRisk 6.7. The model utilises the
UDM dispersion model and the Cartesian grid to determine the overpressure effects from a given
release point when the flammable cloud reaches an obstructed region. As such, distances to
overpressure have not been tabulated as PhastRisk 6.7 does not produce these results when utilising
the 3D Obstructed region model.
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
E.5 BLEVE
Table 19 BLEVE (Fireball)– Distance to Fatality
27kL LPG Bullet BLEVE F 0.7 68.5 9.8 137 229 196 119 62
27kL LPG Bullet BLEVE D 0.8 68.5 9.8 137 231 196 119 62
27kL LPG Bullet BLEVE D 3.9 68.5 9.8 137 240 197 120 64
27kL LPG Bullet BLEVE D 7.5 68.5 9.8 137 245 198 121 65
27kL LPG Bullet BLEVE B 1.8 68.5 9.8 137 247 198 121 66
27kL LPG Bullet BLEVE E 2.6 68.5 9.8 137 233 196 119 63
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Appendix F Likelihood Analysis - Data and Results
20 mm Leak from
9 mm Flange Leak 9 mm Valve Leak
Instrument Piping
(per flange per yr) (per valve per yr)
(per section per yr)
1.82E-04 2.00E-04 1.00E-04
Table 22 Piping Failure Frequency
Table 23 Pump, Compressor, Vessel, Fin-Fan, and Hose Leak Frequency
1
Taken from UK HSE Failure Rate and Event Data for use within Risk Assessments (28/06/2012), failure frequency for components in
“Multi safety system facilities”.
Doc Number: J-000223-REP-PHA
Page 106
Revision: B
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Table 24 Leak Frequency
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
F.2 Release Frequency
It is noted that only the release frequency for 1 Module is presented here. The likelihood of release
was assessed based on all 4 Modules in operation
Table 25 Leak Frequency
Total Frequencies (p.a.)
ID Scenario
9mm 20mm 50mm
KL-1 [M1-4] Depolymerisation Kiln 0.001361 0.00059 2.5E-06
KL-2 [M1-4] Scrubber Vapour feed to Fractionator 0.00048 0.00021 1.25E-05
FR-1 [M1-4] Fractionator FT1101 Light Ends to condenser CD1201 0.0002 0.00009 2.25E-05
GS-1 [M1-4] Petrol from TK201 to day tank (at Module) 0.003871 0.000205 0.000005
GS-2 [M1-4] Petrol reflux to Fractionation Tower FT1101 0.004042 0.00028 0.00001
GS-4 [M1-4] Condensate from VC1501 to Petrol Water Separator 0.003261 0.00003 0.00002
LPG-2 [M1-4] Vapour from VC1501 to Light Ends Condenser CD1201 0.003411 0.000095 0.00002
DS-1 [M1-4] Diesel from TK130 to Fractionation Tower FT1101 0.003612 0.000095 0.00002
DS-2 [M1-4] Diesel through DH1501, DT1501, and HE1501 (drying) 0.003913 0.000145 0.000065
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Total Frequencies (p.a.)
ID Scenario
9mm 20mm 50mm
TF_6 290 Kl vertical diesel tank B 0.00037 0.000075 0.000005
TF_7 290 Kl vertical diesel tank C 0.00037 0.000075 0.000005
TF_8 290 Kl vertical Petrol Tank A 0.00037 0.000075 0.000005
TF_12 80Kl vertical day marine Diesel Tank 0.00037 0.000075 0.000005
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
F.3 BLEVE Frequency
The BLEVE frequency for the 27kL LPG Bullet has been calculated as 1.19E-6 p.a. This has been
derived based on those scenarios which may result in flame jet flame impingement or pool fire
engulfment of the LPG vessel.
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Appendix G Ignition Probabilities
Ignition probabilities were obtained from the OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory – Ignition
Probabilities [Ref 8], cases as applicable to the facility. The following Scenarios where selected as
being the most appropriate given the materials released, size and location of the facility.
• Scenario 5 – Small Plant Gas
• Scenario 7 – Small Plant Liquid Bund
• Scenario 13 – Tank Liquid
• Scenario 15 – LPG Storage
• Scenario 30 – Tank Liquid Diesel Fuel
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Release Rate (sec) Delayed Ignition Probability
ID Scenario
9mm 20mm 50mm 9mm 20mm 50mm OGP Scenario
TF_8 290 Kl vertical Petrol Tank A 0.397 1.96 12.2 0.0002 0.0006 0.0027 Scenario 13
TF_9 290 Kl vertical Petrol Tank B 0.397 1.96 12.2 0.0002 0.0006 0.0027 Scenario 13
TF_10 80 Kl vertical rework Tank 0.397 1.96 12.2 0.0002 0.0006 0.0027 Scenario 13
TF_11 150 Kl vertical day Diesel Tank 0.42 2.1 12.8 0 0.0001 0.0004 Scenario 30
TF_12 80Kl vertical day marine Diesel Tank 0.42 2.1 12.8 0 0.0001 0.0004 Scenario 30
TF_13 80 Kl vertical day Petrol Tank 0.397 1.96 12.2 0.0002 0.0006 0.0027 Scenario 13
TF_14 LPG Tank 27Kl Vertical Tank 1.2 5.8 36.2 0.0002 0.0063 0.06825 Scenario 15
KL-3 [M1-4] Slops pipework at Kiln 1.2 6 37.4 0.0008 0.0078 0.012 Scenario 7
LB_1 Diesel Tanker loading 1.2 6 37.4 0.0008 0.0078 0.012 Scenario 7
LB_2 Petrol Tanker loading 1.2 5.8 36.3 0.0008 0.0078 0.012 Scenario 7
UT_1 Fuel to boiler 0.11 0.54 3.3 0 0.0009 0.0064 Scenario 5
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis