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Topic Vices of Consent > Violence or Intimidation ISSUE & RATIO DECIDENDI

Case No. G.R. No. 90423 | September 6, 1991


Case Name LEE v. Court of Appeals 1. WON the shouting at the complainant with piercing looks constitute
Full Case FRANCIS LEE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, violence or intimidation.
Name PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PELAGIA No.
PANLINO DE CHIN, respondents.
Ponente MEDIALDEA., J. The SC interpreted “joint obligation” using Tolentino’s definition:
Doctrine
Nature “A joint obligation is one in which each of the debtors is liable only for a
proportionate part of the debt, and each creditor is entitled only to a
proportionate part of the credit. A solidary obligation is one in which
RELEVANT FACTS each debtor is liable for the entire obligation, and each creditor is entitled
to demand the whole obligation. Hence, in the former, each creditor can
PRIVATE RESPONDENT (COMPLAINANT). Maria Pelagia Panlino De recover only his share of the obligation, and each debtor can be made to
Chin, 23, was fetched from her house upon the instructions of Petitioner pay only his part; whereas, in the latter, each creditor may enforce the
Branch Manager Francis Lee of Pacific Banking Corporation. Upon arriving at entire obligation, and each debtor may be obliged to pay it in full.”
the office of the bank, Lee did not atten to her immediately. After an hour, Lee
confronted Chin about a forged check which was allegedly deposited in the Likewise, Tolentino was cited to define “active solidarity”:
account of Honorio Carpio. During said confrontation, Lee was shouting at her “The essence of active solidarity consists in the authority of each creditor
and threatened to file charges against her unless she return the money
to claim and enforce the rights of all, with the resulting obligation of
equivalent to the subject check. Accordingly she was caused to sign a
withdrawal slip and an affidavit prepared by the bank’s lawyer, where she was paying every one what belongs to him; there is no merger, much less a
made to admit that she had swindled the bank and had return the money renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation.”
equivalent of the spurious check. Full satisfaction of a judgment obtained against them by Quiombing
would discharge their obligation to Biscocho, and vice versa; hence, it
PETITIONER. Lee denied the allegations. After having been informed that
was not necessary for both Quiombing and Biscocho to file the
the check was dishonored for being spurious, he examined the records and
discovered that Chin was instrumental in inducing the bank to accept the complaint. Inclusion of Biscocho as a co-plaintiff, when Quiombing was
subject check and was also the one who withdrew the proceeds thereof, by competent to sue by himself alone, would be a useless formality.
utiliing the withdrawal slip purportedly signed by Carpio. Petitioner then Interpreting Art. 1212 of the New Civil Code which provides that: “Each
invitedChin to his office. Chin was merely informed that the subject check was
one of the solidary creditors may do whatever may be useful to the others,
fake and that it was deposited out of her assruance that it was genuine. And that
but not anything which may be prejudice to the latter.”
the complainant was not compelled into signing the withdrawal slip, but she
acted voluntarily and freely in executing her affidavit and in returning the The SC interpreted that Quiombing’s act of “suing for recovery of the
money equivalent of the subject check. contract price” as “useful” to Biscocho.
The Metropolitan City Court found the petitioner guilty of grave coercion uner 1. Is the defendant entitled to the dismissal of the complaint on the
Article 286 of the RPC. RTC found petitioner guilty of light coercion.CA on ground of non-joinder of the second creditor as an indispensable party?
the other hand set aside RTC’s decision and affirmed MTC. No, a solidary debtor may by himself alone be held liable for any possible
breach of contract that may be proved.
Although the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the second
agreement, which was concluded alone by Quiombing with the spouses,
was based on the original Construction and Service Agreement as well as
the promissory note later signed. However, this matter is not really that
important now in view of the conclusion that the complaint could have
been filed alone by Quiombing.
2. Is the second solidary creditor an indispensable party?
No, because the participation of Biscocho is not at all necessary for
complete relief to be obtained by either him or Quiombing.

The Supreme Court defined “indispensable party” using the definition of


Justice Feria: "where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either one
of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even necessary (now
proper) because complete relief may be obtained from either."

DISPOSITIVE

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent


court dated March 27, 1990, is SET ASIDE, and the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, is directed to REINSTATE Civil Case No. 913-A. Costs against
the private respondents.