Analysis
The Battle of the Giants
Summary: Unlike the rest of the
world, where the word “turmoil”
would immediately bring to mind the
financial crisis that is terminating an
era of financial sector and neolib-
eral ideological domination in eco-
nomic affairs, in Turkey, “turmoil”
these days means the serially erupt-
ing corruption cases and Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s
personal declaration of war against
media tycoon Aydın Doğan and his
multi-business empire. The war’s
true meaning, however, has gone
beyond the confines of an Erdoğan-
Doğan war. It has brought to light
the unhealthy, corroding pattern of
relations between media and politi-
cal power, the hidden and obvious
costs of a non-transparent, non-
accountable system of patronage,
and the frightful distance between
EU and Turkish criteria on freedom
of expression.
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by Soli Ozel*
ISTANBUL — Turkey finally relaxes
during a nine-day holiday. The govern-
ment extended the three and a half
weekday break by a day and a half to
give both the public and itself a respite
from the “turmoil” of recent weeks.
Unlike the rest of the world, where the
word “turmoil” would immediately
bring to mind the financial crisis that
is terminating an era of financial sector
and neoliberal ideological domina-
tion in economic affairs, in Turkey,
‘turmoil’ these days means the serially
erupting corruption cases and Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s
personal declaration of war against
media tycoon Aydın Doğan and his
multi-business empire. The war’s true
meaning, however, has gone beyond
the confines of an Erdoğan-Doğan war.
It has brought to light the unhealthy,
corroding pattern of relations between
media and political power, the hidden
and obvious costs of a non-transparent,
non-accountable system of patronage,
and the frightful distance between EU
and Turkish criteria on freedom of
expression.
The public held high hopes that once
the closure case against the ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP)
came to a politically viable end, Turkey
and its government would concentrate
on the pressing issues and challenges
that confronted the country. After all,
the government and Erdoğan surfaced
*
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of International Relations and Political Science and is a columnist for the
Turkish daily Sabah. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German
Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).
from that crisis stronger (a recent sur-
vey by the polling company Metropoll
put the AKP’s support at 51 percent)
and the opposition was at best in
disarray. Circumstances were as propi-
tious as they would ever get for the
government to undertake bold mea-
sures for structural reform and steps
to deepen Turkish democracy. It could
also make moves to allay the concerns
of a substantial segment of the popu-
lation regarding its view of relations
between religion and politics.
The optimists expected Prime Min-
ister Erdoğan to engage in a cabinet
revision (a demand most recently
voiced by the conservative business
association MUSIAD who is close to
and supportive of the AKP), re-launch
the constitutional change project, and
for good measure move forward on
EU accession related reforms. Business
groups and interested opinion makers
are concerned with the complacency
that seems to permeate government
circles concerning the unfolding
financial crisis and the impending
slowdown of the world economy.
Experts argue that the Turkish econo-
my’s relative immunity so far to both
the financial shocks emanating from
Wall Street and the recent economic
downturn in Turkey’s major export
markets, was no reason to remain
inactive.
Analysis
Instead of this type of surge though the government ef-
fectively chose to concentrate on the upcoming municipal
elections and not risk any bold moves. Moreover, Turkey
got embroiled in corruption scandals and political wars.
This turned the country inward and made it impervious to
the gathering storms abroad.
The opening shot of the war between Erdoğan and Doğan’s
media holdings came during a local party conference at
which Erdoğan spoke. Interestingly, the speech took place
on the day Turkey’s president, Abdullah Gül, was in Ar-
menia ostensibly to watch the soccer game between the
national teams of Turkey and Armenia. In truth, Gül’s visit
was one of the most important and historical diplomatic
openings of the Republic’s history. Inevitably, however,
this opening to Armenia was overshadowed by the Prime
Minister’s hard-hitting accusations against Doğan.
Erdoğan’s attack had a much broader context that lent itself to
a more complex and multifaceted interpretation of his move.
He was responding to the reports in Doğan newspapers
about a court case in Germany, where the German branch of
an Islamic charity organization, Denizfeneri (Lighthouse) e.V,
was accused of malfeasance. The prosecution argued, that
from the €42 million collected by Denizfeneri for charitable
purposes, €18.5 million was sent to Turkey. Of that €18.5
million, €8 million was either embezzled or siphoned off to
businesses. Kanal 7, a local television station whose founder
and principals are supportive of the AKP and close to
Erdoğan, figured particularly prominently in the indictment.
There were also serious charges against Zahit Akman, the
head of Turkey’s Radio-TV Supervisory Council and himself
formerly of Kanal 7.
The case resulted in three guilty verdicts, and those jail
sentences came on top of accusations against one of Erdoğan’s
closest associates, Şaban Dişli. Dişli was accused of influence
peddling and grossing about a million dollars in a land
transaction. Following a period of stonewalling, Dişli was
forced to resign his post as AKP deputy president by his
party colleagues, most notably the former speaker of the
Parliament, Bülent Arınç. The Doğan groups’ newspapers
and television stations relentlessly pursued both cases while
pro-government media mostly ignored this news or present-
ed it as part of one or another type of conspiracy.
Feeling besieged and already infuriated by the Doğan group
2
for what he considers to be inimical or anti-AKP editorial
positions on matters that range from the e-memorandum
of April 2007, to the election of the President, to the cover-
age of the July 2007 elections, to the closure case against the
AKP, Erdoğan called the integrity of Doğan into question. He
accused Doğan of holding grudges against the government
because Doğan was not receiving the kind of favoritism that
he was accustomed to under other governments that were
beholden to his media power. Most notably, Erdoğan brought
up the issue of a land zoning arrangement for the Istanbul
Hilton, a hotel that Doğan owns and wanted to convert into
a residential area. Erdoğan mentioned Doğan’s demand for
a land transmission license on CNN-Turk. Incensed, Doğan
responded to the Prime Minister in a live interview from one
of his own channels and revealed that he went to see Erdoğan
to inquire about his chances for the tender of a refinery to
be built in the port city of Ceyhan, where two oil pipelines
end. He was informed that the refinery project would go to
Ahmet Çalık and that Russian Prime Minister Vladmir Putin
and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi were in some
way engaged. Çalık is the owner of a multi-business company
active in central Asia who, encouraged and supported by the
Prime Minister, bought the second-largest media conglomer-
ate that included Turkey’s second most influential newspaper
Sabah.
This exchange continued and culminated with Erdoğan
presenting his preferences for how proper headlines ought
to read, displaying his anger with the presence of disobedi-
ent writers in the pro-government papers, and asking the
party faithful not to buy or read Dogan’s newspapers. In this
process, the Turkish public had a glimpse of the way the
Turkish system functions, the way the big media’s outlets are
not firewalled from their other businesses, the kind of abuse
this can generate in media-politics relations, and therefore
how corruptible the entire system actually is.
Upon Erdoğan’s call to boycott the newspapers, the demo-
cratic public and opinion makers voiced strong objections
and questioned the Prime Minister’s commitment to freedom
of expression, freedom of the press, democracy, and finally
given the context of the outburst, to fighting corruption. The
European Union also expressed concern on these matters.
A few questions need to be answered. Why did the Prime
Minister decide to pick a fight with the Doğan group, and
with such passion, at this particular moment? Given the de-
Analysis
gree of corruption that seems to have permeated all ranks of
the party and the larger Islamist networks, will the elector-
ate punish the AKP in the upcoming municipal elections?
It is easier to answer the second question. By now it is pretty
clear that corruption is the Achilles’ heel of the AKP. In the
words of the Islamist intellectual Ali Bulaç, “the Lighthouse
case and the revelations created trauma among the believers.”
Undoubtedly, many such cases will come to light in the com-
ing months. In fact, the main opposition party, the Repub-
lican People’s Party (CHP), is finally taking a different track
and instead of attacking the AKP on secularism, is presenting
files about alleged corruption by major figures within the
party. Erdoğan’s failure to take the charges seriously and show
the will to fight corruption might yet cost him politically, but
this will not come about very soon. Under existing circum-
stances, the AKP is likely to win an overwhelming majority
in these elections but corruption would eventually erode the
party’s unshakable grip on power.
The most obvious answer to the first question is that the
Prime Minister wanted to divert attention from the Light-
house case. This is probably true but insufficient to explain
the ferocity of his language. Many pundits suggested that
the style was deliberate because not only did Erdoğan have a
visceral dislike for Doğan, but also because he calculated that
given the Doğan group’s unpopular positions and the public’s
reactions to these, this attack would pay off. (In the event,
the circulation of Doğan newspapers—the main source of
opposition at a time when the pro-government media failed
miserably to respect even the most fundamental principles
of the trade—increased.) Otherwise it is unconscionable that
the Prime Minister’s insinuations were about matters that
happened a while ago and on which he should have acted
immediately, rather than use these as threats or quid pro
quos against a group that he disliked. Yet, another interpre-
tation was that, the Prime Minister was trying to preempt
another possible campaign, such as the closure case against
his party and himself in which the Doğan media would be a
willing collaborator. Finally, some saw this confrontation as
Erdoğan’s fight, on behalf of the rising provincial entrepre-
neurial classes, against the established economic and
bureaucratic elites. In short, this was a fight to assert AKP’s
and Erdoğan’s power. The trouble with this analysis was that
this degree of instability and tension in the country would
serve nobody’s interest, and in fact it could boomerang on
Erdoğan.
For the larger public, the lessons are more telling and the
urgency of change is absolute. As a rising regional power
that wishes to be an agent of stability and peace in its
neighborhood, Turkey cannot continue to have such a
tense, fractured country that keeps on fighting itself. Nor
can it continue to let this unhealthy and corroding rela-
tion between media and politics persist. The media owners
ought to build a firewall between their media business and
other commercial endeavors. The government ought to stop
trying to create a subservient media that will serve as a pro-
paganda outlet. What Turkey needs more than anything else
these days is transparency for all and a political culture that
gives the pride of place to efforts to build consensus.
Soli Ozel, Lecturer, Bilgi University; Columnist, Sabah
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of
International Relations and Political Science. He is a columnist for the
national daily Sabah and is senior advisor to the chairman of the
Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association. Additionally, he
is the editor of TUSIAD’s magazine Private View.
About GMF
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