Osmena vs COMELEC
government. Regarding the challenge to the petitioner’s standing, the
Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus & Injunction
Ponente: Justice Paras
Personalities: Gov. Emiliano Osmeña, Gov. Roberto Pagdanganan, Rep.
Pablo Garcia, Rep. Raul del Mar, Rep. Antonio Bacaltos, Rep. Wilfredo
Cainglet, Rep. Romeo Guanzon Petitioners vs.
COMELEC Oscar Orbos, Guillermo Carague, Rosalina Cajucom
Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized elections
violates the Constitution:
1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding
of synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May
1992;
2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof,
providing that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold
over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have
been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory
Provision) of the Constitution;
3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect,
shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd
Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution;
4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for
Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision
of Section 9, Article IX under the title “Commission on Elections” of the
Constitution;
5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in
Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the
Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much
less, valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday
of November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at all,
Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the
Constitution, to eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still,
is not feasible, resort can be made to the self-correcting mechanism built in
the Constitution for its amendment or revision.
On the other hand, the SolGen, counsel for COMELEC, prays for the denial of
this petition arguing that the question is political in nature and that the
petitioners lack legal standing to file the petition and what they are asking for
is an advisory opinion from the court, there being no justiciable controversy to
resolve. On the merits, the SolGen contends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid
exercise of legislative power by Congress and that the regular amending
process prescribed by the Constitution does not apply to its transitory
provisions.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE: WON the Court has competence to take cognizance
of the instant petition?
HELD: Yes.
What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of RA 7056. Hence,
contrary to SolGen’s contention, the issue in this case is justiciable rather than
political. And even if the question were political in nature, it would still come
within the Court’s power considering the expanded jurisdiction conferred by
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which includes the authority to
determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the
Supreme Court held that even if the petitioners have no legal standing, the
Court has the power to brush aside technicalities considered the
“transcendental importance” of the issue being raised herein.
MAIN ISSUE: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional?
HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and
5 of the 1987 Constitution which provides for the synchronization of national
and local elections. The said law, on the other hand, provides for the de-
synchronization of election by mandating that there be two separate elections
in 1992. The term of “synchronization” in the mentioned constitutional
provision was used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since
this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or
occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to
once every three years.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that the local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve
until noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent
local officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their
successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. The Supreme Court,
quoting Corpus Juris Secundum, states that “it is not competent for the
legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over
until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in
effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution
fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative
authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the
successors fail to qualify within the time”.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987
Constitution which fixed the term of office of all elective local officials, except
barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local election will be held on the
second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will
be serving for only two years and seven months, that is, from November 30,
1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years.
The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by
changing the campaign period. RA 7056 provides for a different campaign
period, as follows:
a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days
before the day of election.
b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the election, and
c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local
elective provincial, city and municipal officials forty-five (45) days before the
day of the elections.
Rappler vs Bautista
FACTS
Rappler, Inc. signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to sponsor the
Presidential and Vice-Presidential debates. Alleging that it is being
discriminated particularly as regards the MOA provisions on live audio
broadcast via online streaming, Rappler argues that the MOA grants radio
stations the right to simultaneously broadcast live the audio of the debates,
even if the radio stations are not obliged to perform any obligation under the
MOA. However, the right to broadcast by online live streaming the audio of the
debates is denied to the petitioner and other online media entities which also
have the capacity to live stream the audio of the debates.
Rappler filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against COMELEC
Chairman Andres Bautista to nullify MOA provisions on the ground of violating
the fundamental rights protected under the Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner has the right to live stream the debates
RULING
Yes, Rappler has the right to live stream the debates because the exercise to
do so is its contractual right under the MOA. Under the MOA, as long as it
complies with the copyright conditions for the debates, it can live stream the
debates.
The MOA recognizes the right of other mass media entities, not parties to the
MOA, to reproduce the debates subject to the same copyright conditions. The
freedom of the press to report and disseminate the live audio can no longer
be infringed or subject to prior restraint. Such freedom of the press to report
and disseminate the live audio of the debates is now protected and guaranteed
under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that, “No law
shall be passed abridging the freedom…of the press.”
The petition was partially granted. The COMELEC Chairman was directed to
allow the debates to be shown or live streamed unaltered on the petitioner’s
website subject to the copyright condition that the source is clearly indicated.
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON v. COMELEC
(Ns discuss na dati)
G.R. No. L-27833 April 18, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF RE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT 4880. ARSENIO GONZALES
and FELICISIMO R. CABIGAO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
(Sobrang haba) kaya digest na lang muna hahaha, read the full case at your
own risk
Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early
nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or
partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional grounds. More
precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of
assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner
Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in
the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-
Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967;
petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered
voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was
the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period
of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience
which only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves
through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the
regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in
the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the
constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator
Lorenzo M. Tañada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated
that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred
rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its
enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being
the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being
debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship
and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in
government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil
Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle
were requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the act was
based on the police power of the state.
Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may
supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of
speech. These are the “clear and present danger” rule and the 'dangerous
tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of the comment or
utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against
is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of
establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional
law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established. The
"dangerous tendency rule" is such that “If the words uttered create a
dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words
are punishable.” It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of
force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be
advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be
reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the
utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
seeks to prevent.
The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the
practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional
requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger
doctrine. As the author Tañada clearly explained, such provisions were
deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and
appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the
actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship,
dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred
election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country.
The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part
of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and
to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression,
this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the
holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for
public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign
literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or
indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or
against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.
Sanidad vs COMELEC
On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING
FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION"
was enacted into law. The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power
vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said
R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No.
2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein
petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the
"OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper
circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the
constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which
provides: Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers.
— During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the
plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or
against the plebiscite issues It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is
void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of
the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution.
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum
on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among
other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement,
the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the
period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days
after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending
the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing
for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to the
national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031
repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976,
Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the
people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites
in its “whereas” clauses that the people’s continued opposition to the
convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such
body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a
new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in
the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting
the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments
to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it
directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct
the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners
contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the
incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose
amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen
contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take
cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the
Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises
a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the
Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a
function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the
terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of
transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular
National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments
becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1,
pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been
followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself
into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal
of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential
Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in
lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a
contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and
1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are
assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a
justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2
(2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: “All cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and
decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement,
or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least
ten Members. . . ..” The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction
not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The
amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a
delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested
with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within
its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments
to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people
in sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature.
It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the
Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of
franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation
or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that
equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable,
equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates are ensured Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11
(b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has
also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media
practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods.
Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite
periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are
no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis. While the limitation does not
absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his
choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced
by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation
is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no
justifiable reason. Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and
importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and
intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an
unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected
by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by
restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.
Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression
but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public
concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers
or to specific radio or television times
National Press Club vs COMELEC
Facts:
R.A. 6646 was enacted which prohibits any newspaper, radio, any person
making the use of media to sell or give free of charge of space or time for
political purpose except COMELEC Petitioners who were representatives of
mass media assails its constitutionality on the ground that it amounts to
censorship because it single’s out for suppression only publications of a
particular content and it abridges freedom of speech of candidates.
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which
are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political
advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for
national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections;
and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election
Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally
argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades
and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression.
Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to
censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression
with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely,
media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of
1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function
and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion
relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b)
abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of
media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the
Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and
television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity
or volume of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election
thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional.
Held:
Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which
enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press
has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be
a special provision applicable during a specific limited period — i.e., "during
the election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer
oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that
one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic
state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the
Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as
may be defined by law." The essential question is whether or not the assailed
legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and
information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has
gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as
to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of
the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the
permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during
election periods.
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability.
By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11
(b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does
not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or
television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their
qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover,
Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or
opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists
in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so
long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact
advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11
(b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage
that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office.
Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of
particular candidates.
The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the
candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable.
Adiong vs COMELEC
Facts:
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347
pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Section
15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda.” The following are lawful election
propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers
may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in
paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21 (f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election
propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary,
except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards…
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992
elections assails the COMELEC’s Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting
of decals and stickers in “mobile” places like cars and other moving vehicles.
According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and
stickers on “mobile” places, public or private, and limit their location or
publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of
Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that “decals and stickers may
be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph
(f) of Section 21 hereof” is DECLARED NULL and VOID. The COMELEC’s
prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public
or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is
null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the
citizen’s fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec.
4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the
questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political
party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his
preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with
him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as
couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where
the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even
the citizen’s private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle
(The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the
posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one’s living room or bedroom.) In
consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the
Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights
provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process
of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation
but when this right is joined by a “liberty” interest, the burden of justification on
the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable.
The burden is not met in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor
candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their
candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in
relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting
decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that
the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and
other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence,
the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election
propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places
whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the
COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347
pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Section
15(a) of the resolution provides:Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda.—The
following are lawful election propaganda:(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards,
decals... Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21
hereof.Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:Sec. 21(f). Prohibited
forms of election propaganda. —It is unlawful:...(f) To draw, paint, inscribe,
post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether
public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common
posted areas and/or billboards...Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial
candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC's Resolution
insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like
cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative
of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act
No. 6646.ISSUE:Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of
decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location
or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
HELD:The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of
Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that "decals and stickers may
be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph
(f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and VOID. The COMELEC's
prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public
or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is
null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the
citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec.
4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the
questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political
party.
The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference
and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.Also, the
questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in
the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals
and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the
citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The
provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the
posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one's living room or bedroom.) In
consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the
Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights
provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process
of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation
but when this right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden of justification on
the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable.
The burden is not met in this case.)Additionally, the constitutional objective to
give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the
electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and
Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution,
is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private
vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars,
calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of
the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial
in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the
candidate.In sum, the prohibitionon posting of decals and stickers on "mobile"
places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by
the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the
Constitution.
SWS and Pulse Asia vs COMELEC
(Di ko mahanap)
Pruneyard Shipping Center vs Robbins
FACTS:
Pruneyard Shopping Center is a privately owned center that consists of
parking, walkways, plazas, and buildings that contain shops, restaurants, and
a cinema. Pruneyard’s policy is not to permit any tenant or visitor to engage in
publicly expressive activity, including the circulating of petitions, that is not
directly related to the commercial purposes.
Appellants are high school students who solicited support for their opposition
to a United Nations resolution against “Zionism.” They sought to discuss their
concerns with shoppers and to solicit signatures for a petition to be sent to the
White House in Washington. Soon after they had begun their soliciting they
were approached by a security guard who informed them that their conduct
violated Pruneyard regulations. The officers suggested that appellants
continue their activities on the public sidewalk at the center’s perimeter and
not inside its vicinity.
High school students seeking support for their opposition to a United Nations
resolution against Zionism set up a table in PruneYard to distribute literature
and solicit signatures for a petition. A security guard told them to leave since
their actions violated the shopping center's regulations against "publicly
expressive" activities.
Did PruneYard's regulations violate the students' free speech rights?
ISSUE:
Whether the restriction of gatherings to a private-owned center violates the
freedom of expression as stated on Art. 1, Sec. 2 of California Constitution.
HELD:
Art. 1, Sec. 2 of the state Constitution reads: “Every person may freely speak,
write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or
press.”
The Supreme Court of California construed the California Constitution to
protect precisely those rights of communication and expression. The California
court concluded that its “Constitution broadly proclaims speech and petition
rights. Shopping centers to which the public is invited can provide an essential
and invaluable forum for exercising those rights.” But shopping center may
restrict expressive gathering activity by adopting time, venue, and manner
regulations that will minimize any interference with its commercial functions.
Free speech rights were violated. Since the California Constitution protected
"speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when
the shopping centers are privately owned," PruneYard could not prevent the
students from soliciting on its property. The Court argued that it was within
California's power to guarantee this expansive free speech right since it did
not unreasonably intrude on the rights of private property owners.
Gonzales vs Kalaw-Katigbak
Facts:
Antonio Gonzales, president of Malaya Films, claimed that his film Kapit sa
Patalim, was rated for adults only by a subcommittee of the movie review
board together with the required cuts and scene deletions. He justified that
these requirements were without basis and were restrains on artistic
expression. He adduced that the film is an integral whole and all its portions,
including those to which the Board now offers belated objection, are essential
for the integrity of the film. Viewed as a whole, there is no basis even for the
vague speculations advanced by the Board as basis for its classification.
He appealed to the movie review board but the same affirmed the decion of
the sub committee.
When Gonzales appealed to the supreme court, the board claimed that the
deletions were removed and the requirement to submit the master negative
was taken out but the film was still rated for adults only. The petition was
amended to contest the rating only.
Issue:
Was the rating made with grave avuse of discretion (Note I put in those
regarding obscenity for future purposes)
Held:
No. Petition dismissed. There was no grave abuse of discretion DUE TO LACK
OF VOTES
Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of
Ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse
Burstyn-importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened
by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform
(No clear dividing line between what affords knowledge and that of pleasure
or else there will be a diminution to a right to self-expression)
Bagatsing- Press freedom may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly
and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment.
This is not to say that such freedom, as is the freedom of speech, absolute. It
can be limited if "there be a 'clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
[the State] has a right to prevent.”
Censorship doesn’t full cover free speech or there might bean emasculation
of basic rights. However, there must be in exceptional circumstances a sine
qua non for the meaningful exercise of such right without denying the freedom
from liability.
Freedom from censorship is a settled principle in our jurisdiction. Mutuc- board
of review is limited to classification of films to safeguard other constitutional
objections, hence the GP, PG, or R-18 ratings.
That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and
restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be
presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited
is the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the
State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also
present. There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the
expression complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there
must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element
cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable.
Where movies are concerned, censorship, especially so if an entire production
is banned, is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil to public public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest.
Roth- "All Ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance —
unorthodox Ideas, controversial Ideas, even Ideas hateful to the prevailing
climate of opinion — have the full protection of the guaranties, unless
excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of the First
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
importance.”
Given obscenity as the nemesis of censorship, there is difficulty in determining
what is obsecene.
Roth- The early leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be judged
merely by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible
persons
The test was whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest. Some material can legitimately deal with sex and
its effects on susceptible persons. Such a censorship can be considered
violative of the constitution. On the other hand, the substituted standard
provides safeguards adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional
infirmity.
Roth- Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material
which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal
of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason
to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press.
Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life has indisputably been
a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the
vital problems of human interest and public concern.
In the Philippine context, E.O. 876 applied contemporary Filipino cultural
values as a standard.
Moreover, as far as the question of sex and obscenity are concerned, it cannot
be stressed strongly that the arts and letters "shall be under the patronage of
the State.
Given this constitutional mandate, It will be less than true to its function if any
government office or agency would invade the sphere of autonomy that an
artist enjoys. There is no orthodoxy in what passes for beauty or for reality. It
is for the artist to determine what for him is a true representation. It is not to
be forgotten that art and belleslettres deal primarily with imagination, not so
much with ideas in a strict sense. What is seen or perceived by an artist is
entitled to respect, unless there is a showing that the product of his talent
rightfully may be considered obscene.
On the question of obscenity, therefore, such standard set forth in Executive
Order No. 878 is to be construed in such a fashion to avoid any taint of
unconstitutionality. To repeat, what was stated in a recent decision in Trinidad-
an elementary, a fundamental, and a universal role of construction, applied
when considering constitutional questions, that when a law is susceptible of
two constructions' one of which will maintain and the other destroy it, the courts
will always adopt the former.
There can be no valid objection to the controlling standard.
There was really a grave abuse of discretion when the Board and its
perception of what obscenity is is very restrictive.
But, sadly, THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH VOTES TO MAINTAIN THAT
THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The supporting evidence
was in the fact that some scenes were not for young people. They might
misunderstand the scenes. The respondents offered to make it GP if the
petitioners would remove the lesbian and sex scenes. But they refused.
The ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion
pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned:
a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion
pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every
home where there is a set.
It is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult
population. It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is
called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.
Pita vs CA
Facts:
In 1983, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, and the Manila Police,
seized and confiscated from dealers along Manila sidewalks, magazines
believed to be obscene. These were later burned. One of the publications was
Pinoy Playboy published by Leo Pita.
He filed an injunction case against the mayor of manila to enjoin him from
confiscating more copies of his magazine and claimed that this was a violation
of freedom of speech. The court ordered him to show cause. He then filed an
Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against
indiscriminate seizure.
Defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and burning of
obscence reading materials but admitted that these were surrendered by the
stall owners and the establishments were not raided.
The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera, filed no
answer.
On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for
hearing on January 16, 1984 "for the parties to adduce evidence on the
question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged (sic)
seized, confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are obscence per se or
not".
On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from
denying the motion for a writ of preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case
for lack of merit
The CA also dismissed the appeal due to the argument that freedom of the
press is not without restraint.
In the SC, the petitioner claimed that:
1. The CA erred in holding that the police officers could without any court
warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis
simply of their determination that they are obscene.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in
effect, holding that the trial court could dismiss the case on its merits without
any hearing thereon when what was submitted to it for resolution was merely
the application of petitioner for the writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Was the seizure constitutional?
Held:
No. Petition grantedTest for obscenity: "whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to
such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article
charged as being obscene may fall
Also, "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the
circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided
by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it."
(Kottinger)
When does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or when can it be said
to be offensive to human sensibilities?
The issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been drawn
nor divided.
Katigbak- "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest."
Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in the sense
that it measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant theme" of the work, rather
than isolated passages, which were central to Kottinger (although both cases
are agreed that "contemporary community standards" are the final arbiters of
what is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make the
determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a
consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law
enforcers.
The latest say on American jurisprudence was Miller v. California, which
expressly abandoned Massachusettes, and established "basic guidelines," to
wit: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary standards' would
find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes
"obscenity" has been attributed to the reluctance of the courts to recognize the
constitutional dimension of the problem.
Apparently, the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the
guaranty of free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has allowed a
climate of opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague
theories of what is acceptable to society.
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the
legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut provided it is smut. For
obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So is
it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging
influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization. What
shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to
the present generation.
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) matter
of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of men and
women that have probably compounded the problem rather than resolved it.
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free
expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court
has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear
and present danger" that would warrant State interference and action. But the
burden to show this lies with the authorities.
"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof
of the existence of such clear and present danger."
As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a
political speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The
burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that
must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop
the speech.
The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the
required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for
which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not
possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be
pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by
way of a search warrant.
Has petitioner been found guilty for publishing obscene works under
Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969? This not answered, one can conclude
that the fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police
power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due process. The PD’s
don’t give the authorities the permission to execute high-handed acts.
It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial
warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge.
There is of course provision for warrantless searches under the Rules of Court
but as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an incident to
a lawful arrest and it must be on account fo a crime committed.
The Court rejected the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor legal
provision which would free the accused of all criminal responsibility because
there had been no warrant, and there is no "accused" here to speak of, who
ought to be "punished".
Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid
(as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant
because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to
make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one.
Fernando vs CA
Facts:
Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, officers of
the Philippine National Police CIDG conducted police surveillance on the store
bearing the name of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair).
On May 5, 1999, Judge Perfecto Laguio of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 19, issued Search Warrant No. 99-1216 for violation of Article 201 of
the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Gaudencio E. Fernando and a
certain Warren Tingchuy.
The warrant ordered the search of the store for copies of New Rave, Hustler,
IOU magazine, and VHS tapes.
On the same day, police officers of the PNP-CIDG NCR served the warrant on
Rudy Estorninos, who, according to the prosecution, introduced himself as the
store attendant of Music Fair. The police searched the premises and
confiscated twenty-five (25) VHS tapes and ten (10) different magazines,
which they deemed pornographic.
All appellants pled not guilty to the offenses charged. They waived their right
to present evidence. The RTC acquitted Tingchuy for lack of evidence to
prove his guilt, but convicted herein petitioners Fernando and Estorninos.
The CA affirmed the decision. The petitioners sought for review in the SC on
certiorari and assailed the CA decision.
They assigned the following errors:
I. Respondent court erred in convicting petitioner Fernando even if he was not
present at the time of the raid
II. Respondent erred in convicting petitioner Estorninos who was not doing
anything illegal at the time of the raid.
Petitioners contend that the prosecution failed to prove that at the time of the
search, they were selling pornographic materials. Fernando contends that
since he was not charged as the owner of an establishment selling obscene
materials, the prosecution must prove that he was present during the raid and
that he was selling the said materials. Estorninos, on the other hand, insists
that he was not an attendant in Music Fair, nor did he introduce himself so.
The Solicitor General counters that owners of establishments selling obscene
publications are expressly held liable under Article 201, and petitioner
Fernando’s ownership was sufficiently proven. As the owner, according to the
Solicitor General, Fernando was naturally a seller of the prohibited materials
and liable under the Information.
Issue:
Whether the appellate court erred in affirming the petitioners’ conviction.
Held:
No. Petition dismissed. As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State
has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens
patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify
the regulation or limitation.
One such regulation is Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. To be held
liable, the prosecution must prove that (a) the materials, publication, picture or
literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold, exhibited, published or gave
away such materials. Necessarily, that the confiscated materials are obscene
must be proved.
People v. Kottinger-.obscenity as something which is offensive to chastity,
decency or delicacy. The test to determine the existence of obscenity is,
whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into
whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall.
Also, “that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an
indecency.” The disclaimer was whether a picture is obscene or indecent must
depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question
is to be decided by the judgment of the aggregate sense of the community
reached by it.
Go Pin- If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art exhibits and
art galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by people
interested in art, there would be no offense committed. However, the pictures
here in question were used not exactly for art’s sake but rather for commercial
purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic qualities of said pictures were
being commercialized so that the cause of art was of secondary or minor
importance. Gain and profit would appear to have been the main, if not the
exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it would not be surprising if the
persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees for the
privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and persons interested in art and
who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their
artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity
and taste, and lust, and for love [of] excitement, including the youth who
because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themselves
from the ill and perverting effects of these pictures
Padan- An actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of
lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In it, there is no room for art.
One can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and
an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it does, nothing but lust
and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence specially on the youth of the
land.
Katigbak- the Court measures obscenity in terms of the “dominant theme” of
the material taken as a “whole” rather than in isolated passages.
Pita v. Court of Appeals, concerning alleged pornographic publications, the
Court recognized that Kottinger failed to afford a conclusive definition of
obscenity, and that both Go Pin and Padan y Alova raised more questions
than answers such as, whether the absence or presence of artists and persons
interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy
and improve their artistic tastes, determine what art is; or that if they find
inspiration in the exhibitions, whether such exhibitions cease to be obscene.
Go Pin and Padan y Alova gave too much latitude for judicial arbitrament,
which has permitted ad lib of ideas and “two-cents worths” among judges as
to what is obscene or what is art.
The Court in Pita also emphasized the difficulty of the question and pointed
out how hazy jurisprudence is on obscenity and how jurisprudence actually
failed to settle questions on the matter. Significantly, the dynamism of human
civilization does not help at all. It is evident that individual tastes develop,
adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of
civilization. It seems futile at this point to formulate a perfect definition of
obscenity that shall apply in all cases.
There is no perfect definition of “obscenity” but the latest word is that of Miller
v. California which established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the
average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts
has the unbridled discretion in determining what is “patently offensive. No one
will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials
unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive “hard core” sexual
conduct. Ie offensive descriptions of sex acts.
What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial
determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the
judge’s sound discretion.
In this case, the trial court found the confiscated materials obscene and the
Court of Appeals affirmed such findings. Findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the trial court are accorded great respect, even by
this Court, unless such findings are patently unsupported by the evidence on
record or the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts.
Did petitioners participate in the distribution and exhibition of obscene
materials? We emphasize that mere possession of obscene materials, without
intention to sell, exhibit, or give them away, is not punishable under Article
201, considering the purpose of the law is to prohibit the dissemination of
obscene materials to the public. The offense in any of the forms under Article
201 is committed only when there is publicity. The mayor’s permit shows that
Fernando was the owner of the store.
Petitioner Estorninos is likewise liable as the store attendant actively engaged
in selling and exhibiting the obscene materials. Prosecution witness Police
Inspector Tababan, who led the PNP-CIDG NCR that conducted the search,
identified him as the store attendant upon whom the search warrant was
served.
Soriano vs Laguardia
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program
Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC.
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang
babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana
ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko
masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga
demonyong ito.
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-
complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private
respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in
connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who
felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a
regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
As a result, The MTRCB initially slapped Soriano’s Ang Dating Daan, which
was earlier given a “G” rating for general viewership, with a 20-day preventive
suspension after a preliminary conference. Later, in a decision, it found him
liable for his utterances, and was imposed a three-month suspension from his
TV program Ang Dating Daan. Soriano challenged the order of the MTRCB.
Soriano’s contention:
• The order of preventive suspension imposed by the
MTRCB was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction
• The IRR is invalid since it provides for the issuance of preventive
suspension orders.
• There was lack of due process since there was no hearing before
the court.
• The order was violative of freedom of religion and freedom of
speech and expression.
• The law (PD 1986) relied by the MTRCB has no sufficient standard
for its implementation resulting to undue delegation. Hence,
the MTRCB cannot provide for the penalties for violations
of its provisions.
Issue:
Won the remarks of Soriano are considered as obscene
HELD:
The SC ruled that “Soriano’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least
with respect to the average child,” and thus his utterances cannot be
considered as protected speech. Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court,
the High Court said that the analysis should be “context based” and found the
utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television broadcasting
as a medium, the time of the show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are
all factors that made the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court
emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily understood by a child
literally rather than in the context that they were used.”
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the
adverse effect of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as
well as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB
properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months.
Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was
an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as
a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the
paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a
broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a
requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the
form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any,
thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.
The SC also said “that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a “form
of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment.” In affirming
the power of the MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority said
that “it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter
without running afoul of the free speech clause.” visit fellester.blogspot.com
The Court said that the suspension “is not a prior restraint on the right of
petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was
already issued to him by MTRCB,” rather, it was a sanction for “the indecent
contents of his utterances in a “G” rated TV program.” (Soriano v. Laguardia;
GR No. 165636, April 29, 2009)
Dissenting Opinion:
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in a separate dissenting opinion, said that a
single government action could be both a penalty and a prior restraint. The
Chief Magistrate pointed out that the three month suspension takes such form
because it also acts as a restraint to petitioner’s future speech and thus
deserves a higher scrutiny than the “context based” approach that the majority
applied. In voting to grant Soriano’s petition, the Chief Justice said that “in the
absence of proof and reason, he [Soriano] should not be penalized with a
three-month suspension that works as a prior restraint on his speech.
Ginzburg vs US
Petitioner Ginzburg and three corporations which he controlled were convicted
of violating the federal obscenity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1461, by mailing three
publications: an expensive hardcover magazine dealing with sex, a sexual
newsletter, and a short book purporting to be a sexual autobiography. The
prosecution charged that these publications were obscene in the context of
their production, sale, and attendant publicity. Besides testimony as to the
merit of the material, abundant evidence was introduced that each of the
publications was originated or sold as stock in trade of the business of
pandering, i.e., the purveying of publications openly advertised to appeal to
the customers' erotic interest. Mailing privileges were sought from places with
salaciously suggestive names; circulars for the magazine and newsletter
stressed unrestricted expression of sex, and advertising of the book which
purported to be of medical and psychiatric interest, but whose distribution was
not confined to a professional audience, dwelt on the book's sexual imagery.
In finding petitioners guilty, the trial judge applied the obscenity standards first
enunciated in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Ralph Ginzburg and several of his associates were charged with violating a
federal obscenity statute for mailing circulars about how and where three
different obscene publications could be obtained. Ginzburg challenged his
conviction as unconstitutional since the circulars themselves were not
obscene. On appeal from an adverse ruling by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, upholding an unfavorable lower court finding, the Supreme Court
granted Ginzburg certiorari.
Issue:
Does conviction under the federal obscenity statute, for pandering
advertisements for sexually explicit publications, violate of the First
Amendment's free speech protections if the advertisements are not
themselves obscene?
Ruling:
Evidence that the petitioners deliberately represented the accused
publications as erotically arousing and commercially exploited them as erotica
solely for the sake of prurient appeal amply supported the trial court's
determination that the material was obscene under the standards of the Roth
case, supra. The mere fact of profit from the sale of the publication is not
considered; but, in a close case, a showing of exploitation of interests in
titillation by pornography with respect to material lending itself to such
exploitation through pervasive treatment or description of sexual matters
supports a determination that the material is obscene
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that although circulars themselves may not
be obscene, their public mailing offends the federal obscenity statute if they
advertise obscene materials. The Court reasoned that where the sole
emphasis of an advertisement is the commercial exploitation of erotica for
prurient appeal, it shall be deemed "pornographic" communication that lies
beyond the scope of First Amendment speech protections. The Court
cautioned, however, that the distribution of materials containing sexuality in
the context of art, literature, or science is not per se prohibited under the
obscenity statute if it can be shown to advance human knowledge or
understanding.
Besides testimony as to the merit of the material, there was abundant evidence
to show that each of the accused publications was originated or sold as stock
in trade of the sordid business of pandering -- "the business of purveying
textual or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of
their customers." [Footnote 7] EROS early sought mailing privileges from the
postmasters of Intercourse and Blue Ball, Pennsylvania. The trial court found
the obvious, that these hamlets were chosen only for the value their names
would have in furthering petitioners' efforts to sell their publications on the
basis of salacious appeal the facilities of the post offices were inadequate to
handle the anticipated volume of mail, and the privileges were denied. Mailing
privileges were then obtained from the postmaster of Middlesex, New Jersey.
EROS and Liaison thereafter mailed several million circulars soliciting
subscriptions from that post office; over 5,500 copies of the Handbook were
mailed.
The "leer of the sensualist" also permeates the advertising for the three
publications. The circulars sent for EROS and Liaison stressed the sexual
candor of the respective publications, and openly boasted that the publishers
would take full advantage of what they regarded as an unrestricted license
allowed by law in the expression of sex and sexual matters.
Roth vs US
Facts:
The Court's first opportunity came in 1957, when it heard two cases
simultaneously. Samuel Roth was convicted under a federal statute that
criminalized the publication and mailing of obscene materials; David Alberts
was convicted under a California law that prohibited distribution and
advertising of obscene materials. Both men argued that they had been
convicted under laws that violated the First Amendment.
In its decision, the Court held to a very broad definition of First Amendment
protections. "All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance
-- unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing
climate of opinion -- have the full protection of the guaranties." But obscenity,
the Court said, fell outside this broad spectrum of protection as it was "utterly
without redeeming social importance." Having reached this conclusion, the
Court tried for the first time to define obscenity. It began by insisting that "sex
and obscenity are not synonymous." Artistic and scientific treatments of sex
were not obscene. But if some material "deals with sex in a manner appealing
to prurient interest" then it could be classified as obscene.55
In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the frequently used obscenity
standard developed by British courts in Regina v. Hicklin. In that case
obscenity was judged "by the effect of isolated passages upon the most
susceptible persons." Instead, the United States Supreme Court set a very
different standard by holding that materials could be labeled obscene if "to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest."56
The distinctions were significant. The Supreme Court substituted the "average
person" for the "most susceptible person"—such as a child or a very religious
person—and it required that the material be "taken as a whole," that is, judged
in its entirety, not on the basis of an isolated passage or picture. Moreover, in
subsequent cases, the Court worked to reinforce this relatively liberal
approach to obscenity. When lower courts interpreted "community standards"
to mean local community standards, resulting in different rules throughout the
country, the Court said that its intention had been to apply the standards of the
national community.
Roth operated a book-selling business in New York and was convicted of
mailing obscene circulars and an obscene book in violation of a federal
obscenity statute. Roth's case was combined with Alberts v. California, in
which a California obscenity law was challenged by Alberts after his similar
conviction for selling lewd and obscene books in addition to composing and
publishing obscene advertisements for his products.
Issue:
Did either the federal or California's obscenity restrictions, prohibiting the sale
or transfer of obscene materials through the mail, impinge upon the freedom
of expression as guaranteed by the First Amendment?
Ruling:
In a 6-to-3 decision written by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the Court held
that obscenity was not "within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press." The Court noted that the First Amendment was not intended to protect
every utterance or form of expression, such as materials that were "utterly
without redeeming social importance." The Court held that the test to
determine obscenity was "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to prurient interest." The Court held that such a definition
of obscenity gave sufficient fair warning and satisfied the demands of Due
Process. Brennan later reversed his position on this issue in Miller v. California
(1973).
The Court redefined the meaning of obscenity:
Departing from the traditional common law rule, Brennan constructed a
narrower definition of obscenity. He stated that contemporary community
standards should be applied to determine whether the average person (rather
than children) would find that the work's dominant theme (rather than individual
passages) appealed to the prurient interest. Such material would need to be
completely without redeeming social value to be classified as obscenity. This
definition still did not protect the actions of the defendants under the First
Amendment or mandate invalidating the laws as unconstitutional.
Miller vs California
This case involves the application of a State's criminal obscenity statute to a
situation in which sexually explicit materials have been thrust by aggressive
sales action upon unwilling recipients who had in no way indicated any desire
to receive such materials. This Court has recognized that the States have a
legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene
material when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of
offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles.
Jurisprudence was used to define the standards which must be used to identify
obscene material that a State may regulate without infringing on the First
Amendment as applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The dissent of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN reviews the background of the
obscenity problem, but since the Court now undertakes to formulate standards
more concrete than those in the past, it is useful for us to focus on two of the
landmark cases in the somewhat tortured history of the Court's obscenity
decisions. In Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957), the Court sustained
a conviction under a federal statute punishing the mailing of "obscene, lewd,
lascivious or filthy . . ." materials. The key to that holding was the Court's
rejection of the claim that obscene materials were protected by the First
Amendment. Five Justices joined in the opinion stating:
"All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance -- unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of
opinion -- have the full protection of the [First Amendment] guaranties, unless
excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important
interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of
obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. . . . This is the same
judgment expressed by this Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S.
568, 315 U. S. 571-572: "
". . . There are certain well defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene. . . . It has been
well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. . . ."
Miller, after conducting a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of
"adult" material, was convicted of violating a California statute prohibiting the
distribution of obscene material. Some unwilling recipients of Miller's
brochures complained to the police, initiating the legal proceedings.
Issue:
Is the sale and distribution of obscene materials by mail protected under the
First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee?
Whether material, included in a mass-mailing program, soliciting the sale of
adult books and movies can be subjected to state regulation as a criminal
offense?
Ruling:
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene materials did not enjoy First
Amendment protection. The Court modified the test for obscenity established
in Roth v. United States and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, holding that "[t]he
basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person,
applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . . (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." The Court rejected the
"utterly without redeeming social value" test of the Memoirs decision.
Yes, but limited to where the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest in sex; portrays sexual conduct specifically defined by state law in a
patently offensive way; and taken as a whole, does not have serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value.
Procedure: Jury convicted Miller of a misdemeanor distribution of obscenity
charge. Appellate Dept Superior Ct Affirmed b/c statute was based on and
reflected Memoir test. USSCt Vacated and Remanded.
Rule(s): 1st and 14th Amend
Rationale: States have an legit interest in prohibiting the dissemination or
exhibition of obscene material when the mode used has a significant danger
of offending unwilling recipients or there’s a risk of exposure to juveniles.
1st must Define the standard used to i/d obscene material that a state may
regulate w/o infringing on the 1st Amend through the 14th.
Roth – the mailing obscene materials does not rec’v 1st Amend protection.
Then in Memoirs a new three part test for obscenity was created; 1) dominant
theme of prurient interest in sex; 2) material is patently offensive to current
community standards; and 3) material is utterly without a redeeming social
value. Problem with Memoir test: Required proof obscenity was utterly w/o
social value, the prosecution had to prove a negative as an impossible BoP in
criminal case. This standard is no longer the Const’l standard.
No state since Roth has been able to agree on a standard to determine what
constitutes obscenity subject to state regulation.
Under U.S. Const 1st Amend limitations on state powers do not vary from
community to community, but this does not mean a fixed, uniform national
standard of what precisely appeals to the prurient interest or what is “patently
offensive." If a jury applies the standard of an average person under the
current community standards, the material will be adjudged by its impact on
an average person and not a sensitive person.
DISSENT: J.Douglas, suspect material must first be condemned as obscene
in a civil proceeding, and then only after if a party continues to publish, show,
etc. then a vague law has been made specific, and a criminal prosecution at
that point would not violate void for vagueness test.
Reno (Attorney General of the United States) vs American Civil Liberties
Union
Appeal from the united states district court for the eastern district of
Pennsylvania
No. 96-511. Argued March 19, 1997-Decided June 26, 1997
Two provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA or Act)
seek to protect minors from harmful material on the Internet, an international
network of interconnected computers that enables millions of people to
communicate with one another in "cyberspace" and to access vast amounts
of information from around the world. Title 47 U. S. C. A. §223(a)(1)(B)(ii)
(Supp. 1997) criminalizes the "knowing" transmission of "obscene or indecent"
messages to any recipient under 18 years of age. Section 223(d) prohibits the
"knowin[g]" sending or displaying to a person under 18 of any message "that,
in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs."
Affirmative defenses are provided for those who take "good faith, . . . effective
. . . actions" to restrict access by minors to the prohibited communications,
§223(e)(5)(A), and those who restrict such access by requiring certain
designated forms of age proof, such as a verified credit card or an adult
identification number, §223(e)(5)(B). A number of plaintiffs filed suit
challenging the constitutionality of §§223(a)(1) and 223(d). After making
extensive findings of fact, a three-judge District Court convened pursuant to
the Act entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of both
challenged provisions. The court's judgment enjoins the Government from
enforcing §223(a)(1)(B)'s prohibitions insofar as they relate to "indecent"
communications, but expressly preserves the Government's right to
investigate and prosecute the obscenity or child pornography activities
prohibited therein. The injunction against enforcement of §223(d) is
unqualified because that section contains no separate reference to obscenity
or child pornography. The Government appealed to this Court under the Act's
special review provisions, arguing that the District Court erred in holding that
the CDA violated both the First Amendment because it is overbroad and the
Fifth Amendment because it is vague.
Several litigants challenged the constitutionality of two provisions in the 1996
Communications Decency Act. Intended to protect minors from unsuitable
internet material, the Act criminalized the intentional transmission of "obscene
or indecent" messages as well as the transmission of information which
depicts or describes "sexual or excretory activities or organs" in a manner
deemed "offensive" by community standards. After being enjoined by a District
Court from enforcing the above provisions, except for the one concerning
obscenity and its inherent protection against child pornography, Attorney
General Janet Reno appealed directly to the Supreme Court as provided for
by the Act's special review provisions.
At issue is the constitutionality of two statutory provisions enacted to protect
minors from "indecent" and "patently offensive" communications on the
Internet. Notwithstanding the legitimacy and importance of the congressional
goal of protecting children from harmful materials, we agree with the three-
judge District Court that the statute abridges "the freedom of speech" protected
by the First Amendment.(1)
The District Court made extensive findings of fact, most of which were based
on a detailed stipulation prepared by the parties. See 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-
849 (ED Pa. 1996).(2) The findings describe the character and the dimensions
of the Internet, the availability of
sexually explicit material in that medium, and the problems confronting age
verification for recipients of Internet communications. Because those findings
provide the underpinnings for the legal issues, we begin with a summary of
the undisputed facts.
The Internet
The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers. It is the
outgrowth of what began in 1969 as a military program called "ARPANET,"(3)
which was designed to enable computers operated by the military, defense
contractors, and universities conducting defense-related research to
communicate with one another by redundant channels even if some portions
of the network were damaged in a war. While the ARPANET no longer exists,
it provided an example for the development of a number of civilian networks
that, eventually linking with each other, now enable tens of millions of people
to communicate with one another and to access vast amounts of information
from around the world. The Internet is "a unique and wholly new medium of
worldwide human communication.
Sexually explicit material on the Internet includes text, pictures, and chat and
"extends from the modestly titillating to the hardest-core."(11) These files are
created, named, and posted in the same manner as material that is not
sexually explicit, and may be accessed either deliberately or unintentionally
during the course of an imprecise search. "Once a provider posts its content
on the Internet, it cannot prevent that content from entering any
community."(12) Thus, for example, "when the UCR/California Museum of
Photography posts to its Web site nudes by Edward Weston and Robert
Mapplethorpe to announce that its new exhibit will travel to Baltimore and New
York City, those images are available not only in Los Angeles, Baltimore, and
New York City, but also in Cincinnati, Mobile, or Beijing-wherever Internet
users live. Similarly, the safer sex instructions that Critical Path posts to its
Web site, written in street language so that the teenage receiver can
understand them, are available not just in Philadelphia, but also in Provo and
Prague."
Age Verification
The problem of age verification differs for different uses of the Internet. The
District Court categorically determined that there "is no effective way to
determine the identity or the age of a user who is accessing material through
e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups or chat rooms."(20) The Government
offered no evidence that there was a reliable way to screen recipients and
participants in such fora for age. Moreover, even if it were technologically
feasible to block minors' access to newsgroups and chat rooms containing
discussions of art, politics or other subjects that potentially elicit "indecent" or
"patently offensive" contributions, it would not be possible to block their access
to that material and "still allow them access to the remaining content, even if
the overwhelming majority of that content was not indecent."
Issue:
Did certain provisions of the 1996 Communications Decency Act violate the
First and Fifth Amendments by being overly broad and vague in their
definitions of the types of internet communications which they criminalized?
Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that the Act violated the First Amendment because its
regulations amounted to a content-based blanket restriction of free speech.
The Act failed to clearly define "indecent" communications, limit its restrictions
to particular times or individuals (by showing that it would not impact adults),
provide supportive statements from an authority on the unique nature of
internet communications, or conclusively demonstrate that the transmission of
"offensive" material is devoid of any social value. The Court added that since
the First Amendment distinguishes between "indecent" and "obscene" sexual
expressions, protecting only the former, the Act could be saved from facial
overbreadth challenges if it dropped the words "or indecent" from its text. The
Court refused to address any Fifth Amendment issues.
Guingging vs CA
FACTS:
Cirse “Choy” Torralba, a broadcast journalist with two radio programs airing in
Visayasand Mindanao, filed a criminal complaint for libel against Segundo Lim
and petitioner, Guinguing for causing the publication of records of his criminal
cases as well as photographs of his arrest. The criminal records and photos
were published by means of a one-page advertisement paid for by Lim in the
Sunday Post, a weekly publication edited and published by petitioner.
Choy Torralba asserted that he has been acquitted and that the cases referred
to in the publication had already been settled. He sought the conviction of Lim
and Guinguing for libel and claims that such publication placed him in public
contempt and ridicule and was designed to degrade and malign his person
and destroy him as a broadcast journalist.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found the publication indeed libelous
declaring that malice, the most important element of libel, was present in this
case every defamatory publication prima facie implies malice on the part of
the author and publisher towards the person subject thereof.
The lower courts also ruled that publication of calumny even
against public officers or candidates for public office, according to the trial
court, is an offense most dangerous to the people. It deserves punishment
because the latter may be deceived thereby and reject the best and deserving
citizens to their great injury. Thus, petitioner prayed for reversal of the
judgment against him contending that his conviction by the lower courts
constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right to freedom of speech and
of the press.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the publication in the instant case is indeed libelous
RULING:
The lower courts applied the strict letter of the law. However, this Court is
compelled to delve deeper into the issue considering that changes in the
factual milieu evoked a change in the judgment applicable. Under the law,
criminal libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of
a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural
or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Thus, the
elements of libel are:
• Imputation of a discreditable actor condition to another;
• Publication of the imputation;
• Identity of the person defamed; and,
• Existence of malice.
However, in order to protect the constitutional guarantee of free speech,
additional rules were applied to libel cases involving public figures. Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong defined a public figure as a person who, by
his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or
calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and
his character, has become a 'public personage.'
The citizens have a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such
public figures, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about
their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case
of “public officials.” Public opinion may be the only instrument by which society
can attempt to influence their conduct. Thus, in libel cases involving public
figures, actual malice standard rule applies. As held in New York Times vs.
Sullivan and reiterated in Agiong vs. Comelec, even if the defamatory
statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless
the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual
malice — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.
Therefore, in order to justify a conviction for criminal libel against a public
figure, it must be established beyond reasonable doubt that the libelous
statements were made or published with actual malice. In the present case,
Torralba was a public figure, being a broadcast journalist who hosts a public
affairs program. By entering into this line of work, complainant in effect gave
the public a legitimate interest in his life. He likewise gave them a stake in
finding out if he himself had the integrity and character to have the right to
criticize others for their conduct.
Aside from the fact that the information contained in said publication was true,
the intention to let the public know the character of their radio commentator
can at best be subsumed under the mantle of having been done with good
motives and for justifiable ends. Since Torralba failed to establish actual
malice against Lim and Guingguing, the petition for reversal of the judgment
of libel against petitioner was granted.
Fermin vs People of the Philippines
Cristy Fermin is the publisher and Bogs Tugas is the editor-in-chief of Gossip
Tabloid
The June 14, 1995 headline and lead story of the tabloid says that it is
improbable for Annabelle Rama to go to the US should it be true that she is
evading her conviction in an estafa case herein the Philippines for she and
husband Eddie have more problems/cases to confront there. This was said to
be due to their, especially Annabelle's, using fellow Filipinos’ money, failure to
remit proceeds to the manufacturing company of the cookware they were
selling and not being on good terms with the latter.
“MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY
MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DOON SI ANNABELLE
IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI ANNABELLE DAHIL SA
KALAT DIN ANG ASUNTO NILA DUN, BUKOD PA SA NAPAKARAMING
PINOY NA HUMAHANTING SA KANILA MAS MALAKING PROBLEMA ANG
KAILANGAN NIYANG HARAPIN SA STATES DAHIL SA PERANG
NADISPALKO NILA, NAGHAHANAP LANG NG SAKIT NG KATAWAN SI
ANNABELLE KUNG SA STATES NGA NIYA MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA
NGAYON PARA LANG TAKASAN NIYA SI LIGAYA SANTOS AT ANG
SINTENSIYA SA KANYA”
When in truth and in fact, the accused very well knew that the same are entirely
false and untrue but were publicly made for no other purpose than to expose
said ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ to humiliation and disgrace, as it
depicts her to be a fugitive from justice and a swindler, thereby causing
dishonor, discredit and contempt upon the person of the offended party, to the
damage and prejudice of the said ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ.
Annabelle and Eddie filed libel cases against Fermin and Tugas before RTC
of QC, Br. 218.
RTC: Fermin and Tugas found guilty of libel.
CA: Tugas was acquitted on account of non-participation but Fermin's
conviction was affirmed.
Petitioner claims that there was no malice on her part because, allegedly, the
article was merely a fair and honest comment on the fact that Annabelle Rama
Gutierrez was issued a warrant of arrest for her conviction for estafa before
then Judge Palattaos court. She even cited as proof of her lack of malice the
purported absence of any ill will against complainants, as shown by the article
she wrote about complainants daughter Sharmaine Ruffa Gutierrez in the
June 15, 1995 issue of the same tabloid where she expressed her sympathy
and admiration for the latter.
When questioned by the SC, she said she was not paid for the defamations.
That she merely wanted to support her candidates in a fair and civilized
manner thru writing.
Fermin's motion for reconsideration was denied hence, this petition. She
argues that she had no knowledge and participation in the publication of the
article, that the article is not libelous and is covered by the freedom of the
press.
Issue: WON Cristy Fermin is guilty of libel?
Held/Ratio: YES.
Proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication is not required, if the
accused has been specifically identified as “author, editor, or proprietor” or
“printer/publisher “of the publication.
Petitioner was not only the “publisher,” but also the “president” and
“chairperson.”
Petitioner’s criminal guilt should be affirmed, whether or not she had actual
knowledge and participation.
The elements of libel were present.
Evident imputation of the crime of malversation (converting money for
personal use), of vices or defects for being fugitives from the law (evading
prosecution in America) and of being a wastrel (that Annabelle Rama Gutierrez
lost the earnings from their business through irresponsible gambling in
casinos).
Attribution made publicly. Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide circulation.
The victims were identified and identifiable.
The article reeks of malice, as it tends to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of the complainants.
Malice in law - the article was malicious in itself; the imputations were false.
Malice in fact - there was motive to talk ill against complainants during the
electoral campaign as Fermin is a close friend of Eddie's opponent in the
Congressional race
While complainants are considered public figures for being personalities in the
entertainment business, media people do not have the unbridled license to
malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and
malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or in print, about their
personal lives.
Note: CA erred in acquitting Tugas, he being the editor-in-chief. But the SC
cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial court convicting Bogs Tugas because
with his acquittal by the CA as that would run afoul of his constitutional right
against double jeopardy.
We must however take this opportunity to likewise remind media practitioners
of the high ethical standards attached to and demanded by their noble
profession. The danger of an unbridled irrational exercise of the right of free
speech and press, that is, in utter contempt of the rights of others and in willful
disregard of the cumbrous responsibilities inherent in it, is the eventual self-
destruction of the right and the regression of human society into a veritable
Hobbesian state of nature where life is short, nasty and brutish. Therefore, to
recognize that there can be no absolute unrestraint in speech is to truly
comprehend the quintessence of freedom in the marketplace of social thought
and action, genuine freedom being that which is limned by the freedom of
others. If there is freedom of the press, ought there not also be freedom from
the press? It is in this sense that self-regulation as distinguished from self-
censorship becomes the ideal mean for, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has
warned, [W]ithout x x x a lively sense of responsibility, a free press may readily
become a powerful instrument of injustice.
Lest we be misconstrued, this is not to diminish nor constrict that space in
which expression freely flourishes and operates. For we have always strongly
maintained, as we do now, that freedom of expression is mans birthright
constitutionally protected and guaranteed, and that it has become the singular
role of the press to act as its defensor fidei in a democratic society such as
ours. But it is also worth keeping in mind that the press is the servant, not the
master, of the citizenry, and its freedom does not carry with it an unrestricted
hunting license to prey on the ordinary citizen.
Tulfo vs People
FACTS:
Atty. Carlos Ding So of the Bureau of Customs filed and charged petitioners
Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing editor, Rey Salao,
as national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as
president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc., of the daily tabloid Remate, with
the crime of libel. That private respondent was indicated as an extortionist, a
corrupt public official, smuggler and having acquired his wealth illegally.
PINAKAMAYAMAN SA CUSTOMS
Ito palang si Atty. Ding So ng Intelligence Division ng Bureau of Customs and
[sic] pinakamayaman na yata na government official sa buong bansa sa
pangungurakot lamang diyan sa South Harbor.
Hindi matibag ang gagong attorney dahil malakas daw ito sa Iglesia ni Kristo.
Hoy, So! . . nakakahiya ka sa mga INC, ikaw na yata ang pinakagago at
magnanakaw na miyembro nito.
Balita ko, malapit ka nang itiwalag ng nasabing simbahan dahil sa mga
kalokohan mo.
Abangan bukas ang mga raket ni So sa BOC.
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public
official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated,
with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and ridiculing him
before the bar of public opinion.
RTC found petitioners guilty of the crime of Libel. CA affirmed the judgment of
the trial court. Hence, Tulfo appealed and raised that the said article is a
qualified privileged communication and is written without malice.
ISSUE:
Whether the articles of Tulfo are protected as qualified privileged
communication or are defamatory and written with malice, for which he would
be liable.
HELD:
Freedom of the press was given greater weight over the rights of individuals
however, such freedom is not absolute and unbounded. The exercise of this
right or any right enshrined in the Bill of Rights, indeed, comes with an equal
burden of responsible exercise of that right. The recognition of a right is not
free license for the one claiming it to run roughshod over the rights of others.
The exercise of press freedom must be done consistent with good faith and
reasonable care. This was clearly abandoned by Tulfo when he wrote the
subject articles. This is no case of mere error or honest mistake, but a case of
a journalist abdicating his responsibility to verify his story and instead
misinforming the public. Journalists may be allowed an adequate margin of
error in the exercise of their profession, but this margin does not expand to
cover every defamatory or injurious statement they may make in the
furtherance of their profession, nor does this margin cover total abandonment
of responsibility.
Petition is dismissed. The CA decision is affirmed with modification.
The press wields enormous power. Through its widespread reach and the
information it imparts, it can mold and shape thoughts and opinions of the
people. It can turn the tide of public opinion for or against someone, it can build
up heroes or create villains.
It is in the interest of society to have a free press, to have liberal discussion
and dissemination of ideas, and to encourage people to engage in healthy
debate. It is through this that society can progress and develop.
Those who would publish under the aegis of freedom of the press must also
acknowledge the corollary duty to publish responsibly. To show that they have
exercised their freedom responsibly, they must go beyond merely relying on
unfounded rumors or shadowy anonymous sources. There must be further
investigation conducted, some shred of proof found to support allegations of
misconduct or even criminal activity. It is in fact too easy for journalists to
destroy the reputation and honor of public officials, if they are not required to
make the slightest effort to verify their accusations. Journalists are supposed
to be reporters of facts, not fiction, and must be able to back up their stories
with solid research. The power of the press and the corresponding duty to
exercise that power judiciously cannot be understated.
But even with the need for a free press, the necessity that it be free does not
mean that it be totally unfettered. It is still acknowledged that the freedom can
be abused, and for the abuse of the freedom, there must be a corresponding
sanction. It falls on the press to wield such enormous power responsibly. It
may be a clich that the pen is mightier than the sword, but in this particular
case, the lesson to be learned is that such a mighty weapon should not be
wielded recklessly or thoughtlessly, but always guided by conscience and
careful thought.
A robust and independently free press is doubtless one of the most effective
checks on government power and abuses. Hence, it behooves government
functionaries to respect the value of openness and refrain from concealing
from media corruption and other anomalous practices occurring within their
backyard. On the other hand, public officials also deserve respect and
protection against false innuendoes and unfounded accusation of official
wrongdoing from an abusive press. As it were, the law and jurisprudence on
libel heavily tilt in favor of press freedom. The common but most unkind
perception is that government institutions and their officers and employees are
fair game to official and personal attacks and even ridicule. And the practice
on the ground is just as disconcerting. Reports and accusation of official
misconduct often times merit front page or primetime treatment, while
defenses set up, retraction issued, or acquittal rendered get no more, if ever,
perfunctory coverage. The unfairness needs no belaboring. The balm of clear
conscience is sometimes not enough.
Perhaps lost in the traditional press freedom versus government impasse is
the fact that a maliciously false imputation of corruption and dishonesty against
a public official, as here, leaves a stigmatizing mark not only on the person but
also the office to which he belongs. In the ultimate analysis, public service also
unduly suffers.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161032 and
161176 are DISMISSED. The CA Decision dated June 17, 2003 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 25318 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that in lieu of
imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon petitioners shall be a fine of six
thousand pesos (PhP 6,000) for each count of libel, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, while the award of actual damages and
exemplary damages is DELETED.
US vs Bustos
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga
assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive
Secretary(privileged communication) through the law office of Crossfield and
O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan,
justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance
in office and asking for his removal. The specific charges against the justice of
the peace include the solicitation of money from persons who have pending
cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a
writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous
against him.
In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to the Executive Secretary
regarding charges against Roman Punsalan, the justice of the peace of
Macabebe. They wanted to oust him from his office.
Specific allegations against him included bribery charges, involuntary
servitude, and theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges were proved.
But, the judge still found him guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution and one
Jaime, an auxiliary justice, instigated the charges against him for personal
reasons. He was acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General but it wasn’t acted
upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced them to
pay 10 pesos or suffer imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made by
Punsalan. The trial court denied the motion. All except 2 of the defendants
appealed. Making assignments of error.
• The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
• Error in not holding that the libelous statement was not privileged
• Error in not acquitting defendants
• Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond reasonable
doubt.
• Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous statements
were true.
• Error in sustaining the prosecution’s objection to the introduction in
evidence by the accused of the affidavits upon which the petition
forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
• Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in
advertently interposed by their counsel to the admission in
evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the
accusation in this case arose.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman
Punsalan, justice of the peace in Pampanga.
Held:
Yes. Defendants acquitted. Freedom of speech was non existent in the
country before 1900. There were small efforts at reform made by the La
Solidaridad. The Malolos Constitution, on the other hand, guaranteed freedom
of speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid down the tenet Magna
Charta of Philippine Liberty when he wrote, “that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people
to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." This was in the Philippine Bill.
In the Amrican cases it was held, there were references to “public opinion
should be the constant source of liberty and democracy.” It also said “the
guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial
conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern.
Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper
comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the
same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled.
Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be
tyranny of the basest sort.”
“It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the
investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know
of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any
public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire
into and punish them.”
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican
institutions and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means
a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply,
without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government
for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of
course, assume responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public opinion. The doctrine of
privilege has been the result of this. Privilged communications may in some
instances afford an immunity to the slanderer. Public policy is the “unfettered
administration of justice.”
Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified privilege is prima facie which
may be lost by proof of malice. This is apparent in complaints made in good
faith against a public official’s conduct having a duty in the matter. Even if the
statements were found to be false, the protection of privilege may cover the
individual given that it was in good faith. There must be a sense of duty and
not a self-seeking motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is
privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be
slanderous and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege
destroys that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff.
The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the
true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will
amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private
person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges might also
under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government
official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace
dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office
are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a
simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of
charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly
privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further,
although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they
were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action.
Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office
existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure
the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In
no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly
seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of
a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of
first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was
given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice
of the peace was proper.
Policarpio vs Manila Times
Policarpio was executive secretary of UNESCO Nat’l Commission. As such,
she had filed charges against Herminia Reyes, one of her subordinates in the
Commission, & caused the latter to be separated from the service. Reyes, in
turn, filed counter-charges which were referred for investigation.
Pending completion, Reyes filed a complaint against Policarpio for alleged
malversation of public funds & another complaint for estafa thru falsification of
public documents. Policarpio filed a libel suit to Manila Times Publishing Co.
for publishing two defamatory, libelous and false articles/news items in
Saturday Mirror of August 11, 1956 and in the Daily Mirror of August 13, 1956
which are as follows: Saturday Mirror (Aug 11, 1956): “WOMAN OFFICIAL
SUED PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUDS Unesco Official Head
Accused on Supplies, Funds Use by Colleague” Daily Mirror (Aug 13, 1956):
“PALACE OPENS INVESTIGATION OF RAPS AGAINST POLICARPIO Alba
Probes Administrative Phase of Fraud Charges Against Unesco Woman
Official; Fiscal Sets Prelim Quiz of Criminal Suit on Aug 22” The articles
contain news on Reyes’ charges against Policarpio for having malversed
public property and of having fraudulently sought reimbursement of supposed
official expenses.
It was said that Policarpio used several sheets of government stencils for her
private and personal use. The other charge refers to the supposed
reimbursements she had made for a trip to Quezon and Pangasinan. Reyes’
complaint alleged that Policarpio had asked for refund of expenses for use of
her car when she had actually made the trip aboard an army plane. Policarpio
was said to be absent from the Bayambang conference for which she also
sought a refund of expenses. CFI dismissed the complaint on the ground that
the plaintiff had not proven that defendants had acted maliciously in publishing
the articles, although portions thereof were inaccurate or false.
Plaintiff Lumen Policarpio seeks to recover P150,000.00, as actual damages,
P70,000, as moral damages, P60,000 as correctional and exemplary
damages, and P20,000, as attorney's fees, aside from the costs, by reason of
the publication in the Saturday Mirror of August 11, 1956, and in the Daily
Mirror of August 13, 1956, of two (2) articles or news items which are claimed
to be per se defamatory, libelous and false, and to have exposed her to
ridicule, jeopardized her integrity, good name and business and official
transactions, and caused her grave embarrassment, untold and extreme
moral, mental and physical anguish and incalculable material, moral,
professional and business damages.
The defendants are The Manila Times Publishing Co., Inc., as publisher of
The Saturday Mirror and The Daily Mirror, which are newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines, and Constante C. Roldan, Manuel V. Villa-Real,
E. Aguilar Cruz and Consorcio Borje, as the reporter or author of the first article
and the managing editor, the associate editor and the news editor,
respectively, of said newspapers
Issue:
WON the defendant is guilty of having published libelous/defamatory articles
Ruling:
Yes. The headline of the Aug 11 article was given prominence with a 6-column
(about 11 inches) banner headline of 1-inch types. Its sub-title – ‘PCAC raps
Policarpio on fraud” – printed in bold 1 cm type is not true. Also, the statement
in the 1st paragraph of the article, to the effect that plaintiff “was charged with
malversation & estafa by the Presidential Complaint & Action Commission”
(PCAC) is not true, the complaints for said offenses having been filed by
Reyes. Neither is it true that said “criminal action was initiated as a result of
current administrative investigation.”
Plaintiff maintains that the effect of these false statements was to give the
general impression that said investigation by Col. Alba had shown that plaintiff
was guilty and that, as a consequence, PCAC had filed the corresponding
complaints w/ the fiscal’s office. She also said that the article did not mention
that fact that the number of stencils involved in the charge was only 18 or 20;
that the sum allegedly misappropriated by her was only P54, and that the
falsification imputed to her was said to have been committed by claiming that
certain expenses for which she had sought reimbursement were incurred in
trips during the period from July 1 – Sept 30 1955, although the trips actually
were made from Jul 8-Aug 31, 1955. By omitting these details, plaintiff avers
that the Aug 11 article had the effect of conveying the idea that the offenses
imputed to her were more serious than they really were.
Defendants contend that though the complaints were filed, not by the PCAC
but by Reyes, this inaccuracy is insignificant & immaterial to the case for the
fact is that said complaints were filed. As regards the number of sheets & the
nature of the falsification charged, they argue that these “details” do not affect
the truthfulness of the article as a whole. Besides, defendants had no means
of knowing such “details.” Prior to Aug 11, Col. Alba had already taken the
testimony of witnesses; hence, defendants could have ascertained the
“details” had they wanted to. The number of stencil sheets used was actually
mentioned in the Aug 13 article. Moreover, the penalty for
estafa/embezzlement depends partly upon the amount of the damage caused
to the offended party.
Hence, the amount or value of the property embezzled is material to said
offense. It is obvious that the filing of criminal complaints by another agency
of the Government, like the PCAC, particularly after an investigation
conducted by the same, imparts the ideal that the probability of guilt is greater
than when the complaints are filed by a private individual, especially when the
latter is a former subordinate of the alleged offender, who was responsible for
the dismissal of the complainant from her employment. Newspapers must
enjoy a certain degrees of discretion in determining the manner in which a
given event should be presented to the public, and the importance to be
attached thereto, as a news item, and that its presentation in a sensational
manner is not per se illegal.
Newspapers may publish news items relative to judicial, legislative or other
official proceedings, which are not of confidential nature, because the public
is entitled to know the truth with respect to such proceedings. But, to enjoy
immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must be not only
true, but, also, fair, and it must be made in good faith and without any
comments or remarks. Art. 354, RPC provides that “Every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious even if it be true, if no good intention
and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except, “A fair and true report,
made in good faith, w/o any comments or remarks….” In the case at bar, aside
from containing information derogatory to the plaintiff, the Aug 11 article
presented her in a worse predicament than that in which she, in fact was. Said
article was not a fair and true report of the proceedings therein alluded to.
What is more, its sub-title “PCAC raps Policarpio on fraud” is a comment or
remark, besides being false. Accordingly, the defamatory imputations
contained in said article are “presumed to be malicious” In falsely stating that
the complaints were filed by PCAC, either defendants knew the truth or they
did not.
If they did, then the publication would actually be malicious. I f they did not, or
if they acted under a misapprehension of the facts, they were guilty of
negligence in making said statement. We note that the Aug 13 article rectified
a major inaccuracy in the 1st article, by stating that neither Col. Alba nor the
PCAC had filed the complaints. It likewise indicated the number of stencil
sheets involved. But, this rectification or clarification does not wipe out the
responsibility arising from the publication of the Aug 11 article, although it
should mitigate it. HELD: Decision reversed. Defendants ordered to pay
plaintiff moral damages, atty’s fees plus cost.
Lopez vs CA
Facts:
January 1956 – Front-page story on the Manila Chronicle à Fidel Cruz,
sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, sent distress signals to
US Airforce planes which forwarded such message to Manila
An American Army plane dropped emergency sustenance kits on the beach
of the island which contained, among other things, a two way radio set. Using
the radio set Cruz reported to the authorities in Manila that the locals were
living in terror due to a series of killings committed on the island since
Christmas of 1955.
Philippine defense forces (scout rangers) were immediately deployed to the
babuyan claro. They were led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion who discovered
that Cruz only fabricated the story about the killings to get attention. Cruz
merely wanted transportation home to Manila.
Major Encarnacion branded the fiasco as a “hoax” à the same word to be used
by the newspapers who covered the same
January 13, 1956 - This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, edited by
Gatbonton devoted a pictorial article to it. It claimed that despite the story of
Cruz being a hoax it brought to light the misery of the people living in that
place, with almost everybody sick, only 2 individuals able to read and write
and food and clothing being scarce
January 29, 1956 - This Week Magazineà in the "January News Quiz" made
reference to Cruz as “a health inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his
isolated post, cooked up a story about a murderer running loose on the island
of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to civilization.” à Called it “Hoax
of the year”
In both issues photos of a Fidel Cruz were published but both photos were of
a different person of the same name à Fidel G. Cruz former mayor, business
man, contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan
January 27, 1957 à published statements correcting their misprint and
explained that confusion and error happened due to the rush to meet the Jan
13th issue’s deadline
Cruz sued herein petitioners for libel in CFI Manila. Cruz won and was
awarded P11,000 in damages (5k actual, 5k moral, 1k attorney’s fees)
CA affirmed CFI decision hence this case
Issue:
WON petitioners should be held liable for their error in printing the wrong Fidel
Cruz’s photo in relation to the “hoax of the year”?
WON such error is sufficient ground for an action for libel to prosper?
Held:
Yes they are liable but damages awarded to Cruz is reduced to P1,000.00
Ratio:
1. Mistake is no excuse to absolve publishers because libel is harmful on
its face by the fact that it exposes the injured party to more than trivial ridicule,
whether it is fact or opinion is irrelevant.
Citing Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui à libel is "malicious defamation, expressed
either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, ..., tending to
blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or
reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and
thereby "pose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule,"
Citing standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel à "Publication of a
person's photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person, is
a libel on the person whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the
article are imputed to such person."
In this case à 3rd person was Cruz à his picture being published beside the
article imputes him as the purveyor of the hoax of the year
2. Libel cannot be used to curtail press freedom however it also can not
claim any talismanic immunity form constitutional limitations
o State interest in press freedom à citing Justice Malcolm: Full discussion of
public affairs is necessary for the maintenance of good governance… “Public
officials must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments on official
acts”…”of course criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as an
individual is less than the state, so must expected criticism be born for the
common good.”
So long as it was done in good faith, the press should have the legal right to
have and express their opinions on legal questions. To deny them that right
would be to infringe upon freedom of the press.
“Last word on the subject” à Citing Quisumbing v. Lopez: Press should be
given leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively
perform their important role in our democracy
Freedom of the press ranks high in the hierarchy of legal values
TEST of LIABLITY à must prove there was actual malice in publishing the
story/photo! (Note: but this was not done in this case)
4. Citing Concepcion, CJ. à Correction of error in publishing does not wipe
out the responsibility arising from the publication of the original article
Correction = Mitigating circumstance not a justifying circumstance!
Dissent: Dizon, J.
Manila Chronicle should be absolved because:
No evidence of actual malice
The article does not ascribe anything immoral or any moral turpitude to Cruz
The negligence performed by Manila Chronicle is this case should be
considered “excusable negligence”
NY Times vs Sullivan
In 1960, the New York Times ran a full-page advertisement paid for by civil
right activists. The ad openly criticized the police department in the city of
Montgomery, Alabama for its treatment of civil rights protestors. Most of the
descriptions in the ad were accurate, but some of the statements were false.
The police commissioner, L. B. Sullivan, took offense to the ad and sued the
New York Times in an Alabama court. Sullivan argued that the ad had
damaged his reputation, and he had been libeled. The Alabama court ruled in
favor of Sullivan, finding that the newspaper ad falsely represented the police
department and Sullivan. After losing an appeal in the Supreme Court of
Alabama, the New York Times took its case to the United States Supreme
Court arguing that the ad was not meant to hurt Sullivan's reputation and was
protected under the First Amendment.
Decided together with Abernathy v. Sullivan, this case concerns a full-page ad
in the New York Times which alleged that the arrest of the Rev. Martin Luther
King, Jr. for perjury in Alabama was part of a campaign to destroy King's efforts
to integrate public facilities and encourage blacks to vote. L. B. Sullivan, the
Montgomery city commissioner, filed a libel action against the newspaper and
four black ministers who were listed as endorsers of the ad, claiming that the
allegations against the Montgomery police defamed him personally. Under
Alabama law, Sullivan did not have to prove that he had been harmed; and a
defense claiming that the ad was truthful was unavailable since the ad
contained factual errors. Sullivan won a $500,000 judgment.
Issue:
Did Alabama's libel law, by not requiring Sullivan to prove that an
advertisement personally harmed him and dismissing the same as untruthful
due to factual errors, unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment's
freedom of speech and freedom of press protections?
Ruling:
The Court held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all
statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when
statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or
in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity). Under this new standard,
Sullivan's case collapsed.
The United States Supreme Court unanimously ruled in favor of the
newspaper. The Court said the right to publish all statements is protected
under the First Amendment. The Court also said in order to prove libel, a public
official must show that what was said against them was made with actual
malice – "that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for
the truth."
The conclusion that the Constitution affords the citizen and the press an
absolute privilege for criticism of official conduct does not leave the public
official without defenses against unsubstantiated opinions or deliberate
misstatements.
"Under our system of government, counterargument and education are the
weapons available to expose these matters, not abridgment . . . of free speech.
. . ."
The requirement of proving actual malice or reckless disregard may, in the
mind of the jury, add little to the requirement of proving falsity, a requirement
which the Court recognizes not to be an adequate safeguard. The thought
suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson in United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78,
322 U. S. 92-93, is relevant here:
"As a matter of either practice or philosophy, I do not see how we can separate
an issue as to what is believed from considerations as to what is believable.
The most convincing proof that one believes his statements is to show that
they have been true in his experience. Likewise, that one knowingly falsified
is best proved by showing that what he said happened never did happen."
Garrison vs Louisiana
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Louisiana Supreme Court, finding that
criminal sanctions for defamation, even when the speech was true, were in
violation of constitutional freedom of speech provisions, and that existing
criminal defamation laws must be narrowly tailored to target only speech
intending to lead to group disorder or inciting a breach of the peace. The
Louisiana District Attorney issued disparaging comments about members of
the judiciary alleging inefficiency and excessive vacation time. The Court
reasoned that the Constitution limits state power to impose criminal sanctions
for criticism of the official conduct of public officials as it does in respect of civil
sanctions unless the criticisms are made with “actual malice” (New York Times
v Sullivan). Further, anything which might touch on an official’s fitness for office
is relevant so personal attributes such as dishonesty, malfeasance, or
improper motivation are relevant to official conduct even though they may also
affect the official’s private character.
The Louisiana District Attorney, in a press conference, issued disparaging
comments about members of the judiciary alleging inefficiency and excessive
vacation time. He was tried and convicted under the Louisiana Criminal
Defamation Statute, which, in the context of criticism of official conduct,
includes punishment for true statements made with “actual malice” in the
sense of ill-will, as well as false statements if made with ill-will or without
reasonable belief that they were true.
The District Attorney appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, alleging the
conviction violated his freedom of speech rights. the Louisiana Supreme Court
rejected the argument and affirmed the conviction. This appeal followed.
On November 2, 1962, Jim Garrison, the District Attorney for the Parish of
New Orleans, held a press conference in which he issued a statement
disparaging the judicial conduct of the eight judges of the Parish’s Criminal
District Court. He attributed the backlog of pending cases to the judges’
inefficiency, laziness, and excessive vacations. Based on these statements,
Garrison was tried and convicted of defamation under the Louisiana Criminal
Defamation Statute, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed. Garrison
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and argued that the statute impermissibly
infringed on his First Amendment rights to freedom of expression.
Issue:
Does the Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute unconstitutionally infringe on
the First Amendment’s protection of the freedom of speech?
Ruling:
Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority.
The Court held that a criminal libel statute should conform to the same
restrictions as civil libel statutes to protect the freedom of expression under
the First Amendment. Therefore, such statutes may only criminalize
statements that are knowingly false or made with a reckless disregard for their
truth or falsity. This limitation on libel statutes is in line with the precedent the
Court established in New York Times v. Sullivan, and there is no reason that
the freedom of speech protections should apply differently to a civil libel statute
than to a criminal one. Based on this standard, the Louisiana Criminal
Defamation Statute is unconstitutionally broad and infringes on the First
Amendment’s protections of free speech.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Hugo L. Black wrote that the First
Amendment protects citizens from being punished by the government for
expressing an opinion, and therefore there should be no law permitting
criminal punishment for libel. Justice William O. Douglas joined in the
concurrence. Justice Douglas wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he
argued that that the standard the majority opinion seeks to apply to criminal
libel statutes does not adequately protect the freedom of speech. Justice Black
joined in the concurring opinion. In his separate concurring opinion, Justice
Arthur J. Goldberg wrote that the Constitution protects the absolute right of
citizens and the press to criticize official conduct.
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court reversing the Louisiana
Supreme Court.
The issue for the Court was whether, relying on the decision in N.Y. Times v.
Sullivan, the Constitution “limits state power to impose criminal sanctions for
criticism of the official conduct of public officials” as it does in respect of civil
sanctions” unless the criticisms are made with “actual malice” [p. 2]. The Court
found that it does, because, where criticism of public officials is concerned,
there was no merit in the argument that criminal libel statutes serve interests
distinct from those served by civil libel laws, and therefore should not be
subject to the same limitations.
The Court noted that generally criminal law is reserved for those crimes that
threaten the security of society and criminal sanctions cannot be justified
merely by the fact defamation is evil or damaging to a person in ways that may
entitle him to maintain a civil suit. It observed that some narrowly drawn
criminal defamation statutes had been upheld, such as those targeting words
intended to lead to group disorder or incitement, but that that did not apply in
the present case.
The Court took issue with the lower court’s characterization of the District
Attorney’s statements as an attack upon the personal integrity of the judges,
rather than on official conduct. Despite the use of words such as ‘racketeer
influences’ which suggests that a person has been influenced to practice
fraud, deceit, trickery, cheating, and dishonesty, the Court said that the
statements could not be considered as constituting a purely private
defamation. It said that the accusation concerned the judges’ conduct of the
business of the Criminal District Court and that “any criticism of the manner in
which a public official performs his duties will tend to affect his private, as well
as his public, reputation” and “anything which might touch on an official’s
fitness for office is relevant. Few personal attributes are more germane to
fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even
though these characteristics may also affect the official’s private character.”
The Court said that public discourse would be chilled on matters of public
concern if the speakers were subject to potential criminal liability for speaking
out on matters of opinion in their criticism and therefore found the Louisiana
State statute unconstitutionally imposed criminal sanctions for criticism of
public officials. “For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-
expression; it is the essence of self-government” [p. 5]. It said that no true
statement should be the subject of criminal or civil sanctions, especially when
that speech is of a matter of public concern. The Court also noted in several
footnotes the multitude of jurisdictions that allow truth as a defense to
defamation charges.
Applying the principles of the New York Times case, the Court held that the
Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute statute incorporated constitutionally
invalid standards in the context of criticism of the official conduct of public
officials. It said that, “[co]ntrary to the New York Times rule, which absolutely
prohibits punishment of truthful criticism, whereas false statements are only
actionable if made with actual malice,” the Statute imposed punishment for
true statements made with “actual malice”, where actual malice was defined
as ill-will and not in the New York Times v Sullivan sense of “with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”.
Therefore, the Court reversed the lower court finding the statute an
impermissible restraint on freedom of speech.
Justice Black, Justice Goldberg, and Justice Douglas concurred in the
judgment, finding that the Court should have taken the decision one step
farther, outlawing all statutes which attempt to criminalize libel.
Curtis Publishing Co. vs Butts
In No. 37, respondent brought a diversity libel action in federal court seeking
compensatory and punitive damages for an article which was published in
petitioner's magazine accusing respondent of conspiring to "fix" a football
game between the University of Alabama and the University of Georgia, where
he was privately employed as the athletic director. The article was based upon
an affidavit concerning a telephone conversation between respondent and the
Alabama coach which the affiant, Burnett, had accidentally overheard.
Respondent challenged the truth of the article and claimed a serious departure
by the magazine from good investigative standards of the accuracy of its
charges amounting to reckless and wanton conduct.
He submitted evidence at the trial showing, inter alia, that petitioner's
magazine, which had instituted a policy of "sophisticated muckraking," knew
that Burnett was on criminal probation but had published the story without any
independent support for his affidavit; that it did not, before publication, view his
notes (the information in which, if not valueless, would be readily available to
any coach); that the magazine did not interview a person with Burnett when
the phone call was overheard, view the game films, or check for any
adjustments in Alabama's plans after the information was divulged, and that
the magazine assigned the story to a writer not a football expert and made no
effort to have such an expert check the story.
The jury was instructed on the issue of truth as a defense and was also
instructed that it could award punitive damages and could assess the reliability
and the nature of the sources of the magazine's information and its care in
checking the assertions, considerations relevant tn determining whether the
magazine had proceeded with "wanton and reckless indifference."
The jury returned a verdict of general and punitive damages which was
reduced by remittitur. The trial court rejected the defense's new trial motion
based on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (which was decided
after the filing of the complaint in and trial of this case), holding that decision
in applicable to one like petitioner not a public official. It also held the evidence
amply supported the conclusion that the magazine had acted in reckless
disregard of whether the article was false or not.
The Court of Appeals affirmed on the merits. It did not reach the constitutional
claim based on New York Times, holding that petitioner had waived the right
to make that challenge, since some of its lawyers had been involved in the
latter case, yet the defense was based solely on the issue of truth. In No. 150,
petitioner, a news association, published a dispatch about a massive riot on
the University of Mississippi campus attending federal efforts to enforce a
court decree ordering a Negro's enrollment.
The dispatch stated that respondent, a politically prominent figure whose
statements on federal intervention had been widely publicized, had taken
command of the violent crowd and led a charge against federal marshals trying
to enforce the court's decree, had encouraged violence and given technical
advice to the rioters. Respondent brought a libel action in the Texas state
courts for compensatory and punitive damages. Petitioner's defense was
based on truth and constitutional rights. The evidence showed that the
dispatch had been made on the scene and almost immediately reported to the
petitioner by a competent correspondent. There was no significant showing of
improper preparation of the dispatch, or any prejudice by petitioner or its
correspondent. The jury was instructed that compensatory damages could be
awarded if the dispatch was not substantially true and that punitive damages
could be added if the article was actuated by ill will or entire want of care. The
jury returned a verdict for both compensatory and punitive damages. The trial
court refused to enter an award for the latter. The court held New York Times
inapplicable, but that, if applicable, it would require a verdict for the petitioner,
since there was no evidence of malice. Both sides appealed. The Texas Court
of Civil Appeals affirmed, and the Texas Supreme Court denied review.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) the Court held that public officials in
libel cases must show that a statement was made "with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." These two
cases concern libel as it pertains to public figures who are not public officials.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts concerns an article published in the March 23,
1963 edition of The Saturday Evening Post alleging that former University of
Georgia football coach Wallace Butts conspired with University of Alabama
coach Paul "Bear" Bryant to fix a 1962 football game in Alabama's favor.
The article's source was George Burnett, an Atlanta insurance salesman who
had allegedly overheard a telephone conversation between the coaches. Butts
brought and won a libel suit against Curtis Publishing, owner of the periodical.
Soon after the Court's ruling in New York Times, Curtis moved for a new trial.
The trial judge rejected the argument because Butts was not a public official.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision
on the basis that Curtis had waived any constitutional challenges by not raising
such questions at trial. Associated Press v. Walker concerns dispatch reports
of rioting that occurred on the campus of the University of Mississippi on
September 30, 1962. The dispatches, authored by a correspondent on the
scene, reported that Edwin A. Walker, a private citizen and political activist,
had personally led a violent crowd attempting to prevent federal marshals from
enforcing the court-ordered enrollment of an African-American.
Walker denied the report, and filed a libel suit in the state courts of Texas. A
jury found in Walker's favor, but the judge in the case refused to award punitive
damages, finding that there was no malicious intent. The judge also
specifically noted that New York Times was inapplicable. On appeal, the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals agreed. The Supreme Court of Texas declined
to hear the case.
Issue:
1. In light of the Court's ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, were
the allegations made against Butts and Walker libelous?
 2. Do the constitutional safeguards required under New York Times
v. Sullivan apply to a public figure who is not a public official?
Ruling:
1. In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice John M. Harlan, the Court
noted significant differences between the circumstances of these
cases and those of New York Times. In particular, criticism of Butts
or Walker, unlike a government official, could not be conflated with
criticism of public policy. Thus, the Court reasoned that public
figures who are not public officials may recover damages for libel
stemming from false reports based on "highly unreasonable
conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible
publishers." The Court concluded that Curtis' investigation of its
allegations against Butts failed to meet this standard. The company
printed a questionably reliable source's allegations without any
attempt to verify his claims, and the story in question was not a
pressing event or immediately newsworthy. The Court thus
affirmed the lower courts' denial of a retrial. The situation in Butts
contrasted with Walker, where the AP relied on a correspondent on
the scene of an event that was immediately newsworthy. The Court
thus denied Walker's claims to damages.
2. Yes. Judgments affirmed.
Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) argued that the actions cannot be analogized
to prosecutions for seditious libel. Neither of the Plaintiffs has any position in
government, which would permit a recovery by him to be viewed as a
vindication of governmental policy. Neither of the Plaintiffs was entitled to a
special privilege protecting his utterances against accountability in libel.
“Speech can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda, [and] free
debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmental policies.”
Both Plaintiffs commanded a substantial amount of independent public interest
at the times of the publications. Both had sufficient public interest and sufficient
access to the means of counterargument to be able to expose though
discussion the falsehood and fallacies of the defamatory statements.
Libel actions of the present type cannot be left entirely to state libel laws. Both
the Plaintiffs commanded a substantial amount of independent public interest
at the time of the publications. The Supreme Court holds that a public figure is
subject to the same standards for recovery from libel as a public official.
Looking at the evidence in the cases, the Supreme Court finds that Plaintiff
No. 1 has meet the standard set forth in New York Times and Plaintiff No. 2
has not.
Dissent. Justice Hugo Black (J. Black) argued that it is time for the Supreme
Court to abandon New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and adopt the rule to the
effect that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)
was intended to leave the press free from the harassment of libel judgments.
Concurrence. Chief Justice Earl Warren (J. Warren) stated that the
differentiation between public figures and public officials has no basis in law,
logic, or the First Amendment of the Constitution. Public figures like public
officials play an influential role in ordering society. Plaintiff No. 2’s should be
reversed, as there was only evidence of negligence. As for Plaintiff No. 1’s
case J. Warren was satisfied that the evidence discloses the reckless
disregard for the truth.
Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) argues that the evidence unmistakably
would support a judgment for Plaintiff No. 1 under the New York Times
standard.
Rosenbloom vs Metromedia
The judicial travails in defamation cases took the United States Supreme Court
further.
In New York Times versus Sullivan, the actual malice standard was galvanized
as the applicable rule in defamation cases involving public officials in relation
to their official conduct. In the same year, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the
actual malice doctrine in criminal cases in Garrison vs. Louisiana.
In 1967, the actual malice doctrine was held applicable to public figures, and
not just public officials in a divided court in Curtis Publishing Co. vs. Butts.
The next case the U.S. Supreme ruled upon was a case involving plaintiffs
who were neither public officials nor public figures, but private individuals.
There was a seeming trend to provide greater accommodations to press
freedom as the Supreme Court introduced a new standard, which is the public
interest standard.
In the case of Rosenbloom vs. Metromedia Inc. (1971) the Supreme Court
applied the actual malice standard regardless of the status of the plaintiff, as
long as the matter involved was one of public interest.
This became a highly controversial case, in view of the very wide latitude
accorded to the press in defamation cases.
But more significantly, the Rosenbloom case in the United States would be
relevant to later defamation cases decided by the Philippine Supreme Court,
which I will discuss later.
George Rosenbloom distributed nudist magazines in the Philadelphia area.
Police arrested him at his home on obscenity charges and seized several of
the magazines. A local news broadcast, run by Metromedia, Inc., reported on
the arrest, but failed to use the words “allegedly” or “reportedly” in during one
broadcast. In subsequent broadcasts, the reporters called Rosenbloom and
other similar distributors “girlie look peddlers” and “smut distributors”.
Eventually, Rosenbloom was acquitted on the obscenity charges.
Rosenbloom then sued Metromedia for libel. The district court held that the
First Amendment standard, which allowed recovery of damages only for
knowingly and recklessly false statements, did not apply because Rosenbloom
was not a public official or figure. The court instead instructed the jury to award
damages where Metromedia did not use reasonable care to discern the truth
before broadcasting. The jury awarded Rosenbloom general and punitive
damages, although the district court reduced the punitive damages. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the knowingly and
recklessly false standard applied.
Issue:
Whether the New York Times' knowing-or-reckless-falsity standard applies in
a state civil libel action brought not by a "public official" or a "public figure" but
by a private individual for a defamatory falsehood uttered in a news broadcast
by a radio station about the individual's involvement in an event of public or
general interest
Held:
The actual malice standard applies.
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become
less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some
sense the individual did not "voluntarily" choose to become involved.
The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct
of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not
the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety. The present case illustrates the
point.
The community has a vital interest in the proper enforcement of its criminal
laws, particularly in an area such as obscenity where a number of highly
important values are potentially in conflict: the public has an interest both in
seeing that the criminal law is adequately enforced and in assuring that the
law is not used unconstitutionally to suppress free expression. Whether the
person involved is a famous large-scale magazine distributor or a "private"
businessman running a corner newsstand has no relevance in ascertaining
whether the public has an interest in the issue. We honor the commitment to
robust debate on public issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment, by
extending constitutional protection to all discussion and communication
involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the
persons involved are famous or anonymous.
Soliven vs Makasiar
While the President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from
instituting suit. The privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by
virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by
any other person in the President's behalf.
Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case
actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is
deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility
of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In
satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses.
Facts:
Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran
argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit
impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit,
she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her
under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her
privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would
be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also
contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged
character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed
would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.
Issues:
(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for
libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima
faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently,
by the President;
(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when
respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable
cause; and
(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may
initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a
complaint-affidavit.
Held:
(1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary
investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-
affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving
his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law
does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-
affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is
required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-
affidavits if he is so minded.
(2) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure,
he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden
with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints
instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their
courts.
(3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from
suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time,
also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of
the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other
person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which
the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a
defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection
afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other
person.
(4) Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts. Court finds no basis at this
stage to rule on the “chilling effect” point. (Beltran vs. Makasiar, G.R. No.
82585 November 14, 1988)
Ayer Production vs Judge Capulong
Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production
company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial
viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful
struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The
Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government
agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film
production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented
in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real
events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. David
Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University
of New South Wales) is an American historian have developed a script.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction
and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in
any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or
commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of
Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the
projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his
right to privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and
making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious
character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears
substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.
Held:
Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and
produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to
diffuse them through television. Furthermore the circumstance that the
production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield
monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and
of expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited
to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge
knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other
words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy.
Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates
to a highly critical stage in the history of the country.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public
concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public
figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least,
their right to privacy.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the
constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy,
may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture
must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events.
Senator Enrile cannot object to his inclusion in the movie on the EDSA
Revolution by invoking his right to privacy. "The right of privacy or "he right to
be let alone" is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy
has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure
and the information sought to be elic¬ited from him or to be published about
him constitutes matters of a public character. Succinctly put, the right of
privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters
of public interest. The right of priivacy of a "public figure" is necessarily
narrower than that of an ordinary citizen."
As distinguished from Lagunzad v. Gonzales, which involved a film biography
necessarily including at least his immediate family, the subject matter of the
move in this case is one of public concern and does not relate to the individual
or public life of Senator Enrile.
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant
or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty
may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without
prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises
or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machinations, or any
other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of
action by the person who thereby suffers damages.
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires
only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court
may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt,
the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it
may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due
to that ground.
Borjal vs CA
Facts:
A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the court against
Borjal and Soliven for writing and publishing articles that are allegedly
derogatory and offensive against Francisco Wenceslao, attacking among
others the solicitation letters he send to support a conference to be launch
concerning resolving matters on transportation crisis that is tainted with
anomalous activities. Wenceslao however was never named in any of the
articles nor was the conference he was organizing. The lower court ordered
petitioners to indemnify the private respondent for damages which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A petition for review was filed before the SC
contending that private respondent was not sufficiently identified to be the
subject of the published articles.
Issue:
Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for
libel.
Held: In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be
identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not
sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or
defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him
as the object of the libelous publication. These requisites have not been
complied with in the case at bar. The element of identifiability was not met
since it was Wenceslaso who revealed he was the organizer of said
conference and had he not done so the public would not have known.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the
press and that privileged communications must be protective of public opinion.
Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute
a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment
means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is
deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public
person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be
a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the
comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts.
The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the declared
objective of the conference, the composition of its members and participants,
and the manner by which it was intended to be funded no doubt lend to its
activities as being genuinely imbued with public interest. Respondent is also
deemed to be a public figure and even otherwise is involved in a public issue.
The court held that freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed and
protected with the reminder among media members to practice highest ethical
standards in the exercise thereof.
A privileged communication may be either:
1. Absolutely privileged communication are those which are not actionable
even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI,
of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability
for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof.
2. Qualifiedly privileged communications are those containing defamatory
imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good
intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and
"fair and true report without any comments or remarks."
Vazquez vs Court of Appeals
The 1964 ruling in New York Times v. Sullivan handed down by the United
States Supreme Court has been the barometer used in defamation cases
involving public officials in both jurisdictions.
The Philippine case that comes comparably close in circumstances with that
of the New York Times ruling is that of Rodolfo Vasquez versus Court of
Appeals.
It is similar to the New York Times v. Sullivan ruling in the sense that the
plaintiff is also a public official (a barangay official).
When the barangay official sued for criminal libel (note: New York Times case
was a civil case), the Supreme Court ruled that it was incumbent upon the
prosecution to prove actual malice, and failing such, no liability attached
against the accused.
In any event, the Supreme Court took ocassion to apply the New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan standard in this case.
Facts:
Petitioner Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area.
Sometime in April 1986, he and some 37 families from the area went to see
then National Housing Authority (NHA) General Manager Lito Atienza
regarding their complaint against their Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo, a
public official. After their meeting with Atienza and other NHA officials,
petitioner and his companions were met and interviewed by newspaper
reporters at the NHA compound concerning their complaint. The next day,
April 22, 1986, the following exerpts of the news article appeared in the
newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa. In the article, pulished were supposed
allegations by Vasquez that
1. “nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo upang
makamkam ang may 14 na lote ng lupa”;
2. “ang mga lupa ay ilegal na patituluhan, nagawa ito ni Olmedo sa
pakikipagsabwatan sa mga project manager at legal officers ng
NHA”;
3. “kasangkot din umano si Olmedo sa mga ilegal na pasugalan sa
naturang lugar at maging sa mga nakawan ng manok. x x x”
Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against
petitioner alleging that the latter’s statements cast aspersions on him and
damaged his reputation.
On May 28, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of
libel and sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the atual malice standard in New York Times versus Sullivan
is to be applied in prosecutions for criminal libel.
Held:
The standard of actual malice in New York Times versus Sullivan is to be
applied in criminal prosecutions for libel.
For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach
if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that
the statement was made with actual malice — that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by
petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their
falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of
official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such
allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code.
It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression.
Libel was used as a form of harassment:
Instead of the claim that petitioner was politically motivated in making the
charges against complainant, it would appear that complainant filed this case
to harass petitioner.
It is curious that the ones most obviously responsible for the publication of the
allegedly offensive news report, namely, the editorial staff and the periodical
itself, were not at all impleaded. The charge was leveled against the petitioner
and, "curiouser" still, his clients who have nothing to do with the editorial
policies of the newspaper.
Guingging vs CA (naulit na)
GMA Network vs Bustos
FACTS:
A libel complaint was filed against GMA NETWORK, INC and newscaster, Rey
Vidal. The issue started from the Petition for Mandamus filed by the
unsuccessful examinees of the physician’s licensure examinations before the
RTC of Manila to compel the PRC and the board of medical examiners to re-
check and reevaluate the test papers. As alleged, mistakes in the counting of
the total scores and erroneous checking of answers to test questions vitiated
the results of the examinations:
The text of the news report, as drafted and narrated by Vidal and which GMA
Network, Inc. aired and televised on February 10, 1988, runs:
Some 227 examinees in the last August Physician Licensure Examinations
today asked the Manila [RTC] to compel the [PRC] and the Medical Board of
Examiners to recheck the August 1987 test papers. The petitioners
[examinees] today went to the Presiding Judge to also ask for a special raffling
of the case considering that the next physicians examinations have been
scheduled for February [1988] …. They said that the gross, massive,
haphazard, whimsical and capricious checking that must have been going on
for years should now be stopped once and for all.
The last examination was conducted last August … at the PRC central offices,
the Far Eastern University and the Araullo High School, the exams on multiple
choice or matching type involve 12 subjects including general medicine,
biochemistry, surgery and obstetrics and gynecology.
21 schools participated in the examination represented by some 2,835 medical
student graduates, 1,894 passed and 141 failed.
The results of the exams were released December 9 and were published the
following day in metropolitan papers last years (sic).
A group of failing examinees enlisted the help of the Offices of the President
and the Vice President and as a result were allowed by PRC … to obtain the
official set of test questions. The students then researched … and produced
the key answers to the key questions.
The petitioners were also allowed to see their own test papers, most of them
copying the papers ….
With these copies, they were able to match the scores and the correct answers
in the examinations. They found that the errors in checking were so material
that they actually lowered the scores that formed the individual ratings of the
examinees in the various subjects.
Examples of the discrepancies are to be found in identical answers being rated
as incorrect in one examinee’s paper but correct in another. There is also the
case of two different answers being rated as correct. There are indications of
wrong counting of total scores per subject so that the totals are either short by
two up to four points.
Finally, there are raw scores that have been transmuted incorrectly so that a
passing score was rendered a failure. The petitioners said that the haphazard
and whimsical and capricious checking should now be stopped once and for
all. They said that the nine years formal studies and the one year internship
not to mention the expenses and the blood, sweat, and tears of the students
and their families will have been rendered nugatory. The petitioners also noted
that Com. Francia had promised last January 12 to rectify the errors in the
checking and yet they have not received the appropriate action promised
whereas the next exams have been set for Feb. 20, 21, 27 and 28. (Words in
bracket added.)
As news writer and reporter of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. assigned to gather
news from courts, among other beats, its co-petitioner Rey Vidal covered the
filing of the mandamus petition. After securing a copy of the petition, Vidal
composed and narrated the news coverage for the ten o'clock evening news
edition of GMA's Channel 7 Headline News, quoting thereof the allegations of
the unsuccessful examiners that the gross, massive, haphazard, whimsical
and capricious checking that must have been going on for years should now
be stopped once and for all. Simultaneous with the news, was an old video
footage showing physicians wearing black armbands.
Along these lines, respondents claimed that the said report was false,
malicious and one-sided. Vidal and GMA Network, Inc., in reckless disregard
for the truth, defamed them by word of mouth and simultaneous visual
presentation on GMA Network, Inc.'s Channel 7. They added that, the showing
of the unrelated old footage was done purposely so as to make a forceful
impact on their audience making it appear that other doctors were supporting
and sympathizing with the complaining unsuccessful examinees.
In defense of the alleged libel, GMA Network argued that the same was but a
privileged communication.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the said news report was within the ambit of privileged
communication
2. Whether the said narration of the news reporter and the used of video
footage were libelous
HELD:
1. Yes. The disputed news report consists merely of a summary of the
allegations in the said Petition for Mandamus filed by the medical examinees
making the same fall within the protected ambit of privileged communication.
GMA and Vidal cannot be held liable for damages claimed by respondents for
simply bringing to fore information on subjects of public concern.
Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely privileged matters
are not actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact. In absolutely
privileged communications, the mala or bona fides of the author is of no
moment as the occasion provides an absolute bar to the action. On the other
hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications, the freedom
from liability for an otherwise defamatory utterance is conditioned on the
absence of express malice or malice in fact. The second kind of privilege, in
fine, renders the writer or author susceptible to a suit or finding of libel provided
the prosecution established the presence of bad faith or malice in fact. To this
genre belongs "private communications" and "fair and true report without any
comments or remarks" falling under and described as exceptions in Article 354
of the Revised Penal Code.
However, the enumeration under the aforecited Article 354 is not an exclusive
list of conditional privilege communications as the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of the speech and of the press has expanded the privilege to include
fair commentaries on matters of public interest.The news telecast in question
clearly falls under the second kind of privileged matter.
2. No, the statement in the news report falls within the ambit of privileged
communication. For, although every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, the presumption does not exist in matters considered privileged.
Furthermore, neither the insertion of the file video constitute malice on the part
of the petitioners. Contrary to the CA's findings, the identifying character-
generated words "file video" appeared to have been superimposed on screen,
doubtless to disabuse the minds of televiewers of the idea that a particular
footage is current. In the words of the trial court, the phrase "file video" was
"indicated on screen purposely to prevent misrepresentation so as not to
confuse the viewing public." The trial court added the observation that "the use
of file footage in TV news reporting is a standard practice." the absence of the
accompanying character-generated words "file video" would not nevertheless,
change the legal situation insofar as the privileged nature of the audio-video
publication complained of is concerned. In view of the state of things, the video
footage was not libel in disguise; standing without accompanying sounds or
voices, it was meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing derogatory in
nature.
Fermin vs People of the Philippines (Tapos na to bruh, fave ata ni sir to)
Diaz vs People of the Philippines
On October 16, 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Manila an Information for libel against Manny
Pichel and Ogie Diaz (Ogie Frias in real life), petitioner. The Information,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-1113377, reads:
That on or about December 28, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused being then the Managing Editor and writer, respectively of
Bandera, a newspaper of general circulation, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, with the malicious purpose of
impeaching the integrity, honor and reputation of one FLORINDA BAGAY, and
with the evident intent of exposing her to public interest, hatred, contempt, and
ridicule, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously write and
publish, or cause to be written and published in the movie section of said
newspaper an article which reads in part as follows:
Ilang beses na nakaladkad ang pangalan ng isang Miss S sa buhay ni Philip
Henson ang lalaking mahilig makipagsex sa asawa. Nasulat na sa ibang
tabloid na limang beses diumanong ginalaw ni Philip ang babaing kine-claim
na "nabuntis ako ni Philip."
Dahil sa pahayag na yon ay nagpaliwanang at nagbigay pa ng detalye si
Philip. Nagpa-interbyu siya sa ilang piling reporters.
At muli, babanggitin lang namin ang kanyang mga pahayag tungkol sa
pagkakasangkot niya sa buhay ni Miss S.
Inamin ni Philip na limang beses niyang ginalaw si Miss S. Pero hindi ko
pinasok ang akin sa ano niya dahil siya rin ang may ayaw.
Ang sabi niya kasi sa akin, isa siyang malinis na babae at hindi siya basta-
basta nagpapaganuon. So ang ginawa namin, ipit method.
Yung ipitin niya iyong akin sa dalawa niyang hita kunwari sa ano niya
nakapasok habang nagpa-pump ako.
Siya pa nga ang nagturo sa akin ng iba’t ibang posisyon, e yung helicopter at
saka ang galing niyang bumlow job. Sanay na sanay siya.
Kahit itanong nyo pa kay Ray Ravelo. Nagalaw din siya ni Rey, pahayag ni
Philip at kami mismo ang nakarining ng mga linyang iyon sa isa naming pag-
uusap sa Jaloux Disco.
In which words and phrases, which were used by many people, the said
accused meant and intended to convey as in fact, they meant and conveyed
false and malicious imputations that the said Florinda Bagay is a sexual
pervert and possesses lascivious and immoral habits, the accused well
knowing that said imputations are devoid of truth and without foundation in fact
whatsoever, highly libelous and offensive to the good name, character, and
reputation of the said Florinda Bagay.
Manny Pichel and Ogie Diaz, Managing Editor and writer, respectively for
Bandera, were accused of conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, with the malicious purpose of impeaching the integrity,
honor and reputation of one Florinda Bagay. The accused were alleged to
feloniously wrote and published an article about the sexual activities of certain
“Miss S” and Philip Henson, in which through the words and phrases used in
the article meant and conveyed malicious imputation that this “Miss S” is a
sexual pervert and possesses lascivious and immoral habits. Florinda Bagay,
who happened to use “Patricia Santillan” as her screen name, claims that she
was this “Miss S” being referred to in the said article.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject article is libelous.
Held:
Petition granted. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a
vice, or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural
or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must be present: (a)
it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; © it must be given publicity;
and (d) the victim must be identifiable.2 Absent one of these elements, a case
for libel will not prosper.
In the case at bar, it may be find that the first element present. In determining
whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their
entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as
they would naturally be understood by the persons reading them, unless it
appears that they were used and understood in another sense. In the instant
case, the article in question details the sexual activities of a certain “Miss S”
and one “Philip Henson” who had a romantic liaison. In their ordinary sense,
the words used cast aspersion upon the character, integrity, and reputation of
“Miss S.” The words convey that “Miss S” is a sexual libertine with unusually
wanton proclivities in the bedroom. In a society such as ours, where modesty
is still highly prized among young ladies, the behavior attributed to “Miss S” by
the article in question had besmirched both her character and reputation.
As to the element of malice, since on its face the article is defamatory, there
is a presumption that the offender acted with malice. In Article 354 of the same
Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be
true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. There is
malice when the author of the imputation is prompted by personal ill-will or
spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of
the person who claims to have been defamed. There was neither good reason
nor motive why the subject article was written except to embarrass “Miss S”
and injure her reputation.
On the element of publication, there can be no question that the article
appeared in the December 28, 1991 issue of Bandera, a local tabloid.
The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or identifiable from the
contents of the libelous article. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential
that the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that the person be
named. It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the
publication contains matters of description or reference to facts and
circumstances from which others reading the article may know the person
alluded to, or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that
those knowing such person could and did understand that he was the person
referred to.
The libelous article, while referring to “Miss S,” does not give a sufficient
description or other indications which identify “Miss S.” In short, the article fails
to show that “Miss S” and Florinda Bagay are one and the same person.
Although the article is libelous, Florinda Bagay could not have been the person
defamed therein. In Uy Tioco v. Yang Shu Wen, where the requirement for an
identified or identifiable victim has not been complied with, the case for libel
must be dismissed.
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the subject article is libelous.
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
ART. 353. Definition of libel. – A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a
crime, or of a vice, or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt
of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
This provision should be read in relation with Article 355 of the same Code
which states:
ART. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. – A libel committed by
means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting,
theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall
be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a
fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action
which may be brought by the offended party.
In Re: Lozano
The novel question here presented relates to the power of the Supreme Court
to punish for contempt, the editor and the reporter of a newspaper, for
publishing and inaccurate account of the investigation of a Judge of First
Instance notwithstanding the investigation was conducted behind closed
doors, and notwithstanding a resolution of this court which makes such
proceedings confidential in nature. The question arises on the petition of the
Attorney-General praying the court to require the editor and the reporter to
show cause, if any they have, why they should not be punished for contempt.
The answer of the editor pleads good faith, while the answer of the reporter
relies on no less than ten reasons, some material and some puerile, why the
petition should be dismissed.
Sometime ago, the complaint of an attorney against a Judge of First Instance
was by resolution of this court referred to the Attorney-General for
investigation, report, and recommendation. The Solicitor-General was
designated to conduct the investigation of the charges, and pursuant to said
designation, proceeded to the municipality of Capiz, Province of Capiz, to take
the testimony of certain witnesses. The investigation was conducted secretly,
as is customary in cases of this character. Notwithstanding, on April 29, 1930,
El Pueblo, a newspaper published in Iloilo and edited by Severino Lozano,
printed an account of the investigation written by Anastacio Quevedo, said to
be an employee in the office of the Judge under investigation. The opening
portion of this article, as translated from Spanish to English, reads:
NOTES FROM CAPIZ
INVESTIGATION OF THE CHARGES AGAINST JUDGE GARDUÑO
CAPIZ, April 25, 1930
The announced investigation of the administrative charges filed in the
Supreme Court by ex-attorney Jose Y. Torres against Judge Garduño was
commenced on the 22nd instant in the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The
Solicitor-General, Alexander Reyes, was designated to investigate the
charges in behalf of the Attorney-General, to whom they were indorsed for
investigation.
It appears that it was some three months ago that the investigation was begun
in the office of the Solicitor-General in Manila, and that, therefore, the
proceedings taken here were but its continuation. The hearing was held
behind closed doors, notwithstanding my desire to attend the same in order to
take notes and send them, for publication, to the newspaper El Pueblo, which
I represent as correspondent.
However, behind the screen which shut the door of the investigation room,
something could be heard of what transpired within, and to this circumstance,
together with the comments offered gratis et amore in social circles, are due
the present notes of the hearing.
The remaining portion of the article purports to give an account of the evidence
of the different witnesses. Regarding this account, the complainant attorney
alleges that the facts therein contained are "false, malicious, and untrue" and
that "said report took sides with the respondent judge . . . and expressed an
opinion as to the merits of the same, with the object undoubtedly, to influence
the action of the investigator and the public in general and to obstruct,
embarrass or impede the course of the present investigation." In the same
connection, the Attorney-General states that the newspaper report "does not
contain a fair and true account of the facts disclosed at the investigation, . . .
creating a wrong impression in the mind of the public and tending to influence
improperly the action of this court in the said pending matter." Under the
circumstances, the observations of the Attorney-General must necessarily be
accepted as true.
At the time of publication of the aforementioned article, there was in force a
resolution of this court dated January 27, 1922, which provided "That all
proceedings looking to the suspension or disbarment of lawyers, and all
proceedings looking to the suspension or removal of judges of first instance,
shall be considered confidential in nature until the final disposition of the
matter." In so far as this resolution relates to the suspension or removal of
Judges of First Instance, it finds support in section 173 of the Administrative
Code, authorizing the Supreme Court to conduct inquiries into the conduct of
Judges of First Instance "and to adopt such rules of procedure in that regard
as it may deem proper." The reason for the adoption of such a rule is readily
explainable and consists in the practice of litigants and others making
vindictive and malicious charges against lawyers and Judges of First Instance,
which are ruinous to the reputations of the respondent lawyers and judges. It
was accordingly thought best to keep such matters secret for the good of the
administration of justice until the final outcome of the proceedings could be
ascertained.
We come now to a determination of the right of the court to take action in a
case of this character. It has previously been expressly held that the power to
punish for contempt is inherent in the Supreme Court (In re Kelly [1916], 35
Phil., 944). That this power extends to administrative proceedings as well as
to suits at law cannot be doubted. It is as necessary to maintain respect for
the courts, indeed to safeguard their very existence, in administrative cases
concerning the removal and suspension of judges as it is in any other class of
judicial proceedings.
The rule is well established that the newspaper publications tending to impede,
obstruct, embarass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily
punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. It is
also regarded as an interference with the work of the courts to publish any
matters which their policy requires should be kept private, as for example the
secrets of the jury room, or proceedings in camera (6 R. C. L., pp. 508-515)
An examination of the authorities discloses that little attention has been
directed to facts like those before us, and that in the few cases which have
given consideration to the question there exist divergence of opinions. The
English courts are more stringent in prohibiting the publication of their
proceedings than are the American courts. Thus where the petitioner and her
solicitor published a copy of the transcript of the official shorthand notes in a
case of a very delicate and private character in contravention of an order
directing that the cause be heard in camera, the presiding judge in England
found the petitioner and her solicitor in contempt of court but accepted their
excuses and apologies (Scott vs. Scott [1912], Am. Ann. Cas., 1912-B, 540).
A decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa inclines to general or special rule the
publication of testimony pending an investigation has been prohibited, a willful
violation of such rule might amount to a contempt, especially if the rule itself
declared the act to be a contempt (State of Iowa vs. Dunham [1858], 6 Iowa,
245). But in a California divorce case, although the trial court ordered that no
public report of the testimony should be made, and thereafter punished the
editor of a newspaper for publishing a report of the trial, on the certiorari the
Supreme Court of California annulled the proceedings of the court under
review. As explanatory of this judgment, it should be said that a fair and true
report of the testimony was published and that the result was influenced by
the phraseology of the California law (Re Shortridge [1893], 99 Cal., 526; 21
L. R. A., 755). Along similar lines is the case of Ex parte Foster ([1930], 60 L.
R. A., 631), coming from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and not holding
that merely publishing a true statement of the testimony adduced from the
witnesses in the course of a public trial in the courts of justice does not
authorize a finding of contempt. To conclude our review of the pertinent
decisions, we desire to quote from the decision of the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin in Burns vs. State ([1911], 145 Wis., 373; 140 Am. St. Rep., 1081),
where, in referring to the commendation meted out to the courts of England, it
was said: "Judicial proceedings, in a case which the law requires to be
conducted in secret for the proper administration of justice, should never be,
while the case is on trial, given publicity by the press."
With reference to the applicability of the above authorities, it should be
remarked first of all that this court is not bound to accept any of them absolutely
and unqualifiedly. What is the best for the maintenance of the Judiciary in the
Philippines should be the criterion. Here, in contrast to other jurisdictions, we
need not be overly sensitive because of the sting of newspaper articles, for
there are no juries to be kept free from outside influence. Here also we are not
restrained by regulatory law. The only law, and that the judge made, which is
at all applicable to the situation, is the resolution adopted by this court. That
the respondents were ignorant of this resolution is no excuse, for the very
article published by them indicates that the hearing was held behind closed
doors and that the information of the reporter was obtained from outside the
screen and from comments in social circles. Then in writing up the
investigation, it came about that the testimony was mutilated and that the
report reflected upon the action of the complainant to his possible
disadvantage.
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This
constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The court has
heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under to Libel Law
which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen
path. The liberty of the citizen must be preserved in all of its completenes. But
license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be
confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as is the maintenance of
the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged
to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if such
persons are to be permitted by subterranean means of diffuse inaccurate
accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and
the courts.
In recent Federal case (U. S. vs. Sullens [1929], 36 Fed. [2d], 230, 238, 239),
Judge Holmes very appropriately said:
The administration of Justice and the freedom of the press, though separate
and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other.
The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should
cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the
former receives its prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of
legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all
times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order
to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publication which reasonably
tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the
administration of justice, this court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted
power to punish for contempt. . . . .
This court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in
an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its
constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial
court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense,
it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. . . . .
As has been remarked, the parties plead ignorance in extenuation of their
offense. We accept as certain this defense. It is made known also that other
newspapers, particularly in the metropolis, have been guilty of similar acts.
That likewise is undoubtedly true, but does not purge the respondents of their
contempt. All facts considered, we desire on the one hand to proceed on the
corrective and not true retaliatory idea of punishment, while on the other giving
due notice that practices of which the respondents are guilty must stop.
It is the holding of the court that the respondents Severino Lazano and
Anastacio Quevedo are guilty of contempt of court, and it is the order of the
court that they be punished for such contempt by the payment of a nominal
sum by each of them in the amount of twenty pesos (P20), to be turned into
the office of the clerk of court within the period of fifteen days from receipt of
notice, with the admonition that if they fail to comply, further and more drastic
action by the court will be necessary.
In Re: Jurado
Facts:
Jurado, a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation, the
“Manila Standard.” He describes himself as a columnist, who “incidentally
happens to be a lawyer,”, had been writing about alleged improperties and
irregularities in the judiciary over several months (from about October, 1992 to
March, 1993). Other journalists had also been making reports or comments on
the same subject. At the same time, anonymous communications were being
extensively circulated, by hand and through the mail, about alleged venality
and corruption in the courts. And all these were being repeatedly and
insistently adverted to by certain sectors of society. Events Directly Giving Rise
to the Proceeding at Bar.
The seed of the proceeding at bar was sown by the decision promulgated by
this Court on August 27, 1992, in the so-called “controversial case” of
“Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern Telephone
Philippines, Inc. (ETPI),” G.R. No, 94374. In that decision the Court was
sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice
Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion for the majority.
In connection with this case, G.R. No. 94374, the “Philippine Daily Inquirer”
and one or two other newspapers published, on January 28, 1993, a report of
the purported affidavit of a Mr. David Miles Yerkes, an alleged expert in
linguistics. This gentleman, it appears, had been commissioned by one of the
parties in the case, Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), to examine
and analyze the decision of Justice Gutierrez in relation to a few of his prior
ponencias and the writings of one of the lawyers of PLDT, Mr. Eliseo Alampay,
to ascertain if the decision had been written, in whole or in part, by the latter.
Yerkes proffered the conclusion that the Gutierrez decision “looks, reads and
sounds like the writing of the PLDT’s counsel,” Thus, he speaks of the
“Magnificent Seven,” by merely referring to undisclosed regional trial court
judges in Makati; the “Magnificent Seven” in the Supreme Court, as some
undesignated justices who supposedly vote as one; the “Dirty Dozen,” as
unidentified trial judges in Makati and three other cities. He adverts to an
anonymous group of justices and judges for whom a bank allegedly hosted a
party; and six unnamed justices of this Court who reportedly spent a prepaid
vacation in Hong Kong with their families.
The Chief Justice issued an administrative order “Creating an Ad Hoc
Committee to Investigate Reports of Corruption in the Judiciary,” to investigate
the said reports of corruption in the judiciary. A letter affidavit was also
received from the public utility, denying the allegations in Jurado’s column.
The Supreme Court then issued a resolution ordering that the matter dealt with
in the letter and affidavit of the public utility company be docketed and acted
upon as an official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not
the allegations made by Jurado are true.
HELD:
Jurado’s actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate
gross irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that
he might cause to the name and reputation of those of whom he wrote. They
constitute contempt of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or abase
the administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. By doing
them, he has placed himself beyond the circle of reputable, decent and
responsible journalists who live by their Code or the “Golden Rule” and who
strive at all times to maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling.
Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful
exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly
and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity.
The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless
disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.
The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper exercise of
any right, constitutional or otherwise, viz.: “ARTICLE 19. Every person must,
in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” The
provision is reflective of the universally accepted precept of “abuse of rights,”
“one of the most dominant principles which must be deemed always implied
in any system of law.”
Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the
statements when publishing statements which are clearly defamatory to
identifiable judges or other public officials.
Judges, by becoming such, are rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting
themselves to norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards of
honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly required from private
persons. Nevertheless, persons who seek or accept appointment to the
Judiciary cannot reasonably be regarded as having forfeited any right to
private honor and reputation. For to so rule will be to discourage all save those
who feel no need to maintain their self-respect from becoming judges. The
public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of
judges (and for that matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of
private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other. And
the point of adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate
interests is precisely found in the norm which requires those who, invoking
freedom of speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to
identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in
ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does not
require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But
the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by
publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to
ascertain the truth thereof.
Disini vs Secretery of Justice
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace.
Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to the internet, a system
that links him to other computers and enable him, among other things, to:
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he
needs for research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for
the general public or for special audiences like associates, classmates, or
friends and read postings from them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and
payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies,
banks, stock exchanges, trade houses, credit card companies, public utilities,
hospitals, and schools; and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail
address or telephone.
This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of
simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses to and uses of the internet. The
cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater
information and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system
since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to
use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for
instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another
or bully the latter by posting defamatory statements against him that people
can read.
And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from
others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by
hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or
defrauding him through false representations. The wicked can use the
cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography
guileless children who have access to the internet. For this reason, the
government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and
contain and punish wrongdoings.
Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or cause
havoc to the computer systems and networks of indispensable or highly useful
institutions as well as to the laptop or computer programs and memories of
innocent individuals. They accomplish this by sending electronic viruses or
virtual dynamites that destroy those computer systems, networks, programs,
and memories. The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent
these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the
Cybercrime Prevention Act.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for
regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely
seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings,
and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on
February 5, 2013 the Court extended the original 120-day temporary
restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining
respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until
further orders.
Issue:
WoN it is constitutional
Ruling:
Justice Abad delivered the Court’s opinion. The government of Philippines
adopted the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 for the purpose of regulating
access to and use of cyberspace. Several sections of the law define relevant
cyber crimes and enable the government to track down and penalize violators.
Among 21 challenged sections, the Court declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and
19 of the Act as unconstitutional.
Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic
communications, commonly known as spams, that seek to advertise, sell, or
offer for sale of products and services unless the recipient affirmatively
consents, or when the purpose of the communication is for service or
administrative announcements from the sender to its existing users, or “when
the following conditions are present: (aa) The commercial electronic
communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to
reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the
same source; (bb) The commercial electronic communication does not
purposely disguise the source of the electronic message; and (cc) The
commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading
information in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read
the message.”
The government argued that unsolicited commercial communications amount
to both nuisance and trespass because they tend to interfere with the
enjoyment of using online services and that they enter the recipient’s domain
without prior permission.
The Court first noted that spams are a category of commercial speech, which
does not receive the same level of protection as other constitutionally
guaranteed forms of expression ,”but is nonetheless entitled to protection.” It
ruled that the prohibition on transmitting unsolicited communications “would
deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
addressed to him.” Accordingly, the Court declared Section4(c)(3) as
unconstitutional.
Section 12 of the Act authorizes the law enforcement without a court warrant
“to collect or record traffic data in real-time associated with specified
communications transmitted by means of a computer system.” Traffic data
under this Section includes the origin, destination, route, size, date, and
duration of the communication, but not its content nor the identity of users.
The Petitioners argued that such warrantless authority curtails their civil
liberties and set the stage for abuse of discretion by the government. They
also claimed that this provision violates the right to privacy and protection from
the government’s intrusion into online communications.
The Court first recognized that computer data constitutes a personal property,
entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Also, the
Philippines’ Constitution requires the government to secure a valid judicial
warrant when it seeks to seize a personal property or to block a form of
expression. Because Section 19 precluded any judicial intervention, the Court
found it unconstitutional.
1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited
commercial communications;
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-
time; and
c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to
restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data.
2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system without right;

According to the Court, since Section 12 may lead to disclosure of private

communications, it must survive the rational basis standard of whether it is
narrowly tailored towards serving a government’s compelling interest. The
Court found that the government did have a compelling interest in preventing
cybercrimes by monitoring real-time traffic data.
As to whether Section 12 violated the right to privacy, the Court first recognized
that the right at stake concerned informational privacy, defined as “the right
not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live freely without
surveillance and intrusion.” In determining whether a communication is
entitled to the right of privacy, the Court applied a two-part test: (1) Whether
the person claiming the right has a legitimate expectation of privacy over the
communication, and (2) whether his expectation of privacy can be regarded
as objectively reasonable in the society.
b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including transmission of
viruses;
c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain name
over the internet in bad faith to the prejudice of others;
d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of
identifying information belonging to another;
e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of sexual
organs or sexual activity for favor or consideration;
f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child pornography;

The Court noted that internet users have subjective reasonable expectation of g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes defined
privacy over their communications transmitted online. However, it did not find under the Revised Penal Code are committed with the use of information and
the expectation as objectively reasonable because traffic data sent through communications technologies;
internet “does not disclose the actual names and addresses (residential or
office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded Internet Protocol (IP) h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;
addresses.”
i. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require service
Even though the Court ruled that real-time traffic data under Section 12 does providers to preserve traffic data and subscriber information as well as
not enjoy the objective reasonable expectation of privacy, the existence of specified content data for six months;
enough data may reveal the personal information of its sender or recipient,
against which the Section fails to provide sufficient safeguard. The Court
j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a court-
viewed the law as “virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to
issued warrant;
engage in “fishing expedition,” choosing whatever specified communication
they want.”
k. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of computer
data under a court-issued warrant;
Accordingly, the Court struck down Section 12 for lack of specificity and
definiteness as to ensure respect for the right to privacy.
l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously preserved computer
data after the expiration of the prescribed holding periods;
Section 19 authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to
a computer data found to be in violation of the Act. The Petitioners argued
m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to cybercrime
that this section also violated the right to freedom of expression, as well as the
investigations;
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating
Center (CICC);
o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and Functions; and
p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes
libel.
People of the Philippines vs Perez
Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato
Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality, happening to meet on the morning of
April 1, 1992, in the presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in a discussion
regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in
Perez shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos
for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the
Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." Charged in the Court of First
Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having
to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority,
and convicted thereof, Perez has appealed the case to this court. The question
presented for decision is, What crime, if any, did the accused commit?
A logical point of departure is the information presented in this case. It reads
in translation as follows:
That on or about April 1, 1922, in the municipality of Pilar, Province of
Sorsogon, Philippine Islands, the said accused, Isaac Perez, while holding a
discussion with several persons on political matters, did criminally, unlawfully
and wilfully and with knowledge that Honorable Leonard Wood was the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and in the discharge of his
functions as such authority, insult by word, without his presence, said
Governor-General, uttering in a loud voice and in the presence of many
persons, and in a public place, the following phrases: "Asin an mangña filipinos
na caparejo co, maninigong gumamit nin sundang asin haleon an payo ni
Wood huli can saiyang recomendacion sa pag raot con Filipinas," which in
English, is as follows: "And the Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting
off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Philippines.
Contrary to article 256 of the Penal Code.
At the trial of the case, two witnesses were called on behalf of the prosecution
and three witnesses on behalf of the defense. According to the first witness for
the Government, Juan Lumbao, the municipal president of Pilar, what Perez
said on the occasion in question was this:
"The Filipinos, like myself, should get a bolo and cut off the head of Governor-
General Wood, because he has recommended a bad administration in these
Islands and has not made a good recommendation; on the contrary, he has
assassinated the independence of the Philippines and for this reason, we have
not obtained independence and the head of that Governor-General must be
cut off." Higinio J. Angustia, justice of the peace of Pilar, in a written statement,
and Gregorio Cresencio, another witness for the prosecution, corroborated the
testimony of the first witness. Cresencio understood that Perez invited the
Filipinos including himself to get their bolos and cut off the head of Governor-
General Wood and throw it into the sea.
The witnesses for the defense did not deny that an altercation took place on
the morning of April 1, 1922, in which the accused participated. But they
endeavored to explain that the discussion was between Perez and one Severo
Madrid, the latter maintaining that the fault was due to the Nacionalista Party,
while Perez argued that the Governor-General was to blame. The accused
testified that the discussion was held in a peaceful manner, and that what he
wished to say was that the Governor-General should be removed and
substituted by another. On the witness stand, he stated that his words were
the following: "We are but blaming the Nacionalista Party which is in power but
do not take into account that above the representatives there is Governor-
General Wood who controls everything, and I told him that the day on which
the Democrats may kill that Governor-General, then we, the Filipinos will install
the government we like whether you Democratas want to pay or not to pay
taxes."
The trial judge found as a fact, and we think with abundant reason, that it had
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused made use of the
language stated in the beginning of this decision and set out in the information.
The question of fact thus settled, the question of law recurs as to the crime of
which the accused should be convicted.
It should be recalled that the fiscal named, in the information, article 256 of the
Penal Code as having been infringed and the trial judge so found in his
decision. The first error assigned by counsel for the appellant is addressed to
this conclusion of the lower court and is to the effect that article 256 of the
Penal Code is no longer in force.
In the case of United States vs. Helbig ([1920], R. G. No. 14705 1), the
accused was charged with having uttered the following language: "To hell with
the President of the United States and his proclamation!" Mr. Helbig was
prosecuted under article 256, and though the case was eventually sent back
to the court of origin for a new trial, the appellate court by majority vote held
as a question of law that article 256 is still in force.
In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil., 887), the accused was
charged with having published an article reflecting on the Philippine Senate
and its members in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. In this court, Mr.
Perfecto was acquitted by unanimous vote, with three members of the court
holding that article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish
to American sovereignty over the Philippines, and with six members holding
that the Libel Law had the effect of repealing so much of article 256 as relates
to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the
facts, the defendant was neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal
Code nor of the libel Law. In the course of the main opinion in the Perfecto
case, is found this significant sentence: "Act No. 292 of the Philippine
Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected article
256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement."
It may therefore be taken as settled doctrine, to which those of us who retain
a contrary opinion must bow with as good grace as we can muster, that until
otherwise decided by higher authority, so much of article 256 of the Penal
Code as does not relate to ministers of the Crown or to writings coming under
the Libel Law, exist and must be enforced. To which proposition, can properly
be appended a corollary, namely: Seditious words, speeches, or libels,
constitute a violation of Act No. 292, the Treason and Sedition Law, and to this
extent, both the Penal Code and the Libel Law are modified.
Accepting the above statements relative to the continuance and status of
article 256 of the Penal Code, it is our opinion that the law infringed in this
instance is not this article but rather a portion of the Treason and Sedition Law.
In other words, as will later appear, we think that the words of the accused did
not so much tend to defame, abuse, or insult, a person in authority, as they
did to raise a disturbance in the community.
In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed primarily
against individuals, but rather against the existence of the State, the authority
of the Government, or the general public peace. The offenses created and
defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this character. Among them is sedition,
which is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt
against legitimate authority. Though the ultimate object of sedition is a violation
of the public peace or at least such a course of measures as evidently
engenders it, yet it does not aim at direct and open violence against the laws,
or the subversion of the Constitution. (2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 974; U.S.
vs. Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437; People vs. Cabrera [1922], 43 Phil., 64.)
It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not
be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of
Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the
Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless
the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the
act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press
and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to
maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the
constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State. (III Wharton's
Criminal Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U.S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; People
vs. Perfecto, supra.)
Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the
Philippine Islands. His official position, like the Presidency of the United States
and other high offices, under a democratic form of government, instead, of
affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive
attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the
furthest bounds of free speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in
the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people
and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the
Government and obedient to the laws.
The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of
the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the
United States, and holds in his office at the pleasure of the President. The
Organic Act vests supreme executive power in the Governor-General to be
exercised in accordance with law. The Governor-General is the representative
of executive civil authority in the Philippines and of the sovereign power. A
seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the
Filipino people and on American sovereignty. (Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921],
42 Phil., 599; U.S. vs. Dorr [1903], 2 Phil., 332.)
Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act
No. 1692, appears to have been placed on the statute books exactly to meet
such a situation. This section reads as follows:
Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write,
publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United
States or against the Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall print,
write, publish utter or make any statement, or speech, or do any act which
tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office or in
performing his duty, or which tends to instigate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or incites rebellious
conspiracies or which tends to stir up the people against the lawful authorities,
or which tends to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of
the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices from the
constituted authorities, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
dollars United States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding two years,
or both, in the discretion of the court.
In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a
statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act
which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a
statement and done an act which tended to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb
the peace of the community and the safety or order of the Government. All of
these various tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and may be
characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.
A judgment and sentence convicting the accused of a violation of section 8 of
Act No. 292 as amended, is, in effect, responsive to, and based upon, the
offense with which the defendant is charged. The designation of the crime by
the fiscal is not conclusive. The crime of which the defendant stands charged
is that described by the facts stated in the information. In accordance with our
settled rule, an accused may be found guilty and convicted of a graver offense
than that designated in the information, if such graver offense is included or
described in the body of the information, and is afterwards justified by the proof
presented during the trial. (Guevarra's Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9; De
Joya's Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9.)
The penalty meted out by the trial court falls within the limits provided by the
Treason and Sedition Law, and will, we think, sufficiently punish the accused.
That we have given more attention to this case than it deserves, may be
possible. Our course is justified when it is recalled that only last year, Mr. Chief
Justice Taft of the United States Supreme Court, in speaking of an outrageous
libel on the Governor of the Porto Rico, observed: "A reading of the two articles
removes the slightest doubt that they go far beyond the "exuberant
expressions of meridional speech," to use the expression of this court in a
similar case in Gandia vs. Pettingill (222 U.S. , 452, 456). Indeed they are so
excessive and outrageous in their character that they suggest the query
whether their superlative vilification has not overleapt itself and become
unconsciously humorous." (Balzac vs. Porto Rico [1922], 258 U.S., 298.)
While our own sense of humor is not entirely blunted, we nevertheless
entertain the conviction that the courts should be the first to stamp out the
embers of insurrection. The fugitive flame of disloyalty, lighted by an
irresponsible individual, must be dealt with firmly before it endangers the
general public peace.
The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of fact, and on these
facts to convict the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as
amended. With the modification thus indicated, judgment is affirmed, it being
understood that, in accordance with the sentence of the lower court, the
defendant and appellant shall suffer 2 months and 1 day's imprisonment and
pay the costs. So ordered.
Ayer Production vs Capulong (tapos na to tort nasa page 12)
Yuchengco vs Manila Chronicle
FACTS:
The present controversy arose when in the last quarter of 1993, several
allegedly defamatory articles against petitioner were published in The Manila
Chronicle by Chronicle Publishing Corporation.
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents before the RTC of Makati City
under three separate causes of action, namely: (1) for damages due to libelous
publication against Neal H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma
San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino, Rodney P. Diola, all
members of the editorial staff and writers of The Manila Chronicle, and
Chronicle Publishing; (2) for damages due to abuse of right against Robert
Coyiuto, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing; and (3) for attorneys fees and costs
against all the respondents.
On November 8, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner.
Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse before the CA. The CA rendered a
Decision affirming in toto the decision of the RTC.
Respondents then filed an MR. The CA rendered an Amended Decision
reversing the earlier Decision.
Subsequently, petitioner filed the present recourse before this Court.
On November 25, 2009, this Court rendered a Decision partially granting the
petition.
Respondents later filed a MR dated which the Court denied.
Meanwhile, respondent Coyiuto, Jr. also filed a Motion for Leave to File
Supplemental MR with Attached Supplemental Motion.
On April 21, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution grant Coyiuto, Jr.s motion
for leave to file supplemental motion for reconsideration, and require petitioner
to comment on the motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner filed his Comment.
It is apparent that the MR of respondents generally reiterates the arguments
previously advanced by respondents.
However, from the supplemental motion for reconsideration, it is apparent that
Coyiuto, Jr. raises a new matter which has not been raised in the proceedings
below. This notwithstanding, basic equity dictates that Coyiuto, Jr. should be
given all the opportunity to ventilate his arguments in the present action, but
more importantly, in order to write finis to the present controversy.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether Coyuito, Jr., was Chariman of Manila Chronicle Publishing
Corporation when the libelous articles were published, (2) Whether petitioners
cause of action based on Abuse of Rights warrants the award of damages.
HELD:
FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE LOWER COURT, WHEN CONFIRMED BY
THE CA, CONCLUSIVE UPON THIS COURT
From these Comments and contrary to Coyiuto, Jr.s contention, it was
substantially established that he was the Chairman of Manila Chronicle
Publishing Corporation when the subject articles were published. Coyiuto, Jr.
even admitted this fact in his Reply and Comment on Request for Admission.
Both the trial court and the CA affirmed this fact. We reiterate that factual
findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are binding
and conclusive on this Court and will generally not be reviewed on appeal.
AWARD OF DAMAGES BASED ON ABUSE OF RIGHT, PROPER
A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article
19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for
the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would
be proper. Here, it was found that Coyiuto, Jr. indeed abused his rights as
Chairman of The Manila Chronicle, which led to the publication of the libelous
articles in the said newspaper, thus, entitling petitioner to damages under
Article 19, in relation to Article 20.
Fortun vs Quinsayas
On 23 November 2009, a convoy of seven vehicles carrying the relatives of
then Maguindanao vice-mayor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu, as well as
lawyers and journalists, was on their way to the Commission on Elections
office in Shariff Aguak to file Mangudadatu’s Certificate of Candidacy1 when
they were accosted by a group of about 100 armed men at a checkpoint in
Sitio Malating, Ampatuan town, some four to ten kilometers from their
destination.2 The group was taken hostage and brought to a hilly and sparsely-
populated part of Sitio Magating, Barangay Salman, Ampatuan,
Maguindanao.3 The gruesome aftermath of the hostage-taking was later
discovered and shocked the world. The hostages were systematically killed by
shooting them at close range with automatic weapons, and their bodies and
vehicles were dumped in mass graves and covered with the use of a
backhoe.4 These gruesome killings became known as the Maguindanao
Massacre. A total of 57 victims were killed, 30 of them journalists.
Subsequently, criminal cases for Murder were filed and raffled to the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 221, and docketed as Criminal Cases No.
Q-09-162148-172, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652, and Q-10- 163766.
Petitioner is the counsel for Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan, Jr.), the
principal accused in the murder cases.
In November 2010, Atty. Quinsayas, et al. filed a disbarment complaint against
petitioner before this Court, docketed as Bar Matter No. A.C. 8827. The
disbarment case is still pending.
Petitioner alleged that on 22 November 2010, GMA News TV internet website
posted an article, written by Dedace, entitled "Mangudadatu, others seek
disbarment of Ampatuan lawyer," a portion of which reads:
On Monday, Maguindanao Governor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu and four
others filed a 33 page complaint against lawyer Sigrid Fortun whom they
accused of "engaging in every conceivable chichancery or artifice to unduly
delay the proceedings by using and abusing legal remedies available."5
On even date, Inquirer.net, the website of PDI, also published an article,
written by Torres, which according to petitioner also stated details of the
disbarment case, as follows:
"Respondent Atty. Fortun had astutely embarked in an untiring quest to
obstruct, impede and degrade the administration of justice by filing countless
causes of action, all in the hope of burying the principal issue of his client’s
participation or guilt in the murder of 57 people that ill-fated day of November
23, 2009," the petitioners said.6
Petitioner further alleged that on 23 November 2010, PhilStar published an
article, written by Punay, which gave details of the disbarment allegations,
thus:
"Attorney Fortun used and abused legal remedies available and allowed under
under the rules, muddled the issues and diverted the attention away from the
main subject matter of the cases, read the complaint.
Petitioner alleged that the public circulation of the disbarment complaint
against him exposed this Court and its investigators to outside influence and
public interference. Petitioner alleged that opinion writers wrote about and
commented on the disbarment complaint which opened his professional and
personal reputation to attack. He alleged that the purpose of respondents in
publishing the disbarment complaint was to malign his personal and
professional reputation, considering the following: (1) the bases of the charges
were not new but were based on incidents that supposedly took place in
January 2010; (2) it was timed to coincide with the anniversary of the
Maguindanao Massacre to fuel hatred, contempt and scorn for Ampatuan, Jr.
and his counsel and violated the accused’s right to presumption of innocence
and due process; (3) it was published following articles written about
petitioner’s advocacy for the rights of an accused and negated the impact of
these articles on the public; and (4) respondents knew that the charges were
baseless as petitioner always opted for speedy trial and protection of the
accused’s rights at trial. Petitioner further alleged that in announcing their
"causes of action" in the disbarment case, respondents were only seeking the
approval and sympathy of the public against him and Ampatuan, Jr.
Atty. Fortun is the counsel for the Ampatuans, the principal accused in the
Maguindanao Massacre.
Atty. Quinsayas filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Fortun for
misleading the prosecution and trial court under the rules and muddled the
issues and diverted the attention away from the main subject matter of the
case.
Atty. Fortun filed an indirect contempt against Atty. Quinsayas and the media
group for active dissemination of the details of the disbarment complaint
against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on confidential
nature of disbarment proceedings.
The media group denied the posting and publication of the articles about the
disbarment complaint. It would appear that only Atty. Quinsayas was
responsible for the distribution of copies of the disbarment complaint to the
members of the media.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Quinsayas is guilty of indirect contempt in violation of
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
HELD: YES. Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court both as a complainant and as a lawyer in the disbarment case against
Atty. Fortun.
As a lawyer and an officer of the Court, Atty. Quinsayas is familiar with the
confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. However, instead of preserving
its confidentiality, she disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint
against Atty. Fortun to members of the media which act constitutes contempt
of court.
First, the contempt charge filed by petitioner is in the nature of a criminal
contempt. In People v. Godoy,12 this Court made a distinction between
criminal and civil contempt. The Court declared:
A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority
of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do
something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the
opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose
behalf the violated order is made.
A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the
court, is an offense against organized society and, in addition, is also held to
be an offense against public justice which raises an issue between the public
and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive. On the other
hand, the proceedings to punish a civil contempt are remedial and for the
purpose of the preservation of the right of private persons. It has been held
that civil contempt is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the
court.
It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal
contempt, and that no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the
evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. On the contrary, there
is authority indicating that since the purpose of civil contempt proceedings is
remedial, the defendant’s intent in committing the contempt is immaterial.
Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to violate the court’s order is not a
defense in civil contempt.13
The records of this case showed that the filing of the disbarment complaint
against petitioner had been published and was the subject of a televised
broadcast by respondent media groups and personalities.
Soriano vs Laguardia (Tapos na yan bui)
Chaplinsky vs New Hampshire
Brief Fact Summary. Chaplinsky was convicted under a State statute for
calling a City Marshal a “God damned racketeer” and a “damned fascist” in a
public place.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. “Fighting words” are not entitled to protection under
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)
Facts:
A New Hampshire statute prohibited any person from addressing any
offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is on any street
or public place or calling him by any derisive name. Chaplinsky, a Jehovah’s
Witness, called a City Marshal a “God damned racketeer” and a “damned
fascist” in a public place and was therefore arrested and convicted under the
statute.
Chaplinsky (defendant) was a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses.
Chaplinsky was distributing religious literature on a street corner. Several
citizens complained to the City Marshal, Bowering, that Chaplinsky was
denouncing all religions. Bowering responded that Chaplinsky was lawfully
permitted to voice his opinion, but nevertheless warned Chaplinsky that the
crowd was getting restless. After a disturbance occurred later, Chaplinsky was
escorted by a police officer to the police station. On the way, Chaplinsky
passed Bowering and called him a “racketeer” and a “fascist.” Chaplinsky
admitted to uttering the offensive language in question. Chaplinsky was
convicted by the State of New Hampshire (plaintiff) for violating a New
Hampshire law prohibiting speech directed at a person on public streets that
derides, offends or annoys others. Chaplinsky’s conviction was affirmed by the
state supreme court, and he appealed to the United States Supreme Court on
the grounds that the New Hampshire law violated the First Amendment.
Issue:
Did the statute or the application of the statute to Chaplinsky’s comments
violate his free speech rights under the First Amendment of the Constitution?
Held:
No. The lower court is affirmed. Considering the purpose of the First
Amendment of the Constitution, it is obvious that the right to free speech is not
absolute under all circumstances. There are some narrowly defined classes of
speech that have never been protected by the First Amendment of the
Constitution. These include “fighting words,” words that inflict injury or tend to
excite an immediate breach of the peace. Such words are of such little
expositional or social value that any benefit they might produce is far
outweighed by their costs on social interests in order and morality.
The statute at issue is narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct
lying within the domain of government power. Moreover, the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire, which is the ultimate arbiter of the meanings of New
Hampshire law, has defined the Statute as applying only to “fighting words”.
Therefore, the Statute does not unconstitutionally impinge upon the right of
free speech.
Discussion. By holding that “fighting words” are not protected forms of speech
the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) announced a rare
form of content based restriction on speech that is permissible. The student
should consider what characteristics distinguish a “fight word” from a bona fide
criticism. One difference may lie in the speaker’s intent. “Fighting words” are
intended to inflict harm, bona-fide criticisms are intended to communicate
ideas. Another difference may lie in the differing likely effects of each: “fighting
words” are likely to provoke the average person to violence while bona fide
criticisms are not.
Cohen vs California
Case Summary and Outcome
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the California Court of
Appeal that had affirmed Cohen’s conviction and 30 days’ jail sentence meted
out by the Los Angeles Municipal Court for “disturbing the peace … [by]
offensive conduct” for wearing a jacket in a courthouse bearing the phrase
“Fuck the Draft”.
In overturning Cohen’s conviction, the Supreme Court found that the California
law did not meet any of the narrow categories of speech that the state could
restrict as unprotected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution. The state could not lawfully ban use of the profane four-letter
word in general under the U.S. Constitution.
Facts
On April 26, 1968, Paul Robert Cohen (Cohen) was in the Los Angeles County
Courthouse wearing a jacket bearing the phrase “Fuck the Draft.” The words
were plainly visible, and, according to Cohen, “a means of informing the public
of the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the draft.” (at 16,
quoting U.S., People v. Cohen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 97-98 (1969).) Cohen did
not make any loud noises, cause a ruckus, create any disruption, threaten any
bystanders, or commit any acts of violence. Upon entering a courtroom in the
building, Cohen “removed his jacket and stood with it folded over his arm.” (at
19 n.3.) A policeman suggested to the presiding judge that the court hold
Cohen in contempt of court. The judge declined. The officer then arrested
Cohen as he emerged from the courtroom.
California Penal Code § 415 (“Section 415” or “the statute”) prohibits
“maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood
or person … by … offensive conduct.” The Los Angeles Municipal Court
convicted Cohen of violating Section 415 for wearing the jacket in the
courthouse, sentencing him to 30 days of imprisonment.
Cohen’s conviction was upheld by the California Court of Appeals, which found
that Cohen’s jacket was “offensive conduct” in that it was behavior reasonably
foreseeable to provoke others to react violently. The California Supreme Court
took a vote to hear the case, and declined to review Cohen’s appeal. The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to hear the case.
Decision Overview
Harlan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Court first considered and was satisfied that it had jurisdiction to hear the
case because Cohen had exhausted his appeal route in California. He had
argued that Section 415 infringed his freedom of expression rights guaranteed
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution which
contention had been rejected by the highest California state court in which
review could be had.
The Court went on to clarify what was not at issue in the case in order to
identify the precise matter that was in issue.
Firstly, the conviction was clearly on speech and not on expressive conduct
which can be regulated if there is a sufficiently important governmental interest
justifying a limitation on First Amendment freedom (United States v. O’Brien).
Also, because Cohen was not intending to incite disobedience or disrupt the
draft, this was not a case for which Cohen could be punished for the underlying
content of the message.
The Court stated that the First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been
thought to give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or
wherever he pleases, or to use any form of address in any circumstances that
he chooses. However, it went on to note that several well-established
exceptions were not evident in this case.
First, there was no language limiting Section 415 to a courthouse, where
seeking to “preserve an appropriately decorous atmosphere” could have been
a legitimate interest for the government. The statute applied to the entire state
of California, and made no distinction between locations. It was also not a case
of “obscenity”, a category of speech the government may regulate when the
speech is erotic or sexually charged in some way. Cohen’s speech was also
not prohibited as “fighting words”, which are “those personally abusive epithets
which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common
knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction”. While the profane
four-letter word on Cohen’s jacket is often used in a provocative fashion, no
one reading Cohen’s jacket would have interpreted it as directed at them or
antagonizing a certain group. Finally, the government could not regulate
Cohen’s speech to protect the especially sensitive, because Cohen’s speech
occurred in public. Whereas the government may “prohibit intrusion into the
privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be totally
banned from the public dialogue … we are often ‘captives’ outside the
sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech”. (U.S., Rowan v.
Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).) Cohen invaded no one’s privacy
by wearing the jacket in the public.
Having concluded that Cohen’s conviction did not come within any of the
narrow categories that would have allowed the government to prohibit Cohen’s
speech, the Court concluded that Cohen’s conviction was solely based on his
use of the word “fuck”. Put another way, could California use the guise of
“offensive conduct” to excise “one scurrilous epithet from the public discourse”
either upon a theory that it “is inherently likely to cause a violent reaction” or,
acting as the “guardians of public morality” remove the word “from the public
vocabulary”. The Court said that while the word at issue may have been more
objectionable than most, distinguishing one offensive word from another is not
something to be left to the states. “For, while the particular four-letter word
being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre,
it is nevertheless often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric. … [T]he
Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.”
The Court said that freedom of expression is a “powerful medicine” in a
democratic society, and trifling too much with the manner of that expression
inherently limits the desired expression. The Court could not “indulge the facile
assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process” especially when “words
are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force”.
In summing up the Court said that without a more particularized and
compelling reason for its actions, the State could not, consistently with the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display of the single
four-letter expletive a criminal offense. “Because that is the only arguably
sustainable rationale for the conviction here at issue, the judgment below must
be reversed.”
Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C.J., and Black, J.,
joined. Justice Blackmun dissented for two reasons: 1. Cohen’s jacket was
more conduct than speech, and thus the government had greater latitude to
restrict it and, further, it was a case of “fighting words” within Chaplinsky; and
2. The Court should have remanded the case back to California in light of the
1970 California Supreme Court case interpreting Section 415. White, J.,
concurred with the second part of the dissenting opinion.
Disini vs Secretary of Justice (tapos na to mah men)
MVRS Publications, Inc. vs. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines,
Inc.
The Muslim community is too vast as to readily ascertain who among the
Muslims were particularly defamed.
CASES/AUTHORITY CITED:
Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court associations of sugarcane
planters in Negros Occidental filed against Newsweek over an article "Island
of Fear “allegedly depicting Negros Province as a place dominated by
exploitative wealthy landowners and sugar planters who also brutalized and
killed underpaid planters.SC dismissed complaint on the ground that no
allegation in the complaint that the article complained of specifically referred
to any of them. Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a
group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-
embracing as to apply to every individual in that groupers class, or sufficiently
specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the
defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he canbring the
action separately, if need be.
Arcand v. The Evening Call Publishing Company: US CA held that the one
guiding principle of group libel is that defamation of a large group does not
give rise to acause of action on the part of an individual unless it can be shown
that he is thetarget of the defamatory matter.
Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno’s opinion:
Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel (written) and slander (oral). In
either form, defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good
name. This is a "relational interest" since it involves the opinion others in the
community may have, or tend to have of the plaintiff.
The law of defamation protects the interest in reputation — the interest in
acquiring, retaining and enjoying one's reputation as good as one's character
and conduct warrant. Defamation requires that something be communicated
to a third person that may affect the opinion others may have of the plaintiff. It
must be shown that this communication would tend to hurt plaintiff's reputation,
to impair plaintiff's standing in the community.
Although the gist of an action for defamation is an injury to reputation, the
focus of a defamation action is upon the allegedly defamatory statement itself
and its predictable effect upon third persons.
The Restatement of Torts defines a defamatory statement as one that "tends
to so harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."
Consequently as a prerequisite to recovery, it is necessary for the plaintiff to
prove: (1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of and concerning
the plaintiff. The rule in libel is that the action must be brought by the person
against whom the defamatory charge has been made. Plaintiff must be the
person with reference to whom the statement was made.
If the defamatory statements were directed at a small, restricted group of
persons, theyapplied to any member of the group, and an individual member
could maintain an action fordefamation. In contrast, if defamatory words are
used broadly in respect to a large class or group of persons, and there is
nothing that points, or by proper colloquium or innuendo canbe made to apply,
to a particular member of the class or group, no member has a right of action
for libel or slander. A prime consideration, therefore, is the public perception
of thesize of the group and whether a statement will be interpreted to refer to
every member.
Regarding the argument that the present case is an intentional tortious act
causing mental distress and not an action for libel. Invoking Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire where the U.S. SCheld that profanity, intended merely to incite
hostility, have no social value and do not enjoyprotection; and Beauharnais v.
Illinois where it was also ruled that hate speech against agroup (based on
religion, ethnicity, etc.) may validly be prohibited.
COURT: NO.
"Emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature; it is a civil action filed by
an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal
attacks on his character.
APPLICATION:
No particular individual was identified in the disputed article of Bulgar. Here, it
is relational harm — which includes harm to social relationships in the
community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of
reactive harm — which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in
the form of an infliction of emotional distress.
DOCTRINES:
Second Restatement of the Law, to recover for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress the plaintiff must show that:
(a) The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of
the plaintiff;
(b) The conduct was extreme and outrageous;
(c) There was a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's mental distress; and,
(d) The plaintiff’s mental distress was extreme and severe.
"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized
society.
"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as
extreme grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment,
worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror, and
chagrin.
"Severe emotional distress," - he or she has suffered emotional distress so
severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it; severity of
the distress is an element of the cause of action, not simply a matter of
damages.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell:
A parody appeared in Hustler magazine featuring Reverend Falwell depicting
him in an inebriated state having an incestuous, sexual liaison with his mother.
US Court held that it was not libelous, because no reasonable reader would
have understood it as a factual assertion. But still $200,000 awarded on a
separate count of "intentional infliction of emotional distress," a cause of action
that did not require a false statement of fact to be made. Here, an intentional
tort causing emotional distress gives wayto the fundamental right to free
speech.
APPLICATION:
The conduct of petitioners was not extreme or outrageous. Neither was the
emotional distress allegedly suffered by respondents so severe that no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it. There is no evidence on
record that points to that result.
CASES/AUTHORITY CITED:
i.) Professor William Prosser: Liability of course cannot be
extended to every trivial indignity. One must necessarily be
expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of
rough language, and to acts that are definitely inconsiderate
and unkind. One cannot recover merely because of hurt
feelings.
ii.) Professor Calvert Magruder: There is no occasion for the law
to intervene in every casewhere someone's feelings are hurt.
There must still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion.
iii.) Chaplinsky and Beauharnais had largely been superseded by
Cohen and Branderburg .American courts no longer accept
the view that speech may be proscribed merely because it is
"lewd," "profane," "insulting" or otherwise vulgar or offensive.
iv.) Cohen v. California: Cohen wore a jacket bearing the words
"Fuck the Draft". No one present in the courthouse would
have regarded Cohen's speech as a direct personal insult,
nor was there any danger of reactive violence against him.
No specific individual was targeted in the allegedly
defamatory words printed on Cohen's jacket. There was no
showing that Cohen's jacket bearing the words "Fuck the
Draft" had threatened to provoke imminent violence.
v.) Brandenburg v. Ohio: a leader of the Ku Klux Klan was
convicted for advocating unlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of accomplishing reforms; U.S. Supreme Court, held
that the advocacy of illegal action becomes punishable only if
 such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
NO, it is not a valid class suit.
DOCTRINE:
Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug: class suit elements:
(a) Whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of
the other members of the class;
(b) The proportion of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership
of the class; and,
(c) Any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the
rest of the class.
APPLICATION:
Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks in effect to assert the
interests not only of the Muslims in the Philippines but of the whole Muslim
world as well. But they obviously lack the sufficiency of numbers to represent
such a global group and were not able to demonstrate they have the same
interests with the rest of Muslims.
Guingging vs CA (bro di is done)
People of the Philippines vs Perez (oks na ito)
Chavez vs Gonzales (Hello Garci, Hello I’m back)
FACTS: Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci
Tapes where the parties to the conversation discussed “rigging” the results of
the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005, Presidential
spokesperson Bunye held a press conference in Malacañang Palace, where
he played before the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of
conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in
both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the
second compact disc had been “spliced” to make it appear that President
Arroyo was talking to Garcillano.
However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the woman’s
voice in the compact discs was not President Arroyo’s after all. Meanwhile,
other individuals went public, claiming possession of the genuine copy of the
Garci Tapes. Respondent Gonzalez ordered the NBI to investigate media
organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for possible violation of Republic
Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television
stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a ” cause for the suspension, revocation
and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations” issued to them. On 14
June 2005, NTC officers met with officers of the broadcasters group KBP, to
dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement
expressing commitment to press freedom
On 21 June 2005, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as citizen, filed
this petition to nullify the “acts, issuances, and orders” of the NTC and
respondent Gonzalez (respondents) on the following grounds: (1)
respondents’ conduct violated freedom of expression and the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern under Section 7, Article III
of the Constitution, and (2) the NTC acted ultra vires when it warned radio and
television stations against airing the Garci Tapes.
ISSUE: The principal issue for resolution is whether the NTC warning
embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005 constitutes an impermissible
prior restraint on freedom of expression.
1. Standing to File Petition
Petitioner has standing to file this petition. When the issue involves freedom
of expression, as in the present case, any citizen has the right to bring suit to
question the constitutionality of a government action in violation of freedom of
expression, whether or not the government action is directed at such citizen.
Freedom of expression, being fundamental to the preservation of a free, open
and democratic society, is of transcendental importance that must be
defended by every patriotic citizen at the earliest opportunity.
2. Overview of Freedom of Expression, Prior Restraint and Subsequent
Punishment
Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic
society. Freedom of expression is an indispensable condition8 to the exercise
of almost all other civil and political rights. Freedom of expression allows
citizens to expose and check abuses of public officials. Freedom of expression
allows citizens to make informed choices of candidates for public office.
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any law
curtailing freedom of expression:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or
censorship because the Constitution commands that freedom of expression
shall not be abridged. Over time, however, courts have carved out narrow and
well defined exceptions to this rule out of necessity.
The exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in
this jurisdiction to only four categories of expression, namely: pornography,
false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
danger to national security.
All other expression is not subject to prior restraint.
Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value
expression. Any content-based prior restraint on protected expression is
unconstitutional without exception. A protected expression means what it says
– it is absolutely protected from censorship. Thus, there can be no prior
restraint on public debates on the amendment or repeal of existing laws, on
the ratification of treaties, on the imposition of new tax measures, or on
proposed amendments to the Constitution.
If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is
content-neutral even if it burdens expression. A content-neutral restraint is a
restraint which regulates the time, place or manner of the expression in public
places without any restraint on the content of the expression. Courts will
subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny. An example of a
content-neutral restraint is a permit specifying the date, time and route of a
rally passing through busy public streets. A content-neutral prior restraint on
protected expression which does not touch on the content of the expression
enjoys the presumption of validity and is thus enforceable subject to appeal to
the courts.
Expression that may be subject to prior restraint is unprotected expression or
low-value expression. By definition, prior restraint on unprotected expression
is content-based since the restraint is imposed because of the content itself.
In this jurisdiction, there are currently only four categories of unprotected
expression that may be subject to prior restraint. This Court recognized false
or misleading advertisement as unprotected expression only in October 2007.
Only unprotected expression may be subject to prior restraint. However, any
such prior restraint on unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrier. First,
such prior restraint is presumed unconstitutional. Second, the government
bears a heavy burden of proving the constitutionality of the prior restraint.
Prior restraint is a more severe restriction on freedom of expression than
subsequent punishment. Although subsequent punishment also deters
expression, still the ideas are disseminated to the public. Prior restraint
prevents even the dissemination of ideas to the public.
While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, such expression
may be subject to subsequent punishment,27 either civilly or criminally.
Similarly, if the unprotected expression does not warrant prior restraint, the
same expression may still be subject to subsequent punishment, civilly or
criminally. Libel falls under this class of unprotected expression.
However, if the expression cannot be subject to the lesser restriction of
subsequent punishment, logically it cannot also be subject to the more severe
restriction of prior restraint. Thus, since profane language or “hate speech”
against a religious minority is not subject to subsequent punishment in this
jurisdiction, such expression cannot be subject to prior restraint.
If the unprotected expression warrants prior restraint, necessarily the same
expression is subject to subsequent punishment. There must be a law
punishing criminally the unprotected expression before prior restraint on such
expression can be justified.
The prevailing test in this jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of
government action imposing prior restraint on three categories of unprotected
expression – pornography,31 advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
danger to national security – is the clear and present danger test.32 The
expression restrained must present a clear and present danger of bringing
about a substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, and
such danger must be grave and imminent.
Prior restraint on unprotected expression takes many forms – it may be a law,
administrative regulation, or impermissible pressures like threats of revoking
licenses or withholding of benefits.34 The impermissible pressures need not
be embodied in a government agency regulation, but may emanate from
policies, advisories or conduct of officials of government agencies.
3. Government Action in the Present Case
The government action in the present case is a warning by the NTC that the
airing or broadcasting of the Garci Tapes by radio and television stations is a
“cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations” issued to radio and television stations. The NTC warning,
embodied in a press release, relies on two grounds. First, the airing of the
Garci Tapes “is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the
conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to
radio and TV stations.” Second, the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated,
and subsequent investigation may establish that the tapes contain false
information or willful misrepresentation.
The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes
unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. The NTC does
not specify what substantive evil the State seeks to prevent in imposing prior
restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes. The NTC does not claim that the
public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, of grave and imminent character, that the State has a right
and duty to prevent.
The NTC did not conduct any hearing in reaching its conclusion that the airing
of the Garci Tapes constitutes a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Law. There is also the issue of whether a wireless cellular phone conversation
is covered by the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
Clearly, the NTC has no factual or legal basis in claiming that the airing of the
Garci Tapes constitutes a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. The radio and
television stations were not even given an opportunity to be heard by the NTC.
The NTC did not observe basic due process as mandated in Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations.
The NTC concedes that the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated as
accurate or truthful. The NTC also concedes that only “after a prosecution or
appropriate investigation” can it be established that the Garci Tapes constitute
“false information and/or willful misrepresentation.” Clearly, the NTC admits
that it does not even know if the Garci Tapes contain false information or willful
misrepresentation.
4. Nature of Prior Restraint in the Present Case
The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based
prior restraint because it is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The
NTC’s claim that the Garci Tapes might contain “false information and/or willful
misrepresentation,” and thus should not be publicly aired, is an admission that
the restraint is content-based.
5. Nature of Expression in the Present Case
The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does
not fall under any of the four existing categories of unprotected expression
recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a
political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had
allegedly improper conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right after
the close of voting in the last presidential elections.
Obviously, the content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the
ballot. Public discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected
expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint. In any event, public
discussion on all political issues should always remain uninhibited, robust and
wide open.
The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based
prior restraint on protected expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press
release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts determine that the subject
matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the security of the State, the
public airing of the tape becomes unprotected expression that may be subject
to prior restraint. However, there is no claim here by respondents that the
subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves national security and publicly airing
the tapes would endanger the security of the State.
The airing of the Garci Tapes does not violate the right to privacy because the
content of the Garci Tapes is a matter of important public concern. The
Constitution guarantees the people’s right to information on matters of public
concern. The remedy of any person aggrieved by the public airing of the Garci
Tapes is to file a complaint for violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law after the
commission of the crime. Subsequent punishment, absent a lawful defense, is
the remedy available in case of violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, there can be
subsequent punishment for protected expression under libel, tort or other laws.
In the present case, the NTC action seeks prior restraint on the airing of the
Garci Tapes, not punishment of personnel of radio and television stations for
actual violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
6. Only the Courts May Impose Content-Based Prior Restraint
The NTC has no power to impose content-based prior restraint on expression.
The charter of the NTC does not vest NTC with any content-based censorship
power over radio and television stations.
In the present case, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression
that can never be subject to prior restraint. However, even assuming for the
sake of argument that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected
expression, only the courts have the power to adjudicate on the factual and
legal issue of whether the airing of the Garci Tapes presents a clear and
present danger of bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a right
and duty to prevent, so as to justify the prior restraint.
Any order imposing prior restraint on unprotected expression requires prior
adjudication by the courts on whether the prior restraint is constitutional. This
is a necessary consequence from the presumption of invalidity of any prior
restraint on unprotected expression.
7. Government Failed to Overcome Presumption of Invalidity
Respondents did not invoke any compelling State interest to impose prior
restraint on the public airing of the Garci Tapes. The respondents claim that
they merely “fairly warned” radio and television stations to observe the Anti-
Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars on program standards.
Respondents have not explained how and why the observance by radio and
television stations of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars
constitutes a compelling State interest justifying prior restraint on the public
airing of the Garci Tapes.
Violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, like the violation of any criminal statute,
can always be subject to criminal prosecution after the violation is committed.
Respondents have not explained how the violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Law, or of the pertinent NTC circulars, can incite imminent lawless behavior or
endanger the security of the State.
8. The NTC Warning is a Classic Form of Prior Restraint
The NTC press release threatening to suspend or cancel the airwave permits
of radio and television stations constitutes impermissible pressure amounting
to prior restraint on protected expression. Whether the threat is made in an
order, regulation, advisory or press release, the chilling effect is the same: the
threat freezes radio and television stations into deafening silence. Radio and
television stations that have invested substantial sums in capital equipment
and market development suddenly face suspension or cancellation of their
permits. The NTC threat is thus real and potent.
9. Conclusion
In sum, the NTC press release constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint
on protected expression. There can be no content-based prior restraint on
protected expression. This rule has no exception.
Pharmaceutical and Healthcare association of the Philippines vs Duque
Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and
Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of
herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since
respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said
executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by
President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative
powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the
preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to
Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes
(ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From
1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should
be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties
should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and
ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are
informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH
issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
Issue:
Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not
constitutional;
Held:
YES. Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force
for members, in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article
19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO
Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make
recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the
competence of the Organization for an international rule to be considered as
customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states
because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere
of domestic law either
By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that
an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method
applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed
to have the force of domestic law.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA
Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot
be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by
executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.
Constitutionality of the provisions of the RIRR. The Court partially granted the
petition, declaring certain provisions of the RIRR that prohibited the advertising
and promotion of breastmilk substitutes and provided for administrative
sanctions not found in the Milk Code in contravention of the Milk Code, and
therefore null and void.
The Court considered whether certain international instruments are part of the
law of the Philippines. The Court noted that the CRC does not contain specific
provisions regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes. Instead,
the relevant provisions are contained in the ICMBS and various WHA
Resolutions. The ICMBS had been transformed into domestic law through
local legislation, the Milk Code, and consequently it is the Milk Code that has
the force and effect of law in the Philippines, and not the ICMBS per se.
However, the Milk Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely
prohibiting advertising of breastmilk substitutes, but instead created the Inter-
Agency Committee to regulate such advertising. By contrast, the subsequent
WHA Resolutions specifically prohibiting advertisements and promotions of
breastmilk substitutes have not been adopted as domestic law. Moreover,
such Resolutions do not form part of customary international law. Instead, they
may constitute “soft law” or non-binding norms, principles and practices that
influence state behavior (such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
On the issue of whether the the RIRR is in accordance with the Milk Code, the
Court found that sections 4(f) and 11 (prohibition on the advertising and
promotion of breastmilk substitutes) and 46 (providing for administrative
sanctions that are not found in the Milk Code) went beyond the DOH’s
authority and contravened the Milk Code, and were therefore null and avoid.
The Court found that the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are consistent with
the Milk Code. Finally, the Court dismissed the petitioner’s argument that the
RIRR is unnecessary and oppressive, and offensive to the due process clause
of the Constitution insofar as it amounts to a restraint of trade, because trade
must be subjected to some form of regulation for the public good and public
interests must trump business interests.
Excerpts citing CRC and other relevant human rights instruments:
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of
the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take
appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that
all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding. [...]
First, the Court will determine if pertinent international instruments adverted to
by respondents are part of the law of the land.
Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions of the
Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of said law. The
defense of the DOH is that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code but
also various international instruments regarding infant and young child
nutrition. It is respondents' position that said international instruments are
deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement
them through the RIRR.
The Court notes that the following international instruments invoked by
respondents, namely: (1) The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child; (2) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
and (3) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, only provide in general terms that steps must be taken by
State Parties to diminish infant and child mortality and inform society of the
advantages of breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-being of families, and
ensure that women are provided with services and nutrition in connection with
pregnancy and lactation. Said instruments do not contain specific provisions
regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes. [...]
“Soft law” does not fall into any of the categories of international law set forth
in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of
Justice. It is, however, an expression of non-binding norms, principles, and
practices that influence state behavior. Certain declarations and resolutions of
the UN General Assembly fall under this category. The most notable is the UN
Declaration of Human Rights, which this Court has enforced in various cases,
specifically, Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia,
Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, Mijares v. Rañadaand Shangri-la International
Hotel Management, Ltd. v. Developers Group of Companies, Inc. [...]
CRIN Comments:
CRIN believes that this decision is consistent with the CRC. Although the CRC
was found to be not directly relevant to this case as the Convention does not
specifically address the use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes, CRIN
emphasizes children’s right to health under Article 24, which includes the
obligation of the state to ensure that all segments of society, in particular
parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.
United States vs Bustos (bustos naman naulit na to for the 3rd time bro)
Mutuc vs COMELEC
The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a
candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in this special civil
action for prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of respondent Commission
on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes, was
not in vain. Nor could it be considering the conceded absence of any express
power granted to respondent by the Constitutional Convention Act to so
require and the bar to any such implication arising from any provision found
therein, if deference be paid to the principle that a statute is to be construed
consistently with the fundamental law, which accords the utmost priority to
freedom of expression, much more so when utilized for electoral purposes. On
November 3, 1970, the very same day the case was orally argued, five days
after its filing, with the election barely a week away, we issued a minute
resolution granting the writ of prohibition prayed for. This opinion is intended
to explain more fully our decision.
In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, petitioner,
after setting forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his candidacy
for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention, alleged that
respondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to him five days
previously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due course
but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound
systems and loud speakers, an order which, according to him, is "violative of
[his] constitutional right ... to freedom of speech."1 There being no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he would seek a writ of
prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. On the very
next day, this Court adopted a resolution requiring respondent Commission on
Elections to file an answer not later than November 2, 1970, at the same time
setting the case for hearing for Tuesday November 3, 1970. No preliminary
injunction was issued. There was no denial in the answer filed by respondent
on November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth in the petition, but the
justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision of the
Constitutional Convention Act,2which made it unlawful for candidates "to
purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral
propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature),
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin."3 It
was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the
recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda
material, under the above statute subject to confiscation. It prayed that the
petition be denied for lack of merit. The case was argued, on November 3,
1970, with petitioner appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C.
Felizmena arguing in behalf of respondent.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not COMELEC’s contention is correct.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC ban is valid.
HELD:
1. No. By virtue of Ejusdem Generis, general words following any enumeration
must be of the same class as those specifically referred to. COMELEC
contended that the ban makes unlawful the distribution of electoral
propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights,
athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and
cigarettes, and concluding with the words “and the like.” For COMELEC, the
last three words sufficed to justify such an order. The Supreme Court did not
agree. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the said law violated
by Mutuc was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its
distribution. It does not include campaign jingles for they are not gadgets as
contemplated by the law.
2. No. This is a curtailment of Freedom of Expression. The Constitution
prohibits the abridgment of the freedom of speech.
The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent
Commission, laudable as it may be, should not be sought at the cost of the
candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit of his candidacy, but is
to be fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of the Act's limitation in
section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate or
by another person with his knowledge and consent.
Near vs Minnesota
Facts: A complaint alleged that the defendants, on September 24, 1927, and
on eight subsequent dates in October and November, 1927, published and
circulated editions of “The Saturday Press”(published in Minneapolis) which
were 'largely devoted to malicious, scandalous and defamatory articles'(based
on Session Laws of Minnesota). The articles charged, in substance, provides
that a Jewish gangster was in control of gambling, bootlegging, and
racketeering in Minneapolis, and that law enforcing officers and agencies were
not energetically performing their duties. Most of the charges were directed
against the chief of police; he was charged with gross neglect of duty, illicit
relations with gangsters, and with participation in graft. The county attorney
was charged with knowing the existing conditions and with failure to take
adequate measures to remedy them. The mayor was accused of inefficiency
and dereliction. One member of the grand jury was stated to be in sympathy
with the gangsters. A special grand jury and a special prosecutor were
demanded to deal with the situation in general, and, in particular, to investigate
an attempt to assassinate one Guilford, one of the original defendants, who, it
appears from the articles, was shot by gangsters after the first issue of the
periodical had been published. Now defendants challenged the Minnesota
statute which provides for the abatement, as a public nuisance, of a malicious,
scandalous and defamatory news paper, magazine or other periodical. The
District Court ruled against defendants. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the proceeding authorized by the statute herein
constitutes an infringement of the freedom of the press.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court concluded that a law banning the publication
of 'malicious, scandalous, and defamatory' material violated the First
Amendment.
The insistence that the statute is designed to prevent the circulation of scandal
which tends to disturb the public peace and to provoke assaults and the
commission of crime is unavailing.
The reason for the enactment, as the state court has said, is that prosecutions
to enforce penal statutes for libel do not result in 'efficient repression or
suppression of the evils of scandal.' In the present instance, the proof was that
nine editions of the newspaper or periodical in question were published on
successive dates, and that they were chiefly devoted to charges against public
officers and in relation to the prevalence and protection of crime. In such a
case, these officers are not left to their ordinary remedy in a suit for libel, or
the authorities to a prosecution for criminal libel. The statute not only operates
to suppress the offending newspaper or periodical, but to put the publisher
under an effective censorship.
Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases
before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he
publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the
consequence of his own temerity.
The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be
responsible in case of its abuse.' Public officers, whose character and conduct
remain open to debate and free discussion in the press, find their remedies for
false accusations in actions under libel laws providing for redress and
punishment, and not in proceedings to restrain the publication of newspapers
and periodicals.
Characterizing the publication as a business, and the business as a nuisance,
does not permit an invasion of the constitutional immunity against restraint.
Nor can it be said that the constitutional freedom from previous restraint is lost
because charges are made of derelictions which constitute crimes.
The preliminary freedom, by virtue of the very reason for its existence, does
not depend, as this court has said, on proof of truth.
The fact that the liberty of press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of
scandal does not effect the requirement that the press has immunity from
previous restraints when it deals with official misconduct. Subsequent
punishment for such abuses as may exist is the appropriate remedy,
consistent with the constitutional privilege. Therefore, a statute authorizing
such proceedings is not consistent with the conception of the liberty of the
press as historically conceived and guaranteed and is thus, unconstitutional.
The statute in question cannot be justified by reason of the fact that the
publisher is permitted to show, before injunction issues, that the matter
published is true and is published with good motives and for justifiable ends.
This statute, if upheld, could lead to a complete system of censorship. Thus,
the statute is a substantial infringement on the liberty of the press and in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
Grosjean vs American Press Co.
This suit was brought by appellees, nine publishers of newspapers in the State
of Louisiana, to enjoin the enforcement against them of the provisions of § 1
of the act of the legislature of Louisiana known as Act No. 23, passed and
approved July 12, 1934, as follows:
That every person, firm, association, or corporation, domestic or foreign,
engaged in the business of selling, or making any charge for, advertising or
for advertisements, whether printed or published, or to be printed or published,
in any newspaper, magazine, periodical or publication whatever having a
circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week, or displayed and exhibited,
or to be displayed and exhibited by means of moving pictures, in the State of
Louisiana, shall, in addition to all other taxes and licenses levied and assessed
in this State, pay a license tax for the privilege of engaging in such business
in this State of two percent. (2%) of the gross receipts of such business.
The nine publishers who brought the suit publish thirteen newspapers, and
these thirteen publications are the only ones within the State of Louisiana
having each a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week, although the
lower court finds there are four other daily newspapers each having a
circulation of "slightly less than 20,000 copies per week" which are in
competition with those published by appellees both as to circulation and as to
advertising. In addition, there are 120 weekly newspapers published in the
state, also in competition, to a greater or less degree, with the newspapers of
appellees. The revenue derived from appellees' newspapers comes almost
entirely from regular subscribers or purchasers thereof and from payments
received for the insertion of advertisements therein.
The act requires everyone subject to the tax to file a sworn report every three
months showing the amount and the gross receipts from the business
described in § 1. The resulting tax must be paid when the report is filed. Failure
to file the report or pay the tax as thus provided constitutes a misdemeanor
and subjects the offender to a fine not exceeding $500, or imprisonment not
exceeding six months, or both, for each violation. Any corporation violating the
act subjects itself to the payment of $50 to be recovered by suit. All of the
appellees are corporations. The lower court entered a decree for appellees
and granted a permanent injunction.
The case involved a Louisiana law that imposed on publishing companies a
license tax of 2% of the gross receipts for the privilege of engaging in
advertising in newspapers, magazines or periodicals if their circulation is more
than 20,000 copies per week. Nine Louisiana-based publishers of
newspapers, with circulations of more than 20,000 copies per week each, filed
a suit to enjoin the enforcement against them of the said provision. They
assailed the validity of the act on the ground, inter alia, that it abridges the
freedom of the press in contravention of the due process clause contained in
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Issue:
Can a discriminatory tax hitting political foes of a government official withstand
First Amendment scrutiny.
Decision: (9-0) A unanimous Supreme Court of the United States
Ruling:
(Justice George Sutherland, for the Court, with apparent drafting help from the
younger, far more liberal, Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo.)
The Court’s opinion quoted from the legendary 19th Century American
constitutional scholar, Judge Thomas Cooley. The Court quoted Cooley:13
“The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but
any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free
and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to
prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.”
Grosjean v. American Press Co. remains the leading case awarding the media
constitutional protection from discriminatory taxation. And that is important, for
as the Court said in Grosjean, “A free press stands as one of the great
interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it to be fettered
is to fetter ourselves.”
A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court held that “the act imposing the tax in
question is unconstitutional under the due process of law clause because it
abridges the freedom of the press,” thus:
The tax imposed is designated a “license tax for the privilege of
engaging in such business” -- that is to say, the business of selling, or
making any charge for, advertising. As applied to appellees, it is a tax
of two percent on the gross receipts derived from advertisements
carried in their newspapers when, and only when, the newspapers of
each enjoy a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week. It thus
operates as a restraint in a double sense. First, its effect is to curtail
the amount of revenue realized from advertising, and, second, its direct
tendency is to restrict circulation. This is plain enough when we
consider that, if it were increased to a high degree, as it could be if
valid, it well might result in destroying both advertising and
circulation. (Citation omitted.)
xxx xxx xxx
xxx. The tax here involved is bad not because it takes money from the
pockets of the appellees. If that were all, a wholly different question
would be presented. It is bad because, in the light of its history and of
its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in
the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the
public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties. A free press
stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the
people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.
New York Times vs United States
The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that the
Government failed to meet the requisite burden of proof needed to justify a
prior restraint of expression when attempting to enjoin the New York Times
and Washington Post from publishing contents of a classified study.
Any system of prior restraints on expression comes to the Supreme Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its invalidity. The Government “thus
creates a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such a
restraint.
In what became known as the "Pentagon Papers Case," the Nixon
Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington
Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense Department
study regarding the history of United States activities in Vietnam. The
President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national
security. This case was decided together with United States v. Washington
Post Co.
Issue:
Whether or not the Nixon administration's efforts to prevent the publication of
what it termed "classified information" violate the First Amendment.
Ruling:
6-3. Yes. In it’s per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not
overcome the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint of the press in this
case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security"
should not be used "to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First
Amendment." Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not
cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of
American forces, prior restraint was unjustified.
he Supreme Court of the United States held that the U.S. government carries
a heavy burden to justify the need to infringe upon the rights protected under
the First Amendment, a burden it failed to meet in this case. Therefore, the
New York Times and the Washington Post were protected by the First
Amendment and were allowed to publish the contents of the classified study.
Most notably, Justice Black in his concurrence argued that the First
Amendment protection of the freedom of the press is an essential function of
U.S. democracy. Black stated that the purpose of the freedom of the press is
to serve the people and to preserve the right to censure the government. The
First Amendment abolished the government’s ability to censor the press in
order to ensure that the people have access to information that is free from
government bias and to allow people to hold open public debates. The rights
protected in First Amendment triumph over the government’s interest in
security or civil obedience.
In his concurrence, Justice Douglas noted that secrecy in government is
undemocratic, as is the government’s attempt to kept relevant information out
of the public debate surrounding the Vietnam War. Justice Brennan differed
in his concurrence, stating while the First Amendment acts as an absolute bar
in the present case, this may not be the case for a temporary prevention of
publishing information in the interest of national security, or if one of the
exceptions established in Near v. Minnesota applies.[1] Justice Stewart
asserted in his concurrence that if the disclosure would cause a direct,
immediate, and irreparable damage to the U.S. or to U.S. citizens, then the
outcome may be different in the future. Justice White stated in his concurrence
that the fact that information is sensitive to national security does not prevent
the press from exercising its First Amendment rights.
Finally, Chief Justice Burger in his dissent argued that the First Amendment is
not absolute in all cases: there are exceptions to the First Amendment, and
these exceptions should be debated in the court system.
[1] In Near v. Minnesota, the Court outlined three exceptions to the First
Amendment protection of freedom of the press: if the publication is obscene,
would jeopardize national security in wartime, or threatens to incite violence
and/or the overthrow the government. Here, the Court found that none of these
exceptions applied.
New York Times vs Sullivan (tapos na Brodie)
Newsweek, Inc. vs Intermediate Appellate Court
Petitioner, Newsweek, Inc., a foreign corporation licensed to do business in
the Philippines, in this special action for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary
injunction, seeks to annul the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
dated December 17, 1982 sustaining the Order of the then Court of First
Instance of Bacolod City which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the
complaint for libel filed by private respondents (Civil Case No. 15812), and the
Resolution dated March 10, 1983 which denied its Motion for Reconsideration.
"An Island of Fear" was published by Newsweek in its Feb 23, 1981. It
allegedly portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as a place
dominated by big landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploited
the impoverished workers, but also brutalized and killed them with impunity.
#peachesdiaries
Newsweek filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the printed article
sued upon is not actionable in fact and in law; the complaint is bereft of
allegations that state, much less support a cause of action.
Trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Complaint on its face states a valid
cause of action; and the question as to whether the printed article sued upon
its actionable or not is a matter of evidence.
Petitioner:
Complaint failed to state a cause of action because: Complaint made no
allegation the article referred specifically to any one of the private respondents;
Libel can be committed only against individual reputation; in cases where libel
is claimed to have been directed at a group, there is actionable defamation
only if the libel can be said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do damage
to a specific, individual group member's reputation.
Issue:
WON the complaint must be dismissed? YES.
Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr.: "in order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that
the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that he be named (19
A.L.R. 116)."
Uy Tioco vs. Yang Shu Wen: Defamatory remarks directed at a class or group
of persons in general language only, are not actionable by individuals
composing the class or group unless the statements are sweeping.
The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue
for the benefit of all
We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct
reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest
in the subject matter of the controversy.
It is evident from the above ruling that where the defamation is alleged to have
been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so
sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class,
or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove
that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring
the action separately, if need be.
We note that private respondents filed a "class suit" in representation of all the
8,500 sugarcane planters of Negros Occidental. Petitioner disagrees and
argues that the absence of any actionable basis in the complaint cannot be
cured by the filing of a class suit on behalf of the aforesaid sugar planters.
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory
and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec.
2 of Rule 4 1). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file
an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on
appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a
motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and
no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the
motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason
is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the
ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the
motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion
or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the
ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a
few examples of the exceptions to the general rule.
MTRCB vs COMELEC??? (MTRCB vs ABSCBN to brad, tapos na din to)
Facts:
Respondent abs-cbn aired “Prosti-tuition”, an episode of the TV program “The
Inside Story” produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female
students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees.
PWU was named as the school of some of the students involved and the
façade of the PWU building served as the background of the episode. This
caused upsoar in the PWU community and they filed a letter-complaint to the
MTRCB.
MTRCB alleged that respondents
1) Did not submit “the inside story” to petitioner for review
2) Exhibited the same without its permission, thus violating sec 7 of PD 1986
and some sections of MTRCB rules and regulations
ABS-CBN averred:
1) The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary
and socio-political editorial, its airing is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press
2) Petitioners has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose
any form of prior restraint upon respondents.
After hearing and submission of the parties’ memoranda, MTRCB
investigating committee ordered the respondents to pay P20,000 for non-
submission of the program
MTRCB affirmed the ruling
Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with RTC QC. RTC
rendered a decision in favor of respondents, annulling and setting aside the
decision and resolution of the MTRCB and declaring and decreeing that
certain sections of PD 1986 & MTRCB do not cover the TV program “Inside
Story”, they being a public affairs programs which can be equated to a
newspaper. Hence, this petition
Issue:
Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the “Inside Story”
prior its exhibition or broadcast by TV.
Held:
Sec 3 of PD 1986 enumerates the powers, functions and duties of the board:
b) to screen, review and examine all motion pictures herein defined, TV
programs, including publicity materials
The court in INC v. CA rules that PD 1986 gives MTRCB the power to screen,
review and examine ALL TV PROGRAMS
*LESSON* where the law does not make any exceptions, courts may not
exempt something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in
the law to justify it.
Thus, when the law says “all TV programs”, the word all covers all tv programs
whether religious, public affairs, news docu, etc
It then follows that since the Inside Story is a TV Program, MTRCB has the
power to review it
The only exemptions from the MTRCB’s power to review are those mentioned
in Sec 7 of PD 1986
1) TV programs imprinted or exhibited by Phil govt and/or
departments and agencies
2) Newsreels
In a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents content that Inside Story
falls under the category of newsreels.
MTRCB rules and reg defines newsreels as “straight news reporting, as
distinguished from analyses, commentaries, and opinions. Talk shows on a
given issue are not considered newsreels.
Clearly, Inside Story is not a newsreel but more of a public affairs program and
within petitioner’s power of review.
Issue related to Consti law:
Petitioner’s power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D.
No. 1986 does not amount to “prior restraint.”
Ratio:
It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni Cristo, this Court declared that freedom
of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental laws, past and present, “designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs x x x.” Yet despite the fact that freedom of religion has been accorded
a preferred status, still this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia ni Cristo’s religious
program from petitioner’s review power.
Respondents claim that the showing of “The Inside Story” is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However,
there has been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that
freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred status.
If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from the
jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is
no justification to exempt therefrom “The Inside Story” which, according to
respondents, is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of
expression and of the press, a freedom bearing no preferred status.
The only exceptions from the MTRCB’s power of review are those expressly
mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs
imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments
and agencies, and (2) newsreels.
In Re Macasaet
The Case
This resolves a contempt charge1 against respondent Amado A.P. Macasaet
(Macasaet), a newspaper columnist, for authoring publications imputing
bribery to a member of this Court.
The Facts
Macasaet writes a daily column, "Business Circuit," in Malaya, a newspaper
of general circulation. In the 18-21 September 2007 issues of Malaya,
Macasaet ran a story, based on information obtained from confidential
sources, of an alleged bribery in the Court committed as follows: on separate
occasions in the second week of September 2007,2 five3 boxes containing
cash worth P10 million were delivered to the Court and received by a certain
"Cecilia," a staff of an unnamed lady Justice, who opened one of the boxes
and saw its contents. Forthwith, the Justice terminated "Cecilia’s"
employment. The payoff was made allegedly in connection with a decision
rendered by the Justice "acquitting" a Filipino-Chinese businessman.
Macasaet’s story, which carried commentaries on the state of the judiciary and
reputation of judges,4 exhorted "Cecilia" to divulge everything she knows
about the alleged bribery and the Court to investigate the matter.
Subsequently, Newsbreak, an online magazine, posted on its website5 a news
report that the Court is investigating a bribery incident based on facts
substantially similar6 to what Macasaet wrote. Written by Marites Danguilan
Vitug (Vitug), Newsbreak editor, and Aries Rufo (Rufo), Newsbreak reporter,
the news report named Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago as the member of
the Court involved in the alleged bribery and one Cecilia Delis (Delis)7 as her
staff whose employment she terminated.
On 24 September 2007, Justice Santiago issued a statement denying the
"accusations and insinuations" published in Malaya and Newsbreak. Justice
Santiago also asked the Court to investigate the matter.
In a Resolution dated 25 September 2007, the Court en banc required
Macasaet to explain "why no sanction should be impose[d] on him for indirect
contempt of court" under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.8 After Macasaet submitted his compliance and Delis her affidavit,
the Court, in the Resolution of 16 October 2007, created a Committee,
composed of former members of the Court,9 to "receive evidence from all
parties concerned" and submit its report and recommendation within 30 days
from the start of its hearing. Macasaet, Vitug, Rufo, Delis and other Court
employees10 appeared and testified before the Committee.
Macasaet, Vitug and Rufo uniformly testified that they obtained the information
on the alleged bribery from their respective confidential sources. Delis denied
having received or opened any box containing cash intended for Justice
Santiago. While admitting that she was a staff of Justice Santiago, Delis
denied having been fired from service and claimed that she resigned effective
15 March 2007. Danilo Pablo of the Court’s Security Division testified that
while visitors to the Court are listed in the logbook at the Court’s gate, the
security personnel, as a matter of policy, do not open gifts or boxes intended
for members of the Court.
It was determined during the hearings conducted by the Committee that the
case referred to in Macasaet and Newsbreak’s11 publications is G.R. No.
172602 (Henry T. Go v. The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan). The petition in
G.R. No. 172602 sought the nullification of the Sandiganbayan’s ruling
denying quashal of the Information filed against petitioner Henry T. Go (Go)
for violation of Section 3(g), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act). In a Decision dated 13 April 2007, penned by Justice Romeo
J. Callejo, Sr., the Third Division, by a divided vote,12 dismissed the petition
in G.R. No. 172602. Go sought reconsideration and while his motion was
pending, Justice Callejo retired from the Court. In the Resolution dated 3
September 2007, penned by Justice Santiago, a Special Third Division, again
by a divided vote,13 granted Go’s motion, reversed the Decision of 13 April
2007, and dismissed the Information filed against Go. The respondent sought
reconsideration which awaits resolution.
In its Report and Recommendation dated 10 March 2008 (Report), the
Committee found that "there exist valid grounds x x x to cite x x x Macasaet
for indirect contempt x x x." The Report found that (1) Macasaet’s publications
were false, baseless,14 unbelievable,15 and malicious16 and (2) Macasaet
was negligent in failing to ascertain the veracity of his story.17 The Committee
concluded that Macasaet’s publications generated public distrust in the
administration of justice and thus, contumacious. The majority finds the
Report’s findings and conclusion well-taken and accordingly imposes a
punitive fine on Macasaet.
I agree with the majority that Macasaet failed to substantiate his story.
However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this suffices to hold
Macasaet guilty of contempt of court.
At any rate, the evidence at hand fails to meet the applicable standard in
contempt-by-publication proceedings.
This matter comes on the heels of a small but growing line of jurisprudence on
contempt-by-publication;29 however, this is only the second incident to involve
this Court on reports of corruption.30 These cases implicate two competing
but equally vital State interests: on the one hand, the right of journalists to be
protected from contempt of court under the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and of the press and, on the other hand, the right of the courts to
maintain order, impartiality and dignity in the administration of justice. In
resolving the matter, we are called upon to perform a task more commonly
done in constitutional adjudication – the balancing of constitutional values
using applicable standards. As ever, the result of this delicate task hinges on
the liberality or stringency of the test used against which the two interests are
weighed.
In concluding that "there exist valid grounds x x x to cite x x x Macasaet for
indirect contempt x x x," the Report implicitly used two parameters, first applied
in In Re: Emil P. Jurado31 (Jurado test), against which Macasaet’s
publications were measured: (1) whether Macasaet’s story was false and (2)
whether Macasaet could have prevented the publication of the false story by
exercising diligence in verifying its veracity.32 As stated, the Report found
Macasaet’s publications wanting on both counts.
However, long before we adopted the Jurado test, this Court already laid down
the two "theoretical formulas" to serve as the judicial scales upon which the
competing interests in this proceeding are weighed. We held in Cabansag v.
Fernandez:33
Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting
rights of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary
between freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are
the [1] "clear and present danger" rule and the [2] "dangerous tendency" rule.
The first, as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence
of the comment or utterance must be "extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high" before the utterance can be punished. The danger
to be guarded against is the "substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And
this evil is primarily the "disorderly and unfair administration of justice." This
test establishes a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as
to what words may be published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot
constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that
such advocacy will harm the administration of justice.
Thus, speaking of the extent and scope of the application of [the first] rule, the
Supreme Court of the United States said "Clear and present danger of
substantive evils as a result of indiscriminate publications regarding judicial
proceedings justifies an impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of
speech and press only if the evils are extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high. . . . A public utterance or publication is not to be
denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press merely
because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the courts, upon the
theory that in such a case it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and
fair administration of justice.
The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in cases
where extreme difficulty is confronted in determining where the freedom of
expression ends and the right of courts to protect their independence begins.
There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule
lies in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to
petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are not
absolute. They are subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being
the protection of the courts against contempt (Gilbert vs. Minnesota, 254 U. S.
325.)
This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a
dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words
are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of
force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be
advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be
reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the
utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
seeks to prevent. (Gitlow vs. New York, 268 U.S. 652.)
Thus, in this jurisdiction, we have long ago applied the clear and present
danger test in contempt cases.34 We must scrutinize Macasaet's publications
through the lens of the clear and present danger test guided by these queries:
(1) is the evil consequence of Macasaet’s publications extremely serious? and
(2) is the degree of its imminence extremely high? The facts of this case do
not meet either criterion.
These observations are consistent with the rule that the clear and present
danger test is deemed met only upon showing that "the material would tend to
cause the unfair disposition of pending cases"42 or create an imminent and
serious threat to the ability of the Court to decide the issues before it.43 In
sum, the facts of this case fall short of the stringent standard under the clear
and present danger test that the substantive evil brought about by the
publications be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high.
In Re: Letter of UP (plagiarism, Filipino comfort women. Lam mo nay yan)
GMA vs COMELEC (nadiscuss na yun, yung airtime, hakuna ur tatas)