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Ratio decidendi (Latin plural rationes decidendi) is a Latin phrase meaning "the reason" or "the rationale for the
decision." The ratio decidendi is "[t]he point in a case which determines the judgment" [1] or "the principle which the
case establishes."
- In other words, ratio decidendi - legal rule derived from, and consistent with, those parts of legal reasoning within a
judgement on which the outcome of the case depends.
- It is a legal phrase which refers to the legal, moral, political, and social principles used by a court to compose the
rationale of a particular judgment. Unlike obiter dicta, the ratio decidendi is, as a general rule, binding on courts of
lower and later jurisdiction—through the doctrine of stare decisis. Certain courts are able to overrule decisions of a
court of co-ordinate jurisdiction—however out of interests of judicial comity they generally try to follow co-ordinate

Ratio decidendi (plural: rationes decidendi) is a Latin phrase meaning "the reason (or rationale) for the decision."
The ratio decidendi is:
"[t]he point in a case which determines the judgment" [1] or
"the principle which the case establishes."[2]

It is a legal phrase which refers to the legal, moral, political, and social principles used by a court to compose the rationale
of a particular judgment. Unlike obiter dicta, the ratio decidendi is, as a general rule, binding on courts of lower jurisdiction-
-through the doctrine of stare decisis. Certain courts are able to overrule decisions of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction--
however out of interests of judicial comity they generally try to follow co-ordinate rationes.
The process of determining the ratio decidendi is a correctly thought through analysis of what the court actually decided –
essentially, based on the legal points about which the parties in the case actually fought. All other statements about the law
in the text of a court opinion – all pronouncements that do not form a part of the court’s rulings on the issues actually decided
in that particular case (whether they are correct statements of law or not) -- are obiter dicta, and are not rules for which that
particular case stands.


- The legal document setting the reasons for judicial decisions.

- Reasons for a court’s judgment as opposed to the decision itself.


- Judicial opinions on points of law which is not binding but may be regarded as persuasive in a future decision.

- Words of an opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case. A remark made or opinion expressed by a
judge in a decision upon a cause, "by the way", that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question
before the court or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of
illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent.

An obiter dictum (plural obiter dicta, often referred to simply as dicta), Latin for a statement "said by the way", is a remark
or observation made by a judge that, although included in the body of the court's opinion, does not form a necessary part
of the court's decision. In a court opinion, obiter dicta include, but are not limited to, words "introduced by way of illustration,
or analogy or argument."[1] Unlike the rationes decidendi,obiter dicta are not the subject of the judicial decision, even if they
happen to be correct statements of law. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, statements constituting obiter dicta are therefore
not binding, although in some jurisdictions, such as England and Wales, they can be strongly persuasive.


- The final resolution of the case found at the end of the case beginning with the word “WHEREFORE”

Manalang v Rickards GR. No. L-11986 7.31.58

F: Respondent filed an ejectment case against petitioner for refusal to pay the increased rental of their lot. Petitioner filed
motion to dismiss which was denied by the court ordering suspension of the proceeding for 2 years. Upon issuance of court
of the date to set the hearing, the petitioner files a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the court. Thus they file
motion for certiorari and prohibition before the CFI. Responded argued that such motion is improper since the court merely
issued an interlocutory order and cannot be subjected for review by certiorari and asserts that the case should be heard.

I: WON there is merit for filing petition for certiorari in this case

R: No, there is no merit for filing a motion for certiorari in this case, the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court
merely an interlocutory order which did not provide a definite resolution on the case. The lower court should hear the case
and has the power to re-open the case for trial to determine the rights of the parties involved for the final resolution of the

People’s Homesite & Housing v Hon. Ericta GR No. L-40675 8.17.83

F: Respondent judge issued an order for a writ of execution of absolute sale to the petitioner in favor of the plaintiff but
herein petitioner contested the decision asserting that the decision that should be executed is the one stated in the decretal
or dispositive portion of the case.

I: WON judgment can only be found in the decretal portion of the decision.

R: Ordinarily, the decision of the case is found in the dispositive portion but there are instances that the ruling is embodied
in other parts of the case as the writing style of the ponente will vary and is personal in nature. The court cannot implement
a stringent rule as to how the ponente may write a decision as long as they do not violate the Rules of Court.

Brother Mike Velarde v Social Justice Society GR. No. 159357 4.28.04

Declaratory relief - should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and
whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to
interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties
The essential requisites of the action are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the
issue is ripe for judicial determination. 17

Justiciable Controversy - refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not
one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.

Legal Standing/Locus Standi – personal or substantial interest such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of an act.

Relief – specific coercive measure prayed for as a result of a violation of the right of a plaintiff or petitioner.

Cause of Action - is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to
the latter. Failure of complaint to state cause of action is ground for outright dismissal.
Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendant’s act or omission that is violative of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.
Essential Parts of A Good Decision:
1. Statement of the case
2. Statement of the facts
3. Issues or Assignments of Errors
4. Court’s ruling
5. Dispositive portion

Proper Proceedings Before the Trial Court:

1. Dismissal of cases without allegations:
> A compliant/petition contain clear facts on which pleading relies and clear of specification of
relief sought.
2. If complaint is filed and forwarded
> the defendant has 15 days to file an answer. Relief is granted beyond this period in which no
answer was filed.
3. When counterclaim or answer is filed
> it must be answered within 10 days and a reply may then be filed within 10 days from service of
the pleading responded to.
4. Failure to answer gives the court the ability to direct judgment on such pleading.
5. After the last pleading has been served and filed, the case shall be set for a pre-trial.



- an opinion written separately by a judge who dissents or who concurs only in the result of the majority opinion.


- an opinion disagreeing with the majority decision.

A dissenting opinion is an opinion of one or more judges expressing disagreement with the majority opinion. By definition,
a dissent is the minority of the court.
A dissenting opinion cannot create binding precedent because the holding in the opinion is not the holding of the court in
the case. Therefore the dissent's holding does not create case law. However, dissenting opinions are sometimes cited
as persuasive authority when arguing that the holding should be limited or overturned. In some cases, a dissent in an earlier
case is used to spurn a change in the law, and a later case will write a majority opinion for the same rule of law cited by the
dissent in the earlier case.

Ruiz v Ucol GR No. L-45404 8.7.87

F: The petitioner’s laundrywoman filed an administrative complaint against the respondent who alleged that the petitioner
is using the laundrywoman in retaliation for the charges filed by the respondent against petitioner. The case was dismissed
by the court. The petitioner filed a case of libel against the respondent which was likewise dismissed. The petitioner again
filed for damages based on the information in the case of libel which the court dismissed on grounds of res judicata. On one
hand, Ucol files an appeal for certiorari questioning the dissenting opinion of the CA.

I: WON an appeal may be filed questioning a court’s dissenting opinion.

R: It would be elementary to know that a dissenting opinion is not the decision of the case. What is subject to appeal or a
special civil action would be the majority opinion of the court.

Nolasco v Paño GR No. L-69803 1.30.87

F: The case at bar is a question on the validity of the search warrant and arrest of the petitioner charged for the crime of
rebellion. The CA decision holds the search warrant as null and void but the articles seized shall be retained. Petitioners
contend that a lawful search would only be justified by a lawful arrest therefore with the court ruling that the arrest was illegal
the articles seized should also be returned to them. Respondents assert that although the search warrant was null and void
the arrest was not.

I: WON the personalities that were seized by an illegal search warrant should be returned.

R: Yes, it should be returned. The court used the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee invoking the Constitutional
provision from the Bill of Rights that mandates the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of this Constitutional mandate shall
be inadmissible for any purpose or proceedings.

Tolentino v Ongsiako GR. No. L-17938 4.30.63

F: Appellant is the successor of interest in behalf of the late Severino Domingo who has a case against Ongsiako. It took
20 years before he came to know about the decision of the case, prompting him to file a complaint for the enforcement of
the dissenting opinion of the case and asserting erroneous decision of the court. The same was dismissed by the court due
to lack of merit and without cause of action.

I: (1) WON an action for the enforcement of a dissenting opinion may be filed before the court.
(2) WON the court should act before the complaint on erroneous decision of the court.

R: (1) No because a dissenting opinion merits no right or claim as it is just merely a dissent from the majority decision of
the case.
(2) Appellant is barred from assailing the decision of the court by res judicata and the decision has already been final and
executory already.

People v Malmstedt 198 SCRA 401 6.19.91

F: Accused is a Swedish national arrested for carrying Hashish, a form of marijuana during a NARCOM inspection. He was
tried and found guilty in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. He contends that the arrest was illegal without the search warrant.

I: WON the arrest made was illegal in the absence of a search warrant.

R: NARCOM operation was conducted with a probable cause for a warrantless search upon information that prohibited
drugs are in the possession of the accused and he failed to immediately present his passport.
A warrantless arrest may be lawfully made:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.



- a precedent setting decision that is an outcome of a legal case that substantially changes the interpretation of the law
or simply establishes new case on a particular issue.
- An important judicial decision that is frequently regarded as having settled or determined the law upon all points
involved in such controversies and thereby serves as a guide for subsequent decisions.
A landmark decision is the outcome of a legal case (often thus referred to as a landmark case) that establishes
a precedent that either substantially changes the interpretation of the law or that simply establishes new case law on a
particular issue. Certain cases within this category are widely known in legal studies and may be reviewed by law students
even if they have been overturned by later decisions.

Villaber v COMELEC GR No. 148326 11.15.01

F: Petitioner seeks to annul Comelec resolution disqualifying him as congressional candidate of Davao Del Sur and for the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and denial of motion for reconsideration. Petitioner was disqualified upon the
petition of his rival candidate for disqualification on grounds of his previous conviction in violation of BP 22 (bouncing check
law) which constitutes moral turpitude, a ground for disqualification for electoral candidacy under the Omnibus Election

I: WON a violation of BP 22 constitutes a disqualification for electoral candidacy.

R: A violation of BP 22 involves the following elements:

1. Accused makes, draws, issues any check to apply to account or for value;
2. Accused knows at the time of the issuance that there is no sufficient fund on the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment.
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank.

The presence of the 2nd element represents moral turpitude as stated in the ruling of People v Atty. Fe Tuanda where
conviction for violation of BP 22 involves deceit and affects the good moral character of a person.

Recuerdo v People GR. No. 133036 1.22.03

F: Petitoner was found guilty in violation of BP 22 where out of the 9 checks she issued as payment for the jewelry she
bought from Yolanda Floro, 5 were dishonored by the bank. A demand letter was sent to her and upon failure to make
payments, a complaint was filed by which she was found guilty. On petition for certiorari, she contends that BP 22 is

I: WON BP 22 is unconstitutional.

R: The court upheld the constitutionality of BP 22 citing the landmark case of Lozano v Martinez where it was held that BP
22 punishes the act of making and issuing worthless checks. It is not the non-payment of debt or obligation which the law
punishes and the law does not coerce the debtor to pay debt but the main objective of the law is the prohibition and
penalizing the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Such act is against public order.

** BP 22 is a special penal law.


An important judicial decision that is frequently regarded as having settled or determined the law upon all points involved in
such controversies and thereby serves as a guide for subsequent decisions.
Philippine Export v Philippine Infrastructures GR No. 120384 1.13.04

F: The case involves a collection of sum of money by the petitioner from the respondent by virtue of their Deed of
Undertaking where petitioner stands as a guarantor to the credit accommodation provided by PNB to respondent which
upon failure of the respondent to pay the PNB, the petitioner was made to pay by the bank on behalf of the respondent.
Upon filing of the complaint to collect the said money, respondent files a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action on
the part of the petitioner since it does not allege that petitioner has suffered any damage, loss or penalty because of the
guarantees petitioner had extended for and on behalf of respondent. Subsequently petitioner filed a Motion to Amend
Complaint to Conform to Evidence and the motion to amend resulted to the dismissal of the case on the on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action by RTC decision. The CA denied the motion to set aside the decision of RTC and its motion
for reconsideration.

I: WON the complaint be dismissed due to lack of cause of action.

R:.Although the complaint did not allege that the petitioner sustained some actual loss, the complaint of the petitioner
emanates from the obligation of the respondent to indemnify the petitioner once it fails to comply with paying its creditors
by virtue of their Deed of Undertaking. Respondents’ obligation under the Deed of Undertaking to keep petitioner free and
harmless from any damage or liability then became operative as soon as the liability of petitioner arose and there was no
need for petitioner to first sustain actual loss before it could have a cause of action against respondents

Asufrin v San Miguel GR No. 156658 3.10.04

F: The petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondent after it fails to include him among the
employees who signify their willingness to be absorbed by the company after its announcement for retrenchment of their
workers on ground of redundancy. Apparently, respondent gave their employees the choice to opt to avail of the early
retirement package they offer or for re-deployment to its other sales offices. The petitioner chose to be absorbed but was
included in the list among those who want to avail of the retirement package. Despite his manifestation of his willingness to
be demoted to any position as long as the company retain him for employment he was still dismissed from work. The labor
arbiter dismissed his complaint due to lack of merit and on appeal the decision was set aside by the NLRC which ordered
respondent to reinstate petitioner with payment of backwages. The respondent appealed to the CA which reversed the
decision of the NLRC and reinstated the judgment of the labor arbiter. Thus, this petition before the SC.

I: WON there is an illegal dismissal of the petitioner from employment.

R: The court held that based from Dole Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, citing the leading case of Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. NLRC,
the nature of redundancy is an authorized cause for dismissal wherein there is duplication of work of employees. It is upon
the judgment of the employer to determine whether an employee’s services are sustainable and properly terminable.
However, the employer should declare redundancy with a just cause and in good faith. The court noted that the respondent
was adamant from the request of the petitioner to be retained despite his willingness to be demoted in position while the
same request of other employees was granted. The warehouse which respondent claims to close remains to be in operation.
The respondent also did not establish criteria in dismissing the petitioner and the court gave weight to the petitioner’s
predicament that his dismissal may be related to his expose on some irregularities of transaction involving their manager.
The court upholds the right of every worker for security of tenure thus due to failure of the respondent to give justifiable
cause for dismissing petitioner, the decision of the CA was set aside and reinstated the decision of the NLRC, ordering
reinstatement of the petitioner with full backwages .

Nicolas-Lewis v Comelec GR No. 162759 8.4.06

F: Petitioners are dual citizens (by virtue of Republic Act No. 9225 - Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003,
allowing one to retain or re-acquire Phil. Citizenship) who want to exercise their right to suffrage under the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). The Comelec denies on the ground that they fail to meet the qualification of 1-
year residency required by the Constitution.
I: WON dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters even short of the 1-yr residency requirement.
R: Court held that there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. Since it is by basic
knowledge that duals are likely to be non-residents, RA 9189 aims to enfranchise as much as possible OFW the qualification
to vote as court ruling in the case of Macalintal. Furthermore, by the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory
construction, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to
the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect
declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the
residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who
retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003.


- “let the decision stand”

- The policy of courts to abide by or adhere to principles established by decisions in earlier cases.
- The principle of stare decisis was not always applied with uniform strictness. the principle of stare decisis has always
been tempered with a conviction that prior decisions must comport with notions of good reason or they can be
overruled by the highest court in the jurisdiction.

Tala Realty v Banco Pilipinas 6.20.00

“disagreement between parties on which lease contract should prevail”

RULING: It is the policy of the court to maintain judicial stability in accordance to stare decisis. The case involves the same
questions relating to similarly situated conditions which the court already litigated abd decided upon and the rule on stare
decisis is a bar to attempt to relitigate the same issue (“stare decisis et non quieta movere” – follow past precedents and do
not disturb what has already been settled.) Stare decisis should apply if the facts are substantially the same even if the
parties may be different.

El Pueblo Filipinas v Marcaida 9.18..47

F: Respondent appeals for the decision of lower court finding him guilty of treason. He was allegedly helping Japanese
occupants in arresting Filipinos thought to be guerillas. He contends that he should not be tried by the court on account that
his nationality and citizenship are undetermined, citing previous cases under the doctrine of stare decisis where a limitation
on the application of jus soli for citizenship was established.

I: Whether stare decisis is applicable at the case at bar

R: No. The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to the extent of perpetuating an error. The doctrine stands to be corrected
once it was found out that a previous judgment was erroneous.



“fiduciary relationship between lawyers and clients”

Regala v Sandiganbayan GR. No. 105938 9.20.96

F: Corporation clients of petitioner consulted them regarding corporate structure and financial matters upon which legal
advice were given by petitioners. Said corporation is subject to investigation by the PCGG involving ill gotten wealth.
Petitioner refuses to provide information on fear that it may implicate them in the very activity from which legal advice was
sought from them and it may breach the fiduciary relationship of the petitioner with their client.
I: WON fiduciary duty may be asserted by petitioner on refusal to disclose names of their clients (privilege information)

R: SC upheld the right of petitioners to refuse disclosure of names of their clients under the pain of breach of fiduciary
relationship with their client.

As a general rule, a lawyer MAY NOT INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE BECAUSE:

1. The court has the right to know that the client whose privilege is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
2. Privilege begins to exist only after the atty-client relationship has been established.
3. Privilege generally pertains to be the subject matter of the relationship.
4. With due process consideration, the opposing party should know his adversary.


1. Strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate the client in the very activity for
which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
2. Disclosure would open to civil liability of client. (present in this case)
3. Government lawyers have no case against the lawyer’s client unless by revealing the client’s name it would
provide them the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime.
(present in this case)
4. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which client seeks legal assistance. (present in this
5. Nature of atty-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be
Old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901:
Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to
him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment." 28 Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the
attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases:
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. 29
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his
client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:
The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion
of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No
fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled
to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert
every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not
without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or
any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.


Francisco v HRET 11.10.03

“2 impeachment cases filed against Chief Justice Davide within a period of 1 year”

RULING: The court declared the proceeding to be unconstitutional. Article XI of the Constitution provides that no public
official be subject for impeachment twice within a period of 1 year. While the Congress contends that the S.C. has no power
to inquire about the impeachment proceedings against Davide by virtue of separation of powers where the Congress has
the sole jurisdiction to initiate and hear impeachment proceedings, the court declared it is empowered by the Constitution
to exercise judicial review with the duty vested upon it to check whether there is grave abuse of discretion on any branch of
the government. The SC has the power to interpret the fundamental law of the land and to answer involving Constitutional
issues. The SC is not bar to inquire about any actions of the Congress especially involving Constitutional issues.
David v Macapagal-Arroyo GR. No. 171396 5.3.06

F: The President issued Proclamation No. 1017 declaring national emergency and placing the AFP under her command to
maintain law and order in the Phils., suppress all forms of lawless violence, and enforce obedience to all the laws, order,
decree promulgated by her or in her direction. Such proclamation was assailed as unconstitutional and a form of
encroachment upon the powers of the legislative department.

I: WON the Presidential Proclamation is unconstitutional

R: The court held that the Constitution grants the President the power to call the AFP to suppress lawless violence and
during times of calamity being the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. However, the provision asserting her power to
issue decrees, direct AFP to enforce obedience to ALL laws she promulgate, impose standard of media and other forms of
restraints against the press are unconstitutional, all of which is the exercise of the legislative department.



- the court’s authority to examine executive or legislative act and invalidate that act if it is contrary to constitutional
- the doctrine under which legislative and executive actions are subject to review, and possible invalidation, by the
- A court's authority to examine an executive or legislative act and to invalidate that act if it is contrary to
constitutional principles.




- the practical authority granted to a formally constituted legal body or to a political leader to deal with and make
pronouncements on legal matters and, by implication, to administer justice within a defined area of responsibility.
- Authority to hear and determine cause of action.
- The geographic area over which authority extends; legal authority; the authority to hear and determine
causes of action

Herrera v Barretto 25 PHIL 245 9.10.13

F: The case at bar involves a motion for certiorari by the petitioner against Judge Barretto for allegedly acting without
jurisdiction on the case involving the cockpit license permit of Constancio Joaquin which the petitioner, in his capacity of the
Caloocan Municipal President revoked to operate. Respondent judge apparently issued a provisional license upon the filing
of Joaquin for a mandatory injunction without notice to the petitioner. The petitioner now files a motion for certiorari before
the higher court against the respondent for acting in excess of jurisdiction for issuing the mandatory injunction of provisional

I: WON a writ of certiorari the proper action on the case at bar.

R: No. A writ for certiorari is not issued unless it is established whether or not the court to which it is directed acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction. Once the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in a case all decisions
exercised within its jurisdiction, however erroneous or irregular, cannot be corrected by certiorari. The court held that the
CFI has the jurisdiction over the present case to resolve all matters arising in question.

Court held that Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause —the right to act in a case. Since it is the power
to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness
of the decisions made. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide
a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction.

Certiorari on one hand may not be used to correct errors committed within the jurisdiction of the court no matter how
irregular or erroneous it is.

People v Mariano GR No. L-40527

F: Accused, a liaison officer of the Province of Bulacan, is charged with estafa in the amount of less than P6,000.00. He
filed a motion to quash the information on the account that the court has no jurisdiction over the case since the military
commission already ruled on his malversation case involving the same subject matter.

I: WON the court has jurisdiction over the case at bar.

R: The court ruled that estafa and malversation constitute different offense. The CFI has original jurisdiction over the case
of estafa citing the Judicial Act of 1948 (CFI shall have original jurisdiction over all criminal cases involving a penalty of
imprisonment for more than 6 months or a fine of P200.00)



- necessary changes
- Latin phrase meaning "by changing those things which need to be changed" or more simply "the necessary changes
having been made". The term is used when comparing two situations with a multiplicity of common variables set at
the same value, in which the value of only one variable is allowed to differ – "all other things being equal" –thereby
making comparison easier


People v Mapa 20 SCRA 1164 (1967)

I: WON the position of a secret agent working for a governor a defense against prosecution from illegal possession of

R: Petitioner relied on the previous ruling of People v Macarandang where the secret agent was acquitted of the same
charge where the court ruled that appointment of a secret agent sufficiently puts him in the category of a peace officer. But
the court now abandoned such jurisprudence finding no provision from the law that exempts a secret agent from the
prohibition of unlawful possession of ammunition and firearms.

Relampagos v Cumba 4.27.95

F: Both parties running are mayoralty candidates with Cumba declared as the winner. Relampagos appealed and the court
declared him as a winner, the decision received by both parties on July 1. On July 4 Cumba appeal. On Jul 8 the court
referred the case to the Comelec. On July 12, Relampagos filed motion for execution pending appeal which Cumbas
opposed but the court granted the appeal. Cumbas filed a petition to the Comelec to annul the grant for execution. In its
resolution, the Comelec resolve to declare the court’s grant for execution be lifted by virtue of its authority to hear and decide
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, andmandamus in election cases provided by B.P. Blg. 697. The said resolution was
challenged by the petitioner questioning the appellate jurisdiction of the Comelec to decide over the issue.
I: WON Comelec has the appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involving election

R: The court pointed out that the previous ruling on Garcia v Uy, the comelec was found to have no jurisdiction over the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus because there is no specific constitutional or statutory
conferment to it of such jurisdiction. But the Comelec stated that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly granted it such
jurisdiction which the court finds to be correct as there is no expressed repeal of the said provision. The court thereby
abandons said ruling from the Garcia v Uy.

Moreover, the court points out that the petitioner made an appeal after which the court already divested its jurisdiction over
the case to the comelec therefore it could no longer validly act upon its motion. (Any motion for execution pending appeal
must be filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal which is 5 days after upon receipt of the court decision. An
appeal would be deemed perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal.)
On repeal of a statute:
An express general repealing clause to the effect that. all inconsistent enactments are repealed; is in legal contemplation a
nullity. Repeals must either be expressed or result by implication. Although it has in some instances been held to be an
express recognition that there are acts in conflict with the act in which it is included and as indicative of the legislative intent
to repeal such acts, a general repealing clause cannot be deemed an express repeal because it fails to identify or designate
any act to be repealed. It cannot be determinative of an implied repeal for if does not declare any inconsistency but
conversely, merely predicates a repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict is found under application of the rules
of implied repeals. If its inclusion is more than mere mechahical verbiage, it is more often a detriment than an aid to the
establishment of a repeal, for such clause is construed as an express limitation of the repeal to inconsistent acts. 13
This Court is not unaware of the equally settled rule in statutory construction that in the revision or codification of laws, all
parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute
or code provides otherwise expressly or impliedly. 14
Serrano v NLRC 5.04.00

F: Isettan, respondent in the case files a motion for reconsideration after it was ordered to pay petitioner full backwages
from the day of its termination from work until it is determined that he has been terminated for an authorized cause. The
Labor Arbiter decision that Serrano was illegally dismissed and ordered to be reinstated was reversed by the NLRC on
ground that he was dismissed by “authorized causes” (redundancy) which does not requires the 30 day notice. It is only for
reasons of “just cause” that an employee must be issued the notice to give them due process. Serrano petitioned for review,
which the court ordered Isettan to pay Serrano full backwages until it is determined whether his termination from service is
of authorized cause. Isettan’s arguments include: (1) failure to issue a 30 days written notice to Serrano is not a violation of
the labor law since the petitioner accepted their form of notice of giving 30 days pay to their employees in lieu of giving the
30 days notice although the petitioner did not accept the payment; (2) that the 30 day pay is more advantageous than the
30 days notice; (3) in any event the new ruling of this case should be applied prospectively.

I; WON the labor law requirement of giving 30 days notice prior to termination may be offset to giving 30 days pay.

R: Art. 283 of the Labor Code intends that the 30 day notice is mandatory. Nothing in the law gives private respondent the
option to substitute the required prior written notice with payment of thirty (30) days salary. It is not for private respondent
to make substitutions for a right that a worker is legally entitled to. Upon the contention of the respondent that the ruling of
the case should only be applied prospectively, the court finds no compelling reason not to apply it immediately. Respondent
relied on the previous rulings of case inColumbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that the new ruling should be applied
prospectively and should not be applied on parties who relied on the old doctrine in good faith which is not applicable in this

Vitarich v NLRC 5.20.99

F: Vitarich terminated Recodo for failure to comply with the memo issued upon him involving issues on company policies
on credit transactions and cash advances. Prior to his termination, the Head of Personnel of the company submitted a report
of its investigation finding no just cause to terminate Recodo but Vitarich still terminated Recodo, who filed a case for illegal
dismissal against them. The Labor Arbiter finds Recodo was illegally dismissed but his findings were set aside by the NLRC
ruling otherwise. Upon appeal of Recodo, the NLRC reversed its decision admitting some flaws on its decision. Vitarich
contends that such decision of the NLRC is a grave abuse of its discretionary powers.
I; WON NLRC abused its discretionary power.

R: The court held that with its findings, although there is truth in the delayed implementation of the memo order to Recodo,
such delay does not constitutes disobedience to merit the cause of his termination on grounds of loss of trust and confidence
of the company upon him. In the name of social justice policy on labor, there must be sufficient grounds that the employer
must prove when terminating its employees. This very norm of social justice demands the presumption of good faith credited
to the employees in the performance of their duties upon failure of their employer to prove just cause for their dismissal. It
is in obedience of this social policy mandate that the NLRC finds itself bound to reverse its first decision. Court re-affirmed
the NLRC decision.

Astraquillo v Javier 13 SCRA 125 (1965)

F: The trial court decide in favor of the respondent declaring the real estate mortgage void and ordered the petitioners to
pay respondents with unpaid rentals and damages. On appeal by the petitioners, it was assailed by the respondent that it
is incomplete and defective thus the court said to wait until the appeal is perfected. For the meantime respondent moved
for the writ of execution pending appeal due to the insolvency of the petitioners. The trial court granted the writ of execution
which the petitioners appealed before the CA by petition for certiorari. CA ruled in favor of the petitioner but upon appeal of
the respondent it reversed its decision upholding the decision of the CA. Petitioner questions the validity of the decision of
CA on reversing its decision when the respondents did not raised any new issues to make it reverse its decision.

I: WON the CA erred in reversing its decision

R: No. it did not err in its decision to uphold the writ of execution pending appeal in court. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court provides the discretionary power of the trial court to grant or deny a motion ad the appellate courts will not interfere
or modify or control such discretion unless there is an abuse thereof. The trial court has found the substantial claim in the
case at bar and the appellate court affirmed this in its disputed resolution. There is no merit on the contention of the petitioner
that the CA lacks substantial reason to reverse its decision. Courts have the power to amend and control its orders and
processes to make them conform to law and justice. The SC finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA to
uphold the writ of execution decided upon by the lower court.

Ebranilag v Division Superintendent of Schools 219 SCRA 256

F: Petitioners are children who were expelled by the respondent from school on grounds for refusal to participate in the flag
ceremony in violation of RA 1265 penalizing educational institution that refuses to perform flag ceremony. Petitioners belong
to the sect of Jehova’s witness and participating to the flag ceremony and patriotic pledge is against their religious belief as
it amounts to idolatry. Respondent contends that his action is in accordance with the Gerona case where the court upholds
that the flag is a symbol of the RP that symbolizes its sovereignty, freedom and liberty which does not involve any religious
ceremony and that the determination of certain ritual is religious or not rests upon the court to decide.

I: WON the expulsion of the children from school is valid.

R: No, since the Gerona case was re-examined by the court and ruled that compelling one to take part in the flag ceremony
undermines one’s constitutional rights specifically the FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE.

The court cites the 2 fold aspect of religious freedom namely:

1. The absolute freedom to believe within the realm of thoughts
2. the freedom to act on one’s belief which may be regulated

It underscores that the only justification for relief is the existence of clear and present danger , both grave and imminent
which is of serious evil to public interest. In the case at bar, the court held there is no clear and present danger to society
with the refusal of the petitioner’s children to participate in the flag ceremony.


- the Latin term for "a matter [already] judged", and may refer to two things: in both civil law and common law legal
systems, a case in which there has been a final judgment and is no longer subject to appeal.[1]; and the term is also
used to refer to the legal doctrine meant to bar (or preclude) continued litigation of such cases between the
same parties, which is different between the two legal systems. In this latter usage, the term is synonymous
with "preclusion".

Elements of Res Judicata

1. The former judgment must be final

2. Judgment must be on the merits of the case
3. The former decision is rendered by the court having jurisdiction over the subject.
4. There is similar identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action for both cases.
Cause of action - defined as "an act or omission of second party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other, and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right."
In the application of the doctrine of res judicata, if it is doubtful whether a second action is for the same cause of action
as the first, the test generally applied is to consider the Identity of facts essential to their maintenance, or whether the
same evidence would sustain both. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the
same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the two actions rest
upon different states of facts, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no
bar to the maintenance of the other.
Litis pendentia: "a pending suit." same parties, same cause. Interposed as a ground for the dismissal of a civil
action pending in court.
Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious
Requisites for litis pendentia:
(a) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions
(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts
(c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is successful, amounts to res adjudicata in the other.
Forum shopping  exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the final other.
Doctrine of Estoppel  an unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may bring suit in Philippine
courts against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited from said corporation. A party is
estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a
contract with it. This doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence and capacity applies to foreign as well as
domestic corporations.45 The application of this principle prevents a person contracting with a foreign corporation from
later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes chiefly in cases where such person has received the
benefits of the contract.
Replivin - A legal action to recover the possession of items of Personal Property.
Agilent Technologies v Integrated Silicon Technology 4.14.04

F: Petitioner Agilent is foreign corporation not licensed to transact business in the Philippines but engaged services of the
defendant Silicon Tech by a 5-year Value Added Assembly Services Agreement ("VAASA"). Silicon filed a complaint on
"Specific Performance and Damages" against Agilent in a civil case No. 3110-01-C alleging breach of oral agreement by
petitioner to extend their contract for 5 more years. Consequently, Agilent filed a complaint against Silicon on "Specific
Performance, Recovery of Possession, and Sum of Money with Replevin, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and Damages"
before the RTC as Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. Agilent prayed that a writ of replevin or a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, be issued ordering defendants to immediately return and deliver to plaintiff its equipment, machineries which
were left in the plant of Silicon. Silicon filed motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of legal capacity of Agilent to sue, litis
pendentia, forum shopping and failure to state cause of action. Such motion was denied by the trial court and granted motion
for replevin by the plaintiff. Without filing motion for reconsideration, Silicon filed motion for certiorari to the appellate court.
Court of Appeals granted respondents’ petition for certiorari, set aside the assailed Order of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C thus this petition for review assailing the decision of the CA.

I: (1) whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in giving due course to respondents’ petition,
notwithstanding the failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration and (2) whether or not the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in dismissing Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C.

R: CA contends RTC has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C because of the pendency of Civil Case No. 3110-
2001-C therefore, a motion for reconsideration was not necessary before resort to a petition for certiorari. There is no
urgency of the case that merits dispensing the procedure of filing motion for reconsideration before a certiorari may be filed.
Respondents availed of premature remedy which the CA should have dismissed outright.
Litis pendencia is not appreciated in the case since the instituted actions in both civil cases are different, the first is an action
for "Specific Performance and Damages" the other is action for "Specific Performance, Recovery of Possession, and Sum
of Money with Replevin, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and Damages." The issues involved are also different: WON
there is a breach of oral agreement for renewing the VAASA on the first case while on the second case WON the petitioner
has the right to possess the subject properties. In the absence of the requisites of litis pendencia, the court ruled that th e
trial court is not barred from taking cognizant to both cases.

In assailing the legal capacity of Agilent to sue, the court cited the following principles:
The principles regarding the right of a foreign corporation to bring suit in Philippine courts may thus be condensed
in four statements: (1) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, it cannot sue before the
Philippine courts;47 (2) if a foreign corporation is not doing business in the Philippines, it needs no license to sue before
Philippine courts on an isolated transaction or on a cause of action entirely independent of any business transaction 48; (3)
if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, a Philippine citizen or entity which has contracted
with said corporation may be estopped from challenging the foreign corporation’s corporate personality in a suit brought
before Philippine courts;49 and (4) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines with the required license, it can
sue before Philippine courts on any transaction.
Two general tests to determine whether or not a foreign corporation can be considered as "doing business" in
the Philippines.
1. substance test - whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body of the business or enterprise for which it was
organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another.
2. continuity test - implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the
performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in the progressive prosecution
of, the purpose and object of its organization.
The court ruled that Agilent categorically is not doing business in the Philippines, hence as a foreign corporation not doing
business in the Philippines, it needed no license before it can sue before our courts. The court granted the petition of Agilent
reversing the CA decision of dismissing Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C while granting the petition of Agilent for Writ of Replivin.

Cayana v CA 03.18.04

F: It appears that the petitioners and respondents’ father, with the marital consent of his wife, sold two parcels of land to
their son, one of the respondents in this case. At the death of the father, the mother filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claims
pertaining to the two parcels of land, alleging that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of their son were forgeries. However,
later on, she issued an affidavit withdrawing such adverse claims. Later on, together with petitioners of this case and
respondent Marceliano, they filed a case against respondent Pastor, for the cancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale and
reconveyance of the two parcels of land.Meanwhile, respondent Pastor entered into an agreement of counter guaranty with
respondent corporation using second parcel of land; mortgaged first parcel to respondent bank and sold first parcel of land
to a certain Rosafina Reginaldo, who then mortgaged the land to respondent bank.
As the civil case against respondents was ongoing, respondents filed an answer but were found to be in default,
the court allowed petitioners to file evidence ex parte. The court decided the civil case in favor of petitioners, declaring the
deed of absolute sale null and void but denied the prayer for reconveyance saying that the mother was still the owner of the
land. No appeal was entered by respondents and the decision was deemed final. The mortgage on the first parcel of land
was foreclosed and the bank being the highest bidder, bought the property who then sold it to respondent spouses
Marceliano Cayabyab. The respondent spouses M. Cayabyab then sold the land to respondent spouses Ramos. The
petitioners filed a verified complaint for the nullification and cancellation of the deeds of absolute sale of the
respondents. They asked also for the possession of the 2 parcels of land due to the alleged donation inter vivos of their
mother. The trial court decided in favor of the petitioners, part of the decision included the application of res
judicata. Respondentsappealed this to the CA contending the misuse of res judicata. CA decided in favor of the
respondents. It held that res judicata was inapplicable and also, declared the deeds of absolute sale and TCT’s valid. CA
mentioned that it was evident that there was an affidavit withdrawing adverse claims over land, that the sale of parcels of
land were not simulated and not done in bad faith, and that there was no evidence for the donation inter vivos being alleged
by the petitioners.

I: Whether or not the decision on the first civil case constitutes a bar to the defenses and claims of respondents in the
second case?

R:Both the trial court and CA misread the provisions on the effect of judgments or final orders as given by Rules of Civil
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration
of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular
person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or
administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters
of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter
that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement to the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same
title and in the same capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been soadjudged, or which was actually
and necessarily included therein or necessarily thereto.
Res judicata and the bar of prior judgment are not applicable to this case since the requisites for these two
to apply are not present. There is ‘bar by prior judgment’ when, between the first case where the judgment was
rendered and the second case which is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause
of action. The judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. It is final as to the claim or
demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered
and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered
for that purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case. But where between the first and
second cases, there is identity of parties but no identity of cause of action, the first judgment is conclusive in the second
case, only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved
therein. For res judicata to apply, there must be (1) a former final judgment rendered on the merits; (2) thecourt must have
had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and, (3) identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action between the first and second actions. According to the appellate court, the third requisite for the application of res
judicata is not present in this case.
The doctrine that should have been followed in this case is conclusiveness of judgment--a fact or question which
was in issue in a former suit and there was judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are
concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any
other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed
by proper authority.

Urbana Velasco v People’s Homesite (GR NO. L-39674) 01.31.78

“Supreme court exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved.”
"cause of action" has been defined as "an act or omission of second party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other, and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission
of the defendant in violation of said legal right."
F: The case at bar involves a parcel of land which the petitioner occupies and built a house thereof. Petitioner filed before the
defendant corporation for the award of sale of the said parcel of land and found out that it was already awarded to defendant spouses.
Petitioner filed protest before the court for annulment of deed of sale of said lot. Defendant spouses invoke res judicata in their
counterclaim stating that the petitioner has no cause for action since there is a decision already to quiet the title and recovery of
possession of the Lot involved in favor of the defendant spouses. The court dismissed the case on ground of res judicata stating that
the court decision has already been final and executory. Petitioner appealed before the appellate court which forwarded the case to
SC since the issue involved is a question of law.
I: WON res judicata is applicable at the case at bar.
R: No. For res judicata be appreciated in a case, 4 elements must be present: (1) there is a former final judgment; (2) decision rendered
by court with proper jurisdiction over the case; (3) judgment must be on merit; (4) there must be identity of parties, subject matter
and cause of action between 2 cases. The identity of cause of action is the main issue on the case at bar. The court held that in order
to identify whether the second action is of the same cause as the first the test generally applied is to consider the Identity of facts
essential to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain both. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both,
the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however,
the two actions rest upon different states of facts, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a j udgment in
one is no bar to the maintenance of the other.
The first case involves quieting the title and recovery and possession of the land while the second case involves the action for
annulment of award and deed of sale and cancellation of the land title. The case was remanded back to the lower court for further


(Not an absolute law, just a common law)

The Law of the case is a legal term of art that is applicable mainly in common law, or Anglo-American,
jurisdictions that recognize the related doctrine of stare decisis. The phrase refers to instances where "rulings
made by a trial court and not challenged on appeal become the law of the case." [1] "Unless the trial court's rulings
were clearly in error or there has been an important change in circumstances, the Court's prior rulings must
stand." [2] Usually the situation occurs when either a case is on appeal for the second time--e.g., if the reviewing
court remanded the matter back to the trial court and the party appeals again, or the case was appealed to a
higher appellate court--for example, from an appellate court to the highest court.
As generally used, the term law of the case designates the principle that if an appellate court has passed on a
legal question and remanded the cause to the court below for further proceedings, the legal question thus
determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case
where the facts remain the same.[3]
The doctrine provides that an appellate court’s determination on a legal issue is binding on both the trial court
on remand and an appellate court on a subsequent appeal given the same case and substantially the same
Law of the case, however, is one of policy only and will be disregarded when compelling circumstances call for
a redetermination of the determination of a point of law on prior appeal, and this is particularly true where an
intervening or a contemporaneous change in law has occurred by overruling former decisions or the
establishment of new precedent by controlling authority.[5]
The law of the case doctrine precludes reconsideration of a previously decided issue unless one of three
"exceptional circumstances" exists: (1) when substantially different evidence is raised at a subsequent trial; (2)
when a subsequent contrary view of the law is decided by the controlling authority; or (3) when a decision is
clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.

JM Tuason v Mariano GR. No. L-33140 10.23.78

F: The case involves the question of validity of ownership of a land title of the petitioners filed by the respondents. A previous
civil case was already decided upon by the court upholding the validity of said title owned by the petitioners. The petitioners
herein filed a motion for certiorari and prohibition.

I: WON the respondents may still question the validity of said land title.

R: The court held they cannot question an issue that has already been decided by the court in finality. The validity of said
title is no longer open for attack as it is against public policy that matters already decided on its merits be re-litigated once
Buaya v Stronghold GR. No, 139020 10.11.00

F: Stronghold filed a case against Buaya who is the manager of its Cebu branch for recovery of un-remitted collection of
money. The lower court ruled on Stronghold’s favor. Buaya appealed before the CA which ruled in his favor remanding the
case back to the lower court. Subsequent hearings were set with failure of Buaya and his counsel to appear many times
until Stronghold filed a petition to reinstate the previous decision of the court. The court decision becomes final and executory
and it denied all other appeals made before it. Buaya thus herein files a motion for certiorari.

I: (1) Can a decision from the lower court that is annulled by the appellate court be reinstated by the same court that rendered
the decision; (2) When the appellate court annuls the decision of the lower court on grounds of failure to give notice to
Buaya at pre-trial and remanded it back to the said lower court, does the proceeding in the lower court merely requires
presentation of evidence by Buaya alone without requiring Stronghold to present its evidence for cross examination by

R: (1) On annulled decision, the court correct that the CA did not annulled the lower court’s decision but merely set aside to
allow petitioner to present his evidence. There is nothing wrong when the court reinstated its decision after failure of
petitioner to present evidence despite the ample time given for him to do so. It is also required for the petitioner to attach an
authentic copy of the original decision to support his claim that the CA annulled the lower court’s decision. Failure to comply
said requirement is a ground for dismissal of petition.
(2) On final and executory judgment, it becomes the law of the case regardless of claims that it is erroneous. Final judgments
are decisions rendered by court with competent jurisdiction acting within its authority and its judgment cannot be altered
even at risk of occasional legal infirmities of errors it may contain. Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. In view of
efficient and effective administration of judgment once a decision has become final, the prevailing party should not be
deprived of the favorable judgment rendered upon them on suits involving the same issues and parties.

Argel v Pascua A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131 8.20.01

F: Petitioner who was charged with murder was previously acquitted by Judge Pascua. After his acquittal, said Judge
modified her decision on the account that she made a mistake of rendering her previous judgment believing there was no
witness against the accused due to the fact that the testimony of the witness was not attached to the records when she
wrote her decision. After finding the accused guilty of murder she ordered the arrest of the accused.

I: WON a final judgment by the court can be susceptible for amendment or modification.

R: No. The final judgment becomes the law of the case and is immune from alteration or modification regardless of claims
of incorrectness or error. A judgment of acquittal in criminal cases becomes immediately effective upon its promulgation. It
cannot be recalled for amendment only in case of any clerical error, clarify any ambiguity caused by omission or mistake in
the dispositive portion. The inherent power of the court to modify its decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in
a criminal case.



Echegaray v Secretary of Justice 301 SCRA 96 1.19.99

F: Leo Echegaray is a convict subject to lethal injection (RA 8177). The SC issued a temporary restraining order for the
execution until it ensures that there will no longer be any repeal or modification as to the implementation of RA 8177. Such
action by the court was questioned since it already rendered a final judgment on the case.

I: WON the court loses its jurisdiction on a decided case with a final judgment.
R: The SC does not lose its jurisdiction over a case with a final judgment rendered upon it. What it cannot do is modify or
amend the final decision. The court held that by finality of judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to amend the decision
but retains its power to execute or enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its
judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter a decision. The former continues for the purpose of enforcing the
judgment while the latter terminates after the final judgment is rendered for after the judgment becomes final, facts and
circumstances may transpire which may render the execution unjust or impossible.



Operative Facts

- A fact that is directly relevant to deciding some question of law. When a legal question is governed by fact-driven
rules, operative facts may be thought of as variables that are plugged in to those rules so that the right answer can
be obtained.
- Adjudicative facts are fact that is either legally operative or important as to be controlling on some question of law.
Adjudicative facts re-create the course of events that led to the dispute and help in determining the proper outcome
in the case. They differ from ordinary facts in that they are considered facts only if the court recognizes and accepts

Que v People 154 SCRA 160 (1987)

F: Petitioner convicted in violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) filed motion for reconsideration before SC on the
following grounds:

(1) petition for reconsideration denied by a mere resolution with nothing else but the statement “lack of merit”
(2) The lower court has no jurisdiction to try the case.
(3) Appelate court erred in considering one of the most impt. Element in the offense against BP 22 which is place of issuance
of check which is absent in the instant case.

I: WON the decision of both the trial court and appellate court and the denial of the Petition for Review are in accordance
with law and evidence.

R: The findings of fact of the trial court reveal that the checks in question were issued at Quezon City as admitted by
petitioner himself in his answer when he was sued by the complainant on his civil liability. It is of no moment whether the
said checks were deposited by the complainant in a bank located outside of Quezon City. The determinative factor is the
place of issuance which is in Quezon City and thus within the court's jurisdiction. Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even
in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee. The enactment in question
does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or
merely to guarantee the said obligation. that the bill was introduced to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to
prevent checks from becoming "useless scraps of paper" and to restore respectability to checks, all without distinction as
to the purpose of the issuance of the checks. From the aforequoted paragraphs, it is clear that is the intention of the framers
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitumand thus punishable
under such law.

On denial of resolution by minute resolution, court held that these 'resolutions' are not 'decisions' within the above
constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions
of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered
that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so
there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court
of Appeals' opinion.
20th Century Fox v CA 164 SCRA 655 (1988)

F: Petitioner sought the help of the NBI in connection with its anti-piracy campaign alleging that some videotape outlets are
engaged in marketing copyrighted films in violation of PD 449 or Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property. A search
warrant was issued to the NBI which was later withdrawn by the court upon motion to lift search warrant due to lack of
probable cause which was affirmed by the appellate court.

I: WON the court erred in lifting the search warrant due to lack of probable cause.

R: Article 3, section 2 of the Constitution provides that no search warrant shall be issued without probable
cause. PROBABLE CAUSE is defined as a valid search as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. The constitutional provisions demand “no less than personal knowledge by
the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of the search warrant may be justified” to convince
the judge, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the search warrant.

In the case at bar, the issuance of the warrant was due to the misrepresentation of the NBI that copyright infringements
were being committed. There was no probable cause since the agents have no personal knowledge of such fact. Court
ordered that the master tapes be presented from which the copyrighted films were allegedly copied for the validity of the
issuance of the search warrant since the court could not afford to make any presumption that duplicates were taken from
the master copy of the petitioner.

Columbia Pictures v CA 261 SCRA 144 (1996)

F: Acting upon a formal complaint by the petitioner on violation of PD 449, NBI agents surveillance different video
establishments in Metro Manila including the private respondent. A search warrant was secured with affidavits and
depositions of the NBI with 2 witnesses. Search and seizure of copyrighted materials were taken by the NBI and a motion
to lift search warrant was filed and was denied by the court. On motion for reconsideration, the court upholds the motion to
lift on grounds that no original copy of the films were presented when securing the warrant citing the case of 20 th Century
Fox vs CA. On appeal, the CA sustained the ruling of the trial court.

I: WON the ruling on the cited case applicable in the case at bar.

R: No because rules and decisions must be applied prospectively. The ruling in the cited case is not applicable since the
ruling in the case at bar happened before such ruling was ever upheld. The ruling in the 20 th Century Fox only serves as a
guidepost and not absolute since it is not always necessary to present the original tapes before ascertaining probable cause.



Arbiter - One who has the power to judge or ordain at will

Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v Ignacio M. Capulong GR No. 82398 4.29.88

F: Petitioner is filming a motion picture about the EDSA Revolution and informed Juan Ponce Enrile about it who opposes
the project and filed a temporary restraining order. Petitioner files motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action since the
mini-series had not yet been completed. The court allowed the petitioners to resume producing and filming those portions
of the projected film that do not make any reference to private respondent or his family or to any fictitious character based
on the respondent. In his reply, Enrile is invoking his right to privacy.

I: WON the production of the mini-series would be an intrusion to the privacy of Enrile.
R: No, the court held there is nothing in the film that constitutes an unlawful intrusion on the respondent’s life and it could
not see any danger such poses into the privacy of respondent. The court held the film is of historical value and involves
public domain and is an appropriate subject on freedom of speech and expression. It further cite the fact that Enrile is a
public figure and being a part of the film is one of the natural consequence of being such and it is limited only to his character
as a public officer and does not extend to his family in general.

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Association v Philippine Blooming Mills 51 SCRA 189

F: petitioners staged a mass demonstration before the Malacanang Palace expressing their grievance against the abuses
of the Pasig police. Their employer, herein respondent called for a meeting with the petitioner appealing to go back to work
as it could hamper their operation of business and it is against the “no strike, no lockout” clause of their collective bargaining
agreement. Petitioners assert they are not performing a strike but an exercise of the laborer’s constitutional right to freedom
of expression. A second mtng. was called by respondent to urge the petitioners to report to work otherwise they will be
dismissed from work. Petitioners did not grant the request of the respondent who consequently dismissed the officials of
petitioners on grounds for violation of their CBA. The court ruled in favor of respondents hence this petition for review.

I: WON there is justified cause for the dismissal of the petitioners

R: Workers acted right in the exercise of their freedom to expression. The petitioners explained to the company that such
is what they are trying to assert thus it is not violative of their agreement on “no strike, no lockout” rule. The company’s right
to property should yield to the workers Constitutional right to freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom to
petition for redress of grievances. The company’s loss ofunrealized profits for the day of the strike is not as important as
the workers fight their rights. In fact, they were even able to save money on the operational expenses for that day. The
Court of Industrial Relations should not be confined by technical and procedural rules in its quest for justice. Since the CIR
is a creature of the Legislature and even the rules of the legislature itself must be liberally applied if strict adherence to it
would result in the denial of a person’s constitutional right, the CIR should not have denied their motion for reconsideration.
In doing so, the court divested itself of their jurisdiction which renders their decision in favor of the company null and void.

The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man’s
enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Human rights are supreme over property
rights since property rights can be lost through prescription while human rights do not prescribe. A constitutional
or valid infringement of human rights requires a morestringent criterion, namely EXISTENCE OF A GRAVE AND
acts against the Constitution, its judgments and orders become null and void. A court may suspend its own rules whenever
the purposes of justice requires it.


Facts: Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, was accused for possessing one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an
intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been
accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged
and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50 or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Issue: The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:
(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the
(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution;
(3) That it is an improper exercise of the police power of the state.

1. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not
violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable,
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical,
distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the degree
of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical
area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship
apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably
reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional
cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers,
cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.

That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or
drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors
which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act," is
unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience
of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian
tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard
of life and civilization.

The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times
as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that
the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the
civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security.

Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its
operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the
equality of its application.

2. Appellant contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the
government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the
non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the Constitution. But this provision is not involved in
the case at bar. Besides, to constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is
especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases.

Due process of law means simply:

(1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the
(2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation;
(3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed;
(4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a class.

Thus a person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or
property used in violation of law may be confiscated, or when the Property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case.

3. Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the police power is the most
insistent and least limitable of all the powers of the government. It has been aptly described as a power coextensive with
self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any measure intended to promote, the health, peace, morals,
education and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth
and prosperity, is a legitimate exercise of the police power, and unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly
interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must be upheld.

Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all
obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of
their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a
greater Philippines.

The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all
measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right
to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality
before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to
raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing
them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is indeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from
retrograding, are definitely asserting themselves in a competition world," as appellant's attorney impressively avers, and
that they are "a virile, up- and-coming people eager to take their place in the world's social scheme." As a matter of fact,
there are now lawyers, doctors and other professionals educated in the best institutions here and in America. Their active
participation in the multifarious welfare activities of community life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a
source of pride and gratification to people of thePhilippines. But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial
or complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within the prerogative of the National Assembly to

In the constitutional scheme of our government, this court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the
power to enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy
under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no authority to pass upon.
And, if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in the
all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the
discontinuance of a certain practice by a certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from
providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private
interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation.

Gashem Shookat Baksh v CA GR No. 97336 2.19.93

F: Petitioner, an exchange student in the Philippines, promised the private respondent to marry her and asked that they will
live together. After taking her virginity, the petitioner began to change his behavior and have become violent. He confessed
that he is already married to someone else which prompted the private respondent to file a case against petitioner for
damages due to breach of promise to marry under the provision of Article 21 of the Civil Code. The court decided in her
favor in the account of the deceitful promise of the petitioner and that the parents of the respondent spent money for the
preparation of the marriage. On appeal the CA affirmed lower court decision thus this petition.

I: WON the private respondent may sue under the provision of Article 21 of the Civil Code.

R: The court held that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. There was a deliberate omission of
the provision that makes it so by the congress but in the interest of justice it incorporates in the Civil Code Art. 23 which
provides that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.” Article 21 is designed to expand the concepts of torts or
quasi-delict and fills the vaccum by adding legal remedy for the untold numbers of moral wrongs without which some
injurious acts would be beyond redress. The private respondent therefore may claim for damages not by breach of promise
to marry but because of the fraudulent and deceitful act of the petitioner that injures her honor and dignity.


- means that the states must apply the law equally and cannot give preference to one person or class of persons
over another.

Tiu v CA GR No. 127410 1.20.99

F: The passage of RA 7227 (An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses,
Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefore and for Other
Purposes) paved the creation of Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). It included City of Olongapo and
the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval bases Agreement and within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan as secured areas of SSEZ and
should, therefore, enjoy the same privileges.Pres. Ramos issued EO 97-A, specifying the areas within which the tax-and-
duty-free privilege was operative (only in secured areas consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base shall
be the completely tax and duty-free area in SSEZ – some of the citizens from areas no longer included in the new delineated
areas challenged the constitutionality of EO 97-A. According to the citizens, EO 97-A excluded the residents of the first two
components of the zone from enjoying the benefits granted by the law. It has effectively discriminated against them without
reasonable or valid standards, in contravention of the equal protection guarantee.

I: WON the issuance of EO 97-A violates the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution. And WON the
exclusion of some locations from the zone is discriminatory.

R: The equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. The fundamental right of equal protection
of the law is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.

Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3)
not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.

Furthermore, RA 7227 clearly vests in the President the authority to delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ.

People v Cayat 68 PHIL 12

F: Cayat is a member of non-Christian tribe convicted under Act. No. 1639 for possession of an intoxicating liquor and
sentenced him to pay P50.00 or subsidiary imprisonment. Cayat assails the decision on the ff. grounds: It is
discriminatory, denial of equal protection of the law, violative of due process provided by the constitution, that it is an
improper exercise of police power.

I: Does Act No. 1639 unconstitutional

R: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty for equal protection of the law is not violated by
a legislation based on reasonable classification.

For the classification to be reasonable it must have the ff requisites:

1. must rest on substantial distinction
2. must be germane to the purpose of the law
3. must not be limited to existing conditions only
4. must apply equally to all members of the same class

Due Process of Law defined:

2) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the
3) That it shall be reasonable in its operation
4) That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedures prescribed
5) That it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a class

- to constitute due process of law, notice and hearings are not always necessary.

The Act No. 1639 is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes to remove all obstacles in their
intellectual and moral growth. It is meant to mark the non-Christian tribe as inferior or less capable race. When public
safety or public moral requires discontinuance of a certain practice by certain classes of persons, the hand of the
legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some
members of the class may suffer. The private interest of such member should yield to the paramount interest of the