39.

AGUSTIN VS EDU

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of
Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices
particularly to equip them with a pair of “reflectorized triangular early warning devices”.
Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to
the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already
enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists
to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.

HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor
oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights in the
fore and aft of said motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered blinking lights inside motor
vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4)
‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the
signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse
conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any
part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on
the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along
the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is
stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other
hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the
petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still
think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law
enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the
motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.

On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the
former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due
process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was
mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was
originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847
decision, as “nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty” was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel,
in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams,
identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property
could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948,
Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as ‘the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order
or safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The concept was set forth in negative terms by
Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power in
the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society.’ In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v.
Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most
powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the most essential,
insistent, and at least illimitable powers,’ extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out ‘to
all the great public needs.’ Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,
even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient
and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be
interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent
changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far
from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good
order, and welfare.”
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the
particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety.
It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive
act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-
existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector
Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found
nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: “To promote safe transit
upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . .” As a
matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise
prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.

40. BINAY VS DOMINGO

Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which
extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not
exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available
funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution.
Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the
implementation of the program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said
resolution and the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the following
reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare,
safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be disbursed for public
purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection clause since it will only benefit a few
individuals.
Issues:

1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general
welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause

Held:

1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which

was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et
ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing
the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal
corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by
the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant
thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred
upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety,
comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the
prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure
the protection of property therein.

2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet
the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people
in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private
rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation
and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects,
and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals,
and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal
with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by
promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the
preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed
inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of
police power.
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited
number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift
is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate
social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as human dignity
and respect for human rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public
duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the
promotion of the common good.

3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably

classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our
legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have
been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer
from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted
under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing
program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a
relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful
experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death.
Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those
who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken
as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a
philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise. (Binay vs
Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991)

41. QUEZON CITY VS ERICTA

Facts:

An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation
ofestablishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of
the total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private
memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of
property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of
all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of
police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and
not for the benefit of the public.

Issue:

Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property
Ruling:

No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The
ordinace is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaing a public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of expropriation
requires payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the
owner of the property with just compensation or due process, would amount to unjust
taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be used for the
public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come forward and not the
police power of the state.

42. PHIL. ASSOC VS DRILON

PASEI VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988]

Monday, February 02, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in

the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges
the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled
“Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and
Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an
invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor
General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelinesinvolving
the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the
deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines
and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and
protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department
Order No. 1.

Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been validclassification,
the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the
special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies
only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not
import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification,
provided that:

1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions

2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment
ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects
among other things, to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by law.
Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power
as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the
contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power
as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

43. YNOT VS IAC

FACTS
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of
carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984,
Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in
violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to
be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to
outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower
court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to
promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A
ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos
from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue.
Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred
before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due
process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken.

44.

45 Macasiano vs Diokno GR 97764 (August 10, 1992)

Facts:

Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure of

J.Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets and the
establishment of a flea market thereon. This was passed pursuant to MMC Ordinance No.2
and was approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority on July 20, 1990.

On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and Palanyag entered into a contract

agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain & manage the flea markets and/or
vending areas in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the
treasury of the municipal government of Parañaque.
On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the destruction and confiscation of
stalls along G.G. Cruz & Gabriel Street in Baclaran. He also wrote a letter to Palanyag
ordering the destruction of the flea market.

Hence, respondent filed a joint petition praying for preliminary injunction. The trial court
upheld the assailed Ordinance and enjoined petitioner from enforcing his letter-order
against Palanyag.

Issues:

WON an ordinance/resolution issued by the municipal council of Parañaque authorizing

the lease & use of public streets/thoroughfares as sites for the flea market is valid.

Held:

No.

J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets are local roads used
for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent
municipality. Properties of the local government devoted to public service are deemed
public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no
authority to control/regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested
upon them by Congress.

Sec. 10, Chapter II of the LGC should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic
principles already established by law.

The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public
property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer
intended/necessary for public use/service. Once withdrawn, the property then becomes
patrimonial property of the LGU concerned and only then can said LGU use the property as
an object of an ordinary contract. Roads and streets available to the public and ordinarily
used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. The
LGU has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private
persons.

Also, the disputed ordinance cannot be validly implemented because it can’t be considered
approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance with the conditions
it imposed for the approval of said ordinance.

The powers of an LGU are not absolute, but subject to the limitations laid down by the
Constitution and laws such as the Civil Code. Every LGU has the sworn obligation to enact
measures that will enhance the public health, safety & convenience, maintain peace & order
and promiote the general prosperity of the inhanbitants pf the local units.

As in the Dacanay case, the general public have the right to demand the demolition of the
illegally constructed stalls in public roads & streets. The officials of the respondent
municipality have the corresponding duty arising from public office to clear the city streets
and restore them to their specific public purpose.

The ordinance is void and illegal for lack of basis in authority in laws applicable during its
time.

46.
47.

48. Ortigas & Co. vs Feati Bank & Trust Co.

Facts:

On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at
Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred
their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed
with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential
purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and
101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic
Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be
devoted for banking purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written
demand to stop construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being
constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27
declaring the area along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil
case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati.

Issue:

Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and
commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of
Titles.

Held:
Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local
Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances
or regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the
municipality should be “liberally construed in it’s favour”, “to give more power to the local
government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the
community”. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-
impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.
Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health,
safety, peace and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not
be a conducive residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise
which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.

Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.

49. Velasco vs Villegas

G.R. No. L-24153 February 14, 1983

Facts: In their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of barbershops in the
City of Manila, petitioners challenge the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of
the City of Manila, which prohibited the business of massaging customers of a barber shop.
They contend that it amounts to a deprivation of property of their means of livelihood
without due process of law.

Issue: Whether said ordinance was unconstitutional, and therefore an improper exercise of
police power

Held: No. The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of
respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment
are: “(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of
massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely
different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in
order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate
rooms for massage of customers.”
The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare
clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm
made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which “delegates in statutory form
the police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide
application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances
of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive
view of Philippine jurisprudence.”
 50. Dela Cruz v Paras

G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983

Fernando, CJ:

Facts:
1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs.
Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality
being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the
same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were
violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial
hearing.

2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting
Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments,
Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective
Territorial Jurisdictions.'

The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall
have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of
night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys,
billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to
regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded
exactly as RA 938.

3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may
go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It
was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that
of regulation, not prohibition.

4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give
rise to a constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity
of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid

NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the

regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to
regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the
 Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap
between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote
the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such
competence extending to all "the great public needs.

2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between

two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity
and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction
that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends
itself.

3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the
operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were
sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to
operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally
open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to
allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate
regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the
necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination
of their business.

4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an
exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

51. Balacuit vs Court of First Instance GR L-38429 30 June 1988

Facts: The Municipal Board of City of Butuan passed Oridinance No 640 on 21 April 1969,
“penalizing any person , group of persons , entity or engeged in the business of selling
admission tickets to any movie… to require children between 7-12 years of age to pay full
payment for ticket should only be charged one half.” Petitioners Carlos Balacuit , et al as
managers of theaters assailed the validity and constitutionality of the said ordinance. The
court adjudged in favour of the respondents hence the petition for review. Petitioners
contend that it violates due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive , unfair ,
unjust, confiscatory and an undue restraint of trade.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 640 – prohibiting selling of theatre admission tickets to
children 7-12 y/o at full price is constitutional or not?
Decision: Decision reversed. Ordinance 640 declared unconstitutional. For the assailed
ordinance be held constitutional it must pass the test of police power. To invoke the
exercise the police power, it must be for the interest of the public without interfering with
private rights and adoptive means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must
be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and
its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the
business or calling subject of regulation. The right of the owner to fix a price at which his
property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such,
within the protection of the due process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a
right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think
most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.

52.
53. FORTICH vs. CORONA
289 SCRA 624, April 24, 1998

TOPIC: Finality of Judgement; Administrative Law

DOCTRINE: The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgements/resolutions

of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and
regulations; a resolution which substantially modifies a decision after it has attained
finality is utterly void. When an administrative agency's decision becomes final and
executory and no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said
agency has lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its decision.

FACTS:

On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision converting a large
parcel of land from agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area. Because of this, a
group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The strike generated a lot of
publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates (for the upcoming 1998 elections)
intervened on behalf of the farmers.
Because of this “blackmail”, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, “politically motivated”, “win-win”
resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had
become final and executory.

ISSUE: WON the “win-win” resolution, issued after the original decision had become final
and executory, had any legal effect.

HELD:

No; When the OP issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29,
1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration
thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its
Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to
entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which
second motion became the basis of the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution. Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate
that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of
March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed
in “exceptionally meritorious cases,” as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of
AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first
motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of
March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-
opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had
already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal
precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.

The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or

quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The
noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all

54.
55.
56.

57. Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. vs Judge Pascual Bercilles

66 SCRA 481 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation – Patrimonial Property – Discretionary

Power
In 1968, a terminal portion of a street in Cebu was excluded in the city’s development plan
hence the council declared it as abandoned and was subsequently opened for public
bidding. Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. was the highest bidder at P10,800.00. Cebu
Oxygen applied for the land’s registration before CFI Cebu but the provincial fiscal
opposed it, so did the court later through Judge Pascual Bercilles, as it was ruled that the
road is part of the public domain hence beyond the commerce of man.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cebu Oxygen can validly own said land.
HELD: Yes. Under Cebu’s Charter (RA 3857), the city council “may close any city road,
street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public
servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.” Since that portion of the city
street subject of Cebu Oxygen’s application for registration of title was withdrawn from
public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can
be the object of an ordinary contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “Property of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State.”

58.
59. MUN. OF CAVITE v ROJAS, G. R. No. L-9069, 31 March 1915

Facts: A parcel of land forming a part of the public plaza was leased to the defendants on
which their house has been constructed and had been occupying the same. The plaintiff
ordered the defendants to vacate the said land as it formed integral part of the public plaza.
The defendants refused to vacate the said land because they had acquired the right of
possession to it and further alleged that the lease agreement provided that they can only be
ordered to vacate the said property if the municipality needed it for decoration or public
use.
The trial court held that the municipality had no legal claim to the property. This case was
appealed through bill of exceptions.
Issue: WON the lease agreement between the parties was valid
Ruling: The lease was null and void.
Ratio Decidendi: The defendant has no right to continue to occupy the land for it is an
integral part of the plaza which is for public use and is reserved for the common benefit.
Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads,
the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of
general service supported by said towns or provinces.
The said Plaza being a promenade for public use, the municipal council of Cavite could not
in 1907 withdraw or exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to lease it for the
sole benefit of the defendant Hilaria Rojas. The plaintiff municipality exceeded its authority
in the exercise of its powers by executing a contract over a thing of which it could not
dispose, nor is it empowered so to do. The Civil Code, articles 1271, prescribes that
everything which is not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract, and
plazas and streets are outside of this commerce. Therefore, it must be concluded that the
said lease is null and void.

60. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V. SECRETARY OF DAR, G.R. No. 78742

(175 SCRA 343), July 14, 1989

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

POLICE POWER
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ,

GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B.
CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA,
FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA,
EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R.
SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989

ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA,

HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC.,
Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
COUNCIL, respondents.

G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989

INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON.
JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs.
SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO
TAAY, respondents.

G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.
FACTS:
These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"

In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229
on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.

In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the
Congress and not to the President, the also allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No.
229 should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions on just compensation,
due process and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous
with payment of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of
the E.O No. 229.

In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by
the President and that the said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that no
private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation which was
denied to the petitioners.

In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are
unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so
far not issued the implementing rules of the decree. They therefore ask the Honorable
Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said rules.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or Power of
Eminent Domain.

RULING:

Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there

are traditional distinction between the police power and the power of eminent domain,
property condemned under police power is noxious or intended for noxious purpose, the
compensation for the taking of such property is not subject to compensation, unlike the
taking of the property in Eminent Domain or the power of expropriation which requires
the payment of just compensation to the owner of the property expropriated.