HUMAN DIGNITY negligence on the part of Sansio and Datuin, Gregorio never imputed to

them any bad faith in her complaint.

How does human dignity relate to intentional torts? Remember, there
are three main family of torts: Negligence; Intentional Tort; Strict Liability, In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff
although it does not specifically states, human dignity falls under has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by
intentional torts, not negligence, since in negligence there is no intention him; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person to
to commit a wrong to others; not strict liability because it is strict as to whose act he must respond; (3) the connection of cause and effect
the scenarios and strict as well as to persons who will be held liable. between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred; and (4) that
there must be no preexisting contractual relation between the parties.
ARTICLE 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for
similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach, though not
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights: (1)
࿿࿿࿿8縢ᐡ࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿9埐焇࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿:촚倕࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿; right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to family
秚䉄࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿<鹨࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿=╪䝞࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿>덾㚍࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿
?煌樻࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿@兾㉻࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿A࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿45J㨰±࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿ TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
K閘摂࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿Lᚐ挟࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿M㸲▗࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿N潖ອ࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿
O Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;
࿿࿿࿿8縢ᐡ࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿9埐焇࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿:촚倕࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿;
秚䉄࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿<鹨࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿=╪䝞࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿>덾㚍࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿
?煌樻࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿@兾㉻࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿A࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿46J㨰±࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿
K閘摂࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿Lᚐ挟࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿M㸲▗࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿N潖ອ࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿
O Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of
another;
࿿࿿࿿8縢ᐡ࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿9埐焇࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿:촚倕࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿;
秚䉄࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿<鹨࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿=╪䝞࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿>덾㚍࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿
?煌樻࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿@兾㉻࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿A࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿47J㨰±࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿
K閘摂࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿Lᚐ挟࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿M㸲▗࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿N潖ອ࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿
O Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
࿿࿿࿿8縢ᐡ࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿9埐焇࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿:촚倕࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿;
秚䉄࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿<鹨࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿=╪䝞࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿>덾㚍࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿
?煌樻࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿@兾㉻࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿A࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿48J㨰±࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿
K閘摂࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿Lᚐ挟࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿M㸲▗࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿N潖ອ࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿
O Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs,
lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal
condition.

========================================================
Gregorio v. CA
0 The case arose from the filing of an Affidavit of Complaint for violation
of B.P. 22 against petitioner Gregorio and one Vito Belarmino, as
proprietors of Alvi Marketing, allegedly for delivering insufficiently
funded bank checks as payment for the numerous appliances bought by
Alvi Marketing from Sansio. As the address stated in the complaint was
incorrect, Gregorio was unable to controvert the charges against her.

The MeTC issued a warrant for her arrest, and it was served upon her by
the armed operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime
(PARAC) of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG),
while she was visiting her husband and their 2 daughters at their city
residence. Gregorio was brought to the PARAC-DILG Office where she
was subjected to fingerprinting and mug shots, and was detained.
She was released in the afternoon of the same day when her husband
posted a bond for her temporary liberty.

Defendants Sansio and Datuin filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground

that the complaint, being one for damages arising from malicious
prosecution, failed to state a cause of action, as the ultimate facts
constituting the elements thereof were not alleged in the complaint.

0 Whether the complaint, a civil suit filed by Gregorio, is based on quasi-

delict or malicious prosecution?

HELD: A perusal of the allegations of Gregorios complaint for damages

readily shows that she filed a civil suit against Sansio and Datuin for filing
against her criminal charges for violation of B.P. Blg. 22; that respondents
did not exercise diligent efforts to ascertain the true identity of the person
who delivered to them insufficiently funded checks as payment for the
various appliances purchased; and that respondents never gave her the
opportunity to controvert the charges against her, because they stated an
incorrect address in the criminal complaint. Gregorio claimed damages
for the embarrassment and humiliation she suffered when she was
suddenly arrested at her city residence in Quezon Citywhile visiting her
family. She was, at the time of her arrest, a respected Kagawad in Oas,
Albay. Gregorio anchored her civil complaint on Articles 26, 2176, and
2180 of the Civil Code. Noticeably, despite alleging either fault or
relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) right
to peace of mind.

A scrutiny of Gregorios civil complaint reveals that the averments thereof,

taken together, fulfill the elements of Article 2176, in relation to Article 26
of the Civil Code. It appears that Gregorios rights to personal dignity,
personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by
Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite
diligence in determining the identity of the person they should
rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault
was compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of
petitioner, thus depriving her of the opportunity to controvert the
charges, because she was not given proper notice. Because she was not
able to refute the charges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for
three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Although she was never found
at No. 76 Pearanda St., Legaspi City, the office address of Alvi Marketing as
stated in the criminal complaint, Gregorio was conveniently arrested by
armed operatives of the PARAC-DILG at her city residence at 78 K-2 St.,
Kamuning, Quezon City, while visiting her family. She suffered
embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention
and she had to spend time, effort, and money to clear her tarnished name
and reputation, considering that she had held several honorable positions
in different organizations and offices in the public service, particularly her
being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest. There exists no
contractual relation between Gregorio and Sansio. On the other hand,
Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its
vicarious liability, as employer, arising from the act or omission of its
employee Datuin.

These allegations, assuming them to be true, sufficiently constituted a

cause of action against Sansio and Datuin. Thus, the RTC was correct
when it denied respondents motion to dismiss.

Sansio and Datuin are in error when they insist that Gregorios complaint
is based on malicious prosecution. In an action to recover damages for
malicious prosecution, it must be alleged and established that Sansio and
Datuin were impelled by legal malice or bad faith in deliberately initiating
an action against Gregorio, knowing that the charges were false and
groundless, intending to vex and humiliate her.[27] As previously
mentioned, Gregorio did not allege this in her complaint. Moreover, the
fact that she prayed for moral damages did not change the nature of her
action based on quasi-delict. She might have acted on the mistaken notion
that she was entitled to moral damages, considering that she suffered
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation on
account of her indictment and her sudden arrest.
========================================================

1. RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Right to Privacy is protected in the bill of rights, however, the bill of rights
are a person’s rights vs. the State, one cannot use the bill of rights in filing
a case for a private person. If one is filing a case for a private person, then,
Article 26 should be invoked.
0 Right to privacy must be reconciled with the right to free speech,
religion, expression etc. because, you have rights but also other
people have rights also, just because somebody said something
may disturbed you, that does not automatically mean that you
already have a right of action against him.

Reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a

two-part test:
0 Whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy.
1 Whether this expectation is one that the society recognizes as
reasonable.

0 Constitutional Right to Privacy

5888 Scope of Protection
Protected by the Due Process Clause, the protection includes the right
against unreasonable search and seizures, the right to privacy of one’s
communication and correspondence, and the right against self-
incrimination.

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without

due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.

DE VERA-YALUNG | 1

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
0 Basis of Liability for Damages
Violation of the constitutional right to privacy that causes damage to
another makes the actor liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code. The
claim for damages may be anchored on deprivation of due process,
violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizure or the
privacy of communication and correspondence and other related rights
specified in Article 32.
B. Violation of the Right to Privacy as Independent Tort
0 Persons entitle to Relief
GR: The right to privacy can be invoked only by natural persons. Juridical
persons cannot invoke such right because the entire basis of the right to
privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party; a
corporation would have no such ground for relief.
XPN: A corporation is entitled to the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizure under Article 32, CC.
GR: The right is purely personal in nature, hence:
23 It may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed
to have been violated;
24 Can be subject to waiver of the person whose zone of privacy is
sought to be intruded into;
25 The right ceases upon the death of the person.
XPN: A privilege may be given to the surviving relatives of a deceased
person to protect his memory but the privilege exist for the benefit of the
living, to protect their feelings and to prevent the violation of their own
rights in the character and memory of the deceased.
23 Standard Applied: In determining if there was a violation of
the right is that of a person with ordinary sensibilities. It is
relative to the customs of time and place and is determined by
the norm of an ordinary person.
Four Types of Invasion of Privacy:
23 Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s solitude or into his private
affairs;
23 Protects a person’s sense of locational and psychological
privacy.
24 It is not limited to cases where the defendant physically
trespassed into another’s property. It includes cases when the
defendant invades one’s privacy by looking from outside
(Example: “peeping-tom”)
GR: There is no invasion of right to privacy when a journalist records
photographs or writes about something that occurs in public places. XPN:
When the acts of the journalist should be to such extent that it constitutes
harassment or overzealous shadowing.
23 The freedom of the press has never been construed to accord
newsmen immunity from tort or crimes committed during the
course of the newsgathering.
24 There is no intrusion when an employer investigates an
employee or when the school investigates its student.
25 RA 4200 makes it illegal for any person not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record
such communication by means of a tape recorder (Ramirez vs
CA, Sept. 28, 1995)
26 Use of a telephone extension for purposes of overhearing a
private conversation without authorization does not violate RA
4200.
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
NOTE: There are instances where the school might be called upon to
exercise its power over its student for acts committed outside the school
premises and beyond school hours in the following:
5888In cases of violation of school policies or regulations occurring
in connection with school sponsored activity off campus; or
5889In cases where the misconduct of the student involves his
status as a student or affects the good name and reputation of
the school.
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Article III, Constitution
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
There is no intrusion into the right of privacy of another if the information
sought are matters of public record. This is especially true in case the
persons who are invoking the right to privacy are public officers and the
matter involved is of public concern. Thus, there is no violation of the
right to privacy if a citizen will ask from the Government Service
Insurance System a list of legislators who secured clean loans therefrom.
(Valmonnte v. Belmonte)
========================================================
Valmonte v. Belmonte
23 Petitioner Ricardo Valmonte wrote a letter to Hon. Feliciano
Belmonte, GSIS General Manager, requesting that he be furnished with the
list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who
were able to secure a clean loan. Belmonte replied through the Deputy
General Counsel of the GSIS whose opinion is that is that a confidential
relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it;
and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality
unless so ordered by the courts.
23 WON they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of
their constitutional right to information? YES!
HELD: The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of
reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the
opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately
before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of th
eformer First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its
employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the
benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More
particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended, provide for
annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and
other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as
the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or
guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is
expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict
compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of
the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law was the
necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds
administered by the System". Consequently, as respondent himself admits,
the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the
legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed
properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to
the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers
were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves
appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the
first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree
of fidelity and that and its transactions were above board.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the
public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information
sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
The Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a
government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are
within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the
constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.
DE VERA-YALUNG | 2

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents
evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations
that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of
examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be
avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the
records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to
inspect the records may be insured.
========================================================
PRIVACY OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
23 Publication of embarrassing private facts;
REQUISITES:
5888Publicity is given to any private or purely personal information
about a person;
5889Without the latter’s consent; and
5890Regardless of whether or not such publicity constitutes a
criminal offense, like libel or defamation, the circumstance that
the publication was made with intent of gain or for commercial
and business purposes invariably serves to aggravate the
violation of the right.
PUBLIC FIGURE - a person, who by his accomplishments, fame or mode of
living or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a
legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs and his character.
NOTE: Public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions
in government enjoy a more limited right to privacy compared to ordinary
individuals.
5888The interest sought to be protected is the right to be free from
unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the
private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside
the realm of legitimate public concern.
5889The publication of facts derived from the records of official
proceedings which are not otherwise declared by law as
confidential, cannot be considered a tortious conduct.
======================================================== Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong
23 Petitioner Hal McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie
production company, Petitioner Ayer Productions envisioned for
commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the
historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. Petitioners discussed
this Project with local movie producer who suggested they consult with
the appropriate government agencies and also with General Fidel V. Ramos
and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played major roles in the events
proposed to be filmed. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four
Day Revolution" was endorsed by the Movie Television Review and
Classification Board as well as the other government agencies consulted.
Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production, and
private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile was informed about the projected
motion picture enclosing a synopsis of it.
Enrile replied that "[he] would not and will not approve of the use,
appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or
that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production,
film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation" and
further advised petitioners that 'in the production, airing, showing,
distribution or exhibition of said or similar film, no reference whatsoever
(whether written, verbal or visual) should not be made to [him] or any
member of his family, much less to any matter purely personal to them. It
appears that petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile
was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the
projected motion picture.
However, Enrile filed a complaint, it alleged that petitioners' production of
the mini-series without private respondent's consent and over his
objection, constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy.
Ayer’s claim that in producing and "The Four Day Revolution," they are
exercising their freedom of speech and of expression protected under our
Constitution. Enrile, upon the other hand, asserts a right of privacy and
claims that the production and filming of the projected mini-series would
constitute an unlawful intrusion into his privacy which he is entitled to
enjoy.
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
23 WON Enrile’s right to privacy was violated? NO!
HELD: The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to the non-
bloody change of government that took place at EDSA in February 1986,
and the train of events which led up to that denouement. Clearly, such
subject matter is one of public interest and concern. Indeed, it is,
petitioners' argue, of international interest. The subject thus relates to a
highly critical stage in the history of this country and as such, must be
regarded as having passed into the public domain and as an appropriate
subject for speech and expression and coverage by any form of mass
media. The subject matter, as set out in the synopsis provided by the
petitioners, does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the
private life of Ponce Enrile. Unlike in the case of Lagunzad, which
concerned the life story of Moises Padilla necessarily including at least his
immediate family, what we have here is not a film biography, more or less
fictionalized, of private respondent Ponce Enrile. "The Four Day
Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man
Juan Ponce Enrile' but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to
the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the
constituent events of the change of government in February 1986.
The extent of the instrusion upon the life of Juan Ponce Enrile that would
be entailed by the production and exhibition of "The Four Day Revolution"
would, therefore, be limited in character. The extent of that intrusion, as
this Court understands the synopsis of the proposed film, may be generally
described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film a
truthful historical account. Enrile does not claim that petitioners
threatened to depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any part of the private
life of private respondent or that of any member of his family.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public
concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, private
respondent was what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a
"public figure:"
A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments,
fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives
the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character,
has become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously
to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of
reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a
professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainment. The list
is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors
and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and
no less a personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in
short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused
upon him as a person.
Enrile is a "public figure" precisely because, inter alia, of his
participation as a principal actor in the culminating events of the change
of government in February 1986. Because his participation therein was
major in character, a film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails
to make reference to the role played by private respondent would be
grossly unhistorical. The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily
narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not
retired into the seclusion of simple private citizenship. He continues to
be a "public figure." After a successful political campaign during which
his participation in the EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly
referred to in the press, radio and television, he sits in a very public place,
the Senate of the Philippines.
========================================================
FALSE LIGHT
23 Publicity which places a person in a false light in the public
eye;
The interest to be protected in this tort is the interest of the individual in
not being made to appear before the public in an objectionable false light
or false position. E.g. Defendant was held liable for damages when he
published an unauthorized biography of a famous baseball player
exaggerating his feats on the baseball field, portraying him as a war hero.
(Spahn vs. Messner)
23 If the publicity given to the plaintiff is defamatory, hence an
action for libel is also warranted; the action for invasion of
privacy will afford an alternative remedy.
24 May be committed by the media by distorting a news report.
DE VERA-YALUNG | 3
 Tort of placing another in False Defamation
Light
As to gravamen of Claim
The gravamen of claim is not the The gravamen of claim is the
reputational harm but rather the reputational harm.
embarrassment of a person being
made into something he is not. RATIO: It is something that puts
you in a bad light, it makes you less
RATIO: It is a little bit broader, as tha you are.
long as it is false, not just that it is E.g. you are valedictorian of your
defamatory. class, and someone said that you
E.g. being portrayed as a war hero, were only valedictorian because
you were called a war hero even if you paid all aircon.
you are not.
MALI YUNG SINABI
As to Publication
The statement should be actually Publication is satisfied if a letter is
made in public. sent to a third person.
As to the defamatory character of the statements
Defendant may still be held liable What is published lowers the
even if the statements tells esteem in which the plaintiff is
something good about the plaintiff. held.
======================================================== St.
Louis Realty Corp. v. CA
0 This case is about the recovery of damages for a wrongful
advertisement in the Sunday Times where Saint Louis Realty Corporation
misrepresented that the house of Doctor Conrado J. Aramil belonged to
Arcadio S. Arcadio. St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the
permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without permission of Doctor
Aramil) in the issue of the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968 an
advertisement with the heading "WHERE THE HEART IS". Below that
heading was the photograph of the residence of Doctor Aramil and the
Arcadio family and below the photo written is their family background.
The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times. Doctor Aramil a
neuropsychiatrist and a member of the faculty of the U. E. Ramon
Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, noticed the mistake. He then wrote St.
Louis Realty a letter of protest. The letter was received by Ernesto
Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis Realty in charge of advertising. He
stopped publication of the advertisement. He contacted Doctor Aramil
and offered his apologies. However, no rectification or apology was
published.
St. Louis Realty claimed that there was an honest mistake and that if
Aramil so desired, rectification would be published in the Manila Times.
It published in the issue of the Manila Times of March 18, 1969 a new
advertisement with the Arcadio family and their real house. But it did not
publish any apology to Doctor Aramil and an explanation of the error.
0 WON there was a violation of a right to privacy under Article 26? YES!
HELD: It was observed that St. Louis Realty should have immediately
published a rectification and apology. He found that as a result of St. Louis
Realty's mistake, magnified by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil
suffered mental anguish and his income was reduced by about P1,000 to
P1,500 a month. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right to
privacy (Art. 26, Civil Code).
St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil
and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday
Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and
explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier
"rectification ".
Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the
distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from
Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life
was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of
income and mental anguish.
========================================================
0 Commercial appropriation of likeness of others.
The unwarranted publication of a person’s name or the unauthorized use
of his photograph or likeness for commercial purposes is an invasion of
privacy.
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
0 With respect to celebrities, however, the right of publicity is
often treated as a separate right that overlaps but is distinct
from the right of privacy. They treat their names and likeness
as property and they want to control and profit therefrom.
24 INTERFERENCE WITH FAMILY RELATIONS
The gist of the tort is an interference with one spouse’s mental attitude
toward the other and the conjugal kindness of marital relations resulting
in some actual conduct which materially affects it.
23 It extends to all cases of wrongful interference in the family
affairs of others whereby one spouse is induced to leave the
other spouse or conduct himself or herself that the comfort of
married life is destroyed.
24 If the interference is by the parents of the spouse, malice must
be proven.
NOTE: The law recognizes the right of the parent to advise the son or
daughter, and when such advice is given in good faith, and results in
separation, the act does not give the injured party a right of action. In
such a case, malice must be established, and it must appear that
defendant’s acts were the controlling cause of the loss of affection; but to
accomplish this it is not necessary that ill will or spite towards the wife
be shown. The malice consists of intentional doing of the wrongful act to
the injury of the plaintiff.”
N.B. The requirement of malice is likewise necessary if the defendant is
not a relative of a spouse whose affection was said to have been
alienated.
========================================================
Tenchavez v. Escano
0 Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish
ancestry and got married with Pastor Tenchavez, before Catholic
chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love
affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A
letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and
disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and one
Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter
would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her
parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it
was approved she left for the US and filed a complaint for divorce against
Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial
Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her
marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married an American, in
Nevada and has begotten children. Petitioner filed a complaint against
Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta
from joining her husband and alienating her affections, and against the
Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,
decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation
and one million pesos in damages.
0 WON Vicenta’s parents were the real reason for the annulment? NO!
HELD: Tenchavez’ charge that his wife’s parents, Dr. Mamerto Escanñ o
and his wife, the late Donñ a Mena Escanñ o, alienated the affection of their
daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not
supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez
about the Escanñ o’s animosity toward him strikes us to be merely
conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor’s own letters
written before this suit was begun.
In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for
“misjudging them” and for the “great unhappiness” caused by his
“impulsive blunders” and “sinful pride” “effrontery and audacity”.
Plaintiff was admitted to the Escanñ o house to visit and court Vicenta, and
the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted
to marry Vicenta had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and
breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and
despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta
proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict
conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the
previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the
marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto
Escanñ o and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That
the spouses Escanñ o did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to
assent to the recelebration but
DE VERA-YALUNG | 4
respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not
constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that
Vicenta’s parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it
was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury
even if they did not concur in their decision to divorce Tenchavez.
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives,
aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent
divorce; she appears to have acted independently and being of age, she
was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with
alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives,
which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the
contrary is proved.
Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta’s aged parents with racial or social
discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek
annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety,
entitling them to recover damages. While his suit may not have been
impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face
of the proven facts and circumstances.
========================================================
3. VEXATION
Discrimination against a person on account of his physical defect, which
causes emotional distress, may result in liability on the part of the
offending party.
0 Sexual Harassment falls under this category. A civil action
separate and distinct from the criminal action may be
commenced under RA 7877.
1 Public humiliation due to lowly station in life may likewise
result in liability. E.g. a department store manager who
searched a person in public for no other reason than the fact
that such person looked poor will be held liable for damages.
1 Infliction of Emotional Distress
0 To recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the
plaintiff must show that: (a) The conduct of the defendant was intentional
or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b) The conduct was extreme and
outrageous; (c) There was a causal connection between the defendant’s
conduct and the plaintiff’s mental distress; and, (d) The plaintiff’s mental
distress was extreme and severe.
0 Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove
more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or
anger.
1 Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities, threats,
annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialities. In
determining whether the tort of outrage had been committed, a
plaintiff is necessarily expected and required to be hardened to
a certain amount of criticism, rough language, and to
occasional acts and words that are definitely inconsiderate and
unkind.
NOTE: The mere fact that the actor knows that the other will regard the
conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not enough.
B. SEXUAL HARRASMENT
0 types:
0 Quid pro quo cases – defendant in these cases, conditions
employment benefits, honors, awards, or privileges on sexual
favors. Sexual favors are elicited in return for something else.
1 Hostile environment cases – involve the allegation that
employees or students work or study in offensive or abusive
environment.
========================================================
Philippine Aeolus Atumotive United Corp. vs. NLRC
23Francis Chua the president of Petitioner (PAAUC) a corporation duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws, while private respondent
Rosalinda C. Cortez was a company nurse thereat until her termination on
7 November 1994.
Two memoranda were a issued addressed to private respondent
requiring her to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken
against her (a) for throwing a stapler at Plant Manager William Chua, her
superior, and uttering invectives against him (b) for losing the money
entrusted to her; and, (c) for asking a co-employee to punch-in her time
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
card thus making it appear that she was in the office when in fact she was
not; (d) for allegedly failing to process the ATM applications of her nine
(9) co-employees with the Bank.
Then, a third memorandum was issued to Cortez, informing her of her
termination from the service effective 7 November 1994 on grounds of
gross and habitual neglect of duties, serious misconduct and fraud or
willful breach of trust.
Explanation as to the first charge: Respondent Cortez claims that as early
as her first year of employment her Plant Manager, William Chua, already
manifested a special liking for her, she was receiving special treatment
from him and oftentimes invite her "for a date, he would make sexual
advances. The special treatment and sexual advances continued during
her employment for four (4) years but she never reciprocated his
flirtations, until finally, she noticed that his attitude towards her changed.
He made her understand that if she would not give in to his sexual
advances he would cause her termination from the service; and he made
good his threat when he started harassing her. One day that her table
which was equipped with telephone and intercom units and containing
her personal belongings was transferred without her knowledge to a
place with neither telephone nor intercom, for which reason, an argument
ensued when she confronted William Chua resulting in her being charged
with gross disrespect.
5888 Whether Cortez is entitled to moral and exemplary damages
for being illegally dismissed, being sexually harassed and thus
experiencing anxiety all throughout her employment
HELD: YES. The gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is not the
violation of the employee's sexuality but the abuse of power by the
employer. Any employee, male or female, may rightfully cry "foul"
provided the claim is well substantiated. There is no time period within
which he or she is expected to complain through the proper channels. The
time to do so may vary depending upon the needs, circumstances, and
more importantly, the emotional threshold of the employee.
Private respondent admittedly allowed four (4) years to pass before
finally coming out with her employer's sexual impositions. This
uneasiness in her place of work thrived in an atmosphere of tolerance for
four (4) years, and one could only imagine the prevailing anxiety and
resentment, if not bitterness, that beset her all that time.
Anxiety was gradual in private respondent's five (5)-year employment. It
began when her plant manager showed an obvious partiality for her
which went out of hand when he started to make it clear that he would
terminate her services if she would not give in to his sexual advances.
Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced "superiority" which is
enough to dampen an employee's spirit in her capacity for advancement.
It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life. If for this alone private
respondent should be adequately compensated. Thus, for the anxiety, the
seen and unseen hurt that she suffered, petitioners should also be made
to pay her moral damages, plus exemplary damages, for the oppressive
manner with which petitioners effected her dismissal from the service,
and to serve as a forewarning to lecherous officers and employers who
take undue advantage of their ascendancy over their employees.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of NLRC finding the dismissal of private
respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez to be without just cause and ordering
petitioners PAACU and/or Francis Chua to pay her back wages computed
from the time of her dismissal, which should be full back wages, is
AFFIRMED. However, in view of the strained relations between the
adverse parties, instead of reinstatement ordered by public respondent,
petitioners should pay private respondent separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month salary for every year of service until finality of this
judgment. In addition, petitioners are ordered to pay private respondent
P25,000.00 for moral damages and P10,000.00 for exemplary damages.
Costs against petitioners.
Concepcion vs. CA
0 Spouses Nestor and Allem Nicolas resided in an apartment leased to
them by the owner Florence "Bing" Concepcion. Nestor Nicolas was then
engaged in the business of supplying office equipment, appliances and
other fixtures on a cash purchase or credit basis. Florence joined this
venture.
Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband of Florence, angrily
accosted Nestor at the latter's apartment and accused him of conducting
an adulterous relationship with Florence. He shouted, "Hoy Nestor, kabit
ka ni Bing! . . . Binigyan ka pa pala ni Bing Concepcion ng P100,000.00
DE VERA-YALUNG | 5
para umakyat ng Baguio. Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa mo doon ay bababa
ka uli para magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing."
The same accusation was hurled by Rodrigo against Nestor when the two
0 confronted Florence at the terrace of her residence. Florence denied
the imputations and Rodrigo backtracked saying that he just heard the
rumor from a relative. Thereafter, however, Rodrigo called Florence over
the telephone reiterating his accusation and threatening her that should
something happen to his sick mother, in case the latter learned about the
affair, he would kill Florence.
As a result of this incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment
and shame to the extent that he could no longer face his neighbors.
Florence Concepcion also ceased to do business with him.
To make matters worse, Allem Nicolas started to doubt Nestor's fidelity
resulting in frequent bickerings and quarrels. Consequently, Nestor was
forced to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of
damages. Rodrigo pointedly ignored the demand, for which reason the
Nicolas spouses filed a civil suit against him for damages.
Rodrigo denied that he maligned Nestor by accusing him publicly of being
Florence's lover. He reasoned out that he only desired to protect the name
and reputation of the Concepcion family which was why he sought an
appointment with Nestor through Florence's son Roncali to ventilate his
feelings about the matter.

0 Whether there is basis in law for the award of damages to private

respondents (Nicolas spouses)

HELD: YES, there is. It does not need further elucidation that the incident
charged of petitioner was no less than an invasion on the right of
respondent Nestor as a person. The philosophy behind Art. 26
underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. Thus, under
this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are
provided for violations of a person's dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind.
It is petitioner's position that the act imputed to him does not constitute
any of those enumerated in Arts 26 and 2219. In this respect, the law is
clear. The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive
but are merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous
acts. Damages therefore are allowable for actions against a person's
dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive
language. Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered
mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation as a proximate result of petitioner's abusive, scandalous and
insulting language.
We cannot help noting this inordinate interest of petitioner to know the
truth about the rumor and why he was not satisfied with the separate
denials made by Florence and Nestor. He had to confront Nestor face to
face, invade the latter's privacy and hurl defamatory words at him in the
presence of his wife and children, neighbors and friends, accusing him —
a married man — of having an adulterous relationship with Florence.
This definitely caused private respondent much shame and
embarrassment that he could no longer show himself in his neighborhood
without feeling distraught and debased. This brought dissension and
distrust in his family where before there was none. This is why a few days
after the incident, he communicated with petitioner demanding public
apology and payment of damages, which petitioner ignored.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the assailed Decision of
the CA affirming the judgment of the RTC holding Rodrigo Concepcion
liable to the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas for F50,000.00 as
moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for
attorney's fees, plus costs of suit, is AFFIRMED.
========================================================

TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS DE VERA-YALUNG | 6

STRICT LIABILITY
When the person is made liable independent of fault or negligence upon
submission of proof of certain facts specified by law.
“When neither care nor negligence, neither good nor bad faith, neither
knowledge nor ignorance will save the defendant.”
NOTE: Strict liability tort can be committed even if reasonable care was
exercised and regardless of the state of mind of the actor at that time.
REQUISITES:
0 There is a duty to make safe or to do no harm;
1 Breach;
2 Injury; and
3 Causation
(i.) FALLING OBJECTS
Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof
is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the
same.
0 The term “head of the family” is not limited to the owner of the
building, and it may even include the lessee thereof. (Dingcong
vs. Kanaan)
1 One doesn’t need to be negligent, there is no excuse.
NOTE: Liability is absolute. It does not indicate a presumption or admit
proof of care.
(ii.) EMPLOYERS
Article 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to
pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen,
mechanics or other employees, even though the event may have been purely
accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal
injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is
also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease
caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the
employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's own notorious
negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be
liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due care contributed
to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced.
0 Article 1711 imposes an obligation on owners of enterprises
and other employers to pay for the death or injuries to their
employees.
1 Liability is strict because it exists even if the cause is purely
accidental.
2 If the mishap was due to the employee’s own notorious
negligence, or voluntary act or drunkenness, the employer shall
not be liable for compensation.
3 When the employee’s lack of due care contributed to his death
or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced.
4 If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow-
workman the latter and the employer shall be solidarily liable
for compensation.
5 If a fellow-worker’s intentional or malicious act is the only
cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be
answerable unless it should be shown that the latter did not
exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the
plaintiff’s fellow-worker.
6 There should be no excuse because if there will be an excuse
then it will be the same as negligence torts.
7 This strict liability tort, this only covers the ,liability of
employer in his employees, it does not cover liability of
employer to third persons (if the employee is negligent, he can
prove that it is SS)
INTENTIONAL ACT – in general the employer is not liable, unless it is
proved failed to prove SS of employee  not a defense, it will just be the
basis for liability.
========================================================
Crewlink, Inc vs. Teringtering
Respondent Editha Teringtering spouse of deceased Jacinto filed a
complaint against petitioner Crewlink, Inc. (Crewlink), and its foreign
principal Gulf Marine Services for the payment of death benefits, benefit
for minor child, burial assistance, damages and attorney's fees. She
alleged that her husband Jacinto entered into an overseas employment
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
contract with Petitioner for and in behalf of its foreign principal.
Teringtering claimed that the deceased underwent a pre-employment
medical examination wherein he was pronounced as "fit to work." Thus,
her husband joined his vessel of assignment and performed his duties as
Oiler.
On or about April 18, 2001, a death certificate was issued wherein it was
stated that Jacinto died on April 9, 2001 due to asphyxia of drowning.
Later on, an embalming and sealing certificate was issued after which the
remains of Jacinto was brought back to the Philippines.
Respondent claimed from petitioners the payment of death compensation
and burial expenses as well as additional death compensation for the
minor Eimaereach Rose de Gracia Teringtering but was refused without
any valid cause. Hence, a complaint was filed against the petitioners.
Respondent claimed that in order for her husband's death to be
compensable it is enough that he died during the term of his contract and
while still on board. Respondent asserted that Jacinto was suffering from
a psychotic disorder, or Mood Disorder Bipolar Type, which resulted to
his jumping into the sea and his eventual death. Respondent further
asserted that her husband’s death was not deliberate and not of his own
will, but was a result of a mental disorder, thus, compensable.
Petitioner asserted that Teringtering was not entitled to the benefits
being claimed, because Jacinto committed suicide because the deceased
jumped into the sea not just once but twice, the second time he was
recovered and revived, he was already dead from drowning. Despite the
non-entitlement, however, Teringtering was even given burial assistance.
She likewise received donations from the GMS staff and crew. Petitioner
likewise argued that Teringtering is not entitled to moral and exemplary
damages, because petitioner had nothing to do with her late husband's
untimely demise as the same was due to his own doing.
Ȁ㨀ĀᜀĀᜀĀᜀĀᜀĀᜀĀᜀĀᜀĀᜀऀऀ̀̀ĀȀ㨀ĀᜀĀᜀĀᜀĀᜀĀᜀĀᜀĀᜀĀ0
Whether the rule that the employer becomes liable once it is established
that his employee(seaman) died during the effectivity of his employment
contract is absolute
HELD: NO.
Under No. 6, Section C, Part II of the (POEA-SEC), it is provided that:
x x x x 6. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury,
incapacity, disability or death resulting from a willful act on his own life
by the seaman, provided, however, that the employer can prove that such
injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to him.
Indeed, in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee
should occur during the effectivity of the employment contract. The death
of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer liable to
his heirs for death compensation benefits. This rule, however, is not
absolute. The employer may be exempt from liability if it can successfully
prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury directly
attributable to his deliberate or willful act. In the instant case, petitioner
was able to substantially prove that Jacinto's death was attributable to his
deliberate act of killing himself by jumping into the sea.
Otherwise slated, while it is true that labor contracts are impressed with
public interest and the provisions of the POEA-SEC must be construed
logically and liberally in favor of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their
employment on board ocean-going vessels, still the rule is that justice is
in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of
established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
========================================================
(iii.) ANIMALS
Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the
same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage
should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has
suffered damage. (1905)
GR: The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damages which it may cause although it may escape or
be lost.
XPN: When the damage was caused by force majeure or by the person
who suffered the damage. (Article 2183)
========================================================
Vestil v. IAC
0 A 3 yr old Theness Tan Uy was bitten by a dog while she was playing
with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the
father of Petitioner Purita Vestil. She was rushed to the hospital, where
she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" and
DE VERA-YALUNG | 7
administered an anti-rabies vaccine. She was discharged after 9 days but
was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The following
day, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-
pneumonia. 7 months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the
Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit
and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge,
insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it
was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite
Theness. Hence this petition where Purita Vestil insists that she is not the
owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet
been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property.
0 Whether the Vestils were considered possessors of the house at the
time of the incident, hence, also of dog that admittedly was staying in the
house and are expected to exercise remote control of the dog
HELD: YES. There are factual evidence that the occupants of the house,
were boarders who paid the petitioners for providing them with meals
and accommodations. Purita Vestil had hired a maid who did the cooking
and cleaning in the said house for its occupants. Another witness testified
that the Vestils were maintaining the house for business purposes. The
application for water connection with the Cebu Water District was in the
name of Purita, which strongly suggested that she was administering the
house in question.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was
still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her
husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. She
was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take
care of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own house.
Moreover, there is evidence showing that she and her family regularly
went to the house, once or twice weekly, and used it virtually as a second
house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with
Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. The dog itself remained
in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until
1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that
the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization
expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually.
In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the
animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. The
law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as
long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, Theness was only
three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for
whatever she might have done to the animal.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil
Code is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that
he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer
for the damage which such animal may cause.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED as above modified.
The petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
========================================================
(iv.) NUISANCE
Under the Civil Code, a nuisance is any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which:
Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
Annoys or offends the senses; or
Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway
or street, or any body of water; or
Hinders or impairs the use of property. (Art. 694).
Code of Sanitation of the PH, it considers the ff nuisance:
Public or private premises maintained and used in a manner
injurious to health;
Breeding places and harborages of vermin;
Animals and their carcasses which are injurious to health;
Accumulation of refuse;
Noxious matter or waste water discharged improperly in streets;
Animals stockage maintained in a manner injurious to health;
Excessive noise; and
Illegal shanties in public or private properties. (Section 85, P.D. No.
856)
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
NOTE: The Civil Code makes the protection against nuisance a legal
easement.
KINDS:
PUBLIC NUISANCE – affects a community or neighborhood or any
considerable number of persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be
unequal.
PRIVATE NUISANCE – is one that is not included in the foregoing
definition.
NUISANCE PER SE – is a nuisance under any and all circumstances.
E.g. A construction without provision for accumulation or
disposal of waste matters and constructed without
building permits contiguously to and therefore liable
to pollute one of the main water pipelines which
supplies potable water to the Greater Manila area. As
such it may be abated without judicial proceedings
under the Civil Code.
NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS – becomes such under certain conditions
and circumstances.
E.g. certain business establishments. Commercial and
industrial activities which are lawful in themselves
may become nuisances if they are so offensive to the
senses that they render the enjoyment of life and
property uncomfortable. a business of building cars
may be considered under certain circumstances as
nuisance per accidens. It is not nuisance per se
because it becomes a nuisance only on account of its
location.
Strict Liability and Person Liable
There is strict liability on the part of the owner or possessor of the
property where a nuisance is found because he is obliged to
abate the same irrespective of the presence or absence of fault
or negligence.
Every successive owner or possessor of property who fails or
refuses to abate a nuisance in that property started by a former
owner or possessor is liable therefore in the same manner as
the one who created it. (Article 686, CC)
Abatement
a. Public Nuisance – Art. 699 of the Civil Code states that the remedies
against a public nuisance are prosecution under the Penal Code or any
local ordinance, or a civil action or abatement, without judicial
proceedings.
NOTE: A private person may file an action on account of a public
nuisance, if it is especially injurious to himself. (Art. 703, Civil Code). Such
private person may abate a public nuisance which is especially injurious
to him by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which
constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the peace, or doing
unnecessary injury.
Before a private person can abate a public nuisance, he must comply
with the following requirements:
That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the
property to abate the nuisance;
That such demand has been rejected;
That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and
executed with the assistance of the local police; and
That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand
pesos.
Private Nuisance – remedies against a private nuisance are a civil action
and abatement, without judicial proceedings. Any person injured by a
private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if necessary, by destroying
the thing which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of
the peace or doing unnecessary injury. However, it is indispensable that
the procedure for extrajudicial abatement of a public nuisance by a
private person be followed.
A private person or a public official extrajudicially abating a
nuisance shall be liable for damages in two cases:
If he causes unnecessary injury; or
DE VERA-YALUNG | 8
 If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real P5,000.00 for attorney's fees. In all other respects, the appealed decision
nuisance. (Article 707, CC) is affirmed. No costs.
========================================================
======================================================== PRODUCT AND SERVICE LIABILITY
Velasco vs. Manila Electric Company Sec. 9, Art. XVI of the 1987 PH Constitution:
In 1948, Velasco bought three (3) adjoining lots situated in Diliman, QC. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from
These lots are within an area zoned out as a "first residence" district by substandard or hazardous products.
the City Council of QC. Subsequently, Velasco sold two (2) lots to the State policy: To protect consumers “is intended not only against traders
Meralco, but retained the third lot, which was farthest from the street- but also manufacturers who dump defective, substandard or even
corner, whereon he built his house. hazardous products in the market”
In September, 1953, the Meralco started the construction of the sub-
station in question and finished it the following November, without prior Republic Act No. 7394
building permit or authority from the PSC. The facility reduces high THE CONSUMER ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES
voltage electricity to a current suitable for distribution to the company's Article 2. Declaration of Basic Policy. – It is the policy of the State to
consumers, numbering not less than 8,500 residential homes, over 300 protect the interests of the consumer, promote his general welfare and to
commercial establishments and about 30 industries. It was constructed establish standards of conduct for business and industry. Towards this
at a distance of 10 to 20 meters from the appellant's house. The company end, the State shall implement measures to achieve the following
built a stone and cement wall at the sides along the streets but along the objectives:
side adjoining the Velasco's property it put up a sawale wall but later protection against hazards to health and safety;
changed it to an interlink wire fence. protection against deceptive, unfair and unconscionable sales acts and
It is undisputed that a sound unceasingly emanates from the substation. practices;
Velasco contends that the sound constitutes an actionable nuisance provision of information and education to facilitate sound choice and the
under Article 694 of the Civil Code of the PH, reading as follows: proper exercise of rights by the consumer;
A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business condition of provision of adequate rights and means of redress; and
property or anything else which: involvement of consumer representatives in the formulation of social
(1) Injuries or endangers the health or safety of others; or and economic policies.
(2) Annoys or offends the senses;
xxx xxx xxx because subjection to the sound since 1954 had disturbed PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
the concentration and sleep of said Velasco, and impaired his health and Law that governs the liability of manufacturers and sellers for damages
lowered the value of his property. Wherefore, he sought a judicial decree resulting from defective products.
for the abatement of the nuisance and asked that he be declared entitled
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil
to recover compensatory, moral and other damages under Article 2202
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
of the Civil Code.
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
Whether this sound constitutes an actionable nuisance or not is the
only a preponderance of evidence.
HELD: YES
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
GR: Everyone is bound to bear the habitual or customary inconveniences
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
that result from the proximity of others, and so long as this level is not
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
surpassed, he may not complain against them. But if the prejudice
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
exceeds the inconveniences that such proximity habitually brings, the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
neighbor who causes such disturbance is held responsible for the
Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet
resulting damage, being guilty of causing nuisance.
articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by
Thus, the impartial and objective evidence points to the sound emitted
any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual
by the Meralco's substation transformers being of much higher level than
relation exists between them and the consumers. (n)
the ambient sound of the locality. The measurements taken by Dr.
Almonte, who is not connected with either party, and is a physician to
boot appear more reliable. The conclusion must be that the noise CONSUMER ACT
continuously emitted, day and night, constitutes an actionable nuisance RA No. 7394 – Consumer Act of the PH
for which the appellant is entitled to relief, by requiring the Meralco to It is a law that is meant to protect the consumers by providing for certain
adopt the necessary measures to deaden or reduce the sound at the safeguards when they purchase or use consumer products.
plaintiff's house, by replacing the interlink wire fence with a partition It covers only consumer products and services that is “goods, services
made of sound absorbent material, since the relocation of the substation and credits, debts or obligations which are primarily for personal, family,
is manifestly impracticable and would be prejudicial to the customers of household or agricultural purposes, which shall include but not limited
the Electric Company who are being serviced from the substation. to food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices.”
Since there is no evidence upon which to compute any loss or damage
allegedly incurred by the Velasco by the frustration of the sale on account ALTERNATIVE THEORIES
of the noise, his claim therefore was correctly disallowed by the trial 5 different causes of action that may justify the award of damages for the
court. It may be added that there is no showing of any further attempts injuries sustained because of defective products.
on the part of Velasco to dispose of the house, and this fact suffices to Fraud of Misrepresentation
raise doubts as to whether he truly intended to dispose of it. He had no Breach of Warranty
actual need to do so in order to escape deterioration of his health, as Negligence
heretofore noted. Civil Liability arising from Criminal Liability and
Despite the wide gap between what was claimed and what was proved, Strict Liability
the Velasco is entitled to damages for the annoyance and adverse effects
suffered by him since the substation started functioning in January, 1954. STRICT LIABILITY UNDER THE STRICT LIABILITY UNDER THE
Considering all the circumstances disclosed by the record, as well as CIVIL CODE CONSUMER ACT
appellant's failure to minimize the deleterious influences from the - Only provision in the NCC wc - The strict liability provision
substation, this Court is of the opinion that an award in the amount of imposes strict liability for defective under Consumer Act is clear and
P20K by way of moderate and moral damages up to the present, is products is Art. 2187 unmistakable, Art. 97 of the statute
reasonable. - Privity of contract is not reqd expressly provides for liability for
The Manila Electric Company is hereby ordered to either transfer its under Art. 2187 bec. it allows defective products “independently
substation at South D and South 6 Streets, Diliman, Quezon City, or take recovery although no contractual of fault”
appropriate measures to reduce its noise at the property line between relation exists - Strict liability even extends to
the defendant company's compound and that of the Velasco to an - “shall” indicates that the liability services under Art. 99 of the
average of forty (40) to fifty (50) decibels within 90 days from finality of of the manufacturer and the Consumer Act that imposes
this decision; and to pay the said Velasco P20,000.00 in damages and processor is strict. liability for defective service
”independently of fault” – Service
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS DE VERA-YALUNG | 9
 “with respect to repair and service
firms, services supplied in
connection with a contact for
construction, maintenance, repair,
processing, treatment or cleaning
of goods or of fixtures on land, or
distribution of goods, or
transportation of goods.”
========================================================
Navida vs Hon. Dizon
336 plaintiffs from GenSan referred to as NAVIDA, et al. filed a Joint
Complaint in the RTC of GenSan named as defendants therein were: SHEL;
DOW; OCCIDENTAL; DOLE; CHIQUITA; DEL MONTE; defendants are
collectively referred to as defendant companies.
Navida, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses
and injuries to the reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered
because of their exposure to DBCP, they were exposed to this chemical
during the early 1970’s up to the early 1980’s when they used the same in
the banana plantations where they worked at; and/or when they resided
within the agricultural area where such chemical was used. Navida, et al.,
claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or
negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they produced, sold
and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCP-containing
products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be exposed to
the said products, which the defendant companies knew, or ought to have
known, were highly injurious to the former’s health and well-being.
Another joint complaint for damages against SHELL, DOW, OCCIDENTAL,
DOLE, DEL MONTE, and CHIQUITA was filed before RTC of Davao by 155
plaintiffs from Davao referred to as ABELLA, et al. they alleged that, as
workers in the banana plantation and/or as residents near the said
plantation, they were made to use and/or were exposed to nematocides,
which contained the chemical DBCP, such exposure resulted in "serious
and permanent injuries to their health, including, but not limited to,
sterility and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities, they claimed
that the defendant companies manufactured, produced, sold, distributed,
used, and/or made available in commerce, DBCP without warning the
users of its hazardous effects on health, and without providing
instructions on its proper use and application, which the defendant
companies knew or ought to have known, had they exercised ordinary
care and prudence.
Whether the RTC of GenSan and Davao have respective jurisdictions over
the subject matter of the complaints filed by NAVIDA et al and ABELLA et
al since Art. 2176 and 2187 of the NCC are broad enough to cover the acts
complained of and to support their claims for damages I2: Whether
HELD1: YES. Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the
defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict which is the basis for the
claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with
individual claims of approximately ₱2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant,
which obviously falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of
the RTCs. Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered resulted from their exposure to DBCP
while they were employed in the banana plantations located in the
Philippines or while they were residing within the agricultural areas also
located in the Philippines. The factual allegations in the Amended Joint-
Complaints all point to their cause of action, which undeniably occurred
in the Philippines. The RTC of GenSan and RTC of Davao obviously have
reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction over the cases.
All parties voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly appeared and
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo. Thus, the
RTC of GenSan and the RTC of Davao have validly acquired jurisdiction
over the persons of the defendant companies, as well as over the subject
matter of the instant case. What is more, this jurisdiction, which has been
acquired and has been vested on the courts a quo, continues until the
termination of the proceedings.
RE: Territoriality
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or
the situs of the act complained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction
and venue for trial of cases. In personal civil actions, such as claims for
payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be
commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs
or defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where
he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are available only in the Philippines.
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
First, plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either in
General Santos or in Davao. Second, the specific areas where they were
allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the territorial
jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
initially filed their claims for damages. Third, the testimonial and
documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as doctors, co-
workers, family members and other members of the community, would be
easier to gather in the Philippines. Considering the great number of
plaintiff claimants involved in this case, it is not far-fetched to assume that
voluminous records are involved in the presentation of evidence to
support the claim of plaintiff claimants. Thus, these additional factors,
coupled with the fact that the alleged cause of action of NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., against the defendant companies for damages occurred in
the Philippines, demonstrate that, apart from the RTC of General Santos
City and the RTC of Davao City having jurisdiction over the subject matter
in the instant civil cases, they are, indeed, the convenient fora for trying
these cases.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petitions for review on
certiorari in G.R. Nos. 125078, 126654, and 128398. We REVERSE and
SET ASIDE the Order of the RTC of GenSan, and the Order RTC of Davao,
and its subsequent Order denying reconsideration in Civil Case No.
24,251-96, and REMAND the records of this case to the respective
Regional Trial Courts of origin for further and appropriate proceedings in
line with the ruling herein that said courts have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the amended complaints in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and
24,251-96.
========================================================
BUSINESS TORTS
Business torts known as interference with contractual relations,
interference with prospective advantage, unfair competition,
and securities related fraud.
Article 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only
the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee
failed to obtain.
The provision also recognizes the existence of liability for various
interference with business interests.  Interference may be in
the form of negligent or intentional acts or omissions. – It may
arise from diff. sources of obligation like delict, quasi-delict or
breach of contract.
CONTRACTUAL INTERFERENCE
INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
GR: Only parties to a contract are bound by the terms of the contract and
only a party can file an action for breach of contract or for rescission or
annulment thereof. – Only parties to the contract can file an action based
thereon.
XPNs: Contracts containing a stipulation in a favor of a third person and
contracts intended to defraud creditors.
Contracting parties cannot sue 3rd persons for breach of contract. 3rd
person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract bec. only
parties can breach contractual provisions.
NB: A contracting party may sue a 3rd person not for breach but for
inducing another to commit such breach.
Article 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.
Art. 1314 is known as interference with contractual relations.
Such interference is considered tortuous bec. it violates the rights of
the contracting parties to fulfill the contract and to have
fulfilled, to reap the profits resulting therefrom, and to compel
the performance by the other party.
Right is derived from a contract is a property right that entitles each
party to protection against the entire world and any damage to
said property should be compensated.
An agreement that prohibits interference (w/ existing contracts) is a
contact that is not contrary to public policy. Thus, a contract is
valid if it amounts simply to an agreement that those executing
the contract will not induce the EEs of those w/ whom the
contract is made to leave their service.
ELEMENTS
1. Existence of a valid contract; [Contract]
DE VERA-YALUNG | 10
Knowle4dge on the part of the third person of the existence of the
contract; and [Malice]
Interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse.
[Procurement]
========================================================
Go vs Cordero
F: In 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, VP of Pamana Marketing Corporation
(Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing inter-island passenger
vessels. Cordero met Tony Robinson, who is the Managing Director of
Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA). Robinson signed documents
appointing Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA catamaran and
other fast ferry vessels in the PH. As such, Cordero offered for sale to
prospective buyers the catamaran known as the SEACAT 25.
After negotiations with Landicho and Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go who
is the owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu, a single
proprietorship, Cordero was able to close a deal for the purchase of two
(2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the MOA. Accordingly, the parties
executed Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one (1) high-speed
catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of US$1,465,512.00. Per agreement
between Robinson and Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions
totalling US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase price, from the sale of
each vessel. However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing
directly with Robinson, Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to
confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be found, while Robinson
refused to answer his calls. Cordero immediately flew to Australia to
clarify matters with Robinson, only to find out that Go and Landicho were
already there in Brisbane, Australia negotiating for the sale of the second
SEACAT 25. Despite repeated follow-up calls, no explanation was given by
Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson who even made Cordero believe there
would be no further sale between AFFA and ACG Express Liner.
Cordero instituted a Civil Case seeking to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and
Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring
together in violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton
disregard of his rights, thus depriving him of his due commissions and
causing him actual, moral and exemplary damages, including expenses for
airplane travel to Australia, telecommunications bills and entertainment,
on account of AFFA’s untimely cancellation of the exclusive
distributorship agreement. Cordero also prayed for the award of moral
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
I: Whether there is Breach of Exclusive Distributorship, Contractual
Interference on the part of the Respondents and hence liable for Damages
HELD: YES. Although there was no sufficient evidence that respondents
actually purchased a second SEACAT 25 directly from AFFA, this
circumstance will not absolve respondents from liability for invading
Cordero’s rights under the exclusive distributorship. Respondents clearly
acted in bad faith in bypassing Cordero as they completed the remaining
payments to AFFA without advising him and furnishing him with copies of
the bank transmittals as they previously did, and directly dealt with AFFA
through Robinson regarding arrangements for the arrival of the first
SEACAT 25 in Manila and negotiations for the purchase of the second
vessel pursuant to the MOA which Cordero signed in behalf of AFFA. As a
result of respondents’ actuations, Cordero incurred losses as he was not
paid the balance of his commission from the sale of the first vessel and his
exclusive distributorship revoked by AFFA.
While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of
contract because only parties can breach contractual provisions, a
contracting party may sue a third person not for breach but for inducing
another to commit such breach.
Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract
shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.
The act of Go, Landicho and Tecson in inducing Robinson and AFFA to
enter into another contract directly with ACG Express Liner to obtain a
lower price for the second vessel resulted in AFFA’s breach of its
contractual obligation to pay in full the commission due to Cordero and
unceremonious termination of Cordero’s appointment as exclusive
distributor. Following our pronouncement in Gilchrist v. Cuddy (supra),
such act may not be deemed malicious if impelled by a proper business
interest rather than in wrongful motives. The attendant circumstances,
however, demonstrated that respondents transgressed the bounds of
permissible financial interest to benefit themselves at the expense of
Cordero. Respondents furtively went directly to Robinson after Cordero
had worked hard to close the deal for them to purchase from AFFA two
(2) SEACAT 25, closely monitored the progress of building the first vessel
sold, attended to their concerns and spent no measly sum for the trip to
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
Australia with Go, Landicho and Go’s family members. But what is
appalling is the fact that even as Go, Landicho and Tecson secretly
negotiated with Robinson for the purchase of a second vessel, Landicho
and Tecson continued to demand and receive from Cordero their
"commission" or "cut" from Cordero’s earned commission from the sale of
the first SEACAT 25.
Cordero was practically excluded from the transaction when Go,
Robinson, Tecson and Landicho suddenly ceased communicating with
him, without giving him any explanation. Go, Robinson, Tecson and
Landicho clearly connived not only in ensuring that Cordero would have
no participation in the contract for sale of the second SEACAT 25, but also
that Cordero would not be paid the balance of his commission from the
sale of the first SEACAT 25. This, despite their knowledge that it was
commission already earned by and due to Cordero. Thus, the trial and
appellate courts correctly ruled that the actuations of Go, Robinson,
Tecson and Landicho were without legal justification and intended solely
to prejudice Cordero.
The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with
contractual relations cannot be held liable for more than the amount for
which the party who was inducted to break the contract can be held
liable. Respondents Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly
held liable for the balance of petitioner Cordero’s commission from the
sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso
equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of the exclusive
distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from June 24, 1998 until the same is fully paid.
========================================================
(ii) INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ADVANTAGE
If there is no contract yet and defendant is only being sued for inducing
another not to enter into a contract w/ the plaintiff, the tort committed is
appropriately called interference w/ prospective advantage.
Tuttle vs Buck
“When a man starts an opposition place of business, not for the sake of
profit himself, but regardless of loss to himself, and for the sole purpose
of driving his competitor out of business, and with the intention of
himself retiring upon the accomplishment of his malevolent purpose, he
is guilty of a wanton wrong and an actionable tort. In such a case he
would not be exercising his legal right, or doing an act which can be
judged separately from the motive which actuated him. To call such
conduct competition is a perversion of terms. It is simply the application
of force without legal justification, which in it6s moral quality may be no
better that highway robbery”
(iii) SECURITIES-RELATED TORTS
A person who, contrary to law, caused damage to another is liable under
Art. 21 of the NCC.
Implicit from any violation of the provisions of the Securities
Regulation Code of RA No. 8799 is the liability for damages caused by
such violation.
Civil liability arising from delict follows such violation bec. Sec. 73 of the
law imposes criminal liability on any person who violates any of the rules
and regulations promulgated by SEC or any person who, in the
registration statement makes untrue statement of or omits to state any
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading.
(iii) UNFAIR COMPETITION
UNFAIR COMPETITION
Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial
enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall
give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.
INTERFERENCE
Unfair competition includes cases involving the tort of interference w/
contractual relations and interference w/ prospective advantage.
Businessman who maliciously interferes w/ the contract of his
competitor w/ the latter’s clients in order to get them as his
own may be guilty of interference w/ contractual relations.
Businessmen through force, intimidation, or any other means
prevents the customers from entering into a contract w/ the
DE VERA-YALUNG | 11
 competitor, the same way amount to interference w/ Consequently, the employer cannot escape liability by claiming that he
prospective advantage. exercised due diligence in the selection or supervision of the employee.

GR: In the Philippines, vicarious liability is generally not governed by the

doctrine of respondeat superior. The employers or the parents are being
THE DEFENDANTS made liable not only because of the negligent or wrongful act of the
Who may be sued for tort, particularly those who may be held liable for person for whom they are responsible but also because of their own
quasi-delict under Art. 2176.  Both natural and juridical persons may negligence.
be held liable for quasi-delict. Liability is imposed on the employer because he failed to exercise
due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee
JURIDICAL PERSONS – liability is always imputed bec. artificial beings Parents are made liable because they failed to exercise diligence in
act only though their officers, employees agents. State and political the supervision of their child who lives in their company.
subdivisions may be subject to civil liability.
NOTE: The liability is still vicarious or imputed because there is no direct
CONCURRENT NEGLIGENCE OR ACTS link between their act or omission and the injury. The employers or the
A. JOINT TORTFEASORS parents, no matter how negligent in supervising their employee or child,
would not be liable were it not for the act or omission of the said
Article 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable employee or child. The operative act or omission is still the act or
for quasi-delict is solidary. (n) omission of the employee or child and the negligence or wrongful
conduct is imputed to the person responsible for them.
Joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate,
promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or XPN: The Doctrine is applicable in:
abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is Liability of employer is applicable under Article 103, RPC;
done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as Liability of a partnership for the tort committed by a partnership.
principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if
they had performed the wrongful act themselves. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR BONUS PATER FAMILIAS
Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which Let the master answer Good father of a family
they commit. The person injured may sue all of them, or any An American Doctrine whereby the Good father of a family, whereby
number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage negligence of the employee is the employer ultimately becomes
caused by all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole conclusively presumed to be liable on his own negligence
damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others negligence of the employer
who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him It is the Latin phrase which It means that the employer is liable
as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his literally means, “let the master or upon a finding that has been
participation in the tort was insignificant as compared with superior answer or let the negligent in the selection of his
that of the others. principal answer for the acts of his employees (culpa in elgiendo) or in
Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be agents.” the supervision of his employees
apportioned among them, except among themselves. (culpa in vigilando)
If the proximate causes of the injury are 2 causal sets, both persons It is a legal doctrine which means Juris tantum – disputable
who are responsible for the two separate causes are liable that the employer is responsible presumption; Jure et de Jure –
jointly and severally. Solidary liability exists not only if the for his employees actions within conclusive presumption
defendants conspired to bring about the result but also in the course of employment.
cases where causes are independent of each other. Thus, if a
passenger was injured in a vehicular accident involving the
RATIO: In respondeat superior, one is liable merely because he is the
public utility vehicle where he was riding and another vehicle,
employer and the mere fact that his employee was negligent. While in
the drivers of both vehicles are solidarily liable if it can be
bonus pater familias, one is liable because the employer is personally
established that their respective negligence are the proximate
negligent in the selection and supervision. (Both Vicarious)
causes of the injury.
N.B. Concurrent Negligence is separate from Vicarious Liability, one can
MOTOR VEHICLE MISHAPS
go against, say, in a vehicular accident where 2 vehicles caused the
mishap, one can go against either the drivers. While Vicarious Liability
Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable means that there is one negligent while the other is sabit lang.
with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the
use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably NOTE: In the PH, bonus pater familias is common.
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the VICARIOUS LIABILITY
next preceding two months.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180
whom one is responsible.
are applicable. (n)
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
Solidary liability is imposed on the owner of the vehicle not
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
because of his imputed liability but because his own omission
their company.
is a concurring proximate cause of the injury. (Chapman v.
Undewood)
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their authority and live in their company.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
A person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
for whom he is responsible. (Tamargo vs. Court of Appeals)
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
Also called, Doctrine of Imputed Negligence
occasion of their functions.
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR vs BONUS PATER FAMILIAS RESPONDEAT
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
SUPERIOR – liability is strictly imputed, that is, the employer is liable not
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
because of his act or omission but because of the act or omission of the
even
employee. What is material is not whether the employer exercised due
care but the conduct of the employee. DE VERA-YALUNG | 12

TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS

though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom
the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article
2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or
employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in
satisfaction of the claim. (1904)
Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no
parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with
his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall
be appointed. (n)
========================================================
Caedo vs Yu Khe Thai
The mishap occurred on Highway 54 in the vicinity of San Lorenzo
Village. Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way to the airport,
Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with
his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner to Wack Wack
for his regular round of golf. The two cars were traveling at fairly
moderate speeds, considering the condition of the road and the absence
of traffic — the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and the Cadillac
at approximately 30 to 35 miles (48 to 56 kilometers). Their headlights
were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in
the same direction, was a caretella towing another horse by means of a
short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side. The
carretela was provided with two lights, one on each side, and they should
have given Bernardo sufficient warning to take the necessary precautions,
the carretela should have been visible to him from afar if he had been
careful, as it must have been in the beam of his headlights for a
considerable while.
In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the
opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping
altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the left
in order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper
caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and
carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it
collided with the oncoming vehicle. Caedo, confronted with the
unexpected situation, tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by
going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful.
There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael
Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages
suffered by the plaintiffs.
I1: Whether or not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily
liable with the driver on the basis of respondeat superior
HELD1: NO. The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not
respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The
theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the
master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own
negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.
Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before
that had been employed by a company before in the same capacity for
over ten years. He had no record of violation of traffic laws and
regulations during that period. No negligence for having employed him at
all may be imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter must
be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident,
that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not
only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act
upon it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed.
The car was running at a reasonable speed. The road was wide and open,
and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car
owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill
and experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of the
carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his
failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he
could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the
carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was
approaching from the opposite direction. The time element was such that
there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks
involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his
mind, he said, was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only
make the other man nervous and make the situation worse. It was a
thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence
required by law to prevent the misfortune.
I2: Whether the test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil
Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective.
HELD2: YES. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard
of diligence as are professional drivers. In many cases they refrain from
driving their own cars and instead hire other persons to drive for them
precisely because they are not trained or endowed with sufficient
discernment to know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative
dangers posed by the different situations that are continually
encountered on the road. What would be a negligent omission under
aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and
knows how to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part,
say, of an old and infirm person who is not similarly equipped.
The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of
skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance
of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his
intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that
which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to
avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a
minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught
with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and
commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of
perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who,
by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be
effectively proscribed.
We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarily with
Rafael Bernardo, is an error.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of
declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability, and is
otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with costs
against the latter.
========================================================
(ii) PARENTS
LIABILITY FOR THE ACTS OF MINORS A.
BASIS OF LIABILITY
The basis of liability of parents for the acts or omissions of their
minor children is the parental authority that they exercise over
them.
Their liability is a necessary consequence of the parental authority
which imposes upon them the duty of supporting their
children, keeping them in their company and educating them in
proportion to their means.
B. PERSONS LIABLE
Liability based on parental authority is not limited to parents; the
same is also imposed on those exercising substitute parental
authority and special parental authority.
NOTE: Parents have the natural right and duty over the person and
property of their unemancipated children. They exercise their authority
jointly and in the absence or death of either parent, the parent present
shall continue exercising parental authority.
In default of the parents or a judicially appointed guardian, parental
authority shall be exercised by the following persons in the order
indicated (Articles 214 and 216, FC):
The surviving grandparents;
The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless
unfit or disqualified; and
The child’s actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless
unfit or disqualified.
Nature of Liability: Both parents are primarily liable for the damages
caused by their child. It should be emphasized that the liability is primary
and not subsidiary.
DE VERA-YALUNG | 13
LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF CHILDREN OF MAJORITY AGE
Emancipation takes place by the attainment of the age of majority.
(Article 234,CC). Emancipation shall terminate parental
authority over the person and property of the child who shall
then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.
(Article 236, FC). Similarly, the power of guardians over minors
shall likewise cease when the said minors reach the age of
majority.
Article 201 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code: 15 under 18 with or
without discernment, the parent or guardian are liable.
Article 2180, CC: 15 under 21, the parents of guardians are still liable.
NOTE: Parents and other persons exercising parental authority can
escape liability by proving that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
FAMILY CODE
Art. 129. Those given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents,
judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority
over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph
shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence
required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions
of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority
over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and
responsible for all acts of civil life.
RPC
Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption
from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article
12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the
following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for
acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under
nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who
has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such
person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there
was no fault or negligence on their part.chanrobles virtual law library
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under
his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent,
said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property,
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil
law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for
whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in
proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate
amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even
approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to
the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever
the damages have been caused with the consent of the authorities or their
agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by
special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the
persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and
secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be
liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from
execution.
========================================================
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
Cuadra vs Monfort
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates
in Grade 6 at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. Their teacher
assigned them to weed the grass in the school premises. Maria Teresa
Monfort found a plastic headband, jokingly she said aloud that she had
found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the
object at her. At that precise moment the latter turned around to face her
friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she
rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day,
the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident
to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She
underwent surgical operation twice, and stayed in the hospital for a total
of 23 days, for all of which the parents spent the sum of P1,703.75.
Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost
the sight of her right eye.
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their
minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father,
the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages;
P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the
costs of the suit.
Whether there is liability that may be imputed on the part of Monfort’s
parents for the act of his their child which causes damage to another
HELD: In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred
that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of
due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental
authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On
the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and
where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and
supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury
was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at
play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason
to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous
propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect
unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be
attributed to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for
the tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to
compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction enforceable
in court, but only the moral compulsion of good conscience.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed,
without pronouncement as to costs.
Tamargo vs CA
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, 10yrs old, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. A civil
complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner
Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses
Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent
spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom
he was living at the time of the tragic incident.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and
Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc
before the CFI of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was grunted on, 18
November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
Respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the
result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but
rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa
Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the
successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually
living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor
been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for
adoption.
Whether the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto w/ an air rifle occurred
when parental authourity was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses
HELD: YES. In the instant case, the shooting occurred when parental
authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural
parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural
parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor
children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental
authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law
assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents
commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of
DE VERA-YALUNG | 14
their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their
custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon
parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the
discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parental
dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be
overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents
had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage.
The basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the
relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with
them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision
and control.
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having
been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not
consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so
as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when
adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted
child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the
petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of
some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant
case, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the
Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that
they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented
(since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical
custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable.
Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and
policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little
differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto
was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's
natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damages
brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of
petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the
court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is
hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE.
Libi vs IAC
Respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong 18-
year old first year commerce student who, at the time of the deplorable
incident which took place and from which she died on January 14, 1979,;
while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between
18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also
died in the same event on the same date. Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell
Libi were sweethearts until when Julie Ann broke up her relationship
with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and
irresponsible. Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for
reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the
former to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann
stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of
Maria Cristina and Juana Osmenñ a Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to 13,
1978. On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single
gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson
revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was
recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private
respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D.
Jakosalem streets of the same city. Private respondents submitted that
Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and,
thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. Petitioners
rejected the imputation and contended that an unknown third party,
whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work
as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit must have
caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness
and thereby avoid identification.
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case in the
then CFI of Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages
arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.
Whether the petitioner parents failed to exercise due diligence of a good
father of a family and be vicariously liable with their deceased son’s civil
liability, hence, primary liable
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
HELD: All YES. Court cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner
spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a
family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten
hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was
negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother
where the other key was. The diligence of a good father of a family
required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large
extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child.
Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently
supervising the activities of their son, despite his minority and
immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of Wendell’s death that
they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that Cresencio’s
gun was missing from the safety deposit box.
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor
children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and
not subsidiary. We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for
felonies committed by their minor children is likewise primary, not
subsidiary.
Just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing
provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their
minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the
defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of
the diligence of a good father of a family.
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the
parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability
arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under
their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is
proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent such damages. Under said Article 2180, the enforcement
of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother. However, under the Family Code, this civil
liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility
of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor
offender. 33 For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by
minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and
2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was
caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi,
respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages
arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications of the premises
relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives herein
explained, we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to duly
exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such
damages.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment
of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against
petitioners.
========================================================
(iii) SCHOOLS
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual,
entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental
authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
(349a)
Article 129, FC, Supra
PERSONS LIABLE
The Code makes the school liable without distinguishing if it is a
non-academic or academic school.
Hence, a school, whether academic or non-academic is civilly liable
for the acts of minors in their custody, instruction or
supervision.
Administrators and teachers include the principal and other persons
who are involved in the supervision of the child.
If the school is being sued together with administrators and
teachers, the liability is joint and solidary.
In an apprenticeship, the head of a school of art and trade is the one
directly responsible. In a regular school, one cannot go all
DE VERA-YALUNG | 15
 the way to the top, because there are a lot of layers, hence, it
will be the teacher in charge.
Schools, Teachers, and Administrators are liable for the damages
caused by:
Pupils and Students or Apprentices while in their custody
Statutory Basis:
If student is minor – Article 219, FC
If student is no longer a minor – Article 2180, CC
RULES UNDER ARTICLE 2180
Article 2180 makes teachers and heads liable for acts of students
and apprentices whether the latter are minors or not.
The teacher-in-charge is liable for the acts of his students. The
school and administrators are not liable.
By way of exception, it is only the head of the school, not the teacher,
who is held liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts
and trade.
The liability of the teacher subsists whether the school is academic
or non-academic.
Liability is imposed only if the pupil is already in the custody of the
teacher or head. The student is in the custody of the school
authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of
the school and within its premises, whether the semester has
not yet begun or has already ended.
OTHER BASIS OF LIABILITY OF SCHOOLS
Vicarious liability of an employer for negligence, the school can
escape liability if it can establish that it exercised due diligence
in the selection and supervision of their employees (including
teachers) under Article 2180.
Liability may be based on contract, the school as employer or as
contracting party may be held liable even if the injury was
inflicted by a non-student.
Liability of teachers under Article 103 of the RPC:
Subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 102 shall also
apply to teachers for felonies committed by their pupils.
NOTE: Article 103 does not distinguish if the teacher is a teacher in an
academic or non-academic school. Hence, a teacher is liable whether he is
employed in an academic or non-academic institution and whether the
pupil is a minor or not.
GR: The teacher-in-charge is liable for the acts of his students. The school
and administrators are not liable.
XPN: It is only the head of the school, not the teacher who is held liable
where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trade.
Liability is imposed only if the pupil is already in the custody of the
teacher or head. The student is the custody of the school
authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of
the school and within its premises whether the semester had
not yet begun of has already ended.
The victim of negligence is likewise required to exercise due care in
avoiding injury to himself.
========================================================
Amadora v. CA
Alfredo Amadora who is waiting for his graduation when on April 13,
1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Daffon, fired a gun that mortally
hit Alfredo, which casued his death. The victim was only seventeen years
old.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally,
the herein petitioners, as the victim’s parents, filed a civil action for
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, and
the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through
their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later
dropped.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to finish his
physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was
then under the custody of the private respondents. The private
respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for
the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in
their custody because the semester had already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the
petitioners consider important because of an earlier incident which they
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
claim underscores the negligence of the school and at least one of the
private respondents. It is not denied by the respondents that on April 7,
1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban
an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without making a report
to the principal or taking any further action. As Gumban was one of the
companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo, the
petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had been
confiscated from Gumban and that their son would not have been killed if
it had not been returned by Damaso. The respondents say, however, that
there is no proof that the gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
WON the school is liable?
HELD: Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection
with the above-quoted provision, to wit: Exconde vs. Capuno, Mercado vs.
Court of Appeals, and Palisoc vs. Brillantes.
In the Exconde Case, the school was exculpated (as it was not a party to
the case) on the ground that it was not a school of arts and trades.
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, the Court declared (as the
school itself had also not been sued) that the school was not liable
because it was not an establishment of arts and trades. Morever, the
custody requirement had not been proved as this “contemplates a
situation where the student lives and boards with the teacher, such that
the control, direction and influences on the pupil supersede those of the
parents.” In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, the Court declared, ‘so long as (the
students) remain in their custody’ — means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise
over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the
school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires
that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the
tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the
lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it
relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present
decision.”
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has
been directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable under Article
2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades but an aca-
demic institution of learning. The parties herein have also directly raised
the question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments
which are technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the
offending student is supposed to be “in its custody.”
The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question
should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the
school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision.
This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it
is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception
to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for
the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in
which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the
canon of reddendo singula singulis, “teachers” should apply to the words
“pupils and students” and “heads of establishments of arts and trades” to
the word “apprentices.”
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic
school is to be held answerable for the torts committed by his students,
why is it the head of the school only who is held liable where the injury is
caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic or
non-technical school, why not apply the rule also to the head thereof
instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the
head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his
pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and
trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their
master who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and
secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was such a
master and so was personally involved in the task of teaching his
students, who usually even boarded with him and so came under his
constant control, supervision and influence. By contrast, the head of the
academic school was not as involved with his students and exercised only
administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly
dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had then (as
now) only a vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently, while
DE VERA-YALUNG | 16
he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the
school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so
blamed.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is
such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is
actually undergoing studies during the school term, as contended by the
respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in
pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and
even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility
of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the
student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the
company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and
atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the
discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must
answer for his students’ torts, in practically the same way that the parents
are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher-in-
charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other
administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the
specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary
that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a
position to prevent it.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the
head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the
custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations
for the maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all cases now, in
fact, these measures are effected through the assistance of an adequate
security force to help the teacher physically enforce those rules upon the
students. This should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken
adequate steps to prevent any injury that may be committed by its
students. A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it
would otherwise be unfair to hold him directly answerable for the
damage caused by his students as long as they are in the school premises
and presumably under his influence.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the
following conclusions:
At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the
custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally
ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to
finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics
report for what is important is that he was there for a
legitimate purpose. As previously observed, even the mere
savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of the
school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought
him in the custody of the school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot
be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge
as previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a
general authority over the student body and not the direct
control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of
particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved in
its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who
the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere
fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in
connection with his physics report did not necessarily make
the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-
charge of Alfredo’s killer.
At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no
showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon
Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance.
His absence when the tragedy happened can not be considered
against him because he was not supposed or required to report
to school on that day. And while it is true that the offending
student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if
the latter was physically absent when the tort was committed,
it has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
enforcing discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the
private respondents have proved that they had exercised due
diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in
maintaining that discipline.
In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys
who should be held liable, especially in view of the unrefuted
evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unli-censed gun
from one of the students and returned the same later to him
without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to
higher authorities. While this was clearly negligence on his
part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it does
not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not
been shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was the
gun that killed the petitioners’ son.
Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made
responsible for the damage caused by the stu-dent or
apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort
committed by any of the other private respondents for none of
them has been found to have been charged with the custody of
the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his
duties in connection with such custody.
In sum, none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito
Daffon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter’s death at the
auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.
PSBA v. CA
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos
Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of
Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to
file suit in the RTC of Manila, for damages against the said PSBA and its
corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the
third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his
assailants were not members of the school’s academic community but
were elements from outside the school.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed,
alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as
jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions,
such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated
article.
WON the school is liable? YES! The school was held liable because under
the Civil Code, the damage should not be caused by the student of the
school. When you talk about vicarious liability (quasi-delict) you can be
held liable. You cannot use Article 2180 because the accused are
outsiders.
HELD: Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
establishes the rule in in loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine
in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently,
in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. In all such cases, it had been stressed that
the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been
caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution
sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its
custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present
case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students
of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations
which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to
pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student
covenants to abide by the school’s academic requirements and observe its
rules and regulations.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet,
no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been
breached thru the former’s negligence in providing proper security
measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if
there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a
DE VERA-YALUNG | 17
breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco Case, the
negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact,
that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation
between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to the school’s liability. The negligence of the
school cannot exist independently on the contract, unless the negligence
occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the
obligation of schools, above-mentioned for conceptually a school, like a
common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This
is specially true in the populous student communities of the so-called
“university belt” in Manila where there have been reported several
incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would
not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent
trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security measures
installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group
determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and
environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by
proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was
not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of
that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place.
Saludaga v. Far Eastern University
Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent
FEU when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), one of the security
guards on duty at the school premises on August 18, 1996. Petitioner
thereafter filed a complaint for damages against respondents on the
ground that they breached their obligation to provide students with a safe
and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning.
Petitioner is suing respondents for damages based on the alleged breach
of student-school contract for a safe learning environment. In turn, FEU
filed a Third-Party Complaint against Galaxy Development and
Management Corporation (Galaxy), the agency contracted by respondent
FEU to provide security services within its premises
In order to avoid liability, however, respondents aver that the shooting
incident was a fortuitous event because they could not have reasonably
foreseen nor avoided the accident caused by Rosete as he was not their
employee; and that they complied with their obligation to ensure a safe
learning environment for their students by having exercised due diligence
in selecting the security services of Galaxy.
WON the school is solidarily liable with the Security Agency? NO! The
school was not the employer of the guard.
HELD: It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the
existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima
facie, a corresponding right of relief. In the instant case, we find that,
when petitioner was shot inside the campus by no less the security guard
who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a
prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply with its obligation
to provide a safe and secure environment to its students.
Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain
and confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess
the qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement. It was not
proven that they examined the clearances, psychiatric test results, 201
files, and other vital documents enumerated in its contract with Galaxy.
Total reliance on the security agency about these matters or failure to
check the papers stating the qualifications of the guards is negligence on
the part of respondents. A learning institution should not be allowed to
completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the
security agency it hired. To do so would result to contracting away its
inherent obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its students.
Re: Solidary Liability
In Powton Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol,26 we held that:
corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and
distinct from those of the persons composing it, such that, save
for certain exceptions, corporate officers who entered into
contracts in behalf of the corporation cannot be held
personally liable for the liabilities of the latter. Personal
liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer along
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
(although not necessarily) with the corporation may so validly
attach, as a rule, only when - (1) he assents to a patently
unlawful act of the corporation, or when he is guilty of bad
faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when there
is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation,
its stockholders or other persons; (2) he consents to the
issuance of watered down stocks or who, having knowledge
thereof, does not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his
written objection thereto; (3) he agrees to hold himself
personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (4) he
is made by a specific provision of law personally answerable
for his corporate action.
None of the foregoing exceptions was established in the instant case;
hence, respondent De Jesus should not be held solidarily liable with
respondent FEU. Incidentally, although the main cause of action in the
instant case is the breach of the school-student contract, petitioner, in the
alternative, also holds respondents vicariously liable under Article 2180
of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. x x x x
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
We agree with the findings of the CA that respondents cannot be held
liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code because respondents
are not the employers of Rosete. The latter was employed by Galaxy. The
instructions issued by respondents' Security Consultant to Galaxy and its
security guards are ordinarily no more than requests commonly
envisaged in the contract for services entered into by a principal and a
security agency. They cannot be construed as the element of control as to
treat respondents as the employers of Rosete.
For these acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent FEU with
an unqualified security guard, which resulted to the latter's breach of
obligation to petitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy liable to respondent
FEU for such damages equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts
awarded to petitioner.
Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem Imperial to be solidarily liable with
Galaxy for being grossly negligent in directing the affairs of the security
agency. It was Imperial who assured petitioner that his medical expenses
will be shouldered by Galaxy but said representations were not fulfilled
because they presumed that petitioner and his family were no longer
interested in filing a formal complaint against them.
St. Joseph’s College v. Miranda
On November 17, 1994, inside St. Joseph Colleges premises, the class to
which respondent Miranda belonged was conducting a science
experiment under supervision of the petitioner Rosalinda Tabugo, she
being the subject teacher and employee of SJC. The adviser of Jayson’s
class is Estefania Abdan. Tabugo left her class while it was doing the
experiment without having adequately secured it from any untoward
incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, Jayson, who was
the assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result of the
experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test
tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved it close and
towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the compound in the test tube
spurted out and several particles of which hit Jayson’s eye and the
different parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a result
thereof, Jayson’s eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for
which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication.
WON the teacher-in-charge is liable? YES! She did no exercise due
diligence in supervising the experiment.
HELD: In this case, petitioners failed to show that the negligence of
[Jayson] was the proximate cause of the latters injury. We find that the
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of Jayson when he
curiously looked into the test tube when the chemicals suddenly
DE VERA-YALUNG | 18
exploded which caused his injury, but the sudden and unexpected
explosion of the chemicals independent of any intervening cause.
[Petitioners] could have prevented the mishap if they exercised a higher
degree of care, caution and foresight. The court a quo correctly ruled that:
All of the petitioners are equally at fault and are liable for negligence
because all of them are responsible for exercising the required reasonable
care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the
students. The individual petitioners are persons charged with the
teaching and vigilance over their students as well as the supervision and
ensuring of their well-being. Based on the facts presented before this
Court, these petitioners were remiss in their responsibilities and lacking
in the degree of vigilance expected of them. [Petitioner] subject teacher
Rosalinda Tabugo was inside the classroom when the class undertook the
science experiment although Jayson insisted that said petitioner left the
classroom. No evidence, however, was presented to establish that
petitioner Tabugo was inside the classroom for the whole duration of the
experiment. It was unnatural in the ordinary course of events that Jayson
was brought to the school clinic for immediate treatment not by
petitioner subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo but by somebody else. The
Court is inclined to believe that petitioner subject teacher Tabugo was not
inside the classroom at the time the accident happened. The Court is also
perplexed why none of the other students (who were eyewitnesses to the
incident) testified in Court to corroborate the story of the petitioners. The
Court, however, understands that these other students cannot testify for
Jayson because Jayson is no longer enrolled in said school and testifying
for Jayson would incur the ire of school authorities. Estefania Abdan is
equally at fault as the subject adviser or teacher in charge because she
exercised control and supervision over petitioner Tabugo and the
students themselves. It was her obligation to insure that nothing would go
wrong and that the science experiment would be conducted safely and
without any harm or injury to the students. Petitioner Sr. Josephini
Ambatali is likewise culpable under the doctrine of command
responsibility because the other individual petitioners were under her
direct control and supervision. The negligent acts of the other individual
petitioners were done within the scope of their assigned tasks.
xxxx
The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by
petitioner St. Joseph College will not exculpate it from liability because it
has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision
of its teachers (despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring)
and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured
environment for conducting dangerous experiments. Petitioner school is
still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it
had full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments but
did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students.
The fact that there has never been any accident in the past during the
conduct of science experiments is not a justification to be complacent in
just preserving the status quo and do away with creative foresight to
install safety measures to protect the students. Schools should not simply
install safety reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals. More
importantly, schools should provide protective gears and devices to shield
students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.
Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend to the school or
university itself, although an educational institution may be held liable
under the principle of RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. It has also been held that
the liability of the employer for the [tortuous] acts or negligence of its
employees is primary and solidary, direct and immediate and not
conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior recourse against the
negligent employee.
Petitioners negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care
and caution is demonstrated by the following:
Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and
injury to its students although it had full information on the
nature of dangerous science experiments conducted by the
students during class;
Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the
students who conduct experiments in class;
Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices,
specifically goggles, to shield students from expected risks and
dangers; and
Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her
class conducted the experiment, specifically, when the
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
accident involving Jayson occurred. In any event, the size of the
classfifty (50) students conducting the experiment is difficult
to monitor.
Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their negligence and liability
by insisting that petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions to her
science class not to look directly into the heated compound.
Aquinas School v. Sps. Inton
Jose Luis Inton Jose Luis was a grade three student at Aquinas School.
Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher
who began teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose
Luis grade three religion class. On July 14, 1998, while Yamyamin was
writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his assigned seat and went over
to a classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed this and
sent Jose Luis back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again and
went over to the same classmate. This time, unable to tolerate the childs
behavior, Yamyamin approached Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs
several times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the classmates seat.
Finally, she told the child to stay where he was on that spot of the room
and finish copying the notes on the blackboard while seated on the floor.
As a result of the incident, respondents Sps. Inton filed an action for
damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas
before the RTC. The Intons also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin
for violation of Republic Act 7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was
sentenced accordingly.
WON Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin?
HELD: The CA found Aquinas liable to Jose Luis based on Article 2180 of
the Civil Code upon the CA’s belief that the school was Yamyamins
employer.
The Court has consistently applied the four-fold test to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship: the employer (a) selects
and engages the employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has power to dismiss
him; and (d) has control over his work. Of these, the most crucial is the
element of control. Control refers to the right of the employer, whether
actually exercised or reserved, to control the work of the employee as well
as the means and methods by which he accomplishes the same.
In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement
with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry,
the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide
catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but
Yamyamins religious congregation that chose her for the task of
catechizing the schools grade three students, much like the way bishops
designate the catechists who would teach religion in public schools.
Under the circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did not have
control over Yamyamins teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the
school directress testimony in this regard. Consequently, it was error for
the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure
that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young
students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to
avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards the students by their
religion teacher.
First, Yamyamins transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed
that she was qualified to teach religion.
Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin
came from a legitimate religious congregation of sisters and that, given
her Christian training, the school had reason to assume that she would
behave properly towards the students.
Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the schools Administrative
Faculty Staff Manual that set the standards for handling students. It also
required her to attend a teaching orientation before she was allowed to
teach beginning that June of 1998.
Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to
teach to ensure that she was really catechizing the students.
And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to
classroom evaluation. Unfortunately, since she was new and it was just
the start of the school year, Aquinas did not have sufficient opportunity to
observe her methods. At any rate, it acted promptly to relieve her of her
assignment as soon as the school learned of the incident. It cannot be said
that Aquinas was guilty of outright neglect.
DE VERA-YALUNG | 19
(iv.) EMPLOYERS
REVISED PENAL CODE
Article 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and
proprietors of establishments. - In default of the persons criminally liable,
innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall
be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases
where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special
police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken
by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for
the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have
notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing
him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore
have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative
may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such
goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
Article 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. - The subsidiary
liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
Primary responsibility of ERs for the negligence of their EEs in the
performance of their duties  the injured party may recover from the
ERs directly, regardless of the solvency of their EEs.
LIABILITY OF THE ERs UNDER THE NCC
ART. 2180 par. 4 - The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed
or on the occasion of their functions.
The ERs shall be liable for the damages caused by their EEs and
household helpers acting w/in the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Liability is direct and primary and likewise solidary with the EE.
EE is not an indispensable part in a case against the ER nor
necessary party bec. complete relief is available from either.
Liability of ER can be established by proving the existence of An
ER-EE relationship w/ the actor and that the latter caused the injury
while performing his assigned task or functions.  ER can escape
liability by establishing that he exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the EE.
REQUISITES:
EE was chosen by the ER personally or through another;
The service to be rendered in accordance w/ orders wc the ER has
authority to give at all times;
The illicit act of the EE was on the occasion or by reason of the functions
entrusted to him.
ELEMENTS ESTABLISHED UNDER ART. 2180 OF THE NCC, WHEN
VICARIOUS LIABILITY WILL ATTACH:
ER-EE relationship bet. the person sought to be made vicariously liable
and the negligent EE;
Liability for quasi-delict of the EE; and [The offended party must establish
fault or negligence on the part of the EE wc was the proximate cause of his
(offended party’s) damage or loss]
Performance by the EE of the task assigned by the ER or the latter’s
authorized representative or EE when damage or injury was inflicted
through fault of negligence was committed.
If EE was not liable for negligence, the ER will not liable as well.
DETERMINATION OF ER-EE RELATIONSHIP
Presence of ER-EE may be established by using what is known as the
control test,
Control test – a person can still be considered ER even if he does not
consider another who works for him as his EE.
Worker is the contractor – if the person for whom the services are to be
performed controls only the result or the end to be achieved; Employee -
if the person controls not only the end but also the manner and means to
be used.
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE (Juris tantum not Juris et de jure)
ER is presumed to be negligent and the presumption flows from the
negligence of the EE. The premise for the ER’s liability is the negligence or
fault on the part of the EE, once such fault is established, the ER can then
be made liable on the basis of the presumption that the ER failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris familia in the selection and supervision of its
EEs.  “When an EE causes damage due to his own negligence while
performing his own duties, there arises a presumption that his ER is
negligent”
The presumption of negligence on the part of the ER is rebuttable
only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of the EE.
DEFENSES OF EMPLOYER
ER can establish that he exercised proper diligence in the selection and
supervision of his negligent EE.
Facts indicating exercised of due diligence must be shown by concrete
proof, including documentary evidence.
1. Diligence in Selection
Requires the examination of the applicants as to their qualifications,
experience and service records. [Submit necessary license, clearances,
underwent examination, tests and training]
2. Diligence in Supervision
Promulgation of proper rules and regulations and the formulation and
publication of proper instructions for the EEs’ guidance in case where
such rules and regulations and instructions are necessary.
SOLIDARY LIABILITY
The weight of authority is to hold the ER and the EE solidarily liable. The
aggrieved party may choose to sue either of them or both of them.
If only ER is sued and made liable for the damages caused by his EE,
he may recover from the EE what he has paid or delivered in
satisfaction of his claim.
If plaintiff decides to sue only the EE, no right of reimbursement
accrues.
If offended party sues both of them, court may hold them solidarily
liable subject to the same right of reimbursement given to the
ER under Art. 2181 of NCC.
========================================================
Filamer vs CA
Funtecha was a working student, a part-time janitor and a scholar of
petitioner Filamer. Funtecha requested and was allowed by the driver and
security guard of petitioner-school, Allan Masa, to take over the vehicle
while the latter was on his way home, (Allan's job demands that he drive
home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of
the next school day.) Allan turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after
driving down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing
that the road was clear, then a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly
hit them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon
swerving, they heard a sound as if something had bumped against the
vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved
towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane
in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him. Allan affirmed that
Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to the right. At the time of the
incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had only one functioning
headlight.
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of
Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was
not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own"
but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the
petitioner school. Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the
act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in
behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny
any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his
janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for
purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes
any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the
employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of
the injury or damage. Hence, there is this claim brought by one for
DE VERA-YALUNG | 20
damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person,
against both doer-employee and his employer.
Whether or not the Funtecha was at the time of the accident performing
any act in furtherance of his petitioner-school even if it is not in line with
his job?
HELD: YES. Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not
have an official appointment for a driver's position in order that the
petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being
sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the
benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school
driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not
relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris
tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a
servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has
failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a
good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
The Court reiterates that supervision includes the formulation of suitable
rules and regulations for the guidance of its employees and the issuance
of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and
persons with whom the employer has relations through his employees.
An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary
discipline called for in the performance of any act indispensable to the
business and beneficial to their employer.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such
rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees from
taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or
prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing
another employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner
has failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees
against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising
from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle.
In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law
imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its
employees. The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary
and solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against the
negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the
plaintiff.
Valenzuela vs CA
Plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer from
her restaurant to her home, heading towards the direction of Manila. She
noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place
where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to
solicit help if needed, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet
away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the
rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her
car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she
was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant
Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander
Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the
windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell
to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's
left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and
sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to a medical
center where she was found to have a "traumatic amputation, leg, left up
to distal thigh (above knee)". She was confined in the hospital for twenty
(20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. Plaintiff filed a
complaint or an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for
serious physical injuries sustained in the vehicular accident., Defendant
Richard Li denied that he was negligent.
Whether Li’s employer Alexander Commercial should be jointly and
solidarily liable for the damage caused by the subject accident
HELD: YES. Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, we are of the opinion that Li's employer,
Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage
caused by the accident of June 24, 1990.
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial,
Inc. In his testimony, he admitted that his functions as Assistant Manager
did not require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was
required quite often to perform work outside the office, visiting
prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with company clients.
These meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours
because, as a managerial employee tasked with the job of
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
representing his company with its clients, meetings with clients were
both social as well as work-related functions. The service car assigned to
Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li - as well as the
corporation - to put up the front of a highly successful entity, increasing
the latter's goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting
between Li and its clients by providing the former with a convenient
mode of travel.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our
satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the
family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to
whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or
ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full
and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the
burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for
entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of
bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the
former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the
accident. WHEREFORE, decision of CA is modified w/ the effect of
reinstating judgment of RTC.
Castilex Indurstries vs Vasquez
Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente
Osmenñ a Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of
traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was
also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other
hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial
Corporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up. Abad drove
the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the
Osmenñ a rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in
proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided
with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his
vehicle and brought Vasquez to the hospital.
Vasquez died. Hence, the present action for damages was commenced by
the parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin
Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation.
Whether CASTILEX may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting
from the negligent operation by a managerial employee (ABAD) of a
company-issued vehicle.
HELD: NO. It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of
petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence and he was acting
within the scope of his assigned task, however, the mere fact that ABAD
was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of
itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent
operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the
vehicle within the course or scope of his employment.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at
the petitioner's office, thereafter, he went to Goldie's Restaurant, where
ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when ABAD
was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. That a
witness testified that at the time of the vehicular accident, ABAD was with
a woman in his car, who then shouted: "Daddy, Daddy!" This woman could
not have been ABAD's daughter, for ABAD was only 29 years old at the
time.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was
carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he
figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August
1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's working day had
ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a
place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes,
pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioner's
business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather,
using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe
benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope
of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to
show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require
that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of
the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the appealed decision and
resolution of the CAis AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner
Castilex Industrial Corporation be absolved of any liability for the
damages caused by its employee, Jose Benjamin Abad.
Jose vs CA
DE VERA-YALUNG | 21
Petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corporation (MCL) is the operator-
lessee of a public utility bus (Bus 203) owned by the Metro Manila Transit
Corporation and is insured with the GSIS.
Bus 203, then driven by petitioner Armando Jose, collided with a red Ford
Escort driven by John Macarubo on MacArthur Highway, in Marulas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. As a result of the collision, the left side of the
Ford Escort's hood was severely damaged while its driver, John Macarubo,
and its lone passenger, private respondent Rommel Abraham, were
seriously injured. The driver and conductress of Bus 203 rushed
Macarubo and Abraham to the nearby hospital where Macarubo lapsed
into a coma. Despite surgery, Macarubo failed to recover and died five
days later. Abraham survived, but he became blind on the left eye which
had to be removed. In addition, he sustained a fracture on the forehead
and multiple lacerations on the face, which caused him to be hospitalized
for a week.
Rommel Abraham, represented by his father, Felixberto, instituted a Civil
Case for damages against petitioners MCL and Armando Jose in the RTC of
Valenzuela while spouses Jose and Mercedes Macarubo, parents of the
deceased John Macarubo, filed their own suit for damages in the same
trial court against MCL alone. On the other hand, MCL filed a third-party
complaint against Juanita Macarubo, registered owner of the Ford Escort
on the theory that John Macarubo was negligent and that he was the
"authorized driver" of Juanita Macarubo.
I1: Whether proof of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees on the part of MCL is required
I2: Whether the burden upon MCL to prove that Juanita Macarubo is one
of those specified persons who are vicariously liable for the negligence of
the deceased John Macarubo was duly proven
HELD1: NO. Before the presumption of the employer's negligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees can arise, the negligence of the
employee must first be established. While the allegations of negligence
against the employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the
complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict under Art. 2180
of the Civil Code, the failure to prove the employee's negligence during the
trial is fatal to proving the employer's vicarious liability. In this case,
private respondents failed to prove their allegation of negligence against
driver Armando Jose who, in fact, was acquitted in the case for criminal
negligence arising from the same incident.
HELD2: NO. MCL alleged that Juanita Macarubo was the registered owner
of the Ford Escort car and that John Macarubo was the "authorized
driver" of the car. Nowhere was it alleged that John Macarubo was the son,
ward, employee or pupil of private respondent Juanita Macarubo so as to
make the latter vicariously liable for the negligence of John Macarubo.
The allegation that John Macarubo was "the authorized driver" of the Ford
Escort is not equivalent to an allegation that he was an employee of
Juanita Macarubo. That John Macarubo was the "authorized driver" of the
car simply means that he drove the Ford Escort with the permission of
Juanita Macarubo. Nor did MCL present any evidence to prove that Juanita
Macarubo was the employer of John Macarubo or that she is in any way
liable for John Macarubo's negligence under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
For failure to discharge its burden, MCL's third-party complaint should be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA is REVERSED and the complaints
filed in Civil Cases against MCLand Armando Jose, as well as the third-
party complaint filed in Civil Case against Juanita Macarubo, are hereby
DISMISSED.
Cerezo vs Tuazon
A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle bearing plate
number along Captain M. Palo Street, Sta. Ines, Mabalacat, Pampanga. On
1 October 1993, tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages
against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her husband Attorney Juan
Cerezo, and bus driver Danilo A. Foronda ("Foronda").
The records show that the Cerezo spouses participated in the proceedings
before the trial court by filing a comment with motion for bill or
particulars.
Whether the trial court should also acquire jurisdiction over Fronda to
validly render a judgment
HELD: NO. the basis of the present action of Tuazon is quasi-delict under
the Civil Code, not delict under the Revised Penal Code. The same
negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to an action for a quasi-
delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An aggrieved party may
choose between the two remedies. An action based on a quasi-delict may
proceed independently from the criminal action.36There is, however, a
distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil liability
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy, whether to sue for a
delict or a quasi-delict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of
the action. Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-
delict. In his complaint, Tuazon alleged that Mrs. Cerezo, "without
exercising due care and diligence in the supervision and management of
her employees and buses," hired Foronda as her driver. Tuazon became
disabled because of Foronda’s "recklessness, gross negligence and
imprudence," aggravated by Mrs. Cerezo’s "lack of due care and diligence
in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly Foronda."
Mrs. Cerezo’s liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not
only solidary, it is also primary and direct. Foronda is not an
indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazon’s action for damages
against Mrs. Cerezo. The responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary obligation on
the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire
obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in
full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual
representation.41 Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of
the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party
because complete relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction
over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from
Mrs. Cerezo alone.
Moreover, an employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and
direct, while the employer’s liability based on a delict is merely
subsidiary. Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the
negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer
directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the
employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or
avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns. While the
employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee’s
criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and
separately for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence
in selecting and supervising his employee. The idea that the employer’s
liability is solely subsidiary is wrong.
There is no need in this case for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over
Foronda. The trial court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezo is
sufficient to dispose of the present case on the merits. WHEREFORE, we
DENY the instant petition for review.
Phil. Rabbit vs Phil-Am Forwarders
In the complaint for damages filed by the bus company and Pangalangan
against Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda, it was alleged
that on November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck,
owned by PAFI, along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The
truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by PRBL,
Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus
was damaged and could not be used for 79 days thus depriving the
company of earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager
of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. Among the defenses interposed by the
defendants in their answer was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer.
Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the
ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action
against him.
Whether the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise" used in article 2180 of the Civil Code,
embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless
operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from
which the damage arose
HELD: NO. Terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be
gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager"
("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer".
Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-
delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of PAFI, in
connection with the vehicular accident already mentioned because he
himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer,
PAFI, PAFI. has a personality separate and distinct from that of the
Balingit spouses. WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of dismissal is
affirmed. Costs against the plaintiffs-appellants. SO ORDERED.
Sps Jayme vs Apostol
Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-
up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Mun. of
Koronadal.The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo
Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano
borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan
Airport at General Santos City to catch his Manila flight. The pick-up truck
DE VERA-YALUNG | 22
accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the
National Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato. The intensity
of the collision sent Marvin some fifty (50) meters away from the point of
impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at
the time of the accident. Marvin sustained severe head injuries with
subdural hematoma and diffused cerebral contusion. Despite medical
attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident.
Petitioners spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, the parents of
Marvin, filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against respondent,
they prayed that all respondents be held solidarily liable for their loss.
In their respective Answers, all respondents denied liability for Marvin's
death. Apostol and Simbulan averred that Lozano took the pick-up truck
without their consent. Miguel and Lozano pointed out that Marvin's
sudden sprint across the highway made it impossible to avoid the
accident. Yet, Miguel denied being on board the vehicle when it hit
Marvin. The Mun. of Koronadal adopted the answer of Lozano and Miguel.
Whether Mayor Miguel was Lozano's employer and, hence, solidarily
liable for the latter's negligent act, hence, should have exercised due care
and diligence in the supervision of Lozano
HELD: NO. In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano's
employer nor the vehicle's registered owner. There existed no causal
relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make
him accountable for Marvin's death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger
at the time of the accident. Parenthetically, it has been held that the failure
of a passenger to assist the driver, by providing him warnings or by
serving as lookout does not make the passenger liable for the latter's
negligent acts. The driver's duty is not one that may be delegated to
others. The true and lawful employer of Lozano is the Municipality of
Koronadal. Unfortunately for Spouses Jayme, the municipality may not be
sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in governmental
functions and, hence, immune from suit.
Verily, liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and
his direct employer.
The accidental death of Marvin Jayme is a tragic loss for his parents.
However, justice demands that only those liable under our laws be held
accountable for Marvin's demise. Justice can not sway in favor of
petitioners simply to assuage their pain and loss. The law on the matter is
clear: only the negligent driver, the driver's employer, and the registered
owner of the vehicle are liable for the death of a third person resulting
from the negligent operation of the vehicle.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
========================================================
(v.) INKEEPERS AND HOTELKEEPERS
ART. 102 of the RPC provides that innkeepers, tavernkeepers and any
other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for the crimes
committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of
municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall
have been committed by them or their employees, in default of the
persons criminally liable.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken
by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for
the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have
notified in advance the innkeeper himself or the person representing him,
of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have
followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may
have given them wrt the care and vigilance over such goods,
No liability shall attach in case of robbery w/ violence against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper’s
EEs.
Article 2000. The responsibility referred to in the two preceding articles
shall include the loss of, or injury to the personal property of the guests
caused by the servants or employees of the keepers of hotels or inns as
well as strangers; but not that which may proceed from any force
majeure. The fact that travellers are constrained to rely on the vigilance of
the keeper of the hotels or inns shall be considered in determining the
degree of care required of him. (1784a)
Article 2001. The act of a thief or robber, who has entered the hotel is not
deemed force majeure, unless it is done with the use of arms or through
an irresistible force. (n)
Article 2002. The hotel-keeper is not liable for compensation if the loss is
due to the acts of the guest, his family, servants or visitors, or if the loss
arises from the character of the things brought into the hotel. (n)
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
Article 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by
posting notices to the effect that he is not liable for the articles brought by
the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the guest
whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in articles 1998 to
2001 is suppressed or diminished shall be void. (n)
========================================================
Makati Shangri-la Hotel vs Harper
In the first week of November 1999, Christian Harper came to Manila on a
business trip. He checked in at the Shangri-La Hotel and was billeted at
Room 1428. He was due to check out on November 6, 1999. In the early
morning of that date, however, he was murdered inside his hotel room by
still unidentified malefactors. He was then 30 years old.
It appears that at around 11:00 am of November 6, 1999, a Caucasian
male expressed interest in purchasing a Cartier lady’s watch with the use
of two Mastercard credit cards and an American Express credit card
issued in the name of Harper. But the customer’s difficulty in answering
the queries phoned in by a credit card representative sufficiently aroused
the suspicion of saleslady, probably sensing trouble for himself, the
customer hurriedly left the store, and left the three credit cards and the
passport behind.
In the meanwhile, Harper’s family in Norway must have called him at his
hotel room to inform him about the attempt to use his American Express
card. Not getting any response from the room, his family requested
Raymond Alarcon, the Duty Manager of the Shangri-La Hotel, to check on
Harper’s room. Alarcon and a security personnel went to Room 1428 at
11:27 a.m., and were shocked to discover Harper’s lifeless body on the
bed. The police investigation actually commenced, they found Harper’s
body on the bed covered with a blanket, and only the back of the head
could be seen. Lifting the blanket, Mendoza saw that the victim’s eyes and
mouth had been bound with electrical and packaging tapes, and his hands
and feet tied with a white rope. The body was identified to be that of hotel
guest Christian Fredrik Harper.
Respondents commenced this suit in the RTC to recover various damages
from petitioner.
Whether petitioner Makati Shangri-la Hotel was liable due to its own
negligence
HELD: YES. Petitioner failed to provide the basic and adequate security
measures expected of a five-star hotel; and that its omission was the
proximate cause of Harper’s death. The testimony of Col. De Guzman
revealed that the management practice prior to the murder of Harper had
been to deploy only one security or roving guard for every three or four
floors of the building; that such ratio had not been enough considering
the L-shape configuration of the hotel that rendered the hallways not
visible from one or the other end; and that he had recommended to
management to post a guard for each floor, but his recommendation had
been disapproved because the hotel "was not doing well" at that
particular time.
The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public,
hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but also
security to the persons and belongings of their guests. The twin duty
constitutes the essence of the business. Applying by analogy Article 2000
Article 2001 and Article 2002 of the Civil Code (all of which concerned the
hotelkeepers’ degree of care and responsibility as to the personal effects of
their guests), we hold that there is much greater reason to apply the same if
not greater degree of care and responsibility when the lives and personal
safety of their guests are involved. Otherwise, the hotelkeepers would simply
stand idly by as strangers have unrestricted access to all the hotel rooms on
the pretense of being visitors of the guests, without being held liable should
anything untoward befall the unwary guests. That would be absurd, something
that no good law would ever envision. In fine, the Court sees no reversible-
error on the part of the CA.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the Court of Appeals;
and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
Sps. Mamaril vs The Boy Scout of the Philippines
Sps. Mamaril are jeepney operators since 1971. They would park their
6 passenger jeepneys every night at the Boy Scout of the Philippines'
(BSP) compound. On May 26, 1995 at 8 o'clock in the evening, all these
vehicles were parked inside the BSP compound. The following morning,
however, one of the vehicles was missing and was never recovered.
According to the security guards Penñ a and Gaddi of AIB Security Agency,
Inc. with whom BSP had contracted for its security and protection, a male
person who looked familiar to them took the subject vehicle out of the
compound.
DE VERA-YALUNG | 23
Sps. Mamaril filed a complaint for damages before RTC against BSP, AIB,
Penñ a and Gaddi. In support thereof, Sps. Mamaril averred that the loss of
the subject vehicle was due to the gross negligence of the above-named
security guards on-duty who allowed the subject vehicle to be driven out
by a stranger despite their agreement that only authorized drivers duly
endorsed by the owners could do so. BSP denied any liability contending
that not only did Sps. Mamaril directly deal with AIB with respect to the
manner by which the parked vehicles would be handled, but the parking
ticket itself expressly stated that the "Management shall not be
responsible for loss of vehicle or any of its accessories or article left
therein." It also claimed that Sps. Mamaril erroneously relied on the Guard
Service Contract. Apart from not being parties thereto, its provisions
cover only the protection of BSP's properties, its officers, and employees.
WON the BSP is liable in the instant case due to the negligence of the
Security guards? NO!
HELD: It is undisputed that the proximate cause of the loss of Sps.
Mamaril's vehicle was the negligent act of security guards Penñ a and Gaddi
in allowing an unidentified person to drive out the subject vehicle.
Moreover, Penñ a and Gaddi failed to refute Sps. Mamaril's contention that
they readily admitted being at fault during the investigation that ensued.
As it was ruled by the CA: There was negligence on the part of security
guards Penñ a and Gaddi. However, it absolved BSP from any liability,
holding that the Guard Service Contract is purely between BSP and AIB
and that there was nothing therein that would indicate any obligation
and/or liability on the part of BSP in favor of third persons, such as Sps.
Mamaril. Nor was there evidence sufficient to establish that BSP was
negligent. It further ruled that the agreement between Sps. Mamaril and
BSP was substantially a contract of lease whereby the former paid
parking fees to the latter for the lease of parking slots. As such, the lessor,
BSP, was not an insurer nor bound to take care and/or protect the lessees'
vehicles.
Neither will the vicarious liability of an employer under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code apply in this case. It is uncontested that Penñ a and Gaddi
were assigned as security guards by AIB to BSP pursuant to the Guard
Service Contract. Clearly, therefore, no employer-employee relationship
existed between BSP and the security guards assigned in its premises.
Consequently, the latter's negligence cannot be imputed against BSP but
should be attributed to AIB, the true employer of Penñ a and Gaddi.
Nor can it be said that a principal-agent relationship existed between BSP
and the security guards Penñ a and Gaddi as to make the former liable for
the latter's complained act. The basis for agency therefore is
representation which element is absent in the instant case. Records show
that BSP merely hired the services of AIB, which, in turn, assigned
security guards, solely for the protection of its properties and premises.
Nowhere can it be inferred in the Guard Service Contract that AIB was
appointed as an agent of BSP. Instead, what the parties intended was a
pure principal-client relationship whereby for a consideration, AIB
rendered its security services to BSP.
========================================================
(vi.) SPOUSES
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY
FC: In the absence of a marriage settlement or when the marriage
settlement agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community
property shall govern.
ACP – Spouses jointly own all properties of the marriage or acquired
thereafter subject only to few XPNs.
Specie of vicarious liability is imposed under the system of ACP bec. it is
expressly provided in par. 9 of the Art. 94 of the FC that the ACP shall be
liable for “liabilities incurred by either spouses by reason of a crime or a
quasi-delict, in the case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive
property of the debtor-spouse. Payments made shall be considered
advances to be deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon
liquidation of the community”
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
Future spouses may agree in the marriage settlement that the regime of
CPG shall govern their property relations during marriage instead of the
ACP regime.  In the absence of any marriage settlement or if the
marriage settlement agreed upon is void, the system of CPG governs the
property relations of those who were married prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code.
GR: Pecuniary indemnities imposed upon the husband or wife are not
chargeable against the CPG but against the separate properties of the
wrongdoer.
SC: Juaniza vs Jose: imposes liability on the conjugal partnership for the
tort committed by the driver of a vehicle who was hired in furtherance of
the husband’s business. Since the profits inured to the benefit of the
partnership, the liabilities to it must also be born by the partnership.
CPG should be made liable if one of the spouses committed the tort while
performing a business or if the act was supposed to benefit the
partnership.
Art. 122 of the Family Code “the payment of personal debts contracted
by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to conjugal partnership XPT insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family” Tort indemnity may be enforced against the
partnership assets provided that liabilities mentioned in Art. 121 are
satisfied.
REGIME OF SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
If separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlement or
approved by the court, each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess,
administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate.
To each spouse shall belong all earnings from his/her profession,
business or industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil due or
received during the marriage from his or her separate property.
Each spouse is responsible for his/her separate obligation. This includes
obligation arising from quasi-delict for the act or omission committed by
one of the spouses.
(vii.) REGISTERED OWNER RULE
RATIONALE
RULE: Person who is the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for any
damages caused by the negligent operation of the vehicle although the
same was already sold.  Registered owner is liable to the injured party
subject to his right of recourse against the transferee or the buyer.
PROOF
In all cases when the registered owner rule is invoked, the person
invoking the rule a particular defendant must prove that the said
defendant is the registered owner of the vehicle. [Best evidence is the
certificate of registration]
LIABILITY OF TRANSFEREE
If registered owner is made liable despite the transfer of the vehicle, the
transferee is liable to the registered owner for the damages caused to the
passenger.  He has the right to be reimbursed by the transferee.
3rd party complaint against the transferee may be appropriate in a
case filed by the injured passenger against the registered
owner.
QUASI-DELICT CASES
The rule is usually applied to common carriers but the SC already
extended the rule to quasi-delict cases involving private vehicles.
Registered owner rule had been applied to cases involving
enforcement of liability against an ER under Art. 2180 of the
NCC even if the ER is not engaged in business.
======================================================== Del
Carmen vs Bacoy
At dawn on New Years Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud along with
her spouse Leonardo Monsalud, Sr. and their daughter Glenda Monsalud,
were on their way home from a Christmas party they attended. Upon
reaching Purok Paglaom in Sominot, they were run over by a Fuso
passenger jeep that was being driven by Allan Maglasang. The jeep was
registered in the name of petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr. and used as a
DE VERA-YALUNG | 24
public utility vehicle. Because of the unfortunate incident, for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide was filed against Allan.
During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilias father, Geronimo
Bacoy (Geronimo), an independent civil action for damages based on
culpa aquiliana. Aside from Allan, also impleaded therein were his alleged
employers, namely, the Spouses del Carmen and the registered owner of
the jeep, their son Oscar Jr. Geronimo. Defendants refused to assume civil
liability for the victims deaths. Oscar Sr. averred that the Monsaluds have
no cause of action against them because he and his wife do not own the
jeep and that they were never the employers of Allan. For his part, Oscar
Jr. claimed to be a victim himself. He alleged that Allan and his friends
stole his jeep while it was parked beside his drivers rented house to take
it for a joyride. Both he and a vehicle mechanic testified that the subject
jeep can easily be started by mere pushing sans the ignition key. The
vehicles engine shall then run but without any headlights on. And
implying that the vehicle was illegally taken.
WON the registered owner Oscar Geronimo is also liable? YES!
HELD: Negligence is presumed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Assuming arguendo that Allan stole the jeep by having the same pushed
by a group, the ignition key should then be with Rodrigo as he was
entrusted with the jeeps possession. Thus, at the time Rodrigo faced his
employer hours after the incident, it is reasonable to expect that the
driver should have also returned the key to the operator together with the
Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration. Notably, Rodrigo did not do
so and instead, the key was allegedly handed over to the police for
reasons unexplained and not available from the records. Interestingly,
Oscar Jr. never presented Rodrigo as his witness. Neither was he able to
attest on cross-examination that Allan really stole the jeep by pushing or
that the key was handed over to him by Rodrigo.
While Oscar Jr. highlights that the headlights were not on to support his
claim that his jeep was stolen, this circumstance by itself will not prove
that it really was stolen.
What this Court instead finds worthy of credence is the CAs conclusion
that Oscar Jr. gave his implied permission for Allan to use the jeep. This is
in view of Oscar Jr.s failure to provide solid proof that he ensured that the
parking area is well secured and that he had expressly imposed
restrictions as to the use of the jeep when he entrusted the same to his
driver Rodrigo. As fittingly inferred by the CA, the jeep could have been
endorsed to Allan by his brother Rodrigo since as already mentioned,
Oscar Jr. did not give Rodrigo any specific and strict instructions on
matters regarding its use. Rodrigo therefore is deemed to have been given
the absolute discretion as to the vehicles operation, including the
discretion to allow his brother Allan to use it.
The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to third
persons for the deaths or injuries consequent to its operation, regardless
of whether the employee drove the registered owners vehicle in
connection with his employment. The main aim of motor vehicle
registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or
that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered
owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public
highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles
without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant
means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so
inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle
registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of
persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways.
Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use or that the subject vehicle
was stolenwhich are valid defenses available to a registered owner, Oscar
Jr. cannot escape liability for quasi-delict resulting from his jeeps use.
Filcar Transport Services vs Espinas
Respondent Jose A. Espinas was driving his car along Leon Guinto Street
in Manila. Upon reaching the intersection of Leon Guinto and President
Quirino Streets, Espinas stopped his car. When the signal light turned
green, he proceeded to cross the intersection. He was already in the
middle of the intersection when another car, traversing President Quirino
Street and going to Roxas Boulevard, suddenly hit and bumped his car. As
a result of the impact, Espinas car turned clockwise. The other car
escaped from the scene of the incident, but Espinas was able to get its
plate number. After verifying with the Land Transportation Office,
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
Espinas learned that the owner of the other car, is Filcar. Espinas sent
several letters to Filcar and to its President and General Manager Carmen
Flor, demanding payment for the damages sustained by his car. Filcar
denied any liability to Espinas and claimed that the incident was not due
to its fault or negligence since Floresca was not its employee but that of
Atty. Flor. Filcar and Carmen Flor both said that they always exercised the
due diligence required of a good father of a family in leasing or assigning
their vehicles to third parties.
Whether Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle which figured in
an accident, may be held liable for the damages caused to Espinas?
HELD: Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver,
Floresca, and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. It is undisputed that Filcar is the registered
owner of the motor vehicle which hit and caused damage to Espinas car;
and it is on the basis of this fact that we hold Filcar primarily and directly
liable to Espinas for damages. As a general rule, one is only responsible
for his own act or omission. Thus, a person will generally be held liable
only for the torts committed by himself and not by another. This general
rule is laid down in Article 2176 of the Civil Code. One exception is an
employer who is made vicariously liable for the tort committed by his
employee is under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, an
action predicated on an employees act or omission may be instituted
against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission
committed by his employee. Although the employer is not the actual
tortfeasor, the law makes him vicariously liable on the basis of the civil
law principle of pater familias for failure to exercise due care and
vigilance over the acts of ones subordinates to prevent damage to another.
In the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the employer may
invoke the defense that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. As its core defense, Filcar contends that Article
2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code is inapplicable
because it presupposes the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. According to Filcar, it cannot be held liable under the subject
provisions because the driver of its vehicle at the time of the accident,
Floresca, is not its employee but that of its Corporate Secretary, Atty. Flor.
We cannot agree. It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps,
the registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered as the
employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable for the
tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in relation with Article
2180, of the Civil Code.
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner
so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is
caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor
can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Thus,
whether there is an employer-employee relationship between the
registered owner and the driver is irrelevant in determining the liability
of the registered owner who the law holds primarily and directly
responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the operation of
the vehicle in the streets and highways.
========================================================
(viii.) RENT-A-CAR BUSINESS
LEASED VEHICLES
The registered owner rule applies even if the registered owner leased the
vehicle to another who is the actual operator. – Registered owner is
directly liable.
To be free from liability, the lessor-owner should register the lease
contract w/ the LTO. The lease should be annotated in the cert.
of registration in order that there will be notice to 3 rd parties
that the lessee and not the registered owner who is in
possession and operating the vehicle.
========================================================
FGU Insurance Corp vs CA
This was a two-car collision at dawn. At around 3 o'clock of 21 April 1987,
2 vehicles, both Mitsubishi Colt Lancers, figured in a traffic accident. The
car bearing Plate No. PDG 435 owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven
at the outer lane of the highway by Benjamin Jacildone, while the other
car, with Plate No. PCT 792, owned by respondent FILCAR and driven by
Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee, was at the center lane, left of
DE VERA-YALUNG | 25
the other vehicle. Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer Street, the car
owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car of
Soriano. At that time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not possess a
Philippine driver's license. Petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation, in view
of its insurance contract with Soriano, paid the latter P25,382.20. By way
of subrogation it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well as
respondent Fortune Insurance Corporation as insurer of FILCAR for
quasi-delict.
WON the registered owner FILCAR is liable for damages suffered by third
persons although the vehicle is leased to another? NO!
HELD: The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a
presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made
responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due care
and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing
damage. Yet, as correctly observed by respondent court, Art. 2180 is
hardly applicable because none of the circumstances mentioned
therein obtains in the case under consideration. Respondent FILCAR
being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car
leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no vinculum juris between
them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way
be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being
an employer of the latter.
We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same Code
which provides: "In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable
with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have by the use
of due diligence, prevented the misfortune . . . . If the owner was not in the
motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable." Obviously, this
provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of
master-driver relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen.
Clearly, petitioner has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on
the basis of quasi-delict; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE
can neither prosper. Petitioner's insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial
Corporation is rooted in a misapprehension of our ruling therein. In that
case, the negligent and reckless operation of the truck owned by
petitioner corporation caused injuries to several persons and damage to
property. Intending to exculpate itself from liability, the corporation
raised the defense that at the time of the collision it had no more control
over the vehicle as it was leased to another; and, that the driver was not
its employee but of the lessee. The trial court was not persuaded as it
found that the true nature of the alleged lease contract was nothing more
than a disguise effected by the corporation to relieve itself of the burdens
and responsibilities of an employer. We upheld this finding and affirmed
the declaration of joint and several liability of the corporation with its
driver.
========================================================
(ix.) ART. 2185 NCC
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n)
========================================================
Añonuevo vs CA
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Aonuevo,
traversing the opposite lane was driving his Lancer car. Aonuevo was in
the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the
collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which
necessitated his hospitalization several times. Villagracia instituted an
action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils. (owner of the car),
Inc. and Aonuevo. Aonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic
regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets
thereon. He posits that Article 2185 of the New Civil Code applies by
analogy.
Whether Article 2185 NCC, which presumes the driver of a motor vehicle
negligent if he was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the mishap,
should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles? NO!
HELD: There is a fundamental flaw in Aonuevos analysis of Art. 2185, as
applicable today. He premises that the need for the distinction between
motorized and non-motorized vehicles arises from the relative mass of
number of these vehicles. The more pertinent basis for the segregate
classification is the difference in type of these vehicles. A motorized
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine unlike a non-motorized
vehicle, which runs as a result of a direct exertion by man or beast of
burden of direct physical force. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the
limitations in physical exertion. is capable of greater speeds and
acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the same time, motorized
vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the
event of an accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors
peculiar to the motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative
greater bulk of mass, and greater combustability due to the fuels that they
use.
As admitted by appellant Aonuevo, he first saw appellee Villagracia at a
distance of about 10 meters before the accident. Corrolarily, therefore, he
could have avoided the accident had he stopped alongside with an earlier
jeep which was already at a full stop giving way to appellee. But according
to eyewitness Sorsano, he saw appellant Aonuevo umaarangkada and hit
the leg of Villagracia. This earlier jeep at a full stop gave way to Villagracia
to proceed but Aonuevo at an unexpected motion came out hitting
Villagracia. Aonuevo admitted that he did not blow his horn when he
crossed Boni Avenue. By Aonuevos own admission, he had seen
Villagracia at a good distance of 10 meters. Had he been decelerating, as
he should, as he made the turn, Aonuevo would have had ample
opportunity to avoid hitting Villagracia. Moreover, the fact that Aonuevo
had sighted Villagracia before the accident would negate any possibility
that the absence of lights on the bike contributed to the cause of the
accident. A motorist has been held liable for injury to or death of a
bicyclist where the motorist turned suddenly into the bicyclist so as to
cause a collision. Neither does Aonuevo attempt before this Court to
establish a causal connection between the safety violations imputed to
Villagracia and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative
presumption that these violations in themselves sufficiently established
negligence appreciable against Villagracia.
As between Anñ onuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged
Aonuevo as solely responsible for the accident. The petition does not
demonstrate why this finding should be reversed. It is hard to imagine
that the same result would not have occurred even if Villagracias bicycle
had been equipped with safety equipment. Aonuevo himself admitted
having seen Villagracia from 10 meters away, thus he could no longer
claim not having been sufficiently warned either by headlights or safety
horns. The fact that Aonuevo was recklessly speeding as he made the turn
likewise leads us to believe that even if Villagracias bicycle had been
equipped with the proper brakes, the cyclist would not have had
opportunity to brake in time to avoid the speeding car. Moreover, it was
incumbent on Aonuevo to have established that Villagracias failure to
have installed the proper brakes contributed to his own injury. The fact
that Aonuevo failed to adduce proof to that effect leads us to consider
such causal connection as not proven.
========================================================
(x.) STATE
STATE LIABILITY
Constitution: State cannot be sued without its consent. Consent of the
State to be sued can be manifested through a special law or general law
allowing the State to be sued.
SPECIAL AGENTS
Par. 5 of Art. 2180 The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is
provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
The liability is limited to acts of special agents. A special agent is one
who receives definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office is he is a special official.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries
suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed
in:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of
the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control or supervision. (n)
DE VERA-YALUNG | 26
It is not necessary for the defective street to belong to the province, city or
municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either
control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.
LGC cannot escape liability by claiming that its officials do not have
knowledge or the existence of excavations on its road; the obligation to
make the road safe is a continuing obligation.
========================================================
Meritt vs Govt of the PH
Plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of
Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to
twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet
from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital
ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, turned suddenly and
unexpectedly without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which
movement it struck the plaintiff. By reason of the resulting collision, the
plaintiff was so severely injured. As the negligence which caused the
collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government,
the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the
damages resulting therefrom.
WON the Government is also liable due to the negligence of the chauffeur?
NO!
HELD: All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be
sued by an individual without its consent. It is also admitted that the
instant case is one against the Government. The plaintiff was authorized
to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance
of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if
any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision. The Act
(An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the
Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to
appear in said suit.) was passed "in order that said questions may be
decided." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the
negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the
defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by
the plaintiff as a result of the collision.
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes
to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same,
on that the person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in
the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It follows
therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not
responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the
functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even
negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of
branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case
wherein it acts through a special agent and a special agent, in the sense in
which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed
order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he
is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound
to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This
concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the
acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the
functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and
which are regulated by law and the regulations."
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine
Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees
when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of
article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the
General Hospital was not such an agent.
City of Manila vs Teotico
Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos
Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he
managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down
from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an
uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue.
Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses
and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As a
consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of
First Instance of Manila, a complaint.
The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed
by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila)
reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to
persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the
Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the
provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers
while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages
for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of
defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or supervision.?
HELD: The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we
think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is
concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a
general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions
above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule
regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to
persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce
the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand,
Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making
"provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death
of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of
the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other-public works under their control or supervision." In other words, said
section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless
of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to
"defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon
the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive
thereon.
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for
damages: 1) because the accident involving him took place in a national
highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has not been negligent in
connection therewith.
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of
fact not made in the answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged in his
complaint, as well as in his amended complaint, that his injuries were due
to the defective condition of a street which is "under the supervision and
control" of the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in
turn, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been
constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm
drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers
concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of
their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus,
the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its
control and supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national
highway was made, for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration of
the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore, a
question of fact, which had not been put in issue in the trial court, and
cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the
rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the
reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the
liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets
belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is
exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or
municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road.
DE VERA-YALUNG | 27

GSIS vs Deang
Spouses Deang obtained a housing loan from the GSIS. Under the
agreement, the loan was to mature on December 23, 1979. The loan was
secured by a real estate mortgage constituted over the spouses' property
covered by a TCT issued by the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. As
required by the mortgage deed, the spouses Daeng deposited the owner's
duplicate copy of the title with the GSIS. 11 months before the maturity of
the loan, the spouses Deang settled their debt with the GSIS 8 and
requested for the release of the owner's duplicate copy of the title.
However, personnel of the GSIS were not able to release the owner's
duplicate of the title as it could not be found despite diligent search.
spouses Deang filed a complaint against GSIS for damages, claiming that
as result of the delay in releasing the duplicate copy of the owner's title,
they were unable to secure a loan. GSIS, citing the sixth paragraph of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code argues that as a GOCC, it falls within the
term "State" and cannot be held vicariously liable for negligence
committed by its employee acting within his functions.
Whether the GSIS, as a GOCC primarily performing governmental
functions, is liable for a negligent act of its employee acting within the
scope of his assigned tasks? YES!
HELD: Under the facts, there was a pre-existing contract between the
parties. GSIS and the spouses Deang had a loan agreement secured by a
real estate mortgage. The duty to return the owner's duplicate copy of
title arose as soon as the mortgage was released. GSIS insists that it was
under no obligation to return the owner's duplicate copy of the title
immediately. This insistence is not warranted. Negligence is obvious as
the owners' duplicate copy could not be returned to the owners. Since
good faith is presumed and bad faith is a matter of fact which should be
proved,29 we shall treat GSIS as a party who defaulted in its obligation to
return the owners' duplicate copy of the title. As an obligor in good faith,
GSIS is liable for all the "natural and probable consequences of the breach
of the obligation." The inability of the spouses Deang to secure another
loan and the damages they suffered thereby has its roots in the failure of
the GSIS to return the owners' duplicate copy of the title.
========================================================
(xi.) LIABILITTY OF INSURER
========================================================
Malayan Insurance vs CA
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., issued in favor of private respondent Sio Choy
Private Car Comprehensive Policy, effective from 18 April 1967 to 18 April
1968, covering a Willys jeep. The insurance coverage was for "own
damage" not to exceed P600.00 and "third-party liability" in the amount
of P20,000.00. During the effectivity of said insurance policy, the insured
jeep, while being driven by one Juan P. Campollo an employee of the
respondent San Leon Rice Mill, Inc., collided with a passenger bus
belonging to the respondent Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. at the
national highway in Barrio San Pedro, Rosales, Pangasinan, causing
damage to the insured vehicle and injuries to the driver, Juan P. Campollo,
and the respondent Martin C. Vallejos, who was riding in the ill-fated jeep.
Defendant Sio Choy and the petitioner insurance company, in their
answer, also denied liability to the plaintiff, claiming that the fault in the
accident was solely imputable to the PANTRANCO. Sio Choy, however,
later filed a separate answer with a cross-claim against the herein
petitioner wherein he alleged that he had actually paid the plaintiff,
Martin C. Vallejos, the amount of P5,000.00 for hospitalization and other
expenses, and, in his cross-claim against the herein petitioner, he alleged
that the petitioner had issued in his favor a private car comprehensive
policy wherein the insurance company obligated itself to indemnify Sio
Choy, as insured, for the damage to his motor vehicle, as well as for any
liability to third persons arising out of any accident during the effectivity
of such insurance contract, which policy was in full force and effect when
the vehicular accident complained of occurred. He prayed that he be
reimbursed by the insurance company for the amount that he may be
ordered to pay.
Whether petitioner is entitled to be reimbursed by respondent San Leon
Rice Mill, Inc. for whatever amount petitioner has been adjudged to pay
respondent Vallejos on its insurance policy? YES!
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
HELD: The basis of petitioner's liability is its insurance contract with
respondent Sio Choy. If petitioner is adjudged to pay respondent Vallejos
in the amount of not more than P20,000.00, this is on account of its being
the insurer of respondent Sio Choy under the third party liability clause
included in the private car comprehensive policy existing between
petitioner and respondent Sio Choy at the time of the complained
vehicular accident.
While it is true that where the insurance contract provides for indemnity
against liability to third persons, such third persons can directly sue the
insurer, however, the direct liability of the insurer under indemnity
contracts against third party liability does not mean that the insurer can
be held solidarily liable with the insured and/or the other parties found
at fault. The liability of the insurer is based on contract; that of the
insured is based on tort.
In the case at bar, petitioner as insurer of Sio Choy, is liable to respondent
Vallejos, but it cannot, as incorrectly held by the trial court, be made
"solidarily" liable with the two principal tortfeasors namely respondents
Sio Choy and San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. For if petitioner-insurer were
solidarily liable with said two (2) respondents by reason of the indemnity
contract against third party liability-under which an insurer can be
directly sued by a third party — this will result in a violation of the
principles underlying solidary obligation and insurance contracts.
In solidary obligation, the creditor may enforce the entire obligation
against one of the solidary debtors. On the other hand, insurance is
defined as "a contract whereby one undertakes for a consideration to
indemnify another against loss, damage, or liability arising from an
unknown or contingent event."
Petitioner upon paying respondent Vallejos the amount of riot exceeding
P20,000.00, shall become the subrogee of the insured, the respondent Sio
Choy; as such, it is subrogated to whatever rights the latter has against
respondent San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. Article 1217 of the Civil Code gives to
a solidary debtor who has paid the entire obligation the right to be
reimbursed by his co-debtors for the share which corresponds to each. In
accordance with Article 1217, petitioner, upon payment to respondent
Vallejos and thereby becoming the subrogee of solidary debtor Sio Choy,
is entitled to reimbursement from respondent San Leon Rice Mill, Inc.
========================================================
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM DELICT
BASIS OF LIABILITY
The basic rule is that every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable. (Article 100, RPC)
Civil liability arising from criminal liability is expressly recognized
as a source of obligation under the Civil Code although it
provides that civil obligations arising from criminal offenses
shall be governed by penal laws.
What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of
everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to
another by reason of his act or omission, whether done
intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by
law.
However, not all offenses give rise to civil liability. Thus, begging in
contravention of ordinances, violation of game laws, and
infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt, do not
produce civil responsibility.
When a criminal action is instituted normally the civil action for recovery
of civil liability arising from the crime is impliedly instituted, unless:
Offended party waives the civil action
When he reserves the right to institute it
When he institutes the civil action before the criminal action.
PERSONS LIABLE
The persons who are criminally liable under the RPC are the
principals, accomplices and accessories defined under Articles
16 to 20 thereof. Consequently, the same persons are also
civilly liable under Article 100 of the same law.
Death of the person liable after final judgment extinguishes the
criminal liability but will not extinguish the civil liability.
WHAT IS INCLUDED IN CIVIL LIABILITY
Restitution, reparation of the damage caused and
indemnification for consequential damages.
DE VERA-YALUNG | 28

========================================================
Ozoa v. Madula
Petitioner Ozoa was the employer of Policarpio Balatayo, who was
convicted by the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon of homicide with
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. The judgment of
conviction having become final, a writ of execution issued at the instance
of the widow of the deceased (Caridad Madula, herein private
respondent), for the enforcement of the defendant's civil liability. The writ
was however returned unsatisfied by reason of the insolvency of the
accused.
The widow Madula then moved for the issuance of a writ of execution
against the accused's employer, Ozoa. Ozoa opposed the motion. He stated
that the widow had executed an "Affidavit of Desistance" acknowledging
full satisfaction of civil liability; and a separate civil case "should and must
be ventilated .. in order that the Court can acquire jurisdiction over .. (his)
person .. so that the employer-employee relationship could be established
and to afford .. (him) the opportunity to prove his defense.
Upon these facts, the Court a quo directed execution against Ozoa. In
support of its ruling the Court placed reliance on Article 103, in relation
to Article 102, of the Revised Penal Code, declaring the employer
subsidiarily responsible for the civil liability of his employee when the
latter is insolvent; to Miranda v. Malate Garage, etc., holding that the
conviction of the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer
not only with regard to the civil liability but also as to its amount because
the employer's liability is inseparable from and indeed follows that of the
employee; and to Pajarito v. Seneris, holding that in substance and in
effect, the employer is a party to the criminal action where his employee's
civil liability is adjudged.
WON an employer may appeal from an order finding him subsidiarily
civilly liable in the same criminal proceeding and in the same manner as
in appeals in criminal cases?
HELD: A person criminally liable is also civilly liable; and upon the
institution of the criminal action, the civil action for the recovery of the
civil liability arising from the crime is also impliedly instituted unless
waived, or the filing of a separate action therefor is reserved. The
employer is subsidiarily answerable for the adjudicated civil liability ex
delito of his employee in the event of the latter's insolvency; and the
judgment in the criminal action pronouncing the employee to be also
civilly liable is conclusive on the employer not only as to the actuality of
that liability but also as to its amount. But the foregoing statement does
not exhaust the entirety of the rules relevant and applicable to the
juridical situation under consideration. There is the additional precept, of
which sight should not be lost because essential due process, that before
the employer's subsidiary liability is exacted, there must be adequate
evidence establishing that (1) he is indeed the employer of the convict;
that he is engaged in some kind of industry; (3) the crime was committed
by the employee in the discharge of his duties; and (4) execution against
the employee is unsatisfied. The determination of these issues need not
be done in a separate civil action. But a determination there must be, on
the basis of evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully
and freely present; and this may be done in the same criminal action at
which the employee's liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced.
The more logical step then is to apply the corresponding rules in criminal
cases, which provide that an appeal is taken simply by filing a notice of
appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice or promulgation of the
judgment. There is no occasion to speak of enforcing the employer's
subsidiary civil liability until and unless it appears that the employee's
primary liability cannot in the first instance be satisfied by reason of
insolvency. This fact cannot, in the very nature of things, be known until
sometime after the verdict of conviction shall have become final. And even
if it appears prima facie that execution against the employee cannot be
satisfied, execution against the employer will not issue as a matter of
course. There must first be, as above pointed out, a determination that the
convict was in truth in the employ of the employer, that the latter is
engaged in some kind of industry, and the employee committed the crime
to which civil liability attaches while in the performance of his duties as
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
such. lt is from this Court order embodying that determination that an
appeal should be taken; and it is from notice of this order that the 15-day
period of appeal must be counted.
Ozoa's subsidiary civil responsibility has been duly established by the
evidence. That evidence was presented at a hearing at which Ozoa was
given opportunity to submit, as he did submit proofs in his behalf. We
agree that the facts proven adequately demonstrate the existence of the
requisites for holding Ozoa subsidiarily liable as an employer under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
Sps. Santos v. Pizardo
Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in
connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit
bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van. After trial, Sibayan
was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment. .
However, as there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no
pronouncement of civil liability was made by the municipal circuit trial
court in its decision. petitioners filed a complaint for damages against
Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris,
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their reservation
to file a separate civil action. They cited therein the judgment convicting
Sibayan. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground
that the cause of action had already prescribed. Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration pointing out yet again that the complaint is not based
on quasi delict but on the final judgment of conviction in the criminal case
which prescribes ten (10) years from the finality of the judgment. The
trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration reiterating that
petitioners cause of action was based on quasi delict and had prescribed
under Article 1146 of the Civil Code because the complaint was filed more
than four (4) years after the vehicular accident. Petitioners insist that the
liability sought to be enforced in the complaint arose ex delicto and is not
based on quasi delict. However, respondents, point out that the averments
in the complaint make out a cause of action for quasi delict under Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. As such, the prescriptive period of four
(4) years should be reckoned from the time the accident took place.
Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced
since Sibayan was not ordered to pay damages in the criminal case. It is
Viron Transits contention that the subsidiary liability of the employer
contemplated in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes a
situation where the civil aspect of the case was instituted in the criminal
case and no reservation to file a separate civil case was made.
WON the petitioners can still recover liability by virtue of the reservation
of their right to file a separate civil action? YES!
HELD: Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Such civil liability may consist of
restitution, reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of
consequential damages. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, subject to three notable exceptions: first, when the injured party
expressly waives the right to recover damages from the accused; second,
when the offended party reserves his right to have the civil damages
determined in a separate action in order to take full control and direction
of the prosecution of his cause; and third, when the injured party actually
exercises the right to maintain a private suit against the offender by
instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution
of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately
waives the others. The reservation of the right to institute the separate
civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. In no case may
DE VERA-YALUNG | 29
the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the accused.
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate
civil action as a result of the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of
this reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its decision convicting
Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the latters civil liability.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are
consistent with petitioners claim that the action was brought to recover
civil liability arising from crime. Although there are allegations of
negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not
necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based
on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint,
the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in
cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an action
to enforce civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code
and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the
cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless,
petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their
reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because
the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to
an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the
latter action had been expressly reserved.
The dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the
enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a
conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer becomes
subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of
the duties of the employees. This is so because Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the
aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a
final judgment convicting the employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint
on the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for
damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners
allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss and
motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, insisting that the
action was to recover civil liability arising from crime.
This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a
separate civil action waives the other civil actions. The rationale behind
this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants
arising out of the same act or omission of the offender. However, since the
stale action for damages based on quasi delict should be considered
waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits
against private respondents as the only recourse available to them is to
pursue damages ex delicto. This interpretation is also consistent with the
bar against double recovery for obvious reasons.
========================================================
i. JUSTIFYING AND EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Justifying Circumstance
GR: NO Civil liability
These are circumstances which make the act of the accused
legal. The person is deemed not to have transgressed the law
and is free from criminal liability.
XPN: 2nd paragraph of Article 101, RPC which imposes liability on the
persons who obtained benefit because he performed an act in a state of
necessity. The liability is similar to those imposed under Article 432, CC,
Exempting circumstances
Merely exempt the person from punishment.
Do not erase civil liability. Civil liability is expressly provided for in
the first and the third paragraphs of Article 101, RPC.
Mitigating and aggravating circumstances
Reduce the criminal liability or compels the court to impose the
penalty to the maximum provided by law.
RPC
Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The
exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and
6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to
the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for
acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under
nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who
has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such
person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there
was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under
his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent,
said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property,
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil
law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for
whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in
proportion to the benefit which they may have received. The courts shall
determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each
one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even
approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to
the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever
the damages have been caused with the consent of the authorities or their
agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by
special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the
persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and
secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be
liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from
execution.
ii. EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL
The offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability
resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that
he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other
rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty,
pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason. (Art. 113, RPC)
========================================================
Padilla v. CA
The petitioners was convicted of the crime of grave coercion by acting
without authority of law prevented Antonio Vergara and his family to
close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the
door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said
stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments,
and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family. That in committing
the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy
Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused
being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident
premeditation. Hence, was convicted by the CA. The petitioners appealed
the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They contended that
the trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the
evidence. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to
order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the
complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal
ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se.
CA: WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the
sense that the appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt.
but they are ordered to pay jointly and severally to complainants the
amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the
extinction of their civil liability.
WON the acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability
results in the extinction of their civil liability? NO!
HELD: In Barredo v. Garcia, et at., the SC laid down the rule that the same
punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against
the accused and, where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil
DE VERA-YALUNG | 30
liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the
same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil liability
may be enforced against the accused, However, the offended party cannot
recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of
criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of
the Civil Code.
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not
included in the preceding section the following rules shall be
observed:
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action
may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by
law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the
thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for
damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the
civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished
by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v.
Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in
civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the
accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96
Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa,
theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby
incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the
civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of
which the accused was acquitted.
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission
may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require
the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of
any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
(Article 29,CC)
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal
case would not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on
the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution. We see no need to
amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant
damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt.
What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the
plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal
prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is
not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The
Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only
in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no
statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible
mode of recovering damages.
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to
be established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal
case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as
efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court
where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil
aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a
separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the
delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it
would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a
separate civil action to be filed. With this in mind, we therefore hold that
the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite
a judgment of acquittal.
Banag, Jr. v. CA
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where they had
sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought
plaintiff-appellant to the house of his grandmother, where they lived
together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973.
On September 10, 1973, Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their
respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his
application for a marriage license. However, Plaintiff-appellant contends
that Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male companion, abducted
her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and
brought her to a motel where she was raped.
A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed
by private respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado Bunag,
Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr., On August 20, 1983, on a finding,
that petitioner had forcibly abducted and raped private respondent, the
trial court rendered a decision ordering petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay
private respondent damages. Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both
the trial and appellate courts failed to take into consideration the alleged
fact that he and private respondent had agreed to marry, and that there
was no case of forcible abduction with rape, but one of simple elopement
and agreement to marry.
WON since action involves a breach of promise to marry, there is no basis
of awarding damages?
HELD: Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of
petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal
knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry
her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such
promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly
constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly
insensate and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant
and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages,
pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219,
and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were
awarded by the trial court on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of
forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint
therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental
postulate of our law that every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability
ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or
injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Hence,
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil
liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In the
instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with
rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation
stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not
in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil
action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the
penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by evidence which
shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil
action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by
preponderance of evidence only. Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, we
stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape
be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action
based on said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be
instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.
========================================================
EFFECT OF DEATH
Death of the accused before final judgment, relieves the accused of
both criminal and civil liability arising from criminal liability.
However, the aggrieved party in a libel or physical injuries case
(including homicide or murder) who initially opted to claim
DE VERA-YALUNG | 31
 damages in the criminal case can file another case to enforce
his claim under Article 33, CC.
Effect of Pardon
Pardon does not erase civil liability.
It is not one of the grounds recognized under the Civil Code that
extinguishes civil liability. Civil liability subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence or for any reason the
sentence is not served by pardon or commutation of sentence.
While pardon has generally been regarded as removing the
existence of guilt so that in the eyes of the law, the offender is
deemed innocent and treated as though he never committed
the offense, it does not operate to remove all the effects of the
previous conviction.
Pardon looks to the future. It makes no amends of the past. It affords
no relief for what has been suffered by the offended party.
========================================================
People v. Bayotas
Rogelio Bayotas was charged with Rape and eventually convicted Pending
appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died. The Solicitor General expressed his
view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil
liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. Counsel for
the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the
Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of
conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil
penalties.
WON the criminal liability of the accused was extinguished by reason of
his death while judgment of conviction is pending appeal? YES!
HELD: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior
to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed,
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." Corollarily, the claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157
of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which
the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law;
b) Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) . . .;e) Quasi-delicts. Where the civil
liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted
during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of
Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. Applying
this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant
Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based
solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is
hereby dismissed without qualification.
========================================================
TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS – include actions for damages for
violation of civil and political rights, defamation, fraud, physical injuries
and neglect of public officers.
Civil action which the Civil Code provisions allow to be filed
(particularly Article 33) is ex-delicto, that is, civil liability
arising from delict.
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
To an ICA, there may be a corresponding criminal action, eg. Article
32, which are violation of the basic rights, hence, there
is a corresponding crime. If one filed a criminal action, and it is
one of the torts under Artticle 32, 33, & 34, then he can file a
civil action independent of that.
========================================================
Casupanan v. Laroya
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Laroya and the other owned by
petitioner Capitulo and driven by petitioner Casupanan figured in an
accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the MCTC Court. Laroya
filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a
civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. When the civil case was filed, the
criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya,
defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the
ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the
civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the
criminal case. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is different
from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an
accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising
from the same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of
the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal
action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one who
filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo,
the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal
case.
Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence
can validly file, sinmultaneously and independently, a separate civil action
for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case? YES!
HELD: Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil
action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed
instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the
criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil
action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2
of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the
crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of
the criminal action. Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits
for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil
action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the
other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-forum
shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently
of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action
will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that
the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no
reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the
accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against
his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act
or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed
in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the
counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action.
This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from
setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in
the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his
counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a
separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in
since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is
filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can
avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To
disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict,
while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to
deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of
DE VERA-YALUNG | 32
the law. Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by
Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.
RE: Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil
action, if reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after final
judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If the separate civil action
was filed before the commencement of the criminal action, the civil
action, if still pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal
action until final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule
applied only to the separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-delicto.
The rule did not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could proceed independently
regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
continues this procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action
has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot
be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already
been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may
be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last
until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless,
before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same
may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the
criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of
consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be
deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without
prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to
present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions
shall be tried and decided jointly.
========================================================
i. ART. 32 CIVIL CODE/SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
NCC
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
Freedom of religion;
Freedom of speech;
Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
Freedom of suffrage;
The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public
use;
The right to the equal protection of the laws;
The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
The privacy of communication and correspondence;
The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes
not contrary to law;
The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government
for redress of grievances;
The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
The right of the accused against excessive bail;
The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from
being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of
immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person
confessing becomes a State witness;
Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless
the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has
not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved
party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and
mat be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may
also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless
his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other
penal statute.
Provides for an independent civil action for damages for violation of
civil and political rights.
RATIONALE: It is for the effective maintenance of democracy
How Committed
Involves intentional acts, the tort of violation of civil and
political rights can also be committed through negligence.
Rule is that good faith on the part of the defendant does
not necessarily excuse such violation.
NOTE: It is not necessary that there should be malice of bad faith. To
make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which
is the effective protection of individual rights.
c. Persons Liable
Directed against public officers or employees
The coverage was expanded to cover even private individuals – who
obstructs, defeat, violate or in any manner impede or impair
the rights and liberties of another.
Direct and Indirect Participation
A person may be held liable whether his participation is direct or
indirect
Superior officers of the law enforcers who conducted the raid
The person who actually conducted illegal search and seizure.
NOTE: Not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission
constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other Penal Statute.
State Immunity
A public officer who is the defendant in a case for damages under
Article 32 cannot escape liability under the doctrine of state
immunity.
The doctrine of state immunity applies only if the acts involved are
acts done by officers in the performance of official duties
within the ambit of their powers. Obviously, officers do not act
within the ambit of their powers if they would violate the
constitutional rights of other persons.
Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
Does not destroy every person’s right and cause of action for
damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of
Consti rights.
What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek
release from his detention as a speedy means for obtaining his
liberty.
========================================================
Aberca v. Ver
Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by General Fabian Ver to
conduct pre-emptive strikes against Communist- Terrorist underground
houses. TFM raided several houses, employing in most cases defectively
judicial search warrants, arrested people without warrant of arrest,
denied visitation rights, and interrogated them with the use of threats and
tortures. A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, stating that 1)
plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry about their detention because
the writ of habeas corpus was suspended; 2) defendants are immune
from liability for acts done in their official duties; 3) there was no cause of
action. On Nov 8, 1983, Judge Fortun granted the motion to dismiss, which
prompted plaintiffs to file a MR on Nov 18, 1983. He later inhibited
himself and was replaced Judge Lising, who denied the MR for being filed
DE VERA-YALUNG | 33
out of time. Another MR was filed, and was only modified to include Maj.
Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba for officers accountable in the said complaint.
1 Whether or not immunity from suit may be invoked? NO!
Whether petitioners have the right to question the alleged violation of
their rights in the constitution? YES!
Whether the superior officers who gave the orders are liable? YES!
HELD: 1. It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they
claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion
and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President
Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in
pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged
communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed
as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any
constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and
liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the
Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to
which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and
allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee
or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional
rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt
the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from
liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not
constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right
and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other
violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render
valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is
merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through
the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends
petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it
does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries
suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings,
the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right
to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against
torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is
applicable to the case. We agree. The doctrine of respondent superior has
been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to
master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such
relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their
subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is
the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or
person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor
alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages
under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for
the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under
the Constitution 5 acquires added meaning and asgilrnes a larger
dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or
abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that
he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter
against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen.
Only Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba were
kept as defendants on the ground that they alone 'have been specifically
mentioned and Identified to have allegedly caused injuries on the persons
of some of the plaintiff which acts of alleged physical violence constitute a
delict or wrong that gave rise to a cause of action. The complaint speaks
of, among others, searches made without search warrants or based on
irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and
confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects
belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not
subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and
illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places
of 'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to
physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and
brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements.
The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the
plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated
"directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses
within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for its violation.
========================================================
ii. ART. 33 CIVIL CODE/DEFAMATION
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action
for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may
be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Provides that in case of defamation, fraud or physical injuries, an
action separate and distinct from the criminal action may be
maintained by the injured party.
DEFAMATION
Includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person’s
character, fame or reputation through false and malicious
statements, it is that which tends to injure reputation or to
diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the
plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the
plaintiff.
It is a publication of anything or tends to bring him into disrepute.
It is an invasion of a relational interest, since it involves the opinion
which others in the community may have or tend to have of the
plaintiff.
Prosser: an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name, by
communication to others which tends to diminish the esteem
in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse feelings or
opinion against him.
Publication of a statement which tends to lower a person in the
estimation of right-thinking members of society generally or
which tends to make them shun or avoid that person.
It tends to injure the plaintiff in his trade, profession, or community
standing, or lower him in the estimation of the community.
REQUISITES:
It must be defamatory;
It must be malicious;
It must be given publicity; and
The victim must be identifiable.
LIBEL
Art. 353. Definition of libel. — A libel is public and malicious imputation
of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.
REQUISITES:
The imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another;
Publication of the imputation;
Identity of the person defamed; and
Existence of malice.
LIBEL AND SLANDER UNDER THE RPC
Libel – written defamation
Slander – oral defamation
DE VERA-YALUNG | 34
NOTE: The RPC considers a statement defamatory if it is an imputation of
circumstance “tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt of a
natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of the one who is
dead.
RPC
Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. — A libel
committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio,
phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition,
or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos,
or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the
offended party.
Art. 356. Threatening to publish and offer to present such publication
for a compensation. — The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200
to 2,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who threatens
another to publish a libel concerning him or the parents, spouse, child, or
other members of the family of the latter or upon anyone who shall offer
to prevent the publication of such libel for a compensation or money
consideration.
Art. 358. Slander. — Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it
is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall be arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
Art. 359. Slander by deed. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine
ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who
shall perform any act not included and punished in this title, which shall
cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another person. If said act is
not of a serious nature, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos.
Test in determining the defamatory character of the imputation: A
charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to
suppose and understand that the person or persons against whom they
were uttered were guilty of certain offense, or are sufficient to impeach
their honesty, virtue, or reputation, or to hold the person or persons up to
public ridicule.
Dissemination to a number of persons in not required;
communication to a single individual is sufficient publication.
GR: Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it
be true, if no good intention or justifiable motive for making it is shown.
XPN:
A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
Fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings
which are not of confidential nature, or any statement, report,
or speech delivered in said proceedings or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.
It is not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the
person attacked or defamed, it must be shown that at least a 3 rd
person could identify him as the object of the libelous
publication.
In order to escape liability, the defendant may claim that the
statements are privileged.
Two kinds of privileged communication:
ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE – those which are not actionable even if the
author acted in bad faith.
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE – not actionable unless found to have been
made without good intention or justifiable motive; fair
comment.
========================================================
Manuel v. Cruz-Pano
On April 21, 1976, a raid was conducted by the agents of the now defunct
ASAC on two rooms in the Tokyo Hotel in Binondo, Manila, pursuant to a
warrant of seizure and detention and such raid resulted in the seizure of
several articles allegedly smuggled but most of them were ordered
released upon proof that the customs duties and other charges thereon
had been duly paid. Petitioner, as counsel for the owners of the
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
seized articles, sent a letter dated April 29,1976, to the Chairman of the
ASAC in which he complained about the conduct of the raid and
demanded that the persons responsible therefore be investigated. After
the demanded investigation, a decision exonerated all of the said agents
that is why the petitioner then filed a complaint for robbery against the
same agents w/ the OCF of Manila but was later withdrawn. The owners
of the seized articles then instituted a civil complaint for damages which
the petitioner filed for them in the CFI of Manila on June 7,1976. Three
days later, there appeared in the issue of the Bulletin Today the following
report: TOURISTS SUE AGENTS, OFFICIAL. On the basis of facts in the
news report, an information for libel was filed against the petitioner, Lee
Kee Ming and Ng Woo Hay in the CFI of Rizal. In the information, it was
alleged that petitioner had committed the crime of libel by writing the
letter of April 29, 1976and by causing the publication of the news item in
the Bulletin Today.
The subject of this petition is the order of the respondent judge denying
the motion to quash filed by the petitioner, who had claimed that his
letter to the ASAC Chairman was not actionable because it was a
privileged communication; that the news report in the Bulletin Today was
not based on the letter-complaint; and that in any case it was a fair and
true report of a judicial proceeding and therefore also privileged.
Petitioner now seeks relief from this Court against what he claims as the
grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent judge in
sustaining the information.
Whether the subject letter or the news report appeared in the Bulletin
Today is libelous and thus not covered with Privilege Communication
HELD: Neither is libelous, hence, covered w/ Privilege Comm.
The applicable provision in the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:
Article 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered
in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions.
The letter comes under Item 1 as it was addressed by the petitioner to the
ASAC Chairman to complain against the conduct of his men when they
raided the Chinese tourists' rooms in the Tokyo Hotel. It was sent by the
petitioner mainly in his capacity as a lawyer in the discharge of his legal
duty to protect his clients. While his principal purpose was to vindicate
his clients' interests against the abuses committed by the ASAC agents, he
could also invoke his civic duty as a private individual to expose
anomalies in the public service. The complaint was addressed to the
official who had authority over them and could impose the proper
disciplinary sanctions. Significantly, as an index of good faith, the letter
was sent privately directly to the addressee, without any fanfare or
publicity.
As for the news report, it is difficult to believe that the petitioner could
have by himself caused the publication of such an explosive item. There is
no prima facie showing that, by some kind of influence he had over the
periodical, he succeeded in having it published to defame the ASAC
agents. It does not appear either that the report was paid for like an
advertisement. This looks instead to be the result of the resourcefulness
of the newspaper in discovering matters of public interest for dutiful
disclosure to its readers. It should be presumed that the report was
included in the issue as part of the newspaper's coverage of important
current events as selected by its editorial staff. At any rate, the news item
comes under Item 2 of the above quoted article as it is a true and fair
report of a judicial proceeding, made in good faith and without comments
or remarks. This is also privileged.
The matters mentioned in Article 354 as XPNs to the GR are not
absolutely privileged and are still actionable. However, since what is
presumed is not malice but in fact lack of malice, it is for the prosecution
to overcome that presumption by proof that the accused was actually
motivated by malice. Absent such proof, the charge must fail.
Also, it appears from the allegations in the information itself that the
accused acted in good faith and for justifiable ends in making the
allegedly libelous imputations, and in pertinent pleadings, there is no
need to prolong the proceedings to the prejudice of the defendant. The
Court can and should dismiss the charge without further ado.
We are convinced that the information against the petitioner should never
have been filed at all and that the respondent judge committed
DE VERA-YALUNG | 35
grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash the information
on the ground that the allegation petitions therein did not constitute an
offense. The petitioner is entitled to the relief he seeks from those who in
the guise of law and through the instrumentality of the trial court would
impose upon him this warrant tyranny. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is
GRANTED.
Borjal v. CA
Between May and July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner
Borjal was published on different dates in his column Jaywalker. The
articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a
conference" without naming or identifying private respondent. Neither
did it refer to the FNCLT as the conference therein mentioned.
Private respondent reacted to the articles. He sent a letter to The
Philippine Star insisting that he was the "organizer" alluded to in
petitioner Borjal's columns. Thereafter, private respondent filed a
complaint with the National Press Club (NPC) against petitioner Borjal for
unethical conduct. Apparently not satisfied with his complaint with the
NPC, private respondent filed a criminal case for libel against petitioners
Borjal and Soliven, among others but was dismissed.
Private respondent instituted against petitioners a civil action for
damages based on libel subject of the instant case.
Whether the subject articles are within the exceptions of Art. 354 of the
RPC
HELD: NO. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim
be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not
sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person
attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person
could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. Regrettably,
these requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar. They are
neither private communications nor fair and true report without any
comments or remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they
are not privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an
exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair
commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged.
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.
The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every
discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every
man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every
false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public
capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable
imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false
allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the
comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts.
Primarily, private respondent failed to substantiate by preponderant
evidence that petitioner was animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable
harm on his reputation, or that the articles were written and published
without good motives or justifiable ends. On the other hand, we find
petitioner Borjal to have acted in good faith. Moved by a sense of civic
duty and prodded by his responsibility as a newspaperman, he proceeded
to expose and denounce what he perceived to be a public deception.
Surely, we cannot begrudge him for that. Every citizen has the right to
enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that petitioner
Borjal has violated that right in this case nor abused his press freedom.
Also, the questioned articles written by Borjal do not identify private
respondent Wenceslao as the organizer of the conference. The first of the
Jaywalker articles yielded nothing to indicate that private respondent was
the person referred to therein. No less than private respondent himself
admitted that the FNCLT had several organizers and that he was only a
part of the organization. Identification is grossly inadequate when even
the alleged offended party is himself unsure that he was the object of the
verbal attack.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals of 25 March 1996 and its Resolution of 12 September 1996
denying reconsideration are, REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
complaint for damages against petitioners is DISMISSED. Petitioners'
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
counterclaim for damages is likewise DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
costs. SO ORDERED.
International Flavors and Fragrances v. Argos
Petitioner International Flavors and Fragrances Inc., (IFFI) is a
corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. Respondents
Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda are the general manager and
commercial director, respectively, of the Fragrances Division of IFFI.
In 1992, the office of managing director was created to head the
corporation's operation in the Philippines. Hernan H. Costa was
appointed managing director. Consequently the general managers
reported directly to Costa.
Costa and respondents had serious differences. When the positions of the
general managers became redundant, respondents agreed to the
termination of their services. They signed a "Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim" on December 10, 1993. On the same date, Costa issued a
"Personnel Announcement" which described respondents as "persona
non grata" and urged employees not to have further dealings with them.
Respondents filed a criminal complaint for libel resulting in the filing of
two Informations against Costa with the MTC of Taguig, Metro Manila.
Respondents filed a civil case for damages filed at the RTC of Pasig against
Costa and IFFI, in its subsidiary capacity as employer. Herein petitioner
IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint.
I: Could private respondents sue petitioner for damages based on
subsidiary liability in an independent civil action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code, during the pendency of the criminal libel cases against
petitioner's employee?
HELD: Respondents' suit based on subsidiary liability of petitioner is
premature.
Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of
defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a
preponderance of evidence.
However, we note that by invoking the principle of respondeat superior,
respondents tried to rely on Art. 33 to hold IFFI primarily liable for its
employee's defamatory statements. But we also find that respondents did
not raise the claim of primary liability as a cause of action in its complaint
before the trial court. On the contrary, they sought to enforce the alleged
subsidiary liability of petitioner as the employer of Costa, the accused in
pending criminal cases for libel, prematurely.
Having established that respondents did not base their civil action on
petitioner IFFI's primary liability under Art. 33 but claimed damages from
IFFI based on its subsidiary liability as employer of Costa, prematurely,
we need not delve further on the other errors raised by petitioner. Plainly
both the trial and the appellate courts erred in failing to dismiss the
complaint against herein petitioner by respondents claiming subsidiary
liability while the criminal libel cases against IFFI's employee, Costa, were
pending before the metropolitan trial court. Nothing herein said, however,
ought to prejudice the reliefs that respondents might seek at the
appropriate time.
To reiterate, nothing could be clearer than that herein respondents are
suing IFFI civilly in its subsidiary capacity for Costa's alleged defamatory
acts. Moreover, the appellate court could not convert allegations of
subsidiary liability to read as averments of primary liability without
committing a fundamental unfairness to the adverse party.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
MVRS Publication v. Islamic Da’Wah Council of the PH
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation
of more than seventy (70) Muslim religious organizations, and individual
Muslims filed in the RTC of Manila a complaint for damages in their own
behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide
against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA
and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., arising from an article published in the 1
August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid. The complaint alleged that
the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; that
these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only
published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast
insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this country,
in violation of law, public policy, good morals and human relations; that
on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims
in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world, especially every Muslim
individual in non-Muslim countries.
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., in their
defense, contended that the article did not mention respondents as the
DE VERA-YALUNG | 36
object of the article and therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that
the article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was
published without malice nor intention to cause damage, prejudice or
injury to Muslims.
Whether the subject article published in the tabloid constitutes as an
actionable act in the form of defamation and thus may be the basis for
asking of damages
HELD: NO. It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are
not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse
however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or
spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the
absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is
offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to
advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances
specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no
member of such class has a right of action without at all impairing the
equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the
press, under the Bill of Rights.
In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was
allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly
defamed could not be identifiable, private respondents have no individual
causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged.
Private respondents must have a cause of action in common with the class
to which they belong to in order for the case to prosper.
In the instant case, the Muslim community is too vast as to readily
ascertain who among the Muslims were particularly defamed. The size of
the group renders the reference as indeterminate and generic as a similar
attack on Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists or Mormons would do. The
word "Muslim" is descriptive of those who are believers of Islam, a
religion divided into varying sects, such as the Sunnites, the Shiites, the
Kharijites, the Sufis and others based upon political and theological
distinctions. "Muslim" is a name which describes only a general segment
of the Philippine population, comprising a heterogeneous body whose
construction is not so well defined as to render it impossible for any
representative identification.
Our conclusion therefore is that the statements published by petitioners
in the instant case did not specifically identify nor refer to any particular
individuals who were purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous
publication. Respondents can scarcely claim to having been singled out
for social censure pointedly resulting in damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Philippine Journalist, Inc. v. Theonen
On 30 September 1990, the a news item appeared in the People’s
Journal, a tabloid of general circulation. The subject of the article, Francis
Thoenen, is a retired engineer permanently residing in this country with
his Filipina wife and their children. Claiming that the report was false and
defamatory, and that the petitioners acted irresponsibly in failing to verify
the truth of the same prior to publication, he filed a civil case for damages
against herein petitioners Philippine Journalists, Inc., Zacarias Nuguid, Jr.,
its publisher, and reporter Cristina Lee. Thoenen claimed that the article
destroyed the respect and admiration he enjoyed in the community, and
that since it had been published, he and his wife received several queries
and angry calls from friends, neighbors and relatives. For the impairment
of his reputation and standing in the community, and his mental anguish.
It was proven at trial that the news article contained several inaccuracies.
Moreover, it is immediately apparent from a comparison between the
letter and the news item in question that while the letter is a mere
request for verification of Thoenen’s status, Lee wrote that residents of BF
Homes had "asked the Bureau of Immigration to deport a Swiss who
allegedly shoots neighbors’ pets." No complaints had in fact been lodged
against him by any of the BF Homeowners, 6 nor had any pending
deportation proceedings been initiated against him in the Bureau of
Immigration. Thoenen also submitted a Certification from the Office of the
Bar Confidant that there was no lawyer in its rolls by the name of Efren
Angara, earlier cited by petitioner Lee as the author of the letter on which
she based her article. Finally, the trial also showed that despite the fact
that respondent’s address was indicated in the letter, Cristina Lee made
no efforts to contact either him or the purported letter-writer, Atty.
Angara.
Whether the subject article is a form of privileged communication - NO
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
HELD: In this case, there is no controversy as to the existence of the three
elements. The respondent’s name and address were clearly indicated in
the article ascribing to him the questionable practice of shooting the
wayward pets of his neighbors. The backlash caused by the publication of
the article was in fact such that stones had been thrown at their house,
breaking several flower pots, and daily and nightly calls compelled him to
request a change of their telephone number. These facts are not contested
by the petitioners.
The article is not a privileged communication.
In the instant case, even if we assume that the letter written by the
spurious Atty. Angara is privileged communication, it lost its character as
such when the matter was published in the newspaper and circulated
among the general population. A written letter containing libelous matter
cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated in
public, which was what the petitioners did in this case.
Neither is the news item a fair and true report without any comments or
remarks of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings; there is in
fact no proceeding to speak of. Nor is the article related to any act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions, for it
concerns only false imputations against Thoenen, a private individual
seeking a quiet life.
We must point out that Lee’s brief news item contained falsehoods on two
levels. On its face, her statement that residents of BF Homes had "asked
the Bureau of Immigration to deport a Swiss who allegedly shoots
neighbors’ pets" is patently untrue since the letter of the spurious Atty.
Angara was a mere request for verification of Thoenen’s status as a
foreign resident. Lee’s article, moreover, is also untrue, in that the events
she reported never happened. The respondent had never shot any of his
neighbors’ pets, no complaints had been lodged against him by his
neighbors, and no deportation proceedings had been initiated against
him. Worse, the author of Lee’s main source of information, Atty. Efren
Angara, apparently either does not exist, or is not a lawyer. Petitioner Lee
would have been enlightened on substantially all these matters had she
but tried to contact either Angara or Thoenen.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 17 January 2000
reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Makati City,
of 31 August 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that
petitioners are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, moral damages in the
sum of ₱100,000.00, exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00, and legal fees of
₱20,000.00. No costs. SO ORDERED.
========================================================
ART. 33 CIVIL CODE/FRAUD
ELEMENTS:
The defendant must have made false representation to the plaintiff;
The representation must be one of fact;
The defendant must know that the representation is false or be
reckless about whether it is false;
The defendant must have acted on the false representation;
The defendant must have intended that the representation should
be acted on;
The plaintiff must have suffered damage as a result of acting on the
representation.
False representation contemplated in the first requisite can be made by
spoken or written words. It can also be made by conduct. A
representation is not confined to words or positive assertions; it may
consist as well of deeds, acts or artifices of a nature calculated to mislead
another and thereby to allow the defendant to obtain undue advantage
over them.
Half-truths are likewise included. It is actionable if it is “such a
partial and fragmentary statement of fact, as that the
withholding of that which is not stated makes that which is
stated absolutely false.”
NOTE: Misrepresentation upon a mere matter of opinion is not an
actionable deceit
========================================================
Heirs of Simon v. Chan
OCP of Manila filed in the MeTC an information charging the late Eduardo
Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22 docketed and entitled as PP vs
Sikmon.
DE VERA-YALUNG | 37
More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit
commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even
the principal amount of ₱336,000.00, coupled with an application for a informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is
writ of preliminary attachment. expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts
MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite
implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases,
vehicle of Simon. one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and
Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to
plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages on the ground of litis pendentia, discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit
that is, as a consequence of the pendency of another action between the the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no
instant parties for the same cause before the MeTCof Manila. longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in
While the instant case is civil in nature and character as court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when
contradistinguished from the said Criminal Case in the MeTC of Manila, the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules
the basis of the instant civil action is the herein plaintiff’s criminal encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have
complaint against defendant arising from a charge of violation of Batas previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of
Pambansa Blg. 22 as a consequence of the alleged dishonor in plaintiff’s recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be
hands upon presentment for payment with drawee bank a Land Bank costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would
Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of ₱336,000- further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits
drawn allegedly issued to plaintiff by defendant who is the accused in said must be avoided. Where petitioners’ rights may be fully adjudicated in the
case. proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover
Chan opposed Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss with application to civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing
charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages stating that the case is actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial
one that falls under Art. 33 of NCC as it is based on fraud, thus, the action court will not apply to the case at bar.
may be prosecuted independently of the criminal action. To repeat, Chan’s separate civil action to recover the amount of the check
Whether or not Chan’s civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded involved in the prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be
check was an independent civil action – IT IS NOT independently maintained under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and
HELD: There is no independent civil action to recover the value of a the aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.
111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil
provides: Case No. 915-00 on the ground of litis pendentia through its decision
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal dated October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising affirming the MeTC.
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal Wherefore, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and,
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right accordingly, we reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the decision rendered on
action. October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be City. Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent. SO ORDERED.
made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under ========================================================
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.
The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check
involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where
the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay
the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are
not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the
court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first
lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not
yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon
application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section
2 of the Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect
when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are
nonetheless applicable.
Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the
violation of any assumed vested right, because the new rule was adopted
from Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding,
the following rules and guidelines shall henceforth be observed in the
filing and prosecution of all criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
which penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check without
funds or credit:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall
be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and
no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or
recognized.
This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with
B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because
ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the

TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS DE VERA-YALUNG | 38

DAMAGES
NCC expressly provides: the provisions of this Title (on Damages) shall be
respectively applicable to all obligations mentioned in Art. 1157, that is
obligations arising from delict, quasi-delict, contract and quas-contract.
Article 2195. The provisions of this Title shall be respectively applicable
to all obligations mentioned in article 1157
Article 2196. The rules under this Title are without prejudice to special
provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in this Code. Compensation
for workmen and other employees in case of death, injury or illness is
regulated by special laws. Rules governing damages laid down in other
laws shall be observed insofar as they are not in conflict with this Code.
Article 2198. The principles of the general law on damages are hereby
adopted insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Code.
Escriche: Damages – “the detriment, injury or loss which are occasioned
by reason of fault of another in the property or person”
Whatsoever nature the damage be, and from whatsoever cause it
may proceed, the person who has done the injury ought to repair it
by an indemnity proportionate to his fault and to the loss caused
thereby.
SC: Damages - the pecuniary compensation, recompense or satisfaction
for an injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary
consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or
violation of some rights.
the loss, hurt or harm which results from injury, and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES IS PERSONAL ACTION
It may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the
defendant resides or may be found, or here the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiffs resides at the election of the plaintiff.
AWARD MUST BE MONETARY
In an action for damages, courts should award an amount to the
winning party and not its equivalent in property.
The damages should be awarded should be the money value of such
damages.
(i) DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA
Almost all conduct may be considered tortuous. – presence of damage
caused to the defendant is required. It does not mean however that a
person is always liable in each and every case that there is damage.
Damnum Absque Injuria - there is no liability even if there is damage
because there is no injury.
Where the case is one of damnum absque injuria, the conjunction of
damages and wrong is absent. There can be no actionable wrong if either
one or the other is wanting. Thus, if the damage resulted because a
person exercised his legal rights (like the filing of a Complaint in good
faith) – DAI.
J. Regalado: Mere damage without injury does not result in liability.
Custodio vs CA:
However, there is a material distinction between damages and injury.
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or
harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was
not the results of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords
no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a
legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria.
In other words, in order that the plaintiff may maintain an action for the
injuries of which he complaints, he must establish that such injuries
resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the
person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is
the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus,
there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability
for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such
duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
INCONVENIENCE OF LITIGATION
Qui jure suo utitur nullum damnum facit – one who exercises a right
does no injury – maxim is often applied to cases where the Court rejects
claims for damages of the winning defendant in a case.
Court reiterates the rule that the adverse result of an action does not per
se make an action wrongful and subject the actor to payment of damages.
KINDS OF DAMAGES
Article 2197. Damages may be:
Actual or compensatory;
Moral;
Nominal;
Temperate or moderate;
Liquidated; or
Exemplary or corrective.
PROOF OF PECUNIARY LOSS WHEN NOT NECESSARY
Proof of pecuniary loss is necessary to successfully recover actual
damages from the defendant.
Article 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral,
nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages, may be
adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is
left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each
case.
========================================================
Diaz v. Davao Light and Power Co.
F: DLPC supplied the Doa Segunda Building (Imperial Hotel Building),
owned by Diaz, with electricity service. DLPC sent a Notice of
Disconnectionto Diaz and Co., Inc. Since Diaz and Co., Inc. ignored the
letter, Meter No. 36510 was disconnected. Diaz filed an application for
preliminary injunction in Sp. Civil Case No. 18,288 to enjoin DLPC from
disconnecting the electric connections to Meter No. 84738. It was
however denied, DLPC then removed its single-phase meter on November
20, 1987, which rendered almost half of the building without power. That
same day, Diaz went to the DLPC building and threw stones at it, breaking
four glass windows in the process. .
RTC &CA: The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It concluded that the
evidence on hand showed good faith on the part of DLPC in filing the
subject complaints. It pointed out that Diaz had been using the electrical
services of DLPC without its consent. As to the effect of the compromise
agreement, the CA ruled that it did not bar the filing of the criminal action.
Thus, under the principle of damnum absque injuria, the legitimate
exercise of a persons right, even if it causes loss to another, does not
automatically result in an actionable injury
Petitioner insisted that the compromise agreement as well as the decision
based on it already settled the controversies between them; yet, DLPC
instituted the theft case against petitioner, and worse, instituted another
action for violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. 876.
WON Diaz is entitled to damages? NO!
HELD: Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise as a contract
whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or
put an end to one already commenced. The purpose of compromise is to
settle the claims of the parties and bar all future disputes and
controversies. However, criminal liability is not affected by compromise
for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the
Government on its own motion, though complete reparation should have
been made of the damages suffered by the offended party. A criminal case
is committed against the People, and the offended party may not waive or
extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the commission
of the offense.
We find that petitioner is not entitled to damages under Articles 19, 20
and 21, and Articles 2217 and 2219(8) of the New Civil Code.
The evidence presented by respondents negates malice or bad faith.
Petitioner himself alleged in his complaint that he unilaterally installed
Meter No. 86673509 to replace Meter No. 84738 after it was removed by
DLPC. No less than this Court, in G.R. No. 85445, admonished petitioner
and reminded him that connections of electrical service and installations
of electric meters should always be upon mutual contract of the parties,
and that payments for electrical consumption should also be made
promptly whenever due. Based on these established
DE VERA-YALUNG | 39
facts, petitioner has not shown that the acts of respondent were done
with the sole intent of prejudicing and injuring him.
Petitioner may have suffered damages as a result of the filing of the
complaints. However, there is a material distinction between damages
and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss,
hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus,
there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss
or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone; the law affords
no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a
legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria. Whatever damages Diaz may have suffered would have to be
borne by him alone since it was his acts which led to the filing of the
complaints against him.
========================================================
(ii) ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
Article 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled
to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him
as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.
Statutory rule allowing recovery of damages proceeds from a sense of
natural justice and designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to
recompense for the injury inflicted and not to impose penalty.
KINDS OF ACTUAL DAMAGES
Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the
loss suffered, but also that of the profits that the obligee failed to obtain.
Indemnification is meant to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to
impose a penalty.
Actual or compensatory damages:
The loss of what a person already possesses (danñ o emergente)
The failure to receive as a benefit that would have pertained to him (lucro
cesante)—this type includes those mentioned in Art. 2205 of NCC.
Article 2205. Damages may be recovered:
For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or
permanent personal injury;
For injury to the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.
EXTENT AND MEASURES OF DAMAGES
NCC expressly provides for the rule regarding the limit of liability in cases
involving quasi-delicts.
Article 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for
all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act
or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have
been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
Note: Rule in crimes and quasi-delcts is the same as the rule in breach
of contracts and quasi-contracts where the breach was accompanied by
fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude on the part of the obligor.
RESTITUTIO IN INTEGRUM
Basic principle for the measure of damages in tort is that there should be
restitution in integrum.
The amount to be awarded to the plaintiff should be that sum of money
wc will put the party who has been injured or who has suffered in the
same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong
for wc he is now getting his compensation or reparation.
The primary object of an award in civil action and the fundamental
principle or theory on wc it is based is just compensation, indemnity or
reparation for the loss or injury sustained by the injured party so that he
may be made whole or restored as nearly as possible prior to the injury.
CERTAINTY OF DAMAGES
A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
actually suffered and duly proved.
Basic rule: To recover damages, the amount of loss must not only be
capable of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of
the actual amount thereof.
BURDEN OF PROOF
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
Claimant is duty-bound to point out specific facts that afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne.
Burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence
would be presented on either side.  He must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence wc means that evidence, as a whole, adduce
by one side is superior to that of the other.
Damages cannot be presumed.
ABSENCE OF PROOF OF PRECISE AMOUNT
Uncertainty as to the precise amount is not necessarily fatal.
Mere difficulty in the assessment of damages is not sufficient reason for
refusing to award damages where the right to them has been established.
CIVIL INDEMNITY
Proof of actual loss is not also necessary where the law or jurisprudence
allows the award of civil indemnity.
E.g Civil indemnity wc is in the nature of actual or compensatory
damages is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.
Proof of actual damages is also not necessary for the award of civil
indemnity in tort cases or criminal case where the victim died.
However, this civil indemnity is in addition to any actual or
compensatory damages that may be awarded in favor of the
victim’s heirs.
PERSONAL INJURY AND LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY
PERSONAL INJURY
a. ACTUAL MEDICAL AND OTHER EXPENSES
If the plaintiff is asking for damages for his own injury, said plaintiff is
entitled to the amount of medical expenses as well as other reasonable
expenses that he incurred to treat his or his relative’s injuries.
b. PLASTIC SURGERY
The award of damages may likewise include the amount spent for he
plastic surgery of the plaintiff or any procedure to restore the part of the
body that was affected.
c. FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES AND LIFE CARE COST
Courts may also award monthly payments to the person who was injured
to answer for his future medical expenses.
SC: If the victim did not die but he or she will require medical attendance
for the rest of his/her life, it is proper to award life care cost because the
tortfeasor is liable for all damages wc are natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of.
LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY
Plaintiff is also entitled to damages for loss of earning capacity when the
defendant’s act or omission resulted in his permanent incapacity.
DAMAGES IN CASE OF DEATH
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or
quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may
have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court,
unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of
article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's
inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand
support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five
years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
the death of the deceased.
DAMAGES THAT CASE BE AWARDED
When death occurs due to a negligent act or a crime, the ff damages may
be recovered:
Civil Indemnity ex delicto for death of the victim;
Actual or compensatory damages;
Moral damages;
Exemplary damages;
Attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation;
Interest in proper cases.
DE VERA-YALUNG | 40
Temperate damages may also be awarded in lieu of actual damages in
proper cases.
ACTUAL EXPENSES
In case of death, the plaintiff is entitled not only to reimbursement for
medical expenses but also to the amount that he spent during the wake
and funeral of the deceased, -- It has been ruled that expenses after the
burial are not compensable.
FIXED DAMAGES OF CIVIL INDEMNITY
Law also requires payment of P3K (minimum) to the heirs of the
deceased in addition to any damage that may have resulted bec. the act or
omission of the defendant including medical expenses and loss of earning
capacity.
Current amount of fixed damages as increased by the Court is P50K.
Murder cases: award of civil indemnity was increased from P50k to
P75K.
P75K civil indemnity is also justified so long as the crime was
committed under the circumstances that would justify the imposition of
death penalty.
LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY
This item of recoverable damages is also applicable if the victim was
rendered permanently incapacitated.
FORMULA
Villa Rey Transit vs CA
SC: Important variables taken into account in determining the
compensable amount of lost earnings are:
The number of years for wc the victim would otherwise have lived (life
expectancy); and
The rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased (net income)
Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income –
(less) Necessary Living Expenses]
LIFE EXPECTANCY
Life expectancy is computed by applying the formula:
(2/3 x [80 – age at death]) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of
Mortality or Actuarial Combined Experience Table of Mortality.
LIFE EXPECTANCY OF VICTIM
It Is the life of the deceased or victim that is the element of the formula for
computing loss of earning capacity and not that of the heirs.
RATIONALE FOR TABLE OF MORTALITY
The table being used by insurance companies is adopted bec. “there is a
link here with actuarial tables, wc were created by life assurance
companies for the purpose of determining what capital sum should be
charged for an annuity, since the insurer is obviously vitally concerned to
make the estimate of the annuitant’s life expectancies”
FACTORS THAT REDUCE LIFE EXPECTANCY
The multiplier that corresponds to the life expectancy of the victim may
be reduced depending on the circumstances.
Reduction is usually made for 2 reasons:
Some allowance must be made for the general vicissitudes of life, that is to
say, damaging events like early death or unemployment wc might have
affected the plaintiff even if the defendant had not injured him.
Account must also be taken of the fact that the lump sum of damage will
itself produce an investment income. Theoretical aim of the process is to
provide a lump sum sufficient, if invested, to produce an income equal to
the lost income when the interest is supplemented by withdrawal of
capital.
NET EARNINGS
Court considered as an important element in measuring loss of earning
capacity, the net earnings of the deceased as well as the latter’s
potentiality and capacity to increase his future income.
========================================================
Marikina Auto Line Transport Corp. v. People – Case of mere
estimation only, estimation must be one that is acceptable to the
court.
Suelto was driving the a passenger bus along Kamias Road, Kamuning,
Quezon City, going towards EDSA. The bus suddenly swerved
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
to the right and struck the terrace of the commercial apartment owned by
Valdellon located along Kamuning Road. Upon Valdellons request, the
court ordered Sergio Pontiveros, the Senior Building Inspection Officer of
the City Engineers Office, to inspect the damaged terrace. He
recommended that since the structural members made of concrete had
been displaced, the terrace would have to be demolished to keep its
monolithicness, and to insure the safety and stability of the building. In a
letter addressed to the bus company and Suelto, Valdellon demanded
payment of P148,440.00, within 10 days from receipt thereof, to cover the
cost of the damage to the terrace. Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property against Suelto.
Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint against Suelto and the bus
company for damages. Moreover, Engr. Jesus Regal, Jr., the proprietor of
the SSP Construction, declared that he inspected the terrace and
estimated the cost of repairs, including labor, at P171,088.46. Architect
Arnulfo Galapate testified that the cost of the repair of the damaged
terrace amounted to P55,000.00.
The trial court rendered judgment finding Suelto guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property,
and ordered MALTC and Suelto to pay, jointly and severally, P150,000.00
to Valdellon, by way of actual and compensatory damages, as well as
attorneys fees and costs of suit.
Petitioners insist that private respondent was able to prove only the
amount of P35,000.00 by way of actual damages; hence, the award of
P100,000.00 is barren of factual basis.
HELD: We agree with the contention of petitioners that respondents
failed to prove that the damages to the terrace caused by the incident
amounted to P100,000.00. The only evidence adduced by respondents to
prove actual damages claimed by private respondent were the summary
computation of damage made by Engr. Jesus R. Regal, Jr. amounting to
P171,088.46 and the receipt issued by the BB Construction and Steel
Fabricator to private respondent for P35,000.00 representing cost for
carpentry works, masonry, welding, and electrical works. Respondents
failed to present Regal to testify on his estimation. In its five-page
decision, the trial court awarded P150,000.00 as actual damages to
private respondent but failed to state the factual basis for such award.
Indeed, the trial court merely declared in the decretal portion of its
decision that the sum of P150,000.00 as reasonable compensation
sustained by plaintiff for her damaged apartment. The appellate court, for
its part, failed to explain how it arrived at the amount of P100,000.00 in
its three-page decision.
Under Article 2199 of the New Civil Code, actual damages include all the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of,
classified as one for the loss of what a person already possesses (dao
emergente) and the other, for the failure to receive, as a benefit, that which
would have pertained to him (lucro cesante).
The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence
would be presented on either side. The claimant must prove the actual
amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable. The Court further
declared that where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of
defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the time of the
destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he would have to
pay in the market for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a
proper case, damages for the loss of the use during the period before
replacement.
We note, however, that petitioners adduced evidence that, in their view,
the cost of the damage to the terrace of private respondent would amount
to P55,000.00. Accordingly, private respondent is entitled to P55,000.00
actual damages.
RULING: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is
AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that petitioner Suelto is
sentenced to pay a fine of P55,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. Petitioners are ORDERED to pay to Erlinda V.
Valdellon, jointly and severally, the total amount of P55,000.00 by way of
actual damages, and P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.
Mercury Drug v. Huang
Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation is the registered owner of a six-
wheeler 1990 Mitsubishi Truck. It has in its employ petitioner Rolando J.
del Rosario as driver. Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are
the parents of respondent Stephen Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota
Corolla GLI Sedan. These two vehicles figured in a road accident,
DE VERA-YALUNG | 41
Respondent Stephen Huang was driving the car, while petitioner Del
Rosario was driving the truck. The car, valued at P300,000.00, was a total
wreck. Respondent Stephen Huang sustained massive injuries to his
spinal cord, head, face, and lung. Despite a series of operations,
respondent Stephen Huang is paralyzed for life from his chest down and
requires continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment. Respondents
fault petitioner Del Rosario for committing gross negligence and reckless
imprudence while driving, and petitioner Mercury Drug for failing to
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its driver.
RTC: found petitioners Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly and
severally liable to pay respondents actual, compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
(P2,973,000.00) actual damages;As compensatory damages:
(P23,461,062.00) for life care cost of Stephen; b. (P10,000,000.00) as and
for lost or impaired earning capacity of Stephen; (P4,000,000.00) as
moral damages; P2,000,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
(P1,000,000.00) as attorneys fees and litigation expense.
CA: affirmed the decision of the trial court but reduced the award of
moral damages to P1,000,000.00.
WON the award for damages was proper?
HELD: With regard to actual damages, Art. 2199 of the Civil Code
provides that except as provided by law or by stipulation one is entitled to
an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him
as he has duly proved x x x. In the instant case, we uphold the finding that
the actual damages claimed by respondents were supported by receipts.
The amount of P2,973,000.00 represented cost of hospital expenses,
medicines, medical services and supplies, and nursing care services
provided respondent Stephen from December 20, 1996, the day of the
accident, until December 1998.
Petitioners are also liable for all damages which are the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. The doctors
who attended to respondent Stephen are one in their prognosis that his
chances of walking again and performing basic body functions are nil. For
the rest of his life, he will need continuous rehabilitation and therapy to
prevent further complications such as pneumonia, bladder and rectum
infection, renal failure, sepsis and severe bed sores, osteoporosis and
fractures, and other spinal cord injury-related conditions. He will be
completely dependent on the care and support of his family. We thus
affirm the award of P23,461,062.00 for the life care cost of respondent
Stephen Huang, based on his average monthly expense and the actuarial
computation of the remaining years that he is expected to live; and the
conservative amount of P10,000,000.00, as reduced by the trial court, for
the loss or impairment of his earning capacity, considering his age,
probable life expectancy, the state of his health, and his mental and
physical condition before the accident. He was only seventeen years old,
nearly six feet tall and weighed 175 pounds. He was in fourth year high
school, and a member of the school varsity basketball team. He was also
class president and editor-in-chief of the school annual. He had shown
very good leadership qualities. He was looking forward to his college life,
having just passed the entrance examinations of the University of the
Philippines, De La Salle University, and the University of Asia and the
Pacific. The University of Sto. Tomas even offered him a chance to obtain
an athletic scholarship, but the accident prevented him from attending
the basketball try-outs. Without doubt, he was an exceptional student. He
excelled both in his academics and extracurricular undertakings. He is
intelligent and motivated, a go-getter, as testified by Francisco Lopez,
respondent Stephen Huangs godfather and a bank executive. Had the
accident not happened, he had a rosy future ahead of him. He wanted to
embark on a banking career, get married and raise children. Taking into
account his outstanding abilities, he would have enjoyed a successful
professional career in banking. But, as Mr. Lopez stated, it is highly
unlikely for someone like respondent to ever secure a job in a bank. To his
knowledge, no bank has ever hired a person suffering with the kind of
disability as Stephen Huangs.
We likewise uphold the award of moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.
The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of
the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante. Moral damages are designed
to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a
person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, they must be
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The amount of the award bears no
relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender.
In the instant case, respondent Stephen Huang and respondent spouses
Richard and Carmen Huang testified to the intense suffering they
continue to experience as a result of the accident. Stephen recounted the
nightmares and traumas he suffers almost every night when he relives the
accident. He also gets depression when he thinks of his bleak future. He
feels frustration and embarrassment in needing to be helped with almost
everything and in his inability to do simple things he used to do. Similarly,
respondent spouses and the rest of the family undergo their own private
suffering. They live with the day-to-day uncertainty of respondent
Stephen Huangs condition. They know that the chance of full recovery is
nil. Moreover, respondent Stephen Huangs paralysis has made him prone
to many other illnesses. His family, especially respondent spouses, have to
make themselves available for Stephen twenty-four hours a day. They
have patterned their daily life around taking care of him, ministering to
his daily needs, altering the lifestyle to which they had been accustomed.
On the matter of exemplary damages, Art. 2231 of the Civil Code
provides that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. The records show
that at the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving
without a license because he was previously ticketed for reckless driving.
The evidence also shows that he failed to step on his brakes immediately
after the impact. Had petitioner Del Rosario done so, the injuries which
respondent Stephen sustained could have been greatly reduced. Wanton
acts such as that committed by petitioner Del Rosario need be
suppressed; and employers like petitioner Mercury Drug should be more
circumspect in the observance of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees. The award of exemplary damages in favor
of the respondents is therefore justified.
With the award of exemplary damages, we also affirm the grant of
attorneys fees to respondents. In addition, attorneys fees may be granted
when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his
interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party.
RULING: IN VIEW THEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 2006 and March
30, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 83981, are AFFIRMED.
Nacar v. Gallery Frames
HELD: Anent the payment of legal interest. In the landmark case of
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the
guidelines regarding the manner of computing legal interest, to wit:
With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual
and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual
thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a
sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should
be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the
interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12%
per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial
demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is
breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be
imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No
interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages
except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable
certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is
made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of
the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be
deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally
adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes
final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under
paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by
then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
Serra v. Mumar
DE VERA-YALUNG | 42
At around 6:30 in the evening of 3 April 2000, there was a vehicular
accident along the National Highway in Barangay Apopong, General
Santos City, which resulted in the death of Armando Mumar (Mumar),
husband of respondent Nelfa T. Mumar (respondent). Subsequently,
respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for Damages by Reason of
Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide.
RTC: judgment is rendered against defendant Paulita Sierra, her co-
defendant and to pay: 1. P65,000.00 for burial damages;
P300,000.00 for loss of income; 3. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and 4.
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The RTC said that Nelfa testified that her husband was earning about
P6,000.00 a month without presenting any documentary evidence to
prove her claim, but nonetheless awarded her P300,000.00 for damages
due to loss of income.
CA: 1. Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00; 2. Indemnity for loss
of earning capacity in the amount of P1,224,000.00; 3. Temperate
damages amounting to P25,000.00 in lieu of the award for burial
expenses; 4. Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. 5. The total
amount of damages shall bear an interest of 12% per annum from the
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
The CA adopted the factual findings of the RTC. It also ruled that the RTC
erred in awarding burial expenses and actual damages for loss of earning
capacity despite lack of proof. Based on the wifes claim that the victim
earned not less than P6,000.00 a month and his age at the time of death,
based on his birth certificate (29), the CA applied the formula:
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80 less the age of the victim
at time of death) x [Gross Annual Income less the
Reasonable and Necessary Living Expenses (50% of gross
income)]
WON the CA erred in awarding to herein respondent loss of earning
capacity despite complete absence of documentary evidence that the
deceased Mumar was self-employed and earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws in force at the time of his death
HELD: Damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual
damages, which as a rule must be duly provenby documentary evidence,
not merely by the self-serving testimony of the widow.
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be
awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the
deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
deceaseds line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the
deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws.
Based solely on Nelfas testimony, the CA determined that the deceased
falls within one of these exceptions. Nelfa testified that her husband was
in the business of contracting and manufacturing grills, fences and gates,
and his earnings exceed P6,000.00 per month prior to his death. She
presented no documentary proof of her claims.
It was error for the CA to have awarded damages for loss of earning
capacity based on Nelfas testimony alone.
First, while it is conceded that the deceased was self-employed, the Court
cannot accept that in his line of work there was no documentary proof
available to prove his income from such occupation. There would have
been receipts, job orders, or some form of written contract or agreement
between the deceased and his clients when he is contracted for a job.
Second, and more importantly, decedent was not earning less than the
minimum wage at the time of his death.
Respondent testified that her husband was earning not less than
P6,000.00 per month. On the other hand, the highest minimum wage rate
at the time of the accident, based on Wage Order No. RTWPB-XI-07, was
P148.00. At that rate, the monthly minimum wage would be P3,256.00,
clearly an amount less than what respondent testified to as her husbands
monthly earnings. The deceased would not fall within the recognized
exceptions. There is therefore no basis for the CAs
computation for Mumars supposed net earning capacity and the
subsequent award of damages due to loss of earning capacity.
RULING: WHEREFORE, we GRANT IN PART the petition.
We AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 31 July 2009 and Resolution dated 27 July 2010 in CA-G.R. CV No.
00023-MIN. We ORDER petitioner to pay respondent the following:
Civil indemnity of P50,000.00;
Temperate damages of P25,000.00, in lieu of the award for burial
expenses;
Moral damages of P50,000.00; and
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
Interest on the total monetary award at the rate of 12% per annum from
the finality of this decision until the award is fully satisfied.
People v. Tibon
Accused-appellant and his common-law wife Gina Sumingit lived together
as husband and wife since 1994. They had two children, Kenken and
Reguel. Gina went to Hong Kong to work as a domestic helper, leaving
accused-appellant with custody of their two children. After some time,
accused-appellant heard from his sister who was also working in Hong
Kong that Gina was having an affair with another man. After the
revelation, he was spotted drinking a lot and was seen hitting his two
children. On the night of December 12, 1998, accused-appellants mother
and his siblings, went to accused-appellants room. They saw accused-
appellant with KenKen and Reguel. The two children appeared lifeless
and bore wounds on their bodies. Accused defense was insanity and also
argues that the reduction of civil indemnity from PhP 75,000 to PhP
50,000 is recommended, since the crimes were not attended by any
aggravating circumstances.
WON the reduction of civil indemnity is proper? NO!
HELD: The commission of parricide is punished more severely than
homicide since human beings are expected to love and support those who
are closest to them. The extreme response of killing someone of ones own
flesh and blood is indeed unnatural and tragic. Tibon must thus be
handed down the harshest penalty for his crimes against his innocent
children.
Penalty Imposed
In view of RA 9346, the appellate court correctly modified the sentence of
Tibon to reclusion perpetua.
Pecuniary Liability
When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be
awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2)
actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary
damages; and (5) temperate damages.
The Solicitor General recommended the reduction of civil indemnity from
PhP75,000 to PhP50,000. However, recent jurisprudence pegs civil
indemnity in the amount of PhP75,000, which is automatically granted to
the offended party, or his/her heirs in case of the formers death, without
need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of murder,
homicide, parricide and rape. People v. Regalariohas explained that the
said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty
but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of
the death penalty attended the commission of the offense.
According to Art. 2199 of the Civil Code, one is entitled to adequate
compensation for pecuniary loss suffered by him that is duly proved. This
compensation is termed actual damages. The party seeking actual
damages must produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable,
such as receipts, to justify an award therefor. We note that the trial court
failed to award actual damages in spite of the presentation of receipts
showing wake and funeral expenses (Exhibits R, R-1, R-2, R-4, and R-5)
amounting to PhP173,000. We therefore grant said amount.
Moral damages are also in order. Even in the absence of any allegation
and proof of the heirs emotional suffering, it has been recognized that the
loss of a loved one to a violent death brings emotional pain and anguish,
more so in this case where two young children were brutally killed while
their mother was away. The award of PhP75,000.00 is proper pursuant to
established jurisprudence holding that where the imposable penalty is
death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to RA 9346, the award
of moral damages should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the trial court should have made
accused-appellant account for PhP30,000 as exemplary damages on
account of relationship, a qualifying circumstance, which was alleged and
proved, in the crime of parricide.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01406 convicting accused-appellant
Honorio Tibon y Deiso of parricide is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant should pay the heir of the
victims:
Civil indemnity of PhP 75,000 for each victim;
Actual damages of PhP 173,000;
Moral damages of PhP 75,000 for each victim; and
Exemplary damages of PhP 30,000 for each victim.
DE VERA-YALUNG | 43
People v. Combate TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
The charge against accused-appellant stemmed from two Informations:
That Jose Pepito D. Combate armed with a firearm, with treachery, with
intent to kill and taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot on
EDMUND PRAYCO y OSABEL and LEOPOLDO GUIRO, JR. y PEREZ
respectively, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the body of the two
which caused the death of the said victims, accused-appellant pleaded
"not guilty" to both charges.
What are the proper moral and compensatory award of damages in
criminal cases where the imposable penalty for the crime is reclusion
perpetua or death?
As a rule, the Court awards three kinds of damages in these types of
criminal cases: civil indemnity and moral and exemplary damages.
RE: Moral Damages
The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which
are also compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals
explained the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz:
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate
one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the concept
of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to
compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable
of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that
moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to
the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury
must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have
sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219 and Article 2220
of the Civil Code.

The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in

Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon: "[T]he award of moral damages is
aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status
quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted."31
And lastly, the Court awards exemplary damages as provided for in Arts.
2229 and 2230 of the Civil Code, viz:
Before awarding any of the above-mentioned damages, the Court,
however, must first consider the penalty imposed by law. Thus, in order
to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties,
the court has the duty to ascertain the presence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, in crimes where the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court can impose either
reclusion perpetua or death, depending on the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances present.
In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v.
Arizapa, PhP 50,000 was awarded as moral damages without need of
pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it is recognized that the
victim’s injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the
odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral damages.
Subsequently, the amount was increased to PhP 75,000 in People v.
Soriano.
RE: RA 9346
The enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death
penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of the death penalty,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.
As a result, courts now cannot impose the penalty of death. Instead, they
have to impose reclusion perpetua. Despite this, the principal
consideration for the award of damages, following the ruling in People v.
Salome and People v. Quiachon, is "the penalty provided by law or
imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public
penalty actually imposed on the offender."
When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the
imposition of the penalty of death were it not for RA 9346, the Court
has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v. Victor, that the award of
civil indemnity for the crime of rape when punishable by death
should be PhP 75,000. Such reasoning also applies to all heinous
crimes found in RA 7659.
Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be
imposed because of RA 9346, the imposable penalty as provided by
the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be used
as the basis for awarding damages and not the actual penalty
imposed.
On the other hand, when the circumstances surrounding the crime
call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the Court has
ruled that the proper amounts should be PhP 50,000 as civil
indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as MD awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means,
exemplary damages. diversions or amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering
RE: Deletion of Compensatory damages he has undergone by reason of the defendant’s culpable action.
Moreover, the deletion of the award of compensatory damages for
unearned income by the CA in Criminal Case No. 95-17071 is proper. DE VERA-YALUNG | 44
This Court pronounced in People v. Mallari:
The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate a claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By
way of exception, damages therefore may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence provided that there is
testimony that the victim was either (1) self-employed earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and
judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the victim’s line of
work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) employed as a
daily-wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.
In this case, neither of the exemption applies. Likewise, the deletion of
the award of compensatory damages by the CA in Criminal Case No.
95-17070 is proper for lack of any basis. The trial court did not
discuss why it awarded compensatory damages to the heirs of
Edmund.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused Jose Combate, Jr. y Dallarte alias Peping, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as Principal thereof.
There being no modifying circumstances, the accused is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall serve a
prison term of Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to
Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal.
By way of civil liability, the accused is condemned to pay the heirs of
the late Leopoldo Guiro the following:
The sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and
The sum of P56,319.59 as reimbursement for the burial expenses.
In addition, the accused is ordered to pay Shenette Guiro the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The accused is also declared GUILTY of MURDER for the death of
Edmund
Prayco as charged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 95-17070 as
Principal thereof. There being no modifying circumstances, the accused
is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is
condemned to pay the heirs of the late Edmund Prayco the sum of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Finally, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be
applied to the award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary
damages from the finality of judgment until fully paid in the two (2)
aforementioned criminal cases. SO ORDERED.
======================================================
==

DOCTRINE OF AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES

Article 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages
resulting from the act or omission in question.

The principle is that a party cannot recover damages flowing from

consequences wc the party could reasonably avoided.
Reasonable Corollary: A person who reasonably attempts to
minimize his damages can recover the expenses that he incurred.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE DOCTRINE OF AVOIDABLE

- Plaintiff’s act or omission occurs CONSEQUENCES
before or at the time of the act or - Plaintiff’s acts occur after the act
omission of the defendant. or omission of the defendant.

MORAL DAMAGES CONCEPT

OF MORAL DAMAGES
Article 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful
act for omission.

The award of moral damages is designed to compensate the

claimants for actual injury and is not meant to enrich the complainant
at the expense of the defendant.
 Its aim is the restoration within the limits of the possible the
spiritual status quo ante.
To be in the concept of grants not punitive or corrective in nature,
calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered.
 MD are not awarded to punish the defendant but to compensate the
victim.
EFFECT OF DEATH
A claim for moral damages does not survive the death of the plaintiff.
The right to moral damages is not transmissible to the injured party’s
substitutes bec. it was extremely personal to the injured party.
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the
nature of the action and the damage sued for.
- In the cause of action wc survive, the wrong complained of affects
primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the
person being merely incidental
- In the causes of action wc do not survive, the injury complained of is to
the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.
PROOF AND CAUSATION
No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may
be adjudicated. The assessment of such damages is left to the discretion of
the court, accdg to the circumstances of each case.
However, there must be proof that the defendant caused physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury to
the plaintiff.  Without allegation and proof of such sufferings, no moral
damages can be awarded.
The language of the law need not be used to warrant the award of
moral damages. So long as there is satisfactory proof or
psychological and mental trauma actually suffered by a party,
the grant to him of moral damages is warranted.
There is need for the claimant to satisfactorily prove the existence of
the factual basis of the damages, it is also necessary to prove its
causal relation to the defendant’s act.
While moral damages are incapable of pecuniary estimation, they
are recoverable if they are the proximate cause of the
defendant’s wrongful act or omission.
WHEN NO ALLEGATION AND PROOF ARE REQUIRED
Moral damages may be awarded to the victim in criminal proceedings in
such amount as the court deems just w/o the need for pleading or proof
of the basis thereof.
Moral damages are mandatory in cases of murder w/o need of to allege
and prove such damages.
Moral damages are automatically granted to a rape victim without
presentation of further proof other that the commission of the crime.
CASES WHEN MORAL DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED
Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
Adultery or concubinage;
Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
Illegal search;
Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
Malicious prosecution;
Acts mentioned in article 309;
Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,
34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred
to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring
the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith.
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
No moral damages may be awarded in the absence of a wrongful act of
omission or of fraud of bad faith.
Expert Travel & Tours Inc vs The Hon. CA and Lo:
An award of moral damages would require certain conditions to be met;
to wit: (1) First, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or
psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there must be
a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act
or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury
sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages is
predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219.
FACTORS IN DETERMINING AMOUNT
While trial courts are given discretion to determine the amount of moral
damages, the award should not be palpably and scandalous and excessive;
it must always reasonably approximate the extent of injury and be
proportional to the wrong committed.
a. Extent of Humiliation
b. Pain and Suffering
c. Official, Political and Financial Standing
Credit Standing
Financial Standing
Domingding and Aranas vs Ng:
In cases like the present, the social and financial standings of the offender
and the offended party are additional elements which should be taken
into account in the determination of the amount of moral damages. While
it is true that social dignity does not depend upon the wealth or poverty
of a person the amount necessary to repair the damage thereto depends
upon her owned social and financial means. The financial and means the
offender is also a convenient gauges for the determination of the amount
necessary to repair the injury caused.
. . . While the fundamental rule of the law is to award compensation, yet
rules for ascertaining the amount of compensation to be awarded are
formed with reference to the just rights of both parties, and the standard
fixed for estimating damages ought to be determined, not only what might
be right for plaintiff to receive in order to afford just compensation, but also
by what is just to compel defendant to pay.
d. Age
FIXED AMOUNT (Court awarded moral damages)
Murder cases: P50K
Separated civil actions for quasi-delict where victim died: P50K
Conviction of rape qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition
of death penalty: P75K
PERSONS WHO MAY RECOVER (GR)
Person who endured physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury is the person who can recover moral
damages.
If the basis of the claim is physical suffering, only the one who suffered
and not his or her spouse may recover.  a person who sympathized w/
an injured relative is not entitled to recover for the physical suffering of
another.
RELATIVES (XPN)
Last two par. of Art. 2219:
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred
to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages [(3) Seduction,
abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;]
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may
bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
[(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;  Article 309. Any person who shows
disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully interferes with a funeral shall be liable
to the family of the deceased for damages, material and moral.]
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or
quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may
have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
DE VERA-YALUNG | 45
The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
the death of the deceased.
========================================================
Herbosa vs CA
The case stemmed from the failure of PVE to record on video the
petitioners' wedding celebration allegedly due to the gross negligence of
its crew as well as the lack of supervision on the part of the general
manager of the PVE. Petitioners also alleged that said failure on the part
of PVE to perform its obligation caused deep disappointment, anxiety and
an irreparable break in the continuity of an established family tradition of
recording by film or slide historical and momentous family events
especially wedding celebrations and for which they were entitled to be
paid actual, moral and exemplary damages including attorney's fees.
Accordingly, on October 11, 1980 at around 6:30 o'clock in the morning
the PVE crew composed of the cameraman, Vedastro Sulit, VTR (video
tape recorder) operator, Michael Rodriguez, and the driver and lightman,
Felix Baguio, arrived at the residence of the bride at 1694 M. H. Del Pilar
Street, Ermita, Manila. They recorded the pre-departure activities of the
bride before leaving for the Malate Church along Mabini Street, Malate,
Manila where the wedding ceremonies were held at 9:00 o'clock in the
morning. Thereafter, the crew proceeded to the Manila Hotel in
Intramuros, Manila, where the wedding reception followed at 10:30
o'clock in the morning.
On October 13, 1980, however, Ben Zarate, studio manager of PVE,
informed the petitioners that the videotape coverage of their wedding
celebration was damaged due to mechanical defect in their equipment.
Deeply aggrieved, the petitioners rejected both of the proposed
alternatives since, according to them, a video tape production through
photographs was not going to compensate for the betamax or film
coverage of their actual wedding celebration and that there could be no
event of similar significance insofar as petitioners are concerned.
PVE, a division of respondent Solid Distributors, Inc., disclaimed any
liability for the damaged videotape by invoking force majeure or
fortuitous event and asserted that a defective transistor caused the
breakdown in its video tape recorder. However, said respondent failed to
substantiate its bare allegation by presenting in evidence the alleged
defective transistor before the trial court. Instead, it presented another
component of the same kind. Having invoked fortuitous event, it was
incumbent upon said respondent to adduce sufficient and convincing
proof to establish its defense.
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to award of damages arising
from breach of contract of services – YES!
HELD: In order that fortuitous event may exempt PVE or respondent
Solid Distributors, Inc. from liability, it is necessary that it be free from
negligence. The record shows, however, that the alleged malfunctioning of
the video tape recorder occurred at the beginning of the video coverage at
the residence of the bride. The PVE crew miserably failed to detect the
defect in the video tape recorder and that they discovered the same
rather too late after the wedding reception at the Manila Hotel.
There appeared to be no valid reason why the alleged defect in the video
tape recorder had gone undetected. There was more than sufficient time
for the PVE crew to check the video tape recorder for the reason that they
arrived at the bride's residence at 6:30 o'clock in the morning while they
departed for the wedding ceremonies at the Malate Church at 9:00 o'clock
in the morning. Besides, PVE was admittedly furnished earlier by the
petitioners with a copy of the scrip of the scenes to be recorded so that it
could prepare and organize its contracted task. PVE studio manager Ben
Zarate even testified that ordinarily, the standard playback test to monitor
the functioning of the video tape recorder was required at every
opportunity. In the instant case, a playback test on three (3) occasions,
preferably at the beginning, middle and towards the end portions of the
video coverage would have been sufficient.
The misfortune that befell the then newly-wed couple, petitioners herein,
could have been avoided by a timely exercise of minimum prudence by
the crew of PVE who are all employees of respondent Solid Distributors,
Inc. to check any possible mechanical defect in the video tape recorder.
The defect could have been detected earlier and remedial measures could
have been made to ensure full video tape coverage of the petitioners'
wedding celebration. But PVE or respondent Solid Distributors, Inc. did
not. The failure to record on videotape the wedding celebration of
the petitioners constitutes malicious breach of contract as well as
gross negligence on the part of respondent Solid Distributors, Inc.
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
For failure of PVE, a division of respondent Solid Distributors, Inc., to
comply with its obligation under the video tape coverage contract,
petitioners are entitled to actual damages at least in the amount of One
Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Three Pesos (P1,423.00) representing
their downpayment in that contract.
Ordinarily, moral damages cannot be recovered in an action for
breach of contract because such an action is not among those
expressly mentioned in Article 2219 45 of the New Civil Code.
However, moral damages are recoverable for breach of contract
where the breach was wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith,
oppressive or abusive. The wanton and reckless failure and neglect
to timely check and remedy the video tape recorder by the PVE crew
who are all employees of respondent Solid Distributors, Inc.
indicates a malicious breach of contract and gross negligence on the
part of said respondent in the discharge of its contractual
obligations. Consequently, the petitioners who suffered mental
anguish and tortured feelings thereby, are entitled to an award of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as moral damages.
Buenaventura vs Buenaventura
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage,
which was filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on the ground that both
he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent denying the
allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated.
The lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-
appellee into marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to
her that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry; that he was not
ready to enter into marriage; that he was unable to relate not only to
defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that
he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as proved by
his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that
the aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish,
anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years
the parties were together but also after and throughout their separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial court’s decision on the ground that
unlike those arising from a breach in ordinary contracts, damages arising
as a consequence of marriage may not be awarded. While it is correct that
there is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme Court where damages by
reason of the performance or non-performance of marital obligations
were awarded, it does not follow that no such award for damages may be
made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral
and exemplary damages in the total amount of 7 million pesos. The lower
court, in the exercise of its discretion, found full justification of awarding
at least half of what was originally prayed for. We find no reason to
disturb the ruling of the trial court.
Whether the award of moral damages based on Articles 2217 and 21 of
the Civil Code is proper – NO!
HELD: The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the
petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and
therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered
these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It
is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological
incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate
inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as
willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the
possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was
negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the
mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was
done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or
her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence
appears to have been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must assume and
discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the
contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent.
If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on
the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was
without basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant
of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that
exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.
DE VERA-YALUNG | 46
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996
and its Resolution dated December 10, 1996 which are contested in the
Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in that the
award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, expenses of
litigation and costs are deleted. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Immaculate Conception Academy vs AMA Computer College
Aside from seeking the dismissal of the complaint, ICA and Dr. Campos
separately seek moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P90
million and P10 million plus attorneys fees and cost of suit.
To be entitled to moral damages, ICA needed to prove that it had a
good reputation and that AMAs action besmirched the same. Such
proof is wanting in this case. As for Dr. Campos, he has amply proved
that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, and social
humiliation following AMAs unfounded accusation that he
fraudulently misled AMA regarding the structural condition of ICAs
building. However, due to his untimely demise before the finality of
this case, his claim for moral damages does not survive and is not
transmissible to his substitutes, for being extremely personal to him.
ABS CBN vs CA
Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate
the claimant for actual injury suffered. and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer. The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the
expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversion, or amusements that will serve to obviate then moral suffering
he has undergone. It is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the
possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and should be proportionate to
the suffering inflicted. Trial courts must then guard against the award of
exorbitant damages; they should exercise balanced restrained and
measured objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to passion,
prejudice, or corruption on the part of the trial court.
The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a
corporation because, being an artificial person and having existence
only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no
senses, It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and
mental anguish, which call be experienced only by one having a
nervous system. The statement in People v. Manero and Mambulao
Lumber Co. v. PNB that a corporation may recover moral damages if it
"has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social
humiliation" is an obiter dictum. On this score alone the award for
damages must be set aside, since RBS is a corporation.
Filipinas Broadcasting Netwrok vs AMEC
Whether AMEC is entitled to moral damages- YES!
A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages
because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical
suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety,
mental anguish or moral shock.
Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB, et al. to justify the award of moral
damages. However, the Court’s statement in Mambulao that "a
corporation may have a good reputation which, if besmirched, may also
be a ground for the award of moral damages" is an obiter dictum.
Nevertheless, AMEC’s claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of
Article 2219 of the Civil Code. This provision expressly authorizes
the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other
form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the
plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person
such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other
form of defamation and claim for moral damages.
Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implies damages.
In such a case, evidence of an honest mistake or the want of character or
reputation of the party libeled goes only in mitigation of damages. Neither
in such a case is the plaintiff required to introduce evidence of actual
damages as a condition precedent to the recovery of some damages. In
this case, the broadcasts are libelous per se. Thus, AMEC is entitled to
moral damages.
However, we find the award of ₱300,000 moral damages unreasonable.
The record shows that even though the broadcasts were libelous per se,
AMEC has not suffered any substantial or material damage to its
reputation. Therefore, we reduce the award of moral damages from
₱300,000 to ₱150,000.
QC Govt vs Dacara
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and owner of a car
while driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings
found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the
Quezon City government. As a result, Dacarra Jr. allegedly sustained
bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned
turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
"Indemnification was sought from the city government which however,
yielded negative results. Consequently, Fulgencio P. Dacara (hereinafter
referred to as FULGENCIO), for and in behalf of his minor son, Jr., filed a
Complaint for damages against the Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon,
as defendants, before the RTC, Quezon City. FULGENCIO prayed that the
amount of not less than ₱20,000.00 actual or compensatory damages,
₱150,000.00 moral damages, ₱30,000.00 exemplary damages, and
₱20,000.00 attorney's fees and costs of the suit be awarded to him.
Whether the alleged body injuries incurred by Fulgencio Jr may be
indemnified in form of moral damages – NO!
HELD: Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered
for quasi-delicts, provided that the act or omission caused physical
injuries. There can be no recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-
delict resulted in physical injury. This rule was enunciated in Malonzo v.
Galang as follows:
"x x x. Besides, Article 2219 specifically mentions 'quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries,' as an instance when moral damages may be allowed,
thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical
injuries are excluded, excepting of course, the special torts referred to in
Art. 309 (par. 9, Art. 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and
35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219)."
In the present case, the Complaint alleged that respondent's son
Fulgencio Jr. sustained physical injuries. The son testified that he suffered
a deep cut on his left arm when the car overturned after hitting a pile of
earth that had been left in the open without any warning device
whatsoever.
It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate courts,
however, that no other evidence (such as a medical certificate or proof of
medical expenses) was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr.'s bare assertion of
physical injury. Thus, there was no credible proof that would justify an
award of moral damages based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the Decisions are conspicuously silent with respect to the claim
of respondent that his moral sufferings were due to the negligence of
petitioners. The Decision of the trial court, which summarizes the
testimony of respondent's four witnesses, makes no mention of any
statement regarding moral suffering, such as mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, social humiliation and the like.
For the court to arrive upon a judicious approximation of emotional or
moral injury, competent and substantial proof of the suffering
experienced must be laid before it. Essential to this approximation are
definite findings as to what the supposed moral damages suffered
consisted of; otherwise, such damages would become a penalty rather
than a compensation for actual injury suffered.
Furthermore, well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be
awarded -- whether in a civil or a criminal case -- in the absence of proof
of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or similar
injury.35 The award of moral damages must be solidly anchored on a
definite showing that respondent actually experienced emotional and
mental sufferings. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be
substantiated by clear and convincing proof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
award of moral damages is DELETED. No costs.
========================================================
(iv.) TEMPERATE OR MODERATE DAMAGES
Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than
nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when
the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
can not, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.
Art. 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the
circumstances.
Temperate damages should be awarded to meet pecuniary loss certain to
be suffered but which could not, from the nature of the case, be made
with certainty. In other words, temperate damages can and should be
awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where
the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of
DE VERA-YALUNG | 47
such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate
damages are provided for.
In cases where the resulting injury must be continuing and possible
future complications directly arising from the injury, while certain to
occur are difficult to predict, temperate damages can and should be
awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages; in such cases
there is no incompatibility between actual and temperate damages.
========================================================
Araneta v. Bank of America
Leopoldo Araneta, the petitioner herein, was a local merchant engaged in
the import and export business. On June 30, 1961 he issued a check for
$500 payable to cash and drawn against the San Francisco main office of
the Bank of America, where he had been maintaining a dollar current
account since 1948. Upon inquiry by Araneta as to why his check had
been dishonored, the Bank of America acknowledged that it was an error.
Consequently, two checks were also issued by Araneta, however, despite
the sufficiency of Araneta's deposit balance to cover both checks, they
were again stamped with the notation "Account Closed" and returned to
the respective clearing banks. In view of the foregoing incidents, Araneta,
through counsel, sent a letter to the Bank of America demanding damages
in the sum of $20,000. While admitting responsibility for the
inconvenience caused to Araneta, the bank claimed that the amount
demanded was excessive, and offered to pay the sum of P2,000.00. The
offer was rejected. The petitioner maintains that in an action by a
depositor against a bank for damages resulting from the wrongful
dishonor of the depositor's checks, temperate damages for injury to
business standing or commercial credit may be recovered even in the
absence of definite proof of direct pecuniary loss to the plaintiff, a finding
— as it was found by the Court of Appeals — that the wrongful acts of the
respondent had adversely affected his credit being sufficient for the
purpose.
The judgment of the trial court awarded all the item prayed for, but on
appeal by the defendant the Court of Appeals eliminated the award of
compensatory and temperate damages and reduced the moral damages to
P8,000.00, the exemplary damages to P1,000.00 and the attorney's fees to
P1,000.00.
Whether or not on the basis of the findings of the Court of Appeals, there
is reason to conclude that the petitioner did sustain some pecuniary loss
although no sufficient proof of the amount thereof has been adduced?
HELD: The financial credit of a businessman is a prized and valuable
asset, it being a significant part of the foundation of his business. Any
adverse reflection thereon constitutes some material loss to him. As
stated in the case Atlanta National Bank vs. Davis, supra, citing 2 Morse
Banks, Sec. 458, "it can hardly be possible that a customer's check can be
wrongfully refused payment without some impeachment of his credit,
which must in fact be an actual injury, though he cannot, from the nature
of the case, furnish independent, distinct proof thereof. The petitioner, as
found by the Court of Appeals, is a merchant of long standing and good
reputation in the Philippines. Some of his record is cited in the decision
appealed from. We are of the opinion that his claim for temperate
damages is legally justified. Considering all the circumstances, including
the rather small size of the petitioner's account with the respondent, the
amounts of the checks which were wrongfully dishonored, and the fact
that the respondent tried to rectify the error soon after it was discovered,
although the rectification came after the damage had been caused, we
believe that an award of P5,000 by way of temperate damages is
sufficient.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is modified
by awarding temperate damages to the petitioner in the sum of P5,000
and increasing the attorney's fees to P4,000; and is affirmed in all other
respects. Costs against the respondent.
De Guzman v. Tumolba
De Guzman and respondent Antonio Tumolva, doing business under the
name and style A.M. Tumolva Engineering Works (the Contractor),
entered into a Construction Agreement for the construction of an
orphanage
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
CA: held that although the Contractor deviated from the plan, CIACs
award of actual damages was not proper inasmuch as De Guzman failed to
establish its extent with reasonable certainty. The CA, however, found it
appropriate to award temperate damages considering that De Guzman
suffered pecuniary loss as a result of the collapse of the perimeter fence
due to the Contractors negligence and violation of his undertakings in the
Agreement.
WON De Guzman is entitled to temperate damages? YES!
HELD: There is no doubt that De Guzman incurred damages as a result of
the collapse of the perimeter fence. The Contractor is clearly guilty of
negligence and, therefore, liable for the damages caused. CIACs award of
actual damages, however, is indeed not proper under the circumstances
as there is no concrete evidence to support the plea. De Guzman failed to
adduce evidence to satisfactorily prove the amount of actual damage
incurred. Contrary to her assertion, the handwritten calculation of
reconstruction costs made by Engineer Santos and attached to his
affidavit cannot be given any probative value because he never took the
witness stand to affirm the veracity of his allegations in his affidavit and
be cross-examined on them.
Nevertheless, De Guzman is indeed entitled to temperate damages as
provided under Article 2224 of the Civil Code for the loss she suffered.
When pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot, from the
nature of the case, be proven with certainty, temperate damages may be
recovered. Temperate damages may be allowed in cases where from the
nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced,
although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some
pecuniary loss.[15] Undoubtedly, De Guzman suffered pecuniary loss
brought about by the collapse of the perimeter fence by reason of the
Contractors negligence and failure to comply with the specifications. As
she failed to prove the exact amount of damage with certainty as required
by law, the CA was correct in awarding temperate damages, in lieu of
actual damages. However, after weighing carefully the attendant
circumstances and taking into account the cost of rebuilding the damaged
portions of the perimeter fence, the amount of ₱100,000.00 awarded to
De Guzman should be increased. This Court, in recognition of the
pecuniary loss suffered, finds the award of ₱150,000.00 by way of
temperate damages as reasonable and just under the premises.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated February 24, 2009 and its Resolution dated May 26,
2009 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of
₱100,000.00 as temperate damages is increased to ₱150,000.00. The
award shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum reckoned from the
finality of this judgment until fully paid.
========================================================
(v.) NOMINAL DAMAGES – STANDS ALONE
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Art. 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation
arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case
where any property right has been invaded.
Art. 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further
contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as between
the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns.’
The allowance of nominal damages is generally based on the ground that
every injury from its very nature legally imports damage, or that the
injury complained of would in the future be evidence in favor of the
wrongdoer, especially where, if continued for a sufficient length of time,
the invasion of the plaintiff’s rights would ripen into a prescriptive right
in favor of the defendant.
Nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact, and are
allowed, not as an equivalent of wrong inflicted, but simply in recognition
of the existence of a technical injury.
GR: Nominal damages by their nature are small sums fixed by the court
without regard to the extent of the harm done to the injured party.
DE VERA-YALUNG | 48
XPN: Substantial claim, if based upon the violation of a legal right; in such
case, the law presumes damage although actual or compensatory
damages are not proven.
Law presumes damage although actual or compensatory damages are not
proven.
These are damages in name only and are allowed simply in recognition of
a technical injury based on a violation of a legal right.
It cannot co-exist with actual or compensatory damages.
REASON: In Temperate damages there is pecuniary loss, in
nominal damages there is an injury but no pecuniary loss.
The idea in nominal is that there is only a wrong but there is no loss,
nobody got hurt, there is no damage to be computed, at the same
time, in recognition of the fact that something not so right was done,
violation of his right occurred. It is not meant to compensate you, it
is merely to recognize that you are correct, you just want to say to
the Court that you are right.
When you are comparing temperate and actual, it is more on the proof, in
both cases, there is an actual loss. In actual and temperate the
violation of a legal right is tantamount to something that must be
compensated; you can face a monetary violation. The only difference
is that, in actual, you have to give the exact amount. In temperate,
you are able to show that you need to be compensated, but there is
something lacking in proof that you presented.
========================================================
Fontana Resort v. Sps. Tan – Injury without Pecuniary Loss
Sps. Tan bought from petitioner RN Development Corporation (RNDC)
two class D shares of stock in petitioner Fontana Resort and Country Club,
Inc. (FRCCI), worth P387,300.00, enticed by the promises of petitioners
sales agents that petitioner FRCCI would construct a park with first-class
leisure facilities and that FRCCI class D shareholders would be admitted
to one membership in the country club, which entitled them to use park
facilities and stay at a two-bedroom villa for 5 ordinary weekdays and 2
weekends every year for free. respondents filed before the SEC a
Complaint for refund of the P387,300.00 they spent to purchase FRCCI
shares of stock from petitioners. Respondents alleged that they had been
deceived into buying FRCCI shares because of petitioners fraudulent
misrepresentations. Construction of FLP turned out to be still unfinished
and the policies, rules, and regulations of the country club were obscure.
Respondents additionally alleged the unreasonable cancellation of their
confirmed reservation for the free use of an FLP villa. According to
respondents, their reservation was confirmed by a Mr. Murphy Magtoto,
only to be cancelled later on by a certain Shaye. Petitioners countered that
April 1, 1999 was a Holy Thursday and FLP was already fully-booked.
Petitioners, however, do not deny that Murphy Magtoto and Shaye are FLP
employees who dealt with respondents. The absence of any confirmation
number issued to respondents does not also discount the possibility that
the latters reservation was mistakenly confirmed by Murphy Magtoto
despite FLP being fully-booked.
WON the Sps. Tan are entitled to nominal damages even though the
transaction they had with Fontana resort was mere negligence only?
HELD: At most, we perceive a mix-up in the reservation process of
petitioners. This demonstrates a mere negligence on the part of
petitioners, but not willful intention to deprive respondents of their
membership benefits. It does not constitute default that would call for
rescission of the sale of FRCCI shares by petitioners to respondents. For
the negligence of petitioners as regards respondents reservation for April
1, 1999, respondents are at least entitled to nominal damages in
accordance with Articles 2221 and 2222 of the Civil Code.
Nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or
recognizing that right, and not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him. Its award is thus not for the purpose of indemnification
for a loss but for the recognition and vindication of a right. Indeed,
nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact. When
granted by the courts, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong
inflicted but simply a recognition of the existence of a technical injury. A
violation of the plaintiff's right, even if only technical, is sufficient to
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
support an award of nominal damages.Conversely, so long as there is a
showing of a violation of the right of the plaintiff, an award of nominal
damages is proper. It is also settled that the amount of such damages is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the
relevant circumstances.
In this case, we deem that the respondents are entitled to an award of
P5,000.00 as nominal damages in recognition of their confirmed
reservation for the free use of an FLP villa on April 1, 1999 which was
inexcusably cancelled by petitioner on March 3, 1999.
In sum, the respondents Complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action
for the annulment or rescission of the contract of sale of FRCCI class D
shares by petitioners to respondents; however, respondents were unable
to establish by preponderance of evidence that they are entitled to said
annulment or rescission.
RULING: Petitioners are ORDERED to pay respondents the amount of
P5,000.00 as nominal damages for their negligence as regards
respondents cancelled reservation for April 1, 1999, but respondents
Complaint, in so far as the annulment or rescission of the contract of sale
of the FRCCI class "D shares of stock is concerned, is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
Almeda v. Carino
Almeda and Carinñ o, entered into two agreements to sell, one covering
eight titled properties 4 and another three untitled properties. The agreed
price of the eight titled properties was was to be paid upon the signing
and execution of the agreement. On the other hand, the purchase price of
the three untitled properties of which was to be paid upon the signing and
execution of the agreement.
Consequently, Almeda asked Carinñ o for the execution of a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the eight titled properties although they had not been
fully paid. Carinñ o granted the request and executed the deed of sale over
the eight titled lots in favor of Almeda, Inc. Then, Almeda executed an
undertaking to pay Carinñ o the balance of the purchase price. Deeds of sale
for two of the three untitled lots were also executed.
Subsequently, Carinñ o made demands for the full and final payment of the
balance due him and the interests thereon. Despite demand letters sent to
Almeda however, the balance was not paid. Hence, Carinñ o filed before the
RTC a complaint against Almeda and Almeda, Inc., in whose name the
titles to the properties had been transferred. Carinñ o prayed that Almeda
and/or Almeda, Inc. be ordered to pay to him the balance of P477,589.47,
the legal interests thereon from demand until full payment, 15% of all the
amounts due, including interests as attorney’s fees, P10,000.00 as
litigation expenses, P100,000.00 as moral, exemplary and nominal
damages and the costs of suit. The RTC granted.
Ponciano Almeda and Almeda, Inc. appealed to the CA for a modification
of judgment, contending that the lower court erred in awarding nominal
damages and attorney’s fees in favor of Carinñ o. They maintained that they
were not guilty of any unfair treatment or reckless and malevolent actions
so as to justify an award of nominal damages. They claimed that they
refused to pay the remaining balance because the proceeds of certain
harvests from the lands in question and liquidated damages were also
due them.
WON THE RTC ERRED IN AWARDING NOMINAL DAMAGES IN THE
AMOUNT OF P150,000.00?
HELD: Nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating
or recognizing that right, and not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any
loss suffered by him.12 Its award is thus not for the purpose of
indemnification for a loss but for the recognition and vindication of a
right.13 Indeed, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in
fact. When granted by the courts, they are not treated as an equivalent of
a wrong inflicted but simply a recognition of the existence of a technical
injury.14 A violation of the plaintiff’s right, even if only technical, is
sufficient to support an award of nominal damages. Conversely, so long as
there is a showing of a violation of the right of the plaintiff, an award of
nominal damages is proper.
Applying such principles to the instant case, we have on record the fact
that petitioners have an unpaid balance on the purchase price of lots sold
to them by respondents. Their refusal to pay the remaining balance of the
DE VERA-YALUNG | 49
purchase price despite repeated demands, even after they had sold the
properties to third parties, undoubtedly constitutes a violation of
respondents’ right to the said amount under their agreements. The facts
show that the right of the vendor to receive the unpaid balance to the lots
sold was violated by petitioners, and this entitles respondents at the very
least to nominal damages.
Deed of Absolute Sale – fully paid
Contract to Sell – must be proved
Agabon v. NLRC
Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the
business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials.
It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum
board and cornice installers, however, they were dismissed for
abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and payment of money claims. The Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent
to pay the monetary claims. Accordingly, the CA, after a careful review of
the facts, ruled that petitioners dismissal was for a just cause. They had
abandoned their employment and were already working for another
employer.
WON PET was validly dismissed? YES! But w/o due process
HELD: The rule thus evolved: where the employer had a valid reason to
dismiss an employee but did not follow the due process requirement, the
dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an
indemnity to the employee. This became known as the Wenphil or Belated
Due Process Rule. This means that the termination is illegal only if it is not
for any of the justified or authorized causes provided by law. Payment of
backwages and other benefits, including reinstatement, is justified only if
the employee was unjustly dismissed.
In cases involving dismissals for cause but without observance of the twin
requirements of notice and hearing, the better rule is to follow Wenphil by
holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on
the employer. Such sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that imposed
in Wenphil. By doing so, this Court would be able to achieve a fair result by
dispensing justice not just to employees, but to employers as well.
It must be stressed that in the present case, the petitioners committed a
grave offense, i.e., abandonment, which, if the requirements of due
process were complied with, would undoubtedly result in a valid
dismissal.
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of
statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal,
or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for
the violation of his statutory rights. The sanction should be in the nature
of indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case,
taking into special consideration the gravity of the due process violation
of the employer. Under the Civil Code, nominal damages is adjudicated in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by
the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose
of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. As enunciated
by this Court in Viernes v. National Labor Relations Commissions, an
employer is liable to pay indemnity in the form of nominal damages to an
employee who has been dismissed if, in effecting such dismissal, the
employer fails to comply with the requirements of due process.
The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the
private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of
nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances.
Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem
it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We believe this form of damages would
serve to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due
process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or
recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the
Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.
========================================================
(vi.) LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to
be paid in case of breach thereof. (Article 2226, Civil Code).
GR: The court cannot change the amount of liquidated damages agreed
upon by the parties.
XPN: Article 2227 provides that liquidated damages, whether intended as
an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are
iniquitous or unconscionable.
Article 2228 provides that when the breach of the contract
committed by the defendant is not the one contemplated by the
parties in agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall
determine the measure of damages, and not the stipulation.
Whether intended as an indemnity or penalty shall be equitably reduced
if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.
Normally intended for breach of obligation, some in certain contracts you
have liquidated damage and penalty, in penalty, normally provided
for something other what the other than what
the liquidated damages covers.
========================================================
Radiowealth Finance Co vs Del Rosario
Spouses Vicente and Maria Sumilang del Rosario jointly and severally
executed in favor of Radiowealth Finance Company a Promissory Note for
₱138,948. It is agreed that if default be made in the payment of any of the
installments or late payment charges thereon as and when the same
becomes due and payable the total principal sum then remaining unpaid,
together with the agreed late payment charges thereon, shall at once
become due and payable without need of notice or demand and, in
addition, a further sum of ten per cent (10%) of said amount which
in no case shall be less than (P500.00), as and for liquidated
damages.”
Thereafter, respondents defaulted on the monthly installments. Despite
repeated demands, they failed to pay their obligations under their
Promissory Note. Petitioner filed a Complaint for the collection of a sum
of money before the RTC of Manila, Petitioner, in its Complaint, prayed for
"14% interest per annum from May 6, 1993 until fully paid."
Whether the prayed interest per annum should be granted – NO! HELD: It
should be stressed that respondents do not contest the amount of the
principal obligation. While the specific date on which each installment
would be due was left blank, the Note clearly provided that each
installment should be payable each month. Their liability as expressly
stated in the Promissory Note and found by the CA is "₱13[8],948.00
which is payable in twelve (12) installments at ₱11,579.00 a month for
twelve (12) consecutive months." In addition, the
Note also provided that the debtors would be liable for attorney’s fees
equivalent to 25 percent of the amount due in case a legal action was
instituted and 10 percent of the same amount as liquidated damages.
Liquidated damages, however, should no longer be imposed for
being unconscionable. Such damages should also be deemed
included in the 2.5 percent monthly penalty. Since the Note already
stipulated a late payment penalty of 2.5 percent monthly to be added to
each unpaid installment until fully paid. Payment of interest was not
expressly stipulated in the Note. Thus, it should be deemed included in
such penalty.
Convincingly, petitioner has established not only a cause of action against
the respondents, but also a due and demandable obligation. The
obligation of the respondents had matured and they clearly defaulted
when their checks bounced. Per the acceleration clause, the whole debt
became due one month (April 2, 1991) after the date of the Note because
the check representing their first installment bounced.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is
MODIFIED in that the remand is SET ASIDE and respondents are ordered
TO PAY ₱138,948, plus 2.5 percent penalty charge per month beginning
April 2, 1991 until fully paid, and 10 percent of the amount due as
attorney’s fees. No costs.
Continental Cement Corporation vs Asea Brown Boveri Inc
Petitioner Continental Cement Corporation (CCC), a corporation engaged
in the business of producing cement, obtained the services of respondents
Asea Brown Boveri, Inc. (ABB) and BBC Brown Boveri, Corp. to repair its
160 KW Kiln DC Drive Motor (Kiln Drive Motor).
Due to the repeated failure of respondents to repair the Kiln Drive Motor,
petitioner filed with RTC of QC a Complaint for sum of money and
damages against respondent corporations
Respondents, however, claimed that under Clause 7 of the General
Conditions, attached to the letter of offer issued by respondent ABB to
DE VERA-YALUNG | 50
petitioner, the liability of respondent ABB "does not extend to
consequential damages either direct or indirect." Petitioner reiterates that
the General Conditions cannot exculpate respondents because petitioner
never agreed to be bound by it nor did petitioner receive a copy of it.
Respondents insist that petitioner is bound by the General Conditions. By
issuing Purchase Order Nos. 17136-37, petitioner in effect
accepted the General Conditions appended to respondent ABB’s letter of
offer. Respondents also deny liability for damages claiming that they
performed their obligation in good faith. However, it was proven that
respondent ABB not only incurred delay in performing its obligation but
likewise failed to repair the Kiln Drive Motor; thus, prompting petitioner
to sue for damages.
Whether the Purchase Order Nos. 17136-37 will bind the petitioner and
hence will exculpate the respondent from payment for damages– NO!
HELD: Respondents failed to show that petitioner was duly furnished
with a copy of said General Conditions. Hence, it is not binding on
petitioner. Having breached the contract it entered with petitioner,
respondent ABB is liable for damages pursuant to Articles 1167, 1170,
and 2201 of the Civil Code,. Based on the foregoing, a repairman who fails
to perform his obligation is liable to pay for the cost of the execution of
the obligation plus damages. Though entitled, petitioner in this case is not
claiming reimbursement for the repair allegedly done by Newton
Contractor, but is instead asking for damages for the delay caused by
respondent ABB.
As per Purchase Order Nos. 17136-37, petitioner is entitled to penalties
in the amount of ₱987.25 per day from the time of delay, August 30, 1990,
up to the time the Kiln Drive Motor was finally returned to petitioner.
Records show that although the testing of Kiln Drive Motor was done on
March 13, 1991, the said motor was actually delivered to petitioner as
early as January 7, 1991. The installation and testing was done only on
March 13, 1991 upon the request of petitioner because the Kiln was
under repair at the time the motor was delivered; hence, the load testing
had to be postponed.
Under Article 1226 of the Civil Code, the penalty clause takes the place of
indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-
compliance with the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the
contrary. In this case, since there is no stipulation to the contrary, the
penalty in the amount of ₱987.25 per day of delay covers all other
damages (i.e. production loss, labor cost, and rental of the crane) claimed
by petitioner.
In sum, we find petitioner entitled to penalties in the amount of ₱987.25
per day from August 30, 1990 up to January 7, 1991 (131 days) or a total
amount of ₱129,329.75 for the delay caused by respondent ABB.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
(vii.) EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil
liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct
from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence.
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award
exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
Art. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right;
the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.
Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be
proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated
damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in
order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless,
before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addi-
tion to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the
stipulation for liquidated damages.
Art. 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are renounced in
advance shall be null and void.’
PUNITIVE or VINDICATIVE DAMAGES
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
Exemplary damages are required by public policy to suppress wanton
acts. When there is gross carelessness or negligence amounting to wanton
misconduct.
Imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition
to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those
species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him
for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in
good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar
conduct in the future.
REQUISITES:
They may be imposed by way of example in addition to
compensatory damages, and only after the claimant’s right to
them has been established;
They cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their de-termination
depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that
may be awarded to the claimant;
The act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton,
fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.
========================================================
Cathay Pacific Airways ;td vs Vasquez
Cathay is a common carrier engaged in the business of transporting
passengers and goods by air. As part of its marketing strategy, Cathay
accords its frequent flyers membership in its Marco Polo Club. The
members enjoy several privileges, such as priority for upgrading of
booking without any extra charge whenever an opportunity arises. Thus,
a frequent flyer booked in the Business Class has priority for upgrading to
First Class if the Business Class Section is fully booked. Respondents-
spouses Dr. Daniel Earnshaw Vazquez and Maria Luisa Madrigal Vazquez
are frequent flyers of Cathay and are Gold Card members of its Marco Polo
Club. On 24 September 1996, the Vazquezes, together with their maid and
two friends, went to Hongkong for pleasure and business. For their return
flight to Manila they were booked on Cathay’s Flight CX-905. Vazquezes
and their companions checked in at Cathay’s check-in counter and were
given their respective boarding passes, to wit, Business Class boarding
passes for the Vazquezes and their two friends, and Economy Class for
their maid. A ground attendant by the name of Ms. Chiu saw a message
that there was a "seat change" from Business Class to First Class for the
Vazquezes. approached and told the Vazquezes’ accommodations were
upgraded to First Class. Dr. Vazquez refused the upgrade, reasoning that it
would not look nice for them as hosts to travel in First Class and their
guests, in the Business Class; and moreover, they were going to discuss
business matters during the flight. Ms. Chiu told them that if they would
not avail themselves of the privilege, they would not be allowed to take
the flight. Eventually, after talking to his two friends, Dr. Vazquez gave in.
He and Mrs. Vazquez then proceeded to the First Class Cabin.
Upon their return to Manila, the Vazquezes, in a letter addressed to
Cathay’s Country Manager, demanded that they be indemnified in the
amount of P1million for the "humiliation and embarrassment" caused by
its employees. They also demanded "a written apology. After Cathay’s
failure to give them any feedback within its self-imposed deadline, the
Vazquezes instituted before the RTC of Makati City an action for damages
against Cathay, praying for the payment to each of them the amounts of
P250,000 as temperate damages; P500,000 as moral damages; P500,000
as exemplary or corrective damages; and P250,000 as attorney’s fees.
Whether (1) by upgrading the seat accommodation of the Vazquezes from
Business Class to First Class Cathay breached its contract of carriage with
the Vazquezes; (2) the upgrading was tainted with fraud or bad faith; and
(3) the Vazquezes are entitled to damages. – YES, NO, YES [NOMINAL
NOT EXEMPLARY]
HELD: Just like other privileges, such priority could be waived. The
Vazquezes should have been consulted first whether they wanted to avail
themselves of the privilege or would consent to a change of seat
accommodation before their seat assignments were given to other
passengers. Normally, one would appreciate and accept an upgrading, for
it would mean a better accommodation. But, whatever their reason was
and however odd it might be, the Vazquezes had every right to decline the
upgrade and insist on the Business Class accommodation they had
booked for and which was designated in their boarding passes. They
clearly waived their priority or preference when they asked that other
DE VERA-YALUNG | 51
passengers be given the upgrade. It should not have been imposed on
them over their vehement objection. By insisting on the upgrade, Cathay
breached its contract of carriage with the Vazquezes.
We find no persuasive proof of fraud or bad faith in this case. The
Vazquezes were not induced to agree to the upgrading through insidious
words or deceitful machination or through willful concealment of
material facts. Upon boarding, Ms. Chiu told the Vazquezes that their
accommodations were upgraded to First Class in view of their being Gold
Card members of Cathay’s Marco Polo Club. She was honest in telling
them that their seats were already given to other passengers and the
Business Class Section was fully booked. Ms. Chiu might have failed to
consider the remedy of offering the First Class seats to other passengers.
But, we find no bad faith in her failure to do so, even if that amounted to
an exercise of poor judgment. Neither was the transfer of the Vazquezes
effected for some evil or devious purpose.
In this case, we have ruled that the breach of contract of carriage, which
consisted in the involuntary upgrading of the Vazquezes’ seat
accommodation, was not attended by fraud or bad faith. The CA’s award of
moral damages has, therefore, no leg to stand on. It is a requisite in the
grant of exemplary damages that the act of the offender must be
accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent
manner. Such requisite is absent in this case. Moreover, to be entitled
thereto the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate, or
compensatory damages. Since the Vazquezes are not entitled to any of
these damages, the award for exemplary damages has no legal basis. And
where the awards for moral and exemplary damages are eliminated, so
must the award for attorney’s fees
The most that can be adjudged in favor of the Vazquezes for Cathay’s
breach of contract is an award for nominal damages under Article 2221 of
the Civil Code. Nonetheless, considering that the breach was intended to
give more benefit and advantage to the Vazquezes by upgrading their
Business Class accommodation to First Class because of their valued
status as Marco Polo members, we reduce the award for nominal damages
to P5,000.
Bright Maritime Corporation vs Fantonial
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for illegal dismissal,
payment of salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract
and for the award of moral, exemplary, and actual damages as well as
attorney’s fees before the Regional Arbitration of the NLRC in Cebu.
Petitioners assert that respondent’s failure to join the vessel on January
17, 2000 should not be attributed to it for it was a direct consequence of
the delay in the release of the medical report. Respondent was not yet
declared fit to work at the time when he was supposed to be deployed on
January 17, 2000, as instructed by petitioners’ principal. Respondent’s
fitness to work is a condition sine qua non for purposes of deploying an
overseas contract worker. Since respondent failed to qualify on the date
designated by the principal for his deployment, petitioners had to find a
qualified replacement considering the nature of the shipping business
where delay in the departure of the vessel is synonymous to
demurrage/damages on the part of the principal and on the vessel’s
charterer. Without a clean bill of health, the contract of employment
cannot be considered to have been perfected as it is wanting of an
important requisite.
Whether petitioners’ reason for preventing respondent from leaving
Manila and joining the vessel M/V AUK in Germany on January 17, 2000 is
valid. – NO!
HELD: Respondent’s Medical Certificate dated January 17, 2000, stamped
with the words "FIT TO WORK," proves that respondent was medically fit
to leave Manila on January 17, 2000 to join the vessel M/V AUK in
Germany. The Affidavit of physician that respondent was declared fit to
work only on January 21, 2000 cannot overcome the evidence in the
Medical Certificate dated January 17, 2000, which already stated that
respondent had "Class-B Non-Infectious Hepatitis-B," and that he was fit
to work. Petitioners’ act of preventing respondent from leaving and
complying with his contract of employment constitutes breach of contract
for which petitioner BMC is liable for actual damages to respondent for
the loss of one-year salary as provided in the contract. The monthly salary
stipulated in the contract is US$670, inclusive of allowance.
The Court upholds the award of moral damages in the amount of
₱30,000.00, as the CA correctly found petitioners’ act was tainted with
bad faith, considering that respondent’s Medical Certificate stated that he
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
was fit to work on the day of his scheduled departure, yet he was not
allowed to leave allegedly for medical reasons. Further, the Court agrees
with the CA that petitioner BMC is liable to respondent for exemplary
damages, which are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good in view of petitioner’s act of preventing respondent from
being deployed on the ground that he was not yet declared fit to work on
the date of his departure, despite evidence to the contrary. Such act, if
tolerated, would prejudice the employment opportunities of our seafarers
who are qualified to be deployed, but prevented to do so by a manning
agency for unjustified reasons. Exemplary damages are imposed not to
enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent
against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions. In
this case, petitioner should be held liable to respondent for exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00.
========================================================
(viii.) ATTORNEY’S FEES
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
When exemplary damages are awarded;
When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the
plaintiff;
Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
In actions for legal support;
In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and
skilled workers;
In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s
liability laws;
In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable.
The amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded is left to the discretion of the
courts. Necessarily, the award must be reasonable under the
circumstances.
The amount agreed upon by the plaintiff and his counsel does not control
the amount of attorney’s fees that should be awarded. In the same vein,
the plaintiff’s counsel does not have a right to enforce the award of
attorney’s fees because, as stated earlier, the same is due to the plaintiff
and not to his counsel.
KINDS:
ORDINARY – attorney’s fees given to the counsel. (Legal
Ethics)
EXTRAORDINARY – not really given to the counsel, rather it is meant
to indemnify the party, for whatever cost he paid his lawyer. It
is possible that the party had to pay 5000.00, the award of
attorney’s fees was 10,000.00, the award will not be given
wholly to the counsel.
========================================================
Kaisahan at Kapatiiran ng mga Manggawa vs Manila Water Co Inc
The Union is the duly-recognized bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of the respondent Manila Water Company, Inc. (Company)
while Borela is the Union President. The Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS) entered into a Concession Agreement
(Agreement) with the Company to privatize the operations of the MWSS.
Article 6.1.3 of the Agreement provides that the Concessionaire shall
grant [its] employees benefits no less favorable than those granted to
MWSS employees at the time of [their] separation from MWSS. Among the
benefits enjoyed by the employees of the MWSS were the amelioration
allowance (AA) and the cost-of-living allowance (COLA) granted in August
1979, pursuant to Letter of Implementation No. 97 issued by the Office of
the President.
The payment of the AA and the COLA was discontinued pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization
DE VERA-YALUNG | 52
Law. Nonetheless, in 2001, the Union demanded from the Company the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of [the Labor Code],
payment of the AA and the COLA during the renegotiation of the parties including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) The Company initially turned favor of labor") and Article 1702 of the Civil Code (which provides that
down this demand, however, it subsequently agreed to an amendment of "[i]n case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be
the CBA on the matter, which provides: construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer)
The Company shall implement the payment of the AA and COLA Properly viewed from this perspective, the award cannot be taken to
retroactive August 1, 1997 should the MWSS decide to pay its employees mean an additional grant of attorneys fees, in violation of the ten percent
and all its former employees or upon award of a favorable order by the (10%) limit under Article 111 of the Labor Code since it rests on an
MWSS Regulatory Office or upon receipt of [a] final court judgment. entirely different legal obligation than the one contracted under the MOA.
Thereafter, the Company integrated the AA into the monthly payroll of all Simply stated, the attorneys fees contracted under the MOA do not
its employees beginning August 1, 2002, payment of the AA and the COLA refer to the amount of attorneys fees awarded by the NLRC; the MOA
after an appropriation was made and approved by the MWSS Board of provision on attorneys fees does not have any bearing at all to the
Trustees. The Company, however, did not subsequently include the COLA attorneys fees awarded by the NLRC under Article 111 of the Labor
since the Commission on Audit disapproved its payment because the Code. Based on these considerations, it is clear that the CA erred in ruling
Company had no funds to cover this benefit. that the LAs award of attorneys fees violated the maximum limit of ten
As a result, the Union and Borela filed on a complaint against the percent (10%) fixed by Article 111 of the Labor Code.
Company for payment of the AA, COLA, moral and exemplary damages, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
legal interest, and attorneys fees before the National Labor Relations hereby GRANTED.The assailed decision dated March 6, 2006 and the
Commission (NLRC). resolution dated August 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
Whether the awarding of 10% attorney’s fees to petitioners is proper - 83654 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Labor Arbiters award of
YES! attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total judgment
HELD: In RTG Construction, Inc. v. Facto and in Ortiz v. San Miguel award is hereby REINSTATED.
Corporation. In RTG Construction, we specifically stated:
Settled is the rule that in actions for recovery of wages, or where an
employee was forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his
rights and interests, a monetary award by way of attorneys fees is
justifiable under Article 111 of the Labor Code; Section 8, Rule VIII, Book
III of its Implementing Rules; and paragraph 7, Article 2208 of the Civil
Code. The award of attorneys fees is proper, and there need not be
any showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith
when it withheld the wages.There need only be a showing that the
lawful wages were not paid accordingly.
In the present case, we find it undisputed that the union members are
entitled to their AA benefits and that these benefits were not paid by the
Company. That the Company had no funds is not a defense as this was not
an insuperable cause that was cited and properly invoked. As a
consequence, the union members represented by the Union were
compelled to litigate and incur legal expenses. On these bases, we find no
difficulty in upholding the NLRCs award of ten percent (10%) attorneys
fees.
The more significant issue in this case is the effect of the MOA provision
that attorneys fees shall be deducted from the AA and CBA receivables. In
this regard, the CA held that the additional grant of 10% attorneys fees by
the NLRC violates Article 111 of the Labor Code, considering that the MOA
between the parties already ensured the payment of 10% attorneys fees
deductible from the AA and CBA receivables of the Unions members. In
addition, the Company also argues that the Unions demand, together with
the NLRC award, is unconscionable as it represents 20% of the amount
due or about P21.4 million.
In the present case, the ten percent (10%) attorneys fees awarded by the
NLRC on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code accrue to the Unions
members as indemnity for damages and not to the Unions counsel as
compensation for his legal services, unless, they agreed that the award
shall be given to their counsel as additional or part of his
compensation; in this case the Union bound itself to pay 10% attorneys
fees to its counsel under the MOA and also gave up the attorneys fees
awarded to the Unions members in favor of their counsel. This is
supported by Borelas affidavit which stated that [t]he 10% attorneys fees
paid by the members/employees is separate and distinct from the
obligation of the company to pay the 10% awarded attorneys fees which
we also gave to our counsel as part of our contingent fee agreement. The
limit to this agreement is that the indemnity for damages imposed by
the NLRC on the losing party (i.e., the Company) cannot exceed ten
percent (10%).
We also held in PCL Shipping that Article 111 of the Labor Code, as
amended, contemplates the extraordinary concept of attorneys fees and
that Article 111 is an exception to the declared policy of strict
construction in the award of attorneys fees. Although an express
finding of facts and law is still necessary to prove the merit of the
award, there need not be any showing that the employer acted
maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld the wages. In carrying out
and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and implementing
regulations, the employee's welfare should be the primary and paramount
consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to
the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of
the Labor Code (which provides that "[a]ll doubts in the

TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS DE VERA-YALUNG | 53