Analysis
April 2009
Summary: After months of
tortuous diplomacy, Turkey and
Armenia have put the final touches
to a deal that would establish
diplomatic ties and re-open their
borders. The agreement is poised
to end decades of mutual hostility,
to blunt Russian influence, and to
help foster economic prosperity
and democracy in the Southern
Caucasus. It has been forged
against a backdrop of mushroom-
ing civil society initiatives aimed at
overcoming decades of prejudice
and deepening friendship between
Turks and Armenians of all stripes.
But stiff opposition from Azerbai-
jan, which is mobilizing Turkish
public opinion against this move,
could yet weaken Turkey’s resolve
and wreck a historic opportunity
for peace in the region.
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Turkey and Armenia
by Amberin Zaman*
ANKARA — The latest round of Swiss-
brokered negotiations between Turkey
and Armenia took a big leap forward
when Abdullah Gül, Turkey’s president,
became the first-ever Turkish leader to visit
Armenia last September for the World Cup
pre-qualifier match pitting Turkey against
Armenia. Gül’s decision to take the plunge
while facing howls of treason from Turkish
ultra-nationalists marked a dramatic shift
in Turkey’s traditional stance of linking ties
with Armenia to resolution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. In 1993, Turkey sealed
its border with Armenia in sympathy with
their Azeri cousins after Armenia occupied
large chunks of Azerbaijan including the
mainly Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh
enclave in the 1990s. Landlocked and poor,
Armenia has been hurt by the embargo but
not enough to cede ground on Karabakh.
Frozen ties with Turkey has propelled
Armenia further into Russia’s arms.
The new thinking in Ankara is that peace
with Armenia will give it the sort of clout
that could push the Armenians into
burying the hatchet with Azerbaijan.
There are also other dividends: Friendship
with Armenia will rob Turkey’s detractors
within the European Union of ammunition
with which to block Turkish membership; it
will also make it less likely that a long-touted
Congressional “genocide” resolution of
Ottoman Armenians in 1915 will be
passed. Moreover, it will enhance Turkey’s
regional influence and provide it with easy
access to markets in former Soviet Central
Asia and give its impoverished eastern
provinces bordering Armenia a sorely
*
Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent for The Economist and writes a weekly column for the Turkish daily Taraf. The views
expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German Marshall Fund of the United
States (GMF).
needed economic boost. But strategic
imperatives alone should not be dictating
rapprochement. Most credible historians
agree that Turkey’s once thriving Arme-
nian population was brutally uprooted
from their ancestral lands and decimated
by Ottoman forces by the hundreds of
thousands in an ethnic cleansing campaign
masterminded by nationalist forces known
as the Ittihadists during World War I. The
fact that Armenian nationalist militia
sided with invading Russian forces against
the Ottomans does not mitigate the pain
inflicted on Armenian civilians, many of
them women and children. Helping the
young Republic of Armenia, where some
60 percent of the population is said to have
Anatolian roots would go a long way in
healing the wounds of the past.
The Obama factor
U.S. President Barack Obama’s campaign
pledge to recognize the 1915 atrocities
as genocide has added a renewed sense
of urgency to Turkish efforts to mend
fences with Armenia. During his recent
visit to Turkey, Obama refrained from
using the term “genocide.” Even so, he
asserted before the press that he had not
changed his views on the fate of the Otto-
man Armenians. In other words, he still
believes that it was genocide. In an address
to the Turkish Parliament, he urged Turkey
to face up to its past. Turkish lawmakers
listened in stony silence. Yet, the U.S. leader
also praised Turkey and Armenia for their
efforts to cement peace. The United States
should not overshadow the talks which
Analysis
“could bear fruit very soon” declared Obama, raising hopes in Turkey
that he will refrain from uttering the G-word on April 24, which
marks the anniversary of the mass killings. This would help ward-off
another crisis in Turkish-U.S. relations and allow Ankara to cement
the agreement with Armenia in the coming weeks. But can it?
Enter Azerbaijan
Until recently it seemed that Azerbaijan, (with lots of nudging from
the United States) had come on board on the grounds that a Turk-
ish-Armenian deal would serve its interests in a Karabakh settle-
ment. Yet, in the days leading up to Obama’s April 6th visit, an array
of Azeri officials began muttering about the grievous consequences
that might entail should Turkey re-open its border with Armenia.
Among these were veiled threats to boycott the proposed Nabucco
project, a project that would pump Azeri and Turkmen gas via
Turkey to Western markets and divert its vast energy resources to
Moscow instead. Meanwhile, Azeri lobbyists have been stirring up
nationalist passions in the Turkish media, claiming that if Turkey
were to re-open the border the Armenians’ next step would be to
make territorial claims on eastern Anatolia. Never mind that the
establishment of diplomatic ties between countries implies overt
recognition of their mutual borders.
A sure sign of Baku’s displeasure came when Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s
president, failed to show up at an Alliance of Civilizations summit
held, April 6-7 in Istanbul, on the sidelines of President Obama’s visit.
This prompted Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s prime minister, to
declare that there was no question of re-opening the border with
Armenia until there was progress on Karabakh. Eduard Nalbandian,
Armenia’s foreign minister, reacted in turn by refusing to also attend
the Alliance of Civilizations summit. It took last minute cajoling
from Washington to make him change his mind. At the Alliance of
Civilizations summit, Nalbandian and his Turkish counterpart, Ali
Babacan, met with Obama, who also rang Aliyev to calm his nerves.
Erdoğan’s brinksmanship game
Armenia’s frustration is understandable. The text of the agreement
reached with Turkey makes no mention of Karabakh, and calls for
the opening of borders some two months after the establishment
of diplomatic relations, and that of joint commissions. These
would include a historical commission that would “examine” the
events of 1915. Erdoğan’s remarks suggest that under pressure from
Azerbaijan and its allies within his own party he is throwing
Karabakh back into the mix. Erdoğan’s local rivals, notably the main
opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the far-Right
Nationalist Action Party (MHP), have jumped into the fray accus-
ing the government of selling out “our Azeri brothers.” The results
of nationwide municipal elections haven’t helped either. Erdoğan’s
ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) saw its share of the
popular vote slide to 39 percent from the thumping 47 percent that
it received in the 2007 parliamentary polls. The question now is
whether Erdoğan is truly backtracking or whether his nationalist
bluster is part of a strategy aimed at getting Armenia to make some
concessions on Karabakh before signing off with Yerevan; conces-
sions that likely include Armenian withdrawal from a few Azeri
villages outside Karabakh proper. Turkish officials are hoping that
Serzh Sargysan, Armenia’s president, will deliver such a pledge when he
meets with Aliyev during an EU meeting on May 6. Sargysan is already
facing criticism from Armenian nationalists for making peace with
Turkey at the expense of genocide recognition. The same accusations are
being levelled by hawks within the Armenian diaspora. Any concessions
on Karabakh could go beyond undermining Sargysan’s legitimacy.
Some go as far as to suggest that it might even cost him his life. (There
is fierce opposition to peace with Turkey from some members of the
powerful gun-toting Karabakh war veterans lobby.) Such claims may be
exaggerated, but having declared its willingness to establish formal ties
with Turkey without any preconditions there seems little else Armenia
can do. Besides, the Karabakh negotiations are being brokered (admit-
tedly with little effect) by the Minsk group, co-chaired by Russia, France,
and the United States. Turkey’s veiled suggestions that the Minsk process
is dead has only served to irritate Washington. Sustainable peace can
only be achieved with Russia’s blessings.
Either way, the longer Turkey sends mixed signals the more likely
it is that the nationalist opposition be it in Armenia, Azerbaijan,
or Turkey, will grow louder and eventually triumph. Erdoğan’s
stated policy of “zero problems” with Turkey’s neighbors will prove
empty, while the threat of renewed conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan will loom anew. An historic opportunity for regional
peace will have been squandered. The challenge facing the Obama
administration is to keep up pressure on all sides, reminding them
that the alternative is falling deeper into the clutches of a more
assertive Russia.
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