Episcopado Inglés y Crisis Política de 1386-88

THE EPISCOPATE AND THE POLITICAL CRISIS
IN ENGLAND OF 1386-1388*
BY RICHARD G. DAVIES
THE political crisis of the middle years of the reign of Richard II has always
attracted the interest of historians, and, indeed, in very recent years this
interest has, if anything, increased. Each succeeding study has demonstrated
yet further how complex and diverse were the implications of the actions —
largely unprecedented and very uncertain — of those magnates who were
most fervently opposed at that time to Richard II, his court and his minis-
ters. One aspect, however, which has not attracted very much specific atten-
tion is that of the attitude of the episcopate, both as a whole and as individ-
uals, towards the crisis, and their involvement in it.1 Yet even a cursory
glance at the crisis suggests that it might constitute an important moment in
the story of relations between church and state in England. Several bishops
were involved as partisans of one or another faction: two lost their bishoprics
in consequence, at least one more was apparently demoted, and others were
translated at the behest of the opponents of the Crown. The lords spiritual
as a whole, bishops and abbots, withdrew from judicial proceedings in
parliament despite pleas to them to remain. And the pope acquiesced in all
that the prevalent political faction asked of him. How came this involve-
ment? And what were its effects?
The English church, as represented by the episcopate and the convoca-
tions of the clergy, did not like to become involved in secular politics in the
later medieval period. Experience suggested that such involvement did the
church little practical good, and, besides, whatever its later reputation, it did
in fact, through its leaders, retain to a high degree such spiritual and moral
convictions as moved it to try to remain free from factional identification and
to lend its weight to the maintenance of legitimate, responsible authority, the
mainspring of good order and social morality within the realm. But in
practice such a course was very difficult to maintain. The church's own status
vis-a-vis the realm and its considerable wealth were often themselves causes
of grave debate and secular, especially royal, ingression. On such occasions
* I should like to thank Professor J. S. Roskell of the University of Manchester and Dr. J. A.
Tuck of the University of Lancaster for their constructive comments on earlier versions of this
paper.
1
Over forty years ago Professor E. Perroy published his magisterial survey of the relations
between England and the Roman Papacy in the reign of Richard II, and, more than that, of the
effect of English policies, secular and ecclesiastical, on the welfare of Western Christendom. He
was, therefore, very interested in the effect which the crisis of 1386-88 had upon English
foreign policy (in particular towards the Great Schism), rather less interested in the effect upon
the English episcopate per se, and not really at all concerned to investigate directly the involve-
ment of the episcopate in the crisis itself. The purpose of this present essay is to draw in a piece
of the picture which, quite properly, Professor Perroy did not set himself to examine closely;
L'Angleterre et le Grand Schisme d'Occident (Paris, 1933), especially pp. 296-309.
659
660 The Episcopate and Political Crisis
the issues were at least relatively clear-cut, but even then, as for example in
the reigns of Edward I and Edward II, the church found it very difficult to
make a common response or one which would accommodate all the ac-
knowledged considerations at issue. More generally, however, and even
more difficult to deal with, the very fact that the church remained the
recognized embodiment of integrity and responsibility meant tha' in times of
purely secular crisis churchmen might be courted or even coerced by those
involved in the controversy to lend their support to one or other point of
view. Furthermore, bishops and abbots formed a large part of those sum-
moned to parliaments as lords, a true reflection indeed of the economic,
social and political influence which, in theory at least, they possessed within
the realm.2 Because political crises were coming increasingly in the four-
teenth century to be fought out through recourse, whether feigned or real,
to parliamentary forms, and because these latter were themselves being
created and refined under the pressure of events, the bishops and their
abbatial colleagues, as an estate within parliament (and the most educated,
experienced and intellectually-matured estate at that), could scarcely hope to
avoid involvement. No matter what integrity that involvement might have in
intention, it might not seem to have such in the eyes of more partisan
observers. And, above all, there were individual bishops who, by reason of
birth or career or social connection, would almost certainly be regarded, or
might indeed choose to stand, as a member of one or another partisan
connection in a time of political concern. At any time, furthermore, one or
two individual bishops would almost certainly be serving in the great offices
of state, whilst the archbishops, especially the archbishop of Canterbury, had
a special position in the counsel of the king by reason of their standing. The
episcopal status of such men would surely have given their contribution a
particular flavor, and their involvement surely carry implications for the
English church and their own ordo. Relatively few bishops, in fact, took a
positive role in political affairs in Richard II's reign, but more had served the
Crown administratively in times past, and were looked to subsequently by
various interested parties to lend their experience and mature opinion in
support of a particular point of view. In short, many bishops, whilst con-
scious of a heavy sense of responsibility both in respect of the church and as
regards their personal conduct by reason of their prelacy, could scarcely
hope to avoid some involvement by reason of their past or present secular
associations or because of their own sympathies derived from such experi-
ence. How far did political responsibility balance such personal interest?
In 1388, as a result of all these considerations, the episcopate were con-
fronted by a critical situation. Certain of the bishops came to be personally
unacceptable to the ascendant political connection, which wished them re-
moved, either from one see to another of lower standing, or altogether from
2
Cf. J. S. Roskell, "The Problem of the Attendance of the Lords in Medieval Parliaments,"
Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 29 (1956), 153-204.
The Episcopate and Political Crisis 661
the bench. Such direct repercussions on the episcopate were unprecedented
and, if as dramatic as they would appear at first sight, they could have had
far-reaching consequences for the bishops and the church as a whole in the
years to come. They threatened the leaders of the church, at least theoreti-
cally, with personal ruin or disadvantage should they offend or gainsay the
secular authority of the day, thereby undermining the independence of the
spiritualty. On the other side of the coin, they could tempt individual
members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy into unrestrained involvement in
political intrigue in order to advance their own fortunes and to destroy those
of their rivals. It was one thing, and quite a regular practice, for a bishop to
secure further promotion by winning the approbation of the Crown, quite
another for him to secure the creation of a vacancy by the ousting of a rival.
Clearly, therefore, one should look very closely at the men who were af-
fected for better or worse by the translations of 1388: to what did they owe
their rise or fall? why did the different parties involved undertake such a
course of action? how were the necessary manoeuvres carried out? Only
when these facts are known can one assess the real significance of the
political involvements of these bishops in 1388 and of their translations, and
what effect the episode might have had on the English church.
Furthermore, such dramatic intentions on the part of the magnates neces-
sarily required the co-operation of the pope in Rome, and, knowing as we do
of the forthcoming re-enactment of the Statute of Provisors (in 1390) and
the controversy surrounding that event, the involvement of Pope Urban VI
in the events of 1388 also merits consideration. The hard-pressed pope,
beset by schism, might well demand a political and financial price of the
magnates for his aid: how to pay this at a time when the government was
supposed to be more responsive to the Commons, those inveterate critics of
the papacy, would be a delicate problem.
Amongst the many points of controversy which made up the crisis of
1386-88, that regarding taxation was, of course, amongst the most impor-
tant. The magnates, basing their public opposition to the king on the latter's
past policies in respect of the raising and spending of revenues, were natur-
ally under considerable pressure from the Commons, on this score their
eager supporters, to reduce taxation of the laity now that they had the
chance to do so. But simultaneously the magnates must remedy those fail-
ures in policy with which they had discredited the king's government, and to
these ends, for example the pursuit of a more vigorous policy towards
France, they must exploit alternative sources of revenue. Increased imposi-
tions upon clerical wealth were, and in the eyes of the Commons had long
been, an obvious possibility. However, the magnates in opposition could not
easily impose heavy burdens upon the church if simultaneously they hoped
to receive support from that quarter for their at least unusual incursions into
areas of royal responsibility. Evidently, therefore, in the execution of their
coup against the government, and in the aftermath, the magnates must needs
consider carefully the attitude to their actions of both the papacy and the
English church: in practice they would need especially to consider the
bishops.
The most important figure in the English church was, of course, the
archbishop of Canterbury, William Courtenay.3 By 1386 his health was
suspect, and it is possible that this prevented him from playing as significant
a role from Canterbury as he might have wished.4 Although never close to
Richard II, he usually enjoyed the king's respect, but in 1385 there was
friction between them of both an official and personal nature. Officially, the
archbishop had taken public offence at the nature and number of the king's
demands upon the clergy for subsidies, with the added affront that Richard
seemed to be dictating to him the place and timing of convocation. In the
end, the archbishop preserved his dignity and rights, and the king got his
money. Quite apart from this, they were party to an ugly scene, after
Courtenay had implicitly criticised the choice of royal advisers. The chancel-
lor, Sir Michael de la Pole, saved the situation, but, even so, the altercation
attracted widespread attention, redounding very much to the king's disad-
vantage.5 In 1376—7, when bishop of London, Courtenay had certainly been
involved in political controversy, most notably in opposition to John of
Gaunt, and in consequence he has sometimes been regarded as something of
an "aristocratic partisan." However, the evidence, when closely examined, is
by no means conclusive.6 His reputation with contemporaries had improved
in subsequent years, and he may not in 1377 have yet been generally
considered a "most perfect man,"7 but it would be wrong to see any dramatic
change in middle-life. Perhaps he settled later for a resigned acquiescence in
political affairs which he would not have done in 1377, but both then and
later he was basically the tough champion of the church's interests —
conservative, naturally (the label is almost anachronistic), especially as he
always had to act defensively — and his involvement in secular politics,
especially in 1376-7, can be argued to have derived only from such an
ecclesiastical attitude. His ability, particularly in later years, to maintain the
respect of those with whom he contended marks him as an admirable, if not
so exceptional, figure.
Partly because of his non-involvement in government after his elevation to
the primacy in 1381, Courtenay spent less time at Lambeth than either his
3
For whom, see J. H. Dahmus, William Courtenay, Archbishop of Canterbury, 1381-1396
(Pennsylvania, 1966), especially Chapter 8, "Courtenay and the State"; idem, "Richard II and
the Church," Catholic Historical Review 39 (1953-4), 412-16.
4
London, Lambeth Palace: Register of William] Courtenay, [archbishop of] Canterbury,
fols., 35, lOOr-v. He was ill in both January 1383 and April 1384.
5
Polychronicon [Ranulphi Higden], ed. J. R. Lumby, 9 vols. (Rolls Series, 1865-1886), 8:469; T.
Walsingham, Historia Anglicana, ed. H. T. Riley (Rolls Series, 1863-4), 2:128; Chronicon Adae de
Usk, ed. E. M. Thompson (London, 1904), p. 150.
6
Cf. Dahmus, William Courtenay, pp. 25—67; R. G. Davies, "The Episcopate in England and
Wales, 1375-1443," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Manchester, 1974, pp. 39-41, 59-63.
7
Usk, p. 149.
predecessor, Simon of Sudbury, or any of his successors over the next fifty
years. His well-known metropolitan visitations had not really got under way
before 1386 (saving his long, stormy visit to Exeter, his home diocese, in
1384), and most of his five years as archbishop had actually been divided
between Otford (Kent) and Mayfield (Sussex).8 In consequence he was prob-
ably something of a stranger at court, and his representations in 1385,
perhaps inspired by widespread and deepening disquiet as well as by his own
wish to help John of Gaunt clear himself with the king, were as a result
perhaps all the more startling to the court. He attempted a mediatory role in
the years following, but with little apparent success, and his more decisive
efforts were restricted to steering the church through the particular prob-
lems posed for it by the political crisis of 1386-88.9
By contrast with Courtenay, the archbishop of York, Alexander Neville,
has received only brief and unflattering notices of his involvement in the
events of this time, as indeed of his whole career.10 Until the end of 1385 he
played no part in political life, indeed was even a poor attender of parlia-
ments.11 He lived in his diocese and got on badly with many with whom he
had to deal, for example the bishop and cathedral priory of Durham, the
chapter of York, the town of Hull and the collegiate churches of Southwell
and Beverley. He incited a singular animosity in his opponents, notably the
Ravenser-Waltham family, whose dispute with him at Beverley had wider
repercussions through their employment in the royal chancery. It seems
probable that, although the archbishop's brother, John, lord Neville of Raby,
had long been an adherent of John of Gaunt, he himself had no significant
political allegiance until shortly before the crisis of 1386. In August 1385 he
accompanied the king on his military expedition into Scotland, and evidently
forsook his diocese at that time after ten years of almost continuous resi-
dence. He went with the king to London, where, in April 1386, he was "of
the king's council, busy with the affairs of the realm at the king's side, under
his special protection."12 He remained with him throughout 1386 and 1387,
and was evidently amongst his closest advisers. It seems, therefore, that at
the time of his appointment to the commission to supervise the king's
government, which was established in November 1386 in the "Wonderful
Parliament," he was already a known member of the court circle.13 It is, of
8
These conclusions are from a prepared itinerary. For the visitation of Exeter, see J. H.
Dahmus, "The Metropolitan Visitations of William Courtenay," University of Illinois Studies in the
Social Sciences 31, pt. 2 (1950), 10-36.
9
T. F. Tout went too far in saying that the king "thus had on his hands a feud with the
primate"; Chapters [in the Administrative History of Medieval England] (Manchester, 1920-33),
3:394.
10
For detailed references in support of the following remarks, see R. G. Davies, "Alexander
Neville, archbishop of York, 1374-1388," Yorkshire Archaeological Journal 46 (1975).
1
' Like other northern magnates he was expected to defend the border against the Scots, for
example in June 1384; Polychronicon, 9:43.
12
Calendar of] P[atent] R[olls], 1385-9, 172.
13
Both Thomas Favent (Hisloria Mirabitis Parliament, ed. M. McKisack, Camden Miscellany XIV
course, nothing remarkable that the king should have found the northern
primate a potentially useful adviser when he met him properly almost for
the first time in 1385. From what one knows of them they would have found
each other's opinions much to their liking, and no sinister motive need be
sought. It was, however, unusual for any archbishop to forsake his diocese so
entirely as did Neville, and this can hardly have assisted his already dubious
reputation.14 His inexperience in political matters may also have been as
potentially dangerous as any deliberate intent to lead the king astray.
In public life the episcopate as a whole, perhaps as always, did not present
a strong front. In practice, the senior figures, as for some years past, were,
apart from Archbishop Courtenay, William Wykeham of Winchester and
Thomas Brantingham of Exeter. In 1385 these two were named in parlia-
ment as royal councillors.15 Brantingham, in fact, having "retired" in 1381 to
his diocese, where he took his duties very seriously, had taken up residence
in London again in July 1384. His insistence on an annual summer tour of
his diocese detracts from the record a little, but virtually he remained in the
capital until August 1389.16 Wykeham, occupying a bishopric nearer to
London, was a regular visitor to his manor at Southwark throughout the
thirteen-eighties.17 Both might therefore look only too available for consulta-
tion on the part of opposition groups, but in fact they seem like their
archbishop to have kept to their long-standing interest in, but without an
overtly partisan view of, the conduct of government. John Gilbert of
Hereford, another experienced bishop soon to play a part, had been in his
diocese for much of the reign, but in the winter of 1383-4 he came to
London and had treated with the French on one or two occasions since
then.18 His principal political connection appears to have been with John of
Gaunt, and he too seems to have been no "worse" than neutral towards the
court. Robert Braybrooke of London had formerly been closely identified
with the court by kinship and upbringing, but, after a brief and unhappy
term as chancellor in 1382-3, he seems to have drifted away into a position
of respected and weighty independence, especially after the death in 1385 of
the king's mother, Joan of Kent, who had borne him especial affection, and
[1926], p. 1) and the roll of the "Merciless Parliament" (Rot[uli] Parl[iamentorum], ed. J. Strachey
et al. [London, 1783], 3:232) say this explicitly, but the evidence of neither can be taken at face
value.
14
His harsh, extortionate administration of his province had even led to complaints in
parliament, and to libels outside parliament in preceding years; Rot. Part 3:352; PRO, Ancient
Petitions, SC8/262/13079; cf. Archaeologia 16 (1812), 80-3. Cf. also John Gower's opinion in
Political Poems and Songs, ed. T. Wright (Rolls Series, 1859), 1:421.
ls
Rot. Part., 3:214; cf. Chapters, 3:396, and J. A. Tuck, Richard U and the English Nobility
(London, 1973), pp. 99-101. Other names were probably also offered, but the record is
mutilated.
16
Reg. Brantingham (Exeter), ed. T. Hingeston-Randolph (London & Exeter, 1886), pp. 894-5.
17
Reg. Wykeham (Winchester), ed. T. F. Kirby (Hampshire Record Soc, 1896-9), pp. 624-5.
18
Itinerary principally from Reg. Gilbert (Hereford), ed. J. H. Parry (Canterbury & York Soc,
1915).
probably had brought him initially into the court circle. Finally, Thomas
Arundel of Ely also spent the winter of 1383-4 in the capital or at his
episcopal manor of Hatfield (Hertfordshire), but in the main he too kept to
his diocese. In June 1386 he stayed briefly at his family's home in Sussex, but
there is no reason to regard this as significant politically.19 Thus, generally
speaking, there are no grounds for associating the leading bishops with any
formation of a group in organised opposition to the court. Episcopal at-
tendances declined if anything in the frequent parliaments of the early
thirteen-eighties.
The clouds darkened during 1386. The chancellor, Sir Michael de la Pole
(who had been created earl of Suffolk in 1385), was irrevocably identified
with the increasingly unacceptable policies of the Crown. Walter Skirlaw,
bishop of Bath and Wells, remained as keeper of the privy seal, as Tout
noted, despite having obtained his translation to that see from Coventry and
Lichfield early in the year in preference to Richard Medford, the king's
secretary and close confidant. Of Skirlaw's relationship with the king and
court more will have to be said.20 On 17 January 1386 John Fordham,
bishop of Durham, returned to ministerial office (which he had forsaken
after his episcopal elevation four years earlier) as treasurer of the Ex-
chequer, in succession to the ailing Sir Hugh Segrave. What is very interest-
ing here is that the employment of the bishop of Durham in such a position
took him away from his northern commitments, on which a high priority
had long been placed by the Crown, and to which tradition Fordham had
previously adhered. His Durham register does not survive, but substantial
numbers of references show that he had resided in his diocese from the
summer of 1382, that is, soon after his elevation. In 1384, when warden of
the marches and guardian of the truce, for example, he had been reported
as "continually present with his household near the marches."21 By 1388, at
least, he was probably not on good terms with the Percies, the foremost
baronial family in the north, which was not unusual for royal officers at this
time.22 As Dr. J. A. Tuck has shown, the renewal of war with Scotland in
1384 forced the king to acknowledge the influence of the Percies and to
abandon his attempts to hold them in check through royal officials. Instead
he tried to restrain them by involving the Neville family with them in the
matters of the border. The withdrawal in 1386 of Fordham, a northern
magnate in his own right as bishop of Durham and the one most responsive
to royal wishes, by definition reduced further the king's ability to restrain the
19
M. E. Aston, Thomas Arundel (Oxford, 1967), pp. 385-6.
20
See below, pp. 686-7.
21
C[alendar of] C[lose] R[olls], 1381-5, 573. At this time the Scots were threatening seriously;
Polychronicon, 9:43. Twenty-four references, principally from the records of the Crown, of
Durham itself and of other bishops, have been found to testify to his living in Stockton and
Auckland.
22
Cf. J. A. Tuck, "Richard II and the Border Magnates," Northern History 3 (1968), 27-52, for
the general picture.
Percies. Furthermore, Fordham's earlier career with the Black Prince and
the king had not been in a specifically financial capacity, so his subsequent
dismissal from the office of treasurer might a priori be attributed as much to
his administrative unsuitability as to political motives. However this may be,
his appointment as treasurer suggests that, as antagonisms became sharper,
the Crown, although of course anxious to have capable officers, now felt its
choice for political reasons to be increasingly limited. If it was already
unusual for Skirlaw to stay on as keeper after his episcopal promotion,
Fordham's re-engagement is much more significant. One must emphasize,
however, that he had not been a member of the court circle for the past few
years, and in fact seems throughout his career to have been regarded by the
Crown as one of its more capable administrators rather than as an intimate
member of the court. It will be argued below that this was an opinion
widely-shared.
Significantly perhaps, the so-called "Wonderful Parliament," which met on
1 October 1386, did not attract so special a turnout of bishops as its succes-
sor, the "Merciless Parliament," was to do in February 1388. This "Wonder-
ful Parliament" turned almost at once to the business of removing the
officers of state. Bishop Arundel went with Thomas of Woodstock to Eltham
to coerce the king into sweeping concessions. Arundel had played little part
in political affairs hitherto and, although one might well believe him to have
been an important contributor to the political theory underlying the criticism
of the king and his government, his entry into active politics so suddenly and
so prominently must surely have been promoted by his brother, the earl,
who was already a foremost critic of the government. The bishop's participa-
tion here, rather than that of some more senior or less obviously committed
bishop, can only be regarded as out-and-out partisanship.23 The king at least
could hardly have been expected to view the brother of so hostile a critic in
any other light. His participation implies also that the opposition to the
Crown had grasped the issue firmly and tried no longer to work through an
ostensibly broad political front. On 23 October Bishops Fordham and Skir-
law accompanied the earl of Suffolk out of office, but were subject to no
recriminations (as he of course was). Indeed, Skirlaw's resignation had not
been formally demanded in the parliament. Bishop Arundel came in as
chancellor, but the other new officers were men probably not properly
committed to opposition to the court. Bishop Gilbert, the new treasurer, had
earlier ties with the Black Prince as well as with the now-absent Gaunt, and
23
Chronicon Henrici de Knighton, ed. J. R. Lumby (Rolls Series, 1895), 2:215-6, 219. Arundel,
admittedly, was a bishop of fourteen years' standing, and occupied a see of first-rank impor-
tance, but his political experience was very limited, and his participation could only be viewed as
reflecting the interest of his brother, the earl, who stood very close to Thomas of Woodstock,
duke of Gloucester, in the latter's criticism of the court. Indeed, Woodstock himself, for all his
position as a royal uncle, could not, given his hostile attitude to the court at this time, be
represented as acting as a senior, disinterested mediator in the crisis. Nor did he and the bishop
even try to appear as such.
Richard II was to show no hostility towards him in the future. John
Waltham, the keeper of the rolls of chancery, had a natural enough promo-
tion to the keepership of the privy seal.24 He was to prosper under the
Appellants but had served the king loyally in the past and was to do so again
(and enjoy much royal favor) in the next decade. Clearly, all three of these
men were taking a chance in accepting office in such circumstances, but two
at least were surely forces for moderation. There was no clear opposition
party at this time, and the general atmosphere was indeed one of restraint.
Gilbert and Waltham were appointed, one would think, as men widely
respected and experienced, in the universal hope of future competence and
success. By the same token, Skirlaw and Fordham were probably not re-
moved out of political bitterness against them personally, but because the
latter at least seemed inappropriate to his office, and because both were too
closely associated with a discredited regime.25
On 19 November a commission was established to supervise government
generally. From episcopal ranks, besides the officers, Brantingham, Wyke-
ham and both archbishops were appointed.26 There is little reason to see
even any of these as partisans of the Crown's enemies, still less as enemies
themselves, for they were, by experience and standing, the obvious bishops
to be chosen. Possibly Neville's inclusion raised qualms, but such a commis-
sion really needed to include both archbishops, just as both royal dukes then
in England were automatic choices. Conceivably his influence at court was
not yet fully appreciated, and he may in general terms have been regarded
lightly.27
As is well known, Richard II strained these arrangements by the simple
expedient of withdrawing from London. Bishop Thomas Rushook, the
king's very unpopular confessor, went down to his diocese of Chichester at
this time, but rejoined the king in August 1387 in the West Midlands.28
Neville and Fordham probably remained with the court throughout, the
archbishop fairly certainly, in particular for the royal excursion into the
diocese of York.29 Bishop John Swaffham of Bangor, who had long been a
24
F o r a consideration o f his position, see below, p p . 688—90.
25
By implication there seems no reason to label Waltham "at this time a keen parliamentar-
ian"; and there is no justification for making Arundel "the active leader of the episcopal
opposition." What episcopal opposition? Chapters, 3:413.
26
CPR, 1385-9, 244. Courtenay, characteristically cautious, alone made a protestation that his
membership was not to be derogatory to the rights of his church of Canterbury; Rot. Pad.,
3:223-4.
27
Courtenay distrusted him, and wrote in December 1386 to John Prophet, a clerk in
chancery, to make sure he did nothing derogatory to Canterbury whilst spending Christmas
with the king; PRO, Council and Privy Seal, E28/1 (39). Favent (p. 1) named Neville as one of the
viciose viventes most hated in 1386, but this was written with hindsight and, in any case, hardly
represents an objective view.
28
PRO, Significations of Excommunications, C85/45/38-9; Reg. Courtenay, fols. 265v-7v.
29
York, Borthwick Institute: Reg. A. Neville I, fol. 96; Lincoln, Diocesan Record Office: Reg.
J o h n Buckingham, Institutions, I I , fols. 22, 29v. Of Fordham, before his attendance at Notting-
permanent resident in his diocese, also joined the court, either by accident or
design, at Nottingham. As for the newly-appointed officers, Arundel and
Gilbert naturally stayed in London almost all the time, Christmas and Easter
apart, and the episcopal commissioners, Neville apart, equally conscien-
tiously withdrew from the capital only for the festivals, until in the last week
of July 1387 they all, presumably by agreement, left to make extended tours
of their dioceses. This "end of session" may well have had some part in
Richard IPs timing of his appeal to the judges for a verdict on the events of
1386, although, feeling self-confident as he did, and with a parliament
necessarily due in the near future, August was in any case the moment to
act.30
Events came to a head in London in November 1387 when the magnates
most vehemently opposed to the Crown had recourse to arms. Some of those
bishops who were on the commission, headed by Courtenay and including
Arundel, attempted with their lay colleagues to mediate.31 Neville played no
part and, righdy fearing for his personal safety, soon took flight.32 If the
bishops were to play a role as a force for peace, the onus fell upon diose
politically involved, since hardly any others were in the capital. Most bishops
were, as usual, residing in their dioceses.33
Subsequendy the issue was decided in favor of the magnates in open
opposition.34 After the magnates' return to London on 27 December, having
defeated Robert de Vere's attempt to bring armed troops to the king's aid,
Bishops Gilbert, Arundel and Wykeham and the duke of York acted alone as
ham on 25 August, it is known only that he was in London on 11 December 1386 and "absent"
from his diocese on 1 May 1387; Durham, Prior's Kitchen: Priory Cartulary II, fol. 292;
Magnum Repertorium 2.5 Ebor. 3 ( D u r h a m ) .
30
It is w o r t h n o t i n g that on 29 J u n e the c o u r t a t t e n d e d t h e installation of Richard Scrope as
bishop of Coventry & Lichfield, not in late August, as T o u t , getting his years confused,
s u r m i s e d . S c r o p e , however, settled to looking over his diocese a n d did n o t travel with the c o u r t
in this year. H e n r y Wakefield, b i s h o p of Worcester, r a t h e r pointedly, went into Gloucestershire
in April whilst t h e c o u r t stayed in his c a t h e d r a l city. His sympathies may well have lain with
T h o m a s of Woodstock.
31
Polychronicon, 9:105, 119; Chron. Knighton, 2:242-3.
32
Walsingharn, who disliked h i m b u t was p e r h a p s a w a r e of t h e c h a r g e s m a d e against him in
connection with the s e c u r i n g of t h e j u d g e s ' verdict in A u g u s t 1387, said h e was the most militant
of the king's courtiers at this time, b u t the s a m e writer h a d stated just previously that Suffolk
was t h e o n e who deliberately frustrated a n a t t e m p t to b r i n g the m a g n a t e s a n d the king
together; Historia Anglicana, 2:163—4.
33
Historia Anglicana, 2:163. R o b e r t B r a y b r o o k e , the local diocesan, j o i n e d the a t t e m p t s at
m e d i a t i o n , b u t after a n altercation with Suffolk h e was a b r u p t l y told to withdraw by t h e king.
B r a n t i n g h a m is n o t m e n t i o n e d in accounts a l t h o u g h h e was back in L o n d o n . Surprisingly
p e r h a p s , R u s h o o k was not in L o n d o n , a n d Skirlaw was also in his diocese. F o r d h a m was
p r e s u m a b l y t h e r e , a l t h o u g h no evidence can be cited. W h e t h e r Swaffham came to L o n d o n
before t h e Merciless P a r l i a m e n t is u n k n o w n . T h a t Ralph E r g h u m of Salisbury alone of those
eleven bishops not o p e n l y involved s h o u l d have been in L o n d o n (he c a m e u p in O c t o b e r in fact)
is r a t h e r interesting a n d m i g h t be b o r n e in m i n d for t h e f u t u r e ; Reg. B u c k i n g h a m (Lincoln),
Institutions, I I , fols. 254v, 387v.
34
J . N . L. M y r e s , " T h e C a m p a i g n of R a d c o t B r i d g e in D e c e m b e r 1387," English Historical
mediators between them and the Crown.35 That Courtenay should now have
held aloof seems curious, for he was spending Christmas at Croydon (Sur-
rey) and must have had immediate news of all events. In fact, he even stayed
in Croydon throughout January 1388, whilst Brantingham, who was in
London over Christmas, moved off to his manor of East Horsley (also in
Surrey) in the new year. There were distinct shades of "neutrality" in the
situation, and these two at least may well have decided that any active role,
however well meant, could only have very uncertain consequences. Thus,
when a committee pro gubernatione regis continua was established on 1 January
1388, composed otherwise from amongst the commissioners of 1386, Skirlaw
had to be named with Wykeham, who, apart from the officers, seems now to
have been the only episcopal commissioner who was both willing and able to
participate further.38 As a force for mediation the episcopate were in no
position to act collectively, and as individuals, for various reasons, very few
chose to play the part.
However, all but four bishops attended the "Merciless Parliament," which
met on 3 February 1388. Neville had absconded. John Buckingham of
Lincoln, Adam Houghton of St. David's and Laurence Childe of St. Asaph
sent proctors, as they had done regularly in recent parliaments.37 Special
efforts to attend seem to have been made by Henry Despenser of Norwich,
Thomas Appleby of Carlisle, Thomas Brinton of Rochester and John Swaff-
ham of Bangor. Fordham appears to have played a normal part.38 Rushook
also was present, ostensibly as a free agent, when the parliament was be-
gun.39
Bishop Arundel as chancellor read the cause of the summons. With the
agreement of the lords spiritual along with everyone else, it was decided,
after some anxious discussion, that the impending trials of the king's friends
should be held by parliamentary forms and not by civil or common law,
which would have thrown doubt on the proceedings.40 The next events to
involve the episcopate are not clear, but whatever their exact nature they
were certainly of much importance and caused considerable concern. Ac-
cording to the roll of the parliament, the appeal against the accused was read
in detail on 5 February, the defendants having been summoned in vain on
preceding days. Having heard the articles, Courtenay caused a formal pro-
Review 42 (1927), 20-33; cf. also R. G. Davies, "Some Notes from the Register of Henry de
Wakefield, bishop of Worcester, on the Political Crisis of 1386-1388," EHR 86 (1971), 547-8.
3S
EHR 86 (1971), 557.
36
Polychronicon, 9:116-7. Neville, manifestly unsuitable, was now in flight. Skirlaw and
Wykeham with Gilbert and Arundel were at the Guildhall on 18 January 1388, where the
Londoners present were loth to accept the edicts of the assembled magnates as binding.
Courtenay and Brantingham are said to have been present, but their registers indicate that they
were not in London at the time.
37
P R O , Parliamentary Proxies, S C 1 0 / 3 6 / 1 7 9 6 , 3 7 / 1 8 0 3 , 1 8 1 0 .
38
He was not used as a trier of petitions, a very rare omission of the bishop of Durham.
39
See below, p . 6 7 4 .
ia
Rot. Parl, 3:244.
testation to be read that the prelates in parliament reserved their full rights
but were canonically debarred from being party to such trials as were being
held. Strangely for so important an occasion several bishops were not pres-
ent: namely, apart from Neville and the three aged or infirm absentees,
Bishops Rushook of Chichester, Wakefield of Worcester, Despenser of Nor-
wich, Brinton of Rochester, Swaffham of Bangor and Bottlesham of Llan-
daff.41 The roll of the parliament adds that Fordham and Appleby of
Carlisle, presumably either because their own archbishop was absent or
because they were unwilling to allow Courtenay or one of themselves to
speak for both, spoke personally in the same vein. Thereupon, the lords
spiritual withdrew.
The most partisan chronicler of the Appellants' cause, Thomas Favent,
varies this account significantly. On 2 February, he relates, Arundel, as
chancellor, heard the articles and protested that scriptural authority de :
barred him and his clerical colleagues from participation in judgments of
blood. The prelates withdrew to the chapter house of Westminster Abbey,
from whence neither threats, bribes or favor nor a direct request from the
Appellants to go against canon law and assist in the condemnation of the
four accused, could move them to return. They persisted in their attitude,
and a second protestation was read out. Finally, the clergy withdrew to the
royal chamber.42 Courtenay's must have been the second protestation. It is
possible that the roll of the parliament oversimplified the record, perhaps to
conceal the fact that the prelates had twice declined to take part, perhaps
seeing no need to record more than the final, formal outcome. Indeed, one
might have expected Favent also to have glossed over the Appellants' at-
tempts to contravene canon law since he was writing so fervent an apologia
for their actions. At the very least he might have been expected to record the
matter more briefly (as did the monk of Westminster, a close observer and
author of a detailed narrative), if he felt it could not be omitted altogether.
Evidently he took a deliberate decision to describe the matter in detail.
Perhaps, then, we must infer from this that, since the withdrawal of the lords
spiritual was indeed a matter of importance, the best gloss Favent could put
on it was to describe at length how the Appellants had recourse to every
conceivable expedient, even in the face of a firm refusal, to try to win the
prelates' participation.
In view of Richard II's insistence in similar circumstances in 1397 and
1398 on the appointment of a general proctor for the clergy, it is indeed
very likely that the self-excusal of the prelates in 1388 was taken very
seriously and, certainly by the Appellants, viewed with concern. Forced to
have recourse to processes of questionable legal validity from the start, they
41
Rot. Parl, 3:236; Reg. Courtenay, fol. 174. Courtenay's register agrees with the roll of the
parliament on the date and the making of the protestation in parliament, but does not relate
what went before.
42
Favent, p. 15.
had now to face the problem of the parliament, their chosen forum, being
challenged as being incomplete in composition. As lords in parliament, the
bishops and abbots formed a large part of the most vital group in the
procedure the Appellants had chosen to employ. Perhaps small wonder then
that the apologist of the Appellants was at some pains to record their efforts
to meet the lawful requirements of a parliamentary assembly. As has been
said, the monk of Westminster by contrast makes only a bare reference to
the withdrawal of the prelates pur saver lour regularite.43 He had no pro-
paganda motive to match that of Favent and may not, at the time he wrote,
have thought the matter so important. No other chronicler even refers to
it.44 Yet Courtenay had certainly posed a problem, for the Appellants had
opted deliberately for parliamentary forms, and he made no explicit admis-
sion that a parliamentary judgment could be valid without the participation
of the prelates. The Appellants must have known that the lords spiritual
would insist on withdrawing, particularly with Bishop Arundel concurring in
the decision, and presumably they resigned themselves to it as a difficulty
they would have to suffer since they had no better way to proceed. They
recognized reluctantly the canonical obligations of the lords spiritual over
and above their obligations as lords in parliament. There is no evidence that
Richard II then or later used the withdrawal as a formal ground for annul-
ling the decisions reached. On the other hand, in 1397 he did have them
appoint a lay proctor in identical circumstances. The prelates did not, of
course, withdraw from the parliament, the trials apart— indeed, Courtenay
was explicit on this point—and it may have been this which saved the
validity of the Appellants' action: if the prelates chose to withdraw from
particular sessions of the parliament, they were nonedieless still attendant
upon it; the parliament was, therefore, theoretically complete. Favent, repre-
senting the Appellants, was possibly unhappy about such an argument, but
other chroniclers were content to see the parliament as properly constituted.
The Appellants' main strength in the "Merciless Parliament" was the wide-
spread support, at least in principle, for their actions: this overcame for the
moment at least any qualms about the legal rectitude of their methods.
Incidentally, when Archbishop Neville was condemned in absentia on 11
February, his episcopal colleagues apparently felt unmoved to make any
special plea. The monk of Westminster says that his status persuaded those
in parliament not to press for the death sentence; instead they "left the pope
and the other prelates of the church to discuss the question of his deposition
and to conclude the matter."45 Evidently they gave these ecclesiastics fairly
strong advice towards reaching their conclusions!
43
Polychronicon, 9:148.
44
Apart from Richard II's implicit recognition of the weakness created by the prelates'
absence, it was never a matter of public debate. Given the sympathy of contemporary chroni-
clers for the Appellants' cause, their omission and the brevity of the monk of Westminster may
not be entirely fortuitous.
45
However, the lords spiritual were present in parliament on 5 March when
Rushook was impeached. The bishop attempted to reply, but the Commons
called for his arrest and the prelates contreplederont in vain. At the same time
the justices who had reported so favorably to Richard II at Shrewsbury and
Nottingham in August 1387 were sent to the Tower. The prelates had
withdrawn again, but returned (without Rushook) to make a striking plea for
mercy for these judges, which, being supported by the Appellants, was
granted. However, feeling apparently ran particularly high against Rushook,
and only the objections of the clergy saved him "without doubt" (in the
monk of Westminster's opinion) from losing his life. Although this chroni-
cler is probably conflating the events of before and after Easter and may
have overestimated the Appellants' determination or ability to carry out such
a potentially embarrassing sentence, yet the postponement of the hearing of
the bishop's case suggests some conflict and doubt over his fate. However, if
the prelates were taking their canonical position very seriously, they must
obviously have had informal contact with the Appellants, who, whilst con-
cerned to retain prelatical support, would hardly have permitted, much less
fallen in easily with, such public displays of clerical pity and opposition to
capital penalties, had they not had some preliminary negotiations on the
question and been privately amenable to such intercessions.46 The bishops
maintained their position by their absence from the trial of Sir Simon Burley
and, surprisingly, made no attempt to throw what might well have been
decisive weight behind the body of opinion which wanted to spare his life.
This, too, one might speculate, could suggest (but no more) that unofficially
the bishops were being influenced by the Appellants (Thomas of Woodstock
and the earl of Arundel at least) as to their public intentions.
The Easter recess might have indicated which bishops, if any, were closely
involved with the Appellants or any other grouping in preparing the strat-
egy for the second session of parliament, which in the nature of things might
be more difficult for the Appellants to control. Although the loss of many
episcopal registers makes a conclusion difficult, it is clear that most bishops
travelled to their dioceses for the festival and, no doubt, to check on their
deputies' conduct. Of those potentially most involved politically, Courtenay,
Wykeham, Erghum of Salisbury and even the treasurer, Gilbert, went off to
their dioceses. Arundel remained in London. Otherwise, only Scrope of
Coventry and Lichfield and Braybrooke of London, the latter naturally
enough, are known to have stayed on in the capital over Easter.47 Fordham's
whereabouts are uncertain, but by 26 April he had apparently gone north, as
instructed in parliament, to assist in the defence of the border.48
46
Polychronicon, 9:151-2, 169-70; Favent, p. 20.
47
Scrope was a particular friend of Arundel, and his tarrying in London might well suggest
that he was lending his support to the chancellor. But he does not appear to have played any
particular part at this time, and in subsequent years he did not suffer the disfavor of the king.
Quite the reverse, in fact.
48
Historiae Dunelmensis Scriptores Tres (Surtees Soc, IX, 1839), p. clviii; but "absent" from his
diocese on 1 May, and apparently in London on 15 May. Cf. below, p. 685.
For the second session evidence of episcopal attendance is deficient. But
Erghum at least appears to have dropped out. On 12 May Rushook was
summoned formally, and, coming to the bar of the assembly, was informed
of his condemnation by the lords temporal. Certainly he would suffer forfei-
ture and "the king" would consider his execution. Early in June the bishop
was sent into exile in Ireland.49 It seems, therefore, that a decision had been
reached over Easter not to press for his execution, wiser counsels having
prevailed. But possibly feelings ran so high that even in May it was felt that a
theoretical possibility of a death sentence should be kept open, at least in
public. It is not known what part the bishops as a body played in all this.
Finally, on 3 June Braybrooke, as the local diocesan, celebrated mass in
Westminster Abbey. Courtenay preached "a good sermon" — would that we
knew what he said! — and presented an oath for himself and his suffragans
to maintain the acts of this parliament. The bishops collectively passed
sentence of excommunication against those who transgressed them. This
again may well have been regarded as of more than routine importance by
the leaders of the opposition.50
With the Cambridge Parliament of September 1388 already in prospect,
the bishops dispersed quickly to their much-neglected dioceses for the sum-
mer. Only Arundel (as chancellor), Wykeham and Braybrooke remained in
London. These two latter had been appointed on 15 May with the earl of
Warwick, John, lord Cobham, and Richard, lord Scrope, to guide the king in
all things.51 As a whole this committee seems by no means extreme.32 Skir-
law's replacement by Braybrooke, as compared to the similar committee in
January, could have any number of innocent explanations. Skirlaw's transla-
tion to Durham was already known, and he may have had matters to settle in
Bath and Wells before leaving for the north. Moreover, his diplomatic
expertise was soon to be employed, so an appointment of this kind would
have been impossible to fulfill for long. Wykeham and Braybrooke, like
Arundel, left London in mid-July, presumably staying with the king.53
On 9 September at Cambridge, the first act in the new parliament was the
approval of the translations of several bishops. Since the bishops involved
(save, of course, Neville and Rushook) were all needed in the parliament, it
" F a v e n t , p . 2 3 : Polyhromam, 9:156-7.

so j r a v e n t j p 24.
51
Polychronicon. 9:178. T o u t h a d qualms about the truth of this r e p o r t , b u t t h e lingering of
the two bishops in L o n d o n a n d t h e similarity of their itineraries seem to confirm t h e chronicler's
record; cf. Chapters, 3:438. I n 1397 W y k e h a m a n d Richard, lord Scrope, were n a m e d with
Courtenay, the duke of York a n d the abbot of Waltham as councillors who h a d been loyal in
1388; Rot. ParL, 3:353.
52
L. H . Butler, "Robert Braybrooke, bishop of L o n d o n (1381-1404), a n d his Kinsmen,"
unpublished D. Phil, thesis, Oxford, 1952, p p . 8 6 - 7 , seems quite correct to i n t e r p r e t Bray-
brooke as neutral despite his relatively recent confrontation with Suffolk. O n 18 April
W y k e h a m h a d shown his i n d e p e n d e n c e by c h a r g i n g Woodstock a n d J o h n , lord C o b h a m , with a
breach of sanctuary in the a p p r e h e n s i o n of Robert Tresilian; they admitted this a m o n t h later;
53
N o n e was in his diocese this s u m m e r , so far as is known. A r u n d e l was in O x f o r d in August.
was decided that they should send proctors to their new dioceses to take
corporal possession.54 This final act of confirmation provides an appropriate
starting-point from which to survey this well-known but complex series of
translations. First, to present the facts. On 3 April Neville was translated to
the Scottish see of St. Andrew's, which, owing allegiance to the Clementist
pope in Avignon, was therefore a purely titular see in Urbanist terms. On
the very same day Arundel was promoted from Ely to York, Fordham left
Durham for Ely, Skirlaw was moved from Bath and Wells to Durham,
Erghum of Salisbury was given Bath and Wells, and John Waltham, the
keeper of the privy seal, was promoted to Salisbury.55
Rushook, exiled to Ireland only in June 1388, and so with his fate unde-
cided at the time when the main series of translations was arranged, was not
dealt with by the pope until some time in 1389 when he was translated to the
bishopric of Kilmore in Ireland. Thus, although in general terms of the
political use of translations he figures in the affair, during 1388 his case was
distinct and did not form part of the situation.
However, although his fate was a matter apart, something must be said of
Rushook, and perhaps this is best done first. Even after being taken into
custody during the Merciless Parliament, he appears to have remained in his
London inn.56 He had been ejected from the court in January 1388 with
many others, but it is possible that the opposition magnates had not intended
to pursue him closely. Certainly Rushook attended the parliament in his
official capacity, although he had admittedly been told to be ready to answer
charges. After Easter he was condemned and exiled on 5 (or 12) May, but in
fact on 2 May his temporalities had already been referred to as forfeit, the
penalty backdated to 1 October 1387, probably not from particular malice or
political cause but for the sake of administrative convenience (the date
coinciding with the beginning of the financial year in the Exchequer). On 8
July 1388 he was given royal protection and letters of assistance to make his
way via Bristol to Cork by 29 September.57
54
Polychronicon, 9:189: " p r i m o n a m q u e a n t e omnia s t a t u e r u n t q u o d episcopi o m n e s p r o -
visione p a p a e translati ad sedes suas transirent et possessionem c o r p o r a l e m p e r e o r u m vicarios
assumerent indilate." Cf. J. A. Tuck, " T h e Cambridge Parliament, 1388," EHR 84 (1969), 2 3 1 .
55
F o r details, see J. le Neve, Fasti Ecdesiae Anglicanae, 1300-1541, revised edition (University
of L o n d o n , 1962-7), 3 : 1 ; 4:14; 6:2, 108; 8:2.
56
Reg. B u c k i n g h a m (Lincoln), Institutions, I I , fol. 307v.
57
I n F e b r u a r y 1389 William Scaldewell was still administering Chichester as Rushook's vicar-
general, b u t shortly afterwards the bishop was translated to Kilmore, from which the p o p e a n d
king possibly h o p e d that h e could d r a w a m o d e s t r e v e n u e . Kilmore was Urbanist in theory, a n d
Rushook is n o t known to have faced any Clementist rival. Much m o r e significant was the very
weak level of English influence at this time in the diocese, as in much of the province of A r m a g h
as a whole. Besides, i n d e e d above all, the king's description of the see in 1390 as modicus was
optimistic, a n d if Rushook did obtain possession — a n d it is quite possible (pace Perroy) that h e
did, at least nominally — this, whilst of political interest to the Crown, would have been of
minimal financial advantage to himself. In 1390 Richard II a n d the royal council, in response to
a petition from the bishop's " p o o r friends," g r a n t e d h i m £ 4 0 per annum. H e died early in 1393.
T h e revenues of Chichester sede vacante were applied to the discharge of the debts of t h e royal
household; Rot. ParL, 3:274.
He remains an enigma. In the light of his eventual ruin it has often been
assumed that he was an unscrupulous, seff-interested person and a bad
influence on the king, and certainly it is not easy to disregard the hostility
toward him in the thirteen-eighties. Yet his earlier career had shown that he
was able, and could win respect and high office outside the court, and
nothing explicit can be brought against him save that he was sufficiently
close to Richard II to influence him. John Gower attributed his fate to his
particular animosity towards the magnates. Whilst this might be construed as
implying that he discouraged the king from making any concessions to them,
and, more generally, that he exacerbated relations between them,58 it would
strain Gower's evidence, credible in itself, too far to suggest that he was
particularly responsible for any developed theories of royal authority. Many
people quite outside the court, let alone those within, saw any criticism of the
king's government as open to question, and any attempt to supervise or
check it, particularly through parliament, as constitutionally quite improper.
One can hardly expect Rushook to have counselled the young ruler oth-
erwise than to fulfil his role as king to the full, but this is not to say that he
actually counselled the king in specific matters of government or systemat-
ically developed the king's political philosophy. Although necessarily preoc-
cupied at court, he had at times shown strong interest in his episcopal duties,
first in Llandaff (1382-5) and then in Chichester, neither, it should be noted,
bishoprics of great financial substance. The particularly virulent hatred
which he had attracted even before 1388 derived less, it would seem, from
the leading opponents of the Crown than from the wider circle represented
by the Commons. And for the king's confessor to be popularly vilified was
far from unusual. The Appellants seem to have hesitated in his case, with
the Commons pressing harder and more harshly than they themselves
wanted, despite his reputed threats against the judges in order to secure a
judgment for the king in 1387.59 In the end, his abilities may have been his
crime more than his character.
The main series of translations involved more individuals than any other
single sequence in the whole history of the episcopate in England and has
been cited as the archetypal and most unscrupulous late medieval instance of
the use of bishoprics for political ends. In fact the procedure, or, rather,
combination of procedures, was not repeated before the Reformation, saving
possibly to a limited extent on papal initiative in 1421-2, and then not
involving established bishops but only a range of nominees. If the threat
remained, it was apparently on an Anglo-papal level rather than as a matter
of internal English politics. Evidently, then, the circumstances of 1388 were
quite unique, and one must examine these translations very carefully.
The first problem, and a complicated one, is that of the source of their
58
Political Poems and Songs, 1:421-2.
59
Polychronicon, 9:170. This chronicler relates that there was some discussion in parliament
how to get round his clerical status in order to execute him, on both 5 and 6 March. Clearly his
case was put off for some time to allow ardor to cool.
inspiration. According to Favent, Urban VI heard of Neville's condemnation
and so sent him to St. Andrew's ad evitandum omnes suspiciones infavorem sui,
in other words as a gesture of goodwill without regard to the vacancy
thereby created at York.60 Favent, then, takes the subsequent translations as
a separate matter. He attributes their inspiration to the pope. Urban, he
claimed, was (as was indeed the case) urgently seeking a subsidy from the
clergy to support his wars, but so far in vain. He therefore set about
translations in order to recoup. When the news of this came to the (Merci-
less) parliament, grave discussions took place over so much money leaving
the realm. However, the clergy would not gainsay the pope, and the opposi-
tion collapsed. It is certainly true that the translations made on 3 April were
known before the end of the parliament, although the bulls themselves had
not arrived.61 The obstacle to Favent's interpretation is, however, that Urban
made all the translations at once, and the nature of almost all of these
indicates plainly that he was fully informed as to what was required by the
magnates. One cannot accept that Urban VI initiated the translations, but
the question of whether he looked to the financial implications of the transla-
tions to compensate for the subsidy is less easy to resolve and must be
examined in the light of other evidence.
The monk of Westminster gives what seems a more straightforward ver-
sion of the events which Favent was trying to gloss, but still does not entirely
clarify the matter. He too places the discussions in the second session of the
Merciless Parliament, that is, when the translations were heard of, rather
than when the arrangements had actually been made, that is, sometime
before 3 April. He agrees that there were serious discussions in parliament
about the flow of money to the Curia but, contrary to Favent, he attributes
these specifically to the pope's demand for a clerical subsidy.62 In the end, he
reports:
illi de parliamento hoc sagaciter advertentes ordinarunt quod faceret translationes
episcoporum, videlicet Elyensem ad Eboracensem, Dunelmensem ad Eliensem,
Bathoniensem ad Dunelmensem et Salesburyensem ad Bathoniensem ecclesias
concederet pertransire, et dominum Johannem Waltham clericum privati sigilli in
Sarum episcopum confirmaret.
The list of bishops is headed, it will be noted, by Arundel's translation to

York. Like Favent, the monk of Westminster has distinguished between
Neville's translation and the rest, but one can perhaps attribute this merely
to his particular concern for the financial implications of these latter transla-
tions. Furthermore, he goes on to say that the pope agreed to the "request"
and translated Neville to St. Andrew's. He thus draws the series together as
being all of a piece and all initiated from England. Most important is his
statement that the parliament wanted the pope to "agree" and "concede" to
60
Favent, p . 22; cf. Historia Anglicana, 2:179.
61
Rot. Part., 3:250; A r u n d e l est ore translate.
62
Polychronicon, 9:178-9.
the translations. His statement and the character of the appointments

confirm that the magnates, not the pope, initiated the translations. Favent's
extreme gloss on the events will not do, but certain other points still need
answering. Given that the monk of Westminster is wrong to imply that the
translations were first mooted in the second session of the parliament, to
what exLent had the Commons known earlier of the Appellants' plans?
Furthermore, the questions still remain, why and on what terms did the
pope agree?
Professor Perroy glossed the monk of Westminster's reference to mean
that the magnates informed the pope that the levy of the subsidy would not
be authorized so long as the translations they wanted were not made.63
Although, as Professor W. E. Lunt said, the reference does not bear this
interpretation explicitly, it is not easy to see what else it could mean. But
although Urban VI tried again for the subsidy as early as 9 March 1389 this
does not mean necessarily that he had been promised it as well as the
handsome "services" from the recent translations. He now referred to the
requested subsidy as being "charitable" in nature, whereas it had hitherto
always been referred to as mandatory. This might imply that the pope was
now so confident of having the subsidy as to be able to drop his coercive
tone. However, Professor Lunt dismissed such a distinction as being of no
significance, and he was probably correct, because Urban VI made it quite
clear that he was still referring to the levy which had been in question since
1386. If he had made any agreement with the Appellants to forego it, he was
now clearly breaking his word.
The final piece of evidence to note is a petition and royal response in the
Merciless Parliament, to which Richard II made reference when prohibiting
the collection of the papal subsidy in October 1389. This petition called
attention to papal taxes "raised or to be raised in aid of . . . the pope, both by
reason of papal bulls called volumus et imponimus, and by reason of transla-
tions of bishops. . . ." It sought action against any who brought in bulls for
the levy of such an imposition or for any "novelty . . . which can turn to the
damage of the king or the realm," and against anyone publishing such
impositions or novelties, or trying to put them into effect. The royal re-
sponse, dictated by the Appellants, declared that the king wanted no imposi-
tion levied "to the charge or hurt of his lieges or of his realm." On the
second point, he would send to the pope to "attempt no novelty in the realm
henceforth." There was no reference to translations.64
This seems to bear out in part both Favent and the monk of Westminster.
Evidently there was indeed hostile comment about the translations, as Favent
says, which, significantly, the lords controlling the government sought to
63
L'Anglelerre, p. 305. He argued, further, that the Appellants then betrayed the pope in the
Cambridge Parliament by forbidding the export of specie from the realm. Dr. Tuck, however,
has shown that this is quite untrue, the prohibition being requested in general terms by the
Commons but apparently not agreed to in practice by the government; EHR 84 (1969), 229.
et
Rot. Part., 3:246-7.
ignore in their response. But there was yet greater concern about the
subsidy, as the monk said, and it is worth noticing the willingness of the
government in its response, although couched in terms which gave room for
wide interpretation, to sympathize with critics of this subsidy. If they had
made any promises to the pope that he could have the subsidy, they were
playing a dangerous double game with him and their supporters amongst
the Commons, a necessary game perhaps, but an unlikely one. Rather than
suppose that they made any definite promises, one might prefer with Profes-
sor Perroy to guess that, if anything, they only warned the pope that he
could not hope to have the subsidy if he did not meet their wishes in the
matter of the appointments. The longstanding problem of clerical taxation
probably came no nearer solution. The Appellants might well have dropped
diplomatic hints to the pope, but it is unlikely that any bargain was struck.
Can one then construct an hypothesis as to how the appointments were
made? All certainly were formally promulgated on 3 April at the behest of
the magnates. These latter must, therefore, even supposing the pope to have
been entirely co-operative, have sent their request or demand to the Curia
no later than the middle of February. Even if negotiations had begun very
much earlier, and such seems unlikely, their initial proposals to the pope
cannot have been much open to debate or dissent. They did not have the
time for lengthy bargaining, nor, before parliament had begun, could diey
have been sufficiently sure of their position to impose stern conditions on
the pope. The latter, for his part, would hardly have agreed to their requests
before being sure of their influence in England. There may have been some
reference to the subsidy, perhaps deliberately vague, by one party or the
other, but it seems unlikely that any formal pact could have been agreed.
Given the reactions in parliament when the news of these translations
reached England, it seems unlikely that they had been discussed previously
or initiated in the first session before Easter. On this point the monk of
Westminster is outweighed by Favent's need to admit to concern in parlia-
ment and by the enrolled petition. But it is notable that the petition, having
referred to the translations, devoted itself more to subsidies. The Commons
were of course aware that the clergy were supposed to have raised a twen-
tieth for the pope by 24 June, and would by then be over two years behind
in its payment. Presumably they accepted the translations with what grace
they could and gave their attention to preventing any further clerical pay-
ments to the pope. In the Cambridge Parliament, in September 1388, they
were to ask, as has been said, for reimposed restrictions on the export of
specie: this the lords failed to concede.
Clerical contributions to taxation were always a delicate subject, and one
that had frequently caused disquiet amongst the Commons in recent years.
Besides, the Appellants were bent on keeping expenditure and taxation
down. Yet they could not be sure of positive papal support if the Commons
forced them to block the subsidy. This apparently is exactly what the Com-
mons sought to do in both parliaments in 1388. Such considerations natur-
ally raise again the suggestion that the series of translations was, in part at
least, deliberately extended to allow the Curia to profit from substantial
"services," and thereby, with the pope's approval, to keep the clergy free to
contribute to domestic rather than papal taxes. Urban fell into line with the
proposed translations willingly enough. But is it really possible that he would
surrender a subsidy to which he was canonically entitled in exchange for
services which were also rightfully his in any case? Certainly, in 1389 he
continued to seek the subsidy. It is true that the monk of Westminster linked
the concern in parliament over the subsidy with the decision over the
translations, but he does not explicitly make the two contingent on one
another, and in any case he clearly confused the events of the two sessions.
Furthermore, the nature of the appointments does not suggest convincingly
any artificial extension of the series, and, again, the time available before 3
April seems too short to allow of the delicate negotiations which would
necessarily precede such a scheme.
The idea of a bargain on such lines seems also to be disproved if one
examines the sums involved. Urban VI had called for his subsidy, a twen-
tieth, on 25 March 1386, and the question had hung over the English church
ever since. Payment had now been fixed yet again for 24 June 1388, but,
principally because of rival claims by the Crown, the clergy had not even
formally agreed amongst themselves to collect it. What was it worth to the
pope? In 1376, a papal demand for 60,000 florins, when met by the imposi-
tion of a twentieth, had produced (after much coaxing) something over
£ 10,000 or, by the papal collector's calculations, a highly satisfactory 67,000
florins. By comparison, the translations and appointments emanating in
1388 from the vacancies at York and Chichester involved theoretical obliga-
tions to the papacy in "common services" of 36,600 florins.65 Clearly, if
Urban VI did accept a proposal offering the services in lieu of a subsidy, he
was reconciling himself to a reduction of almost half in his income, and
surely too great a reduction to make the scheme really credible.66 The
Appellants were not in a position to force him to accept so poor an alterna-
tive, and, furthermore, the attitudes of both Crown and papacy in 1389
really tend to bear out the conclusion that there was no such bargain.
Certainly, if there was, neither side kept to it. One has still to keep open the
65
W. E. L u n t , Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, 1327-1534 ( C a m b r i d g e , Mass.,
1962), p p . 108-12, 114-16. Some m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the facts a n d chronology of the events of
this time u n d e r m i n e s the contribution of J . Favier, Les Finances Pontificates a t'Epoque du Grand
Schisme d'Occident (Paris, 1966), p . 376.
66
Professor Lunt (ut supra, p . 828) estimated, in fact, that some 31,300 florins were eventually
paid in respect of these services, by c o n t e m p o r a r y s t a n d a r d s a not unsatisfactory p r o p o r t i o n a n d
perhaps more than the p o p e could realistically count u p o n if h e did weigh u p the probable
income from such translations against that from a subsidy. T h e p a y m e n t s of the services d u e to
both the p o p e a n d the cardinals were p u t in h a n d very p r o m p t l y in 1388. A l t h o u g h there were,
as so often, some problems over these dues, such were in no way the result of any action on the
part of the English g o v e r n m e n t ; ibid., p p . 7 3 2 - 3 (Bath & Wells), 7 3 4 - 7 (Ely), 7 5 0 - 2 (Salisbury),
756-9 (York), 7 6 0 - 1 ( D u r h a m ) .
possibility that the pope deliberately insisted on overextending the series of
translations as his price for making them at all, the subsidy quite apart. The
nature of each appointment may throw light on this. Otherwise, it seems
most probable that the series of translations, arranged between magnates
and pope before Easter, surprised the Commons, who were roused thereby
to seek further assurances that the pending subsidy would continue to be
obstructed. And if the Commons really knew little about the translations
before their public announcement, this would serve to make Favent's excusa-
tion easier to effect when he tried to transfer the responsibility to the pope.
To turn to the translations themselves. There were really several proce-
dures involved. The translation of Neville to a nominal see outside the realm
was unprecedented in 1388, and, as such, must in itself have cost the
Appellants much effort in the Roman Curia. The device was only ever twice
again repeated. In 1397 Arundel himself was so dealt with, probably as a
deliberate repetition of Neville's treatment in 1388, the same "titular" see
being in fact used. In 1399 Thomas Merk, bishop of Carlisle, was only-
intended to go the same way after his repeated refusal to accept the Lancas-
trian dynasty. In 1399 the use of translation in this way was, therefore,
exceptional, and Roger Walden, who had replaced Arundel at Canterbury in
1397, and was now, in his turn, deprived, was left without such a titular
diocese, although his ordo as a bishop was not (and could not be) denied.
Much later (in Henry VI's reign) Cardinal Henry Beaufort, despite several
squalls, was never eased out of his see of Winchester. During the civil strife
of the fifteenth century the tactic was not employed, nor apparently was any
approach even made to the pope. Such translations, then, were a peculiar
and sharp weapon used only on this one occasion, the translation of Neville
and its aftermath.
A series of moves of deserving men into more important sees cannot be
criticised validly a priori, although the unfortunate concomitant of heavy
payments of servitia communia to Rome by each in-coming bishop could and
did cause complaint. The vacancy of an archbishopric has virtually always
since this time led to at least one, and probably two, subsequent episcopal
changes.67 The keenest interest in 1388 is in the motivation behind the
promotions and in what would appear to have been demotions within the
English episcopate as such. As to the first of these points, the contrast
between political and ecclesiastical motives is by no means as clear as critics
have imagined. It goes without saying that those promoted to the greatest
bishoprics had to be politically acceptable to the Crown. But was it only
67
Since 1388 only Roger Walden (1398), Thomas Cranmer (1533), Reginald Pole (1535),
Matthew Parker (1559) and William Sancroft (1678) have been promoted immediately to the
archdiocese, at least two of these in unusual circumstances. At York Edward Lee (1531) and
John Sharpe (1691), the latter again for curious reasons, have had the only immediate appoint-
ments since that of Neville. In 1375 the vacancy at Canterbury had provoked four appoint-
ments, all logical. In 1443 it was mooted that there might be three, and in 1408 there were,
following Henry Bowet's promotion from Bath & Wells to York.
political considerations which carried weight in a particular case? Of course
one can produce scores of instances of bishops promoted in the later medi-
eval period for services to the Crown, but this is something different from
political motivation in any strict sense. Moreover, the list of men promoted
who were either a priori or in practice indifferent to their episcopal respon-
sibilities is a very small one indeed. Finally, it is well nigh impossible to assert
on any occasion that a "better" candidate was passed over, since so many
criteria applied and our knowledge of an individual's standing or personal
inclinations (so often forgotten) is so fragmentary.
However, it is really the second aspect—demotion within the bench —
which is most unusual and interesting. In 1398 the pope, moved by John of
Gaunt if not perhaps by the king, would have translated John Buckingham
from Lincoln to Coventry and Lichfield, not for political reasons but for
convenience, to make room for Gaunt's second illegitimate son, Henry
Beaufort.68 At about the same time Bishop Erghum of Bath and Wells
expressed private fears that Richard Clifford, the keeper of the privy seal,
was intriguing for the bishop's removal in his own favor.69 But there is no
other attestable instance apart from Buckingham's in the medieval period in
England of a demotion within the bench for any reason, even that of old
age, far less of political legerdemain.70 Thus the translation of John Ford-
ham, enshrined in Tout's famous phrase, "from the fleshpots of Durham to
the more meagre temporalities of Ely," seems to be the move in the series
which is of greatest interest, albeit, as indicated, not of much significance as a
precedent.
However, one can only assess the overall situation by dealing with each
individual in turn. Neville therefore requires the first consideration. After
his flight north in November 1387, he had been captured in June 1388 and
kept in custody by the mayor of Newcastle until 28 November, when he
escaped and fled into the Low Countries.71 In the accusations flung in the
Merciless Parliament his name loomed large, partly because, given due
precedence, his name headed the list of the accused. On 11 February 1388
he was declared in absentia guilty of treason and his temporalities were
declared forfeit, but out of respect for his order he was not sentenced to
death as were his fellow traitors. The church, as noted earlier, was left
(officially) to work out his fate as an ecclesiastic.72 He was not brought south
after his apprehension in June, and, whilst it would be far-fetched to suggest
68
Cf. R. G. Davies, Journal of Medieval History 1 (1975), 3 4 5 - 5 3 .
69
Cf. ibid., pp. 207-8.
70
To judge from the Handbook of British Chronology, there are unlikely to be more than a
handful of possibilities since the Reformation.
71
For these events and his subsequent fortunes, cf. G. S. Haslop, "Two Entries from the
Register of [ohn de Shirburn, abbot of Selby, 1369-1408," Yorkshire Archaeological journal 41
(1963-6), 287-96; R. G. Davies, "Alexander Neville, archbishop of York, 1374-1388," ibid., 46
(1975).
72
Polychromcon, 9 : 1 4 8 , 166.
that his escape was connived at, conceivably the government, coming again
under the king's influence, was not too unhappy at his successful flight into
exile.
York, then, was the catalytic vacancy.73 It went to Arundel. One need
mention only briefly the steps in his rise to prominence.74 He had been a
diligent bishop of Ely, but, although this may have enhanced his claim,
clearly he was obtaining a reward for his political contribution to the Appel-
lants' cause. His participation in the opposition to the Crown must be
credited to intellectual convictions as well as personal loyalties on his part,
but it can scarcely be doubted that he was brought into prominence by his
brother, and no matter how far one attempts to distinguish between their
attitudes and to retain for the bishop a semblance of moderation and the
role of mediator, his ultimate allegiance can never have been in doubt.
Presumably he knew well that in practical terms little good would come of
displacing Richard II, and that some attempt had to be made to work with or
through him. Even so, in 1386, for example, he had aligned himself firmly
with the duke of Gloucester in speaking toughly to the king, probably in fact
overstepping what would have been a politic line.75 And it is difficult to
believe that he was not an important contributor in his own right to the
political theories which they voiced to the king on that occasion.76
To be fair, one should note what signs there are of his increasing stature
in the years before. In the parliament of October 1377 he was included in
the lords' committee for intercommuning with the Commons.77 After the
Peasants' Revolt he was on the commission of inquiry into the conduct of the
government.78 Between then and 1386 his chief public appearance had been
in 1385 to sue for the restitution to Bishop Henry Despenser of the tem-
poralities of the see of Norwich, which had been confiscated by the Crown
after the bishop's disastrous "crusade" into Flanders in 1383. He won a
striking victory over De la Pole, who questioned this, but even then it was by
a sharp retort which might better have been left unsaid.7" All this hardly
adds up to a great deal, and many bishops could offer as much. His assump-
73
It involved certain arrangements whilst Arundel's translation was being c:ompleted. After
11 February 1388 the temporalities were in the hands of the Crown, which therefore made
presentations to benefices. However, in theory, sede vacante arrangements could not be made for
the spiritualities, and Richard Coningstone, the official of York, acted as vicar-general in March
1388. By whom he had been appointed is not clear, for as late as 24 October 1387 Robert
Dalton had been employed by Neville in this capacity. However, on 1 July 1388 Thomas
Walworth was referred to as keeper of the spiritualities sede vacante, presumably after receipt of
the bulls of Neville's translation.
74
For details, see, of course, M. E. Aston, Thomas Arundel, especially Chapters 5, 9 and 12.
75
Chronicon Henrici Knighton, 2:215-6, 219.
76
I owe a particular debt to Dr. J. A. Tuck for drawing my attention to this interesting
problem of the nature and inspiration of the political theory expounded by the critics of the
Crown at this time, and the possibility of Arundel's particular contribution to it.
77
Rot. Part, 3:3.
78
Ibid., 3:100-1.
79
Histona Anglicana, 2:141.
tion of the chancellorship in October 1386 was a much more emotionally-
charged event than the simultaneous changes of the other great officers.
During 1387 and 1388 he seems certainly to have tried to temper passions,
but this does not mean that he had any reservations about the case against
the king's friends which his brother and the other Appellants were bringing;
merely a growing tactical expertise in achieving results in the face of the
king's opposition. Thus one might differ in emphasis a little from Mrs.
Aston, and think of Arundel's moderation as being over means rather than
ends. The king may well have recognized that here was a man who pre-
ferred to circumvent a confrontation where possible, but in the end, without
a doubt, Richard could have harbored few illusions about his "mediation"
and "moderation."
Therefore, whilst it is true that York got a good archbishop, certainly a
better than Neville, and that this may well have improved the look of the
.affair, Arundel's claim to the see, whilst it could be rationalized on pastoral
and administrative grounds, was fundamentally a political one. As always,
alternative stronger candidates are difficult to identify, and perhaps, indeed,
there were few, but in this case a debate on such terms seems well beside the
point.
To fill Ely Fordham was moved from Durham, a curious move, especially
if Arundel (as is probable) had strong influence in the matter of his own
successor. He must have trusted Fordham to carry on his own good work in
Ely, yet wanted him out of Durham. Tout's contrast of the "fleshpots" of
Durham with the "more meagre" temporalities of Ely has been followed by
subsequent historians.80 Yet certain points demand notice. Whilst Durham
was great in prestige, honorial status and privileges, and wealth, Ely was also
an exceedingly eligible bishopric. If one had to postulate a "pecking order,"
it could hardly rank lower than fifth amongst English sees, bearing in mind
its income, its small and compact size, its relative freedom from violence and
disorder, its manor at Hatfield and easy communication with the capital.81
Then again, the architectural and geographical splendors of the Durham
diocese might scarcely be appreciated by someone trying to administer that
area, provide justice, and ward off the Scots and English raiders. Clergy
were in short supply and parishes sprawling. The revenues of the cathedral
fell by half in the period 1300-1450, and some sources could never be
guaranteed at all. There is no reason to suppose that the episcopal revenues
80
Chapters, 3:436. H o w e v e r , cf. A. H . T h o m p s o n , The English Clergy and their Organization in
the Later Middle Ages (Oxford, 1947), p. 14, who more cautiously called Ely "wealthy but less
important," and indicates that Durham may have been regarded by the Appellants as present-
ing peculiar problems.
81
In terms of wealth for size only Canterbury could compete with it, and there the adminis-
trative responsibilities and expenses were, of course, immeasurably greater. "Meagre " cannot be
applied to Ely by any stretch of the imagination, and "more meagre" gives a very misleading
impression when both sees were so wealthy in absolute terms. Henry VI remarked in 1437 that
"of all the other greater sees of our realm (Ely) has least of spiritual cure."
fared any better. Being bishop of Durham was expensive and very hard
work, with difficult travel both internally and to and from the capital,
whereas Ely was probably the easiest of all English bishoprics to administer.
Certainly one must not exaggerate. Durham remained much the greater of
the two, and its distinctive secular authority makes any direct comparison
difficult, but quite certainly a move to Ely, just about the least demotion
possible on the bench, had advantages as well as disadvantages, especially
when in addition one was, like Fordham, a native of the diocese. One surely
cannot assume that this last factor made the translation a joyous homecom-
ing, but it does seem a consideration which must be taken into account.
Of the several contemporary chroniclers, those who mention Fordham's
translation and/or the others do so in the baldest factual terms. Having
referred to Neville paying the price for his sins, it is curious that nothing
should have been said by anyone about the treatment of Fordham, especially
as a demotion would have been literally unprecedented.82 An example is the
continuation of the Historia Eliensis which gives no reasons for the transla-
tion. Yet Henry Wharton glossed this reference with the remark that Ford-
ham was descendere coactus by the Appellants.83
The chroniclers are curious in other ways. Walsingham, writing with
hindsight of Fordham's dismissal from the treasurership in October 1386,
said ambiguously, "he had worked hard and incurred expense, for love of
this dignity." He went on to characterize his replacement, John Gilbert, in
scathing terms.84 Walsingham's opinions are notoriously personal and un-
trustworthy, but it is notable nonetheless that he could combine warm sup-
port for Arundel's entry into the office of chancellor with criticism of the
successor to Fordham, who was being dismissed from another office in the
same motion. Favent is even more striking. On several critical occasions,
although "for a political propagandist . . . remarkably accurate" (M.
McKisack), he omits altogether to mention Fordham. Thus in October 1386
Fordham's dismissal is ignored. At Nottingham in 1387, as witnesses to the
judges' declaration, Favent names Neville, Rushook and Swaffham, but not
Fordham. When before the Merciless Parliament the royal household was
purged on a large scale, and a long list is given, Fordham's name (and
Rushook's, too, in fact) is omitted.85 Yet otherwise the bishops involved are
recorded fully. Since Favent would have it that the pope was the instigator of
82
Only ten other bishops have ever left Durham; six for York, four for Winchester. Fordham
was the first bishop to be translated from Durham. Only six have ever left Ely; three for
Canterbury, one for York, two for Winchester. This brings out clearly how similarly these two
have been regarded by comparison with the rest of the bench.
s3
Anglia Sacra, ed. H. Wharton (London, 1691), 1:666.
84
Historia Anglicana, 2:152. One cannot be sure whether the chronicler meant that Fordham
devoted himself with fidelity and personal sacrifice to the duties of the office or that he had
intrigued and disbursed money in order to gain it in the first place.
85
F a v e n t , p p . 1 3 - 1 4 . P r e s u m a b l y they w e r e i n c l u d e d a s alii vero plures, prout eorum famuli
ceterique inutiles et inanes pro vacabundis reiecti.
the translations, it cannot be expected that he would comment on any of
them. Nonetheless, he lets Fordham off more than lightly.
The monk of Westminster takes Fordham in his stride, casting neither
blame nor praise. He blamed him for the English defeat at the Battle of
Otterburn in August 1388, although he made little of it.86 Finally, Fordham's
own movements betray little anxiety. After his dismissal from the treasurer-
ship he remained with the court apparently, although evidence is thin.
Certainly he was at Nottingham, and certainly also he was ordered from the
court early in 1388. He came freely into the parliament, and made his
protestation with the rest of the prelates against participation in judgments
of blood. His name was not raised in any hostile fashion.
As has been noted, northern lords were instructed on occasion in the
thirteen-eighties to be vigilant against the Scots, once more on the upsurge,
and Fordham had played his part with the rest. On 26 March 1388 he, John,
lord Neville of Raby, and the earl of Northumberland were appointed to
treat with the Scots, but during the second session of parliament were
instructed to go to the March to face a clear physical threat. Fordham duly
went north. Thus there seems no sign of disfavor or distrust. However, in
August 1388 the earl of Northumberland's son, Henry Hotspur, apparently
through his own rashness, plunged into battle and was captured, whilst
Fordham refrained from bringing up reinforcements. The monk of
Westminster, as has been said, blamed the bishop for the defeat, as no doubt
did the Percies. However, the aftermath, the driving off of the Scots, left
Fordham very late for the Cambridge Parliament, and he did not arrive until
27 September, to find his bulls of translation waiting for him. These he
presented on the same day, receiving spiritualities and temporalities forth-
with. Skirlaw had in fact sued out his writs for Durham a fortnight earlier,
and later, on 31 July 1389, Fordham secured a back-dating of the tem-
poralities of Ely to cover that period.87 There seems no friction or obstruc-
tion on any side to his smooth translation.
Obviously Fordham's inactivity at Otterburn could not have led directly to
his removal, but it is perhaps feasible that his failure to work with Hotspur
on that occasion symbolized some estrangement between himself, so obvi-
ously a royal lieutenant, and the Percies. Both his reluctance to act and the
ensuing recrimination suggest that, if there was no open hostility, there was
little affection between them. Possibly, therefore, the Percies may have
played at least some part in his removal, as part of their price for supporting
the Appellants. In more general terms, however, the Appellants perhaps
had doubts about Fordham as bishop of Durham, either in respect of his
abilities as such or because of his past association with the court, and felt that
he should be given a place lacking the strategic importance and secular
responsibilities of Durham, but without too drastic a cut in income. Coupled
86
Polychronicon, 9 : 1 8 5 - 6 .
87
Cambridge, University Library: Reg. Fordham (Ely), fol. 1; CPR, 1385-9, 510; 1388-92, 91.
with the happy accident of Fordham's native diocese falling free (and why
should he have even Ely, if he was really in disgrace?), the Appellants may
have proposed rather than insisted on the move. Fordham himself was
perhaps content enough. What, indeed, tends to the same conclusion is that
he made no political or administrative comeback in the following years. Had
he really been demoted on the king's account, one might have expected that
Richard II, a loyal friend to those who had suffered for him, would have
called him back, at least after 1397.88 In fact, Fordham did not participate
much in parliaments or convocations until after 1399. Then, for a quarter of
a century he played a quiet part befitting an elder of the bench. It is possible
that for all his services to the court he was finally found wanting as an
administrator. He should perhaps be regarded as one who had served his
patrons to the best of his ability, had to be removed when they were
disgraced politically, but was personally regarded as inoffensive. In conclu-
sion, his move to Ely cannot happily be regarded as a punitive demotion,
particularly for political reasons.
Skirlaw's move north to Durham can be dealt with more briefly, although
this has also raised some doubts. Tout's view, which is usually followed with
varying emphases, is that Skirlaw, partly because the king backed Medford
in opposition to him for Bath and Wells, partly because, ambitiously seeking
an even richer see, he saw which way the wind was blowing politically, moved
or switched to the Appellants, and duly had his reward. Some historians
have charitably added that conviction also might have led Skirlaw to support
the opponents of the court.
The bishop had had his professional origins at York, and in recent years
had been placed uneasily between Neville, an old friend and patron, and the
Ravenser-Waltham connection, through whom perhaps he came into royal
service, and whose friendship he still retained. He had not opted for one or
the other in 1386, so one can hardly place him politically from such private
considerations.
The idea of a change of allegiance in 1386 seems superfluous. There is a
necessary distinction between administrator and politician and, like Ford-
ham, Skirlaw seems to have faced no recriminations when he resigned his
office in October 1386. Indeed, the opposition aimed principally in the
following months at bringing Richard II to work through these principal
seals; for, even in Skirlaw's hands, the privy seal had not been used for more
personal or political (and therefore controversial) business. Skirlaw had not
resigned the privy seal after his first translation. Moreover, his translation to
Bath and Wells seems to have been given effect with the approval of the
court, and not in defiance of it.89 Whilst there was no reason for the keeper
88
With Richard II asking for A l e x a n d e r Neville to be allowed to r e t u r n in 1392, it is difficult
to a r g u e that the king d a r e d n o t make overtures to h i m to pick u p his career, as h e did to
Richard Medford, his secretary. H e was still in his p r i m e .
89
F o r details of t h e episcopal a p p o i n t m e n t s of 1385—6, in which the king's intentions a p p e a r
at least to have been contested, cf. R. G. Davies, Ph.D. thesis, p p . 8 4 - 9 5 .
of the privy seal to resign office if (as was frequent) he obtained episcopal
promotion, it was very often the case, for whatever reasons, that he did so.
The timing of Skirlaw's resignation is certainly noteworthy, but, as has been
said, he was not formally attacked in the Wonderful Parliament, as were
Suffolk and Fordham, and his resignation may well not have had such
political significance as might at first sight appear.
The committee appointed on 1 January 1388 to watch over the king seems
to have been a moderate body, and Skirlaw need have been no exception.
He seems in fact to have been out of the capital during most of the events of
this time. If the Appellants wanted partisans, it seems strange that they
should have had to use so recent a convert. The most reasonable interpreta-
tion of Skirlaw's role seems to be to dissociate him from political consid-
erations, and, like Fordham, to see him as a professional administrator,
whose office-holding had to end when the curialist regime came under fire,
but whose expertise, in particular his developing and unrivalled diplomatic
skills, was important if government was to be improved by the opposition
magnates.
However, unlike Fordham, where one must argue from relative silence, it
is Skirlaw's active career into the thirteen-nineties, curtailed only by age,
which suggests that he maintained a respected position throughout all these
vicissitudes. Yet, in 1388 his diplomatic expertise was still of relatively recent
recognition, and the heavy activity of the next few years need not have been
foreseen. In any case, one must bear in mind the importance attached to
Durham itself. In absolute terms Skirlaw did attend to Durham as much as
he could, and with increasing concern. He was a natural choice for the see,
very much in line with his predecessors. Bearing in mind that the Appellants
were not omnipotent in 1388 and in fact represented conservative inclina-
tions for visible order and stability (albeit with a strong dash of self-interest),
Skirlaw was the obvious choice to replace Fordham. Gilbert, it seems, wanted
to stay in the west and was getting old. Braybrooke was not a successful
administrator, still had awkward identification with the court and may not
have wanted to leave London in any case. John Waltham was a possible
contender, certainly, but may have been explicitly required for further
services in central government, where senior personnel were arguably in
short supply and where he was putting through important reforms. There is
a natural tendency to look for political motivation, but here in Durham, in
fact, seems a bishop who can only with imagination be credited with nimble
sail-trimming, and whose role is better considered as one of administrative
acceptability.
To fill Bath and Wells Ralph Erghum — first, last, and always a Lancas-
trian adherent— moved west from Salisbury. Was this a demotion? Doubts
arise, partly because the sees of Salisbury and Bath and Wells cannot be
differentiated in terms of rank, and partly because there is no obvious
reason why Erghum should have been moved at all. No contemporaries and
few historians have given any sort of opinion on the question. Clearly there
was little to choose between the two bishoprics. Between 1366 and the
Reformation bishops left Bath and Wells only for Canterbury, York,
Durham (2) and Ely. In that period bishops of Salisbury went to Canterbury,
Winchester, Durham and Bath and Wells (2). Both, then, were very substan-
tial, well-placed in the episcopal hierarchy just a little behind the greatest
sees. Curiously there were three cases in fifty-five years of proposed transla-
tions from Salisbury to Bath and Wells: in 1388, in 1408, when Nicholas
Bubwith was moved, and in 1443, when William Aiscough, Henry VFs
ill-fated confessor, was offered Bath and Wells but declined. Unfortunately,
Bubwith's case is no more decisive than Erghum's, and, in fact, was probably
an adjustment rather than either promotion or demotion. Aiscough's case
shows only that he and the government could differ over the relative attrac-
tions of the two sees.
The idea of a straight demotion of Erghum can be ruled out, in part
because the earl of Derby (John of Gaunt's son) would surely have objected,
in part because the sees really were too similar. Moreover, Erghum had not
been involved in politics for over a decade, although unpopular on Gaunt's
behalf in 1377. He had lived in his diocese and been quite conscientious, but
conducted a truly ferocious quarrel with the cathedral chapter. This was
fully maintained by Waltham, with whom Erghum significantly seems to
have been on good terms, particularly in offering his support in this feud
with the chapter. Whatever prestige Salisbury had was closely related to the
cathedral, so it was rather less attractive to a bishop on these grounds at this
time. Bath and Wells, however, turned out to be in some financial straits,
and Erghum had to retrench. He was a strong family man, with a widowed
sister as permanent companion, and several young kinsmen to support; he
even brought his parents' bodies for reburial in Wells, suggesting that he
intended very much to make this his final home. He began to ail in the early
thirteen-nineties, and it is possible that he was feeling old in 1388 and
frustrated with Salisbury. If the Appellants wanted to move a bishop or two
around to satisfy the pope financially, and Favent at least admitted that some
in parliament thought there were such shufflings, Erghum was in a position
to be moved without undue inconvenience, apart from the burden of the
first-fruits.
This would fit in very well indeed with the Appellants' apparent anxiety to
award the vacancy which they had created on the bench to John Waltham.
They would not want him to have a poor bishopric — indeed his plurality of
benefices would have made him reluctant to accept such a promotion — , so
could not let the sequence of promotions extend into lesser sees. Waltham
therefore had Salisbury. The complaints in parliament of unnecessary com-
plications seem here to have some justification. At best, some personal
inclination of the bishop of Salisbury was being met. At worst, the pope was
blatantly selling his services to the government or, to put it the other way,
they were paying a high sum for his favor. Erghum missed the second
session of the Merciless Parliament which suggests that he was tidying up in
Salisbury and knew that his translation was being proposed. At all events, it
is most unlikely that Waltham's promotion was an independent idea mooted
by Urban VI.
In 1392 Waltham was slandered as "the most suspect person in England in
respect of breaking the Statute" of Provisors.90 Certainly, his promotion to
Salisbury was the climax to a steady accumulation of preferments, for the
new bishop was no meteor in the political firmament. He was a member of
the Ravenser-Waltham family, which dominated the royal chancery, and
thus a kinsman of John Thoresby, archbishop of York (1352-74). Possibly he
had served the archbishop in his younger days (he did not go to university)
and would certainly have known Skirlaw fairly well. By 1374 he was serving
Edward III as a chancery clerk, and perhaps it was on Thoresby's death that
he had been taken up by his Ravenser uncles.91 On 8 September 1381 he was
appointed keeper of the rolls of chancery, a post he retained until 24
October 1386, when he succeeded Skirlaw as keeper of the privy seal during
the Wonderful Parliament. During his five years as keeper of the rolls he
had been a receiver of petitions in parliament many times and probably
received more proctorial commissions to parliament than any contemporary.
In March 1383 he had had temporary custody of the great seal before the
appointment of Sir Michael de la Pole. Clearly then, his promotion to the
privy seal was quite predictable, and probably many in parliament could feel
confident from past experience of his ability. He was an experienced and
well-known innovator in chancery procedure, but aimed at chancery ef-
ficiency rather than at a change in its character.92 Thus his efforts had little
direct political overtone and were much appreciated by successive and op-
posed employers. What Tout meant by calling W7altham a "keen parliamen-
tarian" is not clear, but it is impossible to think of Waltham as some "fifth-
columnist" in the government circle.
Dr. Tuck has detected some friction in 1387 between Waltham and the
king.93 Moreover, Waltham's uncle, Richard Ravenser, with whom he was
very close, had regarded Archbishop Neville as his '"mortal enemy."94 On the
other hand, before aligning Waltham against the archbishop on personal
grounds, one should recall that he had been Neville's regular proctor in
parliaments in preceding years. Yet, even supposing Neville came to think
badly of him because of the quarrel with his kinsmen, or that he offended
the king in 1387, this only makes the more striking the very warm favor
which Richard II showed towards him in the following years, when Waltham
90
J. F. Baldwin, The King's Council in England during the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1913), pp.
489-90.
91
Cf. CPR, 1374-7, 86.
92
Chapters, 3 : 4 4 2 .
93
J . A. T u c k , " T h e Baronial O p p o s i t i o n to Richard I I . 1 3 7 7 - 8 9 , " u n p u b l i s h e d P h . D . thesis,
Cambridge, 1966, pp. 229, 231, 238-42.
"Memorials, of Beverle Minster: The Chapter Act Book, ed. A. F. Leach (Surtees Soc, 1898, 1903),
p. 220.
became generally unpopular as his efficiency accrued to the king's advan-
tage. Perhaps then he did seem a turncoat, but really he was a thorough-
going "civil servant," giving of his professional best to the government, no
matter who was his political master.
Sometime after October 1386 an official letter was written to the pope on
Waltham's behalf in glowing terms.95 This presumably was the work of the
parliamentary commissioners. Waltham did well financially from the forfei-
tures of 1388 but not on any large scale.96 It seems most probable that his
eligibility for episcopacy was already regarded as proven before the dramatic
events of 1388, and that when the Appellants came to consider whom they
might appoint to fill the vacancy on the bench which they had so strikingly
created by the removal of Neville, Waltham was the obvious person to
promote in order to emphasise the responsibility of their attitude towards
the church, even though they had had to take political action against certain
of its leaders. The bishop's appointment to Salisbury was put through very
promptly during the Cambridge Parliament, for the temporalities (as to all
the new appointees there present) were restored on 13 September, the
spiritualities the next day. On 20 September in Barnwell Priory a glittering
assembly, headed by Richard II, watched Archbishop Courtenay, supported
by Wykeham and Braybrooke, perform Waltham's consecration.97
Thus the sequence was completed. Undoubtedly secular motives dictated
the whole, but in retrospect it seems that the moves were not so politically-
charged as might appear. The drama of ejecting an archbishop (Neville) and
the subsequent decision to remove another bishop (Rushook) in similar
fashion were not followed by any major upheaval or blow to the standing of
the episcopate. Neither prelate could have expected to survive, and little else
was done that was particularly striking. It is probable that the number of
changes could have been reduced if necessary, but there was nothing inher-
ently scandalous in any of them. The promotions were in fact conservative in
character, placing the customary priority on administrative competence.
Certainly they gave no lead to the remainder of the medieval period for
manipulation of the episcopate for partisan ends.
What then should be said of the bishops' involvement in the crisis? It must
be pointed out that anything short of complete acquiescence in the king's
personal wishes could still be construed in the fourteenth century as unjus-
tifiable disloyalty. Hence, as has often been remarked, it is, in general terms,
striking that the Appellants had so much support, even if much was only
tacit, for their very extreme opposition. But equally it is clear that many
leading men were increasingly uneasy about what was happening, the
bishops not least, and, in the end, for whatever reasons, the Appellants could
not sustain their position. Government was the king's. Within such limits and
*~* Diplomatic Correspondence of Richard II, ed. E. Perroy (Camden Soc, 3rd ser., XLVIII, 1933),
pp. 53-4. He may well have written it himself.
S6
CPR, 1385-9, 497; 1388-92, 157.
97
Reg. Courtenay, f'ols. 322-3; Salisbury, Diocesan Record Office: Reg. Waltham, fols. 3r-v.
constraints the episcopate showed themselves willing to intercede where they
could to temper extreme actions on either side. However, Archbishop Cour-
tenay, for example, who had shown in times past (before his election to the
primacy) that he was quite prepared to take up cudgels, chose this time to
avoid with care any involvement which could be construed as partisan,
apparently, indeed, stepping back from his more moderate participation in
1386. In consequence he seems to have played, at least publicly, an almost
disappointingly small part in the developing situation. Arguably, mediation
and moderation had already been tried in the preceding years and been
found wanting; the bishops' influence for compromise was overtaken by
events. Most of the other bishops followed Courtenay in this reticence, but,
even so, they could not as a body avoid actions on which partisan construc-
tions could be put. The appeal to canon law, for example, was no mere
pretext to avoid factional involvement but evidently brought the episcopate
into a position of embarrassment, if not of conflict, with the Appellants.
Their proper professional concern to uphold law on this difficult occasion
might be compared with the legitimate decision of the judges in favor of the
king, in spite of the dangerous political implications inherent in such a
verdict, in 1387, and their successors' reluctance in the Merciless Parliament
itself to give judicial approval to the modes of procedure which the Appel-
lants proposed to employ. On the other hand, the bishops' sentences of
excommunication at the end of the Merciless Parliament against opponents
of its measures implied at least some acquiescence in the opposition to the
king.
Did this formal reticence really only conceal active involvement on the part
of individuals, an involvement which the church could not control? Cer-
tainly, as has been said, Courtenay and many of his colleagues avoided such,
at times by some conscious effort. If the northern primate, Neville, was
inextricably involved, it was, it must be recalled, on the side of the king, and
his entry into the court circle had preceded the onset of open political
controversy. Nor was it easy, as the Appellants knew, to convict Neville or his
fellow-courtiers on specific charges of corruption or other crime. What
Neville counselled may have been disliked, but it was difficult to say that it
was inadmissible in strict legal or constitutional terms. The same is true of
Rushook, who, whilst subject to defamation of character, does not seem in
fact to have exceeded the customary role of confessor. As for bishops who
were involved specifically in 1386-88, it has been suggested that, with differ-
ent nuances, such men as Wykeham, Brantingham, Skirlaw, Fordham, Gil-
bert, Braybrooke and, below the rank of bishop, Waltham, all concerned
themselves, insofar as was possible, with aspects of government as opposed
to political issue. And, arguably, it was possible even at this time to distin-
guish between the role of administrator and that of politician. Only Arundel,
certainly, entered into the crisis in full knowledge of the political implica-
tions of his role, and he alone was to pay the price in the future for such
partisanship. Even in his case it might be argued that he first entered
ministerial office in 1386 when relatively more moderate political expedients
were being tried and, given his close kinship to a leading Appellant, his
further involvement was scarcely avoidable. But, more justifiably, a broader
view of Arundel's career suggests that, almost ironically, he was outstanding
amongst the episcopate even by 1386 in his diligence in diocesan affairs and
hitherto notably apolitical. From this time on he struggled with the rival
claims on his attention of an archdiocese and a necessary political involve-
ment.
But if nearly all the bishops had, then, tried to remain above faction, and,
when it came to a point of canonical rectitude, placed their responsibility as
bishops before private attitudes, the crisis still had its repercussions for them.
What did these entail? There had to be changes made to the bench, but such
were strictly by reason of one or two personal involvements with the court
and did not imply any general wish to dictate the structure of the episcopate
on political grounds. Such appointments as were then necessary by reason of
Neville's removal were made in the tradition of those made in more peaceful
times, and they implied no bargains struck for future partisan support. The
Appellants respected the position of the lords spiritual and protected it.
Presumably Arundel was indeed promoted by reason of his political connec-
tions, but superior candidates were not numerous, and there is much in his
earlier and later career to suggest that his advancement could have been
generally approved as respectable and promising. The Appellants needed
to retain general approval but could reasonably hope that the inevitable
charges of political nepotism in such a promotion would be tempered by the
character of the new archbishop. Fordham's demotion was scarcely drastic or
condemnatory, and Erghum's translation perhaps as welcome to himself as it
was financially to the pope. The promotions of Skirlaw and Waltham were
conservative and respectable enough, and did not imply political partisan-
ship.
It is noteworthy how easily the pope acquiesced in these arrangements in
which patently he had not been more than formally consulted and which
lacked the approval of the king, and this despite Richard II's eager and
apparently successful attempts in previous years to gain a personal un-
derstanding over episcopal appointments with the papacy. The pope needed
money, and this must have been on his mind when he agreed so readily to
the requests of the Appellants. But, in the end, it does not appear that he
"sold" the translations for the services which accrued or for the promise of a
subsidy. Nor were the appointments so scandalous as to impugn his own
integrity. Indeed, the promotions were, on the whole, better than man
made in more peaceful times. Erghum's translation possibly excepted (and
even here the bishop may well have volunteered his willing participation),
there is no appointment in 1388 which can be attributed solely to financial
motives on the part of the pope, and in fact none which cannot be fully
explained on other grounds.
All in all, the episcopate showed, as a body, a care for their prelatical
position and, like most temporal lords indeed, they worked from whatever
their individual viewpoint for the restoration of sound government. In the
early months of 1388, at least, it was not easy to play a moderating role, but
several bishops showed that they were at least prepared to try. In this crisis,
at least, it seems that the episcopate could not exercise any decisive influence
to avert extreme conflict in political affairs, in part because they did not wish
to take any initiative in them, and because many were, as usual, preoccupied
with their dioceses.
As individuals, personal circumstances might involve them in politics or at
least give them a partisan viewpoint. As lords, that majority of bishops which
owned no specific personal allegiance to court or opposition shared the
concern of their temporal colleagues for responsible government by the
king, and, naturally, held very much the same views as to what responsible
government meant. Hence they were willing to lend their support to broad-
based attempts to counsel the king when he appeared to be going wrong,
attempts which were moderate in intention, uncertain in practice, and most
often ineffective in result. Although even such limited intervention might
well incur the royal anger, it did not imply real opposition to the reality of
royal authority. In the end, like most of their temporal colleagues, the
bishops shrank from extreme action against the king, and, whilst sympathet-
ic in general terms to the complaints voiced by the Appellants, their support
for the measures taken was probably uneasy and passive. Finally, as bishops,
they felt, on the one hand, an obligation to avoid an involvement which
might discredit the church, and yet, on the other, an obligation, be it as
spiritual men or as curates of souls or merely as lords, to interest themselves
in the affairs of the realm.
This was a difficult position. In their individual ways they would, conscious
of their spiritual office and its moral obligations, do what they could to
maintain whatever they saw as a right and just peace. As a reward for this
integrity, political protagonists, magnates at least, respected their spiritual
position, perhaps needed to do so, and tried not to harm the church, if at all
avoidable, by reason of any necessary political repercussions against individ-
uals. Finally, even these few who were deeply involved, for better or worse,
were not at all careless of their spiritual responsibility. Like their more
impartial colleagues, they too acknowledged that this responsibility should
have the final word on their conduct.
UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER

Episcopado Inglés y Crisis Política de 1386-88

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THE EPISCOPATE AND THE POLITICAL CRISIS

" F a v e n t , p . 2 3 : Polyhromam, 9:156-7.

The list of bishops is headed, it will be noted, by Arundel's translation to

the translations. His statement and the character of the appointments

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