AP Photo/Alex Brandon

Navigating Political Currents

to Achieve Middle East Peace
American Leadership Is Vital

David A. Halperin and Matthew Duss  September 2010

w w w.americanprogress.org
Navigating Political Currents
to Achieve Middle East Peace
American Leadership Is Vital

David A. Halperin and Matthew Duss  September 2010

Introduction and summary

The fate of the direct talks between Israelis and Palestinians will be significantly
determined by the extent to which the leaders on each side are able and willing to
navigate the constraints of their respective domestic politics. It is also clear that
the renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will require sustained and determined
U.S. involvement from the onset even though the United States is in the thick of
its own mid-term elections.

Israelis and Palestinians launched direct negotiations on September 1 after more

than a year of U.S. efforts to bring them to the negotiating table, including four
months of indirect talks facilitated through U.S. mediation.

The long awaited re-launch of negotiations has effectively raised the stakes for
Israelis and Palestinians, demanding that officials in Jerusalem and Ramallah make
the politically difficult decisions that they have successfully avoided until now.
It also raises the stakes for President Barack Obama, who has made it clear since
taking office that he considers reaching a negotiated end to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict to be a key U.S. interest.

We traveled to the region this summer while the United States worked to
move the parties from indirect to direct talks. We met with dozens of Israeli
and Palestinian officials and analysts from across the political spectrum during
the trip, as well as U.S. officials in the region. Neither Israelis nor Palestinians
reported at the time to have a clear understanding of the U.S. strategy for ulti-
mately achieving a sustainable resolution to the two-state conflict. Each appeared
to use the stalemate preceding the launch of direct talks to strengthen their politi-
cal standings with their respective publics. One former Israeli official told us at
the time, “Israelis and Palestinians are working hard to position themselves for
the failure of direct talks. They want to show that the other side is to blame for
the failure of the peace process.”1

1  Center for American Progress  |  Navigating Political Currents to Achieve Middle East Peace
Now that the Obama administration has launched direct talks, it will need to work
with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President
Mahmoud Abbas in order to help them overcome their respective political
constraints to advance the newly launched talks and build what will hopefully be
a new and robust strategy for achieving a lasting resolution to the conflict. Both
leaders must avoid establishing a position aimed at shedding blame for the talks’
potential failure and must demonstrate political courage by articulating a vision
that promotes the establishment of two states as a realization of their respective
national aspirations and ideals, rather than as a compromise of them. Netanyahu
and Abbas will at the same time be challenged to rise above the influence of
rejectionists who will undoubtedly intensify their efforts to thwart progress, as the
recent attacks in the West Bank indicate. This could be their last chance to do so
given growing questions about the viability of the two-state solution.

Their success will require intensive U.S. support and leadership to ensure that the
dispute over settlements does not disrupt the talks at the start, to engage the Arab
states in contributing to the political process, to encourage the leaders to frame a
two-state solution as integral to their national ideals, and to consistently commu-
nicate America’s strategic and vested interest in the success of this effort.

2  Center for American Progress  |  Navigating Political Currents to Achieve Middle East Peace
Israel: Talks will test
Netanyahu’s coalition

The re-launching of direct negotiations provides the United States with an oppor-
tunity to test whether Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s actions will match his
rhetoric in support of a two-state solution. Netanyahu had for months leading into
the talks consistently presented Israel as eager to begin negotiations, while casting
the Palestinians as rejectionists. Yet Netanyahu and his government have closely
withheld any public exposure of key positions Israel might take on the core issues
to be negotiated.

Israelis balked when the United States called for a complete settlement freeze last
summer, which would include East Jerusalem and the so-called “natural growth”
of existing settlements. Israel ultimately agreed in January to establish a 10-month
“moratorium” on construction in the West Bank settlement, but not in East
Jerusalem after months of discussion—and at times tension—between the United
States and Israel. U.S. officials at the time hailed the moratorium as an unprec-
edented step despite having requested a full freeze.

Israeli officials that we met with during our trip pointed to the moratorium as an
action Israel has already taken in order to advance the peace process, providing
evidence of their good intentions. One Israeli official defiantly told us, “we make
concessions—like the 10-month settlement freeze—and get nothing in return.”2
To be sure, Israel’s moratorium on West Bank construction does not represent a
genuine “concession,” since Israel did commit to halt settlements under the 2003
Quartet Roadmap. But the issue of settlements is one that continues to have tre-
mendous resonance among the prime minister’s coalition and constituency.

The prospect that Israel will resume settlement construction following the
moratorium’s conclusion on September 26 already threatens to derail the talks.
But Netanyahu has stated publicly that he does not intend to renew the freeze.3
A recent poll showed that only 20 percent of Israelis believe that “building in
the territories should freeze completely,” with 39 percent supporting building

3  Center for American Progress  |  Navigating Political Currents to Achieve Middle East Peace
throughout the West Bank and 36 percent supporting construction only within
the settlement blocs.4 A poll this summer indicated, meanwhile, that the Israeli
public gives Prime Minister Netanyahu high marks for his job performance.5

Netanyahu and his government have also improved relations with the Obama
administration. The July 6 meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and
President Barack Obama, after a year of tension over settlement construction set
a new, positive tone in the relationship between the two administrations. The
Israelis we met with lamented the friction that characterized the first year of the
Obama administration, but they lauded the recent warming in relations as well as
security and intelligence cooperation—which one official described as “Even bet-
ter than under [President] Bush.”

Prime Minister Netanyahu will likely soon face a “moment of truth,” however,
where he has to reveal his positions on a final status agreement. Can he do so
while minimizing fallout from his ruling coalition? Or will a new coalition to
be necessary? How Netanyahu addresses these questions while advancing the
renewed peace talks could determine the fate of the negotiations, as well as
Netanyahu’s relationship with the Obama administration.

As one official told us, “Today, there is a growing understanding among Israelis
that the status quo with the Palestinians does not mean a status quo with the
United States and the rest of the world.”6 Another told us that, while “the funda-
mentals of the U.S.-Israel relationship are strong, there is a divergence of interests
on the Palestinian question… President Obama wants a [Palestinian] state; Prime
Minister Netanyahu wants a coalition. In a choice between a coalition and a con-
frontation with the United States, [Netanyahu] will take the coalition.”7

Progress is not impossible with Netanyahu, but few Israeli analysts we spoke
to believe that the Israeli government, as currently constituted, can politically
conclude and implement a two-state solution that addresses the core, final status
issues of the conflict, especially Jerusalem.

Netanyahu’s coalition, which currently has 74 seats in the 120-seat Knesset, is

dominated by right-wing parties: Netanyahu’s Likud (27 seats), Foreign Minister
Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu (15 seats), and the Sephardic-religious Shas
party (11 seats). But the coalition also includes Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s
center-left Labor party, which has 13 seats that Barak claims will be an influential
voice in support of peacemaking from within the government.

4  Center for American Progress  |  Navigating Political Currents to Achieve Middle East Peace
It is not clear, however, how long the Labor party can remain in the coalition.
One Labor minister told us, “If there is not progress by September, there is no
reason for a liberal Zionist party to be in this current government.”8 Ehud Barak
is reportedly reluctant to leave the government, however, believing that Labor’s
participation is critical to the peace process and that his role as defense minister
is particularly significant as concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions intensify.
His continued presence in the government could also serve as a hindrance to new
West Bank settlement construction, which the defense minister in theory must
approve—though settlers have already pledged to overcome such an obstacle. But
Barak may have no choice but to leave the coalition as he is faced with growing
opposition from groups within his party that view him as a fig leaf for the right-
wing government, especially if the talks break down.

Former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and the Kadima party (28 seats) meanwhile
remain outside of the government as the opposition, arguing that the current
Netanyahu government is not serious about achieving and implementing a two-
state solution.

As one analyst put it, the prospect of “Livni coming into the coalition has
become [Barak’s] lifeline.” That is, if Kadima were to replace Yisrael Beiteinu, for
example, the government would be transformed from a right-leaning coalition
skeptical of the peace talks to a solidly centrist one espousing strong support for
the two-state solution.

Kadima has two central demands to enter the coalition: a prominent role in the
negotiating process, and an understanding of Netanyahu’s endgame for the con-
flict. Netanyahu has pointedly refused to provide either. One Kadima official told
us, “Without a reshuffle of the coalition it is not possible to go forward in a serious
way. To be a leader, you have to be willing to take risks. [Netanyahu] has to put
out a vision, otherwise we will oppose him—that’s politics.”9

The direct talks may force Netanyahu to take such risks if he wants to maintain his
current government without being forced to rely solely on an extreme rightwing
coalition and risk losing his appeal to the center. Netanyahu will have no one left
that supports the two-state solution—beyond elements of his Likud party, which
is itself fractured—if Labor leaves and Kadima refuses to join. Some analysts posit
that Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman views the prospect of a Netanyahu
failure in talks as a chance to poach seats from the Likud and strengthen his own
position for future elections.

5  Center for American Progress  |  Navigating Political Currents to Achieve Middle East Peace
A right-wing dominated coalition that is opposed to pursuing peace would also
likely face renewed tension with the United States at a time when both governments
hope to strengthen their relationship toward curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Foreign Minister Lieberman said in an interview with Israel’s Yedioth Ahronoth

newspaper on September 6 that he believes his job is to serve as a voice of opposi-
tion from within the government.10 He told the paper “we will not resign or bring
down the government,” regardless of whether or not Israel renews the current
settlement freeze. Lieberman and others on the right are willing to give Prime
Minister Netanyahu time in the talks, believing that genuine movement toward
a two-state solution is unlikely beyond rhetoric. But as Israeli columnist Shalom
Yerushalmi wrote in Ma’ariv: “Everyone [on the right] can swallow their saliva and
keep silent, because we have not yet started to take any real action. There is no one
in the government who truly thinks that Netanyahu will dismantle hundreds of
settlements in Judea and Samaria and partition Jerusalem.”11

The conclusion of the settlement moratorium provides the first test for the
Netanyahu government. Renewing the freeze will already elicit a harsh response
from those on the right. As Danny Danon, the chairman of the settler umbrella
organization, the Yesha Council, told Ma’ariv newspaper on September 12, “If the
freeze continues in any way, we promise to make every effort to fight against the
Netanyahu government. It will be the beginning of the end for this government.”12

Including Labor and Kadima in the Israeli coalition may ultimately be necessary to
generate real action toward an agreement—and to conclude one. But Netanyahu
will not marginalize his current coalition partners easily. Those who closely
observe Netanyahu believe that we can gain more from him with an embrace than
a cold shoulder. One former official told us, “If the United States tries to bend and
not break Netanyahu’s coalition, it may find he is more flexible, as the easing of the
Gaza blockade suggests.”13

Against this backdrop, a majority of Israelis continue to support a two-state solu-

tion (55 percent), but remain deeply skeptical about the prospect of the negotia-
tions and about President Obama.14

This is the context within which the Obama administration must work with
Netanyahu: it must sufficiently advance negotiations with a largely right-wing Israeli
government, creating momentum toward an agreement, which in turn may require
Netanyahu to bring Kadima into the government in order to conclude the deal.

6  Center for American Progress  |  Navigating Political Currents to Achieve Middle East Peace
The United States must meanwhile instill confidence among Israelis in the
strength of the U.S.-Israel relationship. One way it can do so is by highlighting
the United States’ support for Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense system. The
United States must also communicate that any Israeli government, regardless of its
makeup, is capable of achieving a historic peace agreement with the Palestinians
as long as it demonstrates the political will and courage to do so—and that the
United States is determined to help.

Achieving a two-state solution on the Israeli side will ultimately lie on whether or
not Prime Minister Netanyahu can maintain a coalition that is willing to imple-
ment a peace agreement while simultaneously countering the influence and
actions of rejectionists determined to see this effort fail.

But success may depend on how well the United States can help the Palestinians
to navigate their sensitive domestic politics, and whether the Palestinians can
overcome rejectionists on their side, as well.

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The Palestinians: Abbas needs to
prove his strength in negotiations

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas was a reluctant participant in

the ceremony at the State Department on September 2 where Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton hosted a press conference with Israeli and Palestinian officials to
officially launch direct negotiations.

Abbas does not think Israel is serious about a two-state solution, partly because of
Israel’s continuing refusal to honor its commitments on settlements. But Abbas,
like Netanyahu, is loath to be depicted as a rejectionist to peace. That is why while
Abbas agreed to come to direct talks without a full Israeli settlement freeze; he has
not given up on the demand, threatening to leave the talks if Israel does not extend
its moratorium on construction beyond the September 26 deadline.

While standing up to Israel and the United States is rarely an unpopular position
in the region, Abbas has faced even greater internal pressure to prove that he is a
strong leader that is able to deliver a state to the Palestinians.

The Palestinian leader told reporters that, in opposing direct talks with Israel
without receiving assurances on settlement construction and a framework for the
negotiations, “I am under a kind of pressure I haven’t been through all my life.”15
A leaked internal Palestinian memo confirmed his sentiment, stating, “Going
to direct talks while the Israeli government refuses to stop settlement activities
and refuses to continue talks where they left off in December 2008 would be like
political suicide.”16

Abbas’s initial resistance to direct talks without a full settlement freeze was a
shrewd political move as much as it was a tactical one in advance of negotiations.
His insistence since agreeing to enter direct talks that Israel continue its settle-
ment freeze in the West Bank in order for the talks to continue beyond the freeze’s
September 26 deadline also represents an effective political posture.

8  Center for American Progress  |  Navigating Political Currents to Achieve Middle East Peace
A poll taken after the launch of direct talks in Washington indicates that 57
percent of Palestinians believe the proximity talks “did not achieve any progress
in the peace process.”17 But the same poll shows that 64 percent of Palestinians
would “support direct negotiations with the conditions of a settlement freeze and
international guarantees.”

Yet Abbas’s own Fatah faction remains splintered, fueling public skepticism about
the talks. Abbas postponed municipal elections this past July due to party frag-
mentation in a number of districts despite efforts at a conference last summer in
Bethlehem to unify Fatah around a party platform. A similar lack of party discipline
caused various Fatah-affiliated candidates to run against one another in January
2006, splitting votes and enabling Hamas to win a majority of the seats in the
Palestinian Legislative Council, despite only winning 44 percent of the vote com-
pared to a combined 56 percent for Fatah and other national-secularist parties.

An American official told us during one of our meetings that, “There is some
revival of people [in Fatah] recognizing the need for messaging and to establish a
true political party, but if Fatah doesn’t get its act together, others will.” That offi-
cial said that unlike Fatah, “people know what Hamas stands for and its vision.”18
The Palestinian leadership is wary of losing their already tenuous political man-
date since presidential elections scheduled for January 2010 were also postponed,
providing fuel for those questioning Abbas’s legitimacy. The leadership claims that
the greatest way to strengthen Abbas and Fatah is to show evidence that the peace
process can indeed succeed.

One Palestinian official in Ramallah, describing the challenge presented by

Hamas, told us that, “our opponent’s [Hamas’s] strategy is to show that negotia-
tions lead nowhere and they claim that their strategy will bring results. We don’t
want to take any steps that will justify skepticism of the negotiations process…
We need to win the public here and in the region.”19

The United States encouraged the Arab League’s official support of the talks in
an effort to provide Abbas with additional political cover. Some Israelis argue,
however, that Abbas’s need to consult the Arab League further demonstrates that
he is too weak to conclude a deal. Palestinian officials maintain that support of the
Arab League bolsters their position and links the negotiations to the Arab Peace
Initiative, which calls for the 22 members of the Arab league to normalize rela-
tions with Israel upon a negotiated agreement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

9  Center for American Progress  |  Navigating Political Currents to Achieve Middle East Peace
One Palestinian official told us in Ramallah, “We want them engaged, not just
to announce the [Arab Peace] Initiative and walk away. They need to share the
responsibility with us step by step. Some say where is your political indepen-
dence? We say this is our choice to expand the effort.”20

Arab support for Abbas will be particularly important as Hamas and other rejec-
tionists seek to disrupt the political process, as the recent shooting attacks in the
West Bank indicate.

Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad’s effort to build the infra-
structure of a Palestinian state by next year comes with the implicit—and some-
times explicit—threat that the Palestinians plan to seek international support for
a United Nations resolution recognizing the establishment of a Palestinian state
even in absence of a final agreement.21 Recent polls show that the Palestinian
public supports this effort, with 65 percent of Palestinians reporting support for
seeking a UN Security Council resolution to recognize a Palestinian state, 60 per-
cent supporting a unilaterally declared Palestinian state, and 51 percent support-
ing a nonviolent resistance campaign.22 A majority of Palestinians at the same time
believe that Fayyad’s government has led to a decrease in corruption (52 percent)
and an increase in political reforms (57 percent).23

The United States supports the Palestinian state-building efforts, but not a uni-
lateral declaration of statehood. The threat of unilateral action often undermines
diplomacy and could ultimately threaten a genuine two-state arrangement.

The United States’ strategy for advancing the peace process has until now been
based on a bottom-up, top-down approach combining economic and security
improvements with high-level negotiations. The bottom-up approach has led to
improvements in Palestinian economic and security conditions in the West Bank.
But many people we spoke to during our recent trip said that they believe the
United States has failed to effectively communicate how direct talks will provide
a path to statehood that will complement these bottom-up measures. Israelis and
Palestinians alike told us that without a viable political process with clear goals and
metrics, these improvements only serve to “make the occupation more beautiful.”24

It is doubtful that a unilateral declaration unsupported by Israel or the United

States would substantially change this dynamic. What would help is genuine prog-
ress in the political process alongside the state-building effort. And that requires
the Palestinians to stay at the negotiating table with U.S. help.

10  Center for American Progress  |  Navigating Political Currents to Achieve Middle East Peace
The majority of Palestinians continue to support a two-state solution and will
support President Abbas and Palestinian leaders if they are able to achieve it—but
some will do all they can to see that they fail, including acts of terrorism. Genuine
progress in the political process will intensify rejectionists’ fervor, but it will pro-
vide Abbas with tools to turn against such violence and show that there is indeed a
peaceful path to statehood.

11  Center for American Progress  |  Navigating Political Currents to Achieve Middle East Peace
The United States: The Obama
administration must build confidence

The United States must contend with its own domestic politics as it works with the
parties to navigate theirs. Few Israelis or Palestinians have high hopes for the talks.
Only 32 percent of Israelis believe talks with the Palestinians will lead to peace.25
Two-thirds of Palestinians do not believe “that the U.S. President Barack Obama
is capable of establishing a Palestinian state.”26 Americans are equally pessimistic.
Seventy-three percent of Americans polled at the launch of direct talks indicated
that they do not believe we can achieve Middle East peace in the period ahead.27

The White House engaged in what some Israeli analysts humorously referred to
as a “love campaign” following the rift with Israel on settlement construction to
quell the tension with Israelis and the American Jewish community. American
conservatives have meanwhile attempted to capitalize on those tensions as
political tools for the upcoming midterm congressional election, although this
effort is highly questionable.

A recent Gallup poll indicated that American Jewish approval of President

Obama’s job performance has dropped consistently with the national average,
but remains considerably high at 61 percent.28 But the White House’s tolerance
for tension with Israel and the Palestinians will be challenged as the congres-
sional election season intensifies, particularly with the already wide expectation
of conservative gains. Candidates are likely to follow public opinion in showing
skepticism of the Obama administration’s ability to succeed in the re-launched
peacemaking efforts. Yet the White House does not have the luxury of putting the
peace process on hold until after the November election.

Whether the United States can simultaneously maneuver through politics in

the Middle East and at home could depend on how much it learned from its
settlement dispute with Israel one year ago. The Obama administration received
criticism last summer for appearing to focus only on the settlement dispute, and
has again taken fire this year for allowing the same perception to arise with regard
to direct talks. There is concern that, just as the Obama administration seemed

12  Center for American Progress  |  Navigating Political Currents to Achieve Middle East Peace
unprepared to respond to Israel’s refusal to freeze settlement construction, it also
does not have an effective “Plan B” should the direct talks get bogged down in the
absence of a renewal of Israel’s settlement moratorium.

The Obama administration’s ability to counter these perceptions by effectively

communicating its strategy to Israel, the Palestinians, Americans, and the U.S.
Congress—starting with its approach regarding the end of the settlement freeze on
September 26—could make the difference in the success or failure of direct talks.

13  Center for American Progress  |  Navigating Political Currents to Achieve Middle East Peace
The two-state solution is
at a turning point

The two-state solution may depend on the United States’ ability to help Israel and
the Palestinians navigate past these obstacles. But there are alarming signs that the
viability of the two-state concept—while still supported by the majority of Israelis
and Palestinians—is increasingly being questioned on both sides.

Some on the Israeli right are becoming more vocal in support of a binational state.
Former Foreign Minister Moshe Arens wrote in Ha’aretz that it is time for Israel
“to look at another option: for Israel to apply its law to Judea and Samaria and
grant citizenship to 1.5 million Palestinians.”24 Other prominent figures share this
view, including the current Speaker of the Knesset Likud’s Reuven Rivlin, who
told reporters “It’s preferable for the Palestinians to become citizens of the state
than for us to divide the country.”29

The growing Palestinian antipathy to the two-state solution is equally serious.

One recent Palestinian poll indicates that Palestinians choose two-states (55
percent) over one-state (27 percent) when presented a choice.30 But another poll
in June shows that 52 percent oppose “abandon[ing] the two state solution and
demand[ing] the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis.” 6 And a
third poll taken just prior to the launch of direct talks shows that “as much as 53
percent are willing to support, accept or consider the idea of one-joint state in which
Israelis and Palestinians are equal citizens between the Jordanian River and the
sea.”31 In other words, Palestinians are hesitant to embrace a one-state solution, but
they are willing to entertain the idea, and some officials are increasingly doing so.

One official told us that, “there are some on the Palestinian side who are emotion-
ally—if not intellectually—ready to throw in the towel on the two-state solution.
Many of these people are committed to Palestinian nationalism and recognize
that this means the end of it. Some of it is intended to create a kind of ‘bogeyman’
effect in the event that the peacemaking efforts fail, but some have a genuine con-
viction that this is just not going to work.”17 Another Palestinian official who has
long been supportive of the peace process told us that, “even at the highest levels
[Palestinian] politicians are giving up on the two-state solution,” and that he too

14  Center for American Progress  |  Navigating Political Currents to Achieve Middle East Peace
was losing faith. “The most important thing is my dignity,” he told us. “Give me an
Israeli passport, I’ll take my dignity. If you want the land, take me with you.”32

An Israeli analyst we met was even starker, saying, “In two to three years the
two-state solution may remain the battle cry of the Palestinian national move-
ment, but no longer be seen as a real political platform and agenda.”33 The analyst
also predicted that, “If we don’t make an effort in the Obama administration for
something substantial, it will be too late. If we don’t lock-in Palestinian statehood
now, it’s over.”

The United States has succeeded in convincing Israel and the Palestinians to talk
after more than a year of active efforts to bring both sides to the negotiating table.
Yet there are significant obstacles facing this renewed effort, and rejectionists on
both sides wield considerable power.

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Recommendations: Sustained
engagement is critical

Overcoming the challenges to this effort will require the United States to articu-
late a vision of how to achieve a two-state solution to the leadership and publics
on each side. Measures taken by both sides should be viewed not as conces-
sions, but as strategic measures taken to realize the fulfillment of their respective
national aspirations. The White House will need to maintain consistent, clear, and
transparent communication to engender confidence among Israelis, Palestinians,
and Americans, as well as debunk myths about the renewed peacemaking effort
that rejectionists will undoubtedly pedal.

The administration has already made some progress in this regard. Reports that
the parties will work on a framework of the two-state solution, Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton’s outreach to Israeli and Palestinian media, and both sides’ rejec-
tion of violence at the onset of the talks are all welcome indications that the pieces
may be coming into place for a genuine effort at advancing the peace process.
But as Secretary Clinton stated at the conclusion of the launch ceremony in
Washington, “Now it’s time to get to work.”

Don’t let settlements derail talks

Addressing the September 26 deadline to Israel’s settlement moratorium is

clearly the most pressing challenge to the talks. It is important that the United
States continue to publicly refer to the terms of the 2003 Quartet Road Map,
which called for Israel to freeze all settlement activity, consistent with the 2001
Mitchell Report. A useful way to satisfy the political requirements of both sides
and jumpstart serious negotiations could be to make a tacit acknowledgment of
the plan set-forth by Israel’s Minister Dan Meridor, which calls for Israel to build
only in the West Bank settlement blocs that it intends to keep and compensate the
rest through land swaps. The Meridor plan could be viable if it were to serve as a
point of departure for defining the extent of the settlement blocs that will remain
in Israel, which would require substantive negotiations regarding borders and,
ultimately, Jerusalem.

16  Center for American Progress  |  Navigating Political Currents to Achieve Middle East Peace
Progress in the talks prior to the September 26 deadline could provide Prime
Minister Netanyahu with the impetus to continue the freeze and for Abbas to
remain at the negotiating table, but tensions will rise as the deadline looms. The
issue should be addressed as early as possible so that the freeze does not remain an
elephant sitting at the negotiating table. Reports that Prime Minister Netanyahu
has begun to acknowledge that full-scale building throughout the West Bank will
not continue are a welcome sign.

Engage the Arab states

Secretary Clinton’s inclusion of Egypt and Jordan in the launch of direct talks
was an important gesture to the critical role each must play in implementing any
agreement. Egypt hosting the next round of talks in Sharm-el-Sheikh is another
positive sign. The United States could utilize their involvement as co-chairs of the
Arab League’s follow-up committee on the Arab Peace Initiative to more publicly
recognize the significance of the initiative.

The United States’ attempts to gain goodwill gestures from the Arab states—most
notably Saudi Arabia—failed early in the administration. But their contributions
will be critical going forward.

President Obama’s remark at the launch of direct talks on September 1 that “A lot
of times I hear from those who insist that this is a top priority and yet do very little
to actually support efforts that could bring about a Palestinian state” was a thinly
disguised reference to this point. And Secretary Clinton echoed the remark at the
State Department press conference the next day.

We should continue to challenge the Arab states to make helpful contributions to

the process, and work to incorporate the Arab Peace Initiative into the framework
of the negotiations, as well as encourage Prime Minister Netanyahu to recognize
the significance it represents.

King Abdullah of Jordan’s recent visit to Syria to brief President Basher Assad on
the launch of direct talks is a welcome signal that we might be able to utilize Jordan
as a conduit to promote the Israel-Syria track.34 Their joint statement that the meet-
ing “emphasized that resolving the Palestinian- Israeli conflict on the basis of the
two-state vision requires the regaining of all Arab rights in accordance with ... the
Arab Peace Initiative,” is a reminder of the potential that the initiative represents.

17  Center for American Progress  |  Navigating Political Currents to Achieve Middle East Peace
Frame two-state solution as a victory

The talks began with no preconditions, but the contours of an agreement are well
known. Previous experience shows that these talks can indeed advance quickly if both
sides recognize the importance of compromising on core issues for the sake of fulfilling
their national aspirations. Recognizing that each side must ultimately take such mea-
sures will be critical as the talks address issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, and borders.

President Obama should encourage Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas
to publicly articulate a vision of a sustainable two-state solution as representing the
fulfillment of Jewish and Palestinian national ideals, rather than as their betrayal. It is
unlikely that the Israeli and Palestinian publics will be prepared in the absence of such
a vision to accept the compromises necessary to end the conflict, or to have confi-
dence that a final agreement would represent the end of their respective claims.

Communicate America’s interests

President Obama repeated the oft-heard phrase in launching direct talks that, “the
United States cannot impose a solution, and we cannot want it more than the parties
themselves.” This is true. But achieving a two-state solution is not only in the interest of
Israelis and Palestinians—it is a key objective of America’s foreign policy and national
security agenda in the Middle East. President Obama understands this, which is why
he is spending considerable political capital in promoting an Israeli-Palestinian peace
agreement amid a hotly contested congressional election season, concerns about the
economy, and the end of combat operations in Iraq.

Communicating the importance of succeeding on Arab-Israeli peace for U.S. interests

will be critical both to shore up support at home and send a message to the parties
that the White House is committed to tackling the challenges that lie ahead and suc-
ceeding where others have failed.

18  Center for American Progress  |  Navigating Political Currents to Achieve Middle East Peace
About the authors
David A. Halperin is Assistant Director of Israel Policy Forum.
Matthew Duss is a National Security Editor at the Center for American Progress.
Endnotes
1 Private briefing with Israeli analyst in Jerusalem, June 2010.
2 Private briefing with Israeli official in Jerusalem, June 2010.
3 Barak Ravid and Avi Issacharoff, “Netanyahu: Extending Settle-
ment Freeze Will Cause Government to Collapse” Haaretz, July 27,
2010, available at http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/
netanyahu-extending-settlement-freeze-will-cause-government-to-
collapse-1.304671.
4 Poll conducted by TNS /Teleseeker published in Ma’ariv newspaper,
September 8, 2010, p. B4.
5 “June 7, 2010 Israeli Poll On Aftermath of Ship Boarding: Top Line
Results” Pechter Middle East Polls, June 8, 2010, available at http://
sites.google.com/a/pechterpolls.org/pectherpolls/in-the-news/ju-
ne72010israelipollonaftermathofshipboarding.
6 Private briefing with Israeli official in Jerusalem, June 2010.
7 Private briefing with Israeli analyst in Tel Aviv, June 2010.
8 Private briefing with Israeli official in Jerusalem, June 2010.
9 Ibid.
10 Yuval Karni, “Lieberman: We Won’t Topple the Government,” Yedioth
Ahronoth, September 6, 2010.
11 Shalom Yerushalmi, “Impasse,” Ma’ariv, September 6, 2010.
12 Amihai Attali, “Settlers to Netanyahu: Continuation of the Freeze Will
Mean an End to Your Term,” Ma’ariv, September 13, 2010.
13 Private briefing with former Israeli official in Jerusalem, June 2010.
14 “Abbas Resists Push for Direct Talks With Israel” Hurriyet Daily News,
July 29, 2010, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.
php?n=abbas-resists-push-for-direct-talks-with-israel-2010-07-29.
15 Karin Laub, “US Presses Abbas to Resume Direct Peace Talks,”
Yahoo! News, July 26, 2010, available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/
ap/20100726/ap_on_re_mi_ea/ml_israel_palestinians.
16 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “Joint Israeli-Pales-
tinian Poll, June 2010,” Press release, June 29, 2010, available at http://
www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2010/p36ejoint.html.
17 Private briefing with American official in Jerusalem, June 2010.
18 Private briefing with Palestinian official in Ramallah, June 2010.
19  Center for American Progress  |  Navigating Political Currents to Achieve Middle East Peace
19 Crispian Balmer, “Indirect Talks With Israel Not Progressing-Fayaad,”
Reuters, July 2, 2010, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIn-
dia-49824720100702.
20 Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, “Poll No. 172” (2010), available
at http://www.pcpo.ps/polls.htm.
21 The Israel Democracy Institute, “Peace Index, July 2010” (2010), avail-
able at http://www.idi.org.il/ResearchAndPrograms/peace_index/Do
cuments/%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%99%202010/Peace%20
Index-July-trans.pdf .
22 “CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll,” Pollingreport.com, Septem-
ber 1-2, 2010, available at http://www.pollingreport.com/israel.htm.
23 Frank Newport, “Muslims Give Obama Highest Job Approval;
Mormons, Lowest,” Gallup, August 27,2010, available at http://www.
gallup.com/poll/142700/muslims-give-obama-highest-job-approval-
mormons-lowest.aspx.
24 Moshe Arens, “Is there another option?,” Ha’aretz, June 2, 2010.
25 Noam Sheizaf, “Endgame,” Ha’aretz, July 15, 2010.
26 Dr. Nader Said, “The Middle East Peace Process: Opportunity in the
Face of Despair” (Ramallah: Arab World for Research and Develop-
ment, 2010), August 28, 2010, available at http://www.awrad.org/
pdfs/English%20part1%20peace%20August%202010.pdf.
27 DPA, “Jordan and Syria call on Israeli withdrawal from all Arab lands,”
Ha’aretz, September 8, 2010, available at http://www.haaretz.com/
news/diplomacy-defense/jordan-and-syria-call-for-israeli-withdrawal-
from-all-arab-lands-1.312585.
28 Frank Newport, “Muslims Give Obama Highest Job Approval; Mor-
mons, Lowest.”
29 Noam Sheizaf, “Endgame.”
30 Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, “Poll No. 172.”
31 Dr. Nader Said, “The Middle East Peace Process: Opportunity in the
Face of Despair.”
32 Private briefing with Palestinian official in Ramallah, June 2010.
33 Private briefing with Israeli analyst in Jerusalem, June 2010.
34 DPA, “Jordan and Syria call on Israeli withdrawal from all Arab lands.”
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