Donald Van de Veer - Marx's View of Justice

International Phenomenological Society
Marx's View of Justice

Author(s): Donald van de Veer
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Mar., 1973), pp. 366-386
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2106949
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MARX'S VIEW OF JUSTICE
At a time when many social practices are attacked on the ground

that they are unjust, and radical students make appeals to the writ-
ings of Karl Marx and neo-Marxists, it would be useful to know just
what Marx's views about justice were. At one time the notion that
Marxism was ethically empty or antiethical was widely accepted.
Today this viewpoint is generally rejected and the focal point of
debate has shifted. A current center of dispute concerns the nature
of Marx's moral concerns. But if one recent commentator on Marx
is correct, there is little or no reason to appeal to Marx to support
claims concerning justice for, it is alleged, Marx had little or no con-
cern with considerations of justice. Indeed, it is maintained that "the
fundamental passion of the founders of Marxism was not a passion
for justice" and that Marx had an ". . . aversion to the idea of justice.'"
In my estimation, such remarks are, at best, misleading half-truths
and, at worst, false. I shall attempt to establish the correctness of this
charge. If successful, my arguments will clear away some of the
cobwebs which tend to disguise Marx's position on justice. To do so
I shall, in the first three sections of the paper, examine the assess-
ment of Marx's views on justice which have been put forth by Pro-
fessor Robert Tucker in his recent book, The Marxian Revolutionary
Idea.2 The remainder of the paper is devoted to considering certain
metaethical considerations, i.e., Marx's views about the question of
justifying moral principles. Certain construals of Marx's position on
this point threaten to undermine my claims about his views on
justice.
From Tucker's characterization of Marx's view as one involving

an "aversion to the idea of justice," it is clear that he holds to some
I Robert Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea (New York: W. W. Norton and
Company, 1969) pp. 36, 51.
2 I focus solely on Chapter Two of Tucker's book.
366
MARX'S VIEW OF JUSTICE 367
general view to the effect that no principle of justice played a key

role in Marx's thought. Questions immediately arise. What is meant
by "justice"? In what sense or in what way is it claimed that Marx
was averse to the idea of justice? To answer these questions it is
necessary that we make a close examination of Tucker's remarks.
A common interpretation of Marx, that Tucker is concerned to

refute, is that the Marxist condemnation of capitalist society was, at
bottom, a protest against the injustice inherent in capitalism. On
such a view, the notion of justice is the moral key to Marxism.3
Tucker finds such an interpretation superficially plausible and ac-
knowledges that there is some evidence for such a view. He states:
Marx and Engels depict the capitalist society that they abhor as the scene of a
great and growing inequality of wealth, where untold riches accumulate in the
hands of a small and dwindling class of avaricious capitalist magnates while the
masses of working people sink deeper and deeper into a black pit of poverty.
Do they not, then, condemn capitalist society because of its inequalities? And
finally, what is the capitalist "exploitation" of labor that Marxism talks about
if it is not a relation in which the worker is robbed of what rightfully belongs
to him? In all these ways Marxism invites a moral interpretation that sees
distributive justice as its central issue.4
However, according to Tucker, a closer analysis of Marx reveals

that, on the contrary, "Their condemnation of capitalism was not
predicated upon a protest against injustice, and they did not envisage
the future communist society as a kingdom of justice," and ". . . they
were opposed to the notion that socialism or communism turns prin-
cipally on the matter of distribution."' Tucker then proceeds to pre-
sent evidence from the writings of Marx and Engels to support his
thesis. The first type of evidence concerns the critical reaction of
Marx to one of the proposals put forward in the Gotha program, a
program for a united German workers' party that was drafted in 1875.
The key proposal in question was a demand for a fair distribution
of the proceeds of labor. Tucker claims that Marx responds by asking
"acidly": What is a fair distribution? Further, Marx notes that the
bourgeois claim that the present mode of distribution is a fair one,
and that socialists disagree among themselves as to what counts as
a "fair distribution." Tucker says of Marx, "He declares that such
slogans as 'fair distribution,' 'equal right,' and 'undiminished proceeds
3 Tucker attributes such a view to Harold Laski (see Karl Marx), E. H. Carr (see
Karl Marx: A Study in Fanaticism), A. D. Lindsay (see Karl Marx's Capital: An Intro-
ductory Essay), and Sidney Hook (see From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual
Development of Karl Marx). Tucker, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
4 Ibid., p. 36.
5 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
368 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
of labor,' which might have had some meaning at one time have now
become 'obsolete verbal rubbish.' . . ."6 All this, it is implied, shows
Marx's clear opposition to the notion of fair distribution. However,
Marx's writing does not reveal such an unequivocal rejection. Marx,
in fact, says:
I have dealt more at length with the "undiminished proceeds of labor," on the
one hand, and with "equal right" and "fair distribution," on the other, in order
to show what a crime it is to attempt, on the other hand, to force on our party
again, as dogmas, ideas which in a certain period had some meaning but have
now become obsolete verbal rubbish. . ..7
Several points need to be made here. First, clearly Marx does not
strictly say that the phrase "fair distribution" is obsolete verbal
rubbish. Rather, it appears to be the bourgeois conception or inter-
pretation of "fair distribution" that Marx rejects; it is the bourgeois
idea of fairness which he claims to be rubbish. Secondly, and more
importantly, there is textual evidence that Marx was not so much
unconcerned with fair distribution but rather that he objected to the
use of the expression "fair distribution" when and since (1) its exact
meaning was not clearly specified and not agreed upon by socialists
themselves, and (2) the use of the expression had already been ex-
propriated by the bourgeoisie. In regard to (1) Marx doggedly pro-
ceeded throughout the Critique of the Gotha Program to rigorously
criticize proposals in the program wherever he thought them to be
"ambiguous" or "loose." That part of his purpose was merely to
demand tighter, clearer language is seen repeatedly by the form of
many of his criticisms: "one could just as well have said . .
the whole paragraph bungled in style and content . . . ought
obviously to read . . ."I ... . such hollow phrases can be twi
turned as desired," and so on.8 Marx's question as to what is "fair
distribution" is not obviously an "acid" remark; it is more likely a
demand for conceptual clarity and precision. In regard to (2) it was
quite natural for Marx to object to the use of an expression which,
if used in a socialist program, would be radically misleading. For the
German workers' party to wave the banner of "fair distribution"
would be to create a situation where the party would be understood
to be supporting the bourgeois sanction of capitalist practices; clearly,
6 Ibid., p. 40.
7 Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program," Marx & Engels Basic Writings onl
Politics & Philosophy, ed. Lewis Feuer (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1959),
pp. 119-120.
8 Ibid., pp. 113, 115.
for Marx, this would have been a gross tactical error.9 These last
remarks are, I think, not completely decisive against Tucker but they
do provide good reason to conclude that, so far, Tucker has not made
out his case that Marx was unconcerned with or averse to the notion
of justice understood as a fair distribution of the proceeds of labor.
Before I consider further arguments proffered by Tucker, I should

like to make explicit one possible construal of a number of Marx's
claims, one which I have already implicitly acknowledged. Many of
Marx's comments can be construed more plausibly not as a rejection
of the principle of fair distribution, or distributive justice, but as a
rejection of the rhetoric of "justice," "equal right," and "fair distribu-
tion" on the tactical basis that such terminology had been com-
mandeered by the bourgeoisie and drained of any content that would
make them useful expressions in the spread of socialist doctrines.10
To construe Marx as making this move in no way entails that Marx
was averse to all ideas of justice; here it should be kept in mind that
moralists frequently eschew the use of explicit moral language. Simi-
larly, Marx's aversion to 'fair distribution' does not show that Marx
was averse to fair distribution." The possibility that Marx was tac-
tically rejecting a certain rhetoric seems to have been ignored by
Tucker, but it remains to be seen whether or not all of Marx's
animadversions about justice can be so construed.
11 Compare, for example, the fact that today few politically aware blacks in the
United States use the expression "law and order" because it is generally regarded as a
"code word" or euphemism for harsh reprisal against black activists by the white man.
Such blacks are not necessarily opposed to "law and order" understood differently.
In this regard compare Marx's remark, "the civilization and justice of bourgeois order
comes out in its lurid light whenever the slaves and drudges of that order rise against
their masters." (Karl Marx, "The Civil War in France" in Capital, The Communist
Manifesto and Other Writings by Karl Marx, ed. Max Eastman (New York: Random
House, 1932), p. 421.
II
Tucker next raises the question as to whether Marx considered

the capitalist system unjust and condemned it on that ground. He
9 For this reason, in the Manifesto, Marx is very careful to make it clear that com-
munism is not against property generally but against bourgeois property; not against
individuality and freedom, but against bourgeois individuality and bourgeois freedom;
not against the family, but against the bourgeois family.
10 Tucker himself mentions the tactical consideration but fails to see that the tactical
objection to the rhetoric of justice is distinguishable from the rejection of principles of
justice. Compare his remark, "Now for socialists to raise the cry of justice with refer-
ence to economic relations in capitalist society was to imply that a rightful balance
might be struck, or an adjustment reached . . ." in Robert Tucker, op. cit., p. 51.
acknowledges that Marx defined capitalism as a way of production

founded on the exploitation of wage labor for the accumulation of
capital, and admits that part of the conventional connotation of the
term "exploitation" is injustice."2 One is tempted to think that here,
where one party, the exploiter, receives something that rightfully
belongs to others, the exploited, we surely have a Marxian condem-
nation of capitalism based on some principle of distributive justice.
But, alas, Tucker maintains that the tempting view is a false one.
Before proceeding to Tucker's argument on this point, let us

simply outline Marx's position on the nature of this exploitation.
In essence, it is that the exchange value of a commodity exceeds the
exchange value of the labor that the worker put into the production
of the commodity. The excess or "surplus value" which rightfully
belongs to the laborer is then, according to Marx, expropriated by
the capitalist for himself; for Marx this is exploitation and it is the
very essence of capitalism. As Tucker describes the problem, "the
question at issue here is whether a concern for justice underlies this
value judgment.""3 At this point Tucker claims that an affirmative
answer ". . . flies in the face of the most emphatic and unequivocal
assertions by both Marx and Engels that their condemnation of
capitalist exploitation has nothing whatever to do with justice and
injustice."114 I have maintained that thus far no such unequivocal as-
sertions have been produced by Tucker. He claims that, for Marx,
such exploitation cannot be described as unjust because it is perfectly
just or equitable in accordance with the only applicable norms of
justice - those actually operating in the existing mode of production
and exchange."5 He appeals here to Marx's comment on the process,
"So much the better for the purchaser, but it is nowise an injustice
(Unrecht) to the seller."1 This is admirably explicit, but if there is no
injustice what was the Marxist fuss about? Why regard the process
as one of exploitation? A possible reply to Tucker is that Marx was, at
this point, only claiming that the capitalist mode of distribution was
fair or just when judged by capitalist criteria of fairness, and that
Marx adhered to a different and superior principle of distribution in
the light of which the process must be regarded as unjust. Tucker
anticipates such a suggestion and claims that, according to Marx,
there is no standard of justice superior to the one implicit in the capi-
12 Tucker, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

'3 Ibid., p. 44.
14 Ibid.
Is Ibid.
1b Ibid., p. 45.
talist law of exchange of commodities." To support this view Tucker

quotes a passage he regards as clearly and definitively showing that
Marx thought there was no such superior standard, "Right can never
be higher than the economic structure of society and the cultural
development conditioned by it.""8 His general conclusion is that, for
Marx, each mode of production has its own form of equity and it is
meaningless to pass judgment on it from some other point of view;
it is, for Marx, evil but not inequitable."9
With Tucker's argument clearly before us, let us engage in some

proverbial "further examination." I want to show that, in fact, for
Marx there was a superior standard of justice according to which
the capitalist mode of distribution was inequitable and, therefore,
evil. To do this I will negatively argue that the last-quoted passage
from Marx (let us call it: S) does not at all show what Tucker thinks
it does and, positively, that further passages in the same work of
Marx (p a s s age s Tucker surprisingly ignores) provide sufficient
grounds for concluding that Marx was very much committed to a
principle of just distribution in the light of which he condemned
capitalist procedures. First, there are two plausible ways of constru-
ing S. To say that right can never be higher than the economic struc-
ture of society and the cultural development conditioned by it might
mean roughly
Si the highest attainment of what is right is strictly limited by the eco-

nomic structure of a society at a given stage of development.
or S2 the only principles of right according to which one can validly assess
the social practices of a given society are those commonly accepted
by that society at that time.
Now Tucker clearly takes Marx to be asserting a statement like S2, a

variant of ethical relativism - one applying across societal stages as
well as across territorially distinct societies. Further, it is S2 alone,
and not S, which would warrant Tucker's conclusion that Marx did
not make the value judgment that capitalist distribution was evil on
the basis of a principle of right, in this case a principle of distributive
justice. In addition it should be acknowledged that there is some
indication in Marx's writings that Marx was tempted by the position
represented in S2, notably in his views about ideologies. However, the
context in which Marx states S makes it clear, I submit, that he was
there asserting a proposition like S,. In the relevant paragraphs of
'' Ibid.
18 Marx, Gotha Program, p. 119.
19 Tucker, op. cit., p. 46.
the Critique of the Gotha Program Marx complains that the equal
right according to which the program demands that the proceeds of
labor shall be distributed to the laborers is still in principle "bour-
geois right" and that this equal right is ". . . still constantly stigma-
tized by a bourgeois limitation."20 This suggests that Marx is not
rejecting every principle of equitable or right distribution but only an
inadequate standard of equitable distribution, namely, one with bour-
geois deficiencies built into it. He points out that the principle of
equal right proposed in the program according to which the worker
should receive back the undiminished proceeds of his labor is, in fact,
a principle of inequality since the individual endowment of each
worker is different and the amount of labor (and, consequently, the
proceeds) is, thus, unequal. As Marx states, "This right is an unequal
right for unequal labor.""2 Marx is apparently construing the Gotha
proposal as being roughly: to each according to his labor. This prin-
ciple is a principle of equity formally in the sense that it involves the
application of the same standard to all. But substantively or in respect
of the results of applying the formal principle, each worker will not
receive the same or equal benefits. Since ". . . it tacitly recognizes
unequal individual endowment . . ., it is, therefore, a right of inequal-
ity, in its content, like every right."22 The result is that one man will
be richer than another. What does Marx think of this? It is worth
fully quoting Marx's response in which he asserts S.
To avoid all these defects, right instead of being equal would have to be un-
equal. But these defects are inevitable in the first phase of communist society
as it is when it has just emerged after prolonged birth pangs from capitalist
society. Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and
the cultural development conditioned by it.23
I think that it is now clear that Marx is claiming that the principle
of distribution proposed in the Gotha program, while some "advance,"
is still an inadequate principle; it involves the defect that it ignores
differences in need of each worker and bases its distribution solely
on the contribution of labor power by each worker. Clearly, this is
why Marx reminds the proponents of the principle, "Further, one
worker is married, another not; one has more children than another,
and so on and so forth."24 Marx is hardly averse to the idea of fair
distribution here; in fact, he is attempting to make clear what a fair

21 Ibid., pp. 118-119.
22 Ibid., p. 119.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
principle of distribution involves, what it would take into account. In

fact, Marx is opposing a distribution which ignores need as a relevant
difference between workers. Marx was, here, sensitive to the problem
that since workers had varying needs a distribution of goods pro-
portionate only to the labor of each would result not just in the dis-
tribution of dissimilar amounts of the proceeds of labor ("unequal
right") but amounts which would fail to make the same relative
contribution to the life of each worker; the Gotha proposal would in
this sense be inequitable. So, it is now clear, I think, that the defect
with which Marx was concerned was not just the distribution of
dissimilar amounts of goods which would result on following the
principle: to each according to his labor. In fact Marx was commit-
ted to a distribution of dissimilar amounts of goods to different
laborers, but the dissimilar distribution should be based not on the
different amounts of labor contributed but on the varying needs of
the laborers. A dissimilar distribution on the former basis makes one
man richer than another; a dissimilar distribution on the latter basis
would not since, in more current terminology, it would make the same
relative contribution to the well-being of each worker. For the above
reasons, then, the Gotha principle was, in Marx's view, one of crude
socialism; it had a bourgeois meritocratic deficiency which stigma-
tized it. That the Gotha program principle did not take into account
relevant differences in the needs of different workers was a defect,
but in Marx's view in the first or lower phase of the emergence of
communism such a principle will be the only principle which it is
empirically possible to implement. This, I think, makes it evident that
Marx, in claiming S, is maintaining that the most equitable distribu-
tion realizable is not the fairest one but the "most right" one that can
be attained in a communist society just emerging after the "prolonged
birth pangs from capitalist society." Thus, S must be understood as
asserting a claim like that of S.. Because of this S cannot be con-
strued as supporting Tucker's claim that, for Marx, there is no stan-
dard of justice superior to the one implicit in the capitalist laws of
exchange of commodities. In fact, Marx regarded the Gotha principle
as superior to the standard implicit in capitalist practice; in Marx's
words it was an "advance." Thus, for Marx there was a standard of
justice superior to that invoked in the Gotha program, one taking
into account relevant differences in the needs of workers but one
incapable of implementation in the first phase of communist society.
Only in the higher phase of communist development can this optimal
standard of equitable distribution be realized; as Marx states, ". .
only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its
entirety and society inscribe on its banners; 'From each according to
his ability, to each according to his needs!' "25 Clearly, this undermines
the view that Marx was averse to the idea of justice; Marx was averse
only to inadequate principles of justice. Similarly, the above remarks
reveal (so far as verbal behavior can reveal) that it was a concern for
justice that led Marx to condemn capitalist distribution as exploita-
tion; it was evil because it was inequitable when "equity" and "fair
distribution" are rightly understood.
At this point I must, to avoid misunderstanding, add an important

qualification concerning the expression, "Marx's concern with jus-
tice." While I discuss whether or not Marx was "concerned with" or
"averse to" justice, my aim is not to ascertain any psychological facts
about Marx. It is one thing for a man's writings to espouse a theory
or a principle of justice and another thing for the man himself to
exhibit a concern for justice or to adhere to such principles in his
practice. While Marx's writings espouse, I argue, a principle of justice
and from this it is natural to infer that Marx himself felt deeply about
justice or the absence of it, one cannot help but be struck with Marx's
insensitivity to others and his ruthless lack of concern for fairness in
his relations with other people. Marx was so deceitful and vicious in
his relations with others that he early became known as the "calf-
biter." When Marx wished to return to Germany in 1848 and commu-
nism was unpopular there, he attempted to pass himself off as a
democrat. To succeed in this deceit he banned the use of words "com-
munistic" and "socialistic" in his newly established New Rhenish
Gazette. Further, when it suited his purposes he did not mind falsi-
fying history; when 40,000 people attempted to bring about a second
revolution in France in 1848, Marx labeled them "the people," and the
9,000,000 voters who supported the then current government "the
bourgeosie." When any other figure threatened to displace him as the
leading socialist, he did not hesitate to engage in character assassina-
tion and smear tactics. Thus, he spoke of Lasalle as "The little Jew,"
and "a Jewish nigger," and after Lasalle was killed in a duel Marx,
to promote his own popularity, wrote a beautiful tribute to Lasalle.
Further, in order to establish his intellectual superiority among so-
cialists Marx decided that it was crucial for Capital to stir up ex-
citement and meet with public acclaim. To achieve the former he and
Engels decided that Engels and others should write hostile reviews of
it from a bourgeois point of view. Further, in finishing Capital Marx
and Engels agreed that the book should be padded by much quotation
since this could be done without toil and lengthy tomes were generally
25 Ibid.
regarded as more substantial and more scholarly. For such reasons,

then, one hesitates to attribute the character trait or disposition of
having a concern for justice to Marx the man. These are also reasons
for drawing a distinction between Marxism as a humanism and Marx
as a humanist. Marx's frequent trouble with boils and carbuncles is
indicative of the hate harbored by Marx the man.26 To reiterate once
more, then, when I speak of Marx's concern for justice, I shall only
be claiming that such a principle is contained in Marx's writing and,
in that way, it is a basic aspect of Marxist theory (ignoring later
accretions and deletions).
III
We have, of necessity, already touched on an area which Tucker

regards as a third area of evidence in favor of his thesis - the
Marxist view of the postrevolutionary future. I turn now to examine
Tucker's handling of Marx's views on these matters. Tucker suggests
that here the basic issue is whether Marx and Engels envisage the
future communist society as a realm of distributive justice." My
position here has been made clear, but Tucker's examination of the
Marxist statements we have just noted (as well as others) leads him
to an opposite conclusion. What is crucial here is how we are to
construe Marx's endorsement of the principle: from each according
to his ability, to each according to his needs. Tucker's claim, and
this is the heart of the matter, is that ". . . this is not a formula for
justice."28 He does not say that it is an inadequate formula and he does
not deny that ". . . it admits a distributive theme into the discussion
of communism."29 We have then a conceptual question: what counts
as a formula for justice? Tucker needs to show that Marx's distribu-
tive principle is not a principle of justice. But instead of doing so he
chooses to suggest that Marx placed little emphasis on matters of
distribution at all; he appeals to Marx's further remark, "Quite apart
from the analysis so far given, it was in general a mistake to make a
fuss about so-called distribution and put the principle stress on it."30
Two points need to be made here. First, this does not provide us with
any reason to deny that Marx's principle of distribution is a princi-
ple of justice. Positively, we must say, I think, that any principle
26 I have depended, in these previous remarks, on the excellent and illuminating

account of Marx's life in Leopold Schwartzchild, Karl Marx, The Red Prussian (New
York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1947).
28 Ibid., p. 48.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 120.
stating how goods ought to be distributed among members of a given

class and, explicitly, or implicitly, implies that a violation of the prin-
ciple is evil or exploitative, is a principle of justice - be it a plausible
one (like Marx's principle) or an implausible one (like giving red-
haired persons twice what is given black-haired persons).31 The second
point that must be made concerns the question: to what extent was
Marx deemphasizing matters of distribution and what follows con-
cerning Marx's attitude toward justice? Aside from the mentioned
remark on the "fuss about distribution," Marx does appear to object
to "vulgar" socialism's fixation on distribution.32 However, such re-
marks are misleading when taken out of context. Marx was not un-
concerned with distribution but simply objecting to giving undue
attention to it by ignoring the fact that the way goods are distributed
is a result of the mode of production. As he states, "any distribution
whatever of the means of consumption is only a consequence of the
distribution of the conditions of production themselves.33 Given the
current mode of production, ". . . the present-day distribution of the
means of consumption results automatically."34 Marx was, in effect,
criticizing the socialism of the Gotha program for assuming that the
mode of distribution could be radically altered without a radical
alteration of the mode of production obtaining in the capitalist sys-
tem. In this respect, it is correct to say that Marx's central concern
was with the mode of production, and in this sense it is correct to say
that Marx opposed a "distributive orientation." But Tucker wavers
between saying this much - which is correct - and maintaining a
stronger thesis - one which is false. His oscillation is seen in his
claim that Marx considered it wrong headed ". . . for a socialist to
put the emphasis on the distributive aspect or espouse justice as a
social ideal."35 The weaker correct thesis is that Marx objected to a
distributive orientation which unrealistically regarded distribution as
a process causally independent of the mode of production. The
stronger false thesis is that Marx did not "espouse justice as a social
3' In regard to the question of Marx's attitude toward justice, what is at issue is
obviously a dispute about 'justice' in one of its several senses. We are not concerned
with justice regarded as a personal trait or disposition exhibited by the just man. Rather
'justice' here is a term which is significantly applicable to an actual or possible mode of
distributing benefits or burdens. Our concern, then, is with one of Aristotle's two kinds
of "particular" justice, namely, the kind ". . . exercised in the distribution of honour,
wealth, and the other divisible assets of the community, which may be allotted among
its members in equal or unequal shares." (Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics, trans.
H. Rackham [London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1962], p. 267).
33 Ibid., p. 120.
34 Ibid.
ideal." Our previous discussion has shown that Marx did adhere to an
ideal of justice in his advocation of a principle of equitable distribu-
tion. For these reasons, Tucker's strong thesis must be rejected. It is
false that ". . . Marx does not envisage communism as a realm of
distributive justice."36 Similarly, to speak of ". . . Marx's opposition
to the distributive orientation and the idea of justice" is at best a
half-truth.3"
All of this is, of course, not intended to deny that Marx had other
serious concerns. He not only envisaged the higher phase of commu-
nist society as one of equitable distribution and sufficient material
well-being, but as one where labor is not just a means to an end but
"life's prime want."38 It was to be a realm where no man was enslaved
by the specilization of capitalist labor, where
. . . each one does not have a circumscribed sphere of activity but can train
himself in any branch he chooses, society by regulating the common production
makes it possible for me to do this today and that tomorrow, to hunt in the
morning, to fish in the afternoon, to carry on cattle-breeding in the evening, also
to criticize the food - just as I please - without becoming either hunter, fisher-
man, shepherd or critic.39
Such a realm is obviously more than a realm of justice, but if

my arguments are successful, it is at least that.
IV
There is a further possible objection to the claim that Marx

was committed to a certain principle of justice. It is one not raised
by Tucker but one which comes into view upon reflection on numer-
ous remarks made by Marx and Engels. Quite generally, the objection
is that Marx did not regard any moral principle as valid and so,
a fortiori, he did not regard any principle of justice as valid or justi-
fied. If this is correct, then clearly Marx was not committed to any
such principle. Rather, according to this line of thought, there was
for Marx only the task of describing and explaining why someone or
some class of people espoused certain normative principles. This is
to be done by showing how the espousal of such principles arises
from the economic conditions and interests of a particular class and
in fact functions in such a way as to promote such interests. Such
principles are, then, mere reflections of economic interests; they are,
36 Ibid., p. 48.
37 Ibid., p. 49.
39 Marx, "The German Ideology," Capital, The Communist Manifesto and Other
Writings by Karl Marx, ed. Max Eastman (New York: Random House, 1932), p. 1.
in some sense, "rationalizations" and a part of the ideological super-

structure of a given society at a given historical stage of evolution.
Morality may be explained, but, the implication appears to be, there
is no question of justifying such principles. If it could be established
that Marx held such a view further questions would arise as to the
grounds on which he held the view. Some of Marx's writings suggest
that he held a view somewhat like that which we have sketched and
that he may have been an ethical relativist. By "ethical relativism" I
mean the view that there is at least in some cases, no rational basis for
preferring one morality to another, and if there is any sense in which
a morality is "binding" it is so, at best, only in the culture or cultural
epoch in which it is or was dominant. However, as soon as such a
construal of Marx appears plausible, we are confronted with a para-
dox of healthy proportions since there is also indication that Marx, as
we have suggested, was a first-class moralist himself, that he regarded
numerous moral principles embedded in bourgeois practice as, in
some sense, unjustified and invalid and, therefore, not practically
binding. Positively, he appears deeply committed to other normative
principles, implicitly (at least) suggesting that he regarded 'them as
justified or valid. Did Marx, in the end, try to have it both ways, or is
there some way of resolving the paradox? And if the latter, would
this in any way undermine our thesis concerning Marx's views on jus-
tice? Conclusive answers to all these questions cannot be given here;
that would require a far more exhaustive investigation. However,
some inquiry along these lines may be helpful in our attempt to
bring into focus Marx's conception of the principles of justice.
Because of Marx's explicit claim to be a scientific socialist as

opposed to a utopian one and his suppression of the use of overt
moral language, it is not difficult to see why Marx's views have been,
on occasion, regarded as amoral or ethically empty. The antidote for
this assessment is not the provision of new facts about Marx (e.g.,
calling attention to the more explicitly moral language of the "early"
Marx) but simply reminding oneself of the powerful normative thrust
that lies behind his theoretical work and his revolutionary practice.
Marx was concerned with the dehumanization of the great mass of
working people in the capitalist system, the exhaustion and monotony
of factory labor, the loss of any sense of creativity, and the exploita-
tion of the capitalist in making off with surplus value. For Marx this
was nothing less than organized and repeated rape of human beings
who were, for all intents and purposes, powerless to alter the condi-
tions under which they subsisted. Since the worker could not live
without eating and could not eat without working, his very life was
in the hands of the capitalist. In Marx's view anyone whose life was
in such a way dependent on the wishes of another was, in effect, a
slave. In the Manifesto, he states of the workers, "not only are they
the slaves of the bourgeois class . . . they are daily and hourly
enslaved by the machine . . . and . . . by the individual bourgeois
manufacturer himself."40 This monstrous situation must be changed;
there must be a revolution. Obviously, Marx predicted that a new
order will come about; it should be just as evident that Marx was
totally convinced of something further: that a new order ought to
be brought about. It was surely this conviction which drove Marx
to his extensive social and economic investigations. A diagnosis of
the disease must be made; its causes must be located and analyzed,
and then one must act. The grandiloquent moralizing of the bour-
geoisie about human rights and freedom went on, but the disease
got worse. This view of Marx accords with a comment of Karl Popper
that ". . . Capital is, in fact, largely a treatise on social ethics . . ."41
One need not forget, in this regard, that Marx made many normative
judgments of a familiar and typical "liberal" sort. One thinks of, for
example, his opposition to capital punishment, easy divorce laws, and
censorship of the press. That he did not always refrain from the
explicit language of rights and duties (so familiar in English moral
philosophy) is seen in his comment on the deterrence argument for
capital punishment, "now what right have you to punish me for the
amelioration or intimidation of others?"42
Alongside Marx's normative commitments there runs, as we have

noted, another view which threatens to undermine any purported
justification for those commitments. This is the view that moralities
are the products of social and economic conditions and are explain-
able by reference to such factors. There is the further intimation that
because of this any morality is a mere ideology, that is, a set of
claims put forward as if true or justified, but whose sole function is,
in reality, to make acceptable the exercise of power by the dominant
class. Marx and Engels state, "In every epoch the ideas of the ruling
class are the ruling ideas, that is, the class that is the ruling material
power of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual power."43
40 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," Marx and
Engels, ed. Feuer, p. 14.
41 Karl, Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, II, (New York: Harper and
Row, 1967) p. 199.
42 Karl Marx, "Capital Punishment," Marx and Engels, ed. Feuer, p. 485.
Q Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "The German Ideology," Writings of the Young
Marx on Philosophy and Society, eds. Lloyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1967), p. 438.
There is then an implied skepticism regarding the existence of any

true or justified set of basic moral principles. Such principles, it is
intimated, are neither valid nor invalid; they are, rather, effective or
ineffective in attaining the goals of those in power. That is, one can
only judge how they in fact function, and one can, in principle, pro-
vide explanations of how they arise. The aptness of historical explana-
tion of moral principles along with an apparent corollary skepticism
about cross-cultural and cross-epochal validity is contained in a
remark by Engels in his polemic against a University of Berlin pro-
fessor, Eugen Diihring:
The idea of equality, therefore, both in its bourgeois and in its proletarian
form, is itself a historical product, the creation of which required definite
historical conditions, which in turn themselves presuppose a long previous
historical development. It is therefore anything but an eternal truth. And if
today it is taken for granted by the general public - in one sense or another -
if, as Marx says, it "already possesses the fixity of a popular prejudice," this is
not the consequence of its axiomatic truth, but the result of the general dif-
fusion and the continued appropriateness of the ideas of the eighteenth cen-
tury . . .44
The polemic, it should be emphasized, was published as a series of

articles, and the entire manuscript was read to Marx who approved
of it as an expression of their common views. It is worth further
quoting from this same work a remark which emphasizes the
general position being maintained in regard to any moral principle.
Engels states:
We therefore reject every attempt to impose on us any moral dogma what-

soever as an eternal, ultimate, and forever immutable moral law on the pretext
that the moral world, too, has its permanent principles which transcend history
and the differences between nations.45
The general tenor of the Marxist view here seems relatively clear, but-
certain crucial points are unclear. What did Marx regard as the con-
sequences of this view? Did he actually think that such a position is
incompatible with maintaining that some principle of morality is
superior to or more reasonable than others? And is it, in fact, incom-
patible? Does the suggested sort of ethical relativism rule out every
form of ethical absolutism about morality? By "ethical absolutism"
I mean the view that there exists some moral principle which is
rationally justifiable, whether or not the principle is known, and
that such a principle is, therefore, "binding" across cultures and
cultural epochs. Several points are relevant here. First, regardless of
44 Friedrich Engels, "Herr Eugen Difhring's Revolution in Science," Marx and En-
gels, ed. Feuer, pp. 277-278.
45 Ibid., p. 272.
Marx's own view, it must be acknowledged that there is no inconsis-

tency between asserting that all moral concepts and moral principles
have their genesis in particular cultures at particular epochs and, in
addition, that only some of these principles are justified or valid. In
a similar vein mathematical and scientific claims arise out of particu-
lar historical contexts; yet this fact about origins entails nothing at
all about their correctness. To think otherwise is to commit the
genetic fallacy. The Marxian emphasis on the fact that moral con-
cepts are historical products is not, then, inconsistent with maintain-
ing that some moral claims are justified and others are not. Aristo-
telian and Einsteinian physics are both historical products but not,
therefore, equally plausible.
Secondly, in the rejection of the timeless validity of any moral

dogma, it is not clear whether Marx and Engels had in mind com-
pletely generic moral principles or more specific "low-level" judg-
ments. If "moral dogma" covers only the latter, then there is no in-
compatibility between their view and some form of ethical absolu-
tism. For one could maintain that specific "low-level" judgments like
"having thirty or more children is morally permissible" is a valid or
correct moral maxim only in certain periods, e.g., when there is no
danger of the population exceeding a number which can be supported
by the environment. But such a view is not obviously inconsistent
with maintaining the timeless validity of, for example, the principle
that one ought to maximize the net balance of happiness over pain.
The concrete application of such a principle would take account of
varying states of affairs between cultures or across epochs or both.
However, as with the previous point, it is not evident that Marx and
Engels maintained such a distinction or were cognizant of such a
consideration.
Thirdly, the rejection of timelessly valid moral dogmas may be

construed in another way which is, again, compatible with an absolu-
tist view. The rejection of a "forever immutable moral law" may not
be a denial of the existence of such a principle or set of them, but
rather a rejection of dogmatic adherence to any currently plausible
candidate for such status. That is, just as an open-minded scientist
will admit the possibility of future revisions of his current theory,
so the moralist must always regard his current moral principles as
tentative, as formulations which are, in all probability, only partially
satisfactory approximations of some justified and, hence, valid moral
principle. On this view there may be immutable moral "laws," but
one should always remain skeptical of the notion that they coincide
with one's current formulations. This might be labeled the principle of
metaethical caution, and appears reasonable in the light of discovered

inadequacies of past moral maxims. Such a view seems to accord
with a remark Engels makes in a different regard, "But how young
the whole of human history still is, and how ridiculous it would be to
attempt to ascribe any absolute validity to our present views
While the above view is compatible with absolutism, the evidence is
quite sketchy and one simply cannot be certain that Marx and Engels
maintained a position no stronger than this.
Finally, along with the talk of the rejection of "forever immu-

table moral laws," there is an important qualifying aspect of the
remarks in Anti-Diihring. In describing the various moralities of the
day Engels mentions the Christian feudal morality, the bourgeois
morality, and the proletarian morality. He then replies to the question
as to which is the "true one."
Not one of them, in the sense of having absolute validity, but certainly that
morality which contains the maximum of durable elements is the one which, in
the present, represents the overthrow of the present, represents the future-
that is, the proletarian.47
Engels, with Marx's approval, here seems to be maintaining that one

can justifiably judge between moralities; the implication is that they
are not equally valid, though none is "absolutely valid." Tihe remark
about none being "absolutely valid" can be construed in the manner
just discussed, as an application of the principle of metaethical
caution in regard to any existing morality. Further, the criterion for
judging is to ask which of them contains the "maximum of durable
elements." Of course we are not provided with an explicit criterion
for what counts as a "durable element." Nevertheless, the notion of
validity is not only not rejected, it is invoked and stands behind the
judgment that the proletarian morality is in some sense, the most
valid of the group. In a similar manner Engels speaks of a "really
human morality" as being possible only at a stage of society where
class conflicts have been overcome and forgotten.48 In addition, Engels,
while emphasizing the fallibility of claims to knowledges, admits
that there are some ultimate or eternal truths. They may be found,
he says, in certain results of the exact sciences. Such truths, Engels
claims, are found also, though more rarely, in the biological and his-
torical sciences. Thus while deeply suspicious of claims to have eternal
truths in hand, Engels (and Marx as well) are not skeptics regarding
46 Ibid., p. 280.
47 Ibid., p. 271.
48 Ibid., p. 272.
the possibility of such. He goes on to claim that in the domain of

morals, ". . . ultimate truths are most sparsely sown."49 The anti-
relativist suggestion is obvious.
Drawing together the threads of our discussion at this point, the

paradox, or at least the semblence of one, remains. For, on the one
hand, an absolutist view of morality is implied by Marx's clear and
strong normative commitments; yet, on the other hand, Marx (and
Engels) do not clearly reject ethical relativism and, indeed, sometimes
appear to side with the relativists. However, in noting the various
ways of construing the crucial remarks in Anti-Diihring, as well as
the important qualifications added to the bolder statements, it is fair
to say that the paradox has been softened if not eliminated.
Since there is some indication, then, that Marx may have held the
view that one morality is just as valid as another, that one is no more
rational than another, the problem remains: that Marx appears com-
mitted to the view that his own normative principles are somehow
reasonable and binding and, at the same time, appears to think that
there is no way of justifying one set of moral principles as opposed to
some other competing set. The paradox could be dissolved by show-
ing that Marx did not regard his own moral principles as superior
ones, but in the light of previous remarks this alternative must be
ruled out. Another way of resolving the paradox would be to show
that Marx really was committed to some sort of absolutist view of
morality, that moral principles were up for rational assessment and
that it is possible, in principle, to show that a given set of principles
is justified or that it is not justified. In the light of our previous dis-
cussion this remains a viable alternative. If Marx was committed to
such a view, whether or not he could establish its correctness, this
would show that there is no obvious inconsistency in his thinking,
such as: there is no such thing as rationality in morals, but my moral
judgments are more reasonable than yours. On the presumption that
a paradoxical element still remains and that the relativist streak in
Marx's thought is important and not to be summarily dismissed, it
is worth examining some yet undiscussed passages from the early
Marx which deal more or less explicitly with the issue of ethical
relativism and, indirectly, with the question of the justifiability of
moral principles.
49 Frederich Engels, Anti-Diihring: Herr Eugen Diihring's Revolution in Science, third

edition (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962), p. 130.
Besides the apparent commitment to some absolutistic view as

evidenced by Marx's proffering of numerous normative principles, it
is clear that Marx was not oblivious to the matter of the justification
of such principles. His remarks are not as plentiful as one would like,
and it is mainly his earlier writings which are relevant. A standard
attempt to justify basic normative principles has been the attempt to
derive statements about what ought to be from statements about
what is the case. And Marx appears to have been cognizant of Hume's
identification of such a move as well as the latter's skepticism about
its success. At the age of nineteen, Marx wrote, "Particularly here I
was greatly disturbed by the conflict between what is and what
ought to be.. .5" Five years later, Marx published an article criticizing
what he termed the "historical school" of law, specially one of its
representatives, Gustav Hugo. It is relevant to our purposes because
Marx attributes to Hugo a relativistic view, one which he (Marx)
sharply criticizes. Of Hugo, Marx states:
With self-satisfied industry he pulls together evidence from all corners of the
world to prove that positive institutions such as property, the state, marriage,
etc., are not informed by any rational necessity, and that they even contradict
reason, and that at best one can bicker about them pro and con.5'
Marx goes on to discuss whether a practice or institution is valid

because it is positive (i.e., because it exists or did exist). Alternatively
he questions whether historical practices are thereby, rational, and
charges Hugo with ignoring the point, "He recognizes no distinctions.
Everything that exists is an authority for him; every authority is a
reason for him."52 Marx is here, I think, raising the question as to
whether those practices which do exist ought to exist. Does the mere
fact that various cultural practices occur warrant the conclusion that
they are equally valid or rational? Marx clearly answers in the nega-
tive. For this reason he satirizes Hugo's view:
The shameless Conci who runs around naked or at most covered with mud is as
positive as the Frenchman who not only clothes himself but clothes himself
elegantly. The German who raises his daughter as the jewel of the family is not
more positive than the Rajput who kills her so that he won't have to feed her.
In brief: the pimple is as positive as the skin.53
The import of Marx's discussion seems to be that Hugo fails to see

that of the practices and institutions which exist some are reasonable
50 Karl Marx, "Letter to his father: On a turning-point in life," Writings of the

Young Marx, eds. Easton and Guddat, p. 42.
51 Karl Marx, "The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law," Writ-
ings of the Young Marx, eds. Easton and Guddat, p. 98.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 99.
and are to be promoted, and some are not. In his metaphor, the skin
and the pimple are, but the pimple ought not to be. He complains
that Hugo finds, ". . . that everything rational and ethical in institu-
tions is doubtful for reason."54 While Marx's discussion is often
oblique and somewhat obscure he is undoubtedly rejecting the claim
that what is must be regarded as authoritative and rational; not
every practice can be rightfully claimed to be as worthwhile as any
other existing practice. In this way Marx's thought bears the marks
of an absolutist perspective concerning competing normative claims.
The question naturally arises as to how Marx thought the principles
exemplified in certain practices might be shown justified. What test
must be satisfied or what requirement met? We have very little to go
on at this point. Marx appears to think that some normative princi-
ples are rational, but he does not specify what canons of reason are
involved in the vindication of a moral principle. If Marx thinks that
disputes about basic ethical principles are cognitive ones, where
should his views be placed among the various types of cognitivist
positions recognized by contemporary philosophers? It may be that
an exhaustive study of Marx's writings will reveal the answer to this
question, but it seems more likely that it will not. For it appears that
Marx did not address himself to the issue. Perhaps he did not sense
the existence of the question or perhaps, while recognizing the
theoretical problem, he became too caught up in implementing his
normative commitments in revolutionary practice to think it through.
Perhaps he believed that since life is short, theorizing must come to
an end and action must begin. After all, if not, Marx could have be-
come the target of his own criticisms: that philosophers have only
interpreted the world whereas the point is to change it. On this note
our discussion of Marx must come to an end. By way of conclusion
what inferences can be drawn about Marx's views on justice and
morality?
In view of the evidence considered we may safely assert the

following claims, although they cannot all be asserted with equal
boldness. First, it should be clear once and for all that Marx's theory
was by no means ethically empty. Secondly, Marx's relativistic claims
do not take such a strong form as to preclude his maintaining, with
consistency, an ethical absolutist position. Further, there is strong
indication that the early Marx, if not also the later Marx, was com-
mitted to an absolutist position of some sort. Further, in connection
with the later Marx, the views of Anti-DUhring strongly suggest that
54Ibid., p. 100.
his position was at that time, also, some form of absolutism. And
this is so, I think, in spite of the vagueness of the remarks about
"maximum durable elements" as being a criterion for determining
the "most valid" morality, and the virtual absence of any further
positive attempt to explicate just how it is possible to justify one
normative principle as opposed to another. It is reasonable to con-
clude, then, that our paradox about Marx has been resolved by show-
ing that Marx's commitment to a principle of justice was not incon-
sistent with his metae'thical view on the question of the justifiability
of basic normative principles. Our primary concern has been with
Marx's concept of justice; on the basis of our earlier discussion it is,
I think, incontrovertible that Marx avowed a strong principle of jus-
tice and that, far from being averse to justice, it was one of his
central concerns. I should like to note, as a final point in regard to
my thesis concerning Marx's views on justice, just what conclusion
would be reasonable if, despite indications to the contrary, it were
true that Marx adhered to the position of the ethical relativist. The
proper conclusion would depend on the truth or falsity of the follow-
ing claim: it is inconsistent to assert the truth of ethical relativism
(as we have defined it) and, at the same time, commit oneself to a
normative moral principle as cross-culturally and universally valid.
There may be some argument which shows that such a statement is
false. I have, obviously, not attempted to assess claims for or against
it. However, the burden of proof would seem to be on those who wish
to deny it. If it is correct and if it were true that Marx was a relativist,
then I think we should have to conclude, quite simply, that Marx was
inconsistent. Such a move is far more plausible than the alternative
of maintaining that Marx was not committed to normative moral
principles. More specifically, if one had to choose, it is more plausible
to maintain that Marx was theoretically inconsistent than that Marx
was averse to the idea of justice.
DONALD VAN DE VEER
NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY.

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Marx's View of Justice

International Phenomenological Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve

At a time when many social practices are attacked on the ground

From Tucker's characterization of Marx's view as one involving

general view to the effect that no principle of justice played a key

A common interpretation of Marx, that Tucker is concerned to

However, according to Tucker, a closer analysis of Marx reveals

Before I consider further arguments proffered by Tucker, I should

Tucker next raises the question as to whether Marx considered

acknowledges that Marx defined capitalism as a way of production

Before proceeding to Tucker's argument on this point, let us

12 Tucker, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

talist law of exchange of commodities." To support this view Tucker

With Tucker's argument clearly before us, let us engage in some

Si the highest attainment of what is right is strictly limited by the eco-

Now Tucker clearly takes Marx to be asserting a statement like S2, a

20 Marx, Gotha Program, p. 118.

principle of distribution involves, what it would take into account. In

At this point I must, to avoid misunderstanding, add an important

regarded as more substantial and more scholarly. For such reasons,

We have, of necessity, already touched on an area which Tucker

26 I have depended, in these previous remarks, on the excellent and illuminating

stating how goods ought to be distributed among members of a given

Such a realm is obviously more than a realm of justice, but if

There is a further possible objection to the claim that Marx

in some sense, "rationalizations" and a part of the ideological super-

Because of Marx's explicit claim to be a scientific socialist as

Alongside Marx's normative commitments there runs, as we have

There is then an implied skepticism regarding the existence of any

The polemic, it should be emphasized, was published as a series of

We therefore reject every attempt to impose on us any moral dogma what-

Marx's own view, it must be acknowledged that there is no inconsis-

Secondly, in the rejection of the timeless validity of any moral

Thirdly, the rejection of timelessly valid moral dogmas may be

metaethical caution, and appears reasonable in the light of discovered

Finally, along with the talk of the rejection of "forever immu-

Engels, with Marx's approval, here seems to be maintaining that one

the possibility of such. He goes on to claim that in the domain of

Drawing together the threads of our discussion at this point, the

49 Frederich Engels, Anti-Diihring: Herr Eugen Diihring's Revolution in Science, third

Besides the apparent commitment to some absolutistic view as

Marx goes on to discuss whether a practice or institution is valid

The import of Marx's discussion seems to be that Hugo fails to see

50 Karl Marx, "Letter to his father: On a turning-point in life," Writings of the

In view of the evidence considered we may safely assert the

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