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History of Logic:

The history of logic deals with the study of the development of the science of
valid inference (logic). Formal logics developed in ancient times in China, India, and Greece. Greek
methods, particularly Aristotelian logic (or term logic) as found in the Organon, found wide
application and acceptance in Western science and mathematics for millennia. The Stoics,
especially Chrysippus, began the development of predicate logic.
Christian and Islamic philosophers such as Boethius (died 524) and William of Ockham (died 1347)
further developed Aristotle's logic in the Middle Ages, reaching a high point in the mid-fourteenth
century. The period between the fourteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century saw
largely decline and neglect, and at least one historian of logic regards this time as barren. Empirical
methods ruled the day, as evidenced by Sir Francis Bacon's Novum Organon of 1620.
Logic revived in the mid-nineteenth century, at the beginning of a revolutionary period when the
subject developed into a rigorous and formal discipline which took as its exemplar the exact method
of proof used in mathematics, a hearkening back to the Greek tradition. The development of the
modern "symbolic" or "mathematical" logic during this period by the likes of Boole, Frege, Russell,
and Peano is the most significant in the two-thousand-year history of logic, and is arguably one of
the most important and remarkable events in human intellectual history.
Progress in mathematical logic in the first few decades of the twentieth century, particularly arising
from the work of Gödel and Tarski, had a significant impact on analytic philosophy and philosophical
logic, particularly from the 1950s onwards, in subjects such as modal logic, temporal logic, deontic
logic, and relevance logic.

Rise of modern logic:


The period between the fourteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century had been
largely one of decline and neglect, and is generally regarded as barren by historians of logic. The
revival of logic occurred in the mid-nineteenth century, at the beginning of a revolutionary
period where the subject developed into a rigorous and formalistic discipline whose exemplar
was the exact method of proof used in mathematics. The development of the modern "symbolic"
or "mathematical" logic during this period is the most significant in the 2000-year history of
logic, and is arguably one of the most important and remarkable events in human intellectual
history.
A number of features distinguish modern logic from the old Aristotelian or traditional logic, the
most important of which are as follows:Modern logic is fundamentally a calculus whose rules of
operation are determined only by the shape and not by the meaning of the symbols it employs, as
in mathematics. Many logicians were impressed by the "success" of mathematics, in that there
had been no prolonged dispute about any truly mathematical result. C.S. Peircenote that even
though a mistake in the evaluation of a definite integral by Laplace led to an error concerning the
moon's orbit that persisted for nearly 50 years, the mistake, once spotted, was corrected without
any serious dispute. Peirce contrasted this with the disputation and uncertainty surrounding
traditional logic, and especially reasoning in metaphysics. He argued that a truly "exact" logic
would depend upon mathematical, i.e., "diagrammatic" or "iconic" thought. "Those who follow
such methods will ... escape all error except such as will be speedily corrected after it is once
suspected". Modern logic is also "constructive" rather than "abstractive"; i.e., rather than
abstracting and formalising theorems derived from ordinary language (or from psychological
intuitions about validity), it constructs theorems by formal methods, then looks for an
interpretation in ordinary language. It is entirely symbolic, meaning that even the logical
constants (which the medieval logicians called "syncategoremata") and the categoric terms are
expressed in symbols.

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