SECOND DIVISION On October 3, 1994, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus[5] with
the Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch
[G.R. No. 122954. February 15, 2000]
NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE DIRECTOR
OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA (IN PLACE OF THE
JAIL WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, and THE CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY OF
MANILA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction of the
accused will not render the judgment of conviction void, nor will it warrant the release of the
convict by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus. The proper remedy is the reconstitution of judicial
records which is as much a duty of the prosecution as of the defense.
Subject of this petition for review on certiorari are (1) the Decision dated April 28, 1995, of the
Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal of the petition for habeas
corpusfiled by petitioner, and (2) the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 1, 1995,
which denied the Motion for Reconsideration. As hereafter elucidated, we sustain the judgment of
respondent appellate court.
Based on the available records and the admissions of the parties, the antecedents of the present
petition are as follows:
Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May 21, 1981, up to
present[1] by reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in Criminal Case No.
60677, by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, for the jeepney hold-up and killing of
United States Peace Corps Volunteer Margaret Viviene Carmona.
Some twelve (12) years later, or on June 9, 1993, petitioner sought to be transferred from the
Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City,[2] but the Jail Warden of the
Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer
cannot be effected without the submission of the requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or
Mittimus, Decision, and Information.[3] It was then discovered that the entire records of the case,
including the copy of the judgment, were missing. In response to the inquiries made by counsel of
petitioner, both the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 2 attested to the fact that the records of Criminal Case No. 60677 could
not be found in their respective offices. Upon further inquiries, the entire records appear to have
been lost or destroyed in the fire which occurred at the second and third floor of the Manila City
Hall on November 3, 1986.[4]
2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from
confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and
violative of his constitutional right to due process.
In its Resolution dated October 10, 1994,[6] the Second Division of this Court resolved -
" x x x (a) to ISSUE the Writ of Habeas Corpus; (b) to ORDER the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to conduct an immediate RAFFLE of
this case among the incumbent judges thereof; and (c) to REQUIRE [1] the
Judge to whom this case is raffled to SET the case for HEARING on Thursday,
October 13, 1994 at 8:30 A.M., try and decide the same on the merits and
thereafter FURNISH this Court with a copy of his decision thereon; [2] the
respondents to make a RETURN of the Writ on or before the close of office hours
on Wednesday, October 12, 1994 and APPEAR PERSONALLY and PRODUCE
the person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing on the aforesaid date and time of
hearing to the Judge to whom this case is raffled, and [3] the Director General,
Philippine National Police, through his duly authorized representative(s) to
SERVE the Writ and Petition, and make a RETURN thereof as provided by law
and, specifically, his duly authorized representative(s) to APPEAR
PERSONALLY and ESCORT the person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing at the
aforesaid date and time of hearing."
The case was then raffled to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which on November
15, 1994, after hearing, issued an Order[7] dismissing the case on the ground that the mere loss of
the records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release
of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records of the case
which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision.
Petitioner duly appealed said Order to the Court of Appeals, which on April 28, 1995, rendered the
assailed Decision[8] affirming the decision of the trial court with the modification that "in the interest
of orderly administration of justice" and "under the peculiar facts of the case" petitioner may be
transferred to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City without submission of the requirements
(Mittimus, Decision and Information) but without prejudice to the reconstitution of the original
records.
The Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order having been denied for lack of
merit,[9] petitioner is now before us on certiorari, assigning the following errors of law:[10]
I. WHETHER OR NOT, UNDER THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE, WHERE THE RECORDS OF CONVICTION WERE LOST, THE
PETITIONERS CONTINUED INCARCERATION IS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE
LAW.
COROLLARY TO THIS, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
RESOLUTION, AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF HEREIN APPELLANTS
 PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS, IN CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, A
JUDGMENT OR A SUBSTITUTE JUDGMENT, WHICH CAN BE UTILIZED AS A
SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR HIS INCARCERATION.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RECONSTITUTION OF OFFICIAL RECORDS
LOST/DESTROYED SHOULD BE INITIATED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS
ORGANS, WHO ARE IN CUSTODY OF SUCH, OR BY THE PRISONER,
WHOSE LIBERTY IS RESTRAINED.
Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as
required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,[11] and that the evidence
considered by the trial court and Court of Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not
establish the contents of such judgment. Petitioner further contends that our ruling in Gunabe v.
Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993, 995 (1947), that "reconstitution is as much the duty of the
prosecution as of the defense" has been modified or abandoned in the subsequent case
of Ordonez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152, 155 (1994), wherein we held that "[i]t is not the
fault of the prisoners that the records cannot now be found. If anyone is to be blamed, it surely
cannot be the prisoners, who were not the custodians of those records."
In its Comment,[12] the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the sole inquiry in this habeas
corpus proceeding is whether or not there is legal basis to detain petitioner. The OSG maintains
that public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the existence of a legal ground for
petitioners continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and under Section 4 of
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment is not authorized. Petitioners remedy, therefore, is not a petition for habeas corpus but a
proceeding for the reconstitution of judicial records.
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity, was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best
and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.[13] It secures to a prisoner the right to have the
cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue
ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority.[14] Consequently, the writ may also be
availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose
the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such
excess.[15] Petitioners claim is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his
continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is
violative of his constitutional right to due process.
Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on
record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his
detention. Petitioner made judicial admissions, both verbal and written, that he was charged with
and convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment
"habang buhay".
In its Order dated October 17, 1994, the RTC-Manila, Branch 9, made the finding that -[16]
"During the trial and on manifestation and arguments made by the accused, his
learned counsel and Solicitor Alexander G. Gesmundo who appeared for the
respondents, it appears clear and indubitable that:
(A) Petitioner had been charged with Robbery with Homicide in
Criminal Case No. 60677, Illegal Possession of Firearm in
Criminal Case No. 60678 and Robbery in Band in Criminal
Case No. 60867. ... In Criminal Case No. 60677 (Robbery with
Homicide) the accused admitted in open Court that a
decision was read to him in open Court by a personnel of
the respondent Court (RTC Branch II) sentencing him to
Life Imprisonment (Habang buhay)..." (emphasis supplied)
Further, in the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Commitment Order of the Above Entitled Criminal
Case dated June 8, 1993,[17] petitioner himself stated that -
"COMES NOW, the undersigned accused in the above entitled criminal case and
unto this Honorable Court most respectfully move:
1. That in 1981 the accused was charge of (sic) Robbery with Homicide;
2. That after four years of trial, the court found the accused guilty and given
a Life Sentence in a promulgation handed down in 1985; (emphasis supplied)
3. That after the sentence was promulgated, the Presiding Judge told the councel
(sic) that accused has the right to appeal the decision;
4. That whether the de oficio counsel appealed the decision is beyond the
accused comprehension (sic) because the last time he saw the counsel was
when the decision was promulgated.
5. That everytime there is change of Warden at the Manila City Jail attempts
were made to get the Commitment Order so that transfer of the accused to the
Bureau of Corrections can be affected, but all in vain;"
Petitioners declarations as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him under Section
23 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This rule is based upon the presumption that no man would
declare anything against himself, unless such declaration were true,[18] particularly with respect to
such grave matter as his conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Further, under
Section 4 of Rule 129, "[a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made."
Petitioner does not claim any mistake nor does he deny making such admissions.
The records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 1985[19] of then
Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that petitioner was convicted of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide on January 11, 1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official
records under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which is prima
facie evidence of facts therein stated.
Public respondents likewise presented a certified true copy of Peoples Journal dated January 18,
1985, page 2,[20] issued by the National Library, containing a short news article that petitioner was
convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and was sentenced to "life imprisonment."
However, newspaper articles amount to "hearsay evidence, twice removed"[21] and are therefore
not only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether objected to or not,[22] unless
offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the news
article is admissible only as evidence that such publication does exist with the tenor of the news
therein stated.
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner
who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is,
where it sets forth process which on its face shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner,
it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent
effect of such process.[23] If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the
return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the
burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal. Thus, Section 13 of Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court provides:
"SEC. 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea.If it appears that the
prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the
return shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint, but if he
is restrained of his liberty by any alleged private authority, the return shall be
considered only as a plea of the facts therein set forth, and the party claiming the
custody must prove such facts."
Public respondents having sufficiently shown good ground for the detention, petitioners release
from confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court which
provides that -
"Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted
of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment."
In the case of Gomez v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 458 (1946), accused was convicted by the
trial court of the crime of rape, and was committed to the New Bilibid Prison. Pending appeal with
the Court of Appeals, the records of the case were, for reasons undisclosed, completely destroyed
or lost. Accused then filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus with the
Supreme Court. The Court denied the petition, ruling thus:
"The petition does not make out a case. The Director of Prisons is holding the
prisoner under process issued by a competent court in pursuance of a lawful,
subsisting judgment. The prisoner himself admits the legality of his detention.
The mere loss or destruction of the record of the case does not invalidate the
judgment or the commitment, or authorize the prisoners release."
Note further that, in the present case, there is also no showing that petitioner duly appealed his
conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence for all intents and purposes, such
judgment has already become final and executory. When a court has jurisdiction of the offense
charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to
collateral attack by habeas corpus.[24] Put another way, in order that a judgment may be subject to
collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be void for lack of jurisdiction.[25] Thus, petitioners
invocation of our ruling in Reyes v. Director of Prisons, supra, is misplaced. In the Reyes case, we
granted the writ and ordered the release of the prisoner on the ground that "[i]t does not appear
that the prisoner has been sentenced by any tribunal duly established by a competent authority
during the enemy occupation" and not because there were no copies of the decision and
information. Here, a copy of the mittimusis available. And, indeed, petitioner does not raise any
jurisdictional issue.
The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or public respondents to initiate the
reconstitution of the judgment of the case under either Act No. 3110,[26] the general law governing
reconstitution of judicial records, or under the inherent power of courts to reconstitute at any time
the records of their finished cases in accordance with Section 5 (h) of Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court.[27] Judicial records are subject to reconstitution without exception, whether they refer to
pending cases or finished cases.[28] There is no sense in limiting reconstitution to pending cases;
finished cases are just as important as pending ones, as evidence of rights and obligations finally
adjudicated.[29]
Petitioner belabors the fact that no initiative was taken by the Government to reconstitute the
missing records of the trial court. We reiterate, however, that "reconstitution is as much the duty of
the prosecution as of the defense."[30] Petitioners invocation of Ordoez v. Director of Prisons, 235
SCRA 152 (1994), is misplaced since the grant of the petition for habeas corpus therein was
premised on the loss of records prior to the filing of Informations against the prisoners, and
therefore "[t]he government has failed to show that their continued detention is supported by a
valid conviction or by the pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate cause
whatsoever." In this case, the records were lost after petitioner, by his own admission, was already
convicted by the trial court of the offense charged. Further, the same incident which gave rise to
the filing of the Information for Robbery with Homicide also gave rise to another case for Illegal
Possession of Firearm,[31] the records of which could be of assistance in the reconstitution of the
present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001
EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R TIJING, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and ANGELITA DIAMANTE, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 6, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39056,
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court in a petition for habeas corpus of Edgardo Tijing,
Jr., allegedly the child of petitioners.
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who
was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta.
Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita
Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent
laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait
until she returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as
she usually let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida
forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there. Angelita's
maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back
later. She returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved
to another place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police
who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance.
Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her spouse would react
to the disappearance of their youngest child and this made her problem even more serious. As
fate would have it, Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and together, this time, they looked for
their missing son in other places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his
whereabouts.
Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez,
allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in
Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo,
Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by
Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas
Lopez.1 She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to
recover their son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses, namely,
Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in
the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She
supported her testimony with her clinical records.2 The second witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared
that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as
the latter was sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part against
the edge of a banca causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity.
Benjamin further declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an
adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with children.3
For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age
42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima
Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She added, though, that she has two other children with her real
husband, Angel Sanchez.4 She said the birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law
husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989.
On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband
could not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility.5 The trial court
also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural child
of petitioners. The trial court decreed:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the
petition for Habeas Corpus, as such, respondent Angelita Diamante is ordered to
immediately release from her personal custody minor John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn
him over and/or surrender his person to petitioners, Spouses Edgardo A. Tijing and
Bienvenida R. Tijing, immediately upon receipt hereof.
Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, is hereby commanded to implement the
decision of this Court by assisting herein petitioners in the recovery of the person of their
minor son, Edgardo Tijing Jr., the same person as John Thomas D. Lopez.
SO ORDERED.6
Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal.7 Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994, the sheriff
implemented the order of the trial court by taking custody of the minor. In his report, the sheriff
stated that Angelita peacefully surrendered the minor and he turned over the custody of said child
to petitioner Edgardo Tijing.8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court.
The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its view, the
evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the
minor. It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas
Lopez are one and the same person,9 and disposed of the case, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court dated March 10, 1995 is
hereby REVERSED, and a new one entered dismissing the petition in Spec. Proc. No.
94-71606, and directing the custody of the minor John Thomas Lopez to be returned to
respondent Angelita Diamante, said minor having been under the care of said respondent
at the time of the filing of the petition herein.
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the abovequoted decision which was denied. Hence, the
instant petition alleging:
I presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR
WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE PETITIONERS' ACTION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS
MERELY SECONDARY TO THE QUESTION OF FILIATION THAT THE PETITIONERS
HAD LIKEWISE PROVEN.
II
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
"HABEAS CORPUS" AND DIRECTING THAT THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR JOHN
THOMAS LOPEZ WHO WAS PROVEN TO THE SAME MINOR AS EDGARDO R.
TIJING, JR., BE RETURNED TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.11
In our view, the crucial issues for resolution are the following:
(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy?
(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same
person and is the son of petitioners?
We shall discuss the two issues together since they are closely related.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto.12 Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It
may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary
restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather,
it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.13 It must be
stressed too that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material,
subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person.
In this case, the minor's identity is crucial in determining the propriety of the writ sought. Thus, it
must be resolved first whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to be her son, is the
same minor named John Thomas Lopez, whom Angelita insists to be her offspring. We must first
determine who between Bienvenida and Angelita is the minor's biological mother. Evidence must
necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to be distinct and separate
from each other, are indeed one and the same.14 Petitioners must convincingly establish that the
minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made is the person upon whom they have
rightful custody. If there is doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the application for the
writ is made, petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their right of custody over the said minor.
True, it is not the function of this Court to examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence
order.15 But since the conclusions of the Court of Appeals contradict those of the trial court, this
Court may scrutinize the evidence on the record to determine which findings should be preferred
as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is
sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she
admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in
1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming she
had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no evidence she gave birth to a
child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who allegedly delivered the
child was not presented in court. No clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic
were ever submitted.
Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of
siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the
accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son.
Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost
fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen years,
they also bore no offspring.
Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas
Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the
child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the
registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the
birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after the
birth.16 Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent
were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even
private respondent had admitted she is a "common-law wife".17 This false entry puts to doubt the
other data in said birth certificate.

Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in
court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to
establish parentage.18 Needless to stress, the trial court's conclusion should be given high respect,
it having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner
concerned.

Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing,
Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book,
discharge order and the signatures of petitioners.

All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners.
The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.

A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using
DNA test19 for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural
Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct
DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the
DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father.
The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage.20 Of
course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge.21 Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science
when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress.22 Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be
useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED and decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. Costs against the private
respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No 101724 July 3, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR., respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the resolution
promulgated on August 1, 1991 by the Sandiganbayan which granted the private respondent's
motion to quash the information for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No.
3019) on the ground of prescription of the crime charged.
Two letter-complaints were filed on October 28, 1986 and December 9, 1986, with the
Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of
Congressman Democrito O. Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after the private respondent had
replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial governor of Agusan del Sur in March 1986 (p. 235, Rollo).
Gelacio's complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still the provincial
attorney in 1976, of a free patent title for Lot No. 3097-8, Pls. 67, with an area of 1,391 sq. m.,
more or less, in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
On February 23, 1989, the tanodbayan referred the complaint to the City Fiscal
of Butuan City who subpoenaed Governor Paredes. However, the subpoena was
served on, and received by, the Station Commander of San Francisco, Agusan
del Sur, who did not serve it on Paredes. Despite the absence of notice to
Paredes, Deputized Tanodbayan/City Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy conducted a
preliminary investigation ex-parte. He recommended that an information be filed
in court. His recommendation was approved by the Tanodbayan who, on August
10, 1989, filed the following information in the Sandiganbayan where it was
docketed as TBP Case No. 86-03368:
That on or about January 21, 1976, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the
Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, having been duly appointed and qualified
as such, taking advantage of his public position, did, then and there, wilfully and
unlawfully persuade, influence and induce the Land Inspector of the Bureau of
Lands, by the name of Armando L. Luison to violate an existing rule or regulation
duly promulgated by competent authority by misrepresenting to the latter that the
land subject of an application filed by the accused with the Bureau of Lands is
disposable by a free patent when the accused well knew that the said land had
already been reserved for a school site, thus by the accused's personal
misrepresentation in his capacity as Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur and
applicant for a free patent, a report favorably recommending the issuance of a
free patent was given by the said Armando L. Luison, land inspector, thereby
paving the way to the release of a decree of title, by the Register of Deeds of
Agusan del Sur, an act committed by the accused, in outright prejudice of the
public interest. (pp. 3-4, Rollo.)
Paredes was arrested upon a warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan. Claiming that the information
and the warrant of arrest were null and void because he had been denied his right to a preliminary
investigation. Paredes refused to post bail. His wife filed a petition for habeas corpus praying this
Court to order his release (Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 464), but we denied her
petition because the proper remedy was for Paredes to file a bail bond of P20,000 fixed by the
Sandiganbayan for his provisional liberty, and move to quash the information before being
arraigned.
On April 5, 1991, Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan "An Urgent Motion to Quash Information and
to Recall Warrant of Arrest" alleging that:
1. he is charged for an offense which has prescribed:
2. the preliminary investigation, as well as the Information prepared by the
Tanodbayan and the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan were
invalid for lack of notice to him of the preliminary investigation conducted by
Deputized Tanodbayan Ernesto M. Brocoy and Tanodbayan Prosecutor
Josephine Z. Fernandez; and
3. his constitutional right to due process had been violated by the long delay in
the termination of the preliminary investigation.
After the parties had filed their written arguments, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution on
August 1, 1991 granting the motion to quash on the ground of prescription of the offense charged.
The Sandiganbayan's ratiocination of its resolution is quoted below:
The crime charged is alleged to have been committed "on or about January 21,
1976" when the accused allegedly misrepresented to a Lands Inspector of the
Bureau of Lands that the land subject of the herein movant's Application for a
Free Patent was disposable land. This misrepresentation allegedly resulted in the
issuance of a Torrens Title under a Free Patent to the herein accused-movant.
This, the Information avers, was prejudicial to the public interest because the
land in question had been reserved for a school site and was, therefore, not
disposable.
Thus, the charge is for the violation of Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 3019 because the
accused had allegedly persuaded, induced and influenced the Public Lands
Inspector to violate existing law, rules and regulations by recommending
approval of the free patent application.
The accused asserts that since at the time of the alleged commission of the
crime (January 21, 1976) the period of prescription was ten (10) years under
Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 3019, the crime should have prescribed in 1986. The
prosecution seems to agree with the movant's statement as to the term of the
prescriptive period with the qualification that the period of prescription should
have commenced to run from March 28, 1985, when the complaint was allegedly
filed by the Republic for the cancellation of the title.
xxx xxx xxx
The question then is this: when should the period of prescription have
commenced to run as to the alleged misrepresentation which persuaded,
influenced and induced the Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands resulting in
the approval of the application of the accused for a free patent?
xxx xxx xxx
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that even in the case of falsification of
public documents, prescription commences from its recording with the Registry of
Deeds when the existence of the document and the averments therein
theoretically become a matter of public knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
The matter of improper inducement, persuasion or influence upon the Lands
Inspector allegedly applied by the accused through his misrepresentation may
have been unknown to others besides the two of them because their interaction
would presumably have been private. The fact of the improper segregation of the
piece of land in question and the grant thereof to the accused, however, became,
presumptively at least, a matter of public knowledge upon the issuance of a
Torrens Title over that parcel of non-disposable public land.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Notice to the whole world must be presumed at the very latest on May 28,
1976 when the Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur issued Original Certificate of
Title No. 8379 in the name of the accused as a result of the grant of the patent on
the school site reservation;
5. The act of filing the approved free patent with the Registry of Deeds is notice
duly given to the various offices and officials of the government, e.g., the
Department (Ministry) of Agriculture and the Bureau of Lands, who are affected
thereby specially because it is the Bureau of Lands which files the approved
patent application with the Registry of Deeds. If the land in question was indeed
reserved for as school site, then the Department (Ministry) of Education would
also know or would be presumed to know. (pp. 28-33, Rollo.)
The Sandiganbayan could not abide the fact that the Lands Inspector (Luison) who was
supposedly induced by Paredes to violate the law, and who did violate it by recommending
approval of Paredes' free patent application was not charged with a crime. The Sandiganbayan
concluded:
It would seriously strain credulity to say that while the violation of law, rules or
regulation by the Lands Inspector was obvious and public (since the school site
had been titled in the name of the alleged inducer Pimentel **), the beneficiary
thereof could not have been suspected of having induced the violation itself. It
would be grossly unfair and unjust to say that prescription would run in favor of
the Lands Inspector who had actually violated the law but not to the public official
who had benefitted therefrom and who may have, therefore, instigated the
favorable recommendation for the disposition of non-disposable land.
In view of all the foregoing, the Motion to Quash the Information is granted. (p.
36, Rollo.)
The Sandiganbayan further observed that since R.A. No. 3019 is a special law, the computation of
the period for the prescription of the crime of violating it is governed by Section 29 of Act No. 3326
which provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.
The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that "the date of the violation of the law becomes the
operative date for the commencement of the period of prescription" (p. 34, Rollo).
Assuming that Paredes did induce Lands Inspector Luison to recommend approval of his
application for free patent (which both of them denied doing), the date of the violation, for the
purpose of computing the period of prescription, would be the date of filing his application on
January 21, 1976.
The theory of the prosecution that the prescriptive period should not commence upon the filing of
Paredes' application because no one could have known about it except Paredes and Lands
Inspector Luison, is not correct for, as the Sandiganbayan pointedly observed: "it is not only the
Lands Inspector who passes upon the disposability of public land . . . other public officials pass
upon the application for a free patent including the location of the land and, therefore, the
disposable character thereof" (p. 30, Rollo). Indeed, practically all the department personnel, who
had a hand in processing and approving the application, namely: (1) the lands inspector who
inspected the land to ascertain its location and occupancy: (2) the surveyor who prepared its
technical description: (3) the regional director who assessed the application and determined the
land classification: (4) the Director of Lands who prepared the free patent: and (5) the Department
Secretary who signed it, could not have helped "discovering" that the subject of the application
was nondisposable public agricultural land.
The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the "crime" whether it was the filing of Paredes
application for a free patent in January 1976 or his supposedly having induced Luison to
recommend its approval, prescribed ten (10) years later, on January 21, 1986. Gelacio's
complaint, dated October 28, 1986, was filed late.
The reason for the extinction of the State's right to prosecute a crime after the lapse of the
statutory limitation period for filing the criminal action, is that:
Statutes of Limitation are construed as being acts of grace, and as a
surrendering by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute
at its discretion, and they are considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty. Such
statutes are founded on the liberal theory that prosecutions should not be
allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to explode only after
witnesses and proofs necessary to the protection of accused have by sheer
lapse of time passed beyond availability. They serve, not only to bar prosecutions
on aged and untrustworthy evidence, but also to cut off prosecution for crimes a
reasonable time after completion, when no further danger to society is
contemplated from the criminal activity. (22 CJS 573-574.)
In the absence of a special provision otherwise, the statute of limitations begins
to run on the commission of an offense and not from the time when the offense is
discovered or when the offender becomes known, or it normally begins to run
when the crime is complete. (22 CJS 585; Emphasis supplied.)
Even if the ten-year prescriptive period commenced to run from the registration and issuance of
the free patent title by the Register of Deeds on May 28, 1976, registration being constructive
notice to the whole world, the prescriptive period would have fully run its course on May 28, 1986,
or five (5) months before Gelacio filed his complaint, and more than thirteen (13) years before
judicial proceedings were initiated in the Sandiganbayan on August 10, 1989 by the filing of the
information therein.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Section 11 R.A. No.
3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the prescription or
extinguishment of a violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given retroactive application to the "crime" which
was committed by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it should be prejudicial to the accused. It
would deprive him of the substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under
Section 11, R.A. 3019, which was an essential element of the "crime" at the time he committed it.
Protection from prosecution under a statute of limitation is a substantive right.
Where the statute fixes a period of limitation as to a prosecution for a particular
offense, the limitation so fixed is jurisdictional, and the time within which the
offense is committed is a jurisdictional fact, it being necessary that the indictment
or information be actually filed within the time prescribed. (22 CJS 574.)
Fact that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional necessarily determined that a
prosecution within the period specified is an essential element of the offense.
(People vs. Allen, 118 P 2d, 927, Emphasis supplied.)
Unless statutes of limitation are clearly retrospective in their terms, they do not
apply to crimes previously committed (22 CJS 576; People vs. Lurd, 12 Hun 282;
Martine vs. State, 24 Tex 61; Emphasis ours.)
To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would after his situation
to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished
under the law existing when it was committed. An ex post facto law is defined as:
A law passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which
retrospectively changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed.
By Art. I, Sec. 10 of U.S. Const., the states are forbidden to pass "any ex post
facto law". Most all state constitutions contain similar prohibitions against ex post
facto laws.
An "ex post facto law" is defined as a law which provides for the infliction of
punishment upon a person for an act done which, when it was committed, was
innocent; a law which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was
committed; a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; a law that changes the
rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than was required at
the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender; a law
which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a
penalty or the deprivation of a right which, when done, was lawful; a law which
deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they have
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of
the proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its
consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. Wilensky v.
Fields, Fla., 267 So. 2d 1, 5. (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 520.)
Since an ex post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution (Sec. 22, Article 111, 1987
Constitution), the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in ruling that Paredes may no
longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of R.A. 3019 in 1976, six (6) years before B.P.
Blg. 195 was approved on March 16, 1982. The new prescriptive period under that law should
apply only to those offense which were committed after the approval of B.P. 195.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The resolution dated August 1,
1991 of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 13800 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 95939. June 17, 1996]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENTINO BRACAMONTE y
ABELLAR, MANUEL REGINALDO y SAPON, and ERNIE LAPAN y CABRAL alias
ERNING BULAG, defendants-appellants.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of the
commission of the felony, is a plausible excuse for the accused. Let there be no mistake about
it. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is in fact a good defense. But, to be valid for purposes of
exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be such that it would have been
physically impossible for the person charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time
of its commission, the reason being that no person can be in two places at the same time. The
excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there is the least possibility
of accused's presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water.
Appellant Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar, Manuel Reginaldo y Sapon, and Ernie Lapan y
Cabral alias Erning Bulag, stand charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide under
the following Information, dated October 6, 1987:
"The undersigned 2nd Asst. City Fiscal for the City of Cavite accuses Florentino Bracamonte y
Abellar, Manuel Reginaldo y Sapon and Ernie Lapan y Cabral alias Erning Bulag of the crime of
Robbery with Double Homicide, committed as follows:
That on or about September 23, 1987, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping each other, with intent to gain did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously enter the house of one Violeta Sayaman Parnala, and once inside, by means of
violence and intimidation, rob, take and carry away a necklace worth P600.00 and ring worth
P440.00 belonging to one Jay Vee Parnala Custodio, son of Violeta Sayaman Parnala, without the
consent of the said owner and to his damage and prejudice in the total amount of P1,100.00,
Philippine Currency and that on the occasion of the said robbery, and in pursuance of their
conspiracy, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack, scald and stab Jay Vee Parnala inflicting upon Jay Vee Parnala
Custodio 3 incised and 15 stab wounds and upon Teresita Minorca Rosalinas 1 incised and 6 stab
wounds on the different parts of their body, which ultimately caused their deaths.
Contrary to law.''[1]
Ernie Lapan y Cabral was tried and convicted of the crime in a Decision of the court a quo,
dated February 13, 1989, and his case is on appeal with this Court. Manuel Reginaldo y Sapon is
at large.
Appellant Bracamonte had been at large until his arrest on October 27, 1989. He had been in
hiding for more than two years.
The present appeal deals solely with the conviction by the court a quo of herein appellant
Bracamonte.
Arraigned on November 13, 1989, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch XVII, rendered judgment on
September 21, 1990 finding appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the judgment
reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Florentino Bracamonte y
Abellar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide and he is
hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of Jay Vee Parnala and
Teresita Rosalinas the amount of P30,000 each and to pay unto Violeta Parnala P1,100.00
corresponding to the value of the articles lost without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the cost."[2]
Hence, appellant interposed the present appeal, assigning the following errors:
I
"x x x IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PROSECUTION WITNESS' DECLARATION CONCERNING
THE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS ONE OF THE THREE (3)
MEN WHO ALLEGEDLY EMERGED FROM THE GARAGE DOOR OF THE VICTIM'S HOUSE
AND SPRINTED AWAY THEREFROM ALMOST IMMEDIATELY.
II
x x x IN APPRECIATING THE THEN EXTANT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCES AS INDICATIVE
OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S GUILT.
III
x x x IN ITS PRONOUNCEMENT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT EVADED ARREST BY HIDING
AFTER HIS ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE HEINOUS CRIME IMPUTED AGAINST HIM.
IV
x x x IN DISREGARDING COMPLETELY THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI PUT UP BY THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT."[3]
At the trial in the court a quo, the following facts appear to have been proven:
 On September 23, 1987, at about 8:30 in the evening, Violeta Parnala and her common-law A: They were still in the garage when suddenly they opened the door of the garage. I
husband, Clark Din, arrived home from the Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses. She rang their thought he is our maid and I told him that I was knocking here for a long time
doorbell and when she got no response, she pounded on the garage door while her husband went already why did you wake up just now.
to the back of their house and stoned the window of their son's room. Then, she heard somebody
trying to remove the padlock of the garage door and saw a man, prompting her to shout, Q: And the distance between you and the place where they came out was very short
"magnanakaw, magnanakaw." After the door was opened, three (3) men rushed out, one after the distance?
other, whom she recognized as appellant Bracamonte, Ernie Lapan and Manuel Reginaldo. A: Yes, Ma'am.
Upon hearing his wife shouting, Clark Din rushed to her and saw a man about to turn at the Q: What is the distance?
other street. He ran after him but could not catch up. He thus proceeded back to their house. By
this time, some of their neighbors, roused by the shouting of Violeta, came out of their houses, A: About an arm (sic) length.
among whom were Pat. Sahagun and Pat. Punzal. The two (2) policemen went with Clark Din
inside the house and saw the television set on. Din turned on the lights and started to look for his Q: And you said they walked very fast?
son. He tried the bathroom but it was locked. He then went to their room, got the keys and opened A: Not so fast. When they were already outside they ran so fast.
the bathroom where he saw their maid, Teresita M. Rosalinas, hands tied with her mouth gagged,
and bathed in her own blood. Thereafter, he saw their son, Jay Vee Parnala, in the dirty kitchen, Q: Mrs. Witness, is there a lighting facilities (sic) in your door?
his head and body immersed in a pail of water, dead.
A: There is an electric post that has a light.
Dr. Regalado Sosa, City Health Officer of Cavite City, conducted an autopsy on the cadavers
of Jay Vee and Rosalina. His findings disclosed that Rosalina sustained six (6) stab wounds and Q: And would it be 8 to 10 meters from the door of your garage?
one (1) incised wound, while Jay Vee sustained thirteen (13) stab wounds and three (3) incised A: It could be not so far (sic) because our house is at the corner.
wounds on different parts of the body.[4] In the case of Rosalina, the most fatal wounds were
wounds Nos. 6 and 7 while in the case of Jay Vee, almost all of the wounds were fatal due to his Q: Page 35 of your transcript of stenographic notes shows it is about 8 to 10
age.[5] Jay Vee was only six years old at the time of his death. meters. What is the kind of light?
Appellant Florentino Bracamonte denied the charge and interposed the defense of A: Electric bulb.
alibi. According to him, he was not in Cavite City at the time the crime was committed, but was
then in the premises of the RM Motor Works located in Paraaque, Metro Manila. This shop is Q: Not the fluorescent?
owned by Rafael Diaz. Appellant worked as an all around employee, alternating as a mechanic A: Bulb.
and shopkeeper of Rafael Diaz.
Q: And it was about how high?
We affirm the conviction of the herein appellant.
A: The height of an electric post.
The defense of alibi is a handy but shabby excuse which indictees never seem to tire of. [6] At
the risk of sounding like a broken record, we reiterate once more the oft-repeated rule that the Q: It could be about 20 feet?
defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification. [7] In the case at bench, Violeta
Parnala, witness for the prosecution and mother of one of the victims, positively testified that she A: I am not sure.
saw appellant Bracamonte, together with Manuel Reginaldo and Ernie Lapan, come out of their Q: And you will agree with me that that light was not sufficient enough to be able to
garage door, obviously immediately after the incident in question. The situation was that the clearly see the faces of the persons going out of the garage?
accused were still inside the Parnala residence when the spouses Parnala arrived thereat. This
circumstance and the fact that the three accused left Violeta in a hurried manner and without A: The house nearby have also light. The place was also lighted by the houses of the
paying their respects to the house owner as would have been the case if their presence in the neighbor which has a light."[8]
Parnala house were legitimate, constitute circumstantial evidence of their culpability. Violeta
Violeta Parnala was unswerving in her identification in open court of appellant Bracamonte as
clearly saw the three (3) men because they were only about an arm's length from where she was
one of the felons who emerged from their house, considering that the latter used to drive her son
when they scampered out of the garage door. As they came out, they were practically facing
to school. As further recounted by Violeta, viz:
her. Moreover, although the light coming from the electric post, admittedly, was dim, there was
additional illumination coming from the houses nearby sufficient to enable her to identify the Q: In your direct testimony when you were asked this question. Q: Why do you know the
malefactors: Thus: accused? A: Because my son used to ride in his jeepney on his way to
school. How young was your son Jay Vee Parnala Custodio when the incident
"Q: Following your testimony, you were outside the small door knocking, then these
happened?
three persons came out from the garage?
 A: He was six years old?
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And during those times when this Teresita Rosalinas and your son Jay Vee Parnala
Custodio were going to school, you do not mind who the driver was of the jeepney
they were taking?
A: I also looked at him.
Q: But your concern was merely to reach their destination, not to identify the driver of
the jeepney?
A: Of course when my child leaves the house, I used to see who was the driver because
I have much concern about my son in case something might happen.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What is in the driver taking your son to school (sic) or the distinguishing feature that
made you say that you came to know the accused because he used to ride in the
jeepney of his?
A: Of course the feature of his face and the built of his body.
Q: Was there any distinguishing feature in his face or in his body, what is it?
A: His face a little bit round.
Q: If that accused is in the courtroom today, will you be able to identify him?
A: Yes, Ma'am (He is there, witness pointing to the accused.)
Q: How many times more or less did your son Jay Vee and Teresita Rosalinas ride in
this jeepney being driven by this Bracamonte?
A: I cannot remember already how many times but I could see them very often riding in
the jeepney.
Q: And this accused Bracamonte is not living in your neighborhood?
A: He is also living in that place but a little bit far from our place."[9]
Appellant countered, however, that witness Violeta could not have known him personally
since her son and maid rode coincidentally on appellant's jeepney only on occasions whenever he
passed by the witness' house in the course of regular work. Their relationship was impersonal, not
conducive to close and regular relationship thereby ruling out intimate knowledge of each
other.[10] The implication is that Violeta could not have positively identified him as one of those who
emerged from the garage door of the victims' house, they being complete strangers to each other.
This averment is of no consequence, because nowhere in the testimony of Violeta did she
claim that she knows the appellant personally. What she testified to was that she used to see her
son and maid ride in appellant's jeepney very often,[11] which is the reason why she became
familiar with appellant's physical appearance. There is nothing in law and jurisprudence which
requires, as a condition sine qua non, that in order for there to be a positive identification by a
prosecution witness of a felon, he must first know the latter personally. If this were the case, the
prosecution would rarely get any conviction since, in most instances, the perpetrator of the crime
is unrelated to the victim. No further requirement is imposed by law on the prosecution than that
the identification made by its witness be direct, firm, unequivocal, and, most importantly,
credible. The witness' degree of closeness or familiarity with the accused, although may be
helpful, is by no means an indispensable requirement for purposes of positive identification.
To corroborate his defense of alibi, appellant presented Rafael Diaz, owner of RM Motor
Works in Paraaque, where appellant used to work as an all around employee and where he
allegedly spent the night on September 23, 1987, the time when the crime was committed. Diaz'
testimony contributed very little, if at all, to his defense. The direct examination of Diaz reveals the
following:
"Q: Please recall the specific date of September 23, 1987, have you gone to your shop?
A: As far as I know, I cannot remember. At that date because of too long to recall (sic)
but what can say is that I know that he stayed in the shop. He sleep (sic) in the
shop.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, you said that you used to visit, inspect your shop usually in the morning. Now,
tell us Mr. Witness have you done that in September 1987?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In your doing such inspection, where was Florentino Bracamonte?
A: He was in the shop.
Q: For the whole month of September 1987?
A: Yes, sir.[12]
However, on cross-examination, Diaz became more ambivalent:
"Q: And you are definite that on September 23, 1987 as you mentioned earlier you did
not know if the accused left your shop or not?
A: In the afternoon.
Q: On September 23, 1987?
A: I am not sure.
COURT:
Q: You are not sure he did not leave?
A: Yes, Your Honor, I am not sure.[13]
The above testimony, whose purpose is to corroborate appellant's defense of alibi, failed to
serve its purpose for it was hardly clear and convincing. Thus, the trial court did not commit any
error in refusing to give probative value to this piece of evidence. Settled is the doctrine that the
trial court's evaluation of the credit-worthiness of the testimony given before it by witnesses must
be accorded great respect.[14] It has been said that the defense of alibi is inherently weak since it is
very easy to concoct. In order that this defense may prosper, it must be established clearly and
convincingly not only that the accused is elsewhere at the time of the commission of the crime, but
that likewise it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the vicinity thereof. [15] In the
instant case, appellant Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear and convincing proof, that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the victims' house at the time the crime was committed,
apart from his self-serving declaration that he was at RM Motors Works in Paraaque on the fateful
night of September 23, 1987, seconded by the discredited testimony of his alleged employer,
Rafael Diaz.
With marked relevance is the fact that there appears to be no motive on the part of Violeta
Parnala to falsely accuse appellant, other than her sincere desire to seek justice for the deaths of
her son and maid. Appellant himself admitted that he was not aware of any reason or motive why
Violeta should testify falsely against him.[16] Positive identification by an independent witness who
has not been shown to have any reason or motive to testify falsely must prevail over simple
denials and the unacceptable alibi of the accused.[17]
Appellant insists that, as proof of his innocence, he did not escape nor evade arrest after the
commission of the crime imputed against him. He contends that he stayed in his place of
employment in Paraaque, Metro Manila, from 1986 to 1989, regularly performing his job, when he
was apprehended on the strength of a warrant of arrest.
This is contrary to the finding of the court a quo which held that:
"Accused Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar also stayed at large until his arrest on October 27,
1989 after more than two years of hiding to evade the scales of justice.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x [A]ccused chose to flee from the scene of the crime and to stay beyond the clutches of the
law x x x, thus spotlighting the legal maxim 'the guilty fleeth while the innocent stands fast, bold as
a lion."'[18] The evidence on record does not warrant reversal of this finding by the trial court. It is
this Court's bounden duty to refrain from reviewing findings of fact by the lower court, considering
that it has all the opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and to determine by their demeanor
on the stand the probative value of their testimonies.[19]
In any case, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that appellant's claim of non-flight is true, there is
no law or principle which guarantees that non-flight per se is proof, let alone conclusive proof, of
one's innocence and, as in the case of alibi, such a defense is unavailing when placed astride the
undisputed fact that there is positive identification of the felon.[20]
Finally, appellant claims that the evidence against him is purely circumstantial which is
insufficient to sustain his conviction. He submits that there is no solitary piece of evidence directly
linking him to the commission of the crime imputed against him, hence he should be acquitted.
This argument is specious. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which indirectly proves a
fact in issue.[21] In this jurisdiction, direct evidence is not only the basis upon which the guilt of an
accused may be proved; it may also be established through circumstantial evidence. [22] Under the
Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence will support and justify a conviction if the
following requisites concur:
(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.[23]
In the case at bench, the circumstances pointing to accused-appellant's guilt are as follows:
(1) He was not an inmate of private complainant's house and so, his presence therein at
a late hour in the evening indicate his and his companions' evil designs.
(2) He and his cohorts were seen coming out of the victims' house immediately after the
crime of robbery with homicide was perpetrated.
(3) After coming out, the culprits immediately fled.
(4) He and Sapon went into hiding for more than two (2) years. Bracamonte was
arrested on October 27, 1989.
The above circumstances, highlighted by the testimony of Violeta Parnala which was
straightforward and clear as to the identity of the appellant as one of the malefactors, clearly point
to appellant Bracamonte's guilt. Thus was overcome, by proof beyond reasonable doubt, the
presumption of innocence in appellant's favor.
In contrast, appellant merely relies on denial and alibi, weak defenses, to support his claim of
innocence, which defenses were overthrown by the prosecution.
The Court notes that appellant, together with his two (2) other co-accused, were charged and
convicted of robbery with double homicide. The charge and the corresponding conviction should
have been for robbery with homicide only although two persons were killed.[24] In this complex
crime, the penalty prescribed in Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not affected by the
number of killings accompanying the robbery.[25] The multiplicity of the victims slain, though, is
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.[26]
Although Republic Act No. 7659 reimposed the death penalty for certain heinous crimes,
including robbery with homicide,[27] the capital punishment could not be imposed in the case at
bench.The crime here was committed way back in September 23, 1987, while R.A. No. 7659 took
effect only on December 31, 1993.[28] To impose upon appellant the death penalty would violate
the basic rule in criminal law that, if the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the
time of the commission of the offense shall be applied,[29] which in this case is Article 294 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code sans the death penalty clause by virtue of Section 19 (1), Article III of the
1987 Constitution which provides, viz:
"x x x Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua."
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that
the conviction is for robbery with homicide, and the indemnity for the heirs of the two victims is
hereby increased from P30,000 to P50,000[30] each.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,
vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-
appellee.
Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.
ANTONIO, J.:p
Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in
Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and
one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in
issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v.
Mapa.1
The complaint filed against the accused reads:
That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the
poblacion, Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
person not authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22,
RG8 German Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells
without first securing the necessary permit or license to possess the same.
At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which
trial was accordingly held.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however,
claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an
appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as
Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly
carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.
Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His
appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:
Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you
will be an effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of
peace and order in the province of Batangas, especially with respect to the
suppression of trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle
rustling, robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby
appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to take effect
immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for the position. As such Secret
Agent, your duties shall be those generally of a peace officer and particularly to
help in the preservation of peace and order in this province and to make reports
thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be clearly understood that any
abuse of authority on your part shall be considered sufficient ground for the
automatic cancellation of your appointment and immediate separation from the
service. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-
12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm,
particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of your
duties.
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties
by taking your oath of office and filing the original thereof with us.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO LEVISTE
Provincial Governor
FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:
Kind: — ROHM-Revolver
Make: — German
SN: — 64
Cal:— .22
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of
Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities,
wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace
and order condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily
authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in
the performance of his duties.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments
as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the
prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People
vs. Macarandang2 and People vs. Lucero.3 The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the
evidence of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by
the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with
authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the
accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a
firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases
of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court
considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent.
Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero,
supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of
conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he was found to possess a
certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had an appointment from the
Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the
detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore
held that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit,
nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and
Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and
detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero,
We held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm
to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander
to effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine
in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on
the following ground:
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be
unlawful for any person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or
ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used
in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section
provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers,
soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of
such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official
duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such
he is not exempt. ... .
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in
1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the
matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958).
Our decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole
question in this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings
in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of
the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he
accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the
laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The
interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that
law originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine
laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land,
at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by
the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a
doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted
on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws,
where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of
society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent
and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine
enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his
possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must
be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done
was held not to be punishable.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with
costs de oficio.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac,
Branch I), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy
Reyes alias "Taba," respondents.
Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.
CASTRO, J.:p
I. Statement of the Case
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion
Act,1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive associations,"
and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with,
becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive" organization.
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was
filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10
Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case
against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The twice-
amended information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking
leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal
organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of
force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of
establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government
under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the
Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New People's
Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines.
That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating
circumstances are present, to wit:
(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public
authorities;
(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford impunity.
(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, sharing
the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary investigation was
had, an information was filed, which, as amended, reads:
The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly
designated by the Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of
Tarlac, pursuant to the Order dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby accuse
Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias TABA, ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO
(REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE
alias COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN DOES, whose identities are
still unknown, for violation of REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as the
Anti-Subversion Law, committed as follows:
That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter, in the
Province of Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and elsewhere
in the Philippines, the above-named accused knowingly, willfully and by overt
acts organized, joined and/or remained as offices and/or ranking leaders, of the
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined in Republic
Act No. 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER MELODY, in addition
thereto, knowingly, willfully and by over acts joined and/or remained as a
member and became an officer and/or ranking leader not only of the Communist
Party of the Philippines but also of the New People's Army, the military arm of the
Communist Party of the Philippines; and that all the above-named accused, as
such officers and/or ranking leaders of the aforestated subversive organizations,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
knowingly, willfully and feloniously commit subversive and/or seditious acts, by
inciting, instigating and stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and
tumultuously and take up arms against the government, and/or engage in
rebellious conspiracies and riots to overthrow the government of the Republic of
the Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means
among which are the following:
 1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused conducted
meetings and/or seminars wherein the said accused delivered speeches
instigating and inciting the people to unite, rise in arms and overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, by force, violence, deceit,
subversion and/or other illegal means; and toward this end, the said accused
organized, among others a chapter of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio
Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed purpose of undertaking or promoting an
armed revolution, subversive and/or seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/or
riots and/or other illegal means to discredit and overthrow the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and to established in the Philippines a Communist
regime.
2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA, together with
FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and others, pursued the above
subversive and/or seditious activities in San Pablo City by recruiting members for
the New People's Army, and/or by instigating and inciting the people to organize
and unite for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines through armed revolution, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal
means, and establishing in the Philippines a Communist Government.
That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
offense: (a) aid of armed men or persons to insure or afford impunity; and (b)
craft, fraud, or disguise was employed.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that
(1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in
the title thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September 15, 1970,
declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and
overboard, and dismissed the informations against the two accused. The Government appealed.
We resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex port facto law shall
be enacted."2 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. 3 Its
essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. 4 The constitutional
ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers 5 by
confining legislatures to
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.7 History in
perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political
minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out
of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatizea
statute as a bill of attainder. 9
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of attainder
because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to
the freedom and security of the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the
security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the
powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP
without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the
only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member,
the law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly created a presumption of organizational
guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the
Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it
does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the
outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for definitional
purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to
"any other organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on
individuals but on conduct. 10
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S. vs. Brown, 12 was held to be a bill of
attainder and therefore unconstitutional. Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows:
(a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist
Party ... shall serve —
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar
governing body, business agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other
than as an employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any
labor organization.
during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist
Party....
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and penalties on its members.
Membership in the Party, without more, ipso facto disqualifies a person from becoming an officer
or a member of the governing body of any labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the United
States pointed out:
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress
undoubtedly possesses power under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation
designed to keep from positions affecting interstate commerce persons who may
use of such positions to bring about political strikes. In section 504, however,
 Congress has exceeded the authority granted it by the Constitution. The statute
does not set forth a generally applicable rule decreeing that any person who
commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and
characteristics which, in Congress' view, make them likely to initiate political
strikes) shall not hold union office, and leaves to courts and juries the job of
deciding what persons have committed the specified acts or possessed the
specified characteristics. Instead, it designates in no uncertain terms the persons
who possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold union office
without incurring criminal liability — members of the Communist Party.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d
625, 81 S CT 1357, lend a support to our conclusion. That case involved an
appeal from an order by the Control Board ordering the Communist Party to
register as a "Communist-action organization," under the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 781 et seq. (1958 ed). The
definition of "Communist-action organization" which the Board is to apply is set
forth in sec. 3 of the Act:
[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is substantially directed,
dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization
controlling the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title,
and(ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such world Communist
movement... 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec. 782 (1958 ed.)
A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of attainder,
reasoning that sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups upon which the
deprivations setforth in the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth a
general definition. Although the Board has determined in 1953 that the
Communist Party was a "Communist-action organization," the Court found the
statutory definition not to be so narrow as to insure that the Party would always
come within it:
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of Appeals has sustained
its conclusion, that the Communist Party, by virtud of the activities in which it now
engages, comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party should at anytime
choose to abandon these activities, after it is once registered pursuant to sec. 7,
the Act provides adequate means of relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge
Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment.
But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has
yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and
that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its
basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and other illegal means
and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the
requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the
nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who
participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute were
construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful
goals of the Party. 13 But the statute specifically required that membership must be knowing or
active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4
means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired
"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." 14 The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful
goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." 15 This constitutes an element of "membership"
distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in
the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the
organization's illegal objectives.
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not
enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities
underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a
legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit acts
deemed inimical to the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of
attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of
at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such society
which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it
was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan. 17
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act, 18 requiring labor unions
to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they are not
members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization which
teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method,"
was upheld by this Court. 19
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it
become a bill of attainder. 20 It is upon this ground that statutes which disqualified those who had
taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the United States during the Civil War from
holding office, 21 or from exercising their profession, 22 or which prohibited the payment of further
compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that they had engages in
subversive activities, 23 or which made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as
an officer or employee of a labor union, 24 have been invalidated as bills of attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to
be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not
needed fairly to make such determination. 25
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York legislature passed a law requiring
every secret, oath-bound society with a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing
any person who joined or remained a member of such a society failing to register. While the
statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the law applied to the KKK exclusively. In
sustaining the statute against the claim that it discriminated against the Ku Klux Klan while
exempting other secret, oath-bound organizations like masonic societies and the Knights of
Columbus, the United States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the nature and
activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:
The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited and
reached the conclusion that the classification was justified by a difference
between the two classes of associations shown by experience, and that the
difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency on the part of one class to make
the secrecy surrounding its purpose and membership a cloak for acts and
conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare, and (b) in the absence of
such a tendency on the part of the other class. In pointing out this difference one
of the courts said of the Ku Klux Klan, the principal association in the included
class: "It is a matter of common knowledge that this organization functions largely
at night, its members disguised by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated
to strike terror into the minds of the people;" and later said of the other class:
"These organizations and their purposes are well known, many of them having
been in existence for many years. Many of them are oath-bound and secret. But
we hear no complaint against them regarding violation of the peace or interfering
with the rights of others." Another of the courts said: "It is a matter of common
knowledge that the association or organization of which the relator is concededly
a member exercises activities tending to the prejudice and intimidation of sundry
classes of our citizens. But the legislation is not confined to this society;" and
later said of the other class: "Labor unions have a recognized lawful purpose.
The benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law have already
received legislative scrutiny and have been granted special privileges so that the
legislature may well consider them beneficial rather than harmful agencies." The
third court, after recognizing "the potentialities of evil in secret societies," and
observing that "the danger of certain organizations has been judicially
demonstrated," — meaning in that state, — said: "Benevolent orders, labor
unions and college fraternities have existed for many years, and, while not
immune from hostile criticism, have on the whole justified their existence."
We assume that the legislature had before it such information as was readily
available including the published report of a hearing, before a committee of the
House of Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to the formation,
purposes and activities of the Klu Klux Klan. If so it was advised — putting aside
controverted evidence — that the order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an
earlier time with additional features borrowed from the Know Nothing and the A.
P. A. orders of other periods; that its memberships was limited to native-born,
gentile, protestant whites; that in part of its constitution and printed creed it
proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full adherence to the Constitution of the
United States; in another exacted of its member an oath to shield and preserve
"white supremacy;" and in still another declared any person actively opposing its
principles to be "a dangerous ingredient in the body politic of our country and an
enemy to the weal of our national commonwealth;" that it was conducting a
crusade against Catholics, Jews, and Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious
and race prejudices; that it was striving for political power and assuming a sort of
guardianship over the administration of local, state and national affairs; and that
at times it was taking into its own hands the punishment of what some of its
members conceived to be crimes. 27
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of continuing scrutiny
by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an illegal
association. 28 In 1969 we again found that the objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the
Philippine Government by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of
government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China." 29 More recently, in Lansang vs.
Garcia, 30 we noted the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of
Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the
emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the evidence, we said: "We
entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly
risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion
against the Government of the Philippines.
3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the
ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively
and reach past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a
legislative adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was
... doubly objectionable because of its ex post facto features. This is the historic explanation for
uniting the two mischiefs in one
clause — 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' ... Therefore, if [a statute] is a
bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that
establish that it is not are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 31
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
Charter of the City of Los Angeles which provided:
... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or
employment in the service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or department
thereof, either elective or appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to the
effective date of this section advised, advocated, or taught, or who may, after this
section becomes effective, become a member of or affiliated with any group,
society, association, organization or party which advises, advocates or teaches
or has within said period of five (5) years advised, advocated, or taught the
overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States of
America or of the State of California.
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to the petitioner
therein, thus:
... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision
insofar as it purported to apply restrospectively for a five-year period to its
effective date. We assume that under the Federal Constitution the Charter
Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from the city's public service
persons who, subsequently to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or reach
the violent overthrow of the Government or who are or become affiliated with any
 group doing so. The provisions operating thus prospectively were a reasonable
regulation to protect the municipal service by establishing an employment
qualification of loyalty to the State and the United States.
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which petitioners
were removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not declare general and
prospectively operative standards of qualification and eligibility for public
employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited any further payment of
compensationto named individuals or employees. Under these circumstances,
viewed against the legislative background, the statutewas held to have imposed
penalties without judicial trial.
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby assumed judicial
magistracy, them it mustbe demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainderreaches
past conduct and that the penalties it imposesare inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court
observedwith respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities ControlAct of 1950:
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainderby the fact that the
conduct which it regulates is describedwith such particularity that, in probability,
few organizationswill come within the statutory terms. Legislatures may act
tocurb behaviour which they regard as harmful to the public welfare,whether that
conduct is found to be engaged in by manypersons or by one. So long as the
incidence of legislation issuch that the persons who engage in the regulated
conduct, bethey many or few, can escape regulation merely by altering thecourse
of their own present activities, there can be no complaintof an attainder. 33
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof
expressly statesthat the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed"After the approval of
this Act." Only those who "knowingly,willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or
remain members of the Communist Party of thePhilippines and/or its successors or of any
subversive association"after June 20, 1957, are punished. Those whowere members of the Party
or of any other subversive associationat the time of the enactment of the law, weregiven the
opportunity of purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and under oath their
membershipin the Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciationshall operate to
exempt such persons from penalliability. 34 The penalties prescribed by the Act are thereforenot
inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the Communist Party of
the Philippinesis an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of theGovernment is inteded not to
provide the basis for a legislativefinding of guilt of the members of the Party butrather to justify the
proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression and freedom of association are
sofundamental that they are thought by some to occupy a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of
constitutional values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise mustbe justified by the
existence of a substantive evil. This isthe reason why before enacting the statute in question
Congressconducted careful investigations and then stated itsfindings in the preamble, thus:
... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines althoughpurportedly a political party,
is in fact an organized conspiracyto overthrow the Government of the Republic of
the Philippinesnot only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversionand
other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian
regime subject to alien dominationand control;
... [T]he continued existence and activities of the CommunistParty of the
Philippines constitutes a clear, present andgrave danger to the security of the
Philippines;
... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and persistentsubversion, national
in scope but international in direction,posed by the Communist Party of the
Philippines and its activities,there is urgent need for special legislation to cope
withthis continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country.
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if, instead of making these
findings in enactingthe statute, Congress omitted to do so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial magistracy, the trial courd failed
to takeproper account of the distinction between legislative fact and adjudicative fact. Professor
Paul Freund elucidatesthe crucial distinction, thus:
... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore than 3.2 per cent of
alcohol would raise a question of legislativefact, i.e., whether this standard has a
reasonable relationto public health, morals, and the enforcement problem. Alaw
forbidding the sale of intoxicating beverages (assuming itis not so vague as to
require supplementation by rule-making)would raise a question of adjudicative
fact, i.e., whether thisor that beverage is intoxicating within the meaning of the
statuteand the limits on governmental action imposed by the Constitution. Of
course what we mean by fact in each case is itselfan ultimate conclusion founded
on underlying facts and oncriteria of judgment for weighing them.
A conventional formulation is that legislative facts — those facts which are
relevant to the legislative judgment — will not be canvassed save to determine
whether there is a rationalbasis for believing that they exist, while
adjudicativefacts — those which tie the legislative enactment to the litigant — are
to be demonstrated and found according to the ordinarystandards prevailing for
judicial trials. 36
The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted by this Court in Lansang vs.
Garcia, 38 is that 'if laws are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose,
and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and
judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio." The recital of legislative
findings implements this test.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities
Control Actof 1950 (that "Communist-action organizations" are controlledby the foreign
government controlling the worldCommunist movement and that they operate primarily to"advance
the objectives of such world Communist movement"),the U.S. Supreme Court said:
It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of theselegislative findings and
reject them....They are the productof extensive investigation by Committes of
Congress over morethan a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S.502, 516, 530. We certainly cannot dismiss them as unfoundedirrational
imaginings. ... And if we accept them, as we mustas a not unentertainable
appraisal by Congress of the threatwhich Communist organizations pose not only
to existing governmentin the United States, but to the United States as
asovereign, independent Nation. ...we must recognize that thepower of Congress
to regulate Communist organizations of thisnature is
extensive. 39
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative findings articulated in the Anti-
Subversion Act.
That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a proposition too plain to
require elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and
transcendes every other value, "forif a society cannot protect its very structure from armedinternal
attack, ...no subordinate value can be protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said in Dennis
vs. United States: 41
Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argumentthat there is a 'right' to
rebellion against dictatorial governmentsis without force where the existing
structure of government provides for peaceful and orderly change. We rejectany
principle of governmental helplessness in the face of preparationfor revolution,
which principle, carried to its logical conclusion,must lead to anarchy. No one
could conceive that it isnot within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended
tooverthrow the government by force and violence.
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly described in sectin 4
thereof), Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule that "even throughthe governmental purpose
be legitimate and substantial,that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stiflefundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." 42 The
requirement of knowing membership,as distinguished from nominal membership, hasbeen held as
a sufficient basis for penalizing membershipin a subversive organization. 43 For, as has been
stated:
Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the
organization; and when membership is acceptedor retained with knowledge that
the organization is engaged inan unlawful purpose, the one accepting or
retaining membershipwith such knowledge makes himself a party to the
unlawfulenterprise in which it is engaged. 44
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because section 2 merely speaks of
"overthrow"of the Government and overthrow may be achieved by peaceful means, misconceives
the function of the phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely a
legislative declaration; the definitionsof and the penalties prescribed for the different acts
prescribedare stated in section 4 which requires that membershipin the Communist Party of the
Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the
first "whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow contemplated is "overthrow not only by
forceand violence but also be deceit, subversion and other illegalmeans." The absence of this
qualificatio in section 2 appearsto be due more to an oversight rather than to deliberateomission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent and other illegal means.
Only in a metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful overthrow ofgovernments, and certainly
the law does not speak in metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use ofthe word
"overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is hardlyconsistent with the clearly delineated objective of the
"overthrow,"namely, "establishing in the Philippines a totalitarianregime and place [sic] the
Government under thecontrol and domination of an alien power." What thisCourt once said in a
prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The language used by the appellant clearly imported
anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and it should beinterpreted in the plain and obvious
sense in which it wasevidently intended to be understood. The word 'overthrow'could not have
been intended as referring to an ordinarychange by the exercise of the elective franchise. The
useof the whip [which the accused exhorted his audience to useagainst the Constabulary], an
instrument designed toleave marks on the sides of adversaries, is inconsistentwith the mild
interpretation which the appellant wouldhave us impute to the language." 45
IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by
force, violence orother illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom of speechand freedom of
association is infringed by the prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the Communist Party
ofthe Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily outweighed by the
overriding considerationsof national security and the preservartion of democraticinstitutions in his
country.
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar in many respects to the
membership provision ofthe Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize anysociety, group, or
assembly of persons who teach, advocate, orencourage the overthrow or
destruction of any such governmentby force or violence; or becomes or is a
member of, or affiliatedwith, any such society, group or assembly of persons,
knowingthe purpose thereof —
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned notmore than twenty years,
or both, and shall be ineligible for emplymentby the United States or any
department or agencythereof, for the five years next following his conviction.... 46
In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs. United States: 47
 It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we arehere concerned is not
constitutionally protected speech, and itwas further established that a
combination to promote suchadvocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports to
be a politicalparty, is not such association as is protected by the firstAmendment.
We can discern no reason why membership, whenit constitutes a purposeful
form of complicity in a group engagingin this same forbidden advocacy, should
receive anygreater degree of protection from the guarantees of that Amendment.
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof accommodating the exigencies of
self-preservationand the values of liberty are as complex and intricate as inthe situation described
in the legislative findings stated inthe U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,the
legislative judgment as to how that threat may best bemet consistently with the safeguards of
personal freedomsis not to be set aside merely because the judgment of judgeswould, in the first
instance, have chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation, "whether it restrains freedom
tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort at compromisebetween the claims of the social order
and individual freedom,and when the legislative compromise in either case isbrought to the judicial
test the court stands one step removedfrom the conflict and its resolution through law." 49
V. The Act and its Title
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 50
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is the last proviso of section
4 which reads:
And provided, finally, That one who conspires with anyother person to overthrow
the Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines, or the government of any of its
political subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal means,for the
purpose of placing such Government or political subdivisionunder the control and
domination of any lien power, shallbe punished by prision correccional to prision
mayor with allthe accessory penalties provided therefor in the same code.
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly membership in the Communist Party
of the Philippinesor similar associations, but as well "any conspiracyby two persons to overthrow
the national or any local governmentby illegal means, even if their intent is not to establisha
totalitarian regime, burt a democratic regime, evenif their purpose is not to place the nation under
an aliencommunist power, but under an alien democratic power likethe United States or England
or Malaysia or even an anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan, Thailand or Taiwanor Indonesia."
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party of the Philippines and
SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and forOther Purposes"), has a short title.
Section 1 providesthat "This Act shall be known as the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the statuteunequivocally
indicates that the subject matter is subversionin general which has for its fundamental purpose the
substitutionof a foreign totalitarian regime in place of theexisting Government and not merely
subversion by Communistconspiracies..
The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents, and need not recite the details
of the Act. 51 It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear termsthe nature, scope, and
consequences of the proposed lawand its operation. 52 A narrow or technical construction isto be
avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonablyin order not to thwart the legislative
intent. We holdthat the Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.
VI. Conclusion and Guidelines
In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act, we cannot overemphasize
the needfor prudence and circumspection in its enforcement, operatingas it does in the sensitive
area of freedom of expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines to be
observed in any prosecution under the Act.The Government, in addition to proving such
circumstancesas may affect liability, must establish the following elementsof the crime of joining
the Communist Party of the Philippinesor any other subversive association:
(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist Party of the Philippines, (a)
that thepurpose of the organization is to overthrow the presentGovernment of the Philippines and
to establish in thiscountry a totalitarian regime under the domination of aforeign power; (b) that the
accused joined such organization;and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and byovert acts; and
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that the CPP continues to pursue the
objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organizedconspiracy for the overthrow
of the Government by illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country under thecontrol of a
foreign power; (b) that the accused joined theCPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and
byovert acts.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or remaining a member of the
Communist Party ofthe Philippines or of any other subversive association: weleave this matter to
future determination.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set aside, and these two
cases are herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits. Costs de oficio.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.
Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11390 March 26, 1918
EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca
Tanquinyeng, defendant-appellant.
Aitken and DeSelms for appellant.
Hartigan and Welch for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted upon March 31, 1908, by "El Banco Espanol-Filipino" to foreclose a
mortgage upon various parcels of real property situated in the city of Manila. The mortgage in
question is dated June 16, 1906, and was executed by the original defendant herein, Engracio
Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, as security for a debt owing by him to the bank. Upon March
31, 1906, the debt amounted to P218,294.10 and was drawing interest at the rate of 8 per centum
per annum, payable at the end of each quarter. It appears that the parties to this mortgage at that
time estimated the value of the property in question at P292,558, which was about P75,000 in
excess of the indebtedness. After the execution of this instrument by the mortgagor, he returned to
China which appears to have been his native country; and he there died, upon January 29, 1810,
without again returning to the Philippine Islands.
As the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the institution of the present action, it was
necessary for the plaintiff in the foreclosure proceeding to give notice to the defendant by
publication pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An order for publication was
accordingly obtained from the court, and publication was made in due form in a newspaper of the
city of Manila. At the same time that the order of the court should deposit in the post office in a
stamped envelope a copy of the summons and complaint directed to the defendant at his last
place of residence, to wit, the city of Amoy, in the Empire of China. This order was made pursuant
to the following provision contained in section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
In case of publication, where the residence of a nonresident or absent defendant is
known, the judge must direct a copy of the summons and complaint to be forthwith
deposited by the clerk in the post-office, postage prepaid, directed to the person to be
served, at his place of residence
Whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively appear. There is, however,
among the papers pertaining to this case, an affidavit, dated April 4, 1908, signed by Bernardo
Chan y Garcia, an employee of the attorneys of the bank, showing that upon that date he had
deposited in the Manila post-office a registered letter, addressed to Engracio Palanca
Tanquinyeng, at Manila, containing copies of the complaint, the plaintiff's affidavit, the summons,
and the order of the court directing publication as aforesaid. It appears from the postmaster's
receipt that Bernardo probably used an envelope obtained from the clerk's office, as the receipt
purports to show that the letter emanated from the office.
The cause proceeded in usual course in the Court of First Instance; and the defendant not having
appeared, judgment was, upon July 2, 1908, taken against him by default. Upon July 3, 1908, a
decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. In this decision it was recited that publication had
been properly made in a periodical, but nothing was said about this notice having been given mail.
The court, upon this occasion, found that the indebtedness of the defendant amounted to
P249,355. 32, with interest from March 31, 1908. Accordingly it was ordered that the defendant
should, on or before July 6, 1908, deliver said amount to the clerk of the court to be applied to the
satisfaction of the judgment, and it was declared that in case of the failure of the defendant to
satisfy the judgment within such period, the mortgage property located in the city of Manila should
be exposed to public sale. The payment contemplated in said order was never made; and upon
July 8, 1908, the court ordered the sale of the property. The sale took place upon July 30, 1908,
and the property was bought in by the bank for the sum of P110,200. Upon August 7, 1908, this
sale was confirmed by the court.
About seven years after the confirmation of this sale, or to the precise, upon June 25, 1915, a
motion was made in this cause by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original
defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, wherein the applicant requested the
court to set aside the order of default of July 2, 1908, and the judgment rendered upon July 3,
1908, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application, as set
forth in the motion itself, was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were
void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of
the action.
At the hearing in the court below the application to vacate the judgment was denied, and from this
action of the court Vicente Planca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, has
appealed. No other feature of the case is here under consideration than such as related to the
action of the court upon said motion.
The case presents several questions of importance, which will be discussed in what appears to be
the sequence of most convenient development. In the first part of this opinion we shall, for the
purpose of argument, assume that the clerk of the Court of First Instance did not obey the order of
the court in the matter of mailing the papers which he was directed to send to the defendant in
Amoy; and in this connection we shall consider, first, whether the court acquired the necessary
jurisdiction to enable it to proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgage and, secondly, whether
those proceedings were conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law.
The word "jurisdiction," as applied to the faculty of exercising judicial power, is used in several
different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to
entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the
power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in
general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may
entertain and the relief it may grant.
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his
submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over
the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure
of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it
may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the
power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the
property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual
custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment
proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent
stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we
term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under
our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over
the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a
jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all
the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding
quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in
rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its
narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein
the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings
are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the
former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their
sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment,
foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered
in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
In speaking of the proceeding to foreclose a mortgage the author of a well known treaties, has
said:
Though nominally against person, such suits are to vindicate liens; they proceed upon
seizure; they treat property as primarily indebted; and, with the qualification above-
mentioned, they are substantially property actions. In the civil law, they are styled
hypothecary actions, and their sole object is the enforcement of the lien against the res; in
the common law, they would be different in chancery did not treat the conditional
conveyance as a mere hypothecation, and the creditor's right ass an equitable lien; so, in
both, the suit is real action so far as it is against property, and seeks the judicial
recognition of a property debt, and an order for the sale of the res. (Waples, Proceedings
In Rem. sec. 607.)
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made
appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This,
however, does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action
is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing
actions in rem.
There is an instructive analogy between the foreclosure proceeding and an action of attachment,
concerning which the Supreme Court of the United States has used the following language:
If the defendant appears, the cause becomes mainly a suit in personam, with the added
incident, that the property attached remains liable, under the control of the court, to
answer to any demand which may be established against the defendant by the final
judgment of the court. But, if there is no appearance of the defendant, and no service of
process on him, the case becomes, in its essential nature, a proceeding in rem, the only
effect of which is to subject the property attached to the payment of the defendant which
the court may find to be due to the plaintiff. (Cooper vs. Reynolds, 10 Wall., 308.)
In an ordinary attachment proceeding, if the defendant is not personally served, the preliminary
seizure is to, be considered necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court. In this case
the lien on the property is acquired by the seizure; and the purpose of the proceedings is to
subject the property to that lien. If a lien already exists, whether created by mortgage, contract, or
statute, the preliminary seizure is not necessary; and the court proceeds to enforce such lien in
the manner provided by law precisely as though the property had been seized upon attachment.
(Roller vs. Holly, 176 U. S., 398, 405; 44 L. ed., 520.) It results that the mere circumstance that in
an attachment the property may be seized at the inception of the proceedings, while in the
foreclosure suit it is not taken into legal custody until the time comes for the sale, does not
materially affect the fundamental principle involved in both cases, which is that the court is here
exercising a jurisdiction over the property in a proceeding directed essentially in rem.
Passing now to a consideration of the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in a mortgage
foreclosure, it is evident that the court derives its authority to entertain the action primarily from the
statutes organizing the court. The jurisdiction of the court, in this most general sense, over the
cause of action is obvious and requires no comment. Jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, if acquired at all in such an action, is obtained by the voluntary submission of the
defendant or by the personal service of process upon him within the territory where the process is
valid. If, however, the defendant is a nonresident and, remaining beyond the range of the personal
process of the court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the court never acquires jurisdiction over the
person at all. Here the property itself is in fact the sole thing which is impleaded and is the
responsible object which is the subject of the exercise of judicial power. It follows that the
jurisdiction of the court in such case is based exclusively on the power which, under the law, it
possesses over the property; and any discussion relative to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the defendant is entirely apart from the case. The jurisdiction of the court over the
property, considered as the exclusive object of such action, is evidently based upon the following
conditions and considerations, namely: (1) that the property is located within the district; (2) that
the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by the
mortgage; and (3) that the court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the property into
custody, if necessary, and expose it to sale for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt. An
obvious corollary is that no other relief can be granted in this proceeding than such as can be
enforced against the property.
We may then, from what has been stated, formulated the following proposition relative to the
foreclosure proceeding against the property of a nonresident mortgagor who fails to come in and
submit himself personally to the jurisdiction of the court: (I) That the jurisdiction of the court is
derived from the power which it possesses over the property; (II) that jurisdiction over the person
is not acquired and is nonessential; (III) that the relief granted by the court must be limited to such
as can be enforced against the property itself.
It is important that the bearing of these propositions be clearly apprehended, for there are many
expressions in the American reports from which it might be inferred that the court acquires
personal jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by publication and notice; but such is not the
case. In truth the proposition that jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident cannot be acquired
by publication and notice was never clearly understood even in the American courts until after the
decision had been rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States in the leading case of
Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S. 714; 24 L. ed., 565). In the light of that decision, and of other
decisions which have subsequently been rendered in that and other courts, the proposition that
jurisdiction over the person cannot be thus acquired by publication and notice is no longer open to
question; and it is now fully established that a personal judgment upon constructive or substituted
service against a nonresident who does not appear is wholly invalid. This doctrine applies to all
kinds of constructive or substituted process, including service by publication and personal service
outside of the jurisdiction in which the judgment is rendered; and the only exception seems to be
found in the case where the nonresident defendant has expressly or impliedly consented to the
mode of service. (Note to Raher vs. Raher, 35 L. R. A. [N. S. ], 292; see also 50 L .R. A., 585; 35
L. R. A. [N. S.], 312
The idea upon which the decision in Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) proceeds is that the process from
the tribunals of one State cannot run into other States or countries and that due process of law
requires that the defendant shall be brought under the power of the court by service of process
within the State, or by his voluntary appearance, in order to authorize the court to pass upon the
question of his personal liability. The doctrine established by the Supreme Court of the United
States on this point, being based upon the constitutional conception of due process of law, is
binding upon the courts of the Philippine Islands. Involved in this decision is the principle that in
proceedings in rem or quasi in rem against a nonresident who is not served personally within the
state, and who does not appear, the relief must be confined to the res, and the court cannot
lawfully render a personal judgment against him. (Dewey vs. Des Moines, 173 U. S., 193; 43 L.
ed., 665; Heidritter vs. Elizabeth Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S., 294; 28 L. ed., 729.) Therefore in an
action to foreclose a mortgage against a nonresident, upon whom service has been effected
exclusively by publication, no personal judgment for the deficiency can be entered. (Latta vs.
Tutton, 122 Cal., 279; Blumberg vs. Birch, 99 Cal., 416.)
It is suggested in the brief of the appellant that the judgment entered in the court below offends
against the principle just stated and that this judgment is void because the court in fact entered a
personal judgment against the absent debtor for the full amount of the indebtedness secured by
the mortgage. We do not so interpret the judgment.
In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident owner it is necessary for the court, as in all
cases of foreclosure, to ascertain the amount due, as prescribed in section 256 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and to make an order requiring the defendant to pay the money into court. This
step is a necessary precursor of the order of sale. In the present case the judgment which was
entered contains the following words:
Because it is declared that the said defendant Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y
Limquingco, is indebted in the amount of P249,355.32, plus the interest, to the 'Banco
Espanol-Filipino' . . . therefore said appellant is ordered to deliver the above amount etc.,
etc.
This is not the language of a personal judgment. Instead it is clearly intended merely as a
compliance with the requirement that the amount due shall be ascertained and that the evidence
of this it may be observed that according to the Code of Civil Procedure a personal judgment
against the debtor for the deficiency is not to be rendered until after the property has been sold
and the proceeds applied to the mortgage debt. (sec. 260).
The conclusion upon this phase of the case is that whatever may be the effect in other respects of
the failure of the clerk of the Court of First Instance to mail the proper papers to the defendant in
Amoy, China, such irregularity could in no wise impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court, for in
our opinion that jurisdiction rest upon a basis much more secure than would be supplied by any
form of notice that could be given to a resident of a foreign country.
Before leaving this branch of the case, we wish to observe that we are fully aware that many
reported cases can be cited in which it is assumed that the question of the sufficiency of
publication or notice in a case of this kind is a question affecting the jurisdiction of the court, and
the court is sometimes said to acquire jurisdiction by virtue of the publication. This phraseology
was undoubtedly originally adopted by the court because of the analogy between service by the
publication and personal service of process upon the defendant; and, as has already been
suggested, prior to the decision of Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) the difference between the legal
effects of the two forms of service was obscure. It is accordingly not surprising that the modes of
expression which had already been molded into legal tradition before that case was decided have
been brought down to the present day. But it is clear that the legal principle here involved is not
effected by the peculiar language in which the courts have expounded their ideas.
We now proceed to a discussion of the question whether the supposed irregularity in the
proceedings was of such gravity as to amount to a denial of that "due process of law" which was
secured by the Act of Congress in force in these Islands at the time this mortgage was foreclosed.
(Act of July 1, 1902, sec. 5.) In dealing with questions involving the application of the constitutional
provisions relating to due process of law the Supreme Court of the United States has refrained
from attempting to define with precision the meaning of that expression, the reason being that the
idea expressed therein is applicable under so many diverse conditions as to make any attempt ay
precise definition hazardous and unprofitable. As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may
be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following
conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to
hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person
of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant
must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful
hearing.
Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we
observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner,
prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as
essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in
addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. Though
commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a
means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of
judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect
it. In speaking of notice of this character a distinguish master of constitutional law has used the
following language:
. . . if the owners are named in the proceedings, and personal notice is provided for, it is
rather from tenderness to their interests, and in order to make sure that the opportunity for
a hearing shall not be lost to them, than from any necessity that the case shall assume
that form. (Cooley on Taxation [2d. ed.], 527, quoted in Leigh vs. Green, 193 U. S., 79,
80.)
It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the
absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may
never in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be
very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much
increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as
upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision
of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice
unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known.
In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is
not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which
may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the
possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain
conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its
condemnation and sale.
It is the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a nonresident, to take measures that in
some way he shall be represented when his property is called into requisition, and if he
fails to do this, and fails to get notice by the ordinary publications which have usually been
required in such cases, it is his misfortune, and he must abide the consequences. (6 R. C.
L., sec. 445 [p. 450]).
It has been well said by an American court:
If property of a nonresident cannot be reached by legal process upon the constructive
notice, then our statutes were passed in vain, and are mere empty legislative
declarations, without either force, or meaning; for if the person is not within the jurisdiction
of the court, no personal judgment can be rendered, and if the judgment cannot operate
upon the property, then no effective judgment at all can be rendered, so that the result
would be that the courts would be powerless to assist a citizen against a nonresident.
Such a result would be a deplorable one. (Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep.,
662, 667.)
It is, of course universally recognized that the statutory provisions relative to publication or other
form of notice against a nonresident owner should be complied with; and in respect to the
publication of notice in the newspaper it may be stated that strict compliance with the requirements
of the law has been held to be essential. In Guaranty Trust etc. Co. vs. Green Cove etc., Railroad
Co. (139 U. S., 137, 138), it was held that where newspaper publication was made for 19 weeks,
when the statute required 20, the publication was insufficient.
With respect to the provisions of our own statute, relative to the sending of notice by mail, the
requirement is that the judge shall direct that the notice be deposited in the mail by the clerk of the
court, and it is not in terms declared that the notice must be deposited in the mail. We consider
this to be of some significance; and it seems to us that, having due regard to the principles upon
which the giving of such notice is required, the absent owner of the mortgaged property must, so
far as the due process of law is concerned, take the risk incident to the possible failure of the clerk
to perform his duty, somewhat as he takes the risk that the mail clerk or the mail carrier might
possibly lose or destroy the parcel or envelope containing the notice before it should reach its
destination and be delivered to him. This idea seems to be strengthened by the consideration that
placing upon the clerk the duty of sending notice by mail, the performance of that act is put
effectually beyond the control of the plaintiff in the litigation. At any rate it is obvious that so much
of section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure as relates to the sending of notice by mail was
complied with when the court made the order. The question as to what may be the consequences
of the failure of the record to show the proof of compliance with that requirement will be discussed
by us further on.
The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to
mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial
of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the
judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of
notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was absolutely
necessary to sustain the proceedings.
It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference whether it
be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process of law. In the
matter of jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little. The court either
has jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be
considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape from the
conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the
application of the idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so
rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is
an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper,
it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in
applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon the purposes of
the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the exercise of
judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that the
provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law has not been infringed.
In the progress of this discussion we have stated the two conclusions; (1) that the failure of the
clerk to send the notice to the defendant by mail did not destroy the jurisdiction of the court and (2)
that such irregularity did not infringe the requirement of due process of law. As a consequence of
these conclusions the irregularity in question is in some measure shorn of its potency. It is still
necessary, however, to consider its effect considered as a simple irregularity of procedure; and it
would be idle to pretend that even in this aspect the irregularity is not grave enough. From this
point of view, however, it is obvious that any motion to vacate the judgment on the ground of the
irregularity in question must fail unless it shows that the defendant was prejudiced by that
irregularity. The least, therefore, that can be required of the proponent of such a motion is to show
that he had a good defense against the action to foreclose the mortgage. Nothing of the kind is,
however, shown either in the motion or in the affidavit which accompanies the motion.
An application to open or vacate a judgment because of an irregularity or defect in the
proceedings is usually required to be supported by an affidavit showing the grounds on which the
relief is sought, and in addition to this showing also a meritorious defense to the action. It is held
that a general statement that a party has a good defense to the action is insufficient. The
necessary facts must be averred. Of course if a judgment is void upon its face a showing of the
existence of a meritorious defense is not necessary. (10 R. C. L., 718.)
The lapse of time is also a circumstance deeply affecting this aspect of the case. In this
connection we quote the following passage from the encyclopedic treatise now in course of
publication:
Where, however, the judgment is not void on its face, and may therefore be enforced if
permitted to stand on the record, courts in many instances refuse to exercise their quasi
equitable powers to vacate a judgement after the lapse of the term ay which it was
entered, except in clear cases, to promote the ends of justice, and where it appears that
the party making the application is himself without fault and has acted in good faith and
with ordinary diligence. Laches on the part of the applicant, if unexplained, is deemed
sufficient ground for refusing the relief to which he might otherwise be entitled. Something
is due to the finality of judgments, and acquiescence or unnecessary delay is fatal to
motions of this character, since courts are always reluctant to interfere with judgments,
and especially where they have been executed or satisfied. The moving party has the
burden of showing diligence, and unless it is shown affirmatively the court will not
ordinarily exercise its discretion in his favor. (15 R. C. L., 694, 695.)
It is stated in the affidavit that the defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, died
January 29, 1910. The mortgage under which the property was sold was executed far back in
1906; and the proceedings in the foreclosure were closed by the order of court confirming the sale
dated August 7, 1908. It passes the rational bounds of human credulity to suppose that a man
who had placed a mortgage upon property worth nearly P300,000 and had then gone away from
the scene of his life activities to end his days in the city of Amoy, China, should have long
remained in ignorance of the fact that the mortgage had been foreclosed and the property sold,
even supposing that he had no knowledge of those proceedings while they were being conducted.
It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of things that he should have acquired information
as to what was transpiring in his affairs at Manila; and upon the basis of this rational assumption
we are authorized, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to presume that he did have, or soon
acquired, information as to the sale of his property.
The Code of Civil Procedure, indeed, expressly declares that there is a presumption that things
have happened according to the ordinary habits of life (sec. 334 [26]); and we cannot conceive of
a situation more appropriate than this for applying the presumption thus defined by the lawgiver. In
support of this presumption, as applied to the present case, it is permissible to consider the
probability that the defendant may have received actual notice of these proceedings from the
unofficial notice addressed to him in Manila which was mailed by an employee of the bank's
attorneys. Adopting almost the exact words used by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Grannis vs. Ordeans (234 U. S., 385; 58 L. ed., 1363), we may say that in view of the well-known
skill of postal officials and employees in making proper delivery of letters defectively addressed,
we think the presumption is clear and strong that this notice reached the defendant, there being no
proof that it was ever returned by the postal officials as undelivered. And if it was delivered in
Manila, instead of being forwarded to Amoy, China, there is a probability that the recipient was a
person sufficiently interested in his affairs to send it or communicate its contents to him.
Of course if the jurisdiction of the court or the sufficiency of the process of law depended upon the
mailing of the notice by the clerk, the reflections in which we are now indulging would be idle and
frivolous; but the considerations mentioned are introduced in order to show the propriety of
applying to this situation the legal presumption to which allusion has been made. Upon that
presumption, supported by the circumstances of this case, ,we do not hesitate to found the
conclusion that the defendant voluntarily abandoned all thought of saving his property from the
obligation which he had placed upon it; that knowledge of the proceedings should be imputed to
him; and that he acquiesced in the consequences of those proceedings after they had been
accomplished. Under these circumstances it is clear that the merit of this motion is, as we have
already stated, adversely affected in a high degree by the delay in asking for relief. Nor is it an
adequate reply to say that the proponent of this motion is an administrator who only qualified a few
months before this motion was made. No disability on the part of the defendant himself existed
from the time when the foreclosure was effected until his death; and we believe that the delay in
the appointment of the administrator and institution of this action is a circumstance which is
imputable to the parties in interest whoever they may have been. Of course if the minor heirs had
instituted an action in their own right to recover the property, it would have been different.
It is, however, argued that the defendant has suffered prejudice by reason of the fact that the bank
became the purchaser of the property at the foreclosure sale for a price greatly below that which
had been agreed upon in the mortgage as the upset price of the property. In this connection, it
appears that in article nine of the mortgage which was the subject of this foreclosure, as amended
by the notarial document of July 19, 1906, the parties to this mortgage made a stipulation to the
effect that the value therein placed upon the mortgaged properties should serve as a basis of sale
in case the debt should remain unpaid and the bank should proceed to a foreclosure. The upset
price stated in that stipulation for all the parcels involved in this foreclosure was P286,000. It is
said in behalf of the appellant that when the bank bought in the property for the sum of P110,200 it
violated that stipulation.
It has been held by this court that a clause in a mortgage providing for a tipo, or upset price, does
not prevent a foreclosure, nor affect the validity of a sale made in the foreclosure proceedings.
(Yangco vs. Cruz Herrera and Wy Piaco, 11 Phil. Rep., 402; Banco-Español Filipino vs.
Donaldson, Sim and Co., 5 Phil. Rep., 418.) In both the cases here cited the property was
purchased at the foreclosure sale, not by the creditor or mortgagee, but by a third party. Whether
the same rule should be applied in a case where the mortgagee himself becomes the purchaser
has apparently not been decided by this court in any reported decision, and this question need not
here be considered, since it is evident that if any liability was incurred by the bank by purchasing
for a price below that fixed in the stipulation, its liability was a personal liability derived from the
contract of mortgage; and as we have already demonstrated such a liability could not be the
subject of adjudication in an action where the court had no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. If the plaintiff bank became liable to account for the difference between the upset price
and the price at which in bought in the property, that liability remains unaffected by the disposition
which the court made of this case; and the fact that the bank may have violated such an obligation
can in no wise affect the validity of the judgment entered in the Court of First Instance.
In connection with the entire failure of the motion to show either a meritorious defense to the
action or that the defendant had suffered any prejudice of which the law can take notice, we may
be permitted to add that in our opinion a motion of this kind, which proposes to unsettle judicial
proceedings long ago closed, can not be considered with favor, unless based upon grounds which
appeal to the conscience of the court. Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld.
The maximum here applicable is non quieta movere. As was once said by Judge Brewer,
afterwards a member of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld, and that titles obtained in those
proceedings be safe from the ruthless hand of collateral attack. If technical defects are
adjudged potent to destroy such titles, a judicial sale will never realize that value of the
property, for no prudent man will risk his money in bidding for and buying that title which
he has reason to fear may years thereafter be swept away through some occult and not
readily discoverable defect. (Martin vs. Pond, 30 Fed., 15.)
In the case where that language was used an attempt was made to annul certain foreclosure
proceedings on the ground that the affidavit upon which the order of publication was based
erroneously stated that the State of Kansas, when he was in fact residing in another State. It was
held that this mistake did not affect the validity of the proceedings.
In the preceding discussion we have assumed that the clerk failed to send the notice by post as
required by the order of the court. We now proceed to consider whether this is a proper
assumption; and the proposition which we propose to establish is that there is a legal presumption
that the clerk performed his duty as the ministerial officer of the court, which presumption is not
overcome by any other facts appearing in the cause.
In subsection 14 of section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that there is a
presumption "that official duty has been regularly performed;" and in subsection 18 it is declared
that there is a presumption "that the ordinary course of business has been followed." These
presumptions are of course in no sense novelties, as they express ideas which have always been
recognized. Omnia presumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarium. There
is therefore clearly a legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty about mailing this notice;
and we think that strong considerations of policy require that this presumption should be allowed
to operate with full force under the circumstances of this case. A party to an action has no control
over the clerk of the court; and has no right to meddle unduly with the business of the clerk in the
performance of his duties. Having no control over this officer, the litigant must depend upon the
court to see that the duties imposed on the clerk are performed.
Other considerations no less potent contribute to strengthen the conclusion just stated. There is
no principle of law better settled than that after jurisdiction has once been required, every act of a
court of general jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied to
every judgment or decree rendered in the various stages of the proceedings from their initiation to
their completion (Voorhees vs. United States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449); and if the record
is silent with respect to any fact which must have been established before the court could have
rightly acted, it will be presumed that such fact was properly brought to its knowledge. (The
Lessee of Grignon vs. Astor, 2 How., 319; 11 L. ed., 283.)
In making the order of sale [of the real state of a decedent] the court are presumed to
have adjudged every question necessary to justify such order or decree, viz: The death of
the owners; that the petitioners were his administrators; that the personal estate was
insufficient to pay the debts of the deceased; that the private acts of Assembly, as to the
manner of sale, were within the constitutional power of the Legislature, and that all the
provisions of the law as to notices which are directory to the administrators have been
complied with. . . . The court is not bound to enter upon the record the evidence on which
any fact was decided. (Florentine vs. Barton, 2 Wall., 210; 17 L. ed., 785.) Especially
does all this apply after long lapse of time.
Applegate vs. Lexington and Carter County Mining Co. (117 U. S., 255) contains an instructive
discussion in a case analogous to that which is now before us. It there appeared that in order to
foreclose a mortgage in the State of Kentucky against a nonresident debtor it was necessary that
publication should be made in a newspaper for a specified period of time, also be posted at the
front door of the court house and be published on some Sunday, immediately after divine service,
in such church as the court should direct. In a certain action judgment had been entered against a
nonresident, after publication in pursuance of these provisions. Many years later the validity of the
proceedings was called in question in another action. It was proved from the files of an ancient
periodical that publication had been made in its columns as required by law; but no proof was
offered to show the publication of the order at the church, or the posting of it at the front door of
the court-house. It was insisted by one of the parties that the judgment of the court was void for
lack of jurisdiction. But the Supreme Court of the United States said:
The court which made the decree . . . was a court of general jurisdiction. Therefore every
presumption not inconsistent with the record is to be indulged in favor of its jurisdiction. . .
. It is to be presumed that the court before making its decree took care of to see that its
order for constructive service, on which its right to make the decree depended, had been
obeyed.
It is true that in this case the former judgment was the subject of collateral , or indirect attack, while
in the case at bar the motion to vacate the judgment is direct proceeding for relief against it. The
same general presumption, however, is indulged in favor of the judgment of a court of general
jurisdiction, whether it is the subject of direct or indirect attack the only difference being that in
case of indirect attack the judgment is conclusively presumed to be valid unless the record
affirmatively shows it to be void, while in case of direct attack the presumption in favor of its
validity may in certain cases be overcome by proof extrinsic to the record.
The presumption that the clerk performed his duty and that the court made its decree with the
knowledge that the requirements of law had been complied with appear to be amply sufficient to
support the conclusion that the notice was sent by the clerk as required by the order. It is true that
there ought to be found among the papers on file in this cause an affidavit, as required by section
400 of the Code of Civil Procedure, showing that the order was in fact so sent by the clerk; and no
such affidavit appears. The record is therefore silent where it ought to speak. But the very purpose
of the law in recognizing these presumptions is to enable the court to sustain a prior judgment in
the face of such an omission. If we were to hold that the judgment in this case is void because the
proper affidavit is not present in the file of papers which we call the record, the result would be that
in the future every title in the Islands resting upon a judgment like that now before us would
depend, for its continued security, upon the presence of such affidavit among the papers and
would be liable at any moment to be destroyed by the disappearance of that piece of paper. We
think that no court, with a proper regard for the security of judicial proceedings and for the
interests which have by law been confided to the courts, would incline to favor such a conclusion.
In our opinion the proper course in a case of this kind is to hold that the legal presumption that the
clerk performed his duty still maintains notwithstanding the absence from the record of the proper
proof of that fact.
In this connection it is important to bear in mind that under the practice prevailing in the Philippine
Islands the word "record" is used in a loose and broad sense, as indicating the collective mass of
papers which contain the history of all the successive steps taken in a case and which are finally
deposited in the archives of the clerk's office as a memorial of the litigation. It is a matter of
general information that no judgment roll, or book of final record, is commonly kept in our courts
for the purpose of recording the pleadings and principal proceedings in actions which have been
terminated; and in particular, no such record is kept in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila. There is, indeed, a section of the Code of Civil Procedure which directs that such a book
of final record shall be kept; but this provision has, as a matter of common knowledge, been
generally ignored. The result is that in the present case we do not have the assistance of the
recitals of such a record to enable us to pass upon the validity of this judgment and as already
stated the question must be determined by examining the papers contained in the entire file.
But it is insisted by counsel for this motion that the affidavit of Bernardo Chan y Garcia showing
that upon April 4, 1908, he sent a notification through the mail addressed to the defendant at
Manila, Philippine Islands, should be accepted as affirmative proof that the clerk of the court failed
in his duty and that, instead of himself sending the requisite notice through the mail, he relied upon
Bernardo to send it for him. We do not think that this is by any means a necessary inference. Of
course if it had affirmatively appeared that the clerk himself had attempted to comply with this
order and had directed the notification to Manila when he should have directed it to Amoy, this
would be conclusive that he had failed to comply with the exact terms of the order; but such is not
this case. That the clerk of the attorneys for the plaintiff erroneously sent a notification to the
defendant at a mistaken address affords in our opinion very slight basis for supposing that the
clerk may not have sent notice to the right address.
There is undoubtedly good authority to support the position that when the record states the
evidence or makes an averment with reference to a jurisdictional fact, it will not be presumed that
there was other or different evidence respecting the fact, or that the fact was otherwise than
stated. If, to give an illustration, it appears from the return of the officer that the summons was
served at a particular place or in a particular manner, it will not be presumed that service was also
made at another place or in a different manner; or if it appears that service was made upon a
person other than the defendant, it will not be presumed, in the silence of the record, that it was
made upon the defendant also (Galpin vs. Page, 18 Wall., 350, 366; Settlemier vs. Sullivan, 97 U.
S., 444, 449). While we believe that these propositions are entirely correct as applied to the case
where the person making the return is the officer who is by law required to make the return, we do
not think that it is properly applicable where, as in the present case, the affidavit was made by a
person who, so far as the provisions of law are concerned, was a mere intermeddler.
The last question of importance which we propose to consider is whether a motion in the cause is
admissible as a proceeding to obtain relief in such a case as this. If the motion prevails the
judgment of July 2, 1908, and all subsequent proceedings will be set aside, and the litigation will
be renewed, proceeding again from the date mentioned as if the progress of the action had not
been interrupted. The proponent of the motion does not ask the favor of being permitted to
interpose a defense. His purpose is merely to annul the effective judgment of the court, to the end
that the litigation may again resume its regular course.
There is only one section of the Code of Civil Procedure which expressly recognizes the authority
of a Court of First Instance to set aside a final judgment and permit a renewal of the litigation in
the same cause. This is as follows:
SEC. 113. Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or legal
representative from the judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him through
his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; Provided, That application
thereof be made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after such
judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.
An additional remedy by petition to the Supreme Court is supplied by section 513 of the same
Code. The first paragraph of this section, in so far as pertinent to this discussion, provides as
follows:
When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First Instance upon default, and a party
thereto is unjustly deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, and the Court of First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally
adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that court, the party so deprived of a
hearing may present his petition to the Supreme Court within sixty days after he first
learns of the rendition of such judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and
praying to have judgment set aside. . . .
It is evident that the proceeding contemplated in this section is intended to supplement the remedy
provided by section 113; and we believe the conclusion irresistible that there is no other means
recognized by law whereby a defeated party can, by a proceeding in the same cause, procure a
judgment to be set aside, with a view to the renewal of the litigation.
The Code of Civil Procedure purports to be a complete system of practice in civil causes, and it Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
contains provisions describing with much fullness the various steps to be taken in the conduct of
such proceedings. To this end it defines with precision the method of beginning, conducting, and
concluding the civil action of whatever species; and by section 795 of the same Code it is declared
that the procedure in all civil action shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code. We are
therefore of the opinion that the remedies prescribed in sections 113 and 513 are exclusive of all
others, so far as relates to the opening and continuation of a litigation which has been once
concluded.

The motion in the present case does not conform to the requirements of either of these provisions;
and the consequence is that in our opinion the action of the Court of First Instance in dismissing
the motion was proper.

If the question were admittedly one relating merely to an irregularity of procedure, we cannot
suppose that this proceeding would have taken the form of a motion in the cause, since it is clear
that, if based on such an error, the came to late for relief in the Court of First Instance. But as we
have already seen, the motion attacks the judgment of the court as void for want of jurisdiction
over the defendant. The idea underlying the motion therefore is that inasmuch as the judgment is
a nullity it can be attacked in any way and at any time. If the judgment were in fact void upon its
face, that is, if it were shown to be a nullity by virtue of its own recitals, there might possibly be
something in this. Where a judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it may be said to be a
lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head.

But the judgment in question is not void in any such sense. It is entirely regular in form, and the
alleged defect is one which is not apparent upon its face. It follows that even if the judgment could
be shown to be void for want of jurisdiction, or for lack of due process of law, the party aggrieved
thereby is bound to resort to some appropriate proceeding to obtain relief. Under accepted
principles of law and practice, long recognized in American courts, a proper remedy in such case,
after the time for appeal or review has passed, is for the aggrieved party to bring an action to
enjoin the judgment, if not already carried into effect; or if the property has already been disposed
of he may institute suit to recover it. In every situation of this character an appropriate remedy is at
hand; and if property has been taken without due process, the law concedes due process to
recover it. We accordingly old that, assuming the judgment to have been void as alleged by the
proponent of this motion, the proper remedy was by an original proceeding and not by motion in
the cause. As we have already seen our Code of Civil Procedure defines the conditions under
which relief against a judgment may be productive of conclusion for this court to recognize such a
proceeding as proper under conditions different from those defined by law. Upon the point of
procedure here involved, we refer to the case of People vs. Harrison (84 Cal., 607) wherein it was
held that a motion will not lie to vacate a judgment after the lapse of the time limited by statute if
the judgment is not void on its face; and in all cases, after the lapse of the time limited by statute if
the judgment is not void on its face; and all cases, after the lapse of such time, when an attempt is
made to vacate the judgment by a proceeding in court for that purpose an action regularly brought
is preferable, and should be required. It will be noted taken verbatim from the California Code
(sec. 473).

The conclusions stated in this opinion indicate that the judgment appealed from is without error,
and the same is accordingly affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131482. July 3, 2002]
REGALADO P. SAMARTINO, petitioner, vs. LEONOR B. RAON, AGUSTIN G. CRISOSTOMO,
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF NOVELETA, CAVITE, HON. MANUEL A. MAYO,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, CAVITE CITY, HON. ROLANDO D. DIAZ,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 17, CAVITE CITY, SHERIFF DANILO G. LAPUZ,
CAVITE CITY and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister and
spouse, respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May 17,
1994. Among the properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of land in
Noveleta, Cavite, registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 131898 in the name of co-
owners Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena Bernardo.
On January 25, 1996, respondents instituted against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a
complaint for ejectment, docketed as Civil Case No. 744 of the Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta,
Cavite.[1]They alleged that during the lifetime of Filomena Bernardo, she leased her share in the
property to petitioner for a period of five years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and
was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused to vacate the property despite demands
therefor.
Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner.[2] At the time of service of
summons at petitioners house, he was not at home as he was then confined at the National
Bureau of Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation Center (NBI-TRC), Tagaytay City since
January 19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug dependency.
Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court with a
certification that petitioner will be unable to comply with the directive to answer the complaint
within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six months for him to complete the
rehabilitation program and before he can be recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation
Committee.[3]
The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, granted respondents motion to
declare petitioner in default and ordered them to present evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996,
the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents as follows:
FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendant ordering the latter and other person/s claiming rights under
him:
1. To vacate immediately the land in question after the finality of the decision.
2. For the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 monthly from
January, 1992 up to the time he surrenders the premises considered as
damages for the use of the subject land.
3. For the defendant to pay the plaintiffs P 10,000.00 as and for attorneys fees with
an additional P800.00 as appearance fees.
4. To pay the plaintiffs P 100.00 as filing fee.
SO ORDERED.[4]
After learning of the adverse decision against him, petitioners counsel filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 16, a motion to set aside judgment. The motion was treated as
an appeal and docketed as Civil Case No. N-6281. On July 18, 1996, the RTC affirmed the
decision of the MTC.[5]
The aforesaid decision became final. Accordingly, the court of origin issued on September
17, 1996 a writ of execution.[6] Petitioner was given a grace period of one month within which to
vacate the premises. His real property situated in Noveleta, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-283572, was levied and sold at public auction to respondents in full satisfaction of
the monetary award.[7]
On November 25, 1996, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, a petition
for relief from judgment, docketed as Civil Case No. N-6393.[8] In support thereof, petitioner
submitted an affidavit of merit,[9] alleging in fine that the parcel of land from which he was being
evicted had been sold to him by Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 13, 1988.[10]
The following day, November 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the petition for
relief from judgment.[11] Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied on December 12, 1996.
A second Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied on January 14, 1997. [12] On the same
day, a writ of demolition was issued commanding the sheriff to remove the building and
improvements made by petitioner on the subject premises and to deliver the possession thereof to
respondents.[13]
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 432O2.[14] On August 29, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.[15] Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration was denied on November 14, 1997.[16] Hence this petition for review.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy
thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. If efforts to
serve the summons personally to defendant is impossible, service may be effected by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendants dwelling house or residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendants office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. Otherwise stated,
service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only when the
defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service be availed of.[17]
 Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by
handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.
We have long held that the impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted
service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service
failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated
in the proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld. It is
only under exceptional terms that the circumstances warranting substituted service of summons
may be proved by evidence aliunde. It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially
for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would
invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.[18]
In this connection, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 59 was issued on November
19, 1989 to stress the importance of strict compliance with the requisites for a valid substituted
service, to wit:
Delays in court proceedings have been caused by faulty and erroneous implementation of Section
8, Rule 14, Rules of Court on Substituted Service of Summons.
The Trial Judges of all lower courts, as well as the Clerks of Court in their capacity as Ex-Officio
Sheriffs together with the Deputy Sheriffs are reminded of the provision of Section 8, Rule 14,
Rules of Court on substituted service as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The manner of effecting substituted service as prescribed in Venturanza vs. Court of Appeals,
156 SCRA 305, must be strictly complied with, thus:
The substituted service should be availed only when the defendant cannot be served promptly in
person. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the
defendant personally and the failure of such efforts. The statement should be made in the proof of
service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of
service.
Substituted service is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as
prescribed in the circumstances authorized by statute. Thus, the statutory requirements of
substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and any substituted service other than
authorized by the statute is considered ineffective.
For immediate compliance.
In the case at bar, the sheriffs Return of Summons simply states:
This is to certify that on this date: 26th day of January I have caused the service of summons,
together with the attached complaint and its annexes issued in the above entitled case upon
defendant REGALADO SAMARTINO thru ROBERTO SAMARTINO, Brother of the defendant
acknowledge receipt of said court processes by affixing his signature at the lower left portion of
the original summons hereto attached.
WHEREFORE, the attached original summons is hereby respectfully returned to the court of origin
duly served for information and record purposes.
Noveleta, Cavite, February 9, 1996.[19]
Clearly, the above return failed to show the reason why personal service could not be made.
It failed to state that prompt and personal service on the defendant was rendered impossible. It
was not shown that efforts were made to find the defendant personally and that said efforts failed;
hence the resort to substituted service. As stated above, these requirements are indispensable
because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is an extraordinary
method since it seeks to bind the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of
such action is served not upon him but upon another whom law could only presume would notify
him of the pending proceedings. For this reason, failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with
the requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective.[20]
Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of this case is it shown that
petitioners brother, on whom substituted service of summons was effected, was a person of
suitable age and discretion residing at petitioners residence.
There being no valid substituted service of summons, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. It should be emphasized that the service of summons is
not only required to give the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also to afford
the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him. Thus, compliance with the
rules regarding the service of summons is as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction. The
essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of his defense. It is elementary that before a person can be
deprived of his property, he should first be informed of the claim against him and the theory on
which such claim is premised.[21]
By reason of the ineffective service of summons, petitioner was not duly apprised of the
action against him. Consequently, he was prevented from answering the claims against him. He
was not given a chance to be heard on his defenses. What made matters worse was that the trial
court had actual knowledge that petitioner was then indisposed and unable to file his answer to
the complaint, as he was then confined at the NBI-TRC. The trial courts failure to give petitioner a
reasonable opportunity to file his answer violated his right to due process. Perforce, the judgment
rendered against petitioner is nugatory and without effect.
The trial court should not have been too rash in declaring petitioner in default, considering it
had actual notice of valid reasons that prevented him from answering. Well-settled is the rule that
courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for default judgments are frowned upon,
unless in cases where it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay. The
issuance of orders of default should be the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in
clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court. [22]
Suits should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. In this
regard, we have often admonished courts to be liberal in setting aside orders of default as default
judgments are frowned upon and not looked upon with favor for they may amount to a positive and
considerable injustice to the defendant and the possibility of such serious consequences
necessitates a careful examination of the grounds upon which the defendant asks that it be set
aside. Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it is
well recognized that this Court is empowered to suspend its operation, or except a particular case
from its operation, when the rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the
ends of justice. We are not unmindful of the fact that during the pendency of the instant petition,
the trial court has rendered judgment against petitioners. However, being the court of last resort,
we deem it in the best interest that liberality and relaxation of the Rules be extended to petitioners
by setting aside the order of default issued by the trial court and the consequent default judgment;
otherwise, great injustice would result if petitioners are not afforded an opportunity to prove their
claims.[23]
In addition, the Regional Trial Court committed reversible error in dismissing the petition for
relief from judgment for having been filed out of time. According to the Regional Trial Court, the
petition for relief, filed on November 25, 1996, was late because petitioner had actual knowledge
of the judgment in the ejectment case since March 1996. The period within which to file a petition
for relief should have been reckoned from the date petitioner learned of the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court. It should not have been counted from the date of the Municipal Trial Courts
decision because, precisely, petitioner appealed the same. It was the Regional Trial Courts
decision that became final and, hence, was the proper subject of the petition for relief from
judgment. It is axiomatic that a petition for relief is only available against a final and executory
judgment.[24]
Section 3, Rule 38, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a verified petition for
relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or
other proceeding to be set aside and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final
order has been entered or such proceeding has been taken. It must be accompanied with
affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts
constituting petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense.[25]
It is not clear from the records of the case at bar when petitioner learned of the decision of
the Regional Trial Court affirming the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. What appears is that
the said decision became final only on August 15, 1996, and must have been entered sometime
thereafter. Hence, the petition for relief filed on November 25, 1996 was well within the six-month
period prescribed by the Rules.
Finally, the records show that petitioner raised a meritorious defense in his affidavit of merit.
He alleged therein that the property from which he was being ejected had been sold to him by its
registered owner. Ownership is a valid defense in unlawful detainer cases. While possession is the
main issue in ejectment, it is also one of the essential attributes of ownership. It follows that an
owner of real property is entitled to possession of the same. Petitioner can, therefore, properly
plead his right of possession to defeat that of respondents. Indeed, an owner who cannot exercise
the seven "juses or attributes of ownership - the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or
consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits - is a
crippled owner.[26]
All told, the Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta and the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City did
not have jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Hence, all proceedings had as regards
petitioner were null and void. Necessarily, the enforcement of the writ of execution as well as the
sale at public auction of petitioners real property to satisfy the void judgment must also be
declared of no legal effect.
There is a real need to resolve the issue of ownership over the premises in order to
determine who, as between petitioner and respondents, has a better right to possess the property
in dispute. This can only be done in the proper proceeding before the trial court wherein petitioner
will be afforded every right to present evidence in his behalf.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43202 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to
the Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta, Cavite, which is directed to continue proceedings in Civil
Case No. 744 by affording petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a chance to file his answer and
present evidence in his defense, and thereafter to hear and decide the case. The Writ of
Execution dated September 17, 1996, the Writ of Demolition dated January 14, 1997, and the
certificate of sale over Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-283572, as well as all acts and deeds
incidental to the judgment in Civil Case No. 744, are declared NULL AND VOID.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
 Acting on Bistro’s application for injunctive relief, the trial court issued the first assailed temporary
restraining order on December 29, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, respondent and/or his agents and representatives are ordered to refrain
from inspecting or otherwise interfering in the operation of the establishments of petitioner
(Bistro Pigalle, Inc.)."9

At the hearing, the parties submitted their evidence in support of their respective positions. On
January 20, 1993, the trial court granted Bistro’s application for a writ of prohibitory preliminary
THIRD DIVISION injunction. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s order declared:

G.R. No. 111397 August 12, 2002 "WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Petitioners’ application for a writ of prohibitory
preliminary injunction is granted, and Respondent, and any/all persons acting under his
authority, are and (sic) ordered to cease and desist from inspecting, investigating and
HON. ALFREDO LIM and RAFAELITO GARAYBLAS, petitioners,
otherwise closing or impeding the business operations of Petitioner Corporation’s
vs.
establishments while the petition here is pending resolution on the merits.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO REYES and BISTRO PIGALLE,
INC., respondents.
Considering that the Respondent is a government official and this injunction relates to his
official duties, the posting of an injunction bond by the Petitioners is not required.
CARPIO, J.:

On the other hand, Petitioners’ application for a writ of mandatory injunction is hereby
The Case
denied, for to grant the same would amount to granting the writ of mandamus prayed for.
The Court reserves resolution thereof until the parties shall have been heard on the
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March merits."10
25, 1993,2 and its Resolution dated July 13, 19933 which denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration. The assailed Decision sustained the orders dated December 29, 1992, January
However, despite the trial court’s order, Lim still issued a closure order on Bistro’s operations
20, 1993 and March 2, 1993,4 issued by Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial
effective January 23, 1993, even sending policemen to carry out his closure order.
court’s orders enjoined petitioner Alfredo Lim ("Lim" for brevity), then Mayor of Manila, from
investigating, impeding or closing down the business operations of the New Bangkok Club and the
Exotic Garden Restaurant owned by respondent Bistro Pigalle Inc. ("Bistro" for brevity). On January 25, 1993, Bistro filed an "Urgent Motion for Contempt" against Lim and the policemen
who stopped Bistro’s operations on January 23, 1993. At the hearing of the motion for contempt
on January 29, 1993, Bistro withdrew its motion on condition that Lim would respect the court’s
The Antecedent Facts
injunction.

On December 7, 1992 Bistro filed before the trial court a petition5 for mandamus and prohibition,
However, on February 12, 13, 15, 26 and 27, and on March 1 and 2, 1993, Lim, acting through his
with prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, against Lim in his
agents and policemen, again disrupted Bistro’s business operations.
capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila. Bistro filed the case because policemen under Lim’s
instructions inspected and investigated Bistro’s license as well as the work permits and health
certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in Bistro’s night club and restaurant Meanwhile, on February 17, 1993, Lim filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order of January
operations.6 Lim also refused to accept Bistro’s application for a business license, as well as the 20, 1993 and to dismiss the case. Lim insisted that the power of a mayor to inspect and
work permit applications of Bistro’s staff, for the year 1993.7 investigate commercial establishments and their staff is implicit in the statutory power of the city
mayor to issue, suspend or revoke business permits and licenses. This statutory power is
expressly provided for in Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and in
In its petition, Bistro argued that Lim’s refusal to issue the business license and work permits
Section 455, paragraph 3 (iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
violated the doctrine laid down this Court in De la Cruz vs. Paras,8 to wit:

The trial court denied Lim’s motion to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the case in an order
"Municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. They may be
dated March 2, 1993, the dispositive portion of which stated:
regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business."
 "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby orders:
(1) The denial of respondent’s motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction or the dismissal of the instant case;
(2) Petitioner-corporation is authorized to remove the wooden cross-bars or any other
impediments which were placed at its establishments, namely, New Bangkok Club and
Exotic Garden Restaurant on February 12, 1993 and February 15, 1993, respectively,
and thereafter said establishments are allowed to resume their operations;
(3) All the other petitioners are allowed to continue working in the aforenamed
establishments of petitioner-corporation if they have not yet reported; and
(4) The hearing on the contempt proceedings is deferred to give sufficient time to
respondent to elevate the matters assailed herein to the Supreme Court."11
On March 10, 1993, Lim filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus against Bistro and Judge Wilfredo Reyes. Lim claimed that the trial judge committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of prohibitory
preliminary injunction.
On March 25, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision.12 In a resolution dated
July 13, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied Lim’s motion for reconsideration.13
On July 1, 1993, Manila City Ordinance No. 778314 took effect. On the same day, Lim ordered the
Western Police District Command to permanently close down the operations of Bistro, which order
the police implemented at once.15
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In denying Lim’s petition, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse
of discretion since it issued the writ after hearing on the basis of the evidence adduced.
The Court of Appeals reasoned thus:
"x x x. A writ of preliminary injunction may issue if the act sought to be enjoined will cause
irreparable injury to the movant or destroy the status quo before a full hearing can be had
on the merits of the case.
A writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may only be
resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other
purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It is primarily intended to maintain
the status quo between the parties existing prior to the filing of the case.
In the case at bar, We find that the respondent Judge did not act improvidently in issuing
the assailed orders granting the writ of preliminary injunction in order to maintain the
status quo, while the petition is pending resolution on the merits. The private respondent
correctly points out that the questioned writ was regularly issued after several hearings, in
which the parties were allowed to adduce evidence, and argue their respective positions.
The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is within the limits of the sound exercise of
discretion of the court and the appellate court will not interfere, except, in a clear case of
abuse thereof. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and is accordingly DISMISSED."16
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues:
1. "DID RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS SAID
ASSAILED ORDERS OF DECEMBER 29, 1992, JANUARY 20, 1993 AND MARCH 2,
1993?"
2. "DID RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN
RENDERING ITS ASSAILED DECISION OF MARCH 25, 1993 AND ITS ASSAILED
RESOLUTION OF JULY 13, 1993?"
3. "DID SAID CIVIL CASE NO. 92-63712 AND SAID CA-G.R. SP NO. 30381 BECOME
MOOT AND ACADEMIC WHEN THE NEW BANGKOK CLUB AND THE EXOTIC
GARDEN RESTAURANT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT WERE CLOSED ON JULY 1,
1993 PURSUANT TO ORDINANCE NO. 7783?"
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit.
Considering that the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 7783 was not raised before the trial court or
the Court of Appeals, and this issue is still under litigation in another case, 17 the Court will deal
only with the first two issues raised by petitioner.
Validity of the Preliminary Injunction
Bistro’s cause of action in the mandamus and prohibition proceedings before the trial court is the
violation of its property right under its license to operate. The violation consists of the work
disruption in Bistro’s operations caused by Lim and his subordinates as well as Lim’s refusal to
issue a business license to Bistro and work permits to its staff for the year 1993. The primary relief
prayed for by Bistro is the issuance of writs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction. The
mandatory injunction seeks to compel Lim to accept Bistro’s 1993 business license application
and to issue Bistro’s business license. Also, the mandatory injunction seeks to compel Lim to
accept the applications of Bistro’s staff for work permits. The writ of prohibitory injunction seeks to
enjoin Lim from interfering, impeding or otherwise closing down Bistro’s operations.
The trial court granted only the prohibitory injunction. This enjoined Lim from interfering, impeding
or otherwise closing down Bistro’s operations pending resolution of whether Lim can validly refuse
to issue Bistro’s business license and its staff’s work permits for the year 1993.
Lim contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the prohibitory injunction. Lim relies
primarily on his power, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to grant and refuse municipal licenses and
business permits as expressly provided for in the Local Government Code and the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila. Lim argues that the powers granted by these laws implicitly include
the power to inspect, investigate and close down Bistro’s operations for violation of the conditions
of its licenses and permits.
On the other hand, Bistro asserts that the legal provisions relied upon by Lim do not apply to the
instant case. Bistro maintains that the Local Government Code and the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila do not expressly or impliedly grant Lim any power to prohibit the operation of night
clubs. Lim failed to specify any violation by Bistro of the conditions of its licenses and permits. In
refusing to accept Bistro’s business license application for the year 1993, Bistro claims that Lim
denied Bistro due process of law.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the prohibitory preliminary injunction.
We uphold the findings of the Court of Appeals.
The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and permits is beyond question. The law
expressly provides for such authority. Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila, reads:
"Sec. 11. General duties and powers of the mayor. The general duties and powers of
the mayor shall be:
x x x.
(l) To grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke
the same for violation of the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts
prohibited by law or municipal ordinances are being committed under the protection of
such licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have been
granted is carried on, or for any other reason of general interest." (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code provides:
"Sec. 455. Chief Executive, Powers, Duties and Compensation: xxx.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the City and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the City Mayor
shall:
(3) x x x.
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any
violation of the condition upon which said licenses or permits had been
issued, pursuant to law or ordinance." (Emphasis supplied)
From the language of the two laws, it is clear that the power of the mayor to issue business
licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to
issue the same. However, the power to suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly
premised on the violation of the conditions of these permits and licenses. The laws specifically
refer to the "violation of the condition(s)" on which the licenses and permits were issued. Similarly,
the power to refuse to issue such licenses and permits is premised on non-compliance with the
prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits. The mayor must observe due process
in exercising these powers, which means that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice
and opportunity to be heard.
True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private commercial establishments for
any violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits. However, the mayor has no power to
order a police raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating these
commercial establishments. Lim acted beyond his authority when he directed policemen to raid
the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant. Such act of Lim violated Ordinance No.
771618 which expressly prohibits police raids and inspections, to wit:
"Section 1. No member of the Western Police District shall conduct inspection of food and
other business establishments for the purpose of enforcing sanitary rules and regulations,
inspecting licenses and permits, and/or enforcing internal revenue and customs laws and
regulations. This responsibility should be properly exercised by Local Government
Authorities and other concerned agencies." (Emphasis supplied)
These local government officials include the City Health Officer or his representative, pursuant to
the Revised City Ordinances of the City of Manila,19 and the City Treasurer pursuant to Section
470 of the Local Government Code.20
Lim has no authority to close down Bistro’s business or any business establishment in Manila
without due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila and the Local Government Code. There is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly
granting the mayor authority to close down private commercial establishments without notice and
hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The due process clause of the
Constitution requires that Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that
it violated the conditions of its licenses and permits.
The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in accordance
with law, with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of
the law.21 Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. In the instant
case, we find that Lim’s exercise of this power violated Bistro’s property rights that are protected
under the due process clause of the Constitution.

Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific violation of the conditions of its business license or
permits. Still, Lim closed down Bistro’s operations even before the expiration of its business
license on December 31, 1992. Lim also refused to accept Bistro’s license application for 1993, in
effect denying the application without examining whether it complies with legal prerequisites.

Lim’s zeal in his campaign against prostitution is commendable. The presumption is that he acted
in good faith and was motivated by his concern for his constituents when he implemented his
campaign against prostitution in the Ermita-Malate area. However, there is no excusing Lim for
arbitrarily closing down, without due process of law, the business operations of Bistro. For this
reason, the trial court properly restrained the acts of Lim.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding the trial court’s orders. The sole
objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case
can be heard fully. It is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of
the case can be disposed of.22 In the instant case, the issuance of the writ of prohibitory
preliminary injunction did not dispose of the main case for mandamus. The trial court issued the
injunction in view of the disruptions and stoppage in Bistro’s operations as a consequence of Lim’s
closure orders. The injunction was intended to maintain the status quo while the petition has not
been resolved on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO. 30381 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 93891 March 11, 1991
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, petitioner
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION, respondents.
Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner.
Leonardo A. Aurelio for respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corp.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board ("Board") asks us to review the Decision and Resolution
promulgated on 7 February 1990 and 10 May 1990, respectively, by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-
G R. No. SP 18821 entitled "Solar Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board."
In that Decision and Resolution, the Court of Appeals reversed an order of the Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-89-2287 dismissing private respondent Solar
Textile Finishing Corporation's ("Solar") petition for certiorari and remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.
On 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to
cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging
untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The
Order signed by Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., as Board Chairman, reads in full as follows:
Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation with plant and place of business at 999
General Pascual Avenue, Malabon, Metro Manila is involved in bleaching, rinsing and
dyeing textiles with wastewater of about 30 gpm. being directly discharged untreated into
the sewer. Based on findings in the Inspections conducted on 05 November 1986 and 15
November 1986, the volume of untreated wastewater discharged in the final out fall
outside of the plant's compound was even greater. The result of inspection conducted on
06 September 1988 showed that respondent's Wastewater Treatment Plant was noted
unoperational and the combined wastewater generated from its operation was about 30
gallons per minute and 80% of the wastewater was being directly discharged into a
drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River by means of a by-pass and the
remaining 20% was channelled into the plant's existing Wastewater Treatment Plant
(WTP). Result of the analyses of the sample taken from the by-pass showed that the
wastewater is highly pollutive in terms of Color units, BOD and Suspended Solids, among
others. These acts of respondent in spite of directives to comply with the requirements
are clearly in violation of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 103 of its
Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 7 of P.D. 984 and Section 38 of its Implementing
Rules and Regulations, respondent is hereby ordered to cease and desist from utilizing its
wastewater pollution source installation and discharging its untreated wastewater directly
into the canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River effective immediately upon receipt
hereof and until such time when it has fully complied with all the requirements and until
further orders from this Board.
SO ORDERED.1
We note that the above Order was based on findings of several inspections of Solar's plant:
a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12 November 1986 by the National
Pollution Control Commission ("NPCC"), the predecessor of the Board ;2 and
b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources ("DENR").
The findings of these two (2) inspections were that Solar's wastewater treatment plant was non-
operational and that its plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of wastewater, 80% of which
was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The
remaining 20% of the wastewater was being channeled through Solar's non-operational
wastewater treatment plant. Chemical analysis of samples of Solar's effluents showed the
presence of pollutants on a level in excess of what was permissible under P.D. No. 984 and its
Implementing Regulations.
A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 September 1988. A Writ of Execution
issued by the Board was received by Solar on 31 March 1989.
Meantime, Solar filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with prayer for stay of execution of the
Order dated 22 September 1988. Acting on this motion, the Board issued an Order dated 24 April
1989 allowing Solar to operate temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another inspection and
evaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment facilities. In the same Order, the Board directed the
Regional Executive Director of the DENR/ NCR to conduct the inspection and evaluation within
thirty (30) days.
On 21 April 1989, however, Solar went to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, on
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against the Board, the petition being docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-89-2287.
On 21 July 1989, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Solar's petition upon two (2) grounds, i.e.,
that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of
Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to
operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic.
Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in the Decision here assailed,
reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further
proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the
same time, the Court of Appeals said in the dispositive portion of its Decision that:
. . .. Still and all, this decision is without prejudice to whatever action the appellee [Board]
may take relative to the projected 'inspection and evaluation' of appellant's [Solar's] water
treatment facilities.3
The Court of Appeals, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of
petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case might
be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question of due process be settled.
Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without success.
The Board is now before us on a Petition for Review basically arguing that:
1. its ex parte Order dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution were issued in
accordance with law and were not violative of the requirements of due process; and
2. the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a petition for
certiorari.
The only issue before us at this time is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
trial court on the ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board.
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex
parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence
that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which
exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board
contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the Tullahan-
Tinejeros River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982
Effluent Code.
Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex
parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the
inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed
such a threat.
The Court is not persuaded by Solar's contention. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized
petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders under the following circumstances:
P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides:
(a) Public Hearing. . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie
evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set
by the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an ex-parte order directing the
discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the
establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a
prior public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and shall
remain in force until said establishment or person prevents or abates the said pollution
within the allowable standards or modified or nullified by a competent court. (Emphasis
supplied)
We note that under the above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease
and desist order may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an
establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or
plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards set by the
[NPCC]." On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and
desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed
"the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of wastes as to which
allowable standards have been set by the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease
and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding such allowable
standards. Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been the subject matter of
allowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board may act on an ex parte basis when it
finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involved presents an "immediate
threat to life, public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life." Since the applicable
standards set by the Commission existing at any given time may well not cover every possible or
imaginable kind of effluent or waste discharge, the general standard of an "immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life" remains necessary.
Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant allowable standards have been set
by the Commission or Board precisely in order to avoid or neutralize an "immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life.''
Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 19824 sets out the maximum permissible levels of physical
and chemical substances which effluents from domestic wastewater treatment plants and
industrial plants" must not exceed "when discharged into bodies of water classified as Class A, B,
C, D, SB and SC in accordance with the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations." The waters of
Tullahan-Tinejeros River are classified as inland waters Class D under Section 68 of the 1978
NPCC Rules and Regulations5 which in part provides that:
Sec. 68. Water Usage and Classification. — The quality of Philippine waters shall be
maintained in a safe and satisfactory condition according to their best usages. For this
purpose, all water shall be classified according to the following beneficial usages:
 (a) Fresh Surface Water in mg./1. mg./1.
Classification Best usage h) Detergents 5 h) Detergents 2.93
mg./1." mg./1. MBAS
xxx xxx x i) Dissolved 0
xx oxygen, mg./1.
Class D For agriculture, irrigation, livestock watering and industrial cooling and j) Settleable 0.4 1.5
processing. Matter, mg./1.
xxx xxx x k) Total Dis 800 610
xx solved Solids
mg./1.
(Emphases supplied) l) Total Solids 1,400 690
m) Turbidity NTU / ppm, SiO3 70
The reports on the inspections carried on Solar's wastewater treatment facilities on 5 and 12
November 1986 and 6 September 1988 set forth the following Identical finding:
The November 1986 inspections report concluded that:
a. For legal action in [view of] implementing rules and regulations of P.D. No. 984 and
Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982.6 Records of the Commission show that the plant under its previous owner, Fine Touch
Finishing Corporation, was issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing
same to cease and desist from conducting dyeing operation until such time the waste
Placing the maximum allowable standards set in Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982
treatment plant is already completed and operational. The new owner Solar Textile
alongside the findings of the November 1986 and September 1988 inspection reports, we get the
Corporation informed the Commission of the plant acquisition thru its letter dated March
following results:
1986 (sic).

The new owner was summoned to a hearing held on 13 October 1986 based on the
adverse findings during the inspection/water sampling test conducted on 08 August 1986.
"Inland November September As per instruction of the Legal Division a re- inspection/sampling text should be
Waters 1986 1988 conducted first before an appropriate legal action is instituted; hence, this inspection.
(Class C & D7 Report8 Report9
Station 1 Station 1 Based on the above findings, it is clear that the new owner continuously violates the
a) Color in 100 a) Color units 250 125 directive of the Commission by undertaking dyeing operation without completing first and
platinum (Apparent operating its existing WTP. The analysis of results on water samples taken showed that
cobalt Color) the untreated wastewater from the firm pollutes our water resources. In this connection, it
units is recommended that appropriate legal action be instituted immediately against the firm. .
. .10
b) pH 6-8.5 b) pH 9.3 8.7
c) Tempera- 40 c) Temperature The September 1988 inspection report's conclusions were:
ture in °C (°C)
d) Phenols in 0.1 d) Phenols in 1. The plant was undertaking dyeing, bleaching and rinsing operations during the
mg.1 mg./1. inspection. The combined wastewater generated from the said operations was estimated
e) Suspended 75 e) Suspended 340 80 at about 30 gallons per minute. About 80% of the wastewater was traced directly
solids in solids in discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros river by means of a
mg./1. mg./1. bypass. The remaining 20% was channeled into the plant's existing wastewater treatment
f) BOD in 80 f) BOD (5-day) 1,100 152 plant (WTP).
mg./1. mg./1
g) oil/Grease 10 g) Oil/Grease
 2. The WTP was noted not yet fully operational- some accessories were not yet
installed.1âwphi1 Only the sump pit and the holding/collecting tank are functional but
appeared seldom used. The wastewater mentioned channeled was noted held indefinitely
into the collection tank for primary treatment. There was no effluent discharge [from such
collection tank].
3. A sample from the bypass wastewater was collected for laboratory analyses. Result of
the analyses show that the bypass wastewater is polluted in terms of color units, BOD
and suspended solids, among others. (Please see attached laboratory resul .)11
From the foregoing reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima facie evidence
before the Board that the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum allowable
levels of physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was
adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the Board. It is also well
to note that the previous owner of the plant facility Fine Touch Finishing Corporation had been
issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing it to cease and refrain from carrying
out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant was completed and operational. Solar, the
new owner, informed the NPCC of the acquisition of the plant on March 1986. Solar was
summoned by the NPCC to a hearing on 13 October 1986 based on the results of the sampling
test conducted by the NPCC on 8 August 1986. Petitioner Board refrained from issuing an ex
parte cease and desist order until after the November 1986 and September 1988 re-inspections
were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was confirmed. In other words, petitioner
Board appears to have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable
standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued
discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the Tullahan- Tinerejos River, presumably loath to
spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating
condition.
In this connection, we note that in Technology Developers, Inc. v. Court of appeals, et al.,12 the
Court very recently upheld the summary closure ordered by the Acting Mayor of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, of a pollution-causing establishment, after finding that the records showed that:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining
whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the
operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control
Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognized
that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from
pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to
operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken
to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the
emission in the operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February l6, 1989, called the attention of petitioner to
the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the
air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner
was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was required to bring the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution
permit. (Annex A-2, petition)
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of
Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through
channels (Annex A-B, petition).. . .
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made
by Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted
by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air
pollution device has been installed. (Annex A-9, petition)
xxx xxx xxx
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National
Pollution Control Commission on December 15,1987, the permit was good only up to May
25,1988 (Annex A-12, petition). Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate
its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard
to the health of the residents of the community."
In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local government
official but by the Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the Government charged with
the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or
violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here
presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated
effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until
protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course,
including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course
may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were
enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety,
health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal
life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests
like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. The Board's ex parte Order and
Writ of Execution would, of course, have compelled Solar temporarily to stop its plant operations, a
state of affairs Solar could in any case have avoided by simply absorbing the bother and burden of
putting its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled
to reduce their capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase their profits by imposing
upon the public threats and risks to its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by disregarding
the requirements of anti- pollution statutes and their implementing regulations.
It should perhaps be made clear the Court is not here saying that the correctness of the ex
parte Order and Writ of Execution may not be contested by Solar in a hearing before the Board
itself. Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the
correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing where
such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex parteorder. That
such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process
clause of the Constitution in situations like that we have here. The Board's decision rendered after
the public hearing may then be tested judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in
accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and Section 42 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations. A subsequent public hearing is precisely what Solar should have sought instead of
going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution and instead of
appealing to the Court of Appeals. It will be recalled the at the Board in fact gave Solar authority
temporarily to continue operations until still another inspection of its wastewater treatment facilities
and then another analysis of effluent samples could be taken and evaluated.

Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as the questioned Order
and Writ of Execution issued by the Board were patent nullities. Since we have concluded that the
Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board, the trial
court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy
was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 7 February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821
are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order of petitioner Board dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of
Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court dated 21 July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED,
without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order
and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-61689 June 20, 1988
RURAL BANK OF BUHI, INC., and HONORABLE JUDGE CARLOS R.
BUENVIAJE, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and
CONSOLACION ODRA, respondents.
Manuel B. Tomacruz and Rustico Pasilavan for petitioners.
I.B. Regalado, Jr. and Pacifica T. Torres for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction seeking the reversal
of the orders of the Court of Appeals dated March 19, 1982 and March 24, 1982 and its
decision * (HATOL) promulgated on June 17,1982 in CA-G.R. No. 13944 entitled "Banko Central
ng Pilipinas at Consolacion Odra Laban Kina Rural Bank of Buhi (Camarines Sur), Inc." and
praying for a restraining order or a preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain respondents from
enforcing aforesaid orders and decision of the respondent Court, and to give due course to the
petitioners' complaint in IR-428, pending before Hon. Judge Carlos R. Buenviaje of Branch VII,
CFI, Camarines Sur.
The decretal portion of the appealed decision reads:
DAHIL DITO, ang utos ng pinasasagot sa Hukom noong ika-9 ng Marso, 1982,
ay isinasang-tabi. Kapalit nito, isang utos and ipinalabas na nag-uutos sa
pinasasagot sa Hukom na itigil ang anumang pagpapatuloy o pagdidinig kaugnay
sa usaping IR-428 na pinawawalang saysay din ng Hukumang ito.
SIYANG IPINAG-UUTOS.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
The petitioner Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Buhi) is a juridical entity existing
under the laws of the Philippines. Buhi is a rural bank that started its operations only on December
26,1975 (Rollo, p. 86).
In 1980, an examination of the books and affairs of Buhi was ordered conducted by the Rural
Banks and Savings and Loan Association (DRBSLA), Central Bank of the Philippines, which by
law, has charge of the supervision and examination of rural banks and savings and loan
associations in the Philippines. However, said petitioner refused to be examined and as a result
thereof, financial assistance was suspended.
On January 10, 1980, a general examination of the bank's affairs and operations was conducted
and there were found by DRBSLA represented by herein respondent, Consolacion V. Odra,
Director of DRBSLA, among others, massive irregularities in its operations consisting of loans to
unknown and fictitious borrowers, where the sum of P 1,704,782.00 was past due and another
sum of P1,130,000.00 was also past due in favor of the Central Bank (Rollo, p. 86). The
promissory notes evidencing these loans were rediscounted with the Central Bank for cash. As a
result thereof, the bank became insolvent and prejudiced its depositors and creditors.
Respondent, Consolacion V. Odra, submitted a report recommending to the Monetary Board of
the Central Bank the placing of Buhi under receivership in accordance with Section 29 of Republic
Act No. 265, as amended, the designation of the Director, DRBSLA, as receiver thereof. On March
28, 1980, the Monetary Board, finding the report to be true, adopted Resolution No. 583
placing Buhi, petitioner herein, under receivership and designated respondent, Consolacion V.
Odra, as Receiver, pursuant to the provisions of Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265 as amended
(Rollo, p. 111).
In a letter dated April 8, 1980, respondent Consolacion V. Odra, as receiver, implemented and
carried out said Monetary Board Resolution No. 583 by authorizing deputies of the receiver to take
control, possession and charge of Buhi, its assets and liabilities (Rollo, p. 109).
Imelda del Rosario, Manager of herein petitioner Buhi, filed a petition for injunction with
Restraining Order dated April 23, 1980, docketed as Special Proceedings IR-428 against
respondent Consolacion V. Odra and DRBSLA deputies in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, Branch VII, Iriga City, entitled Rural Bank of Buhi vs. Central Bank, which assailed
the action of herein respondent Odra in recommending the receivership over Buhi as a violation of
the provisions of Sections 28 and 29 of Republic Act No. 265 as amended, and Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 720 (The Rural Banks Act) and as being ultra vires and done with grave abuse of
discretion and in excess of jurisdiction (Rollo, p. 120).
Respondents filed their motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1980 alleging that the petition did not
allege a cause of action and is not sufficient in form and substance and that it was filed in violation
of Section 29, Republic Act No. 265 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1007 (Rollo, p. 36).
Petitioners, through their counsel, filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss dated June 17, 1980
averring that the petition alleged a valid cause of action and that respondents have violated the
due process clause of the Constitution (Rollo, p. 49).
Later, respondents filed a reply to the opposition dated July 1, 1980, claiming that the petition is
not proper; that Imelda del Rosario is not the proper representative of the bank; that the petition
failed to state a cause of action; and, that the provisions of Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265 had
been faithfully observed (Rollo, p. 57).
On August 22, 1980, the Central Bank Monetary Board issued a Resolution No. 1514 ordering the
liquidation of the Rural Bank of Buhi (Rollo, p. 108).
On September 1, 1981, the Office of the Solicitor General, in accordance with Republic Act No.
265, Section 29, filed in the same Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VII, a petition
for Assistance in the Liquidation of Buhi, which petition was docketed as SP-IR-553, pursuant to
the Monetary Board Resolution No. 1514 (Rollo, pp. 89; 264).
Meanwhile, respondent Central Bank filed on September 15, 1981, in Civil Case No. IR-428 a
Supplemental Motion To Dismiss on the ground that the receivership of Buhi, in view of the
issuance of the Monetary Board Resolution No. 1514 had completely become moot and academic
(Rollo, p. 68) and the fact that Case SP-IR-553 for the liquidation of Buhi was already pending with
the same Court (Rollo, p. 69).
On October 16, 1981, petitioners herein filed their amended complaint in Civil Case No. IR-428
alleging that the issuance of Monetary Board Resolution No. 583 was plainly arbitrary and in bad
faith under aforequoted Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265 as amended, among others (Rollo, p.
28). On the same day, petitioner herein filed a rejoinder to its opposition to the motion to dismiss
(Rollo, p. 145).
On March 9,1982, herein petitioner Judge Buenviaje, issued an order denying the respondents'
motion to dismiss, supplemental motion to dismiss and granting a temporary restraining order
enjoining respondents from further managing and administering the Rural Bank of Buhi and to
deliver the possession and control thereof to the petitioner Bank under the same conditions and
with the same financial status as when the same was taken over by herein respondents
(defendants) on April 16, 1980 and further enjoining petitioner to post a bond in the amount of
three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) (Rollo, p. 72).
The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to dismiss and supplemental
motion to dismiss, in the light of petitioners' opposition, for want of sufficient merit
is denied. Respondents are hereby directed to file their answer within ten (10)
days from receipt of a copy of this order. (Rollo, p. 4).
On March 11, 1982, petitioner Buhi through counsel, conformably with the above-mentioned order,
filed a Motion to Admit Bond in the amount of P300,220.00 (Rollo, pp. 78-80).
On March 15,1982, herein petitioner Judge issued the order admitting the bond of P300,220.00
filed by the petitioner, and directing the respondents to surrender the possession of the Rural
Bank of Buhi, together with all its equipments, accessories, etc. to the petitioners (Rollo, p. 6).
Consequently, on March 16, 1982, herein petitioner Judge issued the writ of execution directing
the Acting Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Sur to implement the Court's order of March 9, 1982
(Rollo, p. 268). Complying with the said order of the Court, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff went to
the Buhi premises to implement the writ of execution but the vault of the petitioner bank was
locked and no inventory was made, as evidenced by the Sheriffs Report (Rollo, pp. 83-84). Thus,
the petitioner herein filed with the Court an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Allow Sheriff Calope to
Force Open Bank Vault" on the same day (Rollo, p. 268). Accordingly, on March 17, 1982, herein
petitioner Judge granted the aforesaid Ex-Parte Motion to Force Open the Bank Vault (Rollo, p.
269).
On March 18, 1982, counsel for petitioner filed another "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order Manager
of City Trust to Allow Petitioner to Withdraw Rural Bank Deposits" while a separate "Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion to Order Manager of Metrobank to Release Deposits of Petitioners" was filed on the
same date. The motion was granted by the Court in an order directing the Manager of Metro Bank-
Naga City (Rollo, p. 269) to comply as prayed for.
In view thereof, herein respondents filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction docketed as CA-G.R. No. 13944 against herein petitioners,
seeking to set aside the restraining order and reiterating therein that petitioner Buhi's complaint in
the lower court be dismissed (Rollo, p. 270).
On March 19, 1982, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution (KAPASIYAHAN) in tagalog,
restraining the Hon. Judge Carlos R. Buenviaje, from enforcing his order of March 9,1982 and
suspending further proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. IR-428 pending before him while giving the
Central Bank counsel, Atty. Ricardo Quintos, authority to carry out personally said orders and
directing the "Punong Kawani" of the Court of Appeals to send telegrams to the Office of the
President and the Supreme Court (Rollo, p. 168).
Herein petitioners did not comply with the Court of Appeals' order of March 19, 1982, but filed
instead on March 21, 1982 a motion for reconsideration of said order of the Court of Appeals,
claiming that the lower court's order of March 9, 1982 referred only to the denial of therein
respondents' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss and that the return of Buhi to
the petitioners was already an accomplished fact. The motion was denied by the respondent court
in a resolution dated June 1, 1982 (Rollo, p. 301).
In view of petitioners' refusal to obey the Court of Appeals' Order of March 19, 1982, herein
respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion to Cite Petitioners in Contempt, dated April
22, 1982 (Rollo, p. 174).
The Court of Appeals issued on May 24, 1982 an order requiring herein petitioner Rural Bank of
Buhi, Inc., through its then Acting Manager, Imelda del Rosario and herein petitioner Judge Carlos
Buenviaje, as well as Manuel Genova and Rodolfo Sosa, to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice why they should not be held in contempt of court and further directing the Ministry of
National Defense or its representative to cause the return of possession and management of the
Rural Bank to the respondents Central Bank and Consolacion Odra (Rollo, p. 180).
On June 9, 1982, petitioners filed their objection to respondents' motion for contempt dated June
5, 1982 claiming that the properties, subject of the order, had already been returned to the herein
petitioners who are the lawful owners thereof and that the returning could no longer be undone
(Rollo, p. 181).
Later, petitioners filed another motion dated June 17, 1982 for the reconsideration of the resolution
of June 1, 1982 of the Court of Appeals alleging that the same contravened and departed from the
rulings of the Supreme Court that consummated acts or acts already done could no longer be the
subject of mandatory injunction and that the respondent Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to
issue the order unless it was in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, claiming that the case (CA-G.R. No.
13944) did not come to it on appeal (Rollo, p. 302).
As aforestated, on June 17, 1982, respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision (HATOL)
setting aside the lower court's restraining order dated March 9,1982 and ordering the dismissal of
herein petitioners' amended complaint in Civil Case No. IR-428 (Rollo, p. 186).
On July 9, 1982, petitioners (respondents in CA-G.R. No. 13944) filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision dated June 17, 1982 insofar as the complaint with the lower court
(Civil Case No. IR-428 was ordered dismissed (Rollo, p. 305).
On August 23, 1982, the respondent Court of Appeals issued its Resolution denying for lack of
merit, herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the resolution issued by the respondent
Court of Appeals on June 1, 1982 and set on August 31, 1982 the hearing of the motion to cite the
respondents in CA-G.R. No. SP-13944 (herein petitioner) for contempt (Rollo, p. 193).
At said hearing, counsel for Rural Bank of Buhi agreed and promised in open court to restore and
return to the Central Bank the possession and control of the Bank within three (3) days from
August 31, 1982.
However on September 3,1982, Rosalia Guevara, Manager thereof, vigorously and adamantly
refused to surrender the premises unless she received a written order from the Court.
In a subsequent hearing of the contempt incident, the Court of Appeals issued its Order dated
October 13,1982, but Rosalia Guevara still refused to obey, whereupon she was placed under
arrest and the Court of Appeals ordered her to be detained until she decided to obey the Court's
Order (Rollo, pp. 273-274).
Earlier, on September 14, 1982 petitioners had filed this petition even while a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of June 17,1982 was still pending consideration in the Court of
Appeals.
In the resolution of October 20, 1982, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course
to the petition required respondents to COMMENT (Rollo, p. 225).
Counsel for respondents manifested (Rollo, p. 226) that they could not file the required comment
because they were not given a copy of the petition. Meanwhile, they filed an urgent motion dated
October 28, 1982 with the Court of Appeals to place the bank through its representatives in
possession of the Rural Bank of Buhi (Camarines Sur), Inc. (Rollo, p. 237).
On December 9, 1982, petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition with urgent motion for the
issuance of a restraining order dated December 2, 1982 praying that the restraining order be
issued against respondent court (Rollo, p. 229).
In the resolution of December 15,1982, the Court resolved to require petitioners to furnish the
respondents with a copy of the petition and to require the respondents to comment on both the
original and the supplemental petitions (Rollo, p. 243).
In a resolution of February 21, 1983, the Court NOTED Rosalia V. Guevara's letter dated February
4, 1983 (Rollo, p. 252) addressed to Hon. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, requesting that she
be allowed to file a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus (Rollo, p. 256).
At the hearing of the said petition on February 23, 1983 where the counsel of both parties
appeared, this Court noted the Return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus as well as the release of
petitioner Rosalia V. Guevara from detention by the National Bureau of Investigation. After hearing
aforesaid counsel and petitioner herself, and it appearing that the latter had resigned since
January 18,1983 as Manager of the Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. and that the Central Bank might avail
of more than adequate legal measures to take over the management, possession and control of
the said bank (and not through contempt proceedings and detention and confinement of
petitioner), with Assistant Solicitor General Andin manifesting that respondents were not insisting
on the continued detention of petitioner, the Court Resolved to SET the petitioner at liberty and to
consider the contempt incident closed (Rollo, p. 339).
On April 11, 1983, respondents filed their comment on the original and supplemental petitions.
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals, acting on respondents' urgent motion filed on October 28, 1982
ordered on April 13, 1983 the return to the petitioners (herein respondents) or their duly authorized
representatives of the possession, management and control of subject Rural Bank (Rollo, p. 319),
together with its properties.
On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed an urgent motion: (1) to give due course to the petition and (2)
for immediate issuance of a Restraining Order against the respondent court to prevent it from
enforcing its aforesaid resolution dated April 13, 1983 and from further proceeding in AC-G.R. No.
13944-SP (Rollo, p. 315).
On May 16, 1983, this Court resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit (Rollo, p. 321). On July
25, 1983, petitioners filed their verified Motion for Reconsideration (Rollo, p. 337) praying that the
HATOL dated June 17, 1982 of the Court of Appeals be set aside as null and void and that
Special Proceedings No. IR-428 of CFI-Camarines Sur, Iriga City, Branch VII, be ordered
remanded to the RTC of Camarines Sur, Iriga City, for further proceedings.
A Motion for Early Resolution was filed by herein petitioners on March 12,1984 (Rollo, p. 348).
Petitioners raised the following legal issues in their motion for reconsideration:
I. UNDER SEC. 29, R.A. 265, AS AMENDED, MAY THE MONETARY BOARD (MB) OF THE
CENTRAL BANK (CB) PLACE A RURAL BANK UNDER RECEIVERSHIP WITHOUT PRIOR
NOTICE TO SAID RURAL BANK TO ENABLE IT TO BE HEARD ON THE GROUND RELIED
UPON FOR SUCH RECEIVERSHIP?
II. UNDER THE SAME SECTION OF SAID LAW, WHERE THE MONETARY BOARD (MB) OF
THE CENTRAL BANK (CB) HAS PLACED A RURAL BANK UNDER RECEIVERSHIP, IS SUCH
ACTION OF THE MONETARY BOARD (MB) SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW? IF SO, WHICH
COURT MAY EXERCISE SUCH POWER AND WHEN MAY IT EXERCISE THE SAME?
III. UNDER THE SAID SECTION OF THE LAW, SUPPOSE A CIVIL CASE IS INSTITUTED
SEEKING ANNULMENT OF THE RECEIVERSHIP ON THE GROUND OF ARBITRARINESS
AND BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF THE MONETARY BOARD (MB), MAY SUCH CASE BE
DISMISSED BY THE IAC (THEN CA) ON THE GROUND OF INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT HAS NOT HAD A CHANCE YET TO RECEIVE EVIDENCE AND
THE PARTIES HAVE NOT YET PRESENTED EVIDENCE EITHER IN THE TRIAL COURT OR IN
SAID APPELLATE COURT? (Rollo, pp. 330-331).
I. Petitioner Rural Bank's position is to the effect that due process was not observed by the
Monetary Board before said bank was placed under receivership. Said Rural Bank claimed that it
was not given the chance to deny and disprove such claim of insolvency and/or any other ground
which the Monetary Board used in justification of its action.
Relative thereto, the provision of Republic Act No. 265 on the proceedings upon insolvency reads:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency.— Whenever, upon examination by the
head of the appropriate supervising and examining department or his examiners
or agents into the condition of any banking institution, it shall be disclosed that
the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business
would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of
the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary
Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the
department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines
and shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized
competence in banking, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and
liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and
administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers
necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and
foreclosing mortgages in the name of the banking institution.
The Monetary Board shall thereupon determine within sixty days whether the
institution may be recognized or otherwise placed in such a condition so that it
may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors
and the general public and shall prescribe the conditions under which such
redemption of business shall take place as the time for fulfillment of such
conditions. In such case, the expenses and fees in the collection and
administration of the assets of the institution shall be determined by the Board
and shall be paid to the Central Bank out of the assets of such banking
institution.
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the
banking institution is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its
depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires,
order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a
liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in
the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and
praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of the banking institution.
The Court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed
claims against the bank and enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and
do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of the banking institution and to
implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary
Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized
competence in banking, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the
receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The
liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking
institution to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors
and other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such bank and he may,
in the name of the banking institution, institute such actions as may be necessary
in the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of the
banking institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding the actions of the
Monetary Board under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of
this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if
there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith.
No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the
Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the second
paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the
action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the
petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is
pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed
by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted,
shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the
form of cash or Central Bank cashier's check, in an amount twice the amount of
the bond of the petitioner, or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages
which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the
injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they
are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall
govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction
contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a banking
institution to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of
business: Provided, however, that this shall not include the inability to pay of an
otherwise non-insolvent bank caused by extraordinary demands induced by
 financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the banks in the banking
community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the
appointment of receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the
Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary not
withstanding.
It will be observed from the foregoing provision of law, that there is no requirement whether
express or implied, that a hearing be first conducted before a banking institution may be placed
under receivership. On the contrary, the law is explicit as to the conditions prerequisite to the
action of the Monetary Board to forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and to
appoint a receiver to immediately take charge of the bank's assets and liabilities. They are: (a) an
examination made by the examining department of the Central Bank; (b) report by said
department to the Monetary Board; and (c) prima facie showing that the bank is in a condition of
insolvency or so situated that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its
depositors or creditors.
Supportive of this theory is the ruling of this Court, which established the authority of the Central
Bank under the foregoing circumstances, which reads:
As will be noted, whenever it shall appear prima facie that a banking institution is
in "a condition of insolvency" or so situated "that its continuance in business
would involved probable loss to its depositors or creditors," the Monetary Board
has authority:
First, to forbid the institution to do business and appoint a receiver therefor; and
Second, to determine, within 60 days, whether or not:
1) the institution may be reorganized and rehabilitated to such
an extent as to be permitted to resume business with safety to
depositors, creditors and the general public; or
2) it is indeed insolvent or cannot resume business with safety
to depositors, creditors and the general public, and public
interest requires that it be liquidated.
In this latter case (i.e., the bank can no longer resume business with safety to depositors, creditors
and the public, etc.) its liquidation will be ordered and a liquidator appointed by the Monetary
Board. The Central Bank shall thereafter file a petition in the Regional Trial Court praying for the
Court's assistance in the liquidation of the bank." ... (Salud vs. Central Bank, 143 SCRA 590
[1986]).
Petitioner further argues, that there is also that constitutional guarantee that no property shall be
taken without due process of law, so that Section 29, R.A. 265, as amended, could not have
intended to disregard and do away with such constitutional requirement when it conferred upon
the Monetary Board the power to place Rural Banks under receivership (Rollo, p. 333).
The contention is without merit. It has long been established and recognized in this jurisdiction that
the closure and liquidation of a bank may be considered as an exercise of police power. Such
exercise may, however, be subject to judicial inquiry and could be set aside if found to be
capricious, discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, unjust or a denial of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution (Central Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 155 [1981]).
The evident implication of the law, therefore, is that the appointment of a receiver may be made by
the Monetary Board without notice and hearing but its action is subject to judicial inquiry to insure
the protection of the banking institution. Stated otherwise, due process does not necessarily
require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure.
One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would be the order of
the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes may be wiped out, and
disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking community.
In Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals, (106 SCRA 130), the Supreme Court held:
The pivotal issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the appointment of a
receiver by the Court of First Instance on January 14, 1969 was in order.
Respondent Court correctly stated that the appointment of a receiver pendente
lite is a matter principally addressed to and resting largely on the sound
discretion of the court to which the application is made. This Tribunal has so held
in a number of cases. However, receivership being admittedly a harsh remedy, it
should be granted with extreme caution. Sound reasons for receivership must
appear of record, and there should be a clear showing of a necessity therefor.
Before granting the remedy, the court is advised to consider the consequence or
effects thereof in order to avoid irreparable injustice or injury to others who are
entitled to as much consideration as those seeking it.
xxx xxx xxx
This is not to say that a hearing is an indispensable requirement for the
appointment of a receiver. As petitioner correctly contends in his first assignment
of error, courts may appoint receivers without prior presentation of evidence and
solely on the basis of the averments of the pleadings. Rule 59 of the Revised
Rules of Court allows the appointment of a receiver upon an ex parte application.
There is no question that the action of the Monetary Board in this regard may be subject to judicial
review. Thus, it has been held that the courts may interfere with the Central Bank's exercise of
discretion in determining whether or not a distressed bank shall be supported or liquidated.
Discretion has its limits and has never been held to include arbitrariness, discrimination or bad
faith (Ramos vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]).
It has likewise been held that resolutions of the Monetary Board under Section 29 of the Central
Bank Act, such as: forbidding bank institutions to do business on account of a "condition of
insolvency" or because its continuance in business would involve probable loss to depositors or
creditors; or appointing a receiver to take charge of the bank's assets and liabilities, or determining
whether the bank may be rehabilitated or should be liquidated and appointing a liquidator for that
purpose, are under the law "final and executory" and may be set aside only on one ground, that is
"if there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith" (Salud vs.
Central Bank, supra).

There is no dispute that under the above-quoted Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, the Regional
Trial Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the question of whether or not the action of the Monetary
Board directing the dissolution of the subject Rural Bank is attended by arbitrariness and bad faith.
Such position has been sustained by this Court in Salud vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
(supra).

In the same case, the Court ruled further that a banking institution's claim that a resolution of the
Monetary Board under Section 29 of the Central Bank Act should be set aside as plainly arbitrary
and made in bad faith, may be asserted as an affirmative defense (Sections 1 and 4[b], Rule 6,
Rules of Court) or a counterclaim (Section 6, Rule 6; Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court) in
the proceedings for assistance in liquidation or as a cause of action in a separate and distinct
action where the latter was filed ahead of the petition for assistance in liquidation (ibid; Central
Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 143 [1981]).

III. It will be noted that in the issuance of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
Branch VII, Iriga City, dated March 9, 1982 (Rollo, pp. 72-77), there was no trial on the merits.
Based on the pleadings filed, the Court merely acted on the Central Bank's Motion to Dismiss and
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, denying both for lack of sufficient merit. Evidently, the trial court
merely acted on an incident and has not as yet inquired, as mandated by Section 29 of the Central
Bank Act, into the merits of the claim that the Monetary Board's action is plainly arbitrary and
made in bad faith. It has not appreciated certain facts which would render the remedy of
liquidation proper and rehabilitation improper, involving as it does an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the parties properly belonging to the trial court and not
properly cognizable on appeal (Central Bank vs. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 156).

Still further, without a hearing held for both parties to substantiate their allegations in their
respective pleadings, there is lacking that "convincing proof" prerequisite to justify the temporary
restraining order (mandatory injunction) issued by the trial court in its Order of March 9, 1982.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED; We hereby order
the remand of this case to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings, but We LIFT the
temporary restraining order issued by the trial court in its Order dated March 9, 1982.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the
SUPREME COURT judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of
Manila Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:

EN BANC 1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of
leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the
G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940 members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the
records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, 2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
vs. scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
INC., respondents.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically
Relations. prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon. Philippine Army.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood. 4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer
union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal.
LAUREL, J.: (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)

The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled 5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule
case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, and elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5,
we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court: Commonwealth Act No. 213.)

1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o 6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of
que no sea para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable
partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of
en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra; American origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule.

2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya 7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating
colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers'
tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de Brotherhood.
ser empleados u obreros de la misma;
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and
osbreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso,
no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley 9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and
No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado judgment rendered herein.
deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion
for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not
necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed
to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however,
we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of
orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the
powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which should
be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the
proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no
substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or
activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of a
record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion
drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of
counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the
law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction
is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of
the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the determination
of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and
expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle
any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and
employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance
with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or
purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural
dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages,
shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between
landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or
tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is
submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy
and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as
existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It
shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the
parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section
4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all
industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and
fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or
tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to
landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of
industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more
effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific
controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a
mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the
separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated
September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R.
No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of
Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act
requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard
to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it
may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted
to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural
dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be
deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further
industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy,
appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the
rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose.
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected
even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In
the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law.
ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468,
56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22
Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the
board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to
whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This
principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited
power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of
Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G.
1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach
Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed.
965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4
Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97
F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98
 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of
law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions
is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would
not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194
U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431;
United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this
assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify
orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated
hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence
Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by
confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter
be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not,
however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that
purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of
facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the
purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and
decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of
Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its
consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the
peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and
functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such
delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section
10, ibid.)
(appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to
predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by
respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by
Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner
with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in
leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer
union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner
further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial
avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence
they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of
Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal
of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments
against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion
that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at
the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant
to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and
under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial
should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to
the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence
as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth
hereinabove. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of
work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming
before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory
authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the
right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory
authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as
to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 153166 December 16, 2005
TERESITA L. VERTUDES,1 Petitioner,
vs.
JULIE BUENAFLOR and BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
review and set aside the decision2 and resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the
decision of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and
dismissing her from government service.
Petitioner Teresita L. Vertudes was a fingerprint examiner at the Alien Registration Division of the
Bureau of Immigration (BI). In a facsimile letter4 dated July 27, 1998, a certain Peng Villas, a news
editor of the Philippine Weekly Newspaper, referred to then BI Commissioner Rufus Rodriguez the
complaints of private respondent Julie Buenaflor, Amy Cosino and Manuelito Lao, against
petitioner.
According to Villas, private respondent Buenaflor complained of having been convinced by
petitioner into paying the total amount of ₱79,000.00 in exchange for the processing of her visa,
passport and other travel documents for Japan. Private respondent delivered to petitioner Security
Bank (SB) Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798 in the amounts of ₱30,000.00 and ₱20,000.00,
respectively, and cash worth ₱29,000.00. However, no visa was delivered. Private respondent
insisted that petitioner return her money, to no avail.
Villas also referred to Commissioner Rodriguez the complaint of Lao who allegedly told him that
he paid ₱60,000.00 to petitioner in exchange for a Chinese Visa and a passport for Taiwan.
Likewise, Villas referred Cosino’s complaint that the latter collected from Virfinia Dumbrique, Jaime
Santos Flores and Mariano Evangelista, the amounts of ₱20,000.00 each, upon petitioner's word
that they would be in exchange for tourist visas. Both Lao and Cosino claimed that the promised
passport and visas did not materialize and despite many requests for the return of the amounts
paid to petitioner, she refused to comply. Allegedly, "Vertudez threatened them that they cannot
force her to pay back the said amount as she has the back up [of] higher BID officials."
5
Acting upon Villas' letter, Commissioner Rodriguez issued a memorandum, directing the petitioner
to submit a sworn written explanation. In her sworn written memorandum,6 petitioner assailed the
credibility of Villas. She alleged that Villas was not a member of the National Press Club as he
claimed to be. She averred that the sum of ₱50,000.00, as evidenced by SB Check Nos. 0014797
and 0014798, was extended to her by private respondent Buenaflor as a loan. She was
constrained to borrow money from private respondent and other close friends when her brother
became seriously ill. However, she claimed that she had fully settled her obligation to private
respondent through installment. She also claimed that private respondent was the one engaged in
illegal recruitment through the use of falsified or forged passports. Private respondent was
allegedly using petitioner’s name in dealing with some immigration officials and employees to
expedite the processing of the documents of her (private respondent’s) clients. Petitioner allegedly
informed said officers and employees that she was not connected to private respondent in any
way. Private respondent allegedly resented this "abrupt disassociation." Also, her repeated refusal
to "escort" private respondent's clients who were leaving for abroad using falsified travel
documents allegedly led private respondent to threaten her that she could easily use SB Check
Nos. 0014797 and 0014798 as evidence to file charges against petitioner by making it appear that
she (private respondent) gave the money because of petitioner's promise to facilitate her travel to
Japan. Petitioner denied having received the sum of ₱29,000.00 from private respondent,
contending that such claim is "pure falsehood because of the absence of document to prove the
alleged receipt." As regards the complaints of Lao and Cosino, petitioner denied having met or
known said persons.
Finding petitioner’s explanation "unsatisfactory and [her] defense weak," Commissioner Rodriguez
issued Personnel Order No. RBR 98-60,7 preventively suspending her for sixty (60) days pending
the investigation of the case. The instant case was assigned to Special Prosecutor Norberto dela
Cruz, who issued a subpoena8 ordering private respondent and petitioner to appear before him on
October 15, 1998 for the formal investigation of the case. It appears that in the meantime, Villas
died and private respondent personally took on the instant complaint with the BI for Grave
Misconduct against petitioner, docketed as Administrative Charge No. 0004. Lao and Cosino filed
their respective complaint-affidavits9 with the BI which became the subject of another
administrative case against petitioner.10
On August 21, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Personnel Order No. RBR-
98-60) with Motion to Dismiss.11 On September 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Urgent
Prayer to Resolve Motion to Dismiss,12 averring that the complaint instituted by Villas in behalf of
private respondent was a harassment case against her. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the
instant action on the ground that in addition to the instant administrative case, private respondent
had personally filed her complaint-affidavit "of similar nature and character" with the Manila City
Prosecutor's Office, docketed as 98-H-44000-1, and with the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed
as OMB-98-1701.
Private respondent narrated the pertinent events in her complaint-affidavit13 as follows:
1. That I met Ms. Teresita Vertudes, an employee of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation,
Intramuros, Manila sometime in the middle part of 1996;
2. That from that time on, we became friends because we come from the same region and that
she used to tell us that she is capable of deploying job applicants to Japan;
3. That during one of those times that I dropped by her office, she intimated to me that a group of
Immigration Officers are scheduled to leave for Japan for training and that she was the one who
received a call from a Japanese Consul;
4. That Ms. Teresita Vertudes asked me if I am interested in going to Japan because she will find
a way to accommodate me and I told her that I am deeply interested but my problem was that my
passport was left in Bacolod City and she volunteered to work-out [and] facilitate the processing of
my passport and visa and that [all] I need to do is give her my picture which I did;
5. That she even added that she has a brother in Japan who could also help me find a job and I
will be going there along with her son, Jimmy V[e]rtudes Santos. She showed to me her son's
passport and application for a Visa, copies of which are attached and marked as Annexes "A", "B"
and "C";
6. That according to Ms. Vertudes I will be receiving a salary of one lapad per day as a factory
worker and that should I accept to her offer, all that will be required of me is to give her the amount
of ₱80,000.00;
7. That on December 24, 1997 Ms. Vertudes received from me Security Bank Check No. 0014797
in the amount of ₱30,000.00 which she was able to encash and likewise Security Bank Check No.
0014798 in the amount of ₱20,000.00 x x x Annexes "D" and "E";
8. That on February 8, 1998, because of her insistence and persistence that I should deliver the
balance of ₱30,000.00 to her so that I could leave in a week's time, I was forced to produce the
said amount by requesting a friend to pawn my jewelry in the amount of ₱29,000.00 and the
aforesaid amount was handed to Ms. Vertudes in the presence of Ms. Joy Gutierrez at her office in
(BID), Intramuros, Manila;
9. That after that last payment, I have been asking her as to when I am suppose[d] to leave
because I was already prepared to leave and have in fact told my relatives and friends that I will
be leaving soon for Japan but she did not stop making promises;
10. That upon the advi[c]e of a lawyer and to be able to know once and for all whether I could still
leave, I requested my lawyer to write a letter to Ms. Vertudes for her to refund the sums of money
which I delivered to her in the total amount of ₱79,000.00 for the processing of my Passport and
Visa for job deployment abroad but she did not even answer the letter and neither called up my
lawyer to explain her side; letter is attached as Annex "E";
11. That for Ms. Teresita Vertudes' failure to make good her promise to deploy me after receiving
the amount of ₱79,000.00 in consideration of a job placement in Japan, I hereby charge her for
the crime of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa; x x x
Annexed to private respondent's complaint-affidavit were: a) the affidavit of a certain Jessilyn
Gutierrez14 who attested that she accompanied private respondent in going to the office of
petitioner and she was with private respondent when the latter delivered to petitioner the checks
amounting to ₱50,000.00 and cash worth ₱29,000.00 for private respondent's job placement to
Japan; b) copies of the passport and application for a visa of petitioner's son, to prove that
petitioner showed these documents to her so she would believe that she would be going to Japan
with petitioner's son; c) copies of SB Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798, to prove petitioner's
receipt of the total amount of ₱50,000.00 from private respondent; and d) letter of private
respondent's counsel to petitioner demanding the refund of ₱79,000.00 from petitioner.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner, accompanied by her counsel, and private respondent appeared
before Special Prosecutor dela Cruz for the formal investigation of the case.15 The second hearing
took place on October 27, 1998, during which, petitioner submitted her Counter-Affidavit16 and the
affidavits of her witnesses. Her version was:
4.1. I first met Ms. Buenaflor sometime in 1996 when I was still assigned at the General Services
Division of the Bureau of Immigration;
4.2. At that time, Ms. Buenaflor represented to me that she was connected with a travel agency
assigned to process/facilitate documents of their clients in the Buereau of Immigration;
4.3. Indeed, I saw Ms. Buenaflor processing and making follow-ups of documents in the different
Divisions/Departments of the Bureau of Immigration similar to what were being done by the
representatives of other travel agencies transacting business therewith;
4.4. During that period, Ms. Buenaflor and me became close friends because she frequently
visited me in my office at General Services Division and would even stay thereat while processing
documents and waiting for their release. In fact, she often took her lunch and merienda with me
and sometimes, with the other employees of our division;
4.5. Sometime in the third week of December 1997, I was informed by my relatives in our
hometown that my brother, Mariano "Dido" Vertudes was seriously ill and was thereafter confined
on December 22, 1997 at Gingoog General Hospital located at Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental;
4.6. The type of illness of my brother required extensive treatment and medication; and for this
reason, they requested for financial assistance to defray the expenses therefor;
4.7. Since I was then in financial distress, I was constrained to borrow money with interests from
Ms. Buenaflor and other close friends of mine. As a kind gesture on the part of Ms. Buenaflor she
extended to me a loan in the total amount of ₱50,000.00 as represented by Security Bank check
nos. 0014797 and 0014798 in the respective amounts of ₱30,000.00 and ₱20,000.00 (citation
omitted);
4.8. It is however our agreement that I would pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 with the additional
amount of ₱10,000.00 representing the interests therefore for a total of ₱60,000.00;
4.9. We further agreed that I would pay my financial obligation to Ms. Buenaflor on or before the
last day of May 1998 from December 1997 on installment basis;
4.10. With the aforementioned amount of ₱50,000.00 loaned to me by Julie Buenaflor and the
other amounts x x x from other friends, I was able to contribute the total amount of ₱100,000.00
for the treatment and hospitalization of my brother. It was, however, to no avail because my
brother died on January 6, 1998;
4.11. Pursuant to our agreement, I was able to pay Ms. Buenaflor on installment basis the total
amount of ₱60,000.00 at my earlier indicated address on the following dates:
DATE AMOUNT
February 28, 1998 ₱15,000.00
March 31, 1998 15,000.00
April 30, 1998 15,000.00
May 30, 1998 15,000.00
4.12. I tendered the said payments to Ms. Buenaflor at my residence on the dates earlier
enumerated in the presence of my housemaids, Eliza Compo and Jocelyn Reyes; x x x
Petitioner averred that private respondent misrepresented to her (petitioner's) son, Jimmy Santos,
Jr., that she (private respondent) would facilitate his travel to and employment in Japan. She also
assailed the credibility of private respondent by accusing her of using several passports under
different names. Attached to petitioner's counter-affidavit were: a) a copy of a passport application
in the name of Honna Sumadia Araneta showing the photographs of private respondent; b)
referral slip of the Pasay City Police Station and the sworn statement of a certain Armando
Gambala charging private respondent with Estafa and Illegal Recruitment;17 c) affidavits of
petitioner's son, Jimmy Santos, Jr.,18 and a certain Enrico Tuazon, showing that they likewise filed
a case for Estafa and Illegal Recruitment against private respondent; and d) a copy of the
Certificate of Business Name and Certification19 issued by Prudential Bank, to prove that private
respondent misstated the address of her business establishment. Petitioner also submitted to
Special Prosecutor dela Cruz the Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay20of her two housemaids,
Eliza Compo and Jocelyn Reyes, to prove that she had fully paid her obligation to private
respondent. Likewise, she submitted the handwritten joint sworn statement21 of Ernesto V. Cloma
and Jhun M. Romero, media practitioners, to prove that Villas asked for petitioner’s forgiveness
before he died, admitting that he only sent his letter dated July 27, 1998 to Commissioner
Rodriguez in consideration of the amount given by private respondent.
On the same hearing, the parties agreed to submit the instant case for resolution. 22 Thus, in his
Resolution dated November 12, 1998,23 Special Prosecutor dela Cruz found petitioner guilty of
grave misconduct and recommended her dismissal from the service.
Meantime, the case instituted by private respondent with the Office of the Ombudsman was
referred to the Office of the City Prosecutor, thus:
After evaluation, the undersigned finds that the charges imputed against the respondent are not
office related and that the administrative aspect of the case had already been undertaken by the
Bureau of Immigration.
In view thereof, it is respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be referred to the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Manila for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.24 (emphases supplied)
Petitioner filed a Motion to Re-open25 with the BI, contending that the finding of the Ombudsman
that "the charges imputed against [petitioner] are not office related" clearly shows that she is not
administratively liable for grave misconduct. She moved for the re-opening of the case "to allow
her to adduce further evidence mainly based on the findings of the Ombudsman." The motion,
however, was denied for lack of merit.26
On January 12, 1999, Commissioner Rodriguez issued an order, adopting the resolution of
Special Prosecutor dela Cruz, viz:
WHEREFORE, respondent Teresita L. Vertudez is hereby found liable for grave misconduct under
PD No. 807 and the Administrative Code of 1987. Accordingly, she is ordered dismissed from the
service effective immediately with forfeiture of all benefits under the law, with prejudice to her
reinstatement in this Bureau and all its branches.
SO ORDERED.27
The order quoted the pertinent portion of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz's resolution, viz:
After carefully weighing and evaluating the versions of the complainant and the respondent, this
Office is more incline[d] to give credence to complainant's declarations that she was indeed duped
by the respondent into parting with the hard-earned money of ₱79,000.00 on the promise of the
respondent that she would secure a passport and visa for the complainant to Japan.
Respondent's alibi that the said amount was a loan from the complainant, who is her friend, is
highly unbelievable. Complainant does not appear to be a rich person who would so easily part
with such big amount of money without any security without any hope or assurance of being re-
paid.
The fact that complainant paid ₱79,000.00 to the respondent so she could get a passport and a
visa to work in Japan as a factory worker clearly showed that she was desperately in need of a
job. For her to give such amount to the respondent as an unsecured loan is extremely incredulous.
Respondent's claim that the present complaint is pure harassment by the complainant is
completely bereft of credence. What benefit or advantage would the complainant achieve in
fabricating charges against the respondent?
If the complainant filed this complaint, it was because she was wronged by the respondent.
Likewise, respondent's allegation that the ₱50,000.00 she received from the complainant was a
loan because she (respondent) was then in a financial distress and she needed money to help her
sick brother in the province was belied by her own son, Jimmy V. Santos, Jr., who declared in his
Affidavit that sometime in December 1997, he gave ₱50,000.00 to the complainant so that the
latter could obtain a tourist visa for him to Japan. Why should the respondent bother to get a
₱50,000.00 loan from the complainant to assist her ailing brother when she could readily obtain
this amount from her own son?
As to respondent's assertion that she was able to pay the ₱50,000.00 to the complainant, there is
nothing to support such payment. The statements of her two (2) maids -- Eliza C[o]mpo and
Jocelyn Reyes -- in their Sinumpaang Salaysay that respondent paid to the complainant the total
amount of ₱60,000.00 during the months of February 1998 to May 1998 cannot be believed.
Being the housemaids of the respondent, it is but natural and to be expected of these persons to
come to the aid of their employe[r].28
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial,29 reiterating her argument in her
Motion to Re-open. Again, the motion was denied.30 Subsequently, the assailed order of dismissal
was affirmed by then Department of Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas.31
Petitioner appealed to the CSC,32 raising the issues of lack of due process and lack of substantial
evidence. On November 19, 1999, the CSC dismissed petitioner's appeal. It held, in part, that:
A careful study of the records in the light of the arguments of appellant reveals that the
requirements of due process have been duly observed in the proceedings had in this case.
xxx
As to the second issue, the Commission finds substantial evidence to prove that respondent
receive[d] money in exchange for her services in facilitating the issuance of passport and visa of
Julie Bernardo (sic).
The complaint-affidavit of Julie Buenaflor is reproduced in part as follows: x x x
In the absence of any improper motive or malice on the part of the witness to foist said charges on
respondent, the Commission is inclined to give credence to the statements of witness Bernardo
(sic). In fact Vertudez has admitted that she received money from Buenaflor but argued that the
money was a mere loan. However, if this were true, Buenaflor should have demanded for a
collateral, considering the amount involved. Vertudez failed to present any evidence that she gave
any security in return for said loan which makes her version highly incredible. x x x33
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration34 of the CSC's Resolution, to no avail. The CSC held:
In so far as Vertudez'[s] illegal recruitment activities are concerned, the Commission finds the
existence of clear substantial evidence to establish the same. Evidence presented all point to the
fact that Vertudez solicited money from BI clients in return for a visa to Japan. The witnesses
against Vertudez include Peng Villas (Deceased), Julie Buenflor (sic), Amy Cosino, Virginia
Lubriano, Manuelito Lao and Jaime Santos Flores. The affidavits of said witnesses all speak of the
modus operandi of Vertudez at the BI, where she approaches BI clients and offers them a visa,
passport and an employment contract in exchange for ₱120,000.00. In the case of witness Julie
Buenaflor, she testified that respondent assured her of a visa, a passport and a job in Japan for a
fee of ₱80,000.00 and that Vertudez after getting paid failed to fulfill her promise.
It is observed that Vertudez seeks to destroy the credibility of witness Buenaflor by implying that
the former has a pending case for illegal recruitment and estafa. Records, however, show that the
charges against witness Buenaflor all came up after Vertudez was formally charged by the BI and
that such charges have no reasonable connection with her administrative case pending before the
Commission. In this regard, "There being nothing in record to show that witnesses were actuated
by any improper motive, their testimony shall be entitled to full faith and credit."(People v. Flores,
252 SCRA 31)35
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA, raising the issues of: a) whether or
not the BI and CSC violated petitioner's right to due process; b) whether or not respondents erred
in finding that the alleged illegal recruitment activity of the petitioner had a direct relation to and
connected with the performance of her duties and responsibilities as an employee of the BI; and c)
whether or not there is substantial evidence to support the finding that petitioner is an illegal
recruiter, thus, warranting her removal from public service.36
On February 12, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA found that
"petitioner was given more than ample opportunity to ventilate her defense and disprove the
charges leveled against her, hence, there can be no denial of her right to due
process."37 Moreover, it held that "there is more than substantial evidence proving the charge of
grave misconduct against petitioner."38 The CA ratiocinated that:
In the proceedings a quo, it was established that petitioner, indeed, received and encashed the
two (2) checks given by private respondent in the total amount of Php50,000.00. This fact,
therefore, gives credence to the claim of private respondent that she gave petitioner two (2)
checks in consideration of the latter's promise to facilitate her employment abroad. This being the
case, the burden was shifted to petitioner to refute this established fact through equally weighty
and competent evidence.
Now, petitioner admitted having received, and encashed, the two checks from private respondent
but offered the excuse that the same was extended to her as a loan. Aside from her testimony and
that of her household helpers to prove this assertion, no other independent and unbiased
evidence was offered to prove the fact of loan. As it is, her theory of loan stands on flimsy ground
and is not sufficient enough to overthrow the fact established by complainant. This considering
that it is highly improbable and even contrary to human experience for a person to loan a huge
amount of money as Php50,000.00 without any document evidencing such loan nor a collateral to
secure its payment. Note even that the two checks were made payable to "cash," a bearer
instrument, and was not even crossed on its face, hence, can be encashed by any person holding
the negotiable instrument. If, indeed, private respondent gave the two checks to petitioner as a
clean loan (without any collateral) without any separate document embodying their loan
agreement, the latter should have at least been made the payee of the checks and a
memorandum written at the back of the check to the effect that it is being extended as a loan, in
order to protect the interest of the lender. This is conventional business practice which is
altogether absent in the case at bar, hence, petitioner's theory of loan must necessarily crumble.39
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,40 contending that the CA failed to resolve the issue of
whether petitioner's alleged illegal recruitment activities are directly connected with her duties and
responsibilities as a Fingerprint Examiner of the BI. This motion was denied. 41
Undaunted, petitioner filed this petition, summing up the issues as follows:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW THE DECISION
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 58766;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS RESOLVED THE SECOND ISSUE RAISED
IN THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED BEFORE IT;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS
THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT;
4. WHETHER OR NOT A PROMISE TO FACILITATE EMPLOYMENT OF ANOTHER ABROAD
CONSTITUTES GRAVE MISCONDUCT[;]
5. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ACCORDED DUE PROCESS;
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT CONSTITUTING GRAVE MISCONDUCT MUST HAVE A
DIRECT RELATION TO THE FUNCTION OF THE PUBLIC OFFICE HELD BY RESPONDENTS
IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES; AND
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED ACT COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONER IS DIRECTLY
RELATED TO ANY OF HER FUNCTIONS AS FINGERPRINT EXAMINER AT THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION.42
The petition is denied.
We shall first resolve the issue of due process. Petitioner contends that the essential requirements
of due process as laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations43 and Doruelo v.
COMELEC44 were violated in the case at bar. First, she contends that she was denied of her right
to a full hearing when she was not accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
against her, as provided under Section 48, par. 5, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987. She allegedly raised this issue in her appeal before the CSC.45
The argument is unmeritorious.
We have explained the meaning of the right to cross-examination as a vital element of due
process as follows:
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it
criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial
powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one
which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the
right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a
witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-
examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed
to remain in the record.46 (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot argue that she was deprived of due process simply because
no cross-examination took place. Nothing on record shows that petitioner asked for cross-
examination during the formal investigation conducted by Special Prosecutor dela Cruz. Notably,
two hearings were conducted, during which, both private respondent and petitioner appeared.
During the hearing dated October 27, 1998, both parties agreed to submit the case for resolution
after petitioner submitted her counter-affidavit and the affidavits of her witnesses. In fact, when
petitioner filed her Motion to Re-open the case with the BI, she did not question the lack of cross-
examination during the investigation proceedings. She merely based her motion on the order of
the Office of the Ombudsman finding the charge against her as "not office related." In the same
pleading, she admitted that "[a]s early as October 27, 1998, the instant administrative action has
been submitted for resolution after the contending parties have submitted their respective
evidence" and that her move for the re-opening of the administrative case was merely "to allow
her to adduce further evidence mainly based on the findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman." Again, in her Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial of Commissioner
Rodriguez's order of dismissal, she merely reiterated her arguments in her Motion to Re-open.
She never complained that she was deprived of her right to cross-examination during the
investigation of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz. The right to cross-examination being a personal
right, petitioner must be deemed to have waived this right by agreeing to submit the case for
resolution and not questioning the lack of it in the proceedings before the BI.
More importantly, it is well-settled that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is
an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.47 This was clearly satisfied in the case at bar. Records show that petitioner
not only gave her sworn written explanation of the charges against her during the initial stage of
the investigation, she also submitted: a) a sworn counter-affidavit refuting the charges against her,
with all the attached annexes as evidence; b) a Motion to Re-open the case with the BI; c) a
Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial with the BI; d) an Appeal to the CSC; e) a Motion for
Reconsideration with the CSC; f) an Appeal to the CA; g) a Motion for Reconsideration with the
CA; and h) the instant petition for review.
Second, petitioner contends that Commissioner Rodriguez violated the principle that "the tribunal
or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision"
when his denial of her Motion to Re-open and his order finding her guilty of grave misconduct
were based exclusively on the resolution of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz.48
This argument is likewise unavailing.
There is nothing essentially wrong in the head of a bureau adopting the recommendation of a
subordinate. Section 47, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the chief of bureau or
office or department the power to delegate the task of investigating a case to a
subordinate.49 What due process demands is for the chief of the bureau to personally weigh and
assess the evidence which the subordinate has gathered and not merely to rely on the
recommendation of said investigating officer.50
In the case at bar, the order of Commissioner Rodriguez enjoys the disputable presumption that
official duties have been regularly performed. That his decision quotes the resolution of Special
Prosecutor dela Cruz does not necessarily imply that he did not personally examine the affidavits
and evidence presented by the parties. Petitioner's bare assertion that Commissioner Rodriguez
did not personally examine the evidence, without more, is not sufficient to overcome this
presumption.
Third, petitioner contends that the CSC did not have basis in finding: a) that the affidavits of "Peng
Villas (Deceased), Julie Buenaflor, Amy Cosino, Virginia Lubriano, Manuelito Lao and Jaime
Santos Flores x x x all speak of the modus operandi of Vertudez at the BI" as these affidavits were
not submitted to the CSC; and b) that petitioner "solicited money from BI clients" inasmuch as
private respondent never alleged that she was a BI client. Moreover, the CSC's finding that private
respondent "testified that respondent assured her of a visa, a passport and a job in Japan for a fee
of ₱80,000.00 and that Vertudez, after getting paid, failed to fulfill her promise" is not supported by
the complaint-affidavit of private respondent which merely stated that petitioner "volunteered to
work-out and facilitate the processing of [private respondent's] passport and visa" and that
petitioner "has a brother in Japan who could also help [private respondent] find a job."51 Petitioner
also assails the failure of the BI and CSC to consider the handwritten joint sworn statement of
media practitioners Cloma and Romero and the joint affidavit of the housemaids of petitioner,
Compo and Reyes.52
Again, these arguments fail to impress.
It is settled that only questions of law are entertained in petitions for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.53 It is not the function of this Court, in a petition under Rule 45, to
scrutinize, weigh and analyze evidence all over again.54 Well-settled is the rule that the findings of
fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the BI and the CSC, are accorded not only respect but even
finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.55 Substantial evidence is such
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise.56
In the case at bar, we note that contrary to petitioner's stance, the affidavits of Lao and Cosino do
appear in the records of the CSC.57 In any case, the affidavits of Villas, Cosino, Lubriano, Lao and
Flores are of little relevance to the case at bar. If any, they are merely corroborating evidence.
Note that it was only in the CSC's resolution on petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration that said
affidavits were mentioned. These affidavits were not used as basis for the decision rendered by
the BI, the main decision of the CSC denying the appeal of petitioner and the decision of the CA.
We find the unanimous finding of guilt of the BI, the CSC and the CA amply supported by the
following evidence on record: a) the complaint-affidavit of private respondent; b) the affidavit of
Jessilyn Gutierrez; c) copies of the passport and application for a visa of petitioner's son; d) copies
of SB Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798; and e) letter of private respondent's counsel to
petitioner demanding from petitioner the refund of the ₱79,000.00 that private respondent paid to
petitioner.
As to the other contentions, we note that in addition to the self-serving quotations of petitioner
from the complaint-affidavit of private respondent, said complaint-affidavit categorically alleged
that petitioner told private respondent that the latter would "be receiving a salary of one lapad per
day as a factory worker and that should [she] accept [petitioner's] offer, all that [would] be required
of [her was] to give [petitioner] the amount of ₱80,000.00." Private respondent also categorically
alleged that she was charging petitioner for her "failure to make good her promise to deploy [her]
after receiving the amount of ₱79,000.00 in consideration of a job placement in Japan." Thus,
contrary to petitioner's stance, the assailed findings of the CSC are supported by private
respondent's complaint-affidavit.
Moreover, it is well-settled that it is not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for
that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses. Administrative decisions on matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and
can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. None of these
vices has been shown in this case.58
We shall now proceed to the other issue: whether petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct
warranting her removal from government service.
Citing Sarigumba v. Pasok,59 petitioner contends that "[m]isconduct, warranting removal from
office of a public officer, must have a direct relation to and connected with the performance of
official duties, amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to
discharge the duties of the office." Since the BI is a government agency principally responsible for
the administration and enforcement of immigration, citizenship and alien admission and
registration laws, "by no stretch of imagination" can there be a direct relation between the function
of a fingerprint examiner and the alleged promise to facilitate private respondent's employment
abroad.60Petitioner also capitalizes on the allegation of private respondent in her complaint-
affidavit that she and petitioner "became friends" to contend that the acts being imputed against
her are personal and not office-related.61
These arguments lack merit.
The allegations in private respondent’s complaint-affidavit indicate that petitioner used her position
as a BI employee to assure private respondent that she could facilitate petitioner's deployment to
Japan. Private respondent alleged that "during one of those times that [she] dropped by
[petitioner's] office, [petitioner] intimated to [her] that a group of Immigration officers [were]
scheduled to leave for Japan for training and that [petitioner] was the one who received a
call from a Japanese Consul." Petitioner "asked [private respondent] if [she was] interested in
going to Japan because [petitioner] will find a way to accommodate [her]."
Even petitioner's own admissions show that her position as an employee of the BI may be utilized
in connection with illegal recruitment. In her memorandum to Commissioner Rodriguez, as
reiterated in her counter-affidavit, petitioner alleged that private respondent was engaged in illegal
recruitment and "was using [petitioner's] name in her dealings with some immigration
officials and employees, presumably to expedite the processing of the documents IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February 12,
belonging to her clients." Petitioner likewise claimed that she "declined [private respondent's] 2002 and Resolution dated April 16, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58766 are AFFIRMED.
proposal that [she] 'escort' some of [private respondent's] clients who would be leaving for
foreign countries but with falsified travel documents." Private respondent even told her that SO ORDERED.
the "proposed scheme could easily be done because being an employee of this Bureau,
[petitioner has] several connections not only at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
REYNATO S. PUNO
(NAIA) but also in Mactan International Airport."

That her position is designated as "fingerprint examiner" is not determinative of the issue of
whether the charge against her is work-related. The allegations in the complaint against petitioner
and her own admissions show that her duties go beyond her job title and that the charge against
her is connected with her position as an employee of the BI.

Finally, petitioner contends that "a promise to find a way to accommodate private respondent and
a representation that petitioner has a brother who could help private respondent find a job are not
misconduct warranting the dismissal of petitioner from office" but, "[a]t most," only "entitle[s]
private respondent to civil indemnity." Petitioner contends that the CA's finding that petitioner
merely made a "promise to facilitate" private respondent's employment abroad, as distinguished
from the CSC's finding that petitioner committed "shameful illegal recruitment activities," practically
absolved petitioner from the charge of grave misconduct.

This argument deserves scant consideration.

Misconduct has been defined as an intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law
or standard of behavior, especially by a
government official.62 As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of
grave misconduct.63 Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an
official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure
some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.64 An act
need not be tantamount to a crime for it to be considered as grave misconduct as in fact, crimes
involving moral turpitude are treated as a separate ground for dismissal under the Administrative
Code.65

In the case at bar, petitioner cannot downplay the charges against her. Whether the charges
against petitioner satisfy the elements of illegal recruitment to make her criminally liable for such
crime is not the issue at bar. At the very least, petitioner was found to have taken advantage of her
position as an employee of the BI to falsely promise, for pecuniary gain, the facilitation of private
respondent's travel to Japan, including the processing of her passport, visa and other travel
documents. Worse, she was found to have refused to reimburse the amounts paid to her by
private respondent even when the promised passport, visa, and travel documents did not
materialize. Undoubtedly, these acts involve "corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rule." Under Section 23(c), Rule XIV the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, these acts constitute a grave offense for which petitioner must suffer the penalty of
dismissal.
 Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. 172215
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
FIRST DIVISION JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 3 OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BAGUIO CITY, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, PATERNO AQUINO,
G.R. No. 160025 April 23, 2014 RICHARD LABERINTO, ROLANDO ABELLERA, FERNANDO SANGALANG, ALLAN ATOS,
ANGELINO SANGALANG, CITY OF BAGUIO, AND CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D.
YARANON, Respondents.
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO CITY, Petitioner,
vs.
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Respondent. x-----------------------x

x-----------------------x G.R. No. 172216

G.R. No. 163052 JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 03 REGIONAL TRIAL
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner, COURT OF BAGUIO CITY, Respondent.
vs.
MAYOR BERNARDO M. VERGARA, CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO, VICE MAYOR BETTY
LOURDES F. TABANDA, VICE MAYOR OF BAGUIO, COUNCILOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, x-----------------------x
COUNCILOR ELMER O. DATUIN, COUNCILOR ANTONIO R. TABORA, JR., COUNCILOR
GALO D. WEYGAN, COUNCILOR EDILBERTO B. TENEFRANCIA, COUNCILOR FEDERICO J. G.R. No. 173043
MANDAPAT, JR., COUNCILOR RICHARD A. CARINO, COUNCILOR FAUSTINO A. OLOWAN,
COUNCILOR DELFIN V. BALAJADIA, COUNCILOR RUFINO M. PANAGAN, CITY JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
SECRETARY RONALDO B. PEREZ, SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG vs.
BAGUIO,Respondents. CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Respondent.

x-----------------------x x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 164107 G.R. No. 174879

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner, JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs. vs.
CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Respondent. ACTING CITY MAYOR AND FORMERLY VICE MAYOR AND PRESIDING OFFICER OF THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO, REINALDO A. BAUTISTA, JR., MEMBERS OF
x-----------------------x THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO, LEONARDO B. YANGOT, JR., ROCKY
THOMAS A. BALISONG, EDILBERTO B. TENEFRANCIA, FAUSTINO A. OLOWAN, GALO P.
G.R. No. 165564 WEYGAN, FEDERICO J. MANDAP AT, PERLITA L. CHAN-RONDEZ, ANTONIO R. TABORA,
JOSE M. MOLINTAS AND RUFINO M. PANAGAN AND CITY LEGAL OFFICER MELCHOR
CARLOS R. RABANES, Respondents.
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Respondent. x-----------------------x

x-----------------------x G.R. No. 181488

CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Petitioner,
vs.
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, ACTING BY AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT, AND HON. RONALDO
V. PUNO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court are nine (9) Petitions involving essentially the same parties - officials of the City
Government of Baguio and Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell). The only party here
that is neither an official of the City Government of Baguio nor an officer of Jadewell is former
Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan.
The two principal parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on 26 June 2000,
whereby the City of Baguio authorized Jadewell to regulate and collect parking fees for on-street
parking in the city, as well as to implement the installation of modern parking meters.
The legal disputes embodied in the nine Petitions began when the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Baguio City (Sanggunian) revoked the MOA through City Resolution No. 037, Series of 2002
(Resolution 37), alleging substantial breach of the MOA on the part of Jadewell. Then Mayor
Alfredo Vergara vetoed the Resolution. The Sanggunian Panlungsod overrode the veto through an
unnumbered Resolution dated 17 April 2002. These twin Resolutions constitute what we call here
as the first act of Rescission1 of the MOA by the city officials of Baguio. Jadewell denied the
breach and commenced an action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio,2questioning
the validity of the MOA’s revocation and the Sanggunian’s capacity to pass a resolution revoking
the MOA.
There was a second act of rescission that the city officials of Baguio performed in 2006, the
circumstances of which will be narrated later on.
While the main case was under litigation, and then under appeal, the parties filed contempt
charges against each other. Six of these cases are part of the consolidated Petitions before us.
These nine highly-voluminous cases, however, all boil down essentially to just these five sets of
legal questions requiring resolution:
(a) The validity or invalidity and legal efficacy of Saggunian’s two distinct acts of
rescission of the MOA;
(b) The duty of a trial judge to dismiss a case assailing the validity of the MOA and the
city resolution approving it in view of the pendency of the various petitions before this
Court;
(c) the liability of : (i) respondent city officials of Baguio, for various counts of indirect
contempt of this court, (ii) some respondents, who are lawyers at the same time, for acts
that require the disciplinary action of disbarment, (iii) respondent Judge Pamintuan, for
taking cognizance of a civil case allegedly in defiance of this Court’s authority;
(d) the validity of the administrative suspension of one of the respondents herein, former
Mayor Braulio Yaranon, by the Office of the President in relation to his acts of non-
recognition of the MOA; and
(e) the nullification of certain acts of officials of Baguio City directed against Jadewell
pursuant to their belief that the latter had no authority to continue implementing the terms
of the MOA.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
On 1 March 1999, Jadewell proposed the privatization3 of the administration of on-street parking in
Baguio City using Schlumberger’s DG4S Pay and Display Parking Meter (hereinafter "DG4S
P&D"), which it touted as "technologically advanced, up to the level of more progressive countries
and which would make the city as the first and only city in the Philippines, if not in Asia, to have
metered parking as an important part of its traffic and parking system."4
Respondent Sanggunian acted favorably on the proposal.5 On 31 May 2000, it passed Resolution
No. 159, Series of 1999, authorizing the City Mayor of Baguio to negotiate and enter into a
Memorandum of Agreement with Jadewell for the installation of its proposed DG4S parking
technology.6
On 16 July 1999, the City Mayor of Baguio wrote to Jadewell, transmitting to it the finalized draft of
the MOA, with amendments emanating from his office. The City Mayor informed Jadewell that the
finalization of the MOA would be subject to the appropriate action of the Sanggunian and the
passage of an enabling ordinance.7
On 27 March 2000, respondent Sanggunian enacted City Ordinance No. 003, Series of 2000
(Ordinance No. 003-2000) amending Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1983, outlining the rules and
policy on the privatization of the administration of on-street parking in the city streets of
Baguio.8 For this purpose, the City of Baguio authorized the intervention of a private operator for
the regulation, charging and collection of parking fees and the installation of modern parking
meters, among others.
On 10 April 2000, the City Legal Officer of Baguio City advised the City Mayor that the project for
the regulation of on-street parking and installation of parking meters was not an infrastructure.
Hence, the project was not covered by the Build-Operate-Transfer Law9 and did not require
publication of a notice for its validity.10
Nevertheless, for the sake of transparency, the City Legal Officer recommended the publication of
the appropriate notice on the project and an invitation to bid. An invitation to bid for the proposed
regulation of on-street parking and installation of parking meters on Baguio City’s streets was
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on 8, 9 and 10 May 2000. Four interested bidders
submitted their proposals, but three were disqualified. The bid of Jadewell was the only one not
disqualified; hence, it was awarded the project.11
On 26 June 2000, the MOA was finally executed between Jadewell and the City of Baguio –
through its then City Mayor, Mauricio G. Domogan – for the installation, management and
operation of the DG4S P&D parking meters.12
On 17 July 2000, the Sanggunian confirmed the MOA through its Resolution No. 205-2000.13
On 31 August 2000, the parties executed a supplemental MOA to include the Ganza/Burnham
parking space, owned by the Philippine Tourism Authority and managed by the City of Baguio, in
the project.14 This supplemental agreement was neither confirmed nor ratified by the Sanggunian.
In September of 2000, Jadewell began to mobilize and take over the parking facilities at the
Ganza/Burnham Park area.15 Around this time, questions arose regarding the compliance by
Jadewell with the provisions of the MOA, notably on matters such as obtaining the
recommendation from the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for the installation
of the parking meters and the legality of the collection of parking fees being done by its parking
attendants prior to the installation of the parking meters at Burnham Park.16
On 20 December 2000, Jadewell wrote then Vice-Mayor Daniel T. Fariñas to inform him of the
progress of the deputization by the Department of Transportation and Communications–Land
Transportation Office (DOTC-LTO) of parking attendants required for the implementation of the
MOA. Jadewell explained that they were still working on the required deputization of Jadewell’s
parking attendants. Nevertheless, it claimed that its parking attendants were authorized to collect
parking fees pending the actual installation of the parking meters. It also claimed that the parking
meters had not yet been installed because the necessary civil works were yet to be completed. 17
Shortly thereafter, a case was filed by Edgar M. Avila, et al. with the RTC-Baguio City (Branch 61),
assailing Ordinance No. 003-2000 as unconstitutional and seeking to restrain the City Government
of Baguio from implementing the provisions of the MOA. It further alleged that the City
Government could not delegate the designation of pay parking zones to Jadewell, that the parking
attendants deployed by Jadewell were not deputized, and that the questioned ordinance creates
class legislation as the designated taxi and jeepney stands were discriminatorily removed. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4892-R.18 This was dismissed on motion by Jadewell joined
by the City Government of Baguio. The lower court declared that Ordinance No. 003-2000 is
constitutional and that all acts emanating from it are deemed "reasonable and non-
discriminatory...having been enacted in accordance with the powers granted to Baguio City by
law."19 Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration (MR) was denied.
On 24 August 2001, Edgar Avila, et al., filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus with the Supreme Court assailing the RTC’s dismissal of their Complaint. The case
was docketed as G.R. No. 149642. On 10 October 2001, this Court issued a Resolution
dismissing the petition of Avila, et al. for failure to state in their petition the material dates when
they received the appealed resolution and order, and to append the original or certified true copies
of the questioned resolution and order subject of their petition.20 There was no resolution on the
merits. The Resolution became final and executory on 2 April 2002.21
A case was also filed by Nelia G. Cid against then Mayor Bernardo Vergara, et al. when her
vehicle was clamped, towed away, and impounded by Jadewell after the latter found her car to be
illegally parked. She refused to pay the corresponding fees to Jadewell and as a result, the latter
refused to release her vehicle.22 Cid filed a case for replevin and questioned the validity of
Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the MOA, as well as the authority of Jadewell to clamp down/tow
away vehicles whose owners refuse to pay parking fees. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 5165-R and was assigned to Branch 7 of RTC-Baguio. On 24 May 2002, an Omnibus Order
was issued by this RTC that addressed several pending incidents related to the authority of
Jadewell to clamp down/tow away vehicles. The Omnibus Order upheld Jadewell’s authority to
retain the vehicle of petitioner Nelia G. Cid pending her payment of the parking and towage fees to
Jadewell, and held that the authority of Jadewell was lawfully provided in Ordinance No. 003-2000
and the MOA. Also, the RTC-Baguio took cognizance of the ruling by this Court in G.R. No.
149642 which, in its mistaken view, upheld the validity of the questioned ordinance and the
MOA.23
Ultimately, Jadewell was able to install no more than 14 parking meters in three (3) areas of
Baguio City: six (6) on Session Road, five (5) on Harrison Road and three (3) on Lake Drive.24 At
the time that these meters were installed, there were already verbal complaints being raised
against Jadewell by the Sanggunian for the following alleged violations:
a. Failure to install parking meters for each parking space as specified in Section 3-F of
Ordinance No. 003-2000;25
b. Failure to install a convenient and technologically advanced parking device that is
solar-powered and can measure the time a vehicle stays in a parking slot;26
c. Failure to give the City of Baguio the latter's share of the collected parking fee;27
d. Failure to post a performance bond in the amount of ₱1 million after its previous bond
expired.28
The Sanggunian passed Resolution No. 395, Series of 2000, directing Jadewell to comply with its
obligations under the MOA for the installation of the necessary number of parking meters. 29
On 15 March 2001, Jadewell wrote to the City Mayor in response to the mentioned Resolution,
informing the said office that the former had started operation of the off-street parking on 2
December 2000 and of the on-street parking on 15 December 2000.30 On 27 January 2001,
Jadewell also wrote the City Treasurer that the former had completed installation of the parking
meters.31
In response to the letter of Jadewell, the City Treasurer demanded the remittance of Baguio’s
share of the parking fees collected by Jadewell since it started operations. Jadewell responded by
saying that it had complied with this obligation.32
On 19 February 2002, the Sanggunian passed Resolution 37,33 expressing its intent to rescind the
MOA with Jadewell. The said Resolution enumerated in the "Whereas" clauses the alleged
violations of Jadewell prompting it to rescind the MOA. It reads:
xxxx
WHEREAS, it now appears from verified facts that:
1. contrary to its commitment to install a technologically based P & D parking system, at
no cost to the City, including "such equipment and paraphernalia to meter the length of
usage of the affected parking spaces for purposes of payment of the parking fees",
Jadewell has installed only fourteen (14) parking meters (only 12 of which are working) in
only three (3) streets, and Jadewell does not intend to install anymore [sic]; instead it has
resorted as a rule to an exceptional circumstance of manual collection of parking fees by
parking attendants who, despite express provisions of the Ordinance, are not duly
deputized by the DOTC-LTO. Despite assurances to the Honorable City Mayor that
Jadewell would stop collection of parking fees until the parking meters have been duly
installed, Jadewell continues to collect parking fees manually by using undeputized
parking attendants to do the collection;
2. contrary to its commitment to install a technologically based P & D parking system, at
no cost to the City, Jadewell has charged the cost of such and similar equipment as direct
costs, thus substantially eroding the share of the City in the parking fees;
3. contrary to its obligation to post a performance bond, Jadewell has not fully complied,
and when required to update its performance bond Jadewell refused to do so rationalizing
its non-compliance by the assertion that they are already performing and therefore are no
longer obligated to post a performance bond;
4. contrary to its obligation to remit the share of the City within the first ten (10) days of
the following month, Jadewell had initially resisted making payments to the City on the
pretext that the profits cannot be determined until after the end of the fiscal year and
initially failed to have their tickets pre-numbered and registered with the Office of the City
Treasurer;
5. contrary to its promise that the City would derive substantial revenue from the on-street
pay parking system, Jadewell has not paid a single centavo of the City share in on-street
parking operation; whatever Jadewell has remitted to the City are properly chargeable
against the share of the City in the MOA on off-street parking (the Burnham Parking Area
near Ganza), and it appears less than what the City is entitled thereto; and
6. contrary to its representations that the P & D System which it proposed would eliminate
fraud in the collection of parking fees, Jadewell has perpetrated fraud on the City by,
according to the affidavit of its former bookkeeper, Mr. Adonis Cabungan, doctoring the
financial statements before the same are submitted to City authorities.34
WHEREAS, there has been no substantial improvement of the traffic situation in the City even with
the introduction of the P & D Parking System and thus it increasingly appears that the system
introduced by Jadewell is more for revenue raising than for regulatory purposes. As a
consequence the legal principle applies that the collection of taxes cannot be let to any person. In
other words, government cannot allow private persons to collect public funds for themselves with
the agreement that part thereof or as it turned out in this case no part thereof is shared with the
City;
WHEREAS, in its financial reports to the City showing substantial loses [sic] and in its statement to
other persons that it is losing money on the project, the kindest thing that the City can do for
Jadewell is to prevent Jadewell from incurring anymore [sic] loses.
NOW THEREFORE, on motion of Hon. Bautista, and Hon. Cariño, seconded by Hon. Yaranon,
Hon. Weygan and Hon. Tabora, be it RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to rescind the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed between the City of Baguio and Jadewell Parking
System Corporation dated 26 June 2000 on the basis of the foregoing premises and exercising its
rights under Section 12 of the MOA on the subject of On-Street Parking executed between the
City of Baguio and Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation dated 26 June 2000 and, more
importantly, performing its duty to protect and promote the general welfare of the people of Baguio
City.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to direct the City Legal Officer to cause the proper notice of rescission to
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation forthwith and to take all appropriate steps to implement
and enforce the intent of this Resolution.
RESOLVED FURTHERMORE, to inform all City officials and employees and all other persons
concerned to be guided accordingly.35
On 1 March 2002, the then City Mayor of Baguio, Bernardo M. Vergara, vetoed Resolution 37,
through a letter dated 1 March 2002 addressed to the Vice-Mayor, as Presiding Officer of the
Sanggunian, and its members. Mayor Vergara reasoned that it was premature for the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to rescind the MOA, because the latter provides for a minimum period
of five years before the right of rescission can be exercised; and, that the right of Jadewell to due
process was violated due to the lack of opportunity to hear the latter’s side. The City Mayor
proposed a re-negotiation of the MOA with Jadewell as a solution to the problem.36
Meanwhile, on 13 March 2002, the DOTC–Cordillera Autonomous Region (DOTC-CAR) issued a
cease and desist order to Jadewell prohibiting it from clamping down and/or towing away vehicles
in Baguio City for violation of traffic rules and regulations.37
On 17 April 2002, the Sanggunian resolved through a Resolution of the same date, to override the
veto of the City Mayor, worded thus:
NOW THEREFORE, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (City Council) in Regular Session assembled,
by twelve affirmative votes constituting more that [sic] a two-thirds vote of all its Members, has
resolved to override, as it hereby overrides, the veto of His Honor, Mayor Bernardo M. Vergara, of
City Resolution Numbered 037, Series of 2002, entitled "Rescinding the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) Executed Between the City of Baguio and Jadewell Parking Systems
Corporation Dated 26 June 2000."38
Also at this time, Braulio D. Yaranon, who was then a member of the Sanggunian, requested a
special audit from the Commission on Audit–Cordillera Autonomous Region (COA-CAR) on the
operations of Jadewell as regards the pay parking project embodied in the MOA.
On 27 May 2002, Jadewell filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
assailing the validity of Resolution No. 037-2002, which rescinded the MOA between the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Jadewell.39 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5285-R and
was raffled off to RTC-Baguio (Branch 61).
On 8 October 2002, the RTC Br. 61 promulgated its Decision40 finding the Sanggunian’s
rescission of the MOA unlawful. The Sanggunian then filed an appeal assailing the RTC’s decision
with the Court of Appeals; the case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74756.
Meanwhile, pending resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 74756 before the CA, the Sanggunian passed
Resolution No. 089, Series of 2003. The resolution sought the assistance of the DOTC-CAR
specifically, for it to take immediate action against the officers and personnel of Jadewell for
defying the 13 March 2002 cease-and-desist Order it issued prohibiting the latter from clamping
down and/or towing away vehicles.41 On 27 May 2003, City Mayor Vergara approved and signed
Resolution No. 089-2003. In response, Jadewell filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt with the CA
against Mayor Vergara, the Sanggunian and other local government officers. The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77341. The original petition was followed by three (3) supplemental
petitions filed by Jadewell in the same case.
On 7 July 2003, the CA rendered a Decision42 in CA G.R. SP No. 74756, affirming the assailed
Decision of the trial court which declared as invalid the Sanggunian’s rescission of the MOA. The
Sanggunian filed a Motion For Reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA through a
Resolution dated 4 September 2003.43 Aggrieved by the denial of their appeal, the Sanggunian
filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, seeking to reverse and set aside
the 7 July 2003 Decision and its Resolution dated 04 September 2003 of the CA. The petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 160025, the first of the consolidated petitions herein.44
In CA-G.R. SP No. 77341, the CA dismissed in a Decision45 promulgated on 28 July 2004 the
contempt petitions filed by Jadewell for lack of merit. The latter’s Motion For Reconsideration was
likewise denied by the CA.46Jadewell elevated the dismissal of its contempt petitions to this Court
on 8 December 2004 by filing a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari. The case was docketed
as G.R. No. 166094. This is not among the consolidated petitions herein.
On 13 July 2003, the COA-CAR promulgated the requested Report.47 The Report’s objective was
to ascertain compliance by the contracting parties – the City of Baguio and Jadewell – with
Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the MOA. The COA-CAR Report has 12 findings, essentially as
follows:
1) The provisions of the MOA and its Supplement as regards the sharing of the fees are
contradicting, hence the share of the City Government cannot be determined;48
2) There was no proper segregation by area of the parking fees collected, hence the
proper share of Baguio City cannot be determined;49
3) The City Government did not strictly implement the collection of penalties arising from
the late remittances of Jadewell, hence additional revenues were not collected;50
4) The City Treasurer did not conduct an audit of the books and accounts of Jadewell,
thus the City Government’s share from parking fees cannot be ascertained;51
5) The use of the P&D parking meters were [sic] not maximized due to Jadewell’s non-
compliance with Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the MOA, resulting in the collection of
meager income from its use;52
6) The MOA does not specify the guidelines for determining the economic viability of
installing the parking meters and the period within which to install it [sic];53
7) The Supplemental MOA was not confirmed by the City Council of Baguio in violation of
R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code);54
8) The coverage of the parking operations contained in Annex "A" of the MOA was not
confirmed by the City Council in violation of R.A. No. 7160;55
9) The City Government failed to ensure proper compliance by Jadewell with the MOA
provisions;56
10) The pay parking project was awarded to a bidder who did not have all the
qualifications as stated in the "Invitation to Bid" in violation of R.A. No. 7160 and Audit
Circular No. 92-386;57
11) The provisions on deputization in Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the MOA are contrary
to R.A. No. 4136 (the Land Transportation and Traffic Code), thus rendering it invalid;58
12) The monthly minimum amount to be remitted to the City Government is doubtful due
to the discrepancy in the amounts collected and expenses for the year 1999 provided by
the City Government to Jadewell as against the amount certified by the Office of the City
Architect and Parks Superintendent-Burnham Parks Office for the City Government
overseeing the Ganza-Burnham parking spaces.59
On 11 February 2004, after G.R. No. 160025 was filed and pending resolution by this Court, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod adopted Resolution No. 056, Series of 2004. The said Resolution
informs the general public that Jadewell had neither the authority nor the police power to clamp,
tow, or impound vehicles at any place in the City of Baguio.60 Also, on the same date, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod passed Resolution No. 059, Series of 2004, in which it made a formal
demand upon Jadewell to restore to it possession of the Ganza Parking Area.61
With these developments, Jadewell filed directly with this Court its first indirect contempt case
against Bernardo M. Vergara (then City Mayor of Baguio), its Vice-Mayor, and the entire City
Council for enacting Resolution Nos. 056 & 059, Series of 2004 pending resolution by this Court of
G.R. 160025. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 163052.
On 23 June 2004, this Court through its First Division, ordered G.R. No. 163052 consolidated with
G.R. No. 160025.62
On 1 July 2004, then Baguio City Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon issued Executive Order No. 001-
04,63 the decretal portion of which reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned City Mayor, pursuant to his authority to enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the City, and to issue executive orders for the faithful and
appropriate enforcement and execution of such laws and ordinances (Sec. 455 (b) (2) and (iii),
R.A. 7160) hereby affirms and gives protection to the right of the citizenry, particularly affected
motor vehicle owners, operators, and drivers, to refuse to submit to the enforcement of Ordinance
003-2000, by the Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation, and further to refuse to pay public
revenue in the form of fees, charges, impositions, fines, and penalties provided for in the said
ordinance, to the said entity, such acts being patently illegal and prohibited by law; this Executive
Order shall be in force and effect until the City Council, as the legislative arm of the City of Baguio,
shall have adopted appropriate remedial or corrective measures on the matters and concerns
specified hereinabove.
On 8 July 2004, Mayor Yaranon issued a Memorandum64 to the City Director of the Baguio City
Police Department, directing the department to stop and prevent Jadewell from clamping, towing,
and impounding vehicles; to arrest and file criminal charges against Jadewell personnel who
would execute the proscribed acts specified in the said Memorandum; and to confiscate the
equipment used by Jadewell to clamp, tow, or impound vehicles under the authority of the
rescinded MOA.
On 12 July 2004, Jadewell filed its second Petition for indirect contempt again with this Court, this
time against Mayor Yaranon for having issued the above-cited Order also for the same reasons
given in its first contempt petition with this Court. The Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 164107.
Furthermore, on 15 July 2004, Jadewell filed an administrative case against Mayor Yaranon
before the Office of the President (OP). Docketed as Case No. OP 04-G-294, it sought the
mayor’s suspension and removal from office. The case against Mayor Yaranon was for his
issuance of the following: (1) Executive Order No. 001-04 dated 1 July 2004; (2) the Memorandum
dated 7 July 2004 limiting the pay parking business of Jadewell to certain parts of Baguio City;;
and (3) Memorandum dated 8 July 2004 directing the Baguio City Police Department to prevent
Jadewell from apprehending, towing and impounding vehicles. A supplemental petition filed by
Jadewell on 19 January 2005, complaining of Executive Order No. 005-2004, which was issued on
15 October 2004, was also included in administrative case OP 04-G-294.
On the following day, 16 July 2004, Jadewell filed a Supplemental Petition with Motion for Leave
of this Court65 in the second contempt petition before this Court, G.R. No. 164107, alleging as a
supplemental fact, Mayor Yaranon’s Memorandum of 08 July 2004.
On 15 October 2004, Mayor Yaranon issued Executive Order No. 005-2004.66 This was a cease
and desist order against Jadewell to prevent it from performing the following acts: (1) charging and
collecting from motorists, parking fees without their consent;67 (2) seizing and detaining vehicles of
motorists who refuse to pay parking fees to Jadewell;68 and (3) using yellow-colored heavy
wreckers or tow trucks bearing the name "City of Baguio".69
In addition to Executive Order No. 005-2004, Mayor Yaranon issued Executive Order No. 005-
2004-A, which is essentially a rehash of Executive Order No. 005-2004.70
On 25 October 2004, Jadewell filed a third Petition with this Court, praying that Mayor Yaranon be
cited for contempt and that Executive Order No. 005-2004 be nullified.71 This case was docketed
as G.R. No. 165564. On 16 November 2004, Jadewell filed a Supplemental Petition to this Petition
alleging as a supplemental ground the issuance of Executive Order No. 005-2004-A.72
On 20 December 2004, Mayor Yaranon issued Administrative Order No. 622, Series of 2004,
which declared that Jadewell exceeded its area of operations for the administration of on-street
parking and was thus required to show lawful cause why its business permit should not be
revoked. In response to this Order, Jadewell filed a Second Supplemental Petition for contempt
against Mayor Yaranon in G.R. No. 165564 on 25 January 2005.
On 10 January 2005, this Court through a Resolution73 ordered the consolidation of G.R. No.
160025 with G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107, and 165564.
On 17 January 2005, this Court denied Jadewell’s petition in G.R. No. 166094 for failure to show
any reversible error on the part of the CA in dismissing its petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No.
77341.74 Its Motion For Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality.75
In the beginning of the year 2005, Jadewell attempted to renew its business permit from the City of
Baguio and tendered the fees required. However, the Office of the City Mayor refused to renew
the business permit and returned the amount tendered.76 Because of these actions of Mayor
Yaranon, Jadewell filed on 15 April 2005 its Third Supplemental Petition in G.R. No. 164107,
which had been consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052, and 165564. Aside from its main
prayer to cite the mayor for contempt, Jadewell also prayed that Mayor Yaranon, a lawyer, be
disbarred.77 On 25 April 2005, this Court, through its Third Division, admitted the Third
Supplemental Petition of Jadewell.78
On 9 February 2005, this Court, in G.R. No. 160025, issued a Writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction ordering Mayor Yaranon to immediately reopen the streets and premises occupied
and/or operated by Jadewell. The Court also required Jadewell to post a cash or surety bond in
the amount of ₱100,000 within five days from receipt of the order.79
The order, in part, reads:
Acting on the urgent motion dated January 26, 2005 of respondent Jadewell Parking Systems
Corporation for the issuance of a temporary mandatory/preventive order and/or for writ of
preliminary mandatory/prohibitory injunction pending appeal in G.R. No. 160025, alleging that the
effects of the acts of City Mayor Yaranon, unless stayed, would also make effective what the
petitioner Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Baguio failed to obtain in the instant case, the net effect
of which would not only be grave damage and injury to the respondent but also to the City of
Baguio, the Court further Resolved:
(a) to ISSUE, the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION prayed for,
effective immediately, commanding City Mayor Yaranon to immediately reopen the
streets and/or premises operated and/or occupied by the respondent and to let them
remain open, until further orders of this Court; and
(b) to require petitioner to POST a CASH BOND or a SURETY BOND from a reputable
bonding company of indubitable solvency in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (₱100,000.00), with terms and conditions to be approved by the Court, within five
(5) days from notice, otherwise, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction herein issued
shall AUTOMATICALLY be lifted.
NOW THEREFORE, You, [City Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon], your agents, representatives and/or
any person or persons acting upon your orders or in your place or stead, are hereby DIRECTED to
IMMEDIATELY REOPEN the streets and/or premises operated and/or occupied by the
respondents and to let the said streets and premises remain OPEN, until further orders from this
Court.
On 8 April 2005, Mayor Yaranon issued a Memorandum80 directing Col. Isagani Nerez, Director of
the Baguio City Police District, to create a special task force to stop Jadewell from clamping,
towing, and impounding vehicles in violation of parking rules in Baguio City; to impound the
wrecker/tow trucks used by Jadewell.
On 20 April 2005, this Court promulgated a Resolution in G.R. No. 160025, finding Mayor Yaranon
guilty of direct and indirect contempt. He was cited for direct contempt when it was proven that he
had submitted pleadings before this Court containing falsehoods. Mayor Yaranon had stated in his
Compliance that the streets were opened for Jadewell to resume operations, but upon inspection
these were found to be closed.81 He was also cited for indirect contempt, for having continuously
refused to carry out the writ issued by this Court to reopen the streets so Jadewell could resume
operations.82 This Court likewise fined Mayor Yaranon the amount of ₱10,000, which he paid. The
Court further ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to immediately arrest and detain
Mayor Yaranon pending his compliance with the 9 February 2005 writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued by this Court, which ordered the reopening of some streets so Jadewell could
continue its operations.83
On 10 August 2005, Benedicto Balajadia, et al. filed Civil Case No. 6089-R against Jadewell
before the RTC–Baguio City. The case was subsequently raffled to Branch 3 of the RTC presided
by Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan.84 Balajadia, et al. sought to nullify the MOA between Jadewell
and the City Government of Baguio and its enabling ordinance, Ordinance No. 003-2000. The
complainants also prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and for a writ
of preliminary injunction against Jadewell.
On 19 April 2006, Judge Pamintuan issued an Order in Civil Case No. 6089-R granting the prayer
of complainants Balajadia et al. for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction. The
injunction was meant to restrain Jadewell from proceeding with the supervision and collection of
parking, towing, and impounding fees on the streets of Baguio City. Further, Judge Pamintuan
ordered the holding in abeyance of the implementation of City Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the
MOA.85
On 27 April 2006, Jadewell filed with this Court a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus against Judge Pamintuan86 for refusing to dismiss Civil Case No. 6089-R. The case
was docketed as G.R. No. 172215. On the same day, Jadewell filed a Petition asking this Court to
cite Judge Pamintuan for contempt. This fourth contempt case, albeit primarily against a member
of the judiciary, was docketed as G.R. No. 172216.
On 19 June 2006, G.R. No. 172215 was ordered consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052,
164107, and 165564.87
On 23 June 2006, Mayor Yaranon wrote Jadewell a letter demanding that it desist from operating
the pay parking system in Baguio City. Simultaneously, he wrote the Sanggunian, requesting it to
cancel Ordinance No. 003-2000, the enabling ordinance for the MOA.
On 26 June 2006, Jadewell filed a Supplemental Petition88 in G.R. No. 172215 complaining of
Judge Pamintuan’s issuance of the following Orders in Civil Case No. 6089-R: (a) Order dated 24
April 200689 directing the parties to file a pre-trial brief and setting the pre-trial of the case; (b)
Order dated 01 June 200690 informing Jadewell that public respondent was not suspending the
proceedings, because he believed he was not covered by the writ issued by this Court; (c) Order
dated 14 June 200691 upholding the writ he issued in the civil case despite his receipt of a copy of
the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court; and (d) Order dated 16 June 200692 directing
Jadewell to comply with the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction under pain of direct contempt.
On the same day, 26 June 2006, the Office of the President (OP) rendered a Decision in OP 04-G-
294, the administrative case Jadewell had filed against Mayor Yaranon, finding him guilty of grave
misconduct, abuse of authority, and oppression. Mayor Yaranon was meted out a penalty totalling
12 months suspension from office.93This suspension was implemented by the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG). Aggrieved by his suspension, Mayor Yaranon filed his
Motion For Reconsideration, which was denied on 22 August 2006 by the OP.
On 29 June 2006, in response to Mayor Yaranon’s letters of 23 June 2006, Jadewell filed before
this Court yet another case for contempt – its fifth contempt case, and the third one specifically
against Mayor Yaranon. In addition to its prayer to cite the mayor for contempt, Jadewell also
prayed that Mayor Yaranon, a lawyer, be disbarred.94 The case was docketed as G.R. No.
173043.
On 31 July 2006, G.R. No. 173043 was ordered consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052,
164107, 165564, and 172215.95 On 27 September 2006, G.R. No. 172216 was consolidated with
G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052, 164107, 165564.96
On 23 August 2006, while the consolidated cases were pending resolution before this Court, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 204, Series of 2006. The Resolution directed
the City Legal Officer to notify Jadewell of the Baguio City Government’s intention to rescind the
MOA, and to inform Jadewell to stop its operations under the MOA 60 days after receipt of the
Notice.97
On 28 August 2006, the legal counsel for Jadewell wrote to Baguio City Vice-Mayor Bautista, Jr.,
informing him that the OP had denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Mayor Yaranon assailing
the OP resolution ordering the latter’s suspension as City Mayor of Baguio City.98 The counsel for
Jadewell likewise stated in his letter that they were aware that the Sanggunian was planning to
issue a resolution to repeal Ordinance No. 003-2000 and rescind the MOA. The letter requested
the Vice-Mayor to veto the measure in light of the pending petitions with the Supreme Court.99 The
said counsel likewise sent a similar letter to the Sanggunian, urging it to desist from implementing
the repeal of Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the rescission of the MOA pending the resolution of the
cases with the Supreme Court.100
On 13 September 2006, Mayor Yaranon appealed to the CA, in a case docketed as CA G.R. CV
SP No. 96116, praying for the lifting of the penalty of suspension meted him in OP 04-G-294, but
this appeal was denied. Mayor Yaranon moved for reconsideration.101
On 22 September 2006, City Legal Officer Rabanes wrote a letter to Jadewell, through its
President, Mr. Rogelio Tan, informing Jadewell of Resolution No. 204, Series of 2006, which
rescinded the MOA, and ordering it to stop operations within 60 days from notice.102 This letter
was received on the same day it was issued;103 hence, the 60-day period lapsed on 22 November
2006. This notice, together with the resolution, constitute the second act of rescission of the MOA
by the city officials of Baguio.
On 19 October 2006, Jadewell filed the sixth contempt case with this Court against the acting City
Mayor of Baguio, Reinaldo A. Bautista, Jr., and the members of the Sanggunian, including City
Legal Officer Melchor Carlos R. Rabanes, for the second act of rescission of the MOA.104 The
case was docketed as G.R. No. 174879.
On 9 October 2007, the CA dismissed Mayor Yaranon’s Petition in CA G.R. CV SP No. 96116 on
the ground that it had become moot and academic due to Mayor Yaranon’s failure to be re-elected
in the 17 May 2007 elections. Mayor Yaranon filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 07 November
2007, but this was also denied by the CA on 24 January 2008. Thus, on 17 March 2008, Mayor
Yaranon filed a Rule 45 Petition before this Court seeking to reverse and set aside the CA
Decision and Resolution. It was docketed as G.R. No. 181488.
On 12 November 2008, G.R. No. 181488 was ordered consolidated with the cases already
mentioned.105
THE ISSUES
1. On G.R. No. 160025 and on the
claim in G.R. No. 174879 that the second
act of rescission was a valid act of
rescission.
Whilst the issues are spread out among the nine cases, we have grouped these according to what
are common to the specific cases.
In our effort to simplify the issues and provide forms of relief to the parties that are not purely
academic, it is necessary to examine the operative effects that may result from any resolution of
this Court. Such examination may also help guide the parties in their future actions, and perhaps
the overly-litigated matters brought before us in the consolidated petitions may finally be put to
rest.
We note at the outset that on 22 November 2006, 60 days had lapsed from receipt of the letter
dated 22 September 2006, informing Jadewell of the decision of the City of Baguio to rescind the
MOA under Section 12 thereof. It may be recalled that Section 12 requires that notice of the
intention to rescind be given 60 days prior to the effectivity of the rescission. Jadewell has not
questioned the legal efficacy of this notice. It has brought this matter of a second rescission to the
Court’s attention only as a matter of contumacious behavior on the part of the respondents in G.R.
No. 174879, in the same way that it brought various actions of the public respondents before the
Court in its other contempt petitions. Since the legal efficacy of the rescission in 2006 has not
been contested by Jadewell in any of the petitions before us, we thus consider this notice of
rescission to have taken legal effect and therefore, at the latest, the MOA between the City of
Baguio and Jadewell has ceased to legally exist as of 22 November 2006.
Parenthetically, we note that while the validity of the second act of rescission described in G.R.
No. 174879 is not principally determinative of the respondents’ liability for indirect contempt
therein, a conclusion that the second act of rescission was undertaken competently and
appropriately will to a certain degree impact our appreciation of such possible liability. We will
discuss this issue in our subsequent discussion on the charges of contempt.
Inasmuch as there is no longer any existing MOA, no order of this Court can have the effect of
directing the City of Baguio to enforce any of the terms of the MOA, which brings us to the matter
of G.R. No. 160025. In whatever direction we rule on the question of the validity of the first act of
rescission, such ruling will only have the effect of either providing Jadewell a basis to seek
damages from the City of Baguio for the wrongful termination of the MOA, should we find wrongful
termination to have taken place, or, deny Jadewell that right. The possible susceptibility of the City
of Baguio and its officials to an action for damages on a finding of wrongful termination is why we
do not consider G.R. No. 160025 as having been rendered moot by the lawful rescission of the
MOA on 22 November 2006. Thus, we will proceed to rule on the issues in G.R. No. 160025.
The fallo of the RTC Decision upheld by the CA, which affirmance is the lis mota in G.R. No.
160025, reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring both Sangguniang Panlungsod Resolution No.
037, Series of 2002 and the April 17, 2002 Resolution overriding the Mayor’s veto as NULL and
VOID. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction earlier issued by this Court is made PERMANENT, with
costs against respondents.106
The RTC did not order the respondents therein to comply with the MOA. An order to perform a
contract is not necessarily subsumed in an order not to terminate the same.
Contrast this legal point with the fact that the prayer of Jadewell in its original petition asked the
RTC, in relevant part:
...that the writ of preliminary injunction be made permanent and the writs applied for be issued
against the respondents nullifying and voiding Resolution No. 037, series of 2002 and the
resolution over-riding the veto … and instead, directing them to perform what the memorandum of
agreement requires them to do. (Emphasis supplied)107
This latter part, which is effectively a prayer for a permanent mandatory injunction against
respondents therein to perform the terms of the MOA, are not in the fallo of the RTC decision. We
consider therefore that the RTC deliberately withheld granting the specific prayer to order Baguio
City to perform the MOA. No motion to correct or clarify the said fallo having been filed by
Jadewell, the prayer to order the city officials of Baguio to perform the MOA is hereby deemed
abandoned.
We further note three things:
1. Jadewell has not questioned - in its Petition, Reply to Comment, and Memorandum
before this Court - the implication of the RTC and CA Decisions to the effect that the
Sanggunian had the authority to perform acts of contractual rescission on behalf of the
City of Baguio when both these courts ignored the issue raised by Jadewell in its Petition
before the RTC, and we therefore do not consider this to be a genuine issue in this
Petition before us;
2. While the Sangguniang Panlungsod has insinuated that there was fraud and excess of
authority on the part of the mayor in the execution108 of the MOA - because the latter
provided for a smaller sharing of "20 % from the gross profit of the operation or 50% of
the net profit whichever is higher" instead of the intended "20% of gross receipts,"109-
petitioners in G.R. No. 160025 conceded even at the RTC level that they are not assailing
the MOA for being defective but for having been breached in the performance. We thus
disregard all arguments in G.R. No. 160025 regarding the validity of the execution of the
MOA, for being a non-issue in this case;110
3. We also immediately set aside claims of Jadewell in its Petition before the RTC that an
alternative relief should be provided by the courts in the form of compensation for
terminated Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts under the BOT Law (Republic Act No.
6957) as there is not the slightest basis on record that the administration of on-street
parking can be classified as an infrastructure contract, a basic element that must be
present for any contract to come within the terms of the BOT Law.
Having preliminarily screened out the non-issues in this case, we proceed to examine the rulings
of the courts a quo in G.R. 160025.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto, along the following points:
1. On the sole procedural issue. - The RTC was correct in treating the Petition as one for
permanent injunction with a prayer for a preliminary injunction, instead of treating it by its
formal title: "Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with a Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction." It was correct in holding that if the Petition had been treated by its
formal denomination, then it would have been dismissed for failing to satisfy the
requirement that the act sought to be nullified was rendered in a judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity by the respondents, but then this formal denomination could be disregarded and
the nature of the Petition should be determined by its allegations and prayers. Since there
was a prayer to permanently enjoin respondents from enforcing the questioned
resolutions, the RTC was correct in treating it as one for permanent injunction.
2. On the substantive issues:
a. On the lack of due process afforded Jadewell. – The RTC was correct in ruling
that Jadewell was denied the right to be heard before the Sanggunian rescinded
the MOA. There is no evidence on record that the Sanggunian afforded Jadewell
an opportunity to present its side or refute the charges of the latter’s violation
committed under the MOA.111
b. On the authority of the RTC to consider the effect of Section 9 of the
MOA112 when Jadewell never raised the matter of Section 9 in any of its
pleadings. – The RTC correctly considered Jadewell’s letter dated 24 November
2001, addressed to the Sanggunian and offered during the trial, which introduced
the subject matter of the five (5) year guarantee against rescission provided in
Section 9 of the MOA. The CA regarded the RTC’s consideration of said letter as
judicious and added that even without it, the MOA, and its provisions, form part of
the case records.113
c. On the failure to observe the 60-day notice requirement. – The RTC correctly
found that the Sanggunian cannot validly and unilaterally rescind the MOA
without observing the provisions in Section 12 of the MOA requiring that a 60-day
notice be given before rescission can take place. To allow the Sanggunian to
unilaterally rescind the MOA without giving Jadewell an opportunity to present its
side is to render the right to rescission provided in the MOA legally vulnerable.114
d. On the lack of substantiveness of the alleged breach of performance of the
MOA by Jadewell. – The CA reviewed the records of the case and upheld the
findings of the RTC that the violations of Jadewell were not substantial to merit
the consequence of rescission under the MOA.115
We elucidate on the arguments of the parties, the RTC, and the CA.
In its Petition before the RTC, Jadewell argues that the rescission of the MOA was not valid, on
due process grounds, and also because there was no substantial breach on its part to justify a
rescission of the MOA.116 It also asserts that the Sanggunian had no authority to rescind the MOA,
because the latter was not a party thereto.117
Jadewell sought a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of the questioned
Resolution, and prayed that after hearing, the preliminary injunction be made permanent. It further
prayed for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to nullify the assailed Resolution; and for a mandatory
injunction to compel the City Government to perform the latter’s obligations under the
MOA.118 Jadewell alternatively invoked the provisions of Section 18 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of the BOT Law,119 in the event the RTC would uphold the validity of the
questioned Resolution.
The trial court ruled that the rescission violated the due process clause of the Constitution and
failed to meet the requirements for rescission under the Civil Code and the MOA itself. In the
Sanggunian’s Memorandum, on appeal before the CA, the Sanggunian assigned three errors to
the Decision of the trial court: (1) the RTC ignored the evidence on record and the requirements of
Rule 65 when it declared the subject Resolution void; (2) Jadewell was not denied due process
when the MOA was rescinded; and (3) by ruling that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had no right of
rescission for the first 5 years of the MOA – an issue not raised in the pleadings – the trial court
improperly took up the cudgels for Jadewell in the case.120
As earlier stated, the CA upheld the RTC’s Decision in toto.
The Sanggunian filed its Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the CA had erred as follows: (1)
treating Jadewell’s petition as an original action for injunction;121 (2) ruling that Jadewell was
deprived of due process122 when it rescinded the MOA; and (3) finding that the MOA stipulated for
a five-year minimum guarantee against rescission.123This was denied, and this denial and the CA
Decision are the subjects of G. R. 160025.
2. G.R. No. 172215 – Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus, filed by
Jadewell against Judge Pamintuan
for not dismissing Civil Case No. 6089-R
Jadewell directly filed the instant Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari before this Court to nullify the
denial by the trial court of its Motion to Dismiss and its Motion for Reconsideration of the same
order,124 and for ordering Jadewell to cease collecting parking fees, and from towing and
impounding vehicles on the streets of Baguio City. It also seeks to nullify the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 6089-R, invoking both res judicata and litis pendentia.125 It contends that, since the issue
on the validity of the questioned city ordinance and the MOA was favorably ruled upon previously
by RTC Branches 7 and 61 of Baguio City in separate cases, Branch 3 of the same RTC presided
by Judge Pamintuan is bound by the rulings of the other branches.126 Litis pendentia is being
invoked in relation to the petitions already before this Court.
Mayor Yaranon is impleaded in this case on the basis of the order of Judge Pamintuan to the city
mayor to perform his duty to supervise the roads, streets and park of Baguio City, in coordination
with the police and the LTO during the validity of the Writ of Injunction that Judge Pamintuan
issued.127
The main issue to be resolved in Jadewell’s Petition for certiorari is whether Judge Pamintuan’s
rulings in Civil Case No. 6089-R violated the res judicata/litis pendentia doctrines.
3. G.R. No. 181488 – The
Certiorari petition filed by Yaranon
seeking to reverse Resolutions dated
9 October 2008 and 24 January 2008
in CA-G.R. SP No. 96116 which
upheld the validity of his suspension
as City Mayor of Baguio.
Mayor Yaranon’s instant Petition before this Court raises the following issues: (1) that his failed re-
election bid was not a supervening event in the final determination by the CA of whether he was
guilty of grave misconduct, abuse of authority, and oppression; and (2) that the CA should rule on
the substantive validity of his suspension.
4. The Petitions for Contempt
a. G.R. No. 163052 – This is the first contempt petition filed by Jadewell directly with this Court
against City Mayor Vergara, the Vice Mayor, and the entire Sanggunian, for enacting Resolution
Nos. 056 & 059, Series of 2004. To recall, Resolution No. 056, Series of 2004 informs the general
public that Jadewell had neither the authority nor the police power to clamp, tow or impound
vehicles at any place in the City of Baguio.128 In Resolution No. 059, Series of 2004, the City of
Baguio made a formal demand upon Jadewell to surrender the Ganza and Burnham Park Parking
Areas within thirty days. In the same Resolution, the City of Baguio also directed the City Legal
Officer to file the appropriate legal actions necessary to recover the said parking areas and to ask
for damages against Jadewell.129
The core issue to be resolved in this case is whether the Sanggunian Panlungsod is guilty of
indirect contempt for enacting the above resolutions, pending resolution of G.R. No. 160025.
b. G.R. No. 164107 – This contempt petition was filed directly with this Court against then Baguio
City Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon after he issued Executive Order No. 001-04 announcing that, as
City Mayor, he would give protection to motor vehicle owners, operators, and drivers who would
refuse to submit to the enforcement of traffic rules by Jadewell such as by refusing to pay the
parking fees or fines the latter imposes.
Yaranon also issued a Memorandum dated 8 July 2004, ordering the arrest and filing of criminal
charges against Jadewell personnel who would clamp, tow, or impound motor vehicles in defiance
of Executive Order No. 001-04. This was followed by a Memorandum on 8 April 2005 directing the
Baguio City Police District to create a special task force to prevent Jadewell from clamping,
towing, and impounding vehicles found to be in violation of the parking rules in Baguio City.
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether Mayor Yaranon could be cited for contempt for
the above, pending resolution of the issue of the validity of the rescission of the MOA in G.R. Nos.
160025 and 163052.
c. G.R. No. 165564 – Jadewell filed this third contempt petition against Mayor Yaranon for issuing
Executive Order No. 005-2004 dated 15 October 2004. The order directs Jadewell to cease and
desist from: (a) charging and collecting parking fees on the streets of Baguio City without the
consent of the City Government;130 (b) seizing and detaining vehicles of motorists who refuse to
pay the parking fees to Jadewell131 and (c) using yellow-colored tow trucks bearing the name "City
of Baguio".132 Jadewell’s petition also seeks to nullify Executive Order No. 005-2004.
On 16 November 2004, Jadewell filed a Supplemental Petition. The act complained of this time
was the issuance of Executive Order No. 005-2004-A which is a mere rehash of Executive Order
No. 005-2004.133 On 25 January 2005, Jadewell filed a Second Supplemental Petition in
connection with Mayor Yaranon’s issuance of Administrative Order No. 622, Series of 2004. The
said administrative order declared that Jadewell exceeded its area of operations for the
administration of on-street parking and it required to show lawful cause why its business permit
should not be revoked.
Like in the earlier contempt petitions, Jadewell alleges that these issuances by Mayor Yaranon are
contumacious because they were made while the main petition, G.R. No. 160025 questioning the
rescission of the MOA by the Sanggunian, is still pending resolution with this Court.
d. G.R. No. 172216 – On 27 April 2006, Jadewell filed a petition for contempt against Judge
Fernando Vil Pamintuan, Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 3 of Baguio City, in relation to Civil Case
No. 6089-R pending before his sala.134 In the said civil case, Judge Pamintuan issued an Order
directing Jadewell to desist from the collection of parking fees, from towing and impounding
vehicles on the streets of Baguio City and to hold in abeyance the implementation of City
Ordinance 003-2000 and the MOA. The validity of the Order of Judge Pamintuan is the subject of
a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus instituted by Jadewell in G.R. No. 172215.
The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether Judge Pamintuan should be cited for indirect
contempt by this Court for issuing the assailed Orders.
e. G.R. No. 173043 – On 29 June 2006, Jadewell filed yet another contempt case against Mayor
Yaranon. In addition to its prayer to cite him for contempt, Jadewell also prays that Mayor
Yaranon, as a lawyer, be disbarred.135Jadewell instituted this fifth contempt case after it received a
letter from Mayor Yaranon demanding that it stop its business operations in Baguio City, at the
same time directing the Sangguniang Panlungsod to cancel Ordinance 003-2000.
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Mayor Yaranon was guilty of indirect contempt
and professional misconduct for the above acts pending resolution of G.R. Nos. 160025,
163052,164107, 165564 and 172215.136
f. G.R. No. 174879 - On 19 October 2006, Jadewell filed a contempt case against the acting City
Mayor of Baguio, Reinaldo A. Bautista, Jr., and the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
including City Legal Officer Melchor Carlos R. Rabanes, in connection with the second act of
rescission.137 Jadewell also asks that the respondents who are lawyers, namely: Rocky Thomas A.
Balisong, Edilberto B. Tenefrancia, Faustino A. Olowan, Federico J. Mandapat, Perlita L. Chan-
Rondez, and Jose M. Molintas, be disbarred.
These acts, in Jadewell’s view, are contumacious in light of the pending G.R. No. 160025 before
this Court.
OUR RULINGS
1. On G.R. No. 160025
a. On the Treatment of
Jadewell’s Petition as one for
Permanent Injunction.
The CA sustained the position of the Sanggunian that certiorari could not prosper because when
the latter enacted Resolution 37, the Sanggunian was exercising its legislative function and not its
judicial or quasi-judicial function. The writ of certiorari under Rule 65 requires: (a) that it is directed
against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) that such
tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion; and (c) that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.138
The CA nevertheless proceeded to treat the Petition as an original action for injunction, ruling in
this wise:
xxxx
Although in the trial court, Jadewell filed said petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
under Rule 65, it is essentially one for Injunction under Rule 58. Said petition’s form and
substance satisfied all the requirements of a civil action for Injunction, which is the proper remedy
under the attendant circumstances.
The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid technical sense, rules of procedure
are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement
of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated.
Considering the clear and patent denial of due process committed by the Sanggunian in
precipitately rescinding the MOA and in the interest of substantial justice, WE deem it more
prudent to treat the petition filed below as an action for Injunction under Rule 58, which is well
within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Consequently, the present appeal shall be considered as an
appeal from the permanent injunction ordered by the trial court, which is properly appealable to
this Court, as held in Casilan vs. Ybaňez.139
xxxx
We sustain the ruling of the appellate court treating Jadewell’s original action for certiorari as one
for injunction based on the allegations in the latter’s pleadings.
In Ramon Jimenez, Jr. v. Juan Jose Jordana,140 the issue to be resolved was whether the nature
of the action was one for specific performance or for recovery of real property. In determining that
the case was one for the recovery of real property, the Court characterized the suit on the basis of
the allegations in the Complaint. We restated the rule that the nature of an action is determined by
the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. In the recent case
of Reyes v. Alsons Development and Investment Corporation,141 we likewise ruled that the nature
of an action is determined by the allegations in the pleadings.
In Lee, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,142 the controversy to be resolved was whether the appeal filed by
the petitioner was one under Rule 65 or Rule 42. The determination of the issue was crucial,
because the appellate court had dismissed the appeal of the petitioner, saying that the wrong
mode of appeal had been used. The CA had ruled that petitioner should have filed a certiorari
petition under Rule 65 – instead of a petition under Rule 42 – to appeal the assailed decision
rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
We held:
Our perusal of the petition filed before the Court of Appeals clearly shows that it is a petition for
review under Rule 42, and not a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. We note that in
the Court of Appeals’ petition, under the heading "Nature of the Petition," petitioner stated that it
was a "petition for review on certiorari to set aside, invalidate and reverse the Decision dated
December 14, 2001 of public respondent Judge Victor T. Llamas, Jr." Also, the reversal sought
was premised on the ground that the decision was issued in gross error. The statement under the
heading "Nature of the Petition" that the trial courts’ decisions were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and even the caption impleading the lower courts,
would not automatically bring the petition within the coverage of Rule 65. It is hornbook doctrine
that it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that determine the nature of the
action. (Emphasis supplied)
In the original action filed by Jadewell before the RTC of Baguio City, although the action was
clearly denominated as a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus against the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, the allegations actually supported an action for injunction under Rule
58 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. As can be gleaned from its allegations and especially
in its prayers, Jadewell filed the case with the trial court with the ultimate end of restraining the
implementation of Resolution No. 037, Series of 2002.
We agree with the CA when it ruled that Jadewell sought permanent injunction aside from the
auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, thus:
An action for injunction is a recognized remedy in this jurisdiction. It is a suit for the purpose of
enjoining the defendant, perpetually or for a particular time, from committing or continuing to
commit a specific act, or compelling the defendant to continue performing a particular act. It has
an independent existence. The action for injunction is distinct from the ancillary remedy of
preliminary injunction, which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent
action or proceeding.143 xxxx...
In Garcia v. Adeva,144 this Court had the opportunity to clarify that while injunction can be a
provisional remedy, it can also be a main case. The Court had to make this preliminary distinction
in order to find out whether the SEC had the jurisdiction to prevent, on a permanent basis, the
commission of certain acts by the respondents. Thus, the necessity to make the distinction
between injunction as a provisional remedy and injunction as a main case. It found guidance from
Garayblas v. Atienza, Jr.,145 and quoting from the latter:
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from
doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an
incident in the main action. The Court has distinguished the main action for injunction from the
provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction, thus:
The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or
proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary
injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue. Under the law, the main action for
injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from, and should not be
confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to
preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any
stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved
or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.
We, therefore, rule that the CA did not commit any error in treating Jadewell’s Petition for
Certiorari as an original action for injunction.
b. On the denial of due process.
The second issue in this Petition is the correctness of the CA’s ruling that Jadewell was deprived
of due process when the Sangguniang Panlungsod rescinded the MOA. The findings of the CA
are as follows:
In the instant case, evidence on record does not show that before the Sanggunian passed the
disputed Resolution it gave Jadewell an opportunity to present its side. Neither did the
Sanggunian convene an investigatory body to inquire into Jadewell’s alleged violations nor at least
invite Jadewell to a conference to discuss the alleged violations, if only to give Jadewell the
chance to refute any evidence gathered by it against the latter. As it is, the Sanggunian arrogated
upon itself the role of a prosecutor, judge and executioner in rescinding the MOA, all in clear
violation of Jadewell’s constitutionally embedded right to due process.146
x x x.
Both courts held that Jadewell was denied due process. When the denial of due process argument
is raised, it is directed primarily against the exercise of governmental authority that "deprives life,
liberty and property" without observance what is, in the circumstances, the applicable standards of
"due process." It is not an argument that is relevant in situations of contractual breach between
two purely private entities, nor is it available against the government when the latter is not
discharging a governmental function, but merely pursuing a purely commercial activity in a
proprietary capacity. In order to consider the due process argument, this Court must first
determine whether the MOA was entered into by the City of Baguio in a governmental capacity, or
in a purely proprietary capacity.
The regulation of on-street and off-street parking is a governmental function that can be exercised
by local governments. It is important to understand the objective of the Baguio City Government in:
(1) privatizing the administration of on-street and off-street parking; and (2) its execution of a MOA
with Jadewell. This can be gleaned from the Explanatory Note and other provisions of the
agreement, to wit:
The City of Baguio has earned the reputation of the CLEANEST AND GREENEST HIGHLY
URBANIZED CITY for the previous years. This has become possible due to the collective effort of
both the Citizens of Baguio and the City Government. However, the increase in population,
volume of vehicles and the absence of a regulatory measure to address this concern gradually
tainted what used to be a reputation we were proud of.
The ever increasing problems, specifically those relevant to the Traffic situation is at this point the
biggest contributor to environmental degradation. Other Salient points we must consider relevant
to this matter are the problems on OBSTRUCTION AND DOUBLE PARKING which are very
rampant. We further add to these the problems on DISORGANIZED PARKING, LACK OF
DEPUTIZED AGENTS to monitor, supervise and enforce traffic rules and regulations.
At this point in time, we feel the immediate need of focusing on these problems. There is an urgent
need to adopt measures that would alleviate these matters. This we recommend that PARKING
SPACES should be REGULATED in such a manner that it would bring advantage both to the City
Government and the Citizens of Baguio. We further propose the collection of REGULATORY
FEES that would be used in maintaining our roads and to hire people that would de deputized to
help ease the problems as stated above.
Finally, we believe that our roads are beyond the Commerce of Man. To convert our roads into
PAY PARKING SPACES, would be violative of this principle. However to REGULATE its use and
its eventual effect would redound to the GENERAL WELFARE will be an appreciated gesture to
help preserve our image as the CLEANEST AND GREENEST HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY.
xxxx
SECTION 4. Parking spaces. A parking place may be divided into parking spaces and for the
purposes of this Ordinance, each space or for a number of spaces as determined by the private
parking operator in consultation with the concerned Official of the City of Baguio.
xxxx
SECTION 5. Prohibitions against parking outside the parking spaces. No spaces shall park any
motor vehicle on the sidewalk or cause or permit any motor vehicle to wait to any road or length of
road on which in any place in which or adjacent to or in close proximity to which there is a parking
place.
xxxx
SECTION 7. Payment of Prescribed Charges. (1) No person shall park any motor vehicle in a
parking place or parking space during the times specified in this Ordinance without paying the
prescribed charge for the required parking period; (2) The prescribed charge payable in respect to
the parking of a motor vehicle in a parking space shall be paid by the insertion into the parking
meter provided for that parking space a coin/coins of Philippine Currency or by using cards in
order to obtain the payment ticket to evidence the payment of the prescribed charge; (3) The
payment ticket shall be displayed at a conspicuous part of a motor vehicle in a parking place or
parking space; (4) The payment ticket shall be valid to be used on any parking space within the
authorized period indicated in the payment ticket.
xxxx
SECTION 22. Rules. The Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to be entered into by the City Mayor
shall be governed by this Ordinance.
From the above, the following are clear: (1) that the City of Baguio decided on the privatization of
the administration of parking for environmental and peace and safety reasons, both of which are
within its powers under Section 458(A)(5)(v) and (vi) of the Local Government Code; and (2) that
the terms of agreement between the City of Baguio and Jadewell involve the delegation of
governmental functions in terms of regulating the designation and use of parking spaces as well
as the collection of fees for such use. These are indicators that any privatization contract pursuant
to the above Resolution takes the essential character of a franchise because what is being
privatized is a government-monopolized function.
It would thus be relevant to ask if there is a provision in the applicable laws or the franchise (MOA)
that grants the City of Baguio the right to revoke the latter either at will, or upon the satisfaction of
certain conditions, such that ordinary due process protection can be considered to have been
waived by the franchisee. We must caution that when we refer to revocation at will here, we are
referring to the revocation of resolutory, not suspensive, obligations.147
We have looked closely at Resolution No. 003-2000 and the MOA and have additionally reflected
on the applicable provision under the Civil Code. We have come to the conclusion that:
(a) There is only one provision that allows for unilateral revocation of the MOA, which can
be found in Section 9 thereof:
9. Minimum Guaranty – The FIRST PARTY guaranties (sic) a minimum period of five (5)
years against rescission; provided that after such period, the parties may agree to
 increase to a reasonable rate the parking fees and the share of the city from the parking
fees collected as provided for in the guidelines, (Annex "B");
(b) This Section 9 requires that five years must have lapsed – presumably from the date
of execution of the MOA – before the unilateral right to revoke the MOA can be exercised;
(c) Therefore, before the five year period has lapsed, the right to revoke the MOA arises
only under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the
obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the
payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen
fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of
a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the
thing, in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
From the above, it appears that in order to effect a valid revocation of the MOA prior to the lapse
of the 5-year period provided for in Section 9, the City of Baguio had to approach the problem from
one or both of two perspectives: one, negotiate the termination of the MOA with Jadewell, or two,
exercise its option under Article 1191 of the Civil Code.
The first option, a negotiated pretermination of the contract, is an inherent right of every party in a
contract. This can be inferred from the freedom of the parties to contract and modify their previous
covenants provided it would not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy.148 Despite the provision on the minimum warranty against rescission stipulated in the MOA,
the parties were not constrained to mutually modify such restriction. The Sanggunian could have
proposed to Jadewell the possibility of lifting the warranty against rescission subject to the
condition that the latter will comply with its obligations under the MOA.
This scenario could have impressed upon Jadewell that its contractual relations with the city
government of Baguio were less than ideal. The suggested approach for the Sanggunian could
have been legally sound and practical. Obviously, this was not done in this case; thus, Jadewell’s
Complaint before the RTC of Baguio City.
The second option is the exercise of the unilateral right to rescind a bilateral contract on the part of
a party who believes that it has been injured by a breach substantial enough to warrant
revocation. Where one party allegedly failed to comply with his obligations under a contract, the
injured party may rescind the obligation if the other does not perform or is not ready and willing to
perform.149 We will examine the acts of Baguio City in relation to what is allowed under Article
1191.
Rescission under Article 1191 takes place through either of two modes: (1) through an
extrajudicial declaration of rescission; or (2) upon the grant of a judicial decree of rescission.
Extrajudicial declaration of rescission is recognized as a power which does not require judicial
intervention.150 If the rescission is not opposed, extrajudicial declaration of rescission produces
legal effect151 such that the injured party is already relieved from performing the undertaking.152
However, the power of declaring extrajudicial rescission conferred upon the injured party is
regulated by the Civil Code. If the extrajudicial rescission is impugned by the other party, it shall be
subject to a judicial determination153where court action must be taken, and the function of the court
is to declare the rescission as having been properly or improperly made, or to give a period within
which the debtor must perform the obligation alleged to be breached.154 A unilateral cancellation of
a contract may be questioned in courts by the affected party to determine whether or not
cancellation is warranted.155 Thus, in an extrajudicial decree of rescission, revocation cannot be
completely exercised solely on a party’s own judgment that the other has committed a breach of
the obligation156 but always subject to the right of the other party to judicially impugn such
decision.
It is important to contextualize that the agreement entered into by the City of Baguio with Jadewell
is the embodiment of a grant of franchise imbued with public interest and is not merely an
agreement between two private parties.
It is our view that the first act of rescission by the City of Baguio may be valid even if there is a
stipulation against it within the first five years of the MOA’s existence. Article 1191 of the New Civil
Code provides a party the right to rescind the agreement and clearly overrides any stipulation to
the contrary. However, the grounds that would serve as basis to the application of the said article
must be clearly established.
In the exercise of this option under Article 1191, was it necessary for the City of Baguio to provide
Jadewell an opportunity to air its side on the matter before the former implemented the rescission
of the MOA? In the instant case, was Jadewell deprived of procedural due process?
We answer in the negative. We disagree with the rulings of the RTC and the CA that Jadewell was
deprived of due process. In Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila v. The Board of
Transportation,157 we confronted the issue of whether the petitioners were denied procedural due
process when the respondent Board of Transportation issued a circular ordering the phasing out
of old vehicles to be used as taxicabs. In the said case, the phase-out was embodied in a circular
that was promulgated without holding a public hearing or at least requiring those affected to
submit their position papers on the policy to be implemented. We held for the respondent Board,
and ruled in this wise:
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither violative of
procedural due process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA
307 (1972):
Previous notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the
protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes
place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past
act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general
rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises,
unless the law provides otherwise.
In the instant case, the assailed act by the Sanggunian Panlungsod in rescinding the MOA – be it
first or second act of rescission – was clearly in the exercise of its legislative or administrative
functions and was not an exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. The Sanggunian
Panlungsod does not possess any judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The preamble of the MOA
lends support to this view. Evidently, the foremost reason why the agreement was entered into by
the parties was to provide order, given Baguio City’s parking problems in identified areas, as well
as to generate income.
The objectives of the Sanggunian Panlungsod, as well as its intention to rescind the MOA;
because it deems to no longer serve the interest of the City of Baguio, are clearly an exercise of its
legislative or administrative function. However, it is another matter as to whether the City of Baguio
was able to clearly establish the grounds as basis for the exercise of its right to rescind.
c. On the allegation of Jadewell’s
substantial breach of the MOA.
The Baguio City government has repeatedly mentioned that Jadewell had so far installed only 14
parking meters, with only 12 functioning. The COA-CAR Report dated 13 July 2003 enumerated
12 findings,158 a majority of which indicates that Jadewell was remiss in the fulfilment of its
obligations under the MOA. While Finding Nos. (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (8) and (12) of the COA-CAR
Report state that Jadewell collected parking fees, Jadewell failed to properly remit the same.
Finding No. (11) of the COA-CAR Report states that Jadewell failed to have its parking attendants
deputized,159 a condition under the MOA that is also important to the overall objective of the
endeavor.
The MOA does not specifically provide for the exact number of parking meters to be installed by
Jadewell pursuant to the parties’ objective in regulating parking in the city. Nevertheless, 100
parking spaces were allotted as mentioned in Annex A of the MOA.160 The agreement also
obligates Jadewell to have its parking attendants deputized by the DOTC-LTO so that they shall
have the authority to enforce traffic rules and regulations in the regulated areas.161 To the Court’s
mind, these are two of the most important obligations that Jadewell had to comply with,
considering the nature and objective of the agreement it had entered into.
Despite the enumeration of the above-mentioned faults of Jadewell, we do not make a categorical
finding that there was substantial breach committed by Jadewell to justify a unilateral rescission of
the MOA. We find, however, that the RTC had not properly received evidence that would allow it to
determine the extent of the claimed violations of the MOA. Had these violations by Jadewell been
proven in a proper hearing, the finding of a substantial breach of the MOA would have been a
distinct probability.
Unfortunately, neither the RTC nor the CA provided a clear basis for their rulings on the extent of
the breach of the MOA by Jadewell. Save from reiterating the Sanggunian’s litany of violations
said to be committed by Jadewell, there was no testimony on record to prove such facts and no
indication as to whether the RTC or CA dismissed them or took them at face value.
Whatever the extent of breach of contract that Jadewell may have committed – and the
enumeration of Jadewell’s alleged faults in Resolution 37 is quite extensive – the City of Baguio
was still duty-bound to establish the alleged breach.
Matters became complicated when the RTC and the CA lumped the issues on the due process
violation of Baguio City with Jadewell’s alleged substantial breaches under the MOA, instead of
making a clear finding on the existence and extent of such breach. The facts and legal issues
were thus muddled.
We find fault in the lower and appellate court’s lapse in examining the issue on Jadewell’s alleged
substantial breach. Evidence-taking had to be undertaken by these courts before they could arrive
at a judicial conclusion on the presence of substantial breach.
We thus DENY the Petition of the Sanggunian Panlungsod in G.R. No. 160025 and AFFIRM the
questioned CA Decision. However, we reject the ruling made by the appellate court that the
violations of Jadewell under the MOA were not substantial. We hold that there is no sufficient
evidence on record to make such determination.
While Jadewell prays for damages against the public respondent, and while ordinarily we could
grant the same, the context of this case prevents us from giving any form of recompense to
Jadewell even if the rescission of the MOA did not follow the required legal procedure. This is
because it would be appalling to grant Jadewell any award of damages, considering (1) it installed
only 14 out of the apparently 100 contemplated parking meters; (2) its employees, private citizens
who did not possess any authority from the LTO, were manually collecting parking fees from the
public, and (3) it did not, apparently properly remit any significant amount of money to the City of
Baguio. These three facts are uncontested, these omissions are offensive to the concept of public
service that the residents of Baguio were promised through Jadewell. From its ambiguous
responses extant in the records, it is clear that Jadewell does not appear to be an investor who
has lost in its investments in the Baguio City project. Thus, we do not award any damages to
Jadewell.
2. On G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107,
165564, 172216, 173043 and 174879
(The Contempt Petitions)
Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure enumerates the acts constituting
indirect contempt, thus:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,
including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
 property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or
attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession
given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court
not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without
authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer
by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to
bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.
The rule alerts us to three possible situations, wherein, in the context of the facts of these
petitions, contumacious behaviour could have been committed by public respondents. First,
disobedience or resistance to a lawful order of this Court under paragraph (b). Second, unlawful
interference with the proceedings of this Court under paragraph (c). Third, improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impeded, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice by this
Court under paragraph (d).
Jadewell, in G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107, 165564, 172216, 173043, and 174879, bases its charges
of indirect contempt against public respondents on a claim that any action that tends to stop the
implementation of the MOA is contumacious. Such actions include desistance orders to desist
against Jadewell itself, the second act of unilateral rescission of the MOA; orders to other public
officers to prevent Jadewell from exercising its authority under the MOA; and the official
encouragement for motorists to resist attempts of Jadewell to collect parking fees or clamp/tow
vehicles that do not observe the parking regulations.
We find scant jurisprudence to guide us on this matter. The closest situation is that presented in
Southern Broadcasting Network v. Davao Light and Power,162 penned by Justice Felix Makasiar.
In that case, petitioner’s representative, Carmen Pacquing, wrote a letter to President Marcos
asking for his intervention so that her Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the resolution of this
Court denying her Petition could be favorably granted. Respondent Davao Light asked that
petitioner Pacquing be cited for contempt, arguing that her act in writing to the President asking
him to intervene in the case showed disrespect to and disregard for the authority of this Court as
the final arbiter of all cases. We found petitioner Pacquing guilty of contempt, thus:
x x x. WE hold that such actuation of herein petitioner’s representative only bespeaks more of her
contumacious attempt to trifle with the orderly administration of justice because if she know that
this Court will ultimately decide the case "regardless of the President’s intervention," then she
should have desisted from writing to the President.
In the light of the foregoing, there is no doubt that Mrs. Pacquing committed an "improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice" (Section
3, par. [d] Rule 71, Rules of Court) and impair the respect due to the courts of justice in general,
and the Supreme Court, in particular.
In the above case, respondent Carmen Pacquing was clearly asking the President to commit an
improper act – to influence the Supreme Court – that obstructs the orderly administration of
justice, as the Court is constitutionally required to act independently free from the promptings of
the President. Pacquing clearly violated both Sections (c) and (d) of Section 3, Rule 71.
No such similar situation occurred here. Public respondents never asked anyone to employ
pressure or influence on this Court for the former’s benefit.
Instead, the acts that have been allegedly committed by public respondents are acts done
pursuant to their belief that: (a) the MOA has been validly voided, and more importantly, (b) that
Jadewell’s personnel do not have the legal authority to perform the governmental function of
administering the regulation of on-street and off-street parking, of towing or clamping vehicles that
violate such regulation, and of collecting parking fees from motorists.
It is important to note that the Court never gave a mandatory injunction that is couched in a way
that requires public respondents to fully comply with the terms of the MOA. The writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction (WPMI) issued on 9 February 2005 is directed to Mayor Yaranon only, and it
directs him to perform only one specific act: to reopen, and maintain open, the street and premises
then being occupied and operated by Jadewell.
Mayor Yaranon did not immediately comply with this WPMI. Thus, this Court fined him ₱10,000 on
20 April 2005, and ordered the NBI to arrest him if he further failed to comply with the WPMI.
Subsequently, Mayor Yaranon paid the fine, and there is nothing on record to show that he has,
since April of 2005, further defied this Court on that score.
The Court did not issue a WPMI specifically ordering the parties to observe the terms of the MOA.
Thus, public respondents were not expressly prohibited to act on their beliefs regarding the validity
or invalidity of the MOA, or, the authority or lack of authority of Jadewell personnel to perform
governmental functions in the streets of Baguio.
This is an important result, because to hold otherwise is to effectively grant one of the parties a
mandatory injunction even without an express resolution to this effect from the Court. Without an
express order, the pendency of a suit before the Supreme Court is not a prima facie entitlement of
provisional relief to either party.
Public respondents therefore were, at liberty to question and inform the public of their belief
regarding the lack of authority of Jadewell and its personnel to regulate public parking in Baguio.
They were certainly free to formally write Jadewell on their beliefs and pass the corresponding
resolutions to this effect. The mayor was also not under legal compulsion to renew Jadewell’s
business permit in view of his opinion that Jadewell was exceeding its allowable area of operation,
which Jadewell was not able to fully disprove. This is especially true for two important reasons: (1)
there is an uncontested cease and desist order that was issued by the DOTC-CAR on 13 March
2002 which Jadewell defied well into 2005, and (2) public respondents are city officials of Baguio
who have the legal duty to ensure the laws are being followed, including laws that define who may
enforce regulations on public parking.
That Jadewell personnel do not have the legal authority to enforce regulations on public parking is
categorical from the Letter dated 1 February 2001 by the Regional Director of the DOTC-CAR
denying the request of Jadewell for the deputation of its personnel.163
We therefore do not find any of the public respondents who were then officials of the City of
Baguio, liable for indirect contempt, and thereby dismiss G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107, 165564,
173043 and 174879. In G.R. 174879, we have already pronounced that the Sanggunian was
within its full right to perform the second act of rescission, and thus, it is even with more reason,
that its members and the City Legal Officer cannot be held in contempt therefor. We deny the
prayer in the petitions to disbar the respondents therein who are lawyers.
We also do not find Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan liable for contempt in G.R. No. 172216.
Jadewell wants this Court to cite Judge Pamintuan for contempt for issuing a writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction ordering Jadewell to stop collecting parking fees; to refrain from supervising
the parking in Baguio City; as well as to hold in abeyance the implementation of the MOA and its
enabling ordinance.164
It was only on 5 June 2006 that this Court, in G.R. No. 172215, issued a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO)165directing the trial court to discontinue the proceedings in Civil Case No. 6089-R.
Upon receipt by Judge Pamintuan of the TRO, he immediately ordered the cancellation of the 29
June 2006 hearing.166
We do not consider the promulgation of the assailed writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
against Jadewell as a defiance of our writ issued on 9 February 2005, considering, it was directed
against Mayor Yaranon only. We have held in Leonidas v. Supnet that "a party cannot be held in
indirect contempt for disobeying a court order which is not addressed to him."167 We note that
Judge Pamintuan observed deference to the Orders of this Court when he immediately suspended
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 6089-R upon receipt of the TRO.
G.R. No. 172215
In this Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, Jadewell assails the Orders of RTC-Branch 3 (Baguio City) denying its motion to
dismiss and motion for reconsideration in Civil Case No. 6089-R.
We deny the petition of Jadewell in this case.
In Manuel Camacho v. Atty. Jovito Coresis, Jr.,168 we described the nature of special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65, as follows:
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an extraordinary remedy
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. To invoke the Court’s power of judicial review under this
Rule, it must first be shown that respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has indeed acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, and that there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Conversely,
absent a showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the acts of the respondents may not be subjected to our review under Rule
65.
In Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education,169 this Court ruled thus:
An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and so the proper remedy in such a case is
to appeal after a decision has been rendered. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every
controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a
whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its function is limited to keeping
an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts -- acts which courts
or judges have no power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to correct erroneous
findings and conclusions made by the court.
In East Asia Traders, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, et al.,170 we decreed:
The petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner with the Court of Appeals is not the
proper remedy to assail the denial by the RTC of the motion to dismiss. The Order of the RTC
denying the motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory. An interlocutory order does not terminate nor
finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally
decided on the merits. It is always under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded
upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment. This proceeds from the court’s
inherent power to control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and
justice. The only limitation is that the judge cannot act with grave abuse of discretion, or that no
injustice results thereby.
East Asia Trader also reiterated our ruling in Indiana Aerospace. Further, in Bonifacio Construction
Management Corporation v. Hon. Perlas Bernabe,171 we reiterated our rulings in East Asia Traders
and Indiana Aerospace. We had ruled in these earlier cases that an order of the trial court denying
a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order, and to use a writ of certiorari to assail it is improper.
The procedural policy in the cited cases was again referred to in Bernas v. Sovereign Ventures,
Inc.,172 highlighting the following:
Let it be stressed at this point the basic rule that when a motion to dismiss is denied by the trial
court, the remedy is not to file a petition for certiorari, but to appeal after a decision has been
rendered. (Emphasis supplied)
G.R. No. 181488
The question of law raised by petitioner Yaranon in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is whether
the CA correctly dismissed his appeal questioning the validity of his suspension from office as City
Mayor, on the ground that his suit had become moot and academic due to his non-re-election to
office. The CA cited Crespo v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija173 as basis for the dismissal.
For his part, Mayor Yaranon contends that the appellate court should have ruled on the validity of
his suspension from office despite his failure to get re-elected as City Mayor. He argues that he
has the right to know whether his suspension was valid or not and, in the event his suspension is
declared invalid, Mayor Yaranon believes he is entitled to the salaries and benefits accruing during
the period he was suspended.
We deny the Petition of Mayor Yaranon.
The appeal of Mayor Yaranon has been rendered moot and academic. We hold that the resolution
of the issue raised herein would serve no practical purpose.
In Miriam College v. Court of Appeals,174 we ruled that a case becomes moot and academic when
there is no more actual controversy between the parties, or when no useful purpose can be served
in passing upon the merits. Further, courts will not determine a moot question in which no practical
relief can be granted.175
Mayor Yaranon has already served his suspension. We find no practical value in remanding his
case to the appellate court for the determination of the factual basis and legal issues of his appeal
pertaining to the validity of his suspension as then City Mayor of Baguio City.
We have held in Nicart, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division),176 that an issue becomes moot
when a petitioner is not entitled to substantial relief:
x x x [T]he propriety of the preventive suspension of petitioner effected through the assailed
Resolution of February 15, 2001 has become a moot issue, it appearing that he has already
served his suspension. An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justifiable controversy so that a determination thereof would be of no practical use and value. In
such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled to and which
would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
We cannot sustain Mayor Yaranon’s argument that his appeal should not have been dismissed
because, in the event that the finding of the Office of the President to suspend him is reversed, he
is still entitled to the salaries accruing during the period he was suspended. We take note of the
cases cited by Mayor Yaranon such as Crespo v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,177 Baquerfo v.
Sanchez178 and Reyes v. Cristi,179 among others. These cases involve substantial issues – such
as denial of due process and procedural irregularities – other than a mere claim for entitlement to
salaries. The factual background and the legal issues for resolution in the cases mentioned are
not similar to the case at bar.
In Triste v. Leyte State College Board of Trustees180 the Court elucidated on the nature of the
salary of a public official:
Mechem states that "(l)ike the requirement of an oath, the fact of the payment of a salary and/or
fees may aid in determining the nature of a position, but it is not conclusive, for while a salary or
fees are usually annexed to the office, it is not necessarily so. As in the case of the oath, the
salary or fees are mere incidents and form no part of the office. Where a salary or fees are
annexed, the office is often said to be ‘coupled with an interest’; where neither is provided for it is
a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good."
(Emphasis supplied)
Given the circumstances of this case, we find that Mayor Yaranon’s claim for unpaid salaries, in
case of exoneration, does not constitute such substantial relief that would justify the revival of his
appeal. Even if we did sustain his Petition, we nevertheless find that it has been mooted by our
resolution in the main petition.
WHEREFORE, we hereby rule as follows:
a.) In G.R. No. 160025, the Petition of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City is
DENIED. The CA Decision dated 7 July 2003 in CA G.R. SP No. 74756 is hereby
AFFIRMED with modification. There is not enough evidence on record to conclude that
Jadewell’s violations were sufficient to justify the unilateral cancellation of the MOA by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City; at the same time, neither the RTC nor the CA
provided a clear finding whether the breach of the MOA by Jadewell was substantial. We
affirm the CA as to the rest of its dispositions in its assailed Decision. Nevertheless, no
award of damages is hereby made in favour of Jadewell and neither is there any
pronouncement as to costs.
b.) G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107, 165564, 172216, 173043 and 174879, the Petitions of
Jadewell to cite Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon, Mayor Bernardo M. Vergara, Acting City
Mayor Reinaldo A. Bautista, Vice Mayor Betty Lourdes F. Tabanda, the members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City namely: Elmer O. Datuin, Antonio R. Tabora,
Edilberto B. Tenefrancia, Federico J. Mandapat, Jr., Richard A. Carino, Faustino A.
Olowan, Rufino M. Panagan, Leonardo B. Yangot, Jr., Rocky Thomas A. Balisong, Galo
P. Weygan, Perlita L. Chan-Rondez, Jose M. Molintas, and Judge Fernando Vil
Pamintuan for indirect contempt and to disbar Sangguniang Panlungsod members Rocky
Thomas A. Balisong, Edilberto B. Tenefrancia, Faustino A. Olowan, Federico J.
Mandapat, Perlita L. Chan-Rondez, Jose M. Molintas, Melchor Carlos B. Rabanes and
Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon are all hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
 c.) We DENY the Petition of Jadewell for lack of merit in G.R. No. 172215. We likewise
DENY its prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction for being moot and academic. No pronouncement as to costs.

d.) We DENY the Petition of Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon in G.R. No. 181488, for lack of
merit and AFFIRM the CA Decision CA-G.R. SP No. 96116. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, respondents.
Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa for petitioner.
Victor de la Serna for respondent Alcuaz.
REGALADO, J.:
This case is posed as one of first impression in the sense that it involves the public utility services
of the petitioner Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT, for short) which
is the only one rendering such services in the Philippines.
The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission (hereafter,
NTC), dated September 2, 1988, which directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be
charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by fifteen percent (15%) with the
reservation to make further reductions later, for being violative of the constitutional prohibition
against undue delegation of legislative power and a denial of procedural, as well as substantive,
due process of law.
The antecedental facts as summarized by petitioner 2 are not in dispute. By virtue of Republic Act
No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in
the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated
equipment and facilities for international satellite communications." Under this franchise, it was
likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver
telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or
terminals."
Pursuant to said franchise, petitioner puts on record that it undertook the following activities and
established the following installations:
1. In 1967, PHILCOMSAT established its provisional earth station in Pinugay,
Rizal.
2. In 1968, earth station standard "A" antenna (Pinugay I) was established.
Pinugay I provided direct satellite communication links with the Pacific Ocean
Region (the United States, Australia, Canada, Hawaii, Guam, Korea, Thailand,
China [PROC], New Zealand and Brunei) thru the Pacific Ocean INTELSAT
satellite.
3. In 1971, a second earth station standard "A" antenna(Pinugay III) was
established. Pinugay II provided links with the Indian Ocean Region (major cities
in Europe, Middle East, Africa, and other Asia Pacific countries operating within
the region) thru the Indian Ocean INTELSAT satellite.
4. In 1983, a third earth station standard "B" antenna (Pinugay III) was
established to temporarily assume the functions of Pinugay I and then Pinugay II
while they were being refurbished. Pinugay III now serves as spare or reserved
antenna for possible contingencies.
5. In 1983, PHILCOMSAT constructed and installed a standard "B" antenna at
Clark Air Field, Pampanga as a television receive-only earth station which
provides the U.S. Military bases with a 24-hour television service.
6. In 1989, petitioner completed the installation of a third standard "A" earth
3
station (Pinugay IV) to take over the links in Pinugay I due to obsolescence.
By designation of the Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner is also the sole signatory for the
Philippines in the Agreement and the Operating Agreement relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) of 115 member nations, as well as in the
Convention and the Operating Agreement of the International Maritime Satellite Organization
(INMARSAT) of 53 member nations, which two global commercial telecommunications satellite
corporations were collectively established by various states in line with the principles set forth in
Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its satellite circuits to:
1. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company;
2. Philippine Global Communications, Inc.;
3. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc.;
4. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT; and
5. Capitol Wireless, Inc.
or their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services thus provided by petitioner enable said
international carriers to serve the public with indispensable communication services, such as
overseas telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams, high speed data, live television in full color, and
television standard conversion from European to American or vice versa.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then
Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196
issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of
respondent NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said
Executive Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of
public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the
corresponding authority to charge rates therefor.
Consequently, under date of September 9, 1987, petitioner filed with respondent NTC an
application 4 for authority to continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been
continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the international satellite
communications services it has likewise been providing since 1967, and to charge the current
rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional
authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain the above mentioned facilities, provide
the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for.
On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a provisional authority to continue operating its
existing facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then
charging. This authority was valid for six (6) months from the date of said order. 5 When said
provisional authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was extended for another six (6) months, or up
to September 16, 1988.
The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the provisional authority of the petitioner
for another six (6) months, counted from September 16, 1988, but it directed the petitioner to
charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present
authorized rates. Respondent Commissioner ordered said reduction on the following ground:
The Commission in its on-going review of present service rates takes note that
after an initial evaluation by the Rates Regulation Division of the Common
Carriers Authorization Department of the financial statements of applicant, there
is merit in a REDUCTION in some of applicant's rates, subject to further
reductions, should the Commission finds (sic) in its further evaluation that more
reduction should be effected either on the basis of a provisional authorization or
in the final consideration of the case. 6
PHILCOMSAT assails the above-quoted order for the following reasons:
1. The enabling act (Executive Order No. 546) of respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates for
public service communications does not provide the necessary standards constitutionally required,
hence there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of
NTC;
2. Assuming arguendo that the rate-fixing power was properly and constitutionally conferred, the
same was exercised in an unconstitutional manner, hence it is ultra vires, in that (a) the
questioned order violates procedural due process for having been issued without prior notice and
hearing; and (b) the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, thus
constitutive of a violation of substantive due process.
I. Petitioner asseverates that nowhere in the provisions of Executive Order No. 546, providing for
the creation of respondent NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of Executive Order No.
196, placing petitioner under the jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it be inferred that respondent
NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. While
petitioner in its petition-in-chief raised the issue of undue delegation of legislative power, it
subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain
rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the
exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.
Whichever way it is presented, petitioner is in effect questioning the constitutionality of Executive
Orders Nos. 546 and 196 on the ground that the same do not fix a standard for the exercise of the
power therein conferred.
We hold otherwise.
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the
ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the
delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the
administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must
both be non- confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the
legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the
legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate
be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express
requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. 7
It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to respondent NTC and
the manner required by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof.
Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered, among others,
to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications which
necessarily include the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith. And,
under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be guided by the
requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective
competition of private entities in communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section
6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications
with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national
economic viability of the entire network or components of the communications systems
contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable rates. We need not go into an in-depth
analysis of the pertinent provisions of the law in order to conclude that respondent NTC, in the
exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest,
reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of
a valid delegation of legislative power.
II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned order violates procedural due process
because it was issued motu proprio, without notice to petitioner and without the benefit of a
hearing. Petitioner laments that said order was based merely on an "initial evaluation," which is a
unilateral evaluation, but had petitioner been given an opportunity to present its side before the
order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and the consequent
deterioration of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to respondents.
Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and
hence quasi-judicial, not quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the
absence thereof results in a violation of due process.
Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by
administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the function of the
administrative agency is legislative, notice and hearing are not required, but where an order
applies to a named person, as in the instant case, the function involved is
adjudicatory. 8 Nonetheless, they insist that under the facts obtaining the order in question need
not be preceded by a hearing, not because it was issued pursuant to respondent NTC's legislative
function but because the assailed order is merely interlocutory, it being an incident in the ongoing
proceedings on petitioner's application for a certificate of public convenience; and that petitioner is
not the only primary source of data or information since respondent is currently engaged in a
continuing review of the rates charged.
We find merit in petitioner's contention.
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, 9 we made a categorical
classification as to when the rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it
is legislative, thus:
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when
such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character, such is not the
nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to
petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact-based
upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making a
profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner.
Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to
introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or
complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the
respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed
a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which
demands previous notice and hearing.
This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of the Philippines vs.
Cloribel, et al. 10 to wit:
It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative
body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law (See
Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: 'If
the nature of the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements
of notice and hearing are not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action
which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not
determined according to the same rules which apply in the case of the direct
application of a policy to a specific individual) ... It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public
Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: 'Aside from
statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding
depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In
so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative
proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not
essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body
acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but
where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and
its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the
person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice
and hearing. 11
The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes
of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to
petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial,
that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of
petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to
what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate
reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed,
which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not
far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis
the viability of its business requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and
detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking
of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's
ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and the
quality of its service to the public considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still
has to undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based
its questioned order.
At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the
questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice
and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire
proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit.
While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of
petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory
procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness.
Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and
confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce entail
the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any
other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law. In the case at
bar, the applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which provides:
 Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing the
Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance
with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions
mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, ... which shall be imposed,
observed and followed thereafter by any public service; ...
There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision does not apply to respondent NTC,
there being no limiting, excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in Executive Orders Nos.
546 and 196.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order
without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is
immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the
commission's own motion as in the present case. That such a hearing is required is evident in
respondents' order of September 16, 1987 in NTC Case No. 87-94 which granted PHILCOMSAT a
provisional authority "to continue operating its existing facilities, to render the services it presently
offers, and to charge the rates as reduced by them "under the condition that "(s)ubject to hearing
and the final consideration of the merit of this application, the Commission may modify, revise or
amend the rates ..." 12
While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may have other sources of
information or data, still, since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC should act solely on the
basis of the evidence before it and not on knowledge or information otherwise acquired by it but
which is not offered in evidence or, even if so adduced, petitioner was given no opportunity to
controvert.
Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made effective on a specified date. It
becomes a final legislative act as to the period during which it has to remain in force pending the
final determination of the case. 13An order of respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates, even for
a temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable or even confiscatory, especially if the rates are
unreasonably low, since the utility permanently loses its just revenue during the prescribed period.
In fact, such order is in effect final insofar as the revenue during the period covered by the order is
concerned. Upon a showing, therefore, that the order requiring a reduced rate is confiscatory, and
will unduly deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its property, a declaration of its nullity
becomes inductible, which brings us to the issue on substantive due process.
III. Petitioner contends that the rate reduction is confiscatory in that its implementation would
virtually result in a cessation of its operations and eventual closure of business. On the other
hand, respondents assert that since petitioner is operating its communications satellite facilities
through a legislative franchise, as such grantee it has no vested right therein. What it has is merely
a privilege or license which may be revoked at will by the State at any time without necessarily
violating any vested property right of herein petitioner. While petitioner concedes this thesis of
respondent, it counters that the withdrawal of such privilege should nevertheless be neither
whimsical nor arbitrary, but it must be fair and reasonable.
There is no question that petitioner is a mere grantee of a legislative franchise which is subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the common good so requires. 14 Apparently,
therefore, such grant cannot be unilaterally revoked absent a showing that the termination of the
operation of said utility is required by the common good.
The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the conduct and business of public utilities is
limited by the consideration that it is not the owner of the property of the utility, or clothed with the
general power of management incident to ownership, since the private right of ownership to such
property remains and is not to be destroyed by the regulatory power. The power to regulate is not
the power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the power to protect, foster, promote,
preserve, and control with due regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the public, then of the
utility and of its patrons. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of
private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void,
because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the
laws. 15
Hence, the inherent power and authority of the State, or its authorized agent, to regulate the rates
charged by public utilities should be subject always to the requirement that the rates so fixed shall
be reasonable and just. A commission has no power to fix rates which are unreasonable or to
regulate them arbitrarily. This basic requirement of reasonableness comprehends such rates
which must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be oppressive. 16
What is a just and reasonable rate is not a question of formula but of sound business judgment
based upon the evidence 17 it is a question of fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good
sense, and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment. 18 In determining whether a rate is
confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given situation, requirements and opportunities of
the utility. A method often employed in determining reasonableness is the fair return upon the
value of the property to the public utility. Competition is also a very important factor in determining
the reasonableness of rates since a carrier is allowed to make such rates as are necessary to
meet competition. 19
A cursory perusal of the assailed order reveals that the rate reduction is solely and primarily based
on the initial evaluation made on the financial statements of petitioner, contrary to respondent
NTC's allegation that it has several other sources of information without, however, divulging such
sources. Furthermore, it did not as much as make an attempt to elaborate on how it arrived at the
prescribed rates. It just perfunctorily declared that based on the financial statements, there is merit
for a rate reduction without any elucidation on what implications and conclusions were necessarily
inferred by it from said statements. Nor did it deign to explain how the data reflected in the
financial statements influenced its decision to impose a rate reduction.
On the other hand, petitioner may likely suffer a severe drawback, with the consequent detriment
to the public service, should the order of respondent NTC turn out to be unreasonable and
improvident. The business in which petitioner is engaged is unique in that its machinery and
equipment have always to be taken in relation to the equipment on the other end of the
transmission arrangement. Any lack, aging, acquisition, rehabilitation, or refurbishment of
machinery and equipment necessarily entails a major adjustment or innovation on the business of
petitioner. As pointed out by petitioner, any change in the sending end abroad has to be matched
with the corresponding change in the receiving end in the Philippines. Conversely, any in the
receiving end abroad has to be matched with the corresponding change in the sending end in the
Philippines. An inability on the part of petitioner to meet the variegations demanded be technology
could result in a deterioration or total failure of the service of satellite communications.

At present, petitioner is engaged in several projects aimed at refurbishing, rehabilitating, and

renewing its machinery and equipment in order to keep up with the continuing charges of the
times and to maintain its facilities at a competitive level with the technological advances abroad.
There projected undertakings were formulated on the premise that rates are maintained at their
present or at reasonable levels. Hence, an undue reduction thereof may practically lead to a
cessation of its business. While we concede the primacy of the public interest in an adequate and
efficient service, the same is not necessarily to be equated with reduced rates. Reasonableness in
the rates assumes that the same is fair to both the public utility and the consumer.

Consequently, we hold that the challenged order, particularly on the issue of rates provided
therein, being violative of the due process clause is void and should be nullified. Respondents
should now proceed, as they should heretofore have done, with the hearing and determination of
petitioner's pending application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity and in which
proceeding the subject of rates involved in the present controversy, as well as other matter
involved in said application, be duly adjudicated with reasonable dispatch and with due
observance of our pronouncements herein.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents, dated September
2, 1988, in NTC Case No. 87-94 is hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued
under our resolution of September 13, 1988, as specifically directed against the aforesaid order of
respondents on the matter of existing rates on petitioner's present authorized services, is hereby
made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-68288 July 11, 1986
DIOSDADO GUZMAN, ULYSSES URBIZTONDO, and ARIEL RAMACULA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY and DOMINGO L. JHOCSON in his capacity as President of
National University, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado and Haydee Yorac for petitioners.
Samson S. Alcantara for respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent
National University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their
school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary
legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7,
1984, they allege:
1) that respondent University's avowed reason for its refusal to re-enroll them in
their respective courses is "the latter's participation in peaceful mass actions
within the premises of the University.
2) that this "attitude of the (University) is simply a continuation of its cavalier if not
hostile attitude to the student's exercise of their basic constitutional and human
rights already recorded in Rockie C. San Juan vs. National University, S.C. G.R.
No. 65443 (1983) and its utter contempt for the principle of due process of law to
the prejudice of petitioners;" and
3) that "in effect petitioners are subjected to the extreme penalty of expulsion
without cause or if there be any, without being informed of such cause and
without being afforded the opportunity to defend themselves. Berina v. Philippine
Maritime Institute (117 SCRA 581 [1983]).
In the comment filed on September 24, 1986 for respondent University and its President pursuant
to this Court's requirement therefor1 , respondents make the claim:
1) that "petitioners' failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to
their own fault and not because of their allegedexercise of their constitutional and human rights;"
2) that petitioner Urbiztondo, sought to re-enroll only on July 5, 1986 "when the enrollment period
was already closed;"
3) that as regards petitioner Guzman, his "academic showing" was "poor", "due to his activities in
leading boycotts of classes"; that when his father was notified of this development sometime in
August, 1982, the latter had demanded that his son "reform or else we will recall him to the
province"; that Guzman was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 65443 entitled "Rockie San Juan, et
al. vs. National University, et al.," at the hearing of which on November 23, 1983 this Court had
admonished "the students involved (to) take advantage and make the most of the opportunity
given to them to study;" that Guzman "however continued to lead or actively participate in activities
within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that
disturbed or disrupted classes therein;" that moreover, Guzman "is facing criminal charges for
malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Crim. Case No. 066446) in
connection with the destruction of properties of respondent University on September 12, 1983 ",
and "is also one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 8320483 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
entitled 'National University, Inc. vs. Rockie San Juan et al.' for damages arising from destruction
of university properties
4) that as regards petitioner Ramacula, like Guzman "he continued to lead or actively participate,
contrary to the spirit of the Resolution dated November 23, 1983 of this ... Court (in G.R. No.
65443 in which he was also one of the petitioners) and to university rules and regulations, within
university premises but without permit from university officials in activities that disturbed or
disrupted classes;" and
5) that petitioners have "failures in their records, (and) are not of good scholastic standing. "
Respondents close their comment with the following assertions, to wit:
1) By their actuations, petitioners must be deemed to have forfeited their privilege, if any, to seek
enrollment in respondent university. The rights of respondent university, as an institution of higher
learning, must also be respected. It is also beyond comprehension why petitioners, who
continually despise and villify respondent university and its officials and faculty members, should
persist in seeking enrollment in an institution that they hate.
2) Under the circumstances, and without regard to legal technicalities, it is not to the best interest
of all concerned that petitioners be allowed to enroll in respondent university.
3) In any event, petitioners' enrollment being on the semestral basis, respondents cannot be
compelled to enroll them after the end of the semester.
On October 2, 1984 this Court issued a resolution reading as follows:
 ... Acting on the Comment submitted by respondent, the Court Resolved to
NOTE the same and to require a REPLY to such Comment. The Court further
Resolved to ISSUE a MANDATORY INJUNCTION, enjoining respondent to allow
the enrolment of petitioners for the coming semester without prejudice to any
disciplinary proceeding to which any or all of them may be subjected with their
right to lawful defense recognized and respected. As regards petitioner Diosdado
Guzman, even if it be a fact that there is a pending criminal charge against him
for malicious mischief, the Court nonetheless is of the opinion that, as above-
noted, without prejudice to the continuation of any disciplinary proceeding against
him, that he be allowed to resume his studies in the meanwhile. As shown in
Annex 2 of the petition itself, Mr. Juan P. Guzman, father of said petitioner, is
extending full cooperation with petitioners to assure that whatever protest or
grievance petitioner Guzman may have would be ventilated in a lawful and
peaceful manner.
Petitioners' REPLY inter alia—
1) denied that Urbiztondo attempted to enroll only on July 5, 1984 (when enrollment was already
closed), it being alleged that "while he did try to enroll that day, he also attempted to do so several
times before that date, all to no avail, because respondents ... persistently refused to allow him to
do so" respondents' ostensible reason being that Urbiztondo (had) participated in mass actions ...
within the school premises," although there were no existing disciplinary charge against petitioner
Urbiztondo" at the time;
2) asserted that "neither the text nor the context of the resolution 2 justifies the conclusion that
"petitioners' right to exercise their constitutional freedoms" had thereby been restricted or limited;
and
3) alleged that "the holding of activities (mass action) in the school premises without the
permission of the school ... can be explained by the fact that the respondents persistently refused
to issue such permit repeatedly sought by the students. "
On November 23, 1984, this Court promulgated another resolution, this time reading as follows:
... The Court, after considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues
raised in the petition for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer
for preliminary mandatory injunction as well as the respondents' comment on the
petition and the reply of counsel for petitioners to the respondents' comment,
Resolved to (a) give DUE COURSE to the petition; (b) consider the respondents'
comment as ANSWER to the petition; and (c) require the parties to file their
respective MEMORANDA within twenty (20) days from notice. ... .
Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that
they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-
students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the university premises, conducted
without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or
perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts
showing disdain for and defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil
case for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot,
without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also
apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by
which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.
Under the Education Act of 1982, 5 the petitioners, as students, have the right among others "to
freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein
up to graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary
regulations." 6 Petitioners were being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in
violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools 7 that "(n)o penalty
shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in ... (the) Manual and/or in the
school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been
conducted." 8 This Court is therefore constrained, as in Berina v. Philippine Maritime Institute, 9 to
declare illegal this act of respondents of imposing sanctions on students without due investigation.
Educational institutions of course have the power to "adopt and enforce such rules as may be
deemed expedient for ... (its) government, ... (this being)" incident to the very object of
incorporation, and indispensable to the successful management of the college." 10 The rules may
include those governing student discipline. Indeed, the maintenance of "good school discipline" is
a duty specifically enjoined on "every private school" by the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools; 11 and in this connection, the Manual further provides that-
... The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions therefor
must be clearly specified and defined in writing and made known to the students
and/or their parents or guardians. Schools shall have the authority and
prerogative to promulgate such rules and regulations as they may deem
necessary from time to time effective as of the date of their promulgation unless
otherwise specified. 12
But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due
process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not
entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts
of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is
not, 'contrary to petitioners' view, an essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards
which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the
students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2)
they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to
adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to
re-enroll or otherwise continue with their respective courses, without prejudice to any disciplinary
proceedings to which any or all of them may be subjected in accordance with the standards herein
set forth.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 127980 December 19, 2007
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD HOLMES, JUDE DELA
TORRE, AMPARO RIO, CARMELITA QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO and JAMES
YAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION,
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES
PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTO VALDES, JR., respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
NAGTATAGIS sa kasong ito ang karapatang mag-aral ng apat na estudyante na nasangkot
sa away ng dalawang fraternity at ang karapatang akademiko ng isang pamantasan.
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto
Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle
University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB)1 Joint Discipline Board because of their
involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other
student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. This is the backdrop of the controversy before Us
pitting private respondents' right to education vis-a-vis the University's right to academic freedom.
ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court are the following: (1) Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 30, 1996 dismissing
DLSU's petition for certiorariagainst respondent Judge and private respondents Aguilar,
Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.;2 (2) Resolution of the CA dated October 15, 1996
denying the motion for reconsideration;3 (3) Order dated January 7, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 36 Manila granting private respondent Aguilar's motion to reiterate writ of
preliminary injunction;4 and (4) Resolution No. 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 of the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED) exonerating private respondent Aguilar and lowering the penalties for
the other private respondents from expulsion to exclusion.5
Factual Antecedents
Gleaned from the May 3, 1995 Decision of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, two violent
incidents on March 29, 1995 involving private respondents occurred:
x x x From the testimonies of the complaining witnesses, it appears that one week prior to
March 29, 1995, Mr. James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang's Restaurant near
La Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino
Lux. He ignored the comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding house, he
mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while watching television. These two brods
had earlier finished eating their dinner at Manang's. Then, the three, together with four
other persons went back to Manang's and confronted the two who were still in the
restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was a
member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence
then.
After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity
through the intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was
asking for an apology. "Kailangan ng apology" in the words of respondent Aguilar. But no
apology was made.
Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity went to the tambayan of the Domino
Lux Fraternity in the campus. Among them were respondents Bungubung, Reverente and
Papio. They were looking for a person whose description matched James Yap. According
to them, this person supposedly "nambastos ng brod." As they could not find Mr. Yap, one
of them remarked "Paano ba iyan. Pasensiya na lang."
Came March 29, 1995 and the following events.
Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., Mr. James Yap went out of the campus
using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-
cross Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were running
towards him. He panicked. He did not know what to do. Then, respondent Bungubung
punched him in the head with something heavy in his hands – "parang knuckles."
Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching him. Respondents
Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were also punching him. As he was
lying on the street, respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and
the group of attackers left.
Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who attacked him. With
respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said "hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko
nakita sumuntok siya." What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also running with the
group.
Two guards escorted Mr. Yap inside the campus. At this point, Mr. Dennis Pascual was at
the Engineering Gate. Mr. Pascual accompanied Yap to the university clinic; reported the
incident to the Discipline Office; and informed his fraternity brods at their tambayan.
According to Mr. Pascual, their head of the Domino Lux Fraternity said: "Walang gagalaw.
Uwian na lang."
Mr. Ericson Cano, who was supposed to hitch a ride with Dennis Pascual, saw him under
the clock in Miguel Building. However, they did not proceed directly for home. With a
 certain Michael Perez, they went towards the direction of Dagonoy Street because Mr.
Pascual was supposed to pick up a book for his friend from another friend who lives
somewhere in the area.
As they were along Dagonoy Street, and before they could pass the Kolehiyo ng Malate
Restaurant, Mr. Cano first saw several guys inside the restaurant. He said not to mind
them and just keep on walking. However, the group got out of the restaurant, among them
respondents Reverente, Lee and Valdes. Mr. Cano told Mr. Lee: "Ayaw namin ng gulo."
But, respondent Lee hit Mr. Cano without provocation. Respondent Reverente kicked Mr.
Pascual and respondent Lee also hit Mr. Pascual. Mr. Cano and Mr. Perez managed to
run from the mauling and they were chased by respondent Lee and two others.
Mr. Pascual was left behind. After respondent Reverente first kicked him, Mr. Pascual
was ganged-upon by the rest. He was able to run, but the group was able to catch up with
him. His shirt was torn and he was hit at the back of his head with a lead pipe.
Respondent Lee who was chasing Cano and Perez, then returned to Mr. Pascual.
Mr. Pascual identified respondents Reverente and Lee, as among those who hit him.
Although Mr. Pascual did not see respondent Valdes hit him, he identified respondent
Valdez (sic) as also one of the members of the group.
In fact, Mr. Cano saw respondent Valdes near Mr. Pascual. He was almost near the
corner of Leon Guinto and Estrada; while respondent Pascual who managed to run was
stopped at the end of Dagonoy along Leon Guinto. Respondent Valdes shouted: "Mga
putang-ina niyo." Respondent Reverente hit Mr. Pascual for the last time. Apparently
being satisfied with their handiwork, the group left. The victims, Cano, Perez and Pascual
proceeded to a friend's house and waited for almost two hours, or at around 8:00 in the
evening before they returned to the campus to have their wounds treated. Apparently,
there were three cars roaming the vicinity.6
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap
and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the "Domino Lux
Fraternity," while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul
Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of "Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity," a rival fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint7 with the Discipline Board of
DLSU charging private respondents with "direct assault." Similar complaints 8 were also filed by
Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and
Reverente. Thus, cases entitled "De La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar
(AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-
APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A.
Papio (AB-MGT/9251227)" were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar,
Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to
answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers.9
As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB10 were involved in the mauling incidents, a joint
DLSU-CSB Discipline Board11 was formed to investigate the incidents. Thus, petitioner Board
Chairman Emmanuel Sales sent notices of hearing12 to private respondents on April 12, 1995.
Said notices uniformly stated as follows:
Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to
hear and deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from
the written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at
9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and
present evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your
testimony or those of your witnesses.
On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board, through the
Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their
proposed testimony.
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of
witnesses and the sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a
waiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission of the principal act
complained of.
For your strict compliance.13
During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents interposed
the common defense of alibi, summarized by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board as follows:
First, in the case of respondent Bungubung, March 29, 1995 was one of the few instances
when he was picked-up by a driver, a certain Romeo S. Carillo. Most of the time,
respondent Bungubung goes home alone sans driver. But on this particular date,
respondent Bungubung said that his dad asked his permission to use the car and thus,
his dad instructed this driver Carillo to pick-up his son. Mr. Carillo is not a family driver,
but works from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for the Philippine Ports Authority where the elder
Bungubung is also employed.
Thus, attempting to corroborate the alibi of respondent Bungubung, Mr. Carillo said that
he arrived at La Salle at 4:56 p.m.; picked-up respondent at 5:02 p.m.; took the Roxas
Blvd. route towards respondent's house in BF Parañaque (on a Wednesday in Baclaran);
and arrived at the house at 6:15 p.m. Respondent Bungubung was dropped-off in his
house, and taking the same route back, Mr. Carillo arrived at the South Harbor at 6:55
p.m. the Philippine Ports Authority is located at the South Harbor.14
xxxx
 Secondly, respondent Valdes said that he was with his friends at McDonald's Taft just
before 6:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he left McDonald at 5:50 p.m. together
to get some medicine at the university clinic for his throat irritation. He said that he was at
the clinic at 5:52 p.m. and went back to McDonald, all within a span of 3 or even 4
minutes.
Two witnesses, a certain Sharon Sia and the girlfriend of respondent Valdes, a certain
Jorgette Aquino, attempted to corroborate Valdez' alibi.15
xxxx
Third, respondent Reverente told that (sic) the Board that he was at his home at 5:00 p.m.
of March 29, 1995. He said that he was given the responsibility to be the paymaster of the
construction workers who were doing some works in the apartment of his parents.
Although he had classes in the evening, the workers according to him would wait for him
sometimes up to 9:00 p.m. when he arrives from his classes. The workers get paid
everyday.
Respondent Reverente submitted an affidavit, unsigned by the workers listed there,
supposedly attesting to the fact that he paid the workers at the date and time in
question.16
xxxx
Fourth, respondent Aguilar "solemnly sw[ore] that [he] left DLSU at 5:00 p.m. for Camp
Crame for a meeting with some of the officers that we were preparing."17
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution18 finding private
respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion,19 pursuant to
CHED Order No. 4.20 The dispositive part of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN
AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN
LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of
having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby orders their automatic expulsion.
In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him
of the charge.
SO ORDERED.21
Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration22 before the Office of the Senior Vice-
President for Internal Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a Letter-
Resolution23 dated June 1, 1995.
On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a
petition for certiorariand injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-
74122 and assigned to respondent Judge of Branch 36. The petition essentially sought to annul
the May 3, 1995 Resolution of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board and the June 1, 1995 Letter-
Resolution of the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Affairs.
The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO24 directing DLSU, its
subordinates, agents, representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain
and desist from implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1,
1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar for the second term of
school year (SY) 1995.
Subsequently, private respondent Aguilar filed an ex parte motion to amend his petition to correct
an allegation in paragraph 3.2125 of his original petition. Respondent Judge amended the TRO26 to
conform to the correction made in the amended petition.27
On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies of the case records of
Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121,28 in view of the authority granted to it under Section 77(c) of
the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS).
On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes, filed
petitions-in-intervention29 in Civil Case No. 95-74122. Respondent Judge also issued
corresponding temporary restraining orders to compel petitioner DLSU to admit said private
respondents.
On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to dismiss30 in behalf of all petitioners, except
James Yap. On June 20, 1995, petitioners filed a supplemental motion to dismiss31 the petitions-
in-intervention.
On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an Order32 denying petitioners' (respondents
there) motion to dismiss and its supplement, and granted private respondents' (petitioners there)
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The pertinent part of the Order reads:
For this purpose, respondent, its agents, representatives or any and all other persons
acting for and in its behalf is/are restrained and enjoined from –
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the
automatic expulsion of petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention from the De
La Salle University and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995, affirming the
Resolution dated May 3, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrolment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the
courses offered at respondent De La Salle University and to immediately allow
them to enroll and complete their respective courses/degrees until their
graduation thereat in accordance with the standards set by the latter.
 WHEREFORE, the ancillary remedy prayed for is granted. Respondent, its agents,
representatives, or any and all persons acting for and its behalf are hereby restrained and
enjoyed from:
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the
automatic expulsion of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention and the Letter-
Resolution dated June 1, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the
courses offered at respondent (De La Salle University) and to forthwith allow all
said petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention to enroll and complete their
respective courses/degrees until their graduation thereat.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall take effect upon petitioner and petitioners-in-
intervention posting an injunctive bond in the amount of P15,000.00 executed in favor of
respondent to the effect that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention will pay to
respondent all damages that the latter may suffer by reason of the injunction if the Court
will finally decide that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention are not entitled thereto.
The motion to dismiss and the supplement thereto is denied for lack of merit.
Respondents are directed to file their Answer to the Petition not later than fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof.
SO ORDERED.33
Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU
when he attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus,
on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners
(respondents there) in contempt of court.34 Aguilar also prayed that petitioners be compelled to
enroll him at DLSU in accordance with respondent Judge's Order dated September 20, 1995. On
September 25, 1995, respondent Judge issued35 a writ of preliminary injunction, the relevant
portion of which reads:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA that until further orders, you the said DE LA SALLE University as well as your
subordinates, agents, representatives, employees and any other person assisting or
acting for or on your behalf, to immediately desist from implementing the Resolution dated
May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and the intervenors in DLSU,
and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995 affirming the said Resolution of May 3, 1995
and to immediately desist from barring the enrolment of petitioner and intervenors in the
courses offered at DLSU and to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses
until their graduation from said school.36
On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari 37 (CA-G.R. SP No.
38719) with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of
respondent Judge's September 20, 1995 Order and writ of preliminary injunction dated September
25, 1995.
On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction.
On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily
disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to
be reinstated, while other private respondents were to be excluded.38 The Resolution states:
RESOLUTION 181-96
RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY (DLSU), TAFT
AVENUE, MANILA FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF EXPULSION
IMPOSED ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, ROBERT R.
VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V. REVERENTE BE, AS IT IS HEREBY IS,
DISAPPROVED.
RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TO
IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THE
LOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, MR. ROBER R.
VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V. REVERENTE FROM
EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION.39
Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent Aguilar from
enrolling and/or attending his classes, prompting his lawyer to write several demand letters40 to
petitioner DLSU. In view of the refusal of petitioner DLSU to enroll private respondent Aguilar,
CHED wrote a letter dated June 26, 1996 addressed to petitioner Quebengco requesting that
private respondent Aguilar be allowed to continue attending his classes pending the resolution of
its motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 181-96. However, petitioner Quebengco refused to
do so, prompting CHED to promulgate an Order dated September 23, 1996 which states:
Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar through counsel enjoining De La
Salle University (DLSU) to comply with CHED Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion Case of
Alvin Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU) directing DLSU to reinstate Mr. Aguilar and finding the
urgent request as meritorious, there being no other plain and speedy remedy available,
considering the set deadline for enrollment this current TRIMESTER, and in order to
prevent further prejudice to his rights as a student of the institution, DLSU, through the
proper school authorities, is hereby directed to allow Mr. Alvin Aguilar to provisionally
enroll, pending the Commission's Resolution of the instant Motion for Reconsideration
filed by DLSU.
SO ORDERED.41
Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still refused to
allow private respondent Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilar's counsel wrote
another demand letter to petitioner DLSU.42
Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No. 181-96, filed
a motion to dismiss43 in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 rendered the CA case
moot and academic.
On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to dismiss of
private respondent Aguilar, disposing thus:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, dismissal of herein petition is hereby directed.
44
SO ORDERED.
On October 15, 1996, the CA issued its resolution denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, as follows:
It is obvious to Us that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 is immediately executory in
character, the pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding.
After considering the Opposition and for lack of merit, the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.45
On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case records to the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) from the CHED.46 Petitioners claimed that it is the DECS,
not CHED, which has jurisdiction over expulsion cases, thus, necessitating the transfer of the case
records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121 to the DECS.
On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
38719 and the automatic lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, private respondent Aguilar filed
an urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 before
respondent RTC Judge of Manila.47
On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned order granting private
respondent Aguilar's urgent motion to reiterate preliminary injunction. The pertinent portion
of the order reads:
In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar's urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary
injunction is hereby granted, and respondents' motion to dismiss is denied.
The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 is declared to be in force and
effect.
Let a copy of this Order and the writ be served personally by the Court's sheriff upon the
respondents at petitioners' expense.
SO ORDERED.48
Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to conditionally enroll in petitioner DLSU,
subject to the continued effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995
and to the outcome of Civil Case No. 95-74122.
On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the instant petition.
On June 15, 1998, We issued a TRO49 as prayed for by the urgent motion for the issuance of a
TRO50 dated June 4, 1998 of petitioners, and enjoined respondent Judge from implementing the
writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 issued in Civil Case No. 95-74122,
effective immediately and until further orders from this Court.
On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his manifestation51 stating that he has long
completed his course at petitioner DLSU. He finished and passed all his enrolled subjects for the
second trimester of 1997-1998, as indicated in his transcript of records52 issued by DLSU.
However, despite having completed all the academic requirements for his course, DLSU has not
issued a certificate of completion/graduation in his favor.
Issues
We are tasked to resolve the following issues:
1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review decisions of
institutions of higher learning that impose disciplinary action on their students found
violating disciplinary rules.
2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private respondents.
2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law?
2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?
2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence?
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents is proportionate
to their misdeed.
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of petitioners53 that while CHED Resolution No. 181-96
disapproved the expulsion of other private respondents, it nonetheless authorized their exclusion
from petitioner DLSU. However, because of the dismissal of the CA case, petitioner DLSU is now
faced with the spectacle of having two different directives from the CHED and the respondent
Judge – CHED ordering the exclusion of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes,
Jr., and the Judge ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll and complete their degree
courses until their graduation.
This is the reason We opt to decide the whole case on the merits, brushing aside technicalities, in
order to settle the substantial issues involved. This Court has the power to take cognizance of the
petition at bar due to compelling reasons, and the nature and importance of the issues raised
warrant the immediate exercise of Our jurisdiction.54This is in consonance with our case law now
accorded near-religious reverence that rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, such that when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, this Court has the duty to suspend their operation.55
I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the
power of supervision and review over
disciplinary cases decided by institutions
of higher learning.
Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may kapangyarihan ng pagsubaybay at pagrepaso sa mga
desisyong pandisiplina ng mga institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral.
Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to review student expulsion cases, even those
involving students in secondary and tertiary levels, is vested in the DECS not in the CHED. In
support of their stance, petitioners cite Sections 4,56 15(2) & (3),57 54,58 57(3)59 and 7060 of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232, otherwise known as the "Education Act of 1982."
According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS' power of
supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning. They say that
unlike B.P. Blg. 232, R.A. No. 7722 makes no reference to the right and duty of learning
institutions to develop moral character and instill discipline among its students. The clear concern
of R.A. No. 7722 in the creation of the CHED was academic, i.e., the formulation,
recommendation, setting, and development of academic plans, programs and standards for
institutions of higher learning. The enumeration of CHED's powers and functions under Section 8
does not include supervisory/review powers in student disciplinary cases. The reference in Section
3 to CHED's "coverage" of institutions of higher education is limited to the powers and functions
specified in Section 8. The Bureau of Higher Education, which the CHED has replaced and whose
functions and responsibilities it has taken over, never had any authority over student disciplinary
cases.
We cannot agree.
On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the
Commission on Higher Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof and for other purposes."
Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation of the CHED, provides:
Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education. – In pursuance of the
abovementioned policies, the Commission on Higher Education is hereby created,
hereinafter referred to as Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) and attached to the office of the President for administrative
purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and private institutions of higher
education as well as degree-granting programs in all post secondary educational
institutions, public and private.
The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They
include the following:
Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. – The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxxx
n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and functions
as may be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and objectives of this Act; and
o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective operations and for
the continued enhancement of growth or development of higher education.
Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not transfer to the
CHED the DECS' power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher
learning.
First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing. They make no reservations of powers to the
DECS insofar as institutions of higher learning are concerned. They show that the authority and
supervision over all public and private institutions of higher education, as well as degree-granting
programs in all post-secondary educational institutions, public and private, belong to the CHED,
not the DECS.
Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to decide disciplinary cases involving
students on the tertiary level would render nugatory the coverage of the CHED, which is "both
public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree granting programs in all post
secondary educational institutions, public and private." That would be absurd.
It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private educational institution which offers
tertiary degree programs. Hence, it is under the CHED authority.
Third, the policy of R.A. No. 772261 is not only the protection, fostering and promotion of the right
of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of appropriate steps to
ensure that education shall be accessible to all. The law is likewise concerned with ensuring and
protecting academic freedom and with promoting its exercise and observance for the continued
intellectual growth of students, the advancement of learning and research, the development of
responsible and effective leadership, the education of high-level and middle-level professionals,
and the enrichment of our historical and cultural heritage.
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were aware that
disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would continue to arise in the future,
which would call for the invocation and exercise of institutions of higher learning of their right to
academic freedom.
Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim that the Bureau of Higher Education,
which CHED replaced, never had authority over student disciplinary cases. In fact, the
responsibilities of other government entities having functions similar to those of the CHED were
transferred to the CHED.62
Section 77 of the MRPS63 on the process of review in student discipline cases should therefore
be read in conjunction with the provisions of R.A. No. 7722.
Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating that "[j]urisdiction over DECS-
supervised or chartered state-supported post-secondary degree-granting vocational and
tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the Commission [On Higher Education]." This
provision does not limit or distinguish that what is being transferred to the CHED is merely the
formulation, recommendation, setting and development of academic plans, programs and
standards for institutions of higher learning, as what petitioners would have us believe as the only
concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus: Where the law
does not distinguish, neither should we.
To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the CHED, necessarily
includes the transfer to the CHED of any jurisdiction which the DECS might have possessed by
virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for that matter.
IIa. Private respondents were accorded due process of law.
Ang mga private respondents ay nabigyan ng tamang proseso ng batas.
The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights
based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be
deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history.64 The constitutional
behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law is
solemn and inflexible.65
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline,
"[t]here are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of
the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the case."66
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he
cannot complain of deprivation of due process.67 Notice and hearing is the bulwark of
administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected
even in administrative proceedings.68 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.69 So long as the party is
given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said
that there was denial of due process.70
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process – it is
enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective
sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be
based.71 "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one
may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of due process.72
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB
Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the
charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also
informed of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the
Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and
they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all
the parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed
to cross-examine the witnesses against them. This argument was already rejected in Guzman v.
National University73 where this Court held that "x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline
cases may be summary; and cross examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof."
IIb. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses academic freedom
which includes determination of who to admit for study.
Ang petitioner DLSU, bilang institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral, ay nagtataglay ng
kalayaang akademiko na sakop ang karapatang pumili ng mga mag-aaral dito.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic
freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide
for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some restraint.74 According
to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic
institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach,
and (4) who may be admitted to study.75
It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a
necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school
teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the
freedom "what to teach."76 Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982
that students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to
continue their course therein up to graduation,"77 such right is subject to the established academic
and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can
very well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission
to its school.
IIc. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. was proven by
substantial evidence.
Ang pagkakasala ng private respondents na sina Bungubung, Reverente at Valdes, Jr. ay
napatunayan ng ebidensiyang substansyal.
As has been stated earlier, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi. However,
in order that alibi may succeed as a defense, "the accused must establish by clear and convincing
evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b)
the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime."78
On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not be successfully invoked where the identity of the
assailant has been established by witnesses.79 Positive identification of accused where categorical
and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should
prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear
and convincing evidence.80 Well-settled is the rule that denial and alibi, being weak defenses,
cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the offended parties.81
Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to the crime who can positively identify
the accused.82 Alibi is an inherently weak defense and courts must receive it with caution because
one can easily fabricate an alibi.83Jurisprudence holds that denial, like alibi, is inherently weak and
crumbles in light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters
that accused were at the scene of the crime and were the victim's assailants. As between
categorical testimonies that ring of truth on one hand and a bare denial on the other, the former
must prevail.84 Alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove,
and it is for this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of accused by the
witnesses.85
The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline cases, is neither proof
beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence. According
to Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,86 it means "such reasonable evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Viewed from the foregoing, We reject the alibi of private respondents Bungubung, Valdes Jr., and
Reverente.1awphi1 They were unable to show convincingly that they were not at the scene of the
crime on March 29, 1995 and that it was impossible for them to have been there. Moreover, their
alibi cannot prevail over their positive identification by the victims.
We hark back to this Court's pronouncement affirming the expulsion of several students found
guilty of hazing:
No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent
students who have been investigated and found guilty by the Disciplinary Board to have
violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine the
authority of the administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom which
has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution.87
Certainly, private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. do not deserve to claim a
venerable institution as their own, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the
students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after them.88 It must be borne in mind that
universities are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to
inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the
total man.89
As for private respondent Aguilar, however, We are inclined to give credence to his alibi that he
was at Camp Crame in Quezon City at the time of the incident in question on March 29, 1995. This
claim was amply corroborated by the certification that he submitted before the DLSU-CSB Joint
Discipline Board, to wit:
CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We, the undersigned, hereby declare and affirm by way of this Certification that
sometime on March 29, 1995, at about and between 4:30 P.M. and 5:30 P.M.,
we were together with Alvin A. Aguilar, at Kiangan Hall, inside Camp Crame,
Quezon City, meeting in connection with an affair of our class known as Class 7,
Batch 89 of the Philippine Constabulary discussing on the proposed sponsorship
of TAU GAMMA PHI from said Batch '89 affair.
That the meeting was terminated at about 6:30 P.M. that evening and Alvin Aguilar had
asked our permission to leave and we saw him leave Camp Crame, in his car with the
driver.
April 18, 1995, Camp Crame, Quezon City.90
The said certification was duly signed by PO3 Nicanor R. Faustino (Anti-Organized Crime CIC, Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor of private
NCR), PO3 Alejandro D. Deluviar (ODITRM, Camp Crame, Quezon City), PO2 Severino C. Filler respondent Aguilar. On the other hand, it may exclude or drop the names of private respondents
(TNTSC, Camp Crame, Quezon City), and PO3 Ireneo M. Desesto (Supply Center, PNPLSS). The Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately
rule is that alibi assumes significance or strength when it is amply corroborated by credible and issued.
disinterested witnesses.91 It is true that alibi is a weak defense which an accused can easily
fabricate to escape criminal liability. But where the prosecution evidence is weak, and betrays lack SO ORDERED.
of credibility as to the identification of defendant, alibi assumes commensurate strength. This is but
consistent with the presumption of innocence in favor of accused. 92
Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Quisumbing *, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. ** , JJ., concur.
Alibi is not always undeserving of credit, for there are times when accused has no other possible
defense for what could really be the truth as to his whereabouts at the crucial time, and such
defense may, in fact, tilt the scales of justice in his favor.93

III. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents is disproportionate

to their misdeed.

Ang parusang expulsion na ipinataw ng DLSU sa private respondents ay hindi angkop sa

kanilang pagkakasala.

It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as subsumed in their
academic freedom and that "the establishment of rules governing university-student relations,
particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the
smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival."94 This power, however,
does not give them the untrammeled discretion to impose a penalty which is not commensurate
with the gravity of the misdeed. If the concept of proportionality between the offense committed
and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give
rise to a due process question.95

We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed by private respondents Bungubung,
Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for few seconds and the
victims did not suffer any serious injury. Disciplinary measures especially where they involve
suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into the future of a student. They attach to him
for life and become a mortgage of his future, hardly redeemable in certain cases. Officials of
colleges and universities must be anxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that, appropriately
construed, a disciplinary action should be treated as an educational tool rather than a punitive
measure.96

Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of exclusion97 only, not expulsion,98 imposed on them by the
CHED. As such, pursuant to Section 77(b) of the MRPS, petitioner DLSU may exclude or drop the
names of the said private respondents from its rolls for being undesirable, and transfer credentials
immediately issued.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated
July 30, 1996 and dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, Order
dated January 7, 1997 are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, while CHED Resolution 181-96 dated
May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 111953. December 12, 1997]
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, HON.
JESUS B. GARCIA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary, Department of
Transportation and Communications, and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as
General Manager of Philippine Ports Authority, petitioners, vs. UNITED HARBOR
PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and MANILA PILOTS
ASSOCIATION, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), limiting the term of
appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, did the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents right to exercise their profession and their
right to due process of law?
The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505. On
December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPAs charter. Pursuant
to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession, [1] the PPA
promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 [2] on March 21, 1985, which embodied the Rules and Regulations
Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports. These
rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses [3] and must train as
probationary pilots in outports for three months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only
after they have achieved satisfactory performance [4] that they are given permanent and regular
appointments by the PPA itself [5] to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless
sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager. [6] Harbor
pilots in every harbor district are further required to organize themselves into pilot associations
which would make available such equipment as may be required by the PPA for effective pilotage
services. In view of this mandate, pilot associations invested in floating, communications, and
office equipment. In fact, every new pilot appointed by the PPA automatically becomes a member
of a pilot association and is required to pay a proportionate equivalent equity or capital before
being allowed to assume his duties, as reimbursement to the association concerned of the amount
it paid to his predecessor.
Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92 [7] on
July 15, 1992, whose avowed policy was to instill effective discipline and thereby afford better
protection to the port users through the improvement of pilotage services. This was implemented
by providing therein that all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued
either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only and
that all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a
term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the
Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.
On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots
Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the
Department of Transportation and Communication, but they were informed by then DOTC
Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPAs administrative
issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body.
Meanwhile, on August 31, 1992, the PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 08-92 [8] which laid
down the criteria or factors to be considered in the reappointment of harbor pilots, viz.: (1)
Qualifying Factors: [9] safety record and physical/mental medical exam report and (2) Criteria for
Evaluation: [10] promptness in servicing vessels, compliance with PPA Pilotage Guidelines, number
of years as a harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels serviced as pilot, awards/commendations as
harbor pilot, and age.
Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO
No. 04-92, but Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction
of the Board of Directors of the PPA. Compas appealed this ruling to the Office of the President
(OP), reiterating his arguments before the DOTC.
On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the
implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said administrative
order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots
under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV of P. D. No. 857, as amended, and it, along with its implementing
guidelines, was intended to restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of port services.
On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
Renato C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued
earlier. [11] He concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and
purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely implementing Section 6 of
P.D. No. 857, mandating it to control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any
port district.
On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing
memoranda and circulars, Secretary Corona opined that:
The exercise of ones profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful
deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process. In the limited context of
this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful
deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby. As may be noted, the issuance aims
no more than to improve pilotage services by limiting the appointment to harbor pilot positions to
one year, subject to renewal or cancellation after a rigid evaluation of the appointees performance.
PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their
profession in PPAs jurisdictional area. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, as regards the alleged absence of ample prior consultation before the issuance of the
administrative order, Secretary Corona cited Section 26 of P.D. No. 857, which merely requires
the PPA to consult with relevant Government agencies. Since the PPA Board of Directors is
composed of the Secretaries of the DOTC, the Department of Public Works and Highways, the
Department of Finance, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as well as
the Director-General of the National Economic Development Agency, the Administrator of the
Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), and the private sector representative who, due to his
knowledge and expertise, was appointed by the President to the Board, he concluded that the law
has been sufficiently complied with by the PPA in issuing the assailed administrative order.
Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65673. On September 6, 1993, the
trial court rendered the following judgment: [12]
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that:
1. Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in
promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-92 including all its implementing
Memoranda, Circulars and Orders;
2. PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders are declared null
and void;
3. The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative Order 04-92
and its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA,
recognized pilotage as a profession and, therefore, a property right under Callanta v. Carnation
Philippines, Inc.[13] Thus, abbreviating the term within which that privilege may be exercised would
be an interference with the property rights of the harbor pilots. Consequently, any withdrawal or
alteration of such property right must be strictly made in accordance with the constitutional
mandate of due process of law. This was apparently not followed by the PPA when it did not
conduct public hearings prior to the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92; respondents allegedly learned
about it only after its publication in the newspapers. From this decision, petitioners elevated their
case to this Court on certiorari.
After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the arguments of the parties, the
Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents right
against deprivation of property without due process of law. Consequently, the instant petition must
be denied.
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the due process clause of the
Constitution, viz.:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, x x x.
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that
there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due
process. When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between
matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process refers to the
method or manner by which the law is enforced, while substantive due process requires that the
law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and
just. [14] PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be examined in light of this distinction.
Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92
allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby relevant government agencies and the
pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect
of the enactment. Fortunately, the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it
has stressed in the recent case of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, [15] where it declared that (a)s long
as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to
have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due
process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four
times [16] before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score,
however, fail to persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, which
issues the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots examinations, was not consulted, [17] the
facts show that the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard,
was duly represented in the Board of Directors of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued that,
there being no matters of naval defense involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the
Philippine Coast Guard need not be consulted.[18]
Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the
validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental
requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises
its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as
issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of
notice and hearing.[19]
Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and exclusive right to the exercise of
harbor pilotage by pilots is a settled issue. Respondents aver that said right has become vested
and can only be withdrawn or shortened by observing the constitutional mandate of due process
of law. Their argument has thus shifted from the procedural to one of substance. It is here where
PPA-AO No. 04-92 fails to meet the condition set by the organic law.
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property
right. Even petitioner Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision that
(t)he exercise of ones profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful
deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process. [20] He merely expressed
the opinion that (i)n the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful
interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby,
and that PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their
profession. As will be presently demonstrated, such supposition is gravely erroneous and tends to
perpetuate an administrative order which is not only unreasonable but also superfluous.
Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed
individuals. Licensure is the granting of license especially to practice a profession. It is also the
system of granting licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance with established
standards. [21] A license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a
business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal. [22]
Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to pass
through the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but five examinations, each followed by
actual training and practice. Thus, the court a quo observed:
duplicated in PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing memorandum order. Since it adds nothing
new or substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be struck down.
Finally, respondents insinuation that then PPA General Manager Dayan was responsible for
the issuance of the questioned administrative order may have some factual basis; after all, power
and authority were vested in his office to propose rules and regulations. The trial courts finding of
animosity between him and private respondents might likewise have a grain of truth. Yet the
number of cases filed in court between private respondents and Dayan, including cases which
have reached this Court, cannot certainly be considered the primordial reason for the issuance of
PPA-AO No. 04-92. In the absence of proof to the contrary, Dayan should be presumed to have
acted in accordance with law and the best of professional motives. In any event, his actions are
certainly always subject to scrutiny by higher administrative authorities.

Petitioners (herein respondents) contend, and the respondents (herein petitioners) do not deny, WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the
that here (sic) in this jurisdiction, before a person can be a harbor pilot, he must pass five (5) court a quo dated September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 93-65673 is AFFIRMED. No
government professional examinations, namely, (1) For Third Mate and after which he must work, pronouncement as to costs.
train and practice on board a vessel for at least a year; (2) For Second Mate and after which he SO ORDERED.
must work, train and practice for at least a year; (3) For Chief Mate and after which he must work,
train and practice for at least a year; (4) For a Master Mariner and after which he must work as Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Captain of vessels for at least two (2) years to qualify for an examination to be a pilot; and finally, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
of course, that given for pilots. Martinez, J., no part.

Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in
pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under the terms of PPA-AO
No. 04-92, (a)ll existing regular appointments which have been previously issued by the Bureau of
Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only, and (a)ll appointments to
harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year
from date of effectivity subject to renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid
evaluation of performance.
It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy
their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of
security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training,
they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by
the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an
annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the
outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly
confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their
license is now dependent on a rigid evaluation of performance which is conducted only after the
license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term renewal. It is this pre-evaluation
cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In
a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-MO No. 08-92 are already covered by
PPA-AO No. 03-85, which is still operational. Respondents are correct in pointing out that PPA-AO
No. 04-92 is a surplusage [23] and, therefore, an unnecessary enactment. PPA-AO 03-85 is a
comprehensive order setting forth the Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the
Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports. It provides, inter alia, for the qualification,
appointment, performance evaluation, disciplining and removal of harbor pilots - matters which are
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-appellant.
Rodriguez & Del Rosario, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court that the appellant slaughtered or
caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information,
without a permit from the municipal treasure of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in
violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration,
branding, and slaughter of large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was
slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under
such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of
large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure. Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act are
as follows:
SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal
slaughterhouse except upon permit secured from the municipal treasure. Before issuing
the permit for the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, the municipal treasurer
shall require for branded cattle the production of the original certificate of ownership and
certificates of transfer showing title in the person applying for the permit, and for
unbranded cattle such evidence as may satisfy said treasurer as to the ownership of the
animals for which permit to slaughter has been requested.
SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal
treasurer unless such animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in
no event shall a permit be given to slaughter for food any animal of any kind which is not
fit for human consumption.
SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all permits for slaughter issued
by him, and such record shall show the name and residence of the owner, and the class,
sex, age, brands, knots of radiated hair commonly know as remolinos or cowlicks, and
other marks of identification of the animal for the slaughter of which permit is issued and
the date on which such permit is issued. Names of owners shall be alphabetically
arranged in the record, together with date of permit.
A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to the
provincial treasurer, who shall file and properly index the same under the name of the
owner, together with date of permit.
SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption
or killing for food at the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer, shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor
more than five hundred pesos, Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for not less than
one month nor more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court.
It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the
prohibition contained in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of slaughter
of large cattle for human consumption in a municipal slaughter without a permit duly secured from
the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal
slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer; and it is urged that the
municipality of Carmen not being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse, neither the prohibition
nor the penalty is applicable to cases of slaughter of large cattle without a permit in that
municipality.
We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter
of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the
municipal treasurer, and (2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a
municipal slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the penalty provided in section 33 applies
generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a
municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.
It may be admitted at once, that the pertinent language of those sections taken by itself and
examined apart from the context fairly admits of two constructions: one whereby the phrase "at the
municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting both the word "slaughtered"
and the words "killed for food" in section 30, and the words "slaughtering or causing to be
slaughtered for human consumption" and the words "killing for food" in section 33; and the other
whereby the phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting
merely the words "killed for food" and "killing for food" as used in those sections. But upon a
reading of the whole Act, and keeping in mind the manifest and expressed purpose and object of
its enactment, it is very clear that the latter construction is that which should be adopted.
The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against theft and to
make easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed, or
stolen. To this end it provides an elaborate and compulsory system for the separate branding and
registry of ownership of all such cattle throughout the Islands, whereby owners are enabled readily
and easily to establish their title; it prohibits and invalidates all transfers of large cattle
unaccompanied by certificates of transfer issued by the proper officer in the municipality where the
contract of sale is made; and it provides also for the disposition of thieves or persons unlawfully in
possession, so as to protect the rights of the true owners. All this, manifestly, in order to make it
difficult for any one but the rightful owner of such cattle to retain them in his possession or to
dispose of them to others. But the usefulness of this elaborate and compulsory system of
identification, resting as it does on the official registry of the brands and marks on each separate
animal throughout the Islands, would be largely impaired, if not totally destroyed, if such animals
were requiring proof of ownership and the production of certificates of registry by the person
slaughtering or causing them to be slaughtered, and this especially if the animals were
slaughtered privately or in a clandestine manner outside of a municipal slaughterhouse. Hence, as
it would appear, sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or
killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the
municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such permits
in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer.
If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by the appellant,
it will readily be seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the registry and record of
the brands and marks of identification of all large cattle in the Islands would prove in large part
abortion, since thieves and persons unlawfully in possession of such cattle, and naturally would,
evade the provisions of the law by slaughtering them outside of municipal slaughterhouses, and
thus enjoy the fruits of their wrongdoing without exposing themselves to the danger of detection
incident to the bringing of the animals to the public slaughterhouse, where the brands and other
identification marks might be scrutinized and proof of ownership required.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that
construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the
lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be
rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the
object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. We are of opinion, therefore, that
sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered
for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.
It is not essential that an explanation be found for the express prohibition in these sections of the
"killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse" of such animals, despite the fact that this
prohibition is clearly included in the general prohibition of the slaughter of such animals for human
consumption anywhere; but it is not improbable that the requirement for the issue of a permit in
such cases was expressly and specifically mentioned out of superabundance of precaution, and to
avoid all possibility of misunderstanding in the event that some of the municipalities should be
disposed to modify or vary the general provisions of the law by the passage of local ordinances or
regulations for the control of municipal slaughterhouse.
Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of section 31 of the Act leads to the same
conclusion. One of the secondary purposes of the law, as set out in that section, is to prevent the
slaughter for food of carabaos fit for agricultural and draft purposes, and of all animals unfit for
human consumption. A construction which would limit the prohibitions and penalties prescribed in
the statute to the killing of such animals in municipal slaughterhouses, leaving unprohibited and
unpenalized their slaughter outside of such establishments, so manifestly tends to defeat the
purpose and object of the legislator, that unless imperatively demanded by the language of the
statute it should be rejected; and, as we have already indicated, the language of the statute is
clearly susceptible of the construction which we have placed upon it, which tends to make
effective the provisions of this as well as all the other sections of the Act.
It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a permit to slaughter his carabao, and that it was
denied him on the ground that the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work or for draft purposes."
Counsel for appellant contends that the statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize the slaughter
of carabaos for human consumption as food, without first obtaining a permit which can not be
procured in the event that the animal is not unfit "for agricultural work or draft purposes," is
unconstitutional and in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress,
July 1, 1902), which provides that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law."
It is not quite clear from the argument of counsel whether his contention is that this provision of the
statute constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent
domain without providing for the compensation of the owners, or that it is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of the police power of the State. But whatever may be the basis of his
contention, we are of opinion, appropriating, with necessary modifications understood, the
language of that great jurist, Chief Justice Shaw (in the case of Com. vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met., 55,
where the question involved was the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting and penalizing the
taking or carrying away by any person, including the owner, of any stones, gravel, or sand, from
any of the beaches in the town of Chesea,) that the law in question "is not a taking of the property
for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the
power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be
inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the public. All property is acquired and held under the
tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair
the public rights and interest of the community."
It may be conceded that the benificial use and exclusive enjoyment of the property of all carabao
owners in these Islands is to a greater or less degree interfered with by the provisions of the
statute; and that, without inquiring what quantum of interest thus passes from the owners of such
cattle, it is an interest the deprivation of which detracts from their right and authority, and in some
degree interferes with their exclusive possession and control of their property, so that if the
regulations in question were enacted for purely private purpose, the statute, in so far as these
regulations are concerned, would be a violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill relied on be
appellant; but we are satisfied that it is not such a taking, such an interference with the right and
title of the owners, as is involved in the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain, so as
to entitle these owners to compensation, and that it is no more than "a just restrain of an injurious
private use of the property, which the legislature had authority to impose."
In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84), wherein the doctrine laid down in
Com. vs. Tewksbury (supra) was reviewed and affirmed, the same eminent jurist who wrote the
former opinion, in distinguishing the exercise of the right of eminent domain from the exercise of
the sovereign police powers of the State, said:
We think it is settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that
every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under
the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that is shall not be injurious to
the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor
 injurious to the rights of the community. . . . Rights of property, like all other social and
conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall
prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restrain and regulations
establish by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in
them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.
This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take
and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it;
which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor.
The power we allude to is rather the police power, the power vested in the legislature by
the constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and
of the subjects of the same.
It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to
mark its boundaries or prescribe limits to its exercise.
Applying these principles, we are opinion that the restrain placed by the law on the slaughter for
human consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not an appropriation
of property interests to a "public use," and is not, therefore, within the principle of the exercise by
the State of the right of eminent domain. It is fact a mere restriction or limitation upon a private
use, which the legislature deemed to be determental to the public welfare. And we think that an
examination of the general provisions of the statute in relation to the public interest which it seeks
to safeguard and the public necessities for which it provides, leaves no room for doubt that the
limitations and restraints imposed upon the exercise of rights of ownership by the particular
provisions of the statute under consideration were imposed not for private purposes but, strictly, in
the promotion of the "general welfare" and "the public interest" in the exercise of the sovereign
police power which every State possesses for the general public welfare and which "reaches to
every species of property within the commonwealth."
For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a virulent contagious or infectious disease
had threatened the total extinction of carabaos in these Islands, in many sections sweeping away
seventy, eighty, and in some cases as much as ninety and even one hundred per cent of these
animals. Agriculture being the principal occupation of the people, and the carabao being the work
animal almost exclusively in use in the fields as well as for draft purposes, the ravages of the
disease with which they were infected struck an almost vital blow at the material welfare of the
country. large areas of productive land lay waste for years, and the production of rice, the staple
food of the inhabitants of the Islands, fell off to such an extent that the impoverished people were
compelled to spend many millions of pesos in its importation, notwithstanding the fact that with
sufficient work animals to cultivate the fields the arable rice lands of the country could easily be
made to produce a supply more that sufficient for its own needs. The drain upon the resources of
the Islands was such that famine soon began to make itself felt, hope sank in the breast of the
people, and in many provinces the energies of the breadwinners seemed to be paralyzed by the
apparently hopeless struggle for existence with which they were confronted.
To meet these conditions, large sums of money were expended by the Government in relieving
the immediate needs of the starving people, three millions of dollars were voted by the Congress
of the United States as a relief or famine fund, public works were undertaken to furnish
employment in the provinces where the need was most pressing, and every effort made to
alleviate the suffering incident to the widespread failure of the crops throughout the Islands, due in
large measure to the lack of animals fit for agricultural work and draft purposes.
Such measures, however, could only temporarily relieve the situation, because in an agricultural
community material progress and permanent prosperity could hardly be hoped for in the absence
of the work animals upon which such a community must necessarily rely for the cultivation of the
fields and the transportation of the products of the fields to market. Accordingly efforts were made
by the Government to increase the supply of these animals by importation, but, as appears from
the official reports on this subject, hope for the future depended largely on the conservation of
those animals which had been spared from the ravages of the diseased, and their redistribution
throughout the Islands where the need for them was greatest.
At large expense, the services of experts were employed, with a view to the discovery and
applications of preventive and curative remedies, and it is hoped that these measures have
proved in some degree successful in protecting the present inadequate supply of large cattle, and
that the gradual increase and redistribution of these animals throughout the Archipelago, in
response to the operation of the laws of supply and demand, will ultimately results in practically
relieving those sections which suffered most by the loss of their work animals.
As was to be expected under such conditions, the price of carabaos rapidly increase from the
three to five fold or more, and it may fairly be presumed that even if the conservative measures
now adopted prove entirely successful, the scant supply will keep the price of these animals at a
high figure until the natural increase shall have more nearly equalized the supply to the demand.
Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this sudden rise in the price of cattle, the
crime of cattle stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands, necessitating the
enactment of a special law penalizing with the severest penalties the theft of carabaos and other
personal property by roving bands; and it must be assumed from the legislative authority found
that the general welfare of the Islands necessitated the enactment of special and somewhat
burdensome provisions for the branding and registration of large cattle, and supervision and
restriction of their slaughter for food. It will hardly be questioned that the provisions of the statute
touching the branding and registration of such cattle, and prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter
of diseased cattle for food were enacted in the due and proper exercise of the police power of the
State; and we are of opinion that, under all the circumstances, the provision of the statute
prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter for human consumption of carabaos fit for work were in
like manner enacted in the due and proper exercise of that power, justified by the exigent
necessities of existing conditions, and the right of the State to protect itself against the
overwhelming disaster incident to the further reduction of the supply of animals fit for agricultural
work or draft purposes.
It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in these Islands, and disclosed by the official reports
and records of the administrative and legislative departments of the Government, that not merely
the material welfare and future prosperity of this agricultural community were threatened by the
ravages of the disease which swept away the work animals during the years prior to the
enactment of the law under consideration, but that the very life and existence of the inhabitants of
these Islands as a civilized people would be more or less imperiled by the continued destruction of
large cattle by disease or otherwise. Confronted by such conditions, there can be no doubt of the
right of the Legislature to adopt reasonable measures for the preservation of work animals, even
to the extent of prohibiting and penalizing what would, under ordinary conditions, be a perfectly
legitimate and proper exercise of rights of ownership and control of the private property of the
citizen. The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the
invasion of private property by police regulation can be justified, we think that the reasonable
restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion must be
held to be authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power.
As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the case of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U.S., 133,
136):
The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of
discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally
conceded to include everything essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to
justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be
regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has been held that the State may
order the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of
passers-by; the demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of
diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of
wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and other means of public
conveyance, and of interments in burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to
certain localities; the compulsary vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or
those afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual
drunkards; the suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the
prohibition of gambling houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond
this, however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this
particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only
what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the
protection of such interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128
U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests,
arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions
upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise
of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court.
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute
under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human
consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a
"reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of
the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of
momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the
productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.
Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149)
that by this "general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State;
of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and
general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned."
And Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations" (6th ed., p. 738) says:
It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which the police power is or
may be exercised, because the various cases in which the exercise by one individual of
his rights may conflict with a similar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the
public order or safety, are infinite in number and in variety. And there are other cases
where it becomes necessary for the public authorities to interfere with the control by
individuals of their property, and even to destroy it, where the owners themselves have
fully observed all their duties to their fellows and to the State, but where, nevertheless,
some controlling public necessity demands the interference or destruction. A strong
instance of this description is where it becomes necessary to take, use, or destroy the
private property of individuals to prevent the spreading of a fire, the ravages of a
pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any other great public calamity. Here the
individual is in no degree in fault, but his interest must yield to that "necessity" which
"knows no law." The establishment of limits within the denser portions of cities and
villages within which buildings constructed of inflammable materials shall not be erected
or repaired may also, in some cases, be equivalent to a destruction of private property;
but regulations for this purpose have been sustained notwithstanding this result. Wharf
lines may also be established for the general good, even though they prevent the owners
of water-fronts from building out on soil which constitutes private property. And, whenever
the legislature deem it necessary to the protection of a harbor to forbid the removal of
stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may establish regulations to that effect under
penalties, and make them applicable to the owners of the soil equally with other persons.
Such regulations are only "a just restraint of an injurious use of property, which the
legislature have authority" to impose.
So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of
circumstances, and without the fault of the power, that which was once lawful, proper, and
unobjectionable has now become a public nuisance, endangering the public health or the
public safety. Milldams are sometimes destroyed upon this grounds; and churchyards
which prove, in the advance of urban population, to be detrimental to the public health, or
in danger of becoming so, are liable to be closed against further use for cemetery
purposes.
These citations from some of the highest judicial and text-book authorities in the United States
clearly indicate the wide scope and extent which has there been given to the doctrine us in our
opinion that the provision of the statute in question being a proper exercise of that power is not in
violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill, which provide that "no law shall be enacted
which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," a provision
which itself is adopted from the Constitution of the United States, and is found in substance in the
constitution of most if not all of the States of the Union.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be affirmed with
the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED
NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU
OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike —
but hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial
movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the
requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still
manage to circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of
carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order
No. 626 and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is
necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition
of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate
the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth,
no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no
carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or
carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef,
and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry
may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13,
1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for
violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since
they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to
rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority
and also for its presumed validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial
court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries.
His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to
be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains
that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is
also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable
here. The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in
the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then
on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the
Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an
entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the
Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules
of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases
involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such
cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any
means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their
invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and
heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow
the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is
questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess,
paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of
the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition
unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by
President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in
the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that
whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or
whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment
required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters
of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency
to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to
question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds
was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to
protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a
more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental
question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and
unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That
is the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed
and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly
was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P.
Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was
sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently
resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the
fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all
seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of
the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or
constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process
lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they
may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to
leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the
process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus,
Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to
define due process — and in so doing sums it all up — as nothing more and nothing less than "the
embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that
Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for themselves
and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society.
The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through
the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when
confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of
his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear
"the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment.
Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an
impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It
is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading
to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only
but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is
unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all,
in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking,
may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.
It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich
with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments
of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the
State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred
years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of
every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain
arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a
number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of
contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a
rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There
are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in
the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on
sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic
materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily
destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without
hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily
padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In
such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view
of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare
from a clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both
restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power
inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general
welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as
the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the
State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is
hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after
he is dead — from the womb to beyond the tomb — in practically everything he does or owns. Its
reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the
activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police
power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin
maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the
subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A,
amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except
under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of
its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved
for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the
need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased
dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been
remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the
registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property
without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered
his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The
conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the
indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had
stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline
in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the
scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread
alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these
animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and
declared in part as follows:
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. ...
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions
of the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the
prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these
animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably
necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the
loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners,
tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of
animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may
be measurably and dangerously affected.
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the
poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful
subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably
necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals,
again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these
animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female
upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm
work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure,
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on
their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose
(sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one
province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them
there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive
order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the
movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it
should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead
meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still
have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The
penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by
the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained
because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial
and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is
prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and
declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander,
were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the
carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted
the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard,
thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly
dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due
process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative
proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases
accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit,
the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's
peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their
instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive
order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all
the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v.
Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the
authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated
property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized
property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse,
and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines,
or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution.
There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of
their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the
answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive
discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is
not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of
legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive
Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated
the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance
with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a
member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere
subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own
responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals
itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we
now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw
them, this case would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged
measure would have become a faitaccompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit.
Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and
another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed
without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to
invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like
expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise
of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free
society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed
above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and
the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla Bidin Sarmiento
and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions
1
SUPREME COURT prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission.
Manila
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure
FIRST DIVISION examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on
their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988 Branch XXXII, a complaint for injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary
injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned
resolution and to declare the same unconstitution.
LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MANGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA, ALEXANDER R.
REGUYAL, JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA,
ERNESTOC. BLAS, JR., ELPEDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R. RIMANDO, petitioner, Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court
vs. had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October
COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondent. 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the
respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to
be unconstitutional.
Balgos & Perez Law Offices for petitioners.
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals a
The Solicitor General for respondents.
petition for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said petiton was granted in the
Decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, to wit:

WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious the same is hereby GRANTED

GANCAYCO, J.: and the other dated October 21, 1986 issued by respondent court is declared null
and void. The respondent court is further directed to dismiss with prejudice Civil
Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so Case No. 86-37950 for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. No
that it cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can this Commission cost in this instance.
lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or
the like three (3) days before the date of the examination? Theses are the issues presented to the SO ORDERED. 2
court by this petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on
January 13, 1987, in CA-G.R. SP No. 10598, * declaring null and void the other dated Ocober 21,
Hence, this petition.
1986 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 86-37950 entitled "
Lupo L. Lupangco, et al. vs. Professional Regulation Commission."
The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no jurisdiction to
entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No. 105, stated as its basis its
The records shows the following undisputed facts:
conclusion that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are co-
equal bodies. Thus it held —
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those
That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal
applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution body with the Regional Trial Court is beyond question, and co-equal bodies have
embodied the following pertinent provisions: no power to control each other or interfere with each other's acts. 3

No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like
To strenghten its position, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on National Electrification
conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any
Administration vs. Mendoza, 4 which cites Pineda vs. Lantin 5 and Philippine Pacific Fishing, Inc.
school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer,
vs. Luna, 6 where this Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of
lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars the Securities and Exchange Commission, the two being co-equal bodies.
institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day
including examination day.
After a close scrutiny of the facts and the record of this case,
We rule in favor of the petitioner.
The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why
this Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of the Securities
and Exchange Commission was that this was so provided for by the law. In Pineda vs. Lantin, We
explained that whenever a party is aggrieved by or disagree with an order or ruling of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, he cannot seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction
since under the Rules of Court and Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by Republic Act No.
635, creating and setting forth the powers and functions of the old Securities and Exchange
Commission, his remedy is to go the Supreme Court on a petition for review. Likewise,
in Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. vs. Luna,it was stressed that if an order of the Securities and
Exchange Commission is erroneous, the appropriate remedy take is first, within the Commission
itself, then, to the Supreme Court as mandated in Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the law creating
the new Securities and Exchange Commission. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court
of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling
was specifically limited to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The respondent court erred when it place the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Professional Regulation Commsision in the same category. As alraedy mentioned, with respect to
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide with the procedure that
need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling. Upon the other hand, there is no law
providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the
Professional Regulation Commission. Unlike Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree
No. 902-A, there is no provision in Presidential Decree No. 223, creating the Professional
Regulation Commission, that orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the
Court of Appeals or to theSupreme Court. Consequently, Civil Case No. 86-37950, which was filed
in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the respondent Professional Regulation
Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. 7
What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is
attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination. 8 Well settled in our
jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the
Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court). In Medalla vs. Sayo, 9 this rule was
thoroughly propounded on, to wit:
In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions and/or
resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the residential Executive
Asssistant is concerned, there should be no question but that the power of
judicial review should be upheld. The following rulings buttress this conclusion:
The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises
from a failure to recognize the most important principle in our
system of government, i.e., the separation of powers into three
co-equal departments, the executives, the legislative and the
judicial, each supreme within its own assigned powers and
duties. When a presidential act is challenged before the courts
of justice, it is not to be implied therefrom that the Executive is
being made subject and subordinate to the courts. The legality
of his acts are under judicial review, not because the Executive
is inferior to the courts, but because the law is above the Chief
Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or
implement it (the law). A judicial review of the President's
decision on a case of an employee decided by the Civil Service
Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing
of the case to the Courts should be governed by the same
principles as govern the jucucial review of all administrative acts
of all administrative officers. 10
Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. II, 11 is another case in point. Here, "the
Executive Office"' of the Department of Education and Culture issued Memorandum Order No. 93
under the authority of then Secretary of Education Juan Manuel. As in this case, a complaint for
injunction was filed with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte because, allegedly, the
enforcement of the circular would impair some contracts already entered into by public school
teachers. It was the contention of petitioner therein that "the Court of First Instance is not
empowered to amend, reverse and modify what is otherwise the clear and explicit provision of the
memorandum circular issued by the Executive Office which has the force and effect of law." In
resolving the issue, We held:
... We definitely state that respondent Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction in Civil
Case No. II-240 (8) because the plaintiff therein asked the lower court for relief,
in the form of injunction, in defense of a legal right (freedom to enter into
contracts) . . . . .
Hence there is a clear infringement of private respondent's constitutional right to
enter into agreements not contrary to law, which might run the risk of being
violated by the threatened implementation of Executive Office Memorandum
Circular No. 93, dated February 5, 1968, which prohibits, with certain exceptions,
cashiers and disbursing officers from honoring special powers of attorney
executed by the payee employees. The respondent Court is not only right but
duty bound to take cognizance of cases of this nature wherein a constitutional
and statutory right is allegedly infringed by the administrative action of a
government office. Courts of first Instance have original jurisdiction over all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation
(Sec. 44, Republic Act 296, as amended). 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 13 We ruled that a judge of the Court of First Instance has
the authority to decide on the validity of a city tax ordinance even after its validity had been
contested before the Secretary of Justice and an opinion thereon had been rendered.
In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why Resolution No. 105, issued by the
respondent Professional Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129,
it is the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. The said law provides:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution,
the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948.
The contention is devoid of merit.
In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in
Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from
proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions. In
Black's Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of
public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would
mean a determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies
to a specific situation . 14This does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued
by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions like
Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the
integrity of licensure examinations.
The above rule was adhered to in Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer. 15 In this
case, the issue presented was whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over a
case involving an order of the Commission on Elections awarding a contract to a private party
which originated from an invitation to bid. The said issue came about because under the laws then
in force, final awards, judgments, decisions or orders of the Commission on Elections fall within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. Hence, it has been
consistently held that "it is the Supreme Court, not the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive
jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections
relative to the conduct of elections and the enforcement of election laws." 16
As to whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in saidcase, We said:
We are however, far from convinced that an order of the COMELEC awarding a
contract to a private party, as a result of its choice among various proposals
submitted in response to its invitation to bid comes within the purview of a "final
order" which is exclusively and directly appealable to this court on certiorari.
What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions, of the
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are
those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken
cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting
the award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it
wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after
which the questioned order was issued; and that this order of the commission
was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election
purposes. In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of
Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an
incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and
hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order reviewable by
certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt
order may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and
exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question
arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the
trial courts. (Emphasis supplied.) 17
One other case that should be mentioned in this regard is Salud vs. Central Bank of the
Philippines. 18 Here, petitioner Central Bank, like respondent in this case, argued that under
Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, orders of the Monetary Board are appealable only to the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Thus:
The Central Bank and its Liquidator also postulate, for the very first time, that the
Monetary Board is among the "quasi-judicial ... boards" whose judgments are
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the IAC; hence, it is only said Court,
"to the exclusion of the Regional Trial Courts," that may review the Monetary
Board's resolutions. 19
Anent the posture of the Central Bank, We made the following pronouncement:
The contention is utterly devoid of merit. The IAC has no appellate jurisdiction
over resolution or orders of the Monetary Board. No law prescribes any mode of
appeal from the Monetary Board to the IAC. 20
In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil
Case No. 86-37950 and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution.
Although We have finally settled the issue of jurisdiction, We find it imperative to decide once and
for all the validity of Resolution No. 105 so as to provide the much awaited relief to those who are
and will be affected by it.
Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose
which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim
cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it
is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or
the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, collge or university,
or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of
the aforementioned or similar institutions . ... 21
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts
even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the
respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a
watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period.
It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must
be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. 22
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right
to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the
reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot
be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to
become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining
success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful
knowledge that will promote their personal growth. As defined in a decision of the United States
Supreme Court:
The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the
bounds of a prison. It means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in
such a manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment
may dictate for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue such callings and
vocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities, and giv to them
their highest enjoyment. 23
extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be
construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.
Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged
leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the
examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last
three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in
the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day
itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by
the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials
or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be
flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are
committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the
respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right
and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations
should not be curtailed.
In the light of the above, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 10591 and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring Resolution
No. 105 null and void and of no force and effect for being unconstitutional. This decision is
immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa and Cruz, JJ., concur.
Griño-Aquino, J., took no part.

Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the
schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review
schools and centers believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required
before becoming a full fledged public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are
clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers
may not be stopped from helping out their students. At this juncture, We call attention to Our
pronouncement in Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology, 24 regarding academic freedom to wit:

... It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a
right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is
free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding
public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR
INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition
is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The
lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For
reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of
the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the
petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del
Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second
petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as
such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to
give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1).
It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and
protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels, characterized
as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes,
employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and representing an investment of
more than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of
the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-
Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the
assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact
insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila
or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would
impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels;
that the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or
accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons
without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his
presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the
occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room,
if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his
residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a
person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of
such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and
records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such
hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the
Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due
process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being
vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the
guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels
into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels
such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends
against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion
which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room;
that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years
old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless
accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of
certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the
penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would,
cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the
destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the
due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the
above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No.
4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances
regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel
or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its
alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition
did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to
a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and
that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of
the right to privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance
of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its
dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated
September 28, 1964, which reads:
 1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and
Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both
with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general
manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio
City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief
executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution
and enforcement of such ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and
motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then
the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor,
amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances
of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is
similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its
4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted
with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which
is attached hereto as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license
fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City
of Manila.1äwphï1.ñët
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on
the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of
conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria,
but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point
the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on
February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth
in the petition, with citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and
praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and
making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and
referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The
only remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court,
agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does
appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon
the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is
undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of
Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of
the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the
preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from
enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional
doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a
sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand,
consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in
both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed
categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of
the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the
very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the
facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative
body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the
well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when
there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not
the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case
of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court
through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here
questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to
declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and
hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition
the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail
in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual
foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and
the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the
ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as
being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection
associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation
of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from
such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance.
To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has
been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs."5 It would be, to paraphrase another
leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to
be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the
genera welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included
as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution,
adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide
a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal
haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the
clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these
transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to
public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to
shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the
increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from
operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack
against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval,
ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant;8 provide a license
tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting
gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12 prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other
than Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting
any person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium
is smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which are intended to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise
of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the
people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable
constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the
life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police
power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due
process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the
courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to
the question of due process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It
furnishes though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard
of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the
challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal
infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to
the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy
the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds
of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred
by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and
judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations
of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought."18 It is not a narrow or
"technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," 19 decisions
based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to
form or phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a
municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and
capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and
what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted
deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged
ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even
attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure
to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive
plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out
such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom
to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged
ordinance for hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class
motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has
been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified
into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or
restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only.22 As was
explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations
are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power
to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are
allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying
the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or
tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The
desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-
useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of
this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have
frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases
the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable.23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier
announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's
police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority
conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to
cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes,
just and uniform.25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in
imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given
to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a
massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.26 The discussion of this
particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It
is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive
them of their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the
public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat,
the sale of which outside the city markets under certain conditions is permitted x x x . And surely,
the mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or
a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said
in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be
affected by the exercise of the police power embark in these occupations subject to the
disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel,
lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a
different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the
command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb
the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according
to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when
there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation
and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every
regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm
cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of
liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and
for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do
exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of
the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety,
or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power."28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be
made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority
be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should
achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and
order and happiness for all.29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue
deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living
principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public
interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind
or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible
scope of regulatory measure is wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking
the principles of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that
what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed
and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a
guest should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as
indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or
companions referred to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or
entering the room With him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join
him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a
restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso
which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be
charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be
asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness
or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction
Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute
susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
Is this the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree
to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon
against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments
pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged
ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so
uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed
decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith.
With costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON.
JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding
Officer of the City Council of Manila, HON. ERNESTO A. NIEVA, HON. GONZALO P.
GONZALES, HON. AVELINO S. CAILIAN, HON. ROBERTO C. OCAMPO, HON. ALBERTO
DOMINGO, HON. HONORIO U. LOPEZ, HON. FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR., HON.
ROMUALDO S. MARANAN, HON. NESTOR C. PONCE, JR., HON. HUMBERTO B. BASCO,
HON. FLAVIANO F. CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ROMEO G. RIVERA, HON. MANUEL M.
ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S. DE JESUS, HON. BERNARDITO C. ANG, HON. MANUEL L. QUIN,
HON. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON. CHIKA G. GO, HON. VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, HON.
ERNESTO V.P. MACEDA, JR., HON. ROLANDO P. NIETO, HON. DANILO V. ROLEDA, HON.
GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA. PAZ E. HERRERA, HON. JOEY D. HIZON, HON.
FELIXBERTO D. ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q. BUTIONG, HON. ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ, HON.
BERNARDO D. RAGAZA, HON. MA. CORAZON R. CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON,
HON. BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, JR., HON. MA. LOURDES M. ISIP, HON. ALEXANDER S.
RICAFORT, HON. ERNESTO F. RIVERA, HON. LEONARDO L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN
B. DAWIS, in their capacity as councilors of the City of Manila,Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE
TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you
feel bad after.
Ernest Hermingway
Death in the Afternoon, Ch. 1
It is a moral and political axiom that any dishonorable act, if performed by oneself, is less
immoral than if performed by someone else, who would be well-intentioned in his
dishonesty.
J. Christopher Gerald
Bonaparte in Egypt, Ch. I
The Court's commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its fealty to the fundamental
law of the land. It is foremost a guardian of the Constitution but not the conscience of individuals.
And if it need be, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily" in the words of
Justice Laurel, and uphold the constitutional guarantees when faced with laws that, though not
lacking in zeal to promote morality, nevertheless fail to pass the test of constitutionality.
The pivotal issue in this Petition1 under Rule 45 (then Rule 42) of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 (lower court),3 is the validity of Ordinance No. 7783
(the Ordinance) of the City of Manila.4
The antecedents are as follows:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in
the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.5 It built and opened Victoria
Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of
Tourism as a hotel.6 On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 (RTC Petition) with the lower
court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon.
Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed
that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments,
be declared invalid and unconstitutional.8
Enacted by the City Council9 on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March
1993, the said Ordinance is entitled–
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.10
The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary
notwithstanding, no person, partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-
Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the
East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D.
499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing
certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women
are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy
the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community, such as but not limited to:
 1. Sauna Parlors 5. Records and music shops

2. Massage Parlors 6. Restaurants

3. Karaoke Bars 7. Coffee shops

4. Beerhouses 8. Flower shops

5. Night Clubs 9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for
wholesome family entertainment that cater to both local and foreign clientele.
6. Day Clubs
10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion pictures but also of
7. Super Clubs cultural shows, stage and theatrical plays, art exhibitions, concerts and the like.

8. Discotheques 11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as
provided for in the zoning ordinances for Metropolitan Manila, except new
warehouse or open-storage depot, dock or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
9. Cabarets service station, light industry with any machinery, or funeral establishments.

10. Dance Halls

11. Motels
12. Inns
SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said
officials are prohibited from issuing permits, temporary or otherwise, or from
granting licenses and accepting payments for the operation of business
enumerated in the preceding section.
SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the
businesses enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the
date of approval of this ordinance within which to wind up business operations or
to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said
businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area, such as but not
limited to:
1. Curio or antique shop
2. Souvenir Shops
3. Handicrafts display centers
4. Art galleries
SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall upon
conviction, be punished by imprisonment of one (1) year or fine of FIVE
THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, or both, at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED,
that in case of juridical person, the President, the General Manager, or person-in-charge
of operation shall be liable thereof; PROVIDED FURTHER, that in case of subsequent
violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed
and padlocked permanently.
SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.
Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular session today, March 9, 1993.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on March 30, 1993. (Emphasis supplied)
In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its
enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court
considering that these were not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they were
not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they use women as "tools for entertainment,"
and neither did they "disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the
social and moral welfare of the community."11
MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following
reasons: (1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4
(iv)12 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power
to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses and other similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 49913 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area
as a commercial zone with certain restrictions; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper
exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable
relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected; (4) The Ordinance constitutes
an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business
prior to its enactment; (5) The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it is
confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's property rights; (b) the City Council has no
power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to
extrajudicially destroy it; and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the
law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business in
the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area.14
In their Answer15 dated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City
Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and
moral welfare of the community" as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government
Code,16 which reads, thus:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
....
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in
order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
....
(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any
entertainment or amusement facilities, including theatrical performances,
circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths,
massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement; regulate
such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those
which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the
suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement
or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community.
Citing Kwong Sing v. City of Manila,17 petitioners insisted that the power of regulation spoken of in
the above-quoted provision included the power to control, to govern and to restrain places of
exhibition and amusement.18
Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to
protect the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found
in Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409,19 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila (Revised Charter of Manila)20 which reads, thus:
ARTICLE III
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD
. . .
Section 18. Legislative powers. – The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative
powers:
. . .
(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good
order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such
others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall
not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months' imprisonment, or both such fine and
imprisonment, for a single offense.
Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of validity; hence, private
respondent had the burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality.21
Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and
the Ordinance as the latter simply disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the
Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial zone.22 The Ordinance, the petitioners likewise
claimed, cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in
operation.23 The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal protection clause and cannot be
denounced as class legislation as there existed substantial and real differences between the
Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of Manila.24
On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-parte
temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance.25 And on 16 July 1993,
again in an intrepid gesture, he granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC. 26
After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the
petitioners from implementing the Ordinance. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:27
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of
1993, of the City of Manila null and void, and making permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction that had been issued by this Court against the defendant. No costs.
SO ORDERED.28
Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal29 on 12 December 1994, manifesting that
they are elevating the case to this Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law.30
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were
committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance
is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It
erred in holding that the questioned Ordinancecontravenes P.D. 49931 which allows operators of all
kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring
the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.32
33
In the Petition and in its Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made
before the lower court. They contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of
the inherent and plenary power of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by local
government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila and
conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code.34 They allege that the Ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power; it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the presumption of
validity.35
In its Memorandum36 dated 27 May 1996, private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra
vires and that it is void for being repugnant to the general law. It reiterates that the
questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power; that it is violative of due process,
confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its lawful business; that it is violative of
the equal protection clause; and that it confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer unregulated
discretion in the execution of the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions.
This is an opportune time to express the Court's deep sentiment and tenderness for the Ermita-
Malate area being its home for several decades. A long-time resident, the Court witnessed the
area's many turn of events. It relished its glory days and endured its days of infamy. Much as the
Court harks back to the resplendent era of the Old Manila and yearns to restore its lost grandeur, it
believes that the Ordinance is not the fitting means to that end. The Court is of the opinion, and
so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and
therefore null and void.
The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof
violates a constitutional provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal
rights of persons enshrined by the Constitution. The Court is called upon to shelter these rights
from attempts at rendering them worthless.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit
to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform
to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit
but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.37
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the
Constitution and to the laws.38 The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster
under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That
ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The
requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local
government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a
delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to
the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.39
This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy.
The national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will
or modify or violate it.40
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of
the City Council acting as agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the State,
are endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared
objects of their creation.41 This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the Code, known
as the general welfare clause, viz:
SECTION 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of
the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate
and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this
case, the sangguniang panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies
to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code. 42 The
inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be
reasonable and for the public good.43 In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an
invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:
 SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people
of the blessings of democracy.44
SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.45
SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.46
Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.47
A. The Ordinance infringes
the Due Process Clause
The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law. . . ."48
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to
which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in
each appropriate case, be valid. This standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice,49and as such it is a limitation upon the
exercise of the police power.50
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and
property of individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the
government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice; to
protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and
destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to secure
to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. 51
The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and
partnerships are "persons" within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is
concerned.52
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called
"procedural due process" and "substantive due process."
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues
are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide
when it takes a particular action.53
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an
adequate reason for taking away a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive
due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the government's action.54 Case
law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much
on the level of scrutiny used.55 For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review
is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting
fundamental rights, then the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that
the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.56
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power
cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically57 as its exercise is subject to a
qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of
the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears
emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.58 Due process requires the intrinsic validity
of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.59
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of
the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60It must be evident
that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can
work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded.61
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights62 a violation of the due process clause.
The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the
establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive
veneer of legitimate, licensed and tax-paying nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail
lounges, hotels and motels. Petitioners insist that even the Court in the case of Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila63 had already taken judicial
notice of the "alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila
traceable in great part to existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-
seekers."64
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and
moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of
the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means employed for
the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all reasonable
regulations looking to the promotion of the moral and social values of the community. However,
the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community's social ills can be
achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or
their conversion into businesses "allowed" under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the
accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per seprotect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community;
it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it
arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with houses of ill-repute and
establishments of the like which the City Council may lawfully prohibit,65 it is baseless and
insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars,
night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. This is
not warranted under the accepted definitions of these terms. The enumerated establishments are
lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the
illegal prostitution is of no moment. We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a
human frailty, may take place in the most innocent of places that it may even take place in the
substitute establishments enumerated under Section 3 of the Ordinance. If the flawed logic of
the Ordinance were to be followed, in the remote instance that an immoral sexual act transpires in
a church cloister or a court chamber, we would behold the spectacle of the City of Manila ordering
the closure of the church or court concerned. Every house, building, park, curb, street or even
vehicles for that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure"
places where there are impure men. Indeed, even the Scripture and the Tradition of Christians
churches continually recall the presence and universality of sin in man's history.66
The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment, which by its nature cannot be
said to be injurious to the health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but the
deplorable human activity that may occur within its premises. While a motel may be used as a
venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be
classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked
assumption. If that were so and if that were allowed, then the Ermita-Malate area would not only
be purged of its supposed social ills, it would be extinguished of its soul as well as every human
activity, reprehensible or not, in its every nook and cranny would be laid bare to the estimation of
the authorities.
The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as
the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man
out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men.
The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the establishments,
but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of
democracy.
While petitioners' earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable, they
unwittingly punish even the proprietors and operators of "wholesome," "innocent" establishments.
In the instant case, there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of
those individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms
of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City of
Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead
impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of
the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their
licenses for these violations;67 and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words,
there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
Means employed are
constitutionally infirm
The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars,
beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and
inns in the Ermita-Malate area. In Section 3 thereof, owners and/or operators of the enumerated
establishments are given three (3) months from the date of approval of the Ordinance within which
"to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate area or
convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." Further, it states in
Section 4 that in cases of subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the "premises
of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently."
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its
purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a
person's fundamental right to liberty and property.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into
mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to
such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."68 In accordance with this case, the rights
of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn
his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the
concept of liberty.69
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents,70 sought to clarify the meaning
of "liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty. . . guaranteed [by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized…as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of
"liberty" must be broad indeed.
In another case, it also confirmed that liberty protected by the due process clause includes
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education. In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the
person in making these choices, the U.S. Supreme Court explained:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood where they
formed under compulsion of the State.71
Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated establishments under Section 1
of the Ordinancemay seek autonomy for these purposes.
Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate
their bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motel's premisesbe it stressed that their
consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the
Constitution.72 Adults have a right to choose to forge such relationships with others in the
confines of their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty protected
by the Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice.73 Their right to liberty under the
due process clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government, as long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint
the exception.
Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it
must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the
beginning of all freedomit is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.74
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference
demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc,75 borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly
stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his
isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on
which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his
isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out
of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders
himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot
believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which
should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of
the citizen.76
There is a great temptation to have an extended discussion on these civil liberties but the Court
chooses to exercise restraint and restrict itself to the issues presented when it should. The
previous pronouncements of the Court are not to be interpreted as a license for adults to engage
in criminal conduct. The reprehensibility of such conduct is not diminished. The Court only
reaffirms and guarantees their right to make this choice. Should they be prosecuted for their illegal
conduct, they should suffer the consequences of the choice they have made. That, ultimately, is
their choice.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the
respondent of the beneficial use of its property.77 The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the
running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its
owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said
businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property
that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be
recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of
the private property rights of individuals.
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that "private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation." The provision is the most important protection of
property rights in the Constitution. This is a restriction on the general power of the government to
take property. The constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government does not
confiscate the property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the
government takes away a person's property to benefit society, then society should pay. The
principal purpose of the guarantee is "to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.79
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when
the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the
government's regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property. 80
In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,81 it was held that a taking also could be
found if government regulation of the use of property went "too far." When regulation reaches a
certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to support the act. While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.82
No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation
becomes a taking. In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and
therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions." On many other occasions as well, the
U.S. Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of
considering the facts in each case. The Court asks whether justice and fairness require that the
economic loss caused by public action must be compensated by the government and thus borne
by the public as a whole, or whether the loss should remain concentrated on those few persons
subject to the public action.83
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a
taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes
with reasonable expectations for use.84 A regulation that permanently denies all economically
beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owner's point of view, equivalent to a "taking"
unless principles of nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make
the use prohibitable.85 When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle, he has suffered a taking.86
A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require
compensation under the takings clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall
short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred,
depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner,
the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations and
the character of government action. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the takings
clause which is to prevent the government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.87
A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the
effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct
investment-backed expectations of the owner.88
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the "prohibited" establishments three (3) months
from its approval within which to "wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside
of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within
the area." The directive to "wind up business operations" amounts to a closure of the
establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the
owner converts his establishment to accommodate an "allowed" business, the structure which
housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust. Suppose he transfers it to
another area, he will likewise leave the entire establishment idle. Consideration must be given to
the substantial amount of money invested to build the edifices which the owner reasonably
expects to be returned within a period of time. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to
convert into allowed businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in
cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a "taking"
of private property.
The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build another one outside
the Ermita-Malate area. In every sense, it qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an
additional burden imposed on the owner to build another establishment solely from his coffers.
The proffered solution does not put an end to the "problem," it merely relocates it. Not only is this
impractical, it is unreasonable, onerous and oppressive. The conversion into allowed enterprises is
just as ridiculous. How may the respondent convert a motel into a restaurant or a coffee shop, art
gallery or music lounge without essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of private
property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.
The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be compensated by the
government. The burden on the owner to convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be
closed permanently after a subsequent violation should be borne by the public as this end benefits
them as a whole.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning
ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a "wholesome" property to a use
which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just
compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not,
by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of
justice as we know them. The police powers of local government units which have always
received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity and eminent domain. It needs
restating that the property taken in the exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious
or intended for a noxious purpose while the property taken under the power of eminent domain is
intended for a public use or purpose and is therefore "wholesome."89 If it be of public benefit that a
"wholesome" property remain unused or relegated to a particular purpose, then certainly the public
should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for the condemnation of private property for
public use.90
Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners' actions. It in no
way controls or guides the discretion vested in them. It provides no definition of the establishments
covered by it and it fails to set forth the conditions when the establishments come within its ambit
of prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close
down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution,
depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary
will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable
and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement
could be secured.91
Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and
constitutional, specify the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid; and must not
admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of unbridled discretion by the law
enforcers in carrying out its provisions.92
Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,93 as cited in People v. Nazario,94 the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any
sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by." The
ordinance was nullified as it imposed no standard at all "because one may never know in advance
what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.' "
Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments "tend to
disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants," and "adversely affect the social and moral welfare
of the community." The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of
comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing
the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from
carrying on their business. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of
imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts to an interference into personal and
private rights which the Court will not countenance. In this regard, we take a resolute stand to
uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property.
Worthy of note is an example derived from the U.S. of a reasonable regulation which is a far cry
from the ill-considered Ordinance enacted by the City Council.
95
In FW/PBS, INC. v. Dallas, the city of Dallas adopted a comprehensive ordinance regulating
"sexually oriented businesses," which are defined to include adult arcades, bookstores, video
stores, cabarets, motels, and theaters as well as escort agencies, nude model studio and sexual
encounter centers. Among other things, the ordinance required that such businesses be licensed.
A group of motel owners were among the three groups of businesses that filed separate suits
challenging the ordinance. The motel owners asserted that the city violated the due process
clause by failing to produce adequate support for its supposition that renting room for fewer than
ten (10) hours resulted in increased crime and other secondary effects. They likewise argued than
the ten (10)-hour limitation on the rental of motel rooms placed an unconstitutional burden on the
right to freedom of association. Anent the first contention, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
reasonableness of the legislative judgment combined with a study which the city considered, was
adequate to support the city's determination that motels permitting room rentals for fewer than ten
(10 ) hours should be included within the licensing scheme. As regards the second point, the
Court held that limiting motel room rentals to ten (10) hours will have no discernible effect on
personal bonds as those bonds that are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than ten
(10) hours are not those that have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the nation
by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs.
The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely regulated the targeted businesses. It
imposed reasonable restrictions; hence, its validity was upheld.
The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,96 it
needs pointing out, is also different from this case in that what was involved therein was a
measure which regulated the mode in which motels may conduct business in order to put an end
to practices which could encourage vice and immorality. Necessarily, there was no valid objection
on due process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance did not prohibit motels.
The Ordinance in this case however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed
power to prohibit.97
The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of
property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it
cannot, even under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
Protection Clause
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against
others.98 The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.99 The
"equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."100 It limits governmental
discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their
property is concerned.101
The Court has explained the scope of the equal protection clause in this wise:
… What does it signify? To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration:
"The ideal situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed
outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the
affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very
essence of the idea of law." There is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact
exists "cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it
does not take into account the realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee then
is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist. To assure
that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may
cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such
circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the
governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal
was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no
support in reason." Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the
Tuason decision anew "that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under
similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the
conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not
identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that
fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group equally binding on the rest.102
Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is
reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal
protection clause.103 The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be
valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
 4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.104
In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial
establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason
exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other
similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not
rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the
Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any
less noxious if located outside the area.
The standard "where women are used as tools for entertainment" is also discriminatory as
prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banishis not a profession exclusive to
women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. It is not any
less grave a sin when men engage in it. And why would the assumption that there is an ongoing
immoral activity apply only when women are employed and be inapposite when men are in
harness? This discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially
related to important government objectives.105 Thus, the discrimination is invalid.
Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of consistency
with prevailing laws.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government
units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of motels, hotels and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv),
which provides that:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
. . .
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in
order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
. . .
(iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports . . . .
While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of any entertainment or
amusement facilities, and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided
under Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, which reads as follows:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
. . .
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in
order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
. . .
(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any
entertainment or amusement facilities, including theatrical performances,
circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths,
massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement; regulate
such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those
which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the
suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement
or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community.
Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate
relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from
cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance
of such establishments. It is well to recall the rulings of the Court in Kwong Sing v. City of
Manila106 that:
The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code,
means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should
not be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit." Consequently, under the
power to regulate laundries, the municipal authorities could make proper police
regulations as to the mode in which the employment or business shall be exercised.107
And in People v. Esguerra,108 wherein the Court nullified an ordinance of the Municipality of
Tacloban which prohibited the selling, giving and dispensing of liquor ratiocinating that the
municipality is empowered only to regulate the same and not prohibit. The Court therein declared
that:
(A)s a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given authority or power to
regulate or to license and regulate the liquor traffic, power to prohibit is impliedly
withheld.109
These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners' assertion110 that they were modified by the Code
vesting upon City Councils prohibitory powers.
Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools, public dance
halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement as found
in the first clause of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). Its powers to regulate, suppress and suspend "such
other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb
the community or annoy the inhabitants" and to "prohibit certain forms of amusement or
entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" are stated in the
second and third clauses, respectively of the same Section. The several powers of the City
Council as provided in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, it is pertinent to emphasize, are
separated by semi-colons (;), the use of which indicates that the clauses in which these powers
are set forth are independent of each other albeit closely related to justify being put together in a
single enumeration or paragraph.111 These powers, therefore, should not be confused,
commingled or consolidated as to create a conglomerated and unified power of regulation,
suppression and prohibition.112
The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or
entertainment subject to regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing
schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or
amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be included as among
"other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb
the community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain forms of amusement or entertainment" which
the City Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit.
The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those
which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers
and the nature thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or
ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City
Council.113 Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius
est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of
human mind. It is particularly applicable in the construction of such statutes as create new rights or
remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or otherwise come under the rule of strict
construction.114
The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general
welfare clause of the Code and of Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise
without merit. On the first point, the ruling of the Court in People v. Esguerra,115 is instructive. It
held that:
The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare clause, or section
2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, refers to matters not covered by the other
provisions of the same Code, and therefore it can not be applied to intoxicating liquors, for
the power to regulate the selling, giving away and dispensing thereof is granted
specifically by section 2242 (g) to municipal councils. To hold that, under the general
power granted by section 2238, a municipal council may enact the ordinance in question,
notwithstanding the provision of section 2242 (g), would be to make the latter superfluous
and nugatory, because the power to prohibit, includes the power to regulate, the selling,
giving away and dispensing of intoxicating liquors.
On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later expression of the legislative will
must necessarily prevail and override the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis
posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, or later statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant
thereto. As between two laws on the same subject matter, which are irreconcilably inconsistent,
that which is passed later prevails, since it is the latest expression of legislative will. 116 If there is an
inconsistency or repugnance between two statutes, both relating to the same subject matter,
which cannot be removed by any fair and reasonable method of interpretation, it is the latest
expression of the legislative will which must prevail and override the earlier.117
Implied repeals are those which take place when a subsequently enacted law contains provisions
contrary to those of an existing law but no provisions expressly repealing them. Such repeals have
been divided into two general classes: those which occur where an act is so inconsistent or
irreconcilable with an existing prior act that only one of the two can remain in force and those
which occur when an act covers the whole subject of an earlier act and is intended to be a
substitute therefor. The validity of such a repeal is sustained on the ground that the latest
expression of the legislative will should prevail.118
In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that "All general and special laws, acts, city charters,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly." Thus, submitting to petitioners' interpretation that the Revised Charter of Manila
empowers the City Council to prohibit motels, that portion of the Charter stating such must be
considered repealed by the Code as it is at variance with the latter's provisions granting the City
Council mere regulatory powers.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a
nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious
to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a
nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is
not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.119
Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit certain activities and
establishments in another section of the Code which is reproduced as follows:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city
government, and in this connection, shall:
. . .
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for
habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment
and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of
chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction,
maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or
exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities
inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;
. . .
If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the
establishments enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain
terms by adding them to the list of the matters it may prohibit under the above-quoted Section.
The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these establishments with houses of ill-repute and
expand the City Council's powers in the second and third clauses of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the
Code in an effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. It is evident that these establishments may
only be regulated in their establishment, operation and maintenance.
It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. That
these establishments are recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section
of the Code. Section 131 under the Title on Local Government Taxation expressly mentioned
proprietors or operators of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and Swedish baths, hotels, motels and
lodging houses as among the "contractors" defined in paragraph (h) thereof. The same Section
also defined "amusement" as a "pleasurable diversion and entertainment," "synonymous to
relaxation, avocation, pastime or fun;" and "amusement places" to include "theaters, cinemas,
concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain
oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances." Thus, it can be inferred that the Code
considers these establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities. It is well to recall the
maxim reddendo singula singulis which means that words in different parts of a statute must be
referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and,
if possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction
demands otherwise. Likewise, where words under consideration appear in different sections or are
widely dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies.120
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of
P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-
Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all
kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard,
motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral
establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not
only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or
repugnant to the general law.121As succinctly illustrated in Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila
Authority:122
The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local
political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative
power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own
sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are
mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates
of the Congress, the local government units cannot contravene but must obey at all times
the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactment in question, which are
merely local in origin cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of
a statute.123
Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. While this may be the
rule, it has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or
reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the
invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by
proper evidence. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against
public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common
right.124
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs
personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is
discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that
abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council
under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the
concern of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power
legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary we reiterate our
support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or
constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot
prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their
transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection of laws not even under the guise of police power.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
declaring the Ordinancevoid is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,

Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur
Panganiban, J., in the result.
Ynares- Santiago, J., concur in the result only.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject, the
Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash between government power and individual
liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension between law and morality.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the
operation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The
petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same
establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates for such
abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our sacred constitutional
rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the
present petition.
This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of
the Decision3 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of
Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-
Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses,
Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance).
I.
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance. 4 The
Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to
protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the
youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in
hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other
similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension
houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room
rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a
day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but
would mean the same or would bear the same meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this
ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (₱5,000.00)
Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the
president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided,
further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business license of the
guilty party shall automatically be cancelled.
SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or contrary
to this measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order ( TRO)5 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as
defendant, herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim.6 MTDC prayed
that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments,
be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria
Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit
customers on a short time basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only
three hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC)
and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to
admit attached complaint-in-intervention7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their
business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.8 The three companies are
components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels
in Metro Manila.9
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene.10 The RTC also notified the
Solicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On
the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff.11
On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw.12 The RTC issued a TRO
on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance.13 The
City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of
police power.14
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist
from the enforcement of the Ordinance.15 A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General
filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional.
During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for decision
without trial as the case involved a purely legal question.16 On October 20, 1993, the RTC
rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby
declared null and void.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and
jealously guarded by the Constitution."18 Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution
encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to
operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the
Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour
stay, the RTC likened the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,19 where the legitimate purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was
sought to be effected through an inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef.
The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.20 The petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the Court treated
the petition as a petition for certiorari and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.21
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities,
among other local government units, the power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including
tourist guides and transports.22
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III,
Section 18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus:
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary
to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Chapter; and to fix
penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six
months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense.23
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to
privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an
unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
Ordinance.24 First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of
movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals
for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by
having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is
satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments
are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-
being of its constituents in general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association
v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty is regulated by law.
TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari.25 In their petition and
Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the Court of
Appeals. They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
II.
We must address the threshold issue of petitioners’ standing. Petitioners allege that as owners of
establishments offering "wash-up" rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the
Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are also
being interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether or not these establishments have the
requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal protection rights.
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to
and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. More
importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of powers,26 sparing as it
does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its
co-equal branches of government.
The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the
Constitution.27 The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which
concededly are not susceptible of precise definition.28 In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct
and personal interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a
petitioner's standing.29 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and
elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation,
and redressability in Allen v. Wright.30
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth
doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of
transcendental importance.31
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the
overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32 the United States Supreme Court wrote
that: "We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided
three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving
him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must
have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's
ability to protect his or her own interests."33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the
petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for
their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The
relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our nation such as the
American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for
customers to bring suit.34
American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing
to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or
classes of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,35 the United States
Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive health statute that
would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections available to
their patients. The Court held that:
"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless
those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to
them."36
An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,37 wherein the United States
Supreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal protection
claim of a male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males
under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The United States High Court explained
that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek
access to their market or function."38
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to
assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis,
challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties.
Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies
when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights.39 In this case, the
petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their
clients. We can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from
overbreadth.
We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients
to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.
III.
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of
Manila ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association,
Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila.40Ermita-Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons
to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age,
address and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This
earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public
morals. A purpose similar to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban
on motels, inns and similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the
constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the
singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were
enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging
establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on
motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted.
At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate
the lives of its citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of
Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers
of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.41
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be
rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code
through such implements as the general welfare clause.
A.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an
efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant.42 Police power is based upon the concept
of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. 43 Police power
has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the
regulation of dance halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas stations46 and cockpits.47 The awesome scope of
police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our
nation’s legal system, its use has rarely been denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means
must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the
people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and,
sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.
Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or
equal protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal
branches of government as they exercise their political functions. But when we are compelled to
nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another form of caution emerges. If the Court were
animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many political
decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third
political branch of government. We derive our respect and good standing in the annals of history
by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end
than through the development of rigorous and sophisticated legal standards through which the
courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching constitutional questions of the day.
B.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition. 48 The purpose of
the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and
property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary
regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as
their property is concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct
restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural
due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person
of life, liberty, or property.49 Procedural due process concerns itself with government action
adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples
range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of
arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process
completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the
government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.50
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected
dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental
freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more
rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process
has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result
for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead,
the due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has
emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.
C.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested
when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v.
Carolene Products.51 Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary
would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular"
minority or infringement of a "fundamental right."52 Consequently, two standards of judicial review
were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political
process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender53 and legitimacy.54 Immediate
scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig,55 after the Court declined to do so in
Reed v. Reed.56 While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has
in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection
challenges.57 Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally
further a legitimate governmental interest.58 Under intermediate review, governmental interest is
extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered. 59 Applying
strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental
interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for
determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of
fundamental freedoms.60 Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the
regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its
earlier applications to equal protection.61 The United States Supreme Court has expanded the
scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, 62 judicial access63and
interstate travel.64
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect
only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law which
we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that
would warrant the application of the most deferential standard – the rational basis test. Yet as
earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional
rights of their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or
wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial since
they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished rights
that, when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does
not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet fundamental freedoms – which the people
reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence –
that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally
incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style
enumeration of what may or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where
the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each other, their
society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them as inherent, without doing harm or
injury to others.
D.
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld in City
of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into
mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to
such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."[65] In accordance with this case, the
rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will;
to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced
in the concept of liberty.[66]
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of
"liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a
free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed. 67 [Citations
omitted]
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual
behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety
as venue of ‘prostitution, adultery and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ‘ideal haven for
prostitutes and thrill-seekers.’"68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is
accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting
single adults which is constitutionally protected69 will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of
Manila case. Our holding therein retains significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference
demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly
stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation,
are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic
obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly
speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that experience personal to
himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of
others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of
himself is in any real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which
should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of
the citizen.70
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair.
There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day.
Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is
momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips
have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups
of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other
than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a
convenient alternative.
E.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the
means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights.71 It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for
its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and
those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.72
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to
judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected.73 However, this is not in any way meant to
take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of
validity.74
Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to candidates,
this Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument.75 The Ordinance makes no distinction between
places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions.
Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain
reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus
deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right and
unjustified prohibition. wrong, they will remain so oriented.

The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its
longtime home,76 and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city – the Pearl of the
Orient – as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick
Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila like all evolving big
cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a
common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such
perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather,
cities revive themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the
dynamism of individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be
diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the
proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in
easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing
prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be
circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit
activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their
clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
IV.
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan
that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-
intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights
of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of
the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient
justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a
day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-
wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to
the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive
elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual
liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State. Independent and fair-
minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment
of the rule of law, by reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of
office, and because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law.81
Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to governance,
that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty.
And while the tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to
avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more judicious, less drastic means to promote
morality.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED,
and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No.
7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full
endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn
to protect.77 The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as old as
Aristotle.78 The advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy does not de-legitimize
the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which particular behavior to
penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens
could be functional so long as the pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate
accommodation of different interests.79

To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate morality" is
ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more
accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at
variance with public attitudes about right and wrong.80 Our penal laws, for one, are founded on
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
EN BANC
G.R. No. 133640 November 25, 2005
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA
BLOOD BANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the name and style, MOTHER
SEATON BLOOD BANK; PEOPLE’S BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D.,
doing business under the name and style, AVENUE BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA,
M.D., doing business under the name and style, HOLY REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, ALBERT
L. LAPITAN, doing business under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD
TRANSFUSION SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing business under the name
and style, RECORD BLOOD BANK, in their individual capacities and for and in behalf of
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, Respondent.
x ------------------------------------------------ x
G.R. No. 133661
DOCTORS’ BLOOD CENTER, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondent.
x --------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 139147
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA
BLOOD BANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the name and style, MOTHER
SEATON BLOOD BANK; PEOPLE’S BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D.,
doing business under the name and style, AVENUE BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA,
M.D., doing business under the name and style, HOLY REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, ALBERT
L. LAPITAN, doing business under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD
TRANSFUSION SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing business under the name
and style, RECORD BLOOD BANK, in their Individual capacities and for and in behalf of
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, Respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before this Court are petitions assailing primarily the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act
No. 7719, otherwise known as the "National Blood Services Act of 1994," and the validity of
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Republic Act No. 7719.
G.R. No. 133640,1 entitled "Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our
Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health" and G.R. No. 133661,2 entitled
"Doctors Blood Bank Center vs. Department of Health" are petitions for certiorari and mandamus,
respectively, seeking the annulment of the following: (1) Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719; and,
(2) Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995. Both petitions likewise pray for the issuance
of a writ of prohibitory injunction enjoining the Secretary of Health from implementing and
enforcing the aforementioned law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations; and, for a
mandatory injunction ordering and commanding the Secretary of Health to grant, issue or renew
petitioners’ license to operate free standing blood banks (FSBB).
The above cases were consolidated in a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 2, 1998.3
G.R. No. 139147,4 entitled "Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our
Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health," on the other hand, is a petition to
show cause why respondent Secretary of Health should not be held in contempt of court.
This case was originally assigned to the Third Division of this Court and later consolidated with
G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661 in a resolution dated August 4, 1999.5
Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood
Banks, a duly registered non-stock and non-profit association composed of free standing blood
banks.
Public respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his capacity as the public official directly
involved and charged with the enforcement and implementation of the law in question.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2,
1994. The Act seeks to provide
an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood
banks in the country. It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was
subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. The law took effect on August
23, 1994.
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of
Health (DOH).6
Section 7 of R.A. 7719 7 provides:
"Section 7. Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All commercial blood banks shall be
phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum
period of two (2) years by the Secretary."
Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides:
"Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all
commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2)
years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a
careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety."8
Blood banking and blood transfusion services in the country have been arranged in four (4)
categories: blood centers run by the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), government-run blood
services, private hospital blood banks, and commercial blood services.
Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already
been operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled "An Act Regulating
the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and Operation of
Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories." The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956,
allowed the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and blood
processing laboratories. The Bureau of Research and Laboratories (BRL) was created in 1958
and was given the power to regulate clinical laboratories in 1966 under Republic Act No. 4688. In
1971, the Licensure Section was created within the BRL. It was given the duty to enforce the
licensure requirements for blood banks as well as clinical laboratories. Due to this development,
Administrative Order No. 156, Series of 1971, was issued. The new rules and regulations triggered
a stricter enforcement of the Blood Banking Law, which was characterized by frequent spot
checks, immediate suspension and communication of such suspensions to hospitals, a more
systematic record-keeping and frequent communication with blood banks through monthly
information bulletins. Unfortunately, by the 1980’s, financial difficulties constrained the BRL to
reduce the frequency of its supervisory visits to the blood banks.9
Meanwhile, in the international scene, concern for the safety of blood and blood products
intensified when the dreaded disease Acute Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was first
described in 1979. In 1980, the International Society of Blood Transfusion (ISBT) formulated the
Code of Ethics for Blood Donation and Transfusion. In 1982, the first case of transfusion-
associated AIDS was described in an infant. Hence, the ISBT drafted in 1984, a model for a
national blood policy outlining certain principles that should be taken into consideration. By 1985,
the ISBT had disseminated guidelines requiring AIDS testing of blood and blood products for
transfusion.10
In 1989, another revision of the Blood Banking Guidelines was made. The DOH issued
Administrative Order No. 57, Series of 1989, which classified banks into primary, secondary and
tertiary depending on the services they provided. The standards were adjusted according to this
classification. For instance, floor area requirements varied according to classification level. The
new guidelines likewise required Hepatitis B and HIV testing, and that the blood bank be headed
by a pathologist or a hematologist.11
In 1992, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 118-A institutionalizing the National Blood
Services Program (NBSP). The BRL was designated as the central office primarily responsible for
the NBSP. The program paved the way for the creation of a committee that will implement the
policies of the program and the formation of the Regional Blood Councils.
In August 1992, Senate Bill No. 1011, entitled "An Act Promoting Voluntary Blood Donation,
Providing for an Adequate Supply of Safe Blood, Regulating Blood Banks and Providing Penalties
for Violations Thereof, and for other Purposes" was introduced in the Senate.12
Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, House Bills No. 384, 546, 780 and 1978 were being
deliberated to address the issue of safety of the Philippine blood bank system. Subsequently, the
Senate and House Bills were referred to the appropriate committees and subsequently
consolidated.13
In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) released its final report of a study on the Philippine blood
banking system entitled "Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System." It
was revealed that of the blood units collected in 1992, 64.4 % were supplied by commercial blood
banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospital-based blood banks, and 7.4% by
private hospital-based blood banks. During the time the study was made, there were only twenty-
four (24) registered or licensed free-standing or commercial blood banks in the country. Hence,
with these numbers in mind, the study deduced that each commercial blood bank produces five
times more blood than the Red Cross and fifteen times more than the government-run blood
banks. The study, therefore, showed that the Philippines heavily relied on commercial sources of
blood. The study likewise revealed that 99.6% of the donors of commercial blood banks and
77.0% of the donors of private-hospital based blood banks are paid donors. Paid donors are those
who receive remuneration for donating their blood. Blood donors of the PNRC and government-
run hospitals, on the other hand, are mostly voluntary.14
It was further found, among other things, that blood sold by persons to blood commercial banks
are three times more likely to have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood transfusion
transmissible diseases, namely, malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC.15
Commercial blood banks give paid donors varying rates around ₱50 to ₱150, and because of this
arrangement, many of these donors are poor, and often they are students, who need cash
immediately. Since they need the money, these donors are not usually honest about their medical
or social history. Thus, blood from healthy, voluntary donors who give their true medical and social
history are about three times much safer than blood from paid donors.16
What the study also found alarming is that many Filipino doctors are not yet fully trained on the
specific indications for blood component transfusion. They are not aware of the lack of blood
supply and do not feel the need to adjust their practices and use of blood and blood products. It
also does not matter to them where the blood comes from.17
On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act providing for the phase out of commercial
blood banks took effect. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995,
constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by DOH.
The phase-out period was extended for two years by the DOH pursuant to Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Pursuant to said Act, all
commercial blood banks should have been phased out by May 28, 1998. Hence, petitioners were
granted by the Secretary of Health their licenses to open and operate a blood bank only until May
27, 1998.
On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition
for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of
the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The case was entitled
"Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank,"
docketed as G.R. No. 133640.
On June 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order, writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or status quo
ante order.18
In the aforementioned petition, petitioners assail the constitutionality of the questioned legal
provisions, namely, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of Administrative Order
No. 9, Series of 1995, on the following grounds: 19
1. The questioned legal provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing
Rules violate the equal protection clause for irrationally discriminating against free standing blood
banks in a manner which is not germane to the purpose of the law;
2. The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing
Rules represent undue delegation if not outright abdication of the police power of the state; and,
3. The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules are
unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty.
On May 22, 1998, the Doctors Blood Center filed a similar petition for mandamus with a prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction
before this Court entitled "Doctors Blood Center vs. Department of Health," docketed as G.R. No.
133661. 20 This was consolidated with G.R. No. 133640.21
Similarly, the petition attacked the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7719 and its implementing
rules and regulations, thus, praying for the issuance of a license to operate commercial blood
banks beyond May 27, 1998. Specifically, with regard to Republic Act No. 7719, the petition
submitted the following questions22 for resolution:
1. Was it passed in the exercise of police power, and was it a valid exercise of such power?
2. Does it not amount to deprivation of property without due process?
3. Does it not unlawfully impair the obligation of contracts?
4. With the commercial blood banks being abolished and with no ready machinery to deliver the
same supply and services, does R.A. 7719 truly serve the public welfare?
On June 2, 1998, this Court issued a Resolution directing respondent DOH to file a consolidated
comment. In the same Resolution, the Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) for
respondent to cease and desist from implementing and enforcing Section 7 of Republic Act No.
7719 and its implementing rules and regulations until further orders from the Court.23
On August 26, 1998, respondent Secretary of Health filed a Consolidated Comment on the
petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, with opposition to the
issuance of a temporary restraining order.24
In the Consolidated Comment, respondent Secretary of Health submitted that blood from
commercial blood banks is unsafe and therefore the State, in the exercise of its police power, can
close down commercial blood banks to protect the public. He cited the record of deliberations on
Senate Bill No. 1101 which later became Republic Act No. 7719, and the sponsorship speech of
Senator Orlando Mercado.
The rationale for the closure of these commercial blood banks can be found in the deliberations of
Senate Bill No. 1011, excerpts of which are quoted below:
Senator Mercado: I am providing over a period of two years to phase out all commercial blood
banks. So that in the end, the new section would have a provision that states:
"ALL COMMERCIAL BLOOD BANKS SHALL BE PHASED OUT OVER A PERIOD OF TWO
YEARS AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT. BLOOD SHALL BE COLLECTED FROM
VOLUNTARY DONORS ONLY AND THE SERVICE FEE TO BE CHARGED FOR EVERY
BLOOD PRODUCT ISSUED SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE NECESSARY EXPENSES ENTAILED
IN COLLECTING AND PROCESSING OF BLOOD. THE SERVICE FEE SHALL BE MADE
UNIFORM THROUGH GUIDELINES TO BE SET BY THE DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH."
I am supporting Mr. President, the finding of a study called "Project to Evaluate the Safety of the
Philippine Blood Banking System." This has been taken note of. This is a study done with the
assistance of the USAID by doctors under the New Tropical Medicine Foundation in Alabang.
Part of the long-term measures proposed by this particular study is to improve laws, outlaw buying
and selling of blood and legally define good manufacturing processes for blood. This goes to the
very heart of my amendment which seeks to put into law the principle that blood should not be
subject of commerce of man.
…
The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: What does the sponsor say?
Senator Webb: Mr. President, just for clarity, I would like to find out how the Gentleman defines a
commercial blood bank. I am at a loss at times what a commercial blood bank really is.
Senator Mercado: We have a definition, I believe, in the measure, Mr. President.
The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: It is a business where profit is considered.
Senator Mercado: If the Chairman of the Committee would accept it, we can put a provision on
Section 3, a definition of a commercial blood bank, which, as defined in this law, exists for profit
and engages in the buying and selling of blood or its components.
Senator Webb: That is a good description, Mr. President.
…
Senator Mercado: I refer, Mr. President, to a letter written by Dr. Jaime Galvez-Tan, the Chief of
Staff, Undersecretary of Health, to the good Chairperson of the Committee on Health.
In recommendation No. 4, he says:
"The need to phase out all commercial blood banks within a two-year period will give the
Department of Health enough time to build up government’s capability to provide an adequate
supply of blood for the needs of the nation...the use of blood for transfusion is a medical service
and not a sale of commodity."
Taking into consideration the experience of the National Kidney Institute, which has succeeded in
making the hospital 100 percent dependent on voluntary blood donation, here is a success story
of a hospital that does not buy blood. All those who are operated on and need blood have to
convince their relatives or have to get volunteers who would donate blood…
If we give the responsibility of the testing of blood to those commercial blood banks, they will cut
corners because it will protect their profit.
In the first place, the people who sell their blood are the people who are normally in the high-risk
category. So we should stop the system of selling and buying blood so that we can go into a
national voluntary blood program.
It has been said here in this report, and I quote:
"Why is buying and selling of blood not safe? This is not safe because a donor who expects
payment for his blood will not tell the truth about his illnesses and will deny any risky social
behavior such as sexual promiscuity which increases the risk of having syphilis or AIDS or abuse
of intravenous addictive drugs. Laboratory tests are of limited value and will not detect early
infections. Laboratory tests are required only for four diseases in the Philippines. There are other
blood transmissible diseases we do not yet screen for and there could be others where there are
no tests available yet.
A blood bank owner expecting to gain profit from selling blood will also try his best to limit his
expenses. Usually he tries to increase his profit by buying cheaper reagents or test kits, hiring
cheaper manpower or skipping some tests altogether. He may also try to sell blood even though
these have infections in them. Because there is no existing system of counterchecking these, the
blood bank owner can usually get away with many unethical practices.
The experience of Germany, Mr. President is illustrative of this issue. The reason why
contaminated blood was sold was that there were corners cut by commercial blood banks in the
testing process. They were protecting their profits.25
The sponsorship speech of Senator Mercado further elucidated his stand on the issue:
…
Senator Mercado: Today, across the country, hundreds of poverty-stricken, sickly and weak
Filipinos, who, unemployed, without hope and without money to buy the next meal, will walk into a
commercial blood bank, extend their arms and plead that their blood be bought. They will lie about
their age, their medical history. They will lie about when they last sold their blood. For doing this,
they will receive close to a hundred pesos. This may tide them over for the next few days. Of
course, until the next bloodletting.
This same blood will travel to the posh city hospitals and urbane medical centers. This same blood
will now be bought by the rich at a price over 500% of the value for which it was sold. Between this
buying and selling, obviously, someone has made a very fast buck.
Every doctor has handled at least one transfusion-related disease in an otherwise normal patient.
Patients come in for minor surgery of the hand or whatever and they leave with hepatitis B. A
patient comes in for an appendectomy and he leaves with malaria. The worst nightmare: A patient
comes in for a Caesarian section and leaves with AIDS.
We do not expect good blood from donors who sell their blood because of poverty. The humane
dimension of blood transfusion is not in the act of receiving blood, but in the act of giving it…
For years, our people have been at the mercy of commercial blood banks that lobby their interests
among medical technologists, hospital administrators and sometimes even physicians so that a
proactive system for collection of blood from healthy donors becomes difficult, tedious and
unrewarding.
The Department of Health has never institutionalized a comprehensive national program for safe
blood and for voluntary blood donation even if this is a serious public health concern and has
fallen for the linen of commercial blood bankers, hook, line and sinker because it is more
convenient to tell the patient to buy blood.
Commercial blood banks hold us hostage to their threat that if we are to close them down, there
will be no blood supply. This is true if the Government does not step in to ensure that safe supply
of blood. We cannot allow commercial interest groups to dictate policy on what is and what should
be a humanitarian effort. This cannot and will never work because their interest in blood donation
is merely monetary. We cannot expect commercial blood banks to take the lead in voluntary blood
donation. Only the Government can do it, and the Government must do it."26
On May 5, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Expanded Temporary Restraining Order
for the Court to order respondent Secretary of Health to cease and desist from announcing the
closure of commercial blood banks, compelling the public to source the needed blood from
voluntary donors only, and committing similar acts "that will ultimately cause the shutdown of
petitioners’ blood banks."27
On July 8, 1999, respondent Secretary filed his Comment and/or Opposition to the above motion
stating that he has not ordered the closure of commercial blood banks on account of the
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued on June 2, 1998 by the Court. In compliance with the
TRO, DOH had likewise ceased to distribute the health advisory leaflets, posters and flyers to the
public which state that "blood banks are closed or will be closed." According to respondent
Secretary, the same were printed and circulated in anticipation of the closure of the commercial
blood banks in accordance with R.A. No. 7719, and were printed and circulated prior to the
issuance of the TRO.28
On July 15, 1999, petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 filed a Petition to Show Cause Why Public
Respondent Should Not be Held in Contempt of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 139147, citing public
respondent’s willful disobedience of or resistance to the restraining order issued by the Court in
the said case. Petitioners alleged that respondent’s act constitutes circumvention of the temporary
restraining order and a mockery of the authority of the Court and the orderly administration of
justice.29 Petitioners added that despite the issuance of the temporary restraining order in G.R. No.
133640, respondent, in his effort to strike down the existence of commercial blood banks,
disseminated misleading information under the guise of health advisories, press releases, leaflets,
brochures and flyers stating, among others, that "this year [1998] all commercial blood banks will
be closed by 27 May. Those who need blood will have to rely on government blood
banks."30 Petitioners further claimed that respondent Secretary of Health announced in a press
conference during the Blood Donor’s Week that commercial blood banks are "illegal and
dangerous" and that they "are at the moment protected by a restraining order on the basis that
their commercial interest is more important than the lives of the people." These were all posted in
bulletin boards and other conspicuous places in all government hospitals as well as other medical
and health centers.31
In respondent Secretary’s Comment to the Petition to Show Cause Why Public Respondent
Should Not Be Held in Contempt of Court, dated January 3, 2000, it was explained that nothing
was issued by the department ordering the closure of commercial blood banks. The subject health
advisory leaflets pertaining to said closure pursuant to Republic Act No. 7719 were printed and
circulated prior to the Court’s issuance of a temporary restraining order on June 21, 1998. 32
Public respondent further claimed that the primary purpose of the information campaign was "to
promote the importance and safety of voluntary blood donation and to educate the public about
the hazards of patronizing blood supplies from commercial blood banks."33 In doing so, he was
merely performing his regular functions and duties as the Secretary of Health to protect the health
and welfare of the public. Moreover, the DOH is the main proponent of the voluntary blood
donation program espoused by Republic Act No. 7719, particularly Section 4 thereof which
provides that, in order to ensure the adequate supply of human blood, voluntary blood donation
shall be promoted through public education, promotion in schools, professional education,
establishment of blood services network, and walking blood donors.
Hence, by authority of the law, respondent Secretary contends that he has the duty to promote the
program of voluntary blood donation. Certainly, his act of encouraging the public to donate blood
voluntarily and educating the people on the risks associated with blood coming from a paid donor
promotes general health and welfare and which should be given more importance than the
commercial businesses of petitioners.34
On July 29, 1999, interposing personal and substantial interest in the case as taxpayers and
citizens, a Petition-in-Intervention was filed interjecting the same arguments and issues as laid
down by petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 and 133661, namely, the unconstitutionality of the Acts,
and, the issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction. The intervenors are the immediate relatives of
individuals who had died allegedly because of shortage of blood supply at a critical time. 35
The intervenors contended that Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes undue delegation of legislative
powers and unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty.36
In a resolution, dated September 7, 1999, and without giving due course to the aforementioned
petition, the Court granted the Motion for Intervention that was filed by the above intervenors on
August 9, 1999.
In his Comment to the petition-in-intervention, respondent Secretary of Health stated that the sale
of blood is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Act that "blood donation is a humanitarian act" and
"blood transfusion is a professional medical service and not a sale of commodity (Section 2[a] and
[b] of Republic Act No. 7719). The act of selling blood or charging fees other than those allowed
by law is even penalized under Section 12."37
Thus, in view of these, the Court is now tasked to pass upon the constitutionality of Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
In resolving the controversy, this Court deems it necessary to address the issues and/or questions
raised by petitioners concerning the constitutionality of the aforesaid Act in G.R. No. 133640 and
133661 as summarized hereunder:
I
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER;
II
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE;
III
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE;
IV
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS CONSTITUTE DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND PROPERTY;
V
WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7719 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; and,
VI
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS TRULY SERVE PUBLIC WELFARE.
As to the first ground upon which the constitutionality of the Act is being challenged, it is the
contention of petitioners that the phase out of commercial or free standing blood banks is
unconstitutional because it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative power.
According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature, and the
latter failed to fix a standard to which the Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of
his functions. Petitioners also contend that the two-year extension period that may be granted by
the Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the
Act constrained the Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of legislative power.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual
to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of
the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other
appointee or delegate of the Legislature.38 Except as to matters of detail that may be left to be
filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and
administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid
if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be
guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.39
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear
from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the
people and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out
of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for
the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of
public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation.
By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies.40 The Secretary of Health
has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act.
Section 11 of the Act states:
"SEC. 11. Rules and Regulations. – The implementation of the provisions of the Act shall be in
accordance with the rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary, within sixty (60)
days from the approval hereof…"
This is what respondent Secretary exactly did when DOH, by virtue of the administrative body’s
authority and expertise in the matter, came out with Administrative Order No.9, series of 1995 or
the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. Administrative Order. No. 9
effectively filled in the details of the law for its proper implementation.
Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for
commercial blood banks shall be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 "based on the
result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety." This power
to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a period of
extension for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The true distinction between the
power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.41
In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the Act when said
phase-out period was extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in Section 2 thereof:
"SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy – In order to promote public health, it is hereby declared the
policy of the state:
a) to promote and encourage voluntary blood donation by the citizenry and to instill public
consciousness of the principle that blood donation is a humanitarian act;
b) to lay down the legal principle that the provision of blood for transfusion is a medical service
and not a sale of commodity;
c) to provide for adequate, safe, affordable and equitable distribution of blood supply and blood
products;
d) to inform the public of the need for voluntary blood donation to curb the hazards caused by the
commercial sale of blood;
e) to teach the benefits and rationale of voluntary blood donation in the existing health subjects of
the formal education system in all public and private schools as well as the non-formal system;
f) to mobilize all sectors of the community to participate in mechanisms for voluntary and non-profit
collection of blood;
g) to mandate the Department of Health to establish and organize a National Blood Transfusion
Service Network in order to rationalize and improve the provision of adequate and safe supply of
blood;
h) to provide for adequate assistance to institutions promoting voluntary blood donation and
providing non-profit blood services, either through a system of reimbursement for costs from
patients who can afford to pay, or donations from governmental and non-governmental entities;
i) to require all blood collection units and blood banks/centers to operate on a non-profit basis;
j) to establish scientific and professional standards for the operation of blood collection units and
blood banks/centers in the Philippines;
k) to regulate and ensure the safety of all activities related to the collection, storage and banking of
blood; and,
l) to require upgrading of blood banks/centers to include preventive services and education to
control spread of blood transfusion transmissible diseases."
Petitioners also assert that the law and its implementing rules and regulations violate the equal
protection clause enshrined in the Constitution because it unduly discriminates against commercial
or free standing blood banks in a manner that is not germane to the purpose of the law.42
What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always
easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation,
discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable
basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The classification, however, to be
reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d)
must apply equally to each member of the class.43
Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the promotion
of public health and welfare. In the aforementioned study conducted by the New Tropical Medicine
Foundation, it was revealed that the Philippine blood banking system is disturbingly primitive and
unsafe, and with its current condition, the spread of infectious diseases such as malaria, AIDS,
Hepatitis B and syphilis chiefly from blood transfusion is unavoidable. The situation becomes more
distressing as the study showed that almost 70% of the blood supply in the country is sourced
from paid blood donors who are three times riskier than voluntary blood donors because they are
unlikely to disclose their medical or social history during the blood screening. 44
The above study led to the passage of Republic Act No. 7719, to instill public consciousness of
the importance and benefits of voluntary blood donation, safe blood supply and proper blood
collection from healthy donors. To do this, the Legislature decided to order the phase out of
commercial blood banks to improve the Philippine blood banking system, to regulate the supply
and proper collection of safe blood, and so as not to derail the implementation of the voluntary
blood donation program of the government. In lieu of commercial blood banks, non-profit blood
banks or blood centers, in strict adherence to professional and scientific standards to be
established by the DOH, shall be set in place.45
Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in which
unjustifiable discrimination and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a classification
was made between nonprofit blood banks/centers and commercial blood banks.
We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons:
One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian
reasons and as a medical service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former
wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity.
Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to
the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by
promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical
service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of commercial blood
banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood
supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as
shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system.
Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely
to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the
existing conditions.
Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.
Having said that, this Court comes to the inquiry as to whether or not Republic Act No. 7719
constitutes a valid exercise of police power.
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is
a primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the
exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety.
Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and, (b) the
means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.46
In the earlier discussion, the Court has mentioned of the avowed policy of the law for the
protection of public health by ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country through
voluntary blood donation. Attaining this objective requires the interference of the State given the
disturbing condition of the Philippine blood banking system.
In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the Legislature
deemed it necessary to phase out commercial blood banks. This action may seriously affect the
owners and operators, as well as the employees, of commercial blood banks but their interests
must give way to serve a higher end for the interest of the public.
The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise of the State’s police power.
Therefore, the Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course of action that is both
necessary and reasonable for the common good. Police power is the State authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare.47
It is in this regard that the Court finds the related grounds and/or issues raised by petitioners,
namely, deprivation of personal liberty and property, and violation of the non-impairment clause, to
be unmeritorious.
Petitioners are of the opinion that the Act is unconstitutional and void because it infringes on the
freedom of choice of an individual in connection to what he wants to do with his blood which
should be outside the domain of State intervention. Additionally, and in relation to the issue of
classification, petitioners asseverate that, indeed, under the Civil Code, the human body and its
organs like the heart, the kidney and the liver are outside the commerce of man but this cannot be
made to apply to human blood because the latter can be replenished by the body. To treat human
blood equally as the human organs would constitute invalid classification. 48
Petitioners likewise claim that the phase out of the commercial blood banks will be
disadvantageous to them as it will affect their businesses and existing contracts with hospitals and
other health institutions, hence Section 7 of the Act should be struck down because it violates the
non-impairment clause provided by the Constitution.
As stated above, the State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to
certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State and to
this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated.49
Moreover, in the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,50 settled is the
rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted
by the government. The right granted by this provision must submit to the demands and
necessities of the State’s power of regulation. While the Court understands the grave implications
of Section 7 of the law in question, the concern of the Government in this case, however, is not
necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits
that suffer as a result of government regulation.
Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the
police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the
State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-
being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may
demonstrate the necessity.51 This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Vda. de Genuino v. Court
of Agrarian Relations52 where the Court held that individual rights to contract and to property have
to give way to police power exercised for public welfare.
As for determining whether or not the shutdown of commercial blood banks will truly serve the
general public considering the shortage of blood supply in the country as proffered by petitioners,
we maintain that the wisdom of the Legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact laws
cannot be inquired into by the Court. Doing so would be in derogation of the principle of separation
of powers.53
That, under the circumstances, proper regulation of all blood banks without distinction in order to
achieve the objective of the law as contended by petitioners is, of course, possible; but, this would
be arguing on what the law may be or should be and not what the law is.
Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for this
Court to pass upon.54
Finally, with regard to the petition for contempt in G.R. No. 139147, on the other hand, the Court
finds respondent Secretary of Health’s explanation satisfactory. The statements in the flyers and
posters were not aimed at influencing or threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the
constitutionality of the law.
Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence in
defiance of the court.55 There is nothing contemptuous about the statements and information
contained in the health advisory that were distributed by DOH before the TRO was issued by this
Court ordering the former to cease and desist from distributing the same.
In sum, the Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the questioned provisions
of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a
law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.56 Those who
petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the
basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail.
Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National Blood
Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act
constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for Congress to
determine.57
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment as follows:
1. In G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, the Court UPHOLDS THE VALIDITY of Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 7719, otherwise known as the National Blood Services Act of 1994, and Administrative
Order No. 9, Series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719.
The petitions are DISMISSED. Consequently, the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this
Court on June 2, 1998, is LIFTED.

2. In G.R. No. 139147, the petition seeking to cite the Secretary of Health in contempt of court
is DENIED for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO,
FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE,
BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as
PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas,
Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod
are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the
regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and
that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the
respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties — parties —
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass
demonstration at Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig
Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers
as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM
to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00
A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1)
Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section
heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano
de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected
mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin
Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled
because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained
further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the
union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of
the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned
the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular
shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration,
who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore,
would be amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked
Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed
of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio
Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and
appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers may join the
Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4,
1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for
work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate
the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO
STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be
dismiss; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be
primarily liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel
countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the
Malacañang demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the
Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which
are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES
JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43,
rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not
be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts
should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent
Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a
charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a
"violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic
Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20,
rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon,
Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18,
1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex
"C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing
CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on
March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional
freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass
demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent
firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin
M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of
bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de
Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo
Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a
consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company
(Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11,
rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p.
59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that
it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their
arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G",
pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent
Company averred that herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated
September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of
the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or
until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that because
their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed,
invoking Bien vs. Castillo,1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day
period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period
elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October
11, 1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for
reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary
period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on
October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24,
1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of
Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a
motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order and
that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be
perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the
order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration
on time was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of the
petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said
president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969,
herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex
"L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by
the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human
personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The
inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his
thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person."2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the
assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments,
and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles."3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw
"certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's
rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly,
and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections."4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State,
was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the
limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise."5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included
among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice
Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates
insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who
refuse to listen.6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties
of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. 7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also
political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and
complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic
establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public
affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so
that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection
as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized.8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as
the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity."9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If
human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt
to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of
officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or
otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere
reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose
— that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to validate a
law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or valid
infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and
immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been
stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by
the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo
in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs.
Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly
and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or
"when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice
Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. —
whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary
stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the
collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set
against and tested by foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot
be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was
against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private
respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom
expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in
particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers
of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid
protection from what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein
private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members fro the harassment of
local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of,
and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment,
vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its
productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its
employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expenses of its workers?
Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its
workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers
the alleged oppressive police who might have been all the more emboldened thereby subject its
lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of
petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein
private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded
them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The
pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation
merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference
between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic
situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by
the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees
found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to
individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately
compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can
never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate
him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt
on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly
and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic
reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon — at once the shield and armor of the dignity and
worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization — becomes
Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can
produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against
police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and
hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from
employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective
bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as
well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly
and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to
the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe
regular working hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated
working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration against police abuses
during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves
severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender
ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally
enjoined by any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the
workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of
Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is concerted
act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the
demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M.
to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand
failed appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union,
namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the
demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but
also immediately action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction
over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of
expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the
issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons
can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members
will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their
position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the
company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have
made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the
absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse
only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the
Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4,
1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human
understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for
excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as
a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the
company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is
unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part
of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration
against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the
service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of
assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair
labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise
known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees
the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1)
regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the
respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police
abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage
in such common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. The
insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift
should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore
stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal protection as
the concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president
with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban
employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees
to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No.
875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be
contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court
dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration
is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that
"any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the
company" and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the
officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the
following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the
existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief).
Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass demonstration.
However, the issues that the employees raised against the local police, were more important to
them because they had the courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of
dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their
absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer,
more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary
hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But
management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free
speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers
proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes
that the evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities
having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred by the
President of the Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to disciplining the local
police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration
"paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm.
This significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did
not present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to comply with purchase
orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be
filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by
reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or
products were damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the
company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel,
water and electric consumption that day. Such savings could have amply compensated for
unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for
only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right
to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the
workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work,
constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly
employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee
is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State
shall afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the
State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional
guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be
merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of
Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial
unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization
for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic
well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations,
the very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to keep
faith with its avowed mission — its raison d'etre — as ordained and directed by the Constitution.
V delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of
jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from
a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through
habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is
the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a
forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25 or who is
denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due
process of law, 26 even after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these
constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and
aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by
the municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of
Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant
case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public offices
including the courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of
which must not be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations
exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield
to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of the
freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of
one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and
exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be
denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights
would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be
reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter
eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his
interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to
pay for competent legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or writ
should filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said
motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration
(Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of procedure were promulgated by the Court of
Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on
September 22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim
that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights
of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to
comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a
motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative
aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations
over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet
of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules
and regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and
superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule
of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case
does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead
constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees.
Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative
delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and
the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short,
especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the
necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of
fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See.
10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of
the motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a
Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based
on the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence
and facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days within
which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the herein
petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period required
for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for
reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated
October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed
beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or
where the arguments in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period
provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject of29-
a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in all these cases, the constitutional rights
of free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be
specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in
such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even
for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the constitutional issue is
necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which
no final and complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a
procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the
instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must
likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of
the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law,
is a most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which
impinges on such human rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own
rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice
require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-
c reiterated this principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without
concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do
justice, in any case, without further loss of time, provided that the right of the
parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may
treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words, when all the
material facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been
duly heard, it matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or of
jurisdiction. We can then and there render the appropriate judgment. Is within the
contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of
this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or
committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the admit of its
authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any error of
judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of
jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not
the errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short
of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal
grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here and now even if such
errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the
exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the
lower court for the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal.
(Emphasis supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this particular
case at bar would an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the
herein laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right to survive, must be according
supremacy over the property rights of their employer firm which has been given a full hearing on
this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage has be demonstrated
as having been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders
more imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human
rights sanctioned and shielded with resolution concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the
organic law. It should be stressed that the application in the instant case Section 15 of the Court of
Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore
such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning labor
union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with
reference to the case at is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R.
charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo,
speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for
new trial is not "newly discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of
procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding upon
 the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No.
103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and
shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided,
however, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or
controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court
shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it
may deem just and equitable.' By this provision the industrial court is disengaged
from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is
not even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue
such orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes.
(Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply
Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that this
provision is ample enough to have enabled the respondent court to consider
whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority was
founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of newly discovered
evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil.
578). (emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant
case is to rule in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no
longer seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law, simply
because their counsel — erroneously believing that he received a copy of the decision on
September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for reconsideration
September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late considering that September 28, 1969
was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be
instruments of justice, for the attainment of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the
jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs.
Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil.
315 [1910]. The Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v.
Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil.
156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far
back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its proper-office as an aid to justice
and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration
from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has remained committed.
The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a
similar mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule should never "sacrifice
the ends justice." While "procedural laws are no other than technicalities" view
them in their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends themselves for the
compliance with which courts have organized and function, but as means
conducive to the realization the administration of the law and of justice (Ibid.,
p.,128). We have remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language
Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in altar of
sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred principles of justice."
(Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by
Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of the situation."
(Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest
decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing
McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was
partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure "are
not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to help
secure substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the
dismissal or termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh
for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of such a
sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the
same Union and who participated in the demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of
fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not officers,
were not dismissed and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named
as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 16-20,
respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm
insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee participated in the demonstration, for which reason
only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the unfair labor practice
charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular
shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in
operation that day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all — should have been simply to charge
said one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of
the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on
their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families aside from the fact
that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of
the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously
seek to destroy our system of Government, but from men of goodwill — good
men who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what they
propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember,
however, is thatpreservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A
suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppress or be a reformer
or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is a constant alertness
of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each
surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another, larger
surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
 ... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel
secure because we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must
recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we
in all honor and good conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of
sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to
indignities by the local police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits
than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty
tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency
resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It
was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner
Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter ...
to the Bank president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the
appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank employees."
Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents.
Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the
letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in
concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that includes
concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace
Act ...) This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly
stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if
in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the
Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for
cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773,
April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal
exercise of the right of the employer to select his employees or to discharge
them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the
countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S.
177 [1941])...
xxx xxx xxx
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct,
identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-organization or as a
retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair
labor practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial
Peace Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic
Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president
no less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are
rendered all the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass
demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated
September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date
of their separation from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings
they might have realized from other sources during their separation from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, C.J, took no part.

xxx xxx xxx

Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air
their grievances.

xxx xxx xxx

The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the
respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the
right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197,
200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361,
368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551,
566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836,
923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242,
1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826,
1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150,
153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213,
215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273,
275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343,
346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444-
445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609,
610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881,
882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526,
1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-
1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723,
1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-
1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829,
1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858,
1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963,
1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-
2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-
507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560,
563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703,
705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76,
80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view
is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly
affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in
question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified
time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of
the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific
interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted
to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the
public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights
are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is
one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty,
the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it
being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws
[High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a
proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a
special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental.
Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the
proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character
when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were
otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the
reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case
without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular
circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not
applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by
counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are
different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a
proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen
that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be
enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of
the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to
conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the
government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for
respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special
provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In
a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in
those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of
laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at
hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus,
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important
legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the
Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except
such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts
of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of
documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such
documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall
determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or
which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws
taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass
media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones,
ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of
the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el
Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed
on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of
what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents
with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures,
fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may
be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice
Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form
part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law
demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate
and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the
people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not
been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive
about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity
of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have
put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been
enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar
situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot
County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,
conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L.
Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken
with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and
official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public
policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application,
demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest
from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a
party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was
declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the
Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential
decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees
Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so
published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no
copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none
of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan
vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent
officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of
policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been
published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws
provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published,
they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44143 August 31, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
EUSEBIO NAZARIO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Teofilo Ragodon for accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner was charged with violation of certain municipal ordinances of the municipal council
of Pagbilao, in Quezon province. By way of confession and avoidance, the petitioner would admit
having committed the acts charged but would claim that the ordinances are unconstitutional, or,
assuming their constitutionality, that they do not apply to him in any event.
The facts are not disputed:
This defendant is charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance in an
information filed by the provincial Fiscal, dated October 9, 1968, as follows:
That in the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in the Municipality of
Pagbilao, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being then the owner and operator of a fishpond situated in the
barrio of Pinagbayanan, of said municipality, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously refuse and fail to pay the
municipal taxes in the total amount of THREE HUNDRED
SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTY TWO CENTAVOS (P362.62),
required of him as fishpond operator as provided for under
Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended, inspite of
repeated demands made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer
of Pagbilao, Quezon, to pay the same.
Contrary to law.
For the prosecution the following witnesses testified in substance as follows;
MIGUEL FRANCIA, 39 years of age, married, farmer and resident of Lopez,
Quezon —
In 1962 to 1967, I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I know the
accused as I worked in his fishpond in 1962 to 1964. The fishpond of Nazario is
at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I worked in the clearing of the fishpond, the
construction of the dikes and the catching of fish.
On cross-examination, this witness declared:
I worked with the accused up to March 1964.
NICOLAS MACAROLAY, 65 years of age, married, copra maker and resident of
Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon —
I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon since 1959 up to the present. I
know the accused since 1959 when he opened a fishpond at Pinagbayanan,
Pagbilao, Quezon. He still operates the fishpond up to the present and I know
this fact as I am the barrio captain of Pinagbayanan.
On cross-examination, this witness declared:
I came to know the accused when he first operated his fishpond since 1959.
On re-direct examination, this witness declared:
I was present during the catching of fish in 1967 and the accused was there.
On re-cross examination, this witness declared:
I do not remember the month in 1962 when the accused caught fish.
RODOLFO R. ALVAREZ, 45 years old, municipal treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon,
married —
As Municipal Treasurer I am in charge of tax collection. I know the accused even
before I was Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao. I have written the accused a letter
asking him to pay his taxes (Exhibit B). Said letter was received by the accused
as per registry return receipt, Exhibit B-1. The letter demanded for payment of
P362.00, more or less, by way of taxes which he did not pay up to the present.
The former Treasurer, Ceferino Caparros, also wrote a letter of demand to the
accused (Exhibit C). On June 28, 1967, I sent a letter to the Fishery Commission
(Exhibit D), requesting information if accused paid taxes with that office. The
Commission sent me a certificate (Exhibits D-1, D-2 & D-3). The accused had a
fishpond lease agreement. The taxes unpaid were for the years 1964, 1965 and
1966.
On cross-examination, this witness declared:
I have demanded the taxes for 38.10 hectares.
On question of the court, this witness declared:
What I was collecting from the accused is the fee on fishpond operation, not
rental.
The prosecution presented as part of their evidence Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, B, B-2,
C, D, D-1, D-2, D-3, E, F, F-1 and the same were admitted by the court, except
Exhibits D, D-1, D-2 and D-3 which were not admitted for being immaterial.
For the defense the accused EUSEBIO NAZARIO, 48 years of age, married,
owner and general manager of the ZIP Manufacturing Enterprises and resident of
4801 Old Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, declared in substance as follows:
I have lived in Sta. Mesa, Manila, since 1949. I buy my Residence Certificates at
Manila or at San Juan. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, I was living in Manila and my
business is in Manila and my family lives at Manila. I never resided at Pagbilao,
Quezon. I do not own a house at Pagbilao. I am a lessee of a fishpond located at
Pagbilao, Quezon, and I have a lease agreement to that effect with the Philippine
Fisheries Commission marked as Exhibit 1. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, the contract
of lease, Exhibit 1, was still existing and enforceable. The Ordinances Nos. 4, 15
and 12, series of 1955, 1965 and 1966, were translated into English by the
Institute of National Language to better understand the ordinances. There were
exchange of letters between me and the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao
regarding the payment of the taxes on my leased fishpond situated at Pagbilao.
There was a letter of demand for the payment of the taxes by the treasurer
(Exhibit 3) which I received by mail at my residence at Manila. I answered the
letter of demand, Exhibit 3, with Exhibit 3-A. I requested an inspection of my
fishpond to determine its condition as it was not then in operation. The Municipal
Treasurer Alvarez went there once in 1967 and he found that it was destroyed by
the typhoon and there were pictures taken marked as Exhibits 4, 4-A, 4-B and
4C. I received another letter of demand, Exhibit 5, and I answered the same
(Exhibit 5-A). I copied my reference quoted in Exhibit 5-A from Administrative
Order No. 6, Exhibit 6. I received another letter of demand from Tomas Ornedo,
Acting Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, dated February 16, 1966, Exhibit 7, and I
answered the same with the letter marked as Exhibit 7-A, dated February 26,
1966. I received another letter of demand from Treasurer Alvarez of Pagbilao,
Exhibit 8, and I answered the same (Exhibit 8-A). In 1964, I went to Treasurer
Caparros to ask for an application for license tax and he said none and he told
me just to pay my taxes. I did not pay because up to now I do not know whether I
am covered by the Ordinance or not. The letters of demand asked me to pay
different amounts for taxes for the fishpond. Because under Sec. 2309 of the
Revised Administrative Code, municipal taxes lapse if not paid and they are
collecting on a lapsed ordinance. Because under the Tax Code, fishermen are
exempted from percentage tax and privilege tax. There is no law empowering the
municipality to pass ordinance taxing fishpond operators.
The defense presented as part of their evidence Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 3-A, 4, 4-B, 4-B,
4-C, 5, 5-A, 6, 6-A, 6-B, 6-C, 7, 7-A, 8 and 8-A and the same were admitted by
the court.
From their evidence the prosecution would want to show to the court that the
accused, as lessee or operator of a fishpond in the municipality of Pagbilao,
refused, and still refuses, to pay the municipal taxes for the years 1964, 1965
and 1966, in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended
by Municipal Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and finally amended by Municipal
Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966.
On the other hand, the accused, by his evidence, tends to show to the court that
the taxes sought to be collected have already lapsed and that there is no law
empowering municipalities to pass ordinances taxing fishpond operators. The
defense, by their evidence, tried to show further that, as lessee of a forest land to
be converted into a fishpond, he is not covered by said municipal ordinances;
and finally that the accused should not be taxed as fishpond operator because
there is no fishpond yet being operated by him, considering that the supposed
fishpond was under construction during the period covered by the taxes sought
to be collected.
Finally, the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is
outside of the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and
that the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ambiguous and
uncertain.
There is no question from the evidences presented that the accused is a lessee
of a parcel of forest land, with an area of 27.1998 hectares, for fishpond
purposes, under Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 1066, entered into by the
accused and the government, through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources on August 21, 1959.
There is no question from the evidences presented that the 27.1998 hectares of
land leased by the defendant from the government for fishpond purposes was
actually converted into fishpond and used as such, and therefore defendant is an
operator of a fishpond within the purview of the ordinance in question. 1
The trial Court 2 returned a verdict of guilty and disposed as follows:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as
amended by Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965 and further amended by Ordinance No. 12, series
of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao, Quezon; and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of
P50.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of P8.00 a day, and to pay
the costs of this proceeding.
SO ORDERED. 3
In this appeal, certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner alleges that:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 4, SERIES OF
1955, AS AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 15, SERIES OF 1965, AND AS FURTHER
AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 12, SERIES OF 1966, OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PAGBILAO,
QUEZON, IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING AMBIGUOUS AND UNCERTAIN.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION, AS
AMENDED, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING EX POST FACTO.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION
COVERS ONLY OWNERS OR OVERSEER OF FISHPONDS OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND
NOT TO LESSEES OF PUBLIC LANDS.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE QUESTIONED ORDINANCE, EVEN
IF VALID, CANNOT BE ENFORCED BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF PAGBILAO AND
DOES NOT COVER NON-
RESIDENTS. 4
The ordinances in question are Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, Ordinance No. 15, series of
1965, and Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao. Insofar as
pertinent to this appeal, the salient portions thereof are hereinbelow quoted:
Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits
of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per
hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. l (a). For the convenience of those who have or owners or managers of
fishponds within the territorial limits of this municipality, the date of payment of
municipal tax relative thereto, shall begin after the lapse of three (3) years
starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits
of Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or any
fraction thereof per annum beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the
fishpond started operating before the year 1964. 7
The first objection refers to the ordinances being allegedly "ambiguous and uncertain." 8 The
petitioner contends that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not covered since the said
ordinances speak of "owner or manager." He likewise maintains that they are vague insofar as
they reckon the date of payment: Whereas Ordinance No. 4 provides that parties shall commence
payment "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the
Bureau of Fisheries." 9 Ordinance No. 12 states that liability for the tax accrues "beginning and
taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964." 10
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application." 11 It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving
clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 12 the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any
sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by." 13 Clearly,
the ordinance imposed no standard at all "because one may never know in advance what 'annoys
some people but does not annoy others.' " 14
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague" 15 act whose obscurity is
evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise
language — but which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrased — in which
case, it may be "saved" by proper construction.
It must further be distinguished from statutes that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to
certain types of activities. In that event, such statutes may not be challenged whenever directed
against such activities. In Parker v. Levy, 16 a prosecution originally under the U.S. Uniform Code
of Military Justice (prohibiting, specifically, "conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman"), the
defendant, an army officer who had urged his men not to go to Vietnam and called the Special
Forces trained to fight there thieves and murderers, was not allowed to invoke the void for
vagueness doctrine on the premise that accepted military interpretation and practice had provided
enough standards, and consequently, a fair notice that his conduct was impermissible.
It is interesting that in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 17 a divided Court sustained an act of
Congress (Republic Act No. 4880 penalizing "the too early nomination of candidates" 18 limiting the
election campaign period, and prohibiting "partisan political activities"), amid challenges of
vagueness and overbreadth on the ground that the law had included an "enumeration of the acts
deemed included in the terms 'election campaign' or 'partisan political activity" 19 that would supply
the standards. "As thus limited, the objection that may be raised as to vagueness has been
minimized, if not totally set at rest." 20 In his opinion, however, Justice Sanchez would stress that
the conduct sought to be prohibited "is not clearly defined at all." 21 "As worded in R.A 4880,
prohibited discussion could cover the entire spectrum of expression relating to candidates and
political parties." 22 He was unimpressed with the "restrictions" Fernando's opinion had relied on: "
'Simple expressions of opinions and thoughts concerning the election' and expression of 'views on
current political problems or issues' leave the reader conjecture, to guesswork, upon the extent of
protection offered, be it as to the nature of the utterance ('simple expressions of opinion and
thoughts') or the subject of the utterance ('current political problems or issues')." 23
The Court likewise had occasion to apply the "balancing-of-interests" test, 24 insofar as the
statute's ban on early nomination of candidates was concerned: "The rational connection between
the prohibition of Section 50-A and its object, the indirect and modest scope of its restriction on the
rights of speech and assembly, and the embracing public interest which Congress has found in
the moderation of partisan political activity, lead us to the conclusion that the statute may stand
consistently with and does not offend the Constitution." 25 In that case, Castro would have the
balance achieved in favor of State authority at the "expense" of individual liberties.
In the United States, which had ample impact on Castro's separate opinion, the balancing test
finds a close kin, referred to as the "less restrictive alternative " 26 doctrine, under which the court
searches for alternatives available to the Government outside of statutory limits, or for "less drastic
means" 27 open to the State, that would render the statute unnecessary. In United States v.
Robel, 28 legislation was assailed, banning members of the (American) Communist Party from
working in any defense facility. The U.S. Supreme Court, in nullifying the statute, held that it
impaired the right of association, and that in any case, a screening process was available to the
State that would have enabled it to Identify dangerous elements holding defense positions. 29 In
that event, the balance would have been struck in favor of individual liberties.
It should be noted that it is in free expression cases that the result is usually close. It is said,
however, that the choice of the courts is usually narrowed where the controversy involves say,
economic rights, 30 or as in the Levycase, military affairs, in which less precision in analysis is
required and in which the competence of the legislature is presumed.
In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It is
unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage. As the actual
operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term " manager." He does not deny the fact that he
financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into the fishponds, and had
employed laborers to maintain them. 31 While it appears that it is the National Government which
owns them, 32 the Government never shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore only
logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said ordinances.
We agree with the trial court that the ordinances are in the character of revenue
measures 33 designed to assist the coffers of the municipality of Pagbilao. And obviously, it cannot
be the owner, the Government, on whom liability should attach, for one thing, upon the ancient
principle that the Government is immune from taxes and for another, since it is not the
Government that had been making money from the venture.
Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and as the recipient of
profits brought about by the business, the appellant is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in
question. He cannot say that he did not have a fair notice of such a liability to make such
ordinances vague.
Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. There is no merit to the claim that
"the imposition of tax has to depend upon an uncertain date yet to be determined (three years
after the 'approval of the fishpond' by the Bureau of Fisheries, and upon an uncertain event (if the
fishpond started operating before 1964), also to be determined by an uncertain individual or
individuals." 34 Ordinance No. 15, in making the tax payable "after the lapse of three (3) years
starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries," 35 is unequivocal
about the date of payment, and its amendment by Ordinance No. 12, reckoning liability thereunder
"beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year
1964 ," 36 does not give rise to any ambiguity. In either case, the dates of payment have been
definitely established. The fact that the appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning
dates — as far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965, and 1966 is concerned — presents a mere
problem in computation, but it does not make the ordinances vague. In addition, the same would
have been at most a difficult piece of legislation, which is not unfamiliar in this jurisdiction, but
hardly a vague law.
As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on January 1, 1964 for fishponds in operation prior
thereto (Ordinance No. 12), and for new fishponds, three years after their approval by the Bureau
of Fisheries (Ordinance No. 15). This is so since the amendatory act (Ordinance No. 12) merely
granted amnesty unto old, delinquent fishpond operators. It did not repeal its mother ordinances
(Nos. 4 and 15). With respect to new operators, Ordinance No. 15 should still prevail.
To the Court, the ordinances in question set forth enough standards that clarify imagined
ambiguities. While such standards are not apparent from the face thereof, they are visible from the
intent of the said ordinances.
The next inquiry is whether or not they can be said to be ex post facto measures. The appellant
argues that they are: "Amendment No. 12 passed on September 19, 1966, clearly provides that
the payment of the imposed tax shall "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the
fishpond started operating before the year 1964.' In other words, it penalizes acts or events
occurring before its passage, that is to say, 1964 and even prior thereto." 37
The Court finds no merit in this contention. As the Solicitor General notes, "Municipal Ordinance
No. 4 was passed on May 14, 1955. 38 Hence, it cannot be said that the amendment (under
Ordinance No. 12) is being made to apply retroactively (to 1964) since the reckoning period is
1955 (date of enactment). Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the nature of curative
measures intended to facilitate and enhance the collection of revenues the originally act,
Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed. 39 Moreover, the act (of non-payment of the tax), had been,
since 1955, made punishable, and it cannot be said that Ordinance No. 12 imposes a retroactive
penalty. As we have noted, it operates to grant amnesty to operators who had been delinquent
between 1955 and 1964. It does not mete out a penalty, much less, a retrospective one.

The appellant assails, finally, the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao to tax "public forest
land." 40 In Golden Ribbon Lumber Co., Inc. v. City of Butuan 41 we held that local governments'
taxing power does not extend to forest products or concessions under Republic Act No. 2264, the
Local Autonomy Act then in force. (Republic Act No. 2264 likewise prohibited municipalities from
imposing percentage taxes on sales.)

First of all, the tax in question is not a tax on property, although the rate thereof is based on the
area of fishponds ("P3.00 per hectare" 42). Secondly, fishponds are not forest lands, although we
have held them to the agricultural lands. 43 By definition, "forest" is "a large tract of land covered
with a natural growth of trees and underbush; a large wood." 44 (Accordingly, even if the
challenged taxes were directed on the fishponds, they would not have been taxes on forest
products.)

They are, more accurately, privilege taxes on the business of fishpond maintenance. They are not
charged against sales, which would have offended the doctrine enshrined by Golden Ribbon
Lumber, 45 but rather on occupation, which is allowed under Republic Act No. 2264. 46 They are
what have been classified as fixed annual taxes and this is obvious from the ordinances
themselves.

There is, then, no merit in the last objection.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Costs against the appellant.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino
and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, and Regalado, J., took no part.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR
SUPREME COURT OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING
Manila AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES. 3
EN BANC
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or
G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978 participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent,
temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and
paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions
MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner,
of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government
vs.
and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of
HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.
religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.

Angel C. Cruz, Gregorio A. Ejercito, Felix C. Chaves & Jose Laureta for petitioner.
Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to
six (6) months or fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or both such fine and
Sotero H. Laurel for respondents. imprisonment, upon conviction. 5

FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision dated September 17, 1968 of respondent
Judge Francisco Arca of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 72797,
the dispositive portion of winch reads.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the
respondents, declaring Ordinance No. 6 37 of the City of Manila null and void.
The preliminary injunction is made permanent. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.
(SGD.) FRANCISCO ARCA
On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797,
praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the
enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537
null and void. 6
In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for wanting the
ordinance declared null and void:
1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila,
Ordinance No. 6537 is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in
taxation;
2) As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-
useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of
proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to
guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental
principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers:

Judge1 3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who
are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore,
The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.7
22, 1968 and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27,
1968. 2 On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on September
17, 1968 rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent
City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled: the writ of preliminary injunction. 8

AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN

OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT
Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the
present petition on March 27, 1969. Petitioner assigned the following as errors allegedly
committed by respondent Judge in the latter's decision of September 17,1968: 9
I lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR
OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL
RULE OF UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE AND PATENT
ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE
PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNDUE DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT
ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the
exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state
any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to
be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely
the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited
delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. 10
In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, 11 where a law granted a
government agency power to determine the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the
Supreme Court ruled against the interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested in the
administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised without a policy, rule, or standard from
which it can be measured or controlled.
It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso 12 that the authority and discretion to grant and refuse
permits of all classes conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not
uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law.
Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to
guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution.

Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on the
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who
ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation
may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the
applies only to purely tax or revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or
Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not
revenue measure but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it being principally a
obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life
regulatory measure in nature.
without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of
protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its and citizens. 13
principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which
requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.
discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of applications for
employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requires the
payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious
that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation. SO ORDERED.

The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider Barredo, Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Santos and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it.
Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is Castro, C.J., Antonio and Aquino, Fernando, JJ., concur in the result.
imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a
reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being
Concepcion, Jr., J., took no part.
collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or
whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CAYAT, defendant-appellant.
Sinai Hamada y Cariño for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio,
Benguet, Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a
fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal of the
Court of First Instance, the following information was filed against him:
That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of
the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, Cayat,
being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
illegally receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody,
one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and
liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make
prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.
Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the facts alleged
in the information, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer
and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or supper subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. The case is now before this court on appeal. Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 read:
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a
non-Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-
seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine,
or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which
the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the
passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of
any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal
or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully
in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.
SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall,
upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two
hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion
of the court.
The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:
(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;
(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.
(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.
Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian tribes." It is said that
as these less civilized elements of the Filipino population are "jealous of their rights in a
democracy," any attempt to treat them with discrimination or "mark them as inferior or less capable
rate or less entitled" will meet with their instant challenge. As the constitutionality of the Act here
involved is questioned for purposes thus mentioned, it becomes imperative to examine and
resolve the issues raised in the light of the policy of the government towards the non-Christian
tribes adopted and consistently followed from the Spanish times to the present, more often with
sacrifice and tribulation but always with conscience and humanity.
As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude toward
these inhabitants, and in the different laws of the Indies, their concentration in so-called
"reducciones" (communities) have been persistently attempted with the end in view of according
them the "spiritual and temporal benefits" of civilized life. Throughout the Spanish regime, it had
been regarded by the Spanish Government as a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity" to
civilize these less fortunate people living "in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the
"the moral and material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded
them by the same laws." (Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.) This
policy had not been deflected from during the American period. President McKinley in his
instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, said:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the
same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians
to maintain their tribal organization and government, and under which many of those
tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they
are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected
to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active
effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.
Since then and up to the present, the government has been constantly vexed with the problem of
determining "those practicable means of bringing about their advancement in civilization and
material prosperity." (See, Act No. 253.) "Placed in an alternative of either letting them alone or
guiding them in the path of civilization," the present government "has chosen to adopt the latter
measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the national conscience." (Memorandum
of Secretary of the Interior, quoted in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660, 714.) To
this end, their homes and firesides have been brought in contact with civilized communities
through a network of highways and communications; the benefits of public education have to them
been extended; and more lately, even the right of suffrage. And to complement this policy of
attraction and assimilation, the Legislature has passed Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to secure for
them the blessings of peace and harmony; to facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid and steady
march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that the Act must be understood and
applied.
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. (Borgnis vs. Falk Co., 133 N.W.,
209; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61; 55 Law. ed., Rubi vs. Provincial Board of
Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Vera and Cu
Unjieng, 37 Off. Gaz ., 187.)
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage,"
as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-
Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more
directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) This
distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions
existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at
present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the
reasonableness of the classification thus established.
That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive,
have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any
kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have
been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably
designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad
experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly
intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes,
thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is
intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as
counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to
any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a
people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and
security.
Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof.
That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their
degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly
authorized agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found
unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due
process of law provided in the Constitution. But this provision is not involved in the case at bar.
Besides, to constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule
is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in
applying a law to particular cases. (McGehee, Due Process of Law p. 371, cited with approval in
Rubi vs.Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) Due process of law means simply: (1) that there shall
be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the
government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according
to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all
citizens of the state or to all of the class. (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal
by the United States Supreme Court, 218 U.S., 302: 54 Law. ed., 1049.) Thus, a person's property
may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or property used in
violation of law may be confiscated (U.S. vs. Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), or when the property
constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case (Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439, 442).
Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the
police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all powers of the government. It has been
aptly described as a power co-extensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling
necessity. Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order
of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth
and prosperity (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.S., 27), is a legitimate exercise of the police power,
unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual,
the same must be upheld.
Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes
so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their
equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no
other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.
The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race."
On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them
rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in tht enjoyment of those privileges now
enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is,
in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to
raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the
ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is
indeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely asserting
themselves in a competitive world," as appellant's attorney impressively avers, and that they are
"a virile, up-and -coming people eager to take their place in the world's social scheme." As a
matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other professionals educated in the best
institutions here and in America. Their active participation in the multifarious welfare activities of
community life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a source of pride and
gratification to people of the Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant a
partial or complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within the prerogative
of the National Assembly to determine. In the constitutional scheme of our government, this court
can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the
power exists, and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under
existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no
authority to pass upon. And, if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall
incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi
suprema est lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a
certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from
providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class
may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the
nation (Cf. Boston Beer Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S., 25; 24 law. ed., 989).

Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Conception, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON.
ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo and Teehankee, Carreon & Tañada for plaintiff-
appellant.
Ramon O. de Veyra for defendants-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4, Series
of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to
the United States of America and other foreign countries." 2
Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March
20, 1964 for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50.
On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint 3 against the City of Ormoc as
well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution)
and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution), aside from being an export
tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that the
tax is neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its charter
and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, is
authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of
paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of
sugar.
Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's
power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited
constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of
First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the
ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local
Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.
Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Appellant
alleges the same statutory and constitutional violations in the aforesaid taxing ordinance
mentioned earlier.
Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc City,
a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America
and other foreign countries." Though referred to as a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar
produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only
time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported.
Appellant questions the authority of the defendant Municipal Board to levy such an export
tax, in view of Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which denies from municipal
councils the power to impose an export tax. Section 2287 in part states: "It shall not be in the
power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and
merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import
or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage use of bridges
or otherwise, shall be void."
Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective June 19, 1959, gave
chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just and
uniform taxes, licenses or fees. Anent the inconsistency between Section 2287 of the Revised
Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, this Court, in Nin Bay Mining Co. v.
Municipality of Roxas 4 held the former to have been repealed by the latter. And expressing Our
awareness of the transcendental effects that municipal export or import taxes or licenses will have
on the national economy, due to Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, We stated that there was no
other alternative until Congress acts to provide remedial measures to forestall any unfavorable
results.
The point remains to be determined, however, whether constitutional limits on the power of
taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed.
The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We ruled that the equal protection
clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based
on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions
which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those
who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet
them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.,
it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable,
should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be
singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same
class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up,
it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar
Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not
arbitrarily collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the
ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed
constitutional until declared otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is
declared unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the
P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P.
ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig,
Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on
Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85,
Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the
NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its
President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE
MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G.
TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a
Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the
petitioners that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are here
challenging. The Supreme Court is itself affected by these measures and is thus an interested
party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system of government,
however, it cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge, because no other office has the
authority to do so. We shall therefore act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the
discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine
Postal Corporation through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and
the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will
be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken
common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices in
registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces
more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings
in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed
among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the
independence of the Judiciary.
We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the
constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive,
every statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional
before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the
attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
I
We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that
"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof."
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no
intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted;
and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is
usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have
opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.1
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking
privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers,
Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes
Connected Therewith."
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:
The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:
a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters,
from sender to addressee, with full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;
b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through
the unhampered flow or exchange of postal matters between nations;
 c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users
and changing needs, including but not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and
valuables, and the like;
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to
finance the overall cost of providing the varied range of postal delivery and
messengerial services as well as the expansion and continuous upgrading of
service standards by the same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:
Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders,
instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those
provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69,
180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege
under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President,
under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized
use thereof.
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act
violates the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive
as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the
general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to
mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement. 2
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of
the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render
legislation impossible. 3 As has been correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but
matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the
accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included in the act. Thus,
it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which the act is to be
enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in
the way of its execution. If such matters are properly connected with the subject
as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special
mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on
a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same
subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title
is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and to
the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected
therewith."4
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the
subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly
expressed in its title.5 As observed in one case,6 if the title of an act embraces only one subject,
we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by implication
must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of
the Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to
the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more
efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing
clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
II
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking
privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included
in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared
only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution, reading as follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that
amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be
settled by a conference committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a
subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have
been validly added as an amendment.
These argument are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences
between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader
function is described thus:
 A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be
limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where
the conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative
custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be
inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee
produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate, These excursions
occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee
jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference
committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.81).
It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned
to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill
was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V.
Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It
was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez7 laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in
matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the
bill).8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but
still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,9 where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they
are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and
spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions, of the
Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment
was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies
thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled
bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with
Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming
courtesy.
III
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege
from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the
Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on
Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the
general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and officers. 10
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid
classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has
been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of
National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation;
the National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan
(Office of Special Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino
Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled
Persons.11
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied
in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more, specific
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in
general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act
assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is
the equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue
favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or
things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for
example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the
morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of
persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these
same particulars. 13
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking privilege
extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former
Presidents of the Philippines purely as a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered because
of the importance or status of the grantee or because of its need for the privilege? Or have the
grantees been chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully
deliberated upon, by the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to
suspect, however, that not enough care or attention was given to its repealing clause, resulting in
the unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable
that the political departments would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of
the major and equal departments the government. The same observations are made if the
importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the franking
privilege, which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics Office and even some private
individuals but not the courts of justice.
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the
perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial
revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication
between the government and the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is
the Judiciary, that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any
major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the
respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the
basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while
extending it to others less deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office
show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to
P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose
functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of
Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming fromthe
Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total
amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is that because of this considerable
volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege
should be extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former
Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that
a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary but not an operation
that can save his life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it
seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do
not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others,
especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not
need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating
the Constitution.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If
it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the
franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need
on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the
franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to
understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we
may concede the need of the National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we
are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not recognized in the courts of justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege
from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former
Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank mail as the Judiciary.)
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled
corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public
service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from
performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to
it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter.14Among the services it
should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that
need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos,
55% of which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the
sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the
retention of the franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the
withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The
volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress the
dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and
litigants as part of the judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national
budget compared to the Legislative and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for
1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the
increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they
send in the discharge of their judicial functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid
exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its
repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is
superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the
Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of
arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.
IV
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and
that it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section
35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be
deprived of the equal protection of laws."
We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. While
ruling against the discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar
discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable.
Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that we are
prepared to accept.. As judges, we cannot debate with our detractors. We can only decide the
cases before us as law imposes on us the duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us the
light to be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking
privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal
trial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which
offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2,
1992, is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason,
Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE
TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND
TRANSPORTATION, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order" filed by the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and
Ace Transportation, seeks to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42, dated
October 10, 1977, of the Board of Transportation, and Memorandum Circular No. 52, dated
August 15, 1980, of the Bureau of Land Transportation.
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed
of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs
within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners
Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each
being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular
No. 77-42 which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of
Old and Dilapidated Taxis
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and
comfortable units are used as public conveyances;
WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time and again,
complained against, and condemned, the continued operation of old and
dilapidated taxis;
WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort,
convenience, and safety, a program of phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis
should be adopted;
WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation, the
latter believes that in six years of operation, a taxi operator has not only covered
the cost of his taxis, but has made reasonable profit for his investments;
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares that no
car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi, and in implementation of the
same hereby promulgates the following rules and regulations:
1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered
withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and
operated as taxis. In the registration of cards for 1978, only taxis of Model 1972
and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation;
2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered withdrawn from
public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis.
In the registration of cars for 1979, only taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be
accepted for registration and allowed for operation; and every year thereafter,
there shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi, to wit:
1980 — Model 1974
1981 — Model 1975, etc.
All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered
withdrawn from public service as of the last day of registration of each particular
year and their respective plates shall be surrendered directly to the Board of
Transportation for subsequent turnover to the Land Transportation Commission.
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein
shall immediately be effective in Metro-Manila. Its implementation outside Metro-
Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro-
Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board. 1
Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation
(BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional
Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capitol Region, to
implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and
accepted for registration as public conveyances. To quote said Circular:
Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42, taxi units with year models over six
(6) years old are now banned from operating as public utilities in Metro Manila.
As such the units involved should be considered as automatically dropped as
 public utilities and, therefore, do not require any further dropping order from the
BOT.
Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over
6 years old shall be refused registration. The following schedule of phase-out is
herewith prescribed for the guidance of all concerned:
Year Model Automatic Phase-Out Year
1980
1974 1981
1975 1982
1976 1983
1977
etc. etc.
Strict compliance here is desired. 2
In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of
model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981.
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553,
seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and
operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier
models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and
fit for operation.
On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion",
praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on February 20, 1981.
Petitioners presented testimonial and documentary evidence, offered the same, and manifested
that they would submit additional documentary proofs. Said proofs were submitted on March 27,
1981 attached to petitioners' pleading entitled, "Manifestation, Presentation of Additional Evidence
and Submission of the Case for Resolution." 3
On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a "Manifestation and Urgent
Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition" praying that the case be resolved or decided not later
than December 10, 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may
have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-
out on January 1, 1982.
Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later
informed that the records of the case could not be located.
On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the following queries were
posed for consideration by this Court:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in
accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby
safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?
B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural
requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation
and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners'
constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and
unreasonable classification and standard?
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power
4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices,
measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by
operators of public utility motor vehicles.
Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise
of its powers:
Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. — In the exercise of the powers granted in the
preceding section, the Board shag proceed promptly along the method of
legislative inquiry.
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may
require the cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the
Philippine Constabulary, particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support
agencies within the Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications, or any other government office or agency that may be able to
furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the Board of any policy,
plan or program in the implementation of this Decree.
 The Board may also can conferences, require the submission of position papers
or other documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may
be affected by the implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable
means of inquiry.
In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due process, petitioners contend
that they were not caged upon to submit their position papers, nor were they ever summoned to
attend any conference prior to the issuance of the questioned BOT Circular.
It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a
wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy,
plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission
of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being
only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners
cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can
they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to
issuing the challenged Circulars. operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources
of the data and information that may be desired by the BOT.
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither violative of
procedural due process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA
307 (1972):
Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally
required for the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty,
when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-
judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which has to
be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general rules or
regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or
enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and
oppressive because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and
the use to which they are subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken
into consideration at the time of registration. As public contend, however, it is impractical to subject
every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the
door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A
reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly.
The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by
that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment
obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to
the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday
in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of
arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met.
On Equal Protection of the Law:
Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the law
because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi
industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also
envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. To repeat the pertinent portion:
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein
shall immediately be effective in Metro Manila. Its implementation outside Metro
Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro
Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board. 4
In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of the Circulars in Cebu City is
already being effected, with the BOT in the process of conducting studies regarding the operation
of taxicabs in other cities.
The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city,
compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant
use. This is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every
city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly
be successfully claimed.
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding
consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and
dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can
prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. 5 It may also regulate property
rights. 6 In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". 7
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is
concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same
treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons Identically or similarly
situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is
reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must
apply equally to each member of the class. 8 What is required under the equal protection clause is
the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance
would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities
imposed. 9 The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.
Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional
infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear,
categorical and undeniable. 10
WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987
TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B. ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO,
in their behalf and in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges during
the school year 1987-88 and future years who have not taken or successfully hurdled tile
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT).petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVII of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region with seat at Manila, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY LOURDES QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Chairman of the
BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT
(CEM), respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-
1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public
respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and
passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as
scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of
preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was
conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari with this Court to set aside the
Order of the respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act
of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
Section 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization
and regulation of medical education (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and
(c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines.
(Underscoring supplied)
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education which is composed of (a)
the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or his duly authorized representative, as Chairman;
(b) the Secretary of Health or his duly authorized representative; (c) the Director of Higher
Education or his duly authorized representative; (d) the Chairman of the Medical Board or his duly
authorized representative; (e) a representative of the Philippine Medical Association; (f) the Dean
of the College of Medicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a representative of the Council of
Deans of Philippine Medical Schools; and (h) a representative of the Association of Philippine
Medical Colleges, as members. The functions of the Board of Medical Education specified in
Section 5 of the statute include the following:
(a) To determine and prescribe equirements for admission into a recognized college of
medicine;
(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physical facilities of colleges of
medicine, to wit: buildings, including hospitals, equipment and supplies, apparatus,
instruments, appliances, laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating
and delivery rooms, facilities for outpatient services, and others, used for didactic and
practical instruction in accordance with modern trends;
(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimum qualifications of
teaching personnel, including student-teachers ratio;
(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculum leading to the degree of
Doctor of Medicine;
(e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical curriculum in a medical
school that has exceptional faculty and instrumental facilities. Such an experimental
curriculum may prescribe admission and graduation requirements other than those
prescribed in this Act; Provided, That only exceptional students shall be enrolled in the
experimental curriculum;
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a
register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of
twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical
Education;
(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departments of the hospitals for
training which comply with the minimum specific physical facilities as provided in
subparagraph (b) hereof; and
 (h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and regulations for the
proper implementation of the foregoing functions. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:
Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who has not
been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral
turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or
arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of
Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former
professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be
construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the
preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.
xxx xxx x x x (Emphasis supplied)
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and
dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for
admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This
Order goes on to state that:
2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the
selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to
improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the
successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year
by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine
Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission
requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the
issuance of the prescribed certificate of elegibility for admission into the medical colleges.
3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical Education, each medical college
may give other tests for applicants who have been issued a corresponding certificate of
eligibility for admission that will yield information on other aspects of the applicant's
personality to complement the information derived from the NMAT.
xxx xxx xxx
8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA),
or admitted for enrollment as first year student in any medical college, beginning the
school year, 1986-87, without the required NMAT qualification as called for under this
Order. (Underscoring supplied)
Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Center conducted NMATs for
entrance to medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April
1987, respondent Center conducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges during the
school year 1987.1988.1avvphi1
Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to
enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the assailed statute
and administrative order. We regard this issue as entirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely needs
documentation that a court would issue a writ of preliminary injunction only when the petitioner
assailing a statute or administrative order has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong
enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from
showing a clear legal right to the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is of course the
constitutionality of the statute or order assailed.
1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their
assertion, violated by the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381,
as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked read as follows:
(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect of human rights. "
(b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building
and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well
being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs."
(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social
progress and to promote total human liberation and development. "
(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education
accessible to all. "
(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of
study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."
Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies" which the
government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously
undertaken to demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the administrative
order they assail collide with the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have
not, in other words, discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This burden is heavy
enough where the constitutional provision invoked is relatively specific, rather than abstract, in
character and cast in behavioral or operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity
heavier where the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second portion of Article II is
cast, in language descriptive of basic policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy
and therefore highly generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made their case, even a prima
facie case, and we are not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the legislation and
regulation impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional provisions pointed
to by the petitioners.
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more petitioners
have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that
provision. On the contrary we may note-in anticipation of discussion infra — that the statute and
the regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education" at the
level of professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article XIV
as one must one cannot but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute
literalness. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education "
accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but
rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements. "
2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act
No. 2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue
delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the
delegate, the Board of Medical Education. The general principle of non-delegation of legislative
power, which both flows from the reinforces the more fundamental rule of the separation and
allocation of powers among the three great departments of government,1 must be applied with
circumspection in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as
obviously complex and technical as medical education and the practice of medicine in our present
day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co.,
Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission:2
One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of
powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegate potestas
non potest delegare, adopted this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by
G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized
in principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits of the
principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England but in
practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil. 318,
1939]. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws,
there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the
legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." 3
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an
administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly
abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta4 —
The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically.
It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the
Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be
attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads. 5
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959
Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7
of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.
3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an
"unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due process.
Again, petitioners have failed to specify just what factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair"
and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to suggest that passing the NMAT is an
unnecessary requirement when added on top of the admission requirements set out in Section 7
of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission requirements established by internal regulations
of the various medical schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus appear to relate to
utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a
question of power or authority: this Court has neither commission or competence to pass upon
questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation or administrative regulation. Those
questions must be address to the political departments of the government not to the courts.
There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and administrative
provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police
power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-
waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote an the important interests
and needs — in a word, the public order — of the general community.6 An important component of
that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of
which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. 7
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable
relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical
school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on
the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation
of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public.8 That the power to regulate and control the practice
of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine, is also well recognized. thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those
who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago
been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.9 Similarly, the establishment of
minimum medical educational requirements — i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a
recognized medical school — for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as
a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.10 What we have before us in the
instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s.
1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the
professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of
those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity
in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to
those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for
medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our
professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our
social and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a
means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical
schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread
use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America
(the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT]11 and quite probably in other countries with far more
developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of
the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is
reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area.
That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for
disease or trauma.

4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that that portion of
the MECS Order which provides that

the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be
determined every-year by the Board of Medical 11 Education after consultation with the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. (Emphasis supplied)

infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, that students seeking
admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score
than that established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this
renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious." The force of this argument is more apparent
than real. Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by differing conditions
obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function
of such factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff score established the
preceding year; the number of places available in medical schools during the current year; the
average score attained during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the
current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff score regardless of
changes in circumstances from year to year, may wen result in an unreasonable rigidity. The
above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of
Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change.

We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a
condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional
imposition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court
denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994
ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br. 11, Davao
City, respondents.
Victorio S. Advincula for petitioner.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National Police
Regional Headquarters at Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin
Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the informations for
murder1 and attempted murder2 were filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City,
on September 16, 1992, the trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner until the termination
of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known as Department of Interior and
Local Government Act of 1990, which provides:
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. — Upon the filing of a
complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of
the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and
one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office
until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and
shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused
(Emphasis ours).
On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension,3 relying on
Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety
(90) days and, also, on our ruling in Deloso v. Sandiganbayan,4 and Layno v. Sandiganbayan.5 In
his order dated December 14, 19936 respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that under
Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated.
The motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was, likewise, denied.7 Hence, the petition
for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge and to command him to
lift petitioner's preventive suspension.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no question that the case of petitioner who is charged with murder and attempted murder
under the Revised Penal Code falls squarely under Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which specifically applies
to members of the PNP. In dispute however, is whether the provision limits the period of
suspension to 90 days, considering that while the first sentence of Sec. 47 provides that the
accused who is charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed is six (6) years and one
(1) day shall be suspended from office "until the case is terminated", the second sentence of the
same section mandates that the case, which shall be subject to continuous trial, shall be
terminated within 90 days from the arraignment of the accused.
Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine National Police, under Sec. 91 of RA 6975
which reads:
Sec. 91. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall
apply to all personnel of the Department.
he is covered by the Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree,
which limits the maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) days, thus:
Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation.
— When the administrative case against the officer or employee under
preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within
the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who
is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated
in the service; Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due
to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not
be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil
Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws. He
further asserts that the requirements in
Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that "the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the
case is terminated" and the succeeding sentence, "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial
and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused" are both
substantive and should be taken together to mean that if the case is not terminated within 90 days,
the period of preventive suspension must be lifted because of the command that the trial must be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment.
We disagree.
First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the
PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until
the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case.
The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety
(90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand
independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with
the time frame within which the trial should be finished.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of
accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word "shall"
before the phrase "be terminated within ninety (90) days", there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that
suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated
within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without
justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the
facts so warrant, to criminal8 or civil liability.9 If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the
accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may
ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can
compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas
corpus. 10
Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly
shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation,
not in criminal cases, as here. What is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of preventive
suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that "The Civil Service Law and
its implementing rules shall apply to all personnel of the Department" simply means that the
provisions of the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations are applicable to
members of the Philippine National Police insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are not
inconsistent with
R.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the preventive suspension
to ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides
differently, that is, the suspension where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall
continue until the case is terminated.
Third. Petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. These cases all stemmed from
charges in violation of R.A. 3019 (1060), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act which, unlike
R.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the preventive suspension. Sec. 13 of R.A. 3019 reads as
follows:
Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from
office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.
In the case of Layno, the duly elected mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, was preventively
suspended after an information was filed against him for offenses under R.A. 3019 (1060), the
Anti-Graft Corrupt Practices Act. He had been suspended for four (4) months at the time he filed a
motion to lift his preventive suspension. We held that his indefinite preventive suspension violated
the "equal protection clause" and shortened his term of office. Thus:
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His
term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the
suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of
his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of
October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral
process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services
of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them
could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance,
criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there
be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence.
A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an
unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter
he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified.
Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the
only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They
were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In
that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this
preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer
oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an
unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.
3. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due process that is apparent. There is
likewise an equal protection question. If the case against petitioner Layno were
administrative in character the Local Government Code would be applicable. It is
therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is allowable for the
causes therein enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation on the duration
thereof: "In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days
after the start of said suspension." It may be recalled that the principle against
indefinite suspension applies equally to national government officials. So it was
held in the leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Executive Secretary. According to the
opinion of Justice Barrera: "To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer
appointed by the President, facing administrative charges, can be preventively
suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the preventive
suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due
hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service
law." Further: "In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be
shortened and he could in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly
established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution. Clearly then, the
policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of
indefinite duration. In this particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a
charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different
rule of law. To do so would be to negate the safeguard of the equal protection
guarantee. 11
The case of Deloso, likewise, involved another elective official who
was preventively suspended as provincial governor, also under RA 3019 the Anti-Graft Law. This
Court, faced with similar factual circumstances as in Layno, applied the ruling in the latter case "in THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Grave felonies ito e. Six
relation to the principles of due process and equal protection." years and one day or more.

It is readily apparent that Section 13 of R.A. 3019 upon which the preventive suspension of the SEN. SAGUISAG. Kung five years and litigation ng Supreme
accused in Laynoand Deloso was based is silent with respect to the duration of the preventive Court, ganoon ba and . . .?
suspension, such that the suspension of the accused therein for a prolonged and unreasonable
length of time raised a due process question. Not so in the instant case. Petitioner is charged with THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Hindi, dahil iyong iba panay
murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of disciplinary iyon e.
R.A. 6975 which categorically states that his suspension shall last until the case is terminated. The
succeeding sentence of the same section requires the case to be subjected to continuous trial
SEN. PIMENTEL. Anong page iyan, Rene?
which shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. As previously
emphasized, nowhere in the law does it say that after the lapse of the 90-day period for trial, the
preventive suspension should be lifted. The law is clear, the ninety (90) days duration applies to THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Page 29 — Preventive
the trial of the case not to the suspension. Nothing else should be read into the law. When the Suspension.
words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. 12 REP. GUTANG. Ang complaint kasi ng mga tao, pagka may
pulis na may criminal case at may baril pa rin at nag-uuniforme,
Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense hindi magandang tingnan e. So parang natatakot iyong mga
relative to the bill that became R.A. 6975, the meaning of Section 47 of R.A. 6975 insofar as the witnesses.
period of suspension is concerned becomes all the more clear. We quote:
SEN. GONZALES. Anyway, kung ma-exempt na rito naman
So other than that in that particular section, ano ba itong siya e.
"Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases?" What is this all about?
REP. GUTANG. Mayroong entitlement to reinstatement and
REP. ZAMORA. In case they are charged with crimes. pay. . . .

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Ah, the previous one is xxx xxx xxx
administrative, no. Now, if it is charged with a crime, regular
courts. SEN. PIMENTEL. Dito sa "Preventive Suspension Pending
Criminal Case." Okay ito but I think we should also mandate the
SEN. GONZALES. Ano, the courts mismo ang magsasabing . . . early termination of the case. Ibig sabihin, okay, hindi ba "the
suspension of the accused from office until the case is
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, the jurisdiction. terminated?" Alam naman natin ang takbo ng mga kaso rito sa
ating bansa e.
REP. ZAMORA. The jurisdiction if there is robbery.
REP. ZAMORA. Twenty days, okay na.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay. "Preventive
SEN. PIMENTEL. Hindi, and ibig kong sabihin, let us just
Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a
assume that a case can be, as Rene pointed out, can run to six
complaint or informations sufficient in form and substance
years bago
against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the
ma-terminate, sometimes ten years pa nga e. Okay, but maybe
penalty imposed by law is six years and one day or more, the
we should mandate. . .
court shall immediately suspend the accused from the office
until the case is terminated."
REP. ZAMORA. Continuous hearing.
REP. ALBANO. Where are we now Mr. Chairman.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Not only that, but the case must be
terminated within a period.
REP. ALBANO. Ninety days na ho sa Supreme Court the trial.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ha?
REP. ALBANO. The trial must be done within ninety days,
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ang ibig kong sabihin kung maari sanang
ilagay rito that the case shall also be terminated in one year
from the time . . . aywan ko kung kaya nating gawin iyon.
REP. ALBANO. One solution, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Criminal case? Hindi ba
that has all been held as directory even if you put it in the law?
SEN. PIMENTEL. I know, but, iyon na nga, we are looking at
some solution to a particular situation.
SEN. ANGARA. Let's have continuous hearing and be
terminated not later than ninety days.
REP. ZAMORA. Ang point ni Ernie, that's really only the
directory. All of these, well, looks exactly the same thing.
SEN. ANGARA. No, but at least, we will shorten it up in a case
like this. We are really keen on having it quick, swift.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Swift justice.
REP. ALBANO. Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Yes.
REP. ALBANO. Following the Veloso case in Anti-graft cases
before the Sandiganbayan, the preventive suspension is only
ninety days. In no case shall it go beyond ninety days which can
also be applicable here because this is a preventive
suspension.
SEN. PIMENTEL. No, because you can legislate at least.
SEN. SAGUISAG. But then the case may be anti-graft ha. The
case filed against a policeman may be anti-graft in nature. . .
SEN. PIMENTEL. Correct, correct, but is that a constitutional
provision? Is it?
REP. ALBANO. No, but as a standard procedure.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Then you can legislate.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, because this particular
provision is for criminal cases. I know anti-graft is a criminal
case but here we are talking, let's say, of murder, rape, treason,
robbery. That's why it is in that context that there is a difference
between a purely anti-graft case and a criminal case which
could be a serious case since it is six years and one day or
more, so it must be already a grave felony.
xxx xxx xxx
REP. ALBANO. . . .
What I mean to say is, preventive suspension, we can use the
Veloso case.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, that's too short, that's
what I am saying. The feeling here is, for policeman, we have to
be stricter especially if it is a criminal case.
What Rene is just trying to say is, he is agreeable that the
suspension is until the case is terminated, but he just wants
some administrative balancing to expedite it. So let us study
what kind of language could be done along that line. So just on
the National Police Commission . . .
SEN. ANGARA. Can I suggest a language that may reflect. . .
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, please.
SEN. ANGARA. "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial
and be terminated not later than . . ." whatever we agree.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, so let's study that.
 So if there are any further amendments to Chapter 2 on the
National Police Commission. . . . . . 13

The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a
member of the PNP charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six
years of imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case against him is terminated.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be
used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative
discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while
his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant
threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed.
The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of
R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of
the laws.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences
among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires
that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. 14 Thus, the equal protection clause does not
absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the
classification is based on real and substantial differences; 15 is germane to the purpose of the
law; 16 applies to all members of the same
class; 17 and applies to current as well as future conditions, 18 the classification may not be
impugned as violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real
and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists
here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, Padilla and Bidin, JJ., are on leave.

 On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank
(now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the
Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further
implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is
unconstitutional.

Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:

Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:
EN BANC
xxx xxx xxx
G.R. No. 148208 December 15, 2004
(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection,
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall
INC., petitioner, aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in
vs. accordance with sound principles of management.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject
to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko
Sentral's human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board
shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for
under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, That
DECISION
compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary
grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under
Republic Act No. 6758. [emphasis supplied]

The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes

PUNO, J.:
Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that
its continuedoperation would violate the equal protection of the law? We hold that with the
passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial
institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file
employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
I.
The Case
First the facts.
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central
Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.
an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the
BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL)
(exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not
exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification
is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make
real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner also claims that it
is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of
which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.1 Petitioner offers the
following sub-set of arguments:
a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not
appear in the original and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original
version of Senate Bill No. 1235; 2
b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed
by the SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law3 of establishing professionalism and
excellence at all levels in the BSP; 4(emphasis supplied)
 c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation
of Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and
even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the
BSP;5
d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL;
thus within the class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs),
the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon;6 and
e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and
resulted in the gross disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP officers'.7
In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.8 Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No.
7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of
the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of
the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have been prejudiced since
1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the
inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents' implementation of such amounts
to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this Court should take
cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue involved.9
Respondent BSP, in its comment,10 contends that the provision does not violate the equal
protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with
other provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP," and the
mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in
accordance with sound principles of management."
The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of
the provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on actual and real
differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish
professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the
national government.11
II.
Issue
Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last paragraph
of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No
person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws."12
III.
Ruling
A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION,
SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification
created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no constitutional
infirmities.
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature
from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate - so
long as the classification is not unreasonable. As held in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers'
Union,13 and reiterated in a long line of cases:14
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application
of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to
avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child
should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as
to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping
of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane
to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it
must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is
satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over
matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of
discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked
differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be
made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude
the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to
evils as they may appear. (citations omitted)
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification.15 The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class.16 If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.17 The classification must also be
germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.18
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20
and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms of
attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-
and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the
rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis
and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. 19
That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the Senate
Bill does not detract from its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent cases,20 this
Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision of
law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such provision and was
merely inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both Houses.
Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be resolved
in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.21 An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is
presumed to be within constitutional limitations.22 To justify the nullification of a law, there must be
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.23
B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS -
EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES
OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED
APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION
A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power, we hold that
the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs
leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso.
1. The concept of relative constitutionality.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison
of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be
constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.24
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered
circumstances.25 Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its
validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the
light of changed conditions.26
Demonstrative of this doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon,27 where the Court
of Appeals of New York declared as unreasonable and arbitrary a zoning ordinance which placed
the plaintiff's property in a residential district, although it was located in the center of a business
area. Later amendments to the ordinance then prohibited the use of the property except for
parking and storage of automobiles, and service station within a parking area. The Court found the
ordinance to constitute an invasion of property rights which was contrary to constitutional due
process. It ruled:
While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws respecting the
use of property in accordance with a well-considered and comprehensive plan designed
to promote public health, safety and general welfare, such power is subject to the
constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably and this is so
whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the use of the property for any purpose for
which it is reasonably adapted. By the same token, an ordinance valid when adopted
will nevertheless be stricken down as invalid when, at a later time, its operation
under changed conditions proves confiscatory such, for instance, as when the
greater part of its value is destroyed, for which the courts will afford relief in an
appropriate case.28 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law as
unconstitutional as a consequence of significant changes in circumstances. Rutter v.
Esteban29 upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law - its enactment and operation being a
valid exercise by the State of its police power30 - but also ruled that the continued enforcement
of the otherwise valid law would be unreasonable and oppressive. It noted the subsequent
changes in the country's business, industry and agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside because
its continued operation would be grossly discriminatory and lead to the oppression of the creditors.
The landmark ruling states:31
The question now to be determined is, is the period of eight (8) years which Republic Act
No. 342 grants to debtors of a monetary obligation contracted before the last global war
and who is a war sufferer with a claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage
Commission reasonable under the present circumstances?
It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to debtors of prewar
obligations who suffered from the ravages of the last war and who filed a claim for their
losses with the Philippine War Damage Commission. It is therein provided that said
obligation shall not be due and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after
settlement of the claim filed by the debtor with said Commission. The purpose of the law
is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a
reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so as to prevent them from being
victimized by their creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since liberation conditions
have gradually returned to normal, this is not so with regard to those who have suffered
the ravages of war and so it was therein declared as a policy that as to them the debt
moratorium should be continued in force (Section 1).
But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since
1945 as a result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their
enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would
continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to
afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means that
the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they could
 effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. his period seems to us
unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should
be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically left at
the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote, more
so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the
debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief, unlike similar
statutes in the United States.
xxx xxx xxx
In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as
the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way
open to us under the present circumstances is to declare that the continued
operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is
unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and,
therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect. (emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
2. Applicability of the equal protection clause.
In the realm of equal protection, the U.S. case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey32 is
illuminating. The Supreme Court of Florida ruled against the continued application of statutes
authorizing the recovery of double damages plus attorney's fees against railroad companies, for
animals killed on unfenced railroad right of way without proof of negligence. Competitive motor
carriers, though creating greater hazards, were not subjected to similar liability because they
were not yet in existence when the statutes were enacted. The Court ruled that the statutes
became invalid as denying "equal protection of the law," in view of changed conditions since
their enactment.
In another U.S. case, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Faulkner,33 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
declared unconstitutional a provision of a statute which imposed a duty upon a railroad company
of proving that it was free from negligence in the killing or injury of cattle by its engine or
cars. This, notwithstanding that the constitutionality of the statute, enacted in 1893, had
been previously sustained. Ruled the Court:
The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained because it applied to all similar
corporations and had for its object the safety of persons on a train and the protection of
property…. Of course, there were no automobiles in those days.
The subsequent inauguration and development of transportation by motor vehicles on
the public highways by common carriers of freight and passengers created even greater
risks to the safety of occupants of the vehicles and of danger of injury and death of
domestic animals. Yet, under the law the operators of that mode of competitive
transportation are not subject to the same extraordinary legal responsibility for killing such
animals on the public roads as are railroad companies for killing them on their private
rights of way.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co.
v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488, 79 L.Ed. 949, stated, "A statute valid when
enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied. The
police power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily
or unreasonably." A number of prior opinions of that court are cited in support of the
statement. The State of Florida for many years had a statute, F.S.A. § 356.01 et seq.
imposing extraordinary and special duties upon railroad companies, among which was
that a railroad company was liable for double damages and an attorney's fee for killing
livestock by a train without the owner having to prove any act of negligence on the part of
the carrier in the operation of its train. In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey, it was
held that the changed conditions brought about by motor vehicle transportation rendered
the statute unconstitutional since if a common carrier by motor vehicle had killed the
same animal, the owner would have been required to prove negligence in the operation of
its equipment. Said the court, "This certainly is not equal protection of the
law."34 (emphasis supplied)
Echoes of these rulings resonate in our case law, viz:
[C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining
whether that statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its
face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation. Though the law itself be fair on its
face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the
denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.35 (emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
[W]e see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law
which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the
constitutional prohibition….. In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional
because of their effect in operation…. If a law has the effect of denying the equal
protection of the law it is unconstitutional. ….36 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted
3. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763
+ 9302 = consequential unconstitutionality of challenged proviso.
According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also violative
of the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP
and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of the latter GFIs were all exempted from the
coverage of the SSL.37 Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-
and-file are also discriminated upon.
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also
undertook the amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs,
from 1995 to 2004, viz:
 1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);
2. R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System (SSS);
3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation,
(SBGFC);
4. R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System (GSIS);
5. R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP);
6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC);38 and
7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).
It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs
share this common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their employees from the coverage of
the SSL, expressly or impliedly, as illustrated below:
1. LBP (R.A. No. 7907)
Section 10. Section 90 of [R.A. No. 3844] is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 90. Personnel. -
xxx xxx xxx
All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation, position classification
system and qualification standards approved by the Bank's Board of Directors based on a
comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The
compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the
private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board no more than once
every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on
productivity and profitability. The Bank shall therefore be exempt from existing laws,
rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification
standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible
with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
2. SSS (R.A. No. 8282)
Section 1. [Amending R.A. No. 1161, Section 3(c)]:
xxx xxx xxx
(c)The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint an
actuary and such other personnel as may [be] deemed necessary; fix their reasonable
compensation, allowances and other benefits; prescribe their duties and establish such
methods and procedures as may be necessary to insure the efficient, honest and
economical administration of the provisions and purposes of this Act: Provided, however,
That the personnel of the SSS below the rank of Vice President shall be appointed by the
SSS President: Provided, further, That the personnel appointed by the SSS President,
except those below the rank of assistant manager, shall be subject to the confirmation by
the Commission; Provided further, That the personnel of the SSS shall be selected only
from civil service eligibles and be subject to civil service rules and regulations: Provided,
finally, That the SSS shall be exempt from the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758
and Republic Act No. 7430. (emphasis supplied)
3. SBGFC (R.A. No. 8289)
Section 8. [Amending R.A. No. 6977, Section 11]:
xxx xxx xxx
The Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758, and Compensation
Circular No. 10, series of 1989 issued by the Department of Budget and
Management, the Board of Directors of SBGFC shall have the authority to extend to
the employees and personnel thereof the allowance and fringe benefits similar to
those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other
government financial institutions. (emphases supplied)
4. GSIS (R.A. No. 8291)
Section 1. [Amending Section 43(d)].
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 43. Powers and Functions of the Board of Trustees. - The Board of Trustees shall
have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) upon the recommendation of the President and General Manager, to approve the
GSIS' organizational and administrative structures and staffing pattern, and to establish,
 fix, review, revise and adjust the appropriate compensation package for the officers and
employees of the GSIS with reasonable allowances, incentives, bonuses, privileges and
other benefits as may be necessary or proper for the effective management, operation
and administration of the GSIS, which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758,
otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law and Republic Act No. 7430,
otherwise known as the Attrition Law. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
5. DBP (R.A. No. 8523)
Section 6. [Amending E.O. No. 81, Section 13]:
Section 13. Other Officers and Employees. - The Board of Directors shall provide for an
organization and staff of officers and employees of the Bank and upon recommendation
of the President of the Bank, fix their remunerations and other emoluments. All positions
in the Bank shall be governed by the compensation, position classification system and
qualification standards approved by the Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job
analysis of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable
with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to
periodic review by the Board of Directors once every two (2) years, without prejudice to
yearly merit or increases based on the Bank's productivity and profitability. The Bank
shall, therefore, be exempt from existing laws, rules, and regulations on
compensation, position classification and qualification standards. The Bank shall
however, endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the
principles under Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758, as amended). (emphasis supplied)
6. HGC (R.A. No. 8763)
Section 9. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Board of Directors. - The Board shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) To create offices or positions necessary for the efficient management, operation and
administration of the Corporation: Provided, That all positions in the Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC) shall be governed by a compensation and position classification
system and qualifications standards approved by the Corporation's Board of Directors
based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and
responsibilities: Provided, further, That the compensation plan shall be comparable
with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and which shall be
exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization
Law, and from other laws, rules and regulations on salaries and
compensations; and to establish a Provident Fund and determine the Corporation's and
the employee's contributions to the Fund; (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
7. PDIC (R.A. No. 9302)
Section 2. Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as amended] is hereby further amended to read:
xxx xxx xxx
3.
xxx xxx xxx
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject
to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Corporation's
human resource development program: Provided, That all positions in the Corporation
shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification
standards approved by the Board based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of
actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with
the prevailing compensation plans of other government financial institutions and
shall be subject to review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without
prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. The
Corporation shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on
compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall however
endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under
Republic Act No. 6758, as amended. (emphases supplied)
Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of seven other
GFIs were granted the exemption that was specifically denied to the rank-and-file of the
BSP. And as if to add insult to petitioner's injury, even the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) was granted the same blanket exemption from the SSL in 2000! 39
The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its
classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable
because there were substantial distinctions that made real differences between the two classes.
The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in
circumstancethat considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the
last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing
the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the
classification - albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws -
between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must not
only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class. The proviso may
be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its
operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are without
differences.40
Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions: Given that
Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the
exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the
fact that Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress'
power to classify so unbridled as to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply
because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but gradually and
progressively, through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law
bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can only be invoked against a classification made
directly and deliberately, as opposed to a discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a consequence
of several other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis confined to determining the validity within the
parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is articulated), thereby
proscribing any evaluation vis-à-vis the grouping, or the lack thereof, among several similar
enactments made over a period of time?
In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere
assertion that each exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests "on a policy determination
by the legislature." All legislative enactments necessarily rest on a policy determination -
even those that have been declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a
magic wand to sustain the validity of a statute, then no due process and equal protection
challenges would ever prosper. There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination
made by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of
the Constitution.
In fine, the "policy determination" argument may support the inequality of treatment between the
rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between
BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs' who are similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that what is at
issue in the second level of scrutiny is not the declared policy of each law per se, but the
oppressive results of Congress' inconsistent and unequal policytowards the BSP rank-and-
file and those of the seven other GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to the constitutionality of
Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational
discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons similarly situated. In
the field of equal protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be … denied the equal protection
of the laws" includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious
discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the
law, or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional.41
It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs
cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there
exist no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-
and-file of the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal history shows that GFIs have long been
recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from other governmental entities.
Before the SSL, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 985 (1976) declared it as a State policy (1) to
provide equal pay for substantially equal work, and (2) to base differences in pay upon substantive
differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. P.D. No.
985 was passed to address disparities in pay among similar or comparable positions which had
given rise to dissension among government employees. But even then, GFIs and government-
owned and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs) were already identified as a distinct class
among government employees. Thus, Section 2 also provided, "[t]hat notwithstanding a
standardized salary system established for all employees, additional financial incentives may be
established by government corporation and financial institutions for their employees to be
supported fully from their corporate funds and for such technical positions as may be approved by
the President in critical government agencies."42
The same favored treatment is made for the GFIs and the GOCCs under the SSL. Section 3(b)
provides that one of the principles governing the Compensation and Position Classification
System of the Government is that: "[b]asic compensation for all personnel in the government and
government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall generally be
comparable with those in the private sector doing comparable work, and must be in accordance
with prevailing laws on minimum wages."
Thus, the BSP and all other GFIs and GOCCs were under the unified Compensation and Position
Classification System of the SSL,43 but rates of pay under the SSL were determined on the basis
of, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. Notably, the
Compensation and Position Classification System was to be governed by the following principles:
(a) just and equitable wages, with the ratio of compensation between pay distinctions maintained
at equitable levels;44 and (b) basic compensation generally comparable with the private sector, in
accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages.45 Also, the Department of Budget and
Management was directed to use, as guide for preparing the Index of Occupational Services, the
Benchmark Position Schedule, and the following factors:46
(1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the
positions;
(2) the nature and complexity of the work to be performed;
(3) the kind of supervision received;
(4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work;
(5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships;
(6) kind of supervision exercised;
(7) decision-making responsibility;
(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;
(9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and
(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.
The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position titles that fall within Salary Grades 1 to
20.
Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs were similarly situated in all aspects
pertaining to compensation and position classification, in consonance with Section 5, Article IX-B
of the 1997 Constitution.47
Then came the enactment of the amended charter of the BSP, implicitly exempting the
Monetary Board from the SSL by giving it express authority to determine and institute its own
compensation and wage structure. However, employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and
below were specifically limited to the rates prescribed under the SSL.
Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs followed. Significantly, each
government financial institution (GFI) was not only expressly authorized to determine and institute
its own compensation and wage structure, but also explicitly exempted - without distinction as
to salary grade or position - all employees of the GFI from the SSL.
It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant or withdrawal of exemption from
the SSL, based on the perceived need "to fulfill the mandate of the institution concerned
considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is essentially proprietary in character; (2)
the GOCC or GFI is in direct competition with their [sic] counterparts in the private sector, not only
in terms of the provisions of goods or services, but also in terms of hiring and retaining competent
personnel; and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or were [sic] experiencing difficulties filling up plantilla
positions with competent personnel and/or retaining these personnel. The need for the scope of
exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each institution, and the
corresponding variance in the benefits received by the employees is merely incidental."
48
The fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the BSP is the central monetary authority, and
the banker of the government and all its political subdivisions.49 It has the sole power and
authority to issue currency;50 provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit;
and supervise banks and regulate finance companies and non-bank financial institutions
performing quasi-banking functions, including the exempted GFIs.51 Hence, the argument that
the rank-and-file employees of the seven GFIs were exempted because of the importance of their
institution's mandate cannot stand any more than an empty sack can stand.
Second, it is certainly misleading to say that "the need for the scope of exemption necessarily
varies with the particular circumstances of each institution." Nowhere in the deliberations is there a
cogent basis for the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file from the exemption which was granted to
the rank-and-file of the other GFIs and the SEC. As point in fact, the BSP and the seven GFIs are
similarly situated in so far as Congress deemed it necessary for these institutions to be exempted
from the SSL. True, the SSL-exemption of the BSP and the seven GFIs was granted in the
amended charters of each GFI, enacted separately and over a period of time. But it bears
emphasis that, while each GFI has a mandate different and distinct from that of another, the
deliberations show that the raison d'être of the SSL-exemption was inextricably linked to and for
the most part based on factors common to the eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the pivotal role they play in the
economy; (2) the necessity of hiring and retaining qualified and effective personnel to carry out the
GFI's mandate; and (3) the recognition that the compensation package of these GFIs is not
competitive, and fall substantially below industry standards. Considering further that (a) the BSP
was the first GFI granted SSL exemption; and (b) the subsequent exemptions of other GFIs did
not distinguish between the officers and the rank-and-file; it is patent that the classification made
between the BSP rank-and-file and those of the other seven GFIs was inadvertent, and NOT
intended, i.e., it was not based on any substantial distinction vis-à-vis the particular circumstances
of each GFI. Moreover, the exemption granted to two GFIs makes express reference to allowance
and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and
personnel of other GFIs,52 underscoring that GFIs are a particular class within the realm of
government entities.
It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment of the rank-and-file of the BSP - made
manifest and glaring with each and every consequential grant of blanket exemption from the SSL
to the other GFIs - that cannot be rationalized or justified. Even more so, when the SEC - which is
not a GFI - was given leave to have a compensation plan that "shall be comparable with the
prevailing compensation plan in the [BSP] and other [GFIs],"53then granted a blanket exemption
from the SSL, and its rank-and-file endowed a more preferred treatment than the rank-and-file of
the BSP.
The violation to the equal protection clause becomes even more pronounced when we are faced
with this undeniable truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting
the eight GFIs from the coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file employees
would have been devoid of any substantial or material basis. It bears no moment, therefore, that
the unlawful discrimination was not a direct result arising from one law. "Nemo potest facere per
alium quod non potest facere per directum." No one is allowed to do indirectly what he is
prohibited to do directly.
It has also been proffered that "similarities alone are not sufficient to support the conclusion that
rank-and-file employees of the BSP may be lumped together with similar employees of the other
GOCCs for purposes of compensation, position classification and qualification standards. The fact
that certain persons have some attributes in common does not automatically make them members
of the same class with respect to a legislative classification." Cited is the ruling in Johnson v.
Robinson:54 "this finding of similarity ignores that a common characteristic shared by beneficiaries
and nonbeneficiaries alike, is not sufficient to invalidate a statute when other characteristics
peculiar to only one group rationally explain the statute's different treatment of the two groups."
The reference to Johnson is inapropos. In Johnson, the US Court sustained the validity of the
classification as there were quantitative and qualitative distinctions, expressly recognized by
Congress, which formed a rational basis for the classification limiting educational benefits to
military service veterans as a means of helping them readjust to civilian life. The Court listed the
peculiar characteristics as follows:
First, the disruption caused by military service is quantitatively greater than that caused
by alternative civilian service. A conscientious objector performing alternative service is
obligated to work for two years. Service in the Armed Forces, on the other hand, involves
a six-year commitment…
xxx xxx xxx
 Second, the disruptions suffered by military veterans and alternative service performers
are qualitatively different. Military veterans suffer a far greater loss of personal freedom
during their service careers. Uprooted from civilian life, the military veteran becomes part
of the military establishment, subject to its discipline and potentially hazardous duty.
Congress was acutely aware of the peculiar disabilities caused by military service, in
consequence of which military servicemen have a special need for readjustment
benefits…55 (citations omitted)
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are
no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the
exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of
the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only superficial,56 but also arbitrary. It
is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file
and the seven other GFIs.
Moreover, the issue in this case is not - as the dissenting opinion of Mme. Justice Carpio-Morales
would put it - whether "being an employee of a GOCC or GFI is reasonable and sufficient basis for
exemption" from R.A. No. 6758. It is Congress itself that distinguished the GFIs from other
government agencies, not once but eight times, through the enactment of R.A. Nos. 7653, 7907,
8282, 8289, 8291, 8523, 8763, and 9302. These laws may have created a "preferred sub-class
within government employees," but the present challenge is not directed at the wisdom of these
laws. Rather, it is a legal conundrum involving the exercise of legislative power, the validity of
which must be measured not only by looking at the specific exercise in and by itself (R.A. No.
7653), but also as to the legal effects brought about by seven separate exercises - albeit indirectly
and without intent.
Thus, even if petitioner had not alleged "a comparable change in the factual milieu as regards the
compensation, position classification and qualification standards of the employees of the BSP
(whether of the executive level or of the rank-and-file) since the enactment of the new Central
Bank Act" is of no moment. In GSIS v. Montesclaros,57 this Court resolved the issue of
constitutionality notwithstanding that claimant had manifested that she was no longer interested in
pursuing the case, and even when the constitutionality of the said provision was not squarely
raised as an issue, because the issue involved not only the claimant but also others similarly
situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the challenged proviso. The Court
held that social justice and public interest demanded the resolution of the constitutionality of
the proviso. And so it is with the challenged proviso in the case at bar.
It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is a "privilege" fully within the legislative
prerogative to give or deny. However, its subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other
GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees breached the latter's right to equal
protection. In other words, while the granting of a privilege per se is a matter of policy exclusively
within the domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality of the exercise of this
prerogative is subject to judicial review.58 So when the distinction made is superficial, and not
based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between those included and excluded,
it becomes a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and the power to correct.59 As held
in the United Kingdom case of Hooper v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,60 once the
State has chosen to confer benefits, "discrimination" contrary to law may occur where favorable
treatment already afforded to one group is refused to another, even though the State is under no
obligation to provide that favorable treatment. 61
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven
GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination - no one can, with candor
and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption of
the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being
treated as unalikes without any rational basis.
Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute
equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue
preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given
to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon
in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion;
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding on the rest.62
In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment
between the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the enactment of the
seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the
challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared
as an outlaw.
IV.
Equal Protection Under International Lens
In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have
followed the "rational basis" test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications63 and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution. 64
A. Equal Protection in the United States
In contrast, jurisprudence in the U.S. has gone beyond the static "rational basis"
test. Professor Gunther highlights the development in equal protection jurisprudential analysis, to
wit: 65
Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial intervention in most
contexts. Ordinarily, the command of equal protection was only that government must not
impose differences in treatment "except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly
related to the object of regulation." The old variety of equal protection scrutiny focused
solely on the means used by the legislature: it insisted merely that the classification in the
statute reasonably relates to the legislative purpose. Unlike substantive due process,
equal protection scrutiny was not typically concerned with identifying "fundamental
values" and restraining legislative ends. And usually the rational
classification requirement was readily satisfied: the courts did not demand a tight fit
between classification and purpose; perfect congruence between means and ends was
not required.
xxx xxx xxx
[From marginal intervention to major cutting edge: The Warren Court's "new equal
protection" and the two-tier approach.]
From its traditional modest role, equal protection burgeoned into a major intervention
tool during the Warren era, especially in the 1960s. The Warren Court did not abandon
the deferential ingredients of the old equal protection: in most areas of economic and
social legislation, the demands imposed by equal protection remained as minimal as
ever…But the Court launched an equal protection revolution by finding large new areas
for strict rather than deferential scrutiny. A sharply differentiated two-tier
approach evolved by the late 1960s: in addition to the deferential "old" equal protection,
a "new" equal protection, connoting strict scrutiny, arose…. The intensive review
associated with the new equal protection imposed two demands - a demand not only as
to means but also one as to ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far
closer fit between classification and statutory purpose than the rough and ready flexibility
traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection: means had to be shown "necessary"
to achieve statutory ends, not merely "reasonably related" ones. Moreover, equal
protection became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the new
equal protection had to be justified by "compelling" state interests, not merely the wide
spectrum of "legitimate" state ends.
The Warren Court identified the areas appropriate for strict scrutiny by searching
for two characteristics: the presence of a "suspect" classification; or an impact on
"fundamental" rights or interests. In the category of "suspect classifications," the Warren
Court's major contribution was to intensify the strict scrutiny in the traditionally
interventionist area of racial classifications. But other cases also suggested that there
might be more other suspect categories as well: illegitimacy and wealth for example. But
it was the 'fundamental interests" ingredient of the new equal protection that proved
particularly dynamic, open-ended, and amorphous….. [Other fundamental interests
included voting, criminal appeals, and the right of interstate travel ….]
xxx xxx xxx
The Burger Court and Equal Protection.
The Burger Court was reluctant to expand the scope of the new equal protection,
although its best established ingredient retains vitality. There was also mounting
discontent with the rigid two-tier formulations of the Warren Court's equal protection
doctrine. It was prepared to use the clause as an interventionist tool without resorting to
the strict language of the new equal protection…. [Among the fundamental interests
identified during this time were voting and access to the ballot, while "suspect"
classifications included sex, alienage and illegitimacy.]
xxx xxx xxx
Even while the two-tier scheme has often been adhered to in form, there has also been
an increasingly noticeable resistance to the sharp difference between deferential "old"
and interventionist "new" equal protection. A number of justices sought formulations that
would blur the sharp distinctions of the two-tiered approach or that would narrow the gap
between strict scrutiny and deferential review. The most elaborate attack came from
Justice Marshall, whose frequently stated position was developed most elaborately in his
dissent in the Rodriguez case: 66
The Court apparently seeks to establish [that] equal protection cases fall into one of two
neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review - strict scrutiny or
mere rationality. But this (sic) Court's [decisions] defy such easy categorization. A
principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of
standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the equal protection clause.
This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which Court will
scrutinize particular classification, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal
importance of the interests adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the
basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.
Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" approach describes many of the modern decisions,
although it is a formulation that the majority refused to embrace. But the Burger Court's
results indicate at least two significant changes in equal protection
law: First, invocation of the "old" equal protection formula no longer signals, as it did with
the Warren Court, an extreme deference to legislative classifications and a virtually
automatic validation of challenged statutes. Instead, several cases, even while voicing the
minimal "rationality" "hands-off" standards of the old equal protection, proceed to find the
statute unconstitutional. Second, in some areas the modern Court has put forth
standards for equal protection review that, while clearly more intensive than the deference
of the "old" equal protection, are less demanding than the strictness of the "new" equal
protection. Sex discrimination is the best established example of an "intermediate" level
of review. Thus, in one case, the Court said that "classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." That standard is "intermediate" with respect to both
ends and means: where ends must be "compelling" to survive strict scrutiny and merely
"legitimate" under the "old" mode, "important" objectives are required here; and where
means must be "necessary" under the "new" equal protection, and merely "rationally
related" under the "old" equal protection, they must be "substantially related" to survive
the "intermediate" level of review. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
B. Equal Protection in Europe
The United Kingdom and other members of the European Community have also gone
forward in discriminatory legislation and jurisprudence. Within the United Kingdom domestic law,
the most extensive list of protected grounds can be found in Article 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It prohibits discrimination on grounds such as "sex, race,
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status." This list is illustrative and not
exhaustive. Discrimination on the basis of race, sex and religion is regarded as grounds that
require strict scrutiny. A further indication that certain forms of discrimination are regarded
as particularly suspect under the Covenant can be gleaned from Article 4, which, while allowing
states to derogate from certain Covenant articles in times of national emergency, prohibits
derogation by measures that discriminate solely on the grounds of "race, colour, language, religion
or social origin."67
Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a test of justification which
varies with the ground of discrimination. In the Belgian Linguistics case68 the European Court set
the standard of justification at a low level: discrimination would contravene the Convention only if it
had no legitimate aim, or there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
means employed and the aim sought to be realised.69 But over the years, the European Court
has developed a hierarchy of grounds covered by Article 14 of the ECHR, a much higher
level of justification being required in respect of those regarded as "suspect" (sex, race,
nationality, illegitimacy, or sexual orientation) than of others. Thus, in Abdulaziz, 70 the
European Court declared that:
. . . [t]he advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member
States of the Council of Europe. This means that very weighty reasons would have to be
advanced before a difference of treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as
compatible with the Convention.
And in Gaygusuz v. Austria,71 the European Court held that "very weighty reasons would have
to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on the
ground of nationality as compatible with the Convention."72 The European Court will then permit
States a very much narrower margin of appreciation in relation to discrimination on grounds of
sex, race, etc., in the application of the Convention rights than it will in relation to distinctions
drawn by states between, for example, large and small land-owners. 73
C. Equality under International Law
The principle of equality has long been recognized under international law. Article 1 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights. Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal
protection of the law without any discrimination, constitutes basic principles in the protection of
human rights. 74
Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include some prohibition on
discrimination and/or provisions about equality.75 The general international provisions pertinent to
discrimination and/or equality are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR);76 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD);77 the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
In the broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional instruments such as
the American Convention on Human Rights;78 the African Charter on Human and People's
Rights;79 the European Convention on Human Rights;80 the European Social Charter of 1961 and
revised Social Charter of 1996; and the European Union Charter of Rights (of particular
importance to European states). Even the Council of the League of Arab States has adopted the
Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994, although it has yet to be ratified by the Member States of
the League.81
The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional "first
generation" rights, commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining rather than
requiring State action. Article 26 of the ICCPR requires "guarantee[s]" of "equal and effective
protection against discrimination" while Articles 1 and 14 of the American and European
Conventions oblige States Parties "to ensure ... the full and free exercise of [the rights guaranteed]
... without any discrimination" and to "secure without discrimination" the enjoyment of the rights
guaranteed.82 These provisions impose a measure of positive obligation on States Parties to
take steps to eradicate discrimination.
In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards ensuring equality and prevention of
discrimination, are laid down in the ICESCR83 and in a very large number of Conventions
administered by the International Labour Organisation, a United Nations body. 84 Additionally,
many of the other international and regional human rights instruments have specific provisions
relating to employment.85
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also gone beyond the earlier tendency to
view the prohibition against discrimination (Article 26) as confined to the ICCPR
rights.86 In Broeks87 and Zwaan-de Vries,88the issue before the Committee was whether
discriminatory provisions in the Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV) fell within the scope of
Article 26. The Dutch government submitted that discrimination in social security benefit provision
was not within the scope of Article 26, as the right was contained in the ICESCR and not the
ICCPR. They accepted that Article 26 could go beyond the rights contained in the Covenant to
other civil and political rights, such as discrimination in the field of taxation, but contended that
Article 26 did not extend to the social, economic, and cultural rights contained in ICESCR. The
Committee rejected this argument. In its view, Article 26 applied to rights beyond the Covenant
including the rights in other international treaties such as the right to social security found in
ICESCR:
Although Article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does not of
itself contain any obligation with respect to the matters that may be provided for by
legislation. Thus it does not, for example, require any state to enact legislation to provide
for social security. However, when such legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State's
sovereign power, then such legislation must comply with Article 26 of the Covenant.89
Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or indirectly. A classification may be struck
down if it has the purpose or effect of violating the right to equal protection. International law
recognizes that discrimination may occur indirectly, as the Human Rights Committee90 took into
account the definitions of discrimination adopted by CERD and CEDAW in declaring that:
. . . "discrimination" as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood to imply any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour,
 sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and
freedoms. 91 (emphasis supplied)
Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its
conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in
consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international law. There
should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate
every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives in
the Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection afforded to labor, compel this
approach.92
Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and international law, we
held in International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing: 93
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our
Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article
on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil
Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes
discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general
principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No.
111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation - all embody
the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The
Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national
laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor
of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work."
These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace - the factory, the office or
the field - but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities
for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and
letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and
ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory
terms and conditions of employment.
xxx xxx xxx
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article 7
thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of just and [favorable] conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without
distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions
of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal
work;
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored
legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries. (citations omitted)
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the
Constitution.94 The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or
prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations
arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and
require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis
should not suffice.
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution
requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction.
At best, they are persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions.95 We should
not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental
crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own
endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our
own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always
with our own concept of law and justice.96 Our laws must be construed in accordance with the
intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law
and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed
to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not
be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from others.97
In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court has stated that: "[A]merican
jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for
these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar
as Philippine constitutional law is concerned....[I]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court]
should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they
have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."98 Indeed, although the
Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development
have long since diverged. 99
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool
of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The
Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities
in Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in
"all phases of national development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear
commands to the State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality.…
[T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more
vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.100
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to
marginalized groups of society, including labor.101 Under the policy of social justice, the law bends
over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that
those with less privilege in life should have more in law.102 And the obligation to afford protection to
labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to
translate this pledge into a living reality.103 Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.104
V.
A Final Word
Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged provision.
It has been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress, which
alone has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill proposing
the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed.
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative
power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion
would be given deferential treatment. 105
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special
protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call
for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution
and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a
private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be
struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor. 106
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the
issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the
limitations respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of
legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications,
conditions or limitations - particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution -
would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the
settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the Presidential form
of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances,
one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, We have neither the authority nor the
discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable
obligation - made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as
members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution -
to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson, it was held that courts have a "duty,
rather than a power", to determine whether another branch of the government has "kept
within constitutional limits." Not satisfied with this postulate, the court went farther and
stressed that, if the Constitution provides how it may be amended - as it is in our 1935
Constitution - "then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
constitution, will declare the amendment invalid." In fact, this very Court - speaking
through Justice Laurel, an outstanding authority on Philippine Constitutional Law, as well
as one of the highly respected and foremost leaders of the Convention that drafted the
1935 Constitution - declared, as early as July 15, 1936, that "(i)n times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department
is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments" of the government.107 (citations
omitted; emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-
employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the
higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the
BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the
poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications
are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL
while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for
career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to
stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people
whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it
is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the
adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty,
provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the
quality of life for all."108 Any act of Congress that runs counter to this
constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They
represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the
private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for
better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor
practices. Not only are they impotent as a labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is
almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them from the other GFI rank-and-file in
compensation. These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless and
they should not be compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous
treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be
asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court's duty to save them from
reasonless discrimination.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the
last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Azcuna,

Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., see dissenting.

Corona, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., on leave.
 The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C. Fariñas,
Manuel M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino. At the time of filing of the petition,
the petitioners were members of the minority bloc in the House of Representatives. Impleaded as
respondents are: the Executive Secretary, then Speaker of the House of Representatives
Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of the Department of the
Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of
the House of Representatives.

The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 152161 was filed by Gerry A. Salapuddin, then also a
member of the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondent is the COMELEC.
EN BANC

Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006

G.R. No. 147387 December 10, 2003

Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful
RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A.
and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices," is a consolidation of the following bills
AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS
originating from the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively:
TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF
THE MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,petitioners,
vs. House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled "AN ACT ALLOWING THE USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R. ELECTION PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG
BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 881, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ‘OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE,’ AS AMENDED, AND FOR
SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF OTHER PURPOSES;"1
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
…
x-----------------------x
Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled "AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY,
G.R. No. 152161 HONEST, PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION
PRACTICES."2
CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner,
vs. A Bicameral Conference Committee, composed of eight members of the Senate3 and sixteen (16)
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. members of the House of Representatives,4 was formed to reconcile the conflicting provisions of
the House and Senate versions of the bill.
DECISION
On November 29, 2000, the Bicameral Conference Committee submitted its Report,5 signed by its
members, recommending the approval of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to
declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as
it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which
provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
During the plenary session of the House of Representatives on February 5, 2001, Rep. Jacinto V.
Paras proposed an amendment to the Bicameral Conference Committee Report. Rep. Didagen P.
Dilangalen raised a point of order commenting that the House could no longer submit an
amendment thereto. Rep. Sergio A.F. Apostol thereupon moved that the House return the report
to the Bicameral Conference Committee in view of the proposed amendment thereto. Rep.
Dilangalen expressed his objection to the proposal. However, upon viva voce voting, the majority
of the House approved the return of the report to the Bicameral Conference Committee for proper
action.6
In view of the proposed amendment, the House of Representatives elected anew its conferees7 to
the Bicameral Conference Committee.8 Then again, for unclear reasons, upon the motion of Rep.
Ignacio R. Bunye, the House elected another set of conferees9 to the Bicameral Conference
Committee.10
On February 7, 2001, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, Rep. Bunye
moved that the House consider the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the contrasting
provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. Rep. Dilangalen observed that the report had been
recommitted to the Bicameral Conference Committee. The Chair responded that the Bicameral
Conference Report was a new one, and was a result of the reconvening of a new Bicameral
Conference Committee. Rep. Dilangalen then asked that he be given time to examine the new
report. Upon motion of Rep. Apostol, the House deferred the approval of the report until the other
members were given a copy thereof.11
After taking up other pending matters, the House proceeded to vote on the Bicameral Conference
Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. The House
approved the report with 125 affirmative votes, 3 negative votes and no abstention. In explaining
their negative votes, Reps. Fariñas and Garcia expressed their belief that Section 14 thereof was
a rider. Even Rep. Escudero, who voted in the affirmative, expressed his doubts on the
constitutionality of Section 14. Prior to casting his vote, Rep. Dilangalen observed that no senator
signed the Bicameral Conference Committee Report and asked if this procedure was regular.12
On the same day, the Senate likewise approved the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on
the contrasting provisions of SB No. 1742 and HB No. 9000.
Thereafter, Rep. Act No. 9006 was duly signed by then Senate President Aquilino Pimentel, Jr.
and then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. and was duly
certified by the Secretary of the Senate Lutgardo B. Barbo and the Secretary General of the
House of Representatives Robert P. Nazareno as "the consolidation of House Bill No. 9000 and
Senate Bill No. 1742," and "finally passed by both Houses on February 7, 2001."
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Rep. Act No. 9006 into law on February 12, 2001.
The Petitioners’ Case
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one
subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity
in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the
use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office
other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto
resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of
Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code,
leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By
the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is
holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of
candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or
election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the
limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities
attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and
void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that "[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval"
is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require
publication of the law before it becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law;
hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v.
Mitra, Jr.,13 that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate
on the "Accountability of Public Officers:"14
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering
those members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections
as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
The Respondents’ Arguments
For their part, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge this Court to
dismiss the petitions contending, preliminarily, that the petitioners have no legal standing to
institute the present suit. Except for the fact that their negative votes were overruled by the
majority of the members of the House of Representatives, the petitioners have not shown that they
have suffered harm as a result of the passage of Rep. Act No. 9006. Neither do petitioners have
any interest as taxpayers since the assailed statute does not involve the exercise by Congress of
its taxing or spending power.
Invoking the "enrolled bill" doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners’ allegations that
"irregularities" attended the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures of the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill and the certification signed by the
respective Secretaries of both houses of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill was
duly enacted into law.
The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of
the Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly,
Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices," is so broad that it
encompasses all the processes involved in an election exercise, including the filing of certificates
of candidacy by elective officials.
They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is germane to the general subject of Rep. Act No. 9006
as expressed in its title as it eliminates the effect of prematurely terminating the term of an elective
official by his filing of a certificate of candidacy for an office other than the one which he is
permanently holding, such that he is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom. The
legislature, by including the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No.
9006, has deemed it fit to remove the "unfairness" of considering an elective official ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for another elective office.
With the repeal of Section 67, all elective officials are now placed on equal footing as they are
allowed to finish their respective terms even if they run for any office, whether the presidency,
vice-presidency or other elective positions, other than the one they are holding in a permanent
capacity.
The respondents assert that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code need not be
expressly stated in the title of Rep. Act No. 9006 as the legislature is not required to make the title
of the act a complete index of its contents. It must be deemed sufficient that the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general subject which the statute seeks to effect
without expressing each and every means necessary for its accomplishment. Section 26(1) of
Article VI of the Constitution merely calls for all the parts of an act relating to its subject to find
expression in its title. Mere details need not be set forth.
According to the respondents, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67,
leaving Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code intact and effective, does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66
pertains to appointive officials. A substantial distinction exists between these two sets of officials;
elective officials occupy their office by virtue of their mandate based upon the popular will, while
the appointive officials are not elected by popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly
treated as the former. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
are treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Further, Section 16, or the "Effectivity" clause, of Rep. Act No. 9006 does not run afoul of the due
process clause of the Constitution as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and
property. Specifically, the section providing for penalties in cases of violations thereof presume
that the formalities of the law would be observed, i.e., charges would first be filed, and the
accused would be entitled to a hearing before judgment is rendered by a court having jurisdiction.
In any case, the issue about lack of due process is premature as no one has, as yet, been
charged with violation of Rep. Act No. 9006.
Finally, the respondents submit that the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House
of Representatives did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not excluding from the Rolls those
members thereof who ran for the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections. These respondents
merely complied with Rep. Act No. 9006, which enjoys the presumption of validity until declared
otherwise by the Court.
The Court’s Ruling
Before resolving the petitions on their merits, the Court shall first rule on the procedural issue
raised by the respondents, i.e., whether the petitioners have the legal standing or locus standi to
file the petitions at bar.
The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their capacities as members of the House of
Representatives, and as taxpayers and registered voters.
Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.15 The rationale for requiring a party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute
to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is "to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."16
However, being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several cases involving issues of
"overarching significance to our society,"17 had adopted a liberal stance on standing. Thus, in
Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,18 this Court brushed aside the procedural
requirement of standing, took cognizance of, and subsequently granted, the petitions separately
filed by then Senator Francisco Tatad and several members of the House of Representatives
assailing the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 8180 (An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil
Industry and For Other Purposes).
The Court likewise took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the House of
Representatives which impugned as unconstitutional the validity of a provision of Rep. Act No.
6734 (Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) in Chiongbian v.
Orbos.19 Similarly, the Court took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the Senate,
joined by other petitioners, which challenged the validity of Rep. Act No. 7716 (Expanded Value
Added Tax Law) in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance.20
Members of Congress, such as the petitioners, were likewise allowed by this Court to challenge
the validity of acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or
instrumentalities in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,21 Kilosbayan, Inc.
v. Guingona, Jr.,22 Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,23Albano v. Reyes,24 and
Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization.25
Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which this Court had declared in Dimaporo26 as deriving its existence from the
constitutional provision on accountability of public officers, has been validly repealed by Section
14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of "overarching significance" that justifies this Court’s adoption of
a liberal stance vis-à-vis the procedural matter on standing. Moreover, with the national elections
barely seven months away, it behooves the Court to confront the issue now and resolve the same
forthrightly. The following pronouncement of the Court is quite apropos:
... All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the
importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons
of public policy demand that [its] constitutionality . . . be now resolved. It may likewise be added
that the exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and
the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections beings barely six months away,
reinforce our stand.27
Every statute is presumed valid.28 The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid,
sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the
specific purpose of the law.29
It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the
inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit
imposed by the fundamental law.30And where the acts of the other branches of government run
afoul of the Constitution, it is the judiciary’s solemn and sacred duty to nullify the same. 31
Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court shall now resolve the substantial issues raised by
the petitions.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider32
At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of Rep. Act No. 9006, which
provides:
Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and
Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All
laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or amended accordingly.
The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted earlier, reads:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation
as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of
an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.33
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general
object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means
necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth.
The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.34
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices." Section 2 of the law provides not
only the declaration of principles but also the objectives thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. – The State shall, during the election period, supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media of
communication or information to guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for public service,
including access to media time and space, and the equitable right to reply, for public information
campaigns and fora among candidates and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form
of harassment and discrimination.35
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation.
To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that
the title be a complete index of its content.36
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation
on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other
provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for
election propaganda, does not violate the "one subject-one title" rule. This Court has held that an
act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general subject.37
The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the particular matter are particularly
instructive:
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify.
So all we’re looking for now is an appropriate title to make it broader so that it would cover this
provision [referring to the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code], is that correct?
That’s all. Because I believe ...
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
We are looking for an appropriate coverage which will result in the nomenclature or title.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Because I really do not believe that it is out of place. I think that even with the term "fair election
practice," it really covers it, because as expressed by Senator Roco, those conditions inserted
earlier seemed unfair and it is an election practice and, therefore, I think, I’m very comfortable with
the title "Fair Election Practice" so that we can get over with these things so that we don’t come
back again until we find the title. I mean, it’s one provision which I think is fair for everybody. It may
seem like a limitation but this limitation actually provides for fairness in election practices as the
title implies.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Yes.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
So I would want to beg the House contingent, let’s get it over with. To me, ha, it’s not a very
touchy issue. For me, it’s even a very correct provision. I feel very comfortable with it and it was
voted in the Senate, at least, so I would like to appeal to the ... para matapos na, then we come
back as a Bicam just for the title Is that what you’re ...?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
It’s not the title per se, it’s the coverage. So if you will just kindly bear with us. I’m happy that there
is already one comfortable senator there among ... several of us were also comfortable with it. But
it would be well that when we rise from this Bicam that we’re all comfortable with it.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yes. Anyway, let’s listen to Congressman Marcos.
REP. MARCOS:
Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation that although it is true that the bulk of provisions
deals with the area of propaganda and political advertising, the complete title is actually one that
indulge full coverage. It says "An Act to enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest ... elections
through fair election practices." But as you said, we will put that aside to discuss later one.
Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in Section 2, paragraph 2 is perfectly
adequate in that it says that it shall ensure candidates for public office that may be free from any
form of harassment and discrimination.
Surely this provision in Section 67 of the old Election Code of the existing Omnibus Election Code
is a form of harassment or discrimination. And so I think that in the effort at leveling the playing
field, we can cover this and it should not be considered a rider.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think the Congresswoman from Ilocos had very clearly put it, that it is
covered in the Declaration of Principles and in the objective of this bill. And therefore, I hope that
the House contingent would agree to this so that we can finish it now. And it expressly provides for
fair election practices because ...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not disputing this, but we are looking for a title that
is more generic so that then we have less of an objection on constitutionality. I think that’s the
theory. So, there is acceptance of this.
Maybe we should not call it na limitation on elected officials. Maybe we should say the special
provision on elected officials. So how is that? Alam mo ito ...
REP. MARCOS:
I think we just change the Section 1, the short title.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Also, Then we say - - on the short title of the Act, we say ... Fair election practices?

REP. MARCOS: REP. MACARAMBON:

What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should be changed... Yeah. To ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair ...

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

O, sige, fine, fine. Let’s a brainstorm. Equal... Wala nang practices nga.

REP. PADILLA: REP. PICHAY:

Mr. Chairman, why don’t we use "An Act rationalizing the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful Wala nang practices.
and credible elections, amending for the purpose Batasang Pambansa known as the Omnibus
Election Code?" THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): It shall be cited as Fair Election Act.

Why don’t we remove "fair" and then this shall be cited as Election Practices Act?" (Informal discussions)

REP. PICHAY: REP. PICHAY:

That’s not an election practice. That’s a limitation. Approve na iyan.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun. Done. So, okay na iyon. The title will be "Fair Election Act."

REP. MARCOS: The rest wala nang problema ano?

The Fair Election. VOICES:

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Wala na.

O, Fair Election Act. REP. MACARAMBON:

REP. MACARAMBON: Wala na iyong practices?

Nagbi-brainstorm tayo dito, eh. How about if we change the title to enhance the holding of free, THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
orderly, honest, peaceful and ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair election
practices?
Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh.
REP. PICHAY:
O, wala na? We will clean up.
REP. MARCOS:
Title?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
The short title, "This Act ..."
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
You’re back to your No. 21 already.
REP. MARCOS:
The full title, the same?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Iyon na nga. The full title is "An Act to enhance the holding ..." That’s the House version, eh, dahil
pareho, hindi ba? Then the short title "This Act shall be known as the Fair Election Act."38
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found
cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure,
some sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy
as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court.
Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. 39 It
is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed,
whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it
is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within
its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the
legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of
judicial cognizance.40 Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the
Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra41 upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the
same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative
to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount
objective of election laws – the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of
Congress – is achieved.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its
provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice,
action and study of the legislators and the public.42 In this case, it cannot be claimed that the
legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the
same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the
petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding
its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of
the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution43
The petitioners’ contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining
to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and
violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other.44 The Court has
explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate.
It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not.45
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.46 On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure47 while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.48
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter
8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are
strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except
to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political
offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. 49
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators
deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their
tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those
occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the
wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis
appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons
belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
The Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Is Applicable In this Case
Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the petitioners
insist that the entire law should be nullified. They contend that irregularities attended the passage
of the said law particularly in the House of Representatives catalogued thus:
a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral Conference Committee) members by the
House during its session on February 5, 2001;
b. No communication from the Senate for a conference on the compromise bill submitted
by the BCC on November 29, 2000;
c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC was presented for approval on the floor
without copies thereof being furnished the members;
d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its proceedings, and the Report submitted by it was
not signed by the Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof as well as its senator-members at the
time it was presented to and rammed for approval by the House;
e. There was no meeting actually conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC and that its alleged
Report was instantly made and passed around for the signature of the BCC members;
f. The Senate has no record of the creation of a 2nd BCC but only of the first one that
convened on November 23, 2000;
g. The "Effectivity" clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB No. 9000, as well as that of the
compromise bill submitted by the BCC that convened on November 20, 2000, were
couched in terms that comply with the publication required by the Civil Code and
jurisprudence, to wit:
...
However, it was surreptitiously replaced in its final form as it appears in § 16, R.A. No. 9006, with
the provision that "This Act shall take effect immediately upon its approval;"
h. The copy of the compromise bill submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC that was furnished the
members during its consideration on February 7, 2001, did not have the same § 16 as it
now appears in RA No. 9006, but § 16 of the compromise bill, HB 9000 and SB 1742,
reasons for which no objection thereto was made;
i. The alleged BCC Report presented to the House on February 7, 2001, did not "contain
a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject
measure;" and
j. The disappearance of the "Cayetano amendment," which is Section 12 of the
compromise bill submitted by the BCC. In fact, this was the subject of the purported
proposed amendment to the compromise bill of Member Paras as stated in paragraph 7
hereof. The said provision states, thusly:
Sec. 12. Limitation on Elected Officials. – Any elected official who runs for president and vice-
president shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of the certificate of
candidacy.50
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not
persuaded. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and
the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it
was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases 51 reveals the Court’s
consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this
case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of
Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This
Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether
House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts
have no concern.52 Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006
must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De Venecia,53 viz.:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the
power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with
its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or
the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have
declared that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’ And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary rules
are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.’ Consequently, ‘mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite
number of members have agreed to a particular measure.’"
The Effectivity Clause
Is Defective
Finally, the "Effectivity" clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it "shall take
effect immediately upon its approval," is defective. However, the same does not render the entire
law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera,54 this Court laid down the rule:
... the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date
without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended….55

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code56 and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.

In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is
that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That
is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute
is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it
transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power.57No such transgression has
been shown in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise
SUPREME COURT known as the Party-List System Act.4
Baguio City
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians,
EN BANC gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first
applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied
G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010 on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17,
2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition5 for registration with the COMELEC.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs. Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent. represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and
gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of
negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang
DECISION
Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base
DEL CASTILLO, J.: consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of
governance.7
... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere
shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second
of the existing order. Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:

Justice Robert A. Jackson x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette1
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may their sexual orientation and gender identity.
make different choices – choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of,
even choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
prohibited merely because they are different, and the right to disagree and debate about important
questions of public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is x x x refers to a person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and
built on genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more
than one gender."
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and
demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which
those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox – philosophical offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
justifications about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create
agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological
stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the natural
will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly. use into that which is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the
woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly,
and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.
Factual Background
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 20092 (the First For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a people transgressing
Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 20093 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09- beyond bounds." (7.81) "And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what
228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELEC’s refusal
was the end of those who indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me
against people who do mischief" (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petition’s par. 6F:
‘Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age’. It is
further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex
with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of
Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation.
Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the
requirement to be complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‘Any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks,
defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: ‘The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code
provides that ‘Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy’ are inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
penalizes ‘Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows’ as
follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. — The
penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both
such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public
morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the
editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling
the same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit
indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the
obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether
live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1)
glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the
market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend
to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public
order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and
edicts.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or
literature which are offensive to morals.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but
likewise for not being truthful when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives
have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections."
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an
environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible
teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat
to the youth." As an agency of the government, ours too is the State’s avowed duty under Section
13, Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation. 8
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three commissioners voted to overturn the First
Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando
Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlad’s Motion for Reconsideration
(Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC
Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First
Assailed Resolution, stating that:
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that
it has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad’s
expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of
electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent
its constituencies, then all representative organizations would have found themselves into the
party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a
tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons.
Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized
individuals whose interests are also the nation’s – only that their interests have not been brought
to the attention of the nation because of their under representation. Until the time comes when
Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is
beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just
that.
II. No substantial differentiation
In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do
not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of
individuals. x x x Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally
protected fundamental right, and that "nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable
intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual relations," as in the case of
race or religion or belief.
xxxx
Thus, even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT’s is elevated, there can
be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either
male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
xxxx
IV. Public Morals
x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices.
Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious group’s moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what
are being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They
are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500
years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said
religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
V. Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of
the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly
expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines,
obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under
these legal provisions. This is clear from its Petition’s paragraph 6F: "Consensual partnerships or
relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age’ It is further indicated in par. 24 of the
Petition which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the
Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines
"nuisance" as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards
decency or morality x x x." These are all unlawful.10
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed
Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation. Ang
Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the
COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the
May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on
behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.11 Instead of filing a Comment,
however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010
to Comment.12 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioner’s
application.13 Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we
required it to file its own comment.14 The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its
Comment on February 2, 2010.15
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on
January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions. 16
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or
to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.17 The CHR opined
that the denial of Ang Ladlad’spetition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of
the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHR’s
motion to intervene.
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene18 which motion was
granted on February 2, 2010.19
The Parties’ Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad’s petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying
petitioner’s application for registration since there was no basis for COMELEC’s allegations of
immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should
have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification. However, insofar as the
purported violations of petitioner’s freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned,
the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral
grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its
petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s
field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition. § Arts Center of Cabanatuan City – Nueva Ecija

Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941 § Boys Legion – Metro Manila

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that the LGBT § Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related
to any of the sectors in the enumeration. § Can’t Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) – Metro Manila

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition § Cebu Pride – Cebu City
that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
§ Circle of Friends
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections,20 "the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". § Dipolog Gay Association – Zamboanga del Norte
The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. § Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)

Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged § Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) – Metro Manila
that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC
claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that "save for a few isolated § Gay Men’s Support Group (GMSG) – Metro Manila
places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country." 21
§ Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) – Lanao del Norte
This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence" is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not being truthful
when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to § Iloilo City Gay Association – Iloilo City
comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections." Nowhere was this ground for
denial of petitioner’s accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, § Kabulig Writer’s Group – Camarines Sur
in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner’s alleged non-existence were
already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, § Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondent’s theory, and a
serious violation of petitioner’s right to procedural due process.
§ LUMINA – Baguio City

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang
§ Marikina Gay Association – Metro Manila
Ladlad’s initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines.
Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute
at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 § Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) – Metro Manila
members in its electronic discussion group.22 Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national
LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT § Naga City Gay Association – Naga City
networks:"
§ ONE BACARDI
§ Abra Gay Association
§ Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) – Metro Manila
§ Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) – Aklan
§ PUP LAKAN
§ Albay Gay Association
§ RADAR PRIDEWEAR
 § Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. – Metro Manila
§ San Jose del Monte Gay Association – Bulacan
§ Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family – Rizal
§ Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) – Metro Manila
§ Soul Jive – Antipolo, Rizal
§ The Link – Davao City
§ Tayabas Gay Association – Quezon
§ Women’s Bisexual Network – Metro Manila
§ Zamboanga Gay Association – Zamboanga City23
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no
surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if
COMELEC’s findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is
registered as Ang Ladlad’s principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with
the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the
belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled
that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites
under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies
in Ang Ladlad’s morality, or lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters." 24 Clearly,
"governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality."25 We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize
the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend,
instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond
mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes
and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:26
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the
dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may
influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds
articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating
public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what
some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be
compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a
"compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions
upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly
disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result,
government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that
those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.1avvphi1
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal
law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this
conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the
beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might
have a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be
considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a
religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the
human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform
manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or
Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular
purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious
nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine
constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent
neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same
time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional
limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could
allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling
state interests.27
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual
conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public
morals. The COMELEC argues:
Petitioner’s accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but
because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the
government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with
individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we
cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its
own existence.28
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps
homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine
the reasons behind this censure – religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage,
family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived
lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual
conduct. Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law.29
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang
Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that "there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the
group’s members have committed or are committing immoral acts."30 The OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or
more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great
divide between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be
penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the
"straights" and the gays." Certainly this is not the intendment of the law.31
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position
that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage
the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority
to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the
government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society.
Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions,
situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors
of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly
then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy,
at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act,
omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or
disregards decency or morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.32 A
violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or
culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC
targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible
act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall any
person be denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted the provision as an
absolute prohibition on classification. "Equality," said Aristotle, "consists in the same treatment of
similar persons."33 The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons
shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and in like circumstances.34
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some
legitimate government end.35 In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng
Pilipinas,36 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection
challenges x x x have followed the ‘rational basis’ test, coupled with a deferential attitude to
legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution."37
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct
as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner.
Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law
exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior.
Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the
asserted state interest here – that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority – is not a
legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection
clause. The COMELEC’s differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot
contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state
interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the
same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties
similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general
application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list
system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals
insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing
between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We
disagree with the OSG’s position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of
the equal protection clause.38 We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class
meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect,
and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded
that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the
COMELEC made "an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the
circumstances of the case."
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to
persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.39 It is in the
public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and
deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:40
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public
square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral
discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their life
together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious
belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative
democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments may
be proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the people
deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus,
when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely
reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median
groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it
specifies – including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small – not
only for a majority, however large – but for each of us" – the majority imposes upon itself a self-
denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the
dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and
this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend,
shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to
impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to
interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a
disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this
country. It follows that both expressions concerning one’s homosexuality and the activity of
forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public
perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-
sex conduct.41 European and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights
claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection
provisions in foreign and international texts.42 To the extent that there is much to learn from other
jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly
illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may
nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Court’s analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing
free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their actions
were caused by "something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."43
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with
its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly
stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of
a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent with
democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing
order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper
opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may
seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population. 44 A political
group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political
issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.45 Only if a political party
incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside
the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.46
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful,
offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand,
LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between
individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are
entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy
precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from
consideration the values of other members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It
well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid
constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do
not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus
favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of
homosexuality through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment
imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily
associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The
OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC]
simply exercised its authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party
applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a
transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.
xxxx
A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to
freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial.
In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of
Ang Ladlad’s petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the
capacity of its members to fully and equally participate in public life through engagement in the Article 21.
party list elections.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to chosen representatives.
limitations imposed by law. x x x47
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the
party-list system, and – as advanced by the OSG itself – the moral objection offered by the Article 25
COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has
been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action, from publicly expressing its views as a political
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in
party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-
article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner’s fundamental
rights.
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
Non-Discrimination and International Law representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of
human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and
the will of the electors;
humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and
governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be
effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than (c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
ideal, standards of conduct.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25
human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:
to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows: conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public
service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires States to
Article 26 adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an
effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic
government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal Covenant.
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
xxxx
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office
ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating
to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable
to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual
criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by
orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the
unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by
ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26
reason of political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind
should be construed to include "sexual orientation."48Additionally, a variety of United Nations
because of that person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the legislative
bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under
provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from elective office.50
various international agreements.49

The UDHR provides: We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving
effect to the Philippines’ international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is
not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioner’s invocation of the Yogyakarta
Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity),51 which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that
are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles
which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the
sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice.52 Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these
alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

We also hasten to add that not everything that society – or a certain segment of society – wants or
demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be
added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights
today is a much broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to
further claims that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the
effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are couched in
"rights" language, then they are no longer controversial.1avvphi1

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration
formulated by various international law professors, are – at best – de lege ferenda – and do not
constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international
law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that
promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount
to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.53

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are
emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities
are divided in opinion. This Court’s role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior.
Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion,
and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous
debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on

Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are
hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioner’s application
for party-list accreditation.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice