Napalm Bombing in Luzon

See page 48

\_PACT

August, 1945

CONTENTS

Japan on the Eve 3

Okinawa:

Campaign for a Base 4

Fire Blitz:

Progress Report on Incendiary

Destruction of Jap Cities - 18

Fifth Air Force vs. Formosa

and Saigon 40

Borneo Invasion 46

Napalm in Luzon 48

Jap Paper Balloons 54

Blue "Cats" in the Pacific 58 New Bomber: the XB-42 60 Eleventh Air Force in the

Kuriles 61

Launching the JB-2 64

Spooks on Radar Scopes

Back Cover

CLASSIFICATION: Overall classification of IMPACT, including text, is CONFIDENTIAL. To insure that this overall classification is recognized, even when paces are torn out for instructional purposes, all sheets have been stamper! CONFIDENTIAL where practical. This does not refer to pecific photop;raph. The correct individual classification for every photouraph in the issue is ~ivpn helow:

FI10NT COVER THROl'GIi 4:

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PROGRESS REPORT ON THE INCENDIARY BOMBING OF JAPAN

'ESS than five months ago, the 20th Air Force began its L campaign to obliterate all important industrial areas in Japan by fire bombing. These months have seen a new kind of strategic air blitzkrieg. Certainly at no time during the Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany was the pace so fast in terms of resu lts.

Not that the European job wasn't done as quickly and efficiently as possib le. Hather. a combination of factors make Japan considerably more vulnerable than Germany to strategic hombing. particu larly to incendiary bombing. Against Germany. the American doctrine was pinpoint precision bombing against key factories in key target systems. Against Japan, the American doctrine is the same plus the cornplemcntary incendiary program. Right now, in the summer months. with relatively few CA VU days over Japan the incendiary program dominates the precision program. Radar bombing is especially suitab le against area targets and happily most of Japan's cities are on the sea where coastal features make identification by radar easier.

When the industrial analysts first recommended the incendiary program for Japan. we were just starting the precision offensive in Europe. having proclaimed the virtues of our method as against the British area method. We had developed a pickle-barrel philosophy that became identified in the minds of many as strategic bombing itself. Consequently. some of us assumed the precision method by itself could best do the job against Japan.

But the industrial analysts insisted otherwise. They estimated that more than 90% of the buildings in Japan's tinder-box cities were easily combustible, as against less than 10o/e in Germany. They noted that conflagrations, virtual ly unknown in Germany in peacetime. were common in Japan. They said that. whereas the 15 leading RAF area targets contained on ly about ] 2.:~% of Greater Germany's total labor force, the ]4 leading Jap urban areas contained about 42.5% of Japan's homeland labor force. They cited the concentration of key war industries. For example, 40% of Jap aircraft engines are produced in one city. ~O% of a i rrraft assernhly in two citie".157~ of ordnance in seven cities. 50% of machine tools in four cities, 90% of electronic tubes in three cities. In addition, the experts pointed to the many thousands of small "household" industries

Multiply this scene hy lOU and YOII have what Yokohama got 2<) May. For the city huruiug. ~('C pieture on pp. 22-2:'>.

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jammed in these same centers. Far more numerous than in other countries (about 30% of Japan's total labor force works in factories employing 30 workers or under), they were known to be largely engaged in war production, and extremely inflammable. In many cases the "factory" buildings were the flimsy homes of the workers themselves. These were obviously unsatisfactory pinpoint targets. Further, it had already been proven. during the Battle of Britain and in Germany that many large factories. formerly considered fireresistant. were vu Inerable if hit by concentrations of incendiaries. The analysts conceded that many big war plants were dispersed in isolated locations. but they still claimed that Japan depended primarily on the established homeland industrial centers for components and subassemblies as well as finished military products. This left the isolated key war plants and all of the fire-resistant key plants in the urban areas to be knocked out. and this is where precision bombing came in. The plan called for destruction of the Achillesheel target systems just as in the case of Germany. But in the case of Japan it could be donc quicker (and speed is perhaps the most important measure of the worth of a strategic bombing campaign) by the recommended combination. While many of the key plants in priority target systems would not be directly affected by incendiary area attack, there nevertheless would be an appreciable indirect effect by wiping out many of the component and sub-assembly plants feeding into the large plants. All this, plus disruption in utilities and transportation. destruction of valuable storage, administrative breakdowns. dehousing of war workers and loss of life were expected to shake profoundly, if not eventually destroy. the Japanese industrial community.

Basically these objectives were the same as those of British area bombing. However, if our experts were to be believed, we could do the job far quicker, more thoroughly and at infinitely less cost in lives and materiel than ever dreamed of by the British in the case of Germany_

Clearly a plan that promised so much had to be given a good. firm trial. The first few small tests were inconclusive. Finally on 10 March. General LeMay found many of thc answers. His full force of Superforts, bombing for the first time at night with an all-incendiary load, burned out ]5.8 square miles of urban Tokyo. This removed all doubt that Jap cities would burn-the elaborate fire defenses were simp ly saturated. A lso it proved that a large number of small factories plus some big ones could be wiped out in one incendiary hlow. Thus carne the gret'n light. An account of the results so far i" contained on til(' following page~.

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LIKE LOCUSTS, DOWN THEY SWARM

On I June the sk v above Osaka was a lovely or unlovely ~ig'ht to heho ld. depending on whether you were looking

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down or looking up at the locust-like swarm of bombs seen here. This was a hil!" effort and the payoff was only fair.

Partly h)' radar. 478 13-298 dropped 2.894 tons of incendiaries, nicked off another 6% of city's total built-up area.

FIRE con t in ued

BAPTISM OF FLAME FOR YOKOHAMA

Here is a daylight, high-altitude view of what happens when a large Jap city area is saturated with incendiaries, Hun-

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clreds of small fires are seen joining in a conflagration that rlemo lished H.9 square mile, of' the cily on 29 May. This

was Yokohama's first fire treatment. It is estimated that over two-thirds of the population was rendered homeless,

BURNING OUT THE EMPIRE'S HEART

The incendiary assault on Tokyo has been carried out almost 100% by night at medium altitude. Here Tokyo burns on

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the night of 26 May during the most productive and costly of all 20th AF fire missions. For HI.90 square miles of rubble.

our loss was 26 B-29s. At left. photo Aash I center) is just starting to go off. At right, flare lights up burning city.

YOKOHAMA· KAWASAKI T~~~nty~~~reemf.)rce::

Yokohama's built-up area (above) was leveled in one blow, 29 May, by 467 B-29s dropping 2,769 tons of incendiaries in daylight from high altitude. Damage to war production was severe, although much of the city's heavy industry on the waterfront was outside the target area. Kawasaki (middle right) already had gotten the fireworks on the night of 16 April when 202 B-29s, dropping 1,213 tons, canceled out 30 percent (3.37 sq. mi.) of this industrial suburb between Yokohama and part of Tokyo (extreme right).

KOBE Red, in this and the following maps. indicates areas wholly or mostly burned out. In all maps only damage inflicted prior to 15 July is shown. The builtup area of Kobe, this page, was 43% (8 sq. mi.) destroyed by 780 B·29s dropping 5.424 tons of incendiaries in two strikes. Storage and ship-servicing facilities suffered heavily.

NAGOYA In six missions, the last on 17 May, 1,6] 1 B·29s, dropping 10,041 tons, tore the industrial guts out of Nagoya, Japan's fourth city and third largest manufacturing center. Burned out was 29% (12.34 sq. mi.) of the city proper. The primary target areas were hit on the nose, and, in war production, Nagoya is relatively the deadest of Japanese cities.

OSAKA In four missions, one by night and three hy day, 1.642 B·29s knocked out 29% (17.64 sq. mi.) of the built-up area of Osaka, Japan's second largest city. The commercial and financial district in Osaka was more than 75% destroyed. As in the case of Kobe, general storage and ship-servicing plants, par· ticularly important in a port city, were heavy sufferers.

TOKYO Like Berlin, Tokyo has really had it. Burned out is an area equal to all of Pittsburgh and two and one-half times larger than Manhattan Island. It took 1,861 B-29s dropping 12.146 tons in six incendiary missions, five of them at night. Of Tokyo's built-up area. 53% (56.34 sq. mi.) is gone. Besides its significance as lapan's capital and greatest industrial center, seared and groggy Tokyo marks a milestone in AAF operational history. It was here that Gen. LeMay uncorked the works in the AAF's first big medium-altitude night incendiary strike.

INCENDIARIES TOUGH

One thing the Superfort fire hornhers are proving is that very large plants. unless constructed of reinforced concrete throughout, can be seriously affected by incendiary attack. Even suhstantia l ly-built plants usually have "soft" roofs easily penetrated by small incendiaries. If the plant is located in the midst of a number of other more cornbustible plants, a successful incendiary or combination incendiary-Hf attack aimed at all of them is likely to achieve a greater result than HE alone. The before and after photos, at left and on the opposite page. show what happened when incendiaries were used against a cluster of plants in Nagoya. Largest and most important plant is No. ]2. Atsuta Factory of Nagoya Arsenal. a producer of field artillery, AA guns and flexible aircraft guns. In pre· attack anal ysis this target, composed of both combustihle and non-combustihle hui Idings, was not considered especially suitable for incendiary attack. Yet the attack wiped out 40%

+- (A 10 E) dblrirllO eur-Iosed by dotted l i ne; rOlilitill smal l shops p rodueinz tex tile mar hine ry. til es. hir yeles. eloek .. , au to !l8r!I'i, rubber pmJurl:-. hltrtl\Oour." pupe r p rudur-rs. megneto-. bnile rs , b mshes , 1>1111111 boats. etc. Speeifir- p iu nts ant! lit'rC"f'lllttJ;tf' fir faeilin sptu'f' dr",lro),f'li: (I) Kubota f\1tu'hinl'ry CII.. Ittr~~T work" pmulIC"inJ( rnarhim- too ls und munition«, 4{)o/(": (2) FUj.!ila Iron Works. lathe- 811d ge a r :-hupt"rs. IOUo/,.: (3) NOJ(ami Lnom Wud,,,, nroduce r of ral'ltin" .. arul nutommie 100,"". 100%-: (-t) Koa 'I'exrl h- Mill. 1'1)11· ve rte d 10 nrodu cf ng aircraft pari:', 90o/c: (5) Tuho CIIIWorh. largest in Nagoya. 15%: (6) Shlnug a w a Mfg. Co .. Itirnsfl indirlHin~ instruments, 750/'(1: (7) Nippon Cherni eu l l+l an t • 950/<; (8) Tokai Elee trode Co .. No. 1 plant. JO%; (9) probable branch of Okamoto Air. (,fafl Works. 1000/'c: (10) Okamoto Ai re raft Workl'l. ~pl'cillli:ting in landing gea r , 300/',.: (11) CllLlkyo M,t·

What Jap cities look like today can be accurately imagined by a look at this photo of

ON SOME BIG PLANTS

of the area of buildings, approximately the result that could he expected from an average HE precision strike. A very successf u I HE strike undoubtedly would have done better. Certainly it would have done damage to the reo inforced concrete buildings that were not seriously affected by incendiaries. However, the incendiary strike got not only 40% of this plant, but a very large percentage of many of the other surrounding plants, some of them engaged in key war production, as indicated in the annotation list below.

Note that No. 14, the Nippon Insulator Co., built almost entirely of reinforced concrete, suffered only a ]0% loss. Very few Japanese factories are who II y of such resistan t construction.

Damage to major plants is shown in h lack on the pre-attack photo on the opposite page and the plants are identified in the annotation list below. After photo at right, with targets outlined. emphasizes the tremendous destruction effected in the small-shop areas.

dli,l('ry Worb. reported p roduclug ui re ruft Jilin ... , 90o/c: (I:!) AII'IIIII Fnetnrv of Nag:oYll Arl'if'1I1I1. th,' ma i n rUf'IOI'), of )uPlln's third most important 1\ rill)' u rsenul . 1".lit'\t'd 10 ,-,pioriuli7.l" in fif'IJ u rtilh-ry um] uho pro· dllc"'" AA j!UIlI'i and flexible uirHKh f,:Uf1:o, ",Oo/r: (13) unideruitied . !'lo/r: (14) Nippon lusulutnr CII .. IOo/r: (I:;J Ail'hi Airrrurt \\'!lrk,.. brand. plunt I'rndlli'ill~ ht'l ""I'liOIlI'! and ulhn pUrl:". 800/0: (16) Nih .. n Vf'hit'!'· \If!!. CII .• fj'pClI,!t'd jlro<iurinj! armored ("111:0. tnnk s. unu 0I1111111l'i Kilt! urduuuee pllT1:-.. 25%-: (17) H :>ub'pIHIII of (Itl). 60o/c: (18) Atsu tu HH SuuiCIII. Oo/c: (19) Fukitn Loom Works. now p rodur-lng gea r :-.haper,; uud lathes. ~Oo/c: (20) l+aido Eleet rieu l Stee l Plant. 100/(": (20A) I.nw('r plnn t • OOk: (21) Higur-hi MuC'hinl'ry Cn .. 30o/r: (:22) unidentlfied sto rag e. 95%: (:23) Oseku \1uC'hinf'r)' WClrkJoi. repnrted prndll('ill~ ruuehiue 101'11:01. ni rr-ru Ir nnd rudnarn-r- I.ttrt",. I)O°/r.

a mixed residentia l-industria l district in Yokohama after earthquake and fire of 1923.

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WHAT BURNED IN ONE AREA OF TOKYO

Large areas in Japan's cities are heing wiped out, hut are we getting what the analysts said we'd get? One of the answers may be found by examining a typical burned-out industrial section that contained a large number of small and mediumsized plants, such as that shown on the left.

The map covers an area of Tokyo east of the Sumida river. Excepting numerous tiny household industries, everything of industrial significance destroyed by incendiaries is shown in red. Red dots represent small plants not identified in the list below. In black appear the only structures not leveled. most of which probably suffered internal fire damage. The major plant in the area, the Hitachi Engineering Co. (39A, B, C), was not damaged due to its heavy construction, excellent fire protection. Also. it may not have received a heavy concentration of hits. However, other good-sized plants engaged in war production were destroyed such as Oriental ~'eaving Mills (78 & 82), converted to machining, ordnance components and glycerine products; Japan Cast Steel Co. (86), machine too Is and ordnance components and Japan Weapons Co. (17), making AA parts. After photo of area at left appears on next page.

p rer-islon screws and fittings : (59) Amiya Enginee rlng

Co.; (60) Ehlka rishi Iron Works; (61) Tokyo Bus Co. nnd Kameido repair shops : (62) Hamada Prinring Ma· r-hineuy Co .. reported making preclsion ordnance componerns : (63) Kumcido Pipe Cn.: (64) Hamada Iron Work:;: (6S) Musash i Mer-hinery Co.; (66) Kobayashi MfJ,(. Co.: sc rewa and gears : (67) Kanamono Engineering Co.; (68) Huttor! Co .. (Itsu kl Branch, rangefinders and AA fire conlrol appu ratus : (69) Japan Cbcmteat l nduetr y Co.; (70) Yoshldu Contuiner Co.: (71) Sasaki Easting WorklJ: (72) lmni Foundry: (73) Yu ri Mfg. Co .. honin~ and polishing mer-hines ; (74) J41lo Spring Co.: (75) Suzuki Ct ycerlne Co.; (76) Nakajima Mf~. Co .. switchboard and electr!r motor pu rt s : (77) Yoshizawa Lhemlea l Ma('hinery Co.: (78 lind 82) Oriental Weuving Co.: (79) Homma Iron W41rkiot: (80) "fori Iron works : (81) (Iuchi Metul Fub riruling Co.; (83) Nnkujima Mfg. Co .. small elec trlc motors : (84) Huzumu Metal Works: (85) Santo Iron Works: (86) Japan Ca~1 SIPel Co.. machine lools and second-grade hearings; (87) Miyahara Machinery Co.: (88) A:oahi Oil Refinery: (89) Tsutsu i Mfg. Co .. machine tool" and machinery componcms : (90) Tokyo Steel Products Co.: (91) Ka ..... ude Bldg. Material Co.: (92) Sanwu Mfg. Co .. machining: (93) Ishii Iron Works: (94) Nippon Contuiner Co.: (95) Japan H.oll ~Ifg. Co.; (96) Anki Ilnllin~ Mill Mac hlnery ce.. (97) Sugl yama Spring Co.; (98) Tukasngo Iron Work:o: (99) MII,.ki Iron Work" (100) Kakuda Foundry; (101) lrsu m i Alloy Pipe Co.: {l02) Ollila Machinery Co.: (103) Tokyo Electric Co. shops : (lOll) Noharo Metal Working C«.: (105) Ogura Oil Refinery; (106) Yokoyama Mfg. Co .. Joto Works, ordnance components: (107) Ta.e Iron Work.; (108) ai to Iron Works; (109) Inagoshi Foundry; (110) Hayakawa Engineering Co.: (111) Fuji Iron Works.

-+- Red, destro yed ; black. no s'n~ctural dumage :

(I) Sotoynma Co .. wrist pin:;:: (2) Nakata Mfg.

Co .. peur-i ls : (3) Yamanaka Aluminum Co.: (4) 'I'akunn Chl:-p;; Work!!: (5) Kimura Co .. light ma cbinery : (6) Mimat",u Mfg. Co .. wood and metal working : (7) Kaneko l run Work:;: (8) Kameido Soap Work:o i (9) Taka.mat"u Lig ht Metu! Cn.: (10) 'I'oyoda Electric Co.; (II) OZUWR Ca:olillg Works; (12) Junen Metal Works; (13) Hashimoto Cla:o:o Co.: O·t) Modta II'"0n Works; (15) Hayashi Electrolytic Co.: (16) Fujimura Co .• rnar-hin i ng : (17) Japan Weapon:; Co .. AA components : (18) Tokuoka Iron Work:": (19) Nissan Chemical Co.; (20) lshf hare Stee l Works : (21) Aauma Iron Works: (:!2) Fukushima Mfg. Co.. ab ru-Ivcs : (23) Tnkin \lf~. Co .. galvanized stee l pl a te : (24) Suzuki Iron Works: (25) Eba ru Drug Co.: (26) Kunie Metn l Works, alloy a/.· components : (27) Dnldo Steel Co.; (28) Azuma Metal Works: (29) Hlgushl Iron WorkN; (30) Azuma Machine Shop; (31) Kobayashi Copper Works; (32) power transformer ... raunn : (33) Azuma Coppf>r Worh; (3l) Oriental Steel Workll: (35) ~iu\dH Rubber Products Co.: (36) 'I'aisai Ehemlca l Co.: (37) Yanngisbima Drug Co.; (38) warehouses : (398. h. c) Hitachi Engi nee r-i ng Co.: (40) Riken Steel PWdlLC'I:o CII.: (41) Miyamoto Pf aiing Cu.; (42) Kewamata Mft(. C(I .. prt'('i"iolL machinery : (43) Yanagi a w 11 Le llu loid Cn.; (.14) Tokyo Cork Co.; (45) Kyokoku Iron Worb; (46) Tokyo Chain Work!!: (47) Kameidn stntton lind freight ya rds : (4A) Sakai Mf~. Co .. cu t le ry ; (49) Steel P'late Products Co .. (50) Kn wakura Contu i ner Co .. tanks and fitrings for Flhip,.: (51) U('hi· yam a Spring C(I.: (52) Ochiai Metal Worh; (53) Tube Cusling Cn.: (54.) Nakayama Mr~. Co .. stamped metal produ cte : (55) Nlsshin Textile Co., converted to produr-tion of a/e parts: (56) Tokyo Tank Mfg. Co.; (;;7) Ki,in~ Sun Oil Co.; (58) Nakamura Mfg. Co .•

Black rectangle In ahove photo locates section of Tokyo shown by damage map at left. Relation is shown to total Tokyo destruction. enclosed by white lines.

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This ph olograph of fire damage in Tokyo shows exactly IIII' same {Ire" a.~ thru shoion Oil the map on previous page. 36

The annotations on both are identical.

THE OVER-ALL RESULTS ARE EXAMINED

An idea of the over-all effect of fire bombing on Japan may be gleaned from the fo Ilowing estimates of persons left homeless and percentage of total factory space destroyed in the six major cities up to 1 July:

Population dehoused

l ndustrie l bldg s. destroyed or badly damaged

29% .18% .. 28% ... 50% .36% . . 28%

Tokyo Kawasaki Yokohama Nagoya Kobe Osaka

.46%.

· .530;0

· .69%.

· .32%.

· .58%. .40%

It should be noted that industrial damage and residential damage are not always in the same proportions as is shown in the cases of Yokohama and Nagoya. A lso, loss of factory space is far f rom a true index of actual production loss. Experience in the Battle of Britain and what we are now learning in Germany indicates that percentage of production loss, in the four to six weeks following incendiary bombing, is invariably higher than, sometimes double, the percentage of space destroyed. The reason is that, while fire might not destroy the main structural components of a factory, it does raise hell with the innards. The little gadgets, the wiring, bearings, switches, lubricants and small motors are burned out and, if the fire is hot enough, precision machinery is ruined. The Germans found that unlubricatcd machinery, unless immediately protected from moisture, would corrode and become almost a total loss. Moreover, it takes time to reorganize production lines, acquire a new stock of components and raw materials.

In Japan, the heaviest impact has been on components and supporting industries supplying the military endproduct plants. For example. it is estimated the machine tool production loss equals six to eight months of production at pre-attack level. This is of critical importance since all other types of damaged industries now desperately need new machine tools to replace those destroyed. The same

is true of the heavily-hit electrical equipment industry. Likewise serious has been damage to wire and cable production which, while not ordinarily considered of priority significance, is an important supplier not only to industry but to communications systems if! the field. In the six major cities, the following loss or serious damage to factory space is estimated: aircraft, 14% (including damage by precision attacks) ; ordnance, 7%; shipbuilding, 10%; electrical equipment, 24%; finished metal products, 26%; machinery and machine tools, 12% .

Since early June the Superforts have concentrated on some 35 smaller war production centers. In many cases the greater part of the town has been burned out. For example, Hamamatsu is 70% gone, Kagoshima, 44%; Gifu, 74%; Kofu, 64%; Takamatsu, 78%; Shizuoka, 66%. Such bombing has earned some resu Its of immediate strategic significance. Take the aircraft propeller situation. The Sumimoto propeller plants at Amagasaki and Shizuoka have been almost completely destroyed. Add this to 35% destruction of the Japan Musical Instrument Co. propeller plant at Hamamatsu and moderate damage by HE and incendiary attack to Sumimoto's Osaka factory and the Iaps have been handed an acute bottleneck. Sumimoto supplies most of the four-bladed props for the Japanese Navy Air Force and a serious shortage for new Navy types is now believed to exist. Previous precision damage to aircraft factories involved mostly production for the Japanese Army Air Force, so that bombing of the prop plants was not duplicated effort. There are other industries just as important, such as electronics, where a critical toll is being taken. In addition, Iap stockpiles of various materials are being eaten into by widespread destruction of general storage.

The full fi re story can't be written for a long time. One thing is certain:

As the Superfort Aeets grow apace and the incendiary campaign continues, the Japanese war economy is taking a terrible scorching that may prove fatal.

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LOSSES LOW, GETTING LOWER

The 8-29 offensive against Japan is proving less costly in aircraft and lives lost than the strategic bombing of Germany. Consider the following:

In the entire AAF heavy bomber operation over Europe, one crew member was lost for every 18 tons of bombs dropped. In the first seven months of XXI B.C. (now 20th AFI operations from the Marianas (through 31 May), one crew member was lost for every 00 tons dropped. And this rate is rapidly being lowered. In the six weeks period ending 16 Iul y. it was one crew member for every 173 tons.

Average ai rcraft loss rate per mission of the 8th AF Oct., I 943-March. 1944, when the 8th was really getting under \\'ay. was 3.2%. In a comparative six-month period for XXI B.c., Jan.-June, 1945, the average B-29 loss rate was 2.2%. For the last four months, it was only l.4%. In June it was only 0.8% and July promised an even better showing. In June. 1.000 more sorties were Aown than in May. but losses were exactly halved-s--Sd B-29s ill May. 44 in June. Counterair force strikes by Army and Navy fighters and fighter escort have been big factors. These statistics prove that low and medium altitude bombing. over which some qualms were felt at first. certainly has not resulted in higher losses.

Of all XXI B.C. plane losses (th rough June), 46.5% were in the Tokyo area. Coordination of searchlights and AA in Tokyo recently has been good. The new black bellies (opposite page) are our answer.

The foregoing speaks ill for Japan's air defense. With their "balls of fire" (illuminating devices and rockets). airborne searchlights and other "inexplicable illuminations" the Japs are vainly attempting to increase the effectiveness of their night opposition.

Whizzing fireball is seen by 13-29 crews over Osaka 1 June . • Fireballs have been sighted almost exclusively at night.

Phosphorous flak bursts underneath B-29 over Kagamigahaza. This has proven no more effective than H.E. Aak .•

In a setting of cathedral-like majesty, this 8-29 of 314th Wing is about to go down near Kobe, 5 June.

Black bottoms now standard for 8-29s_ foil enemy searchlights. High-gloss black paint gives mirror reflection, e limi-

nates diffusion. AA gunner sees plane surface only when he, and source of light have same angular relationship to it.