Sec. 23.

Declaration of a State of War; Emergency Powers

Delegation of Emergency Powers/Military Powers

SANLAKAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (2004)

MAINPOINT: Power exercised by the President in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling
out the armed forces is in consonance with her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-
Chief.

FACTS: 300 junior officers and enlisted men from the AFP staged a mutiny by storming the
Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City. The mutineers cried of corruption and demanded
for the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chief of the PNP. The
President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion
and called on the AFP to suppress the rebellion. After negotiations, the President lifted the state of
rebellion through Proclamation No. 435. Petitioner contends that the declaration of a state of
rebellion by the President is an indirect exercise of emergency powers. That under Section 23 (2),
Art. VII, such exercise of emergency powers is exclusive to Congress, and that the declaration
made by the President thus results to the latter’s usurpation of their said exclusive power

ISSUE: Whether or not said declaration constitutes exercise of emergency powers

RULING: Power exercised by the President in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the
armed forces is in consonance with her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.
There was no instance wherein the President has acted beyond her powers as both Chief Executive
and Commander-in-Chief

AMPATUAN v. PUNO

MAINPOINT: The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency
in the three places mentioned. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President.

FACTS: After the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing
“the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be allowed
by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence. 3 days
later, she also issued AO 273 transferring supervision of the ARMM to the DILG. She
subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO the term “transfer” used to
“delegate”. The petitioners claimed that the President’s issuances encroached the ARMM’s
autonomy, that it constitutes an invalid exercise of emergency powers, and that the President had
no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. They want Proc. 1946 and
AO 273 be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called
out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the said areas.

RULING: The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under
Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

“In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.”

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to
exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not
need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

Sec. 24. Bills Originating in the House of Representatives

GUINGONA v. CARAGUE

MAINPOINT: Section 3, Article XVIII recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, LOI and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." The argument of petitioners that the
said presidential decrees are inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI is untenable. The
framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including
existing presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced to mere "bills" that must
again go through the legislative.

FACTS: Petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service
in the 1990 budget authorized by P.D. No. 81 as Amended by P.D. No. 1177, and by P.D. No.
1967. Petitioners argue that the decrees of then President Marcos became functus oficio when he
was ousted and so the legislative power was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the
Constitution was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new legislation by Congress
providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress has not approved any such law; and thus the
said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on
no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced.

That it is inoperative under Section 3, Article XVIII which provides ––

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed, or revoked."

And that the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24, Article VI: All appropriation, revenue
or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.

ISSUE: Whether the PDs became inoperative when Pres. Marcos was ousted and/or the PD’s are
inconsistent with constitution Section 24 and 27 of Article VI.

RULING: No. Section 3, Article XVIII recognizes that:

"All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, LOI and other executive issuances
not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked."

Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or,
are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked. The argument of petitioners that the said presidential
decrees are inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI is untenable. The framers of the
Constitution did not contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including existing
presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced to mere "bills" that must again go
through the legislative. The only reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the Constitution
which refer to "bills" is that they mean appropriation measures still to be passed by Congress. If
the intention of the framers thereof were otherwise they should have expressed their decision in a
more direct or express manner.

TOLENTINO V. SEC. OF FINANCE

MAINPOINT: It is not the law-but the (revenue) bill-which is required by the Constitution to
'originate exclusively' in the House of Representatives. Such bill may undergo extensive changes
in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole, since Senate's power includes not
only to 'concur with amendments' but also to 'propose amendments.'

FACTS: The VAT is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on
the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system
and enhance its administration by amending the NIRC. One contention is that RA 7716 did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the
Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197
and S. No. 1630. Also contended that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24

“All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments”.

RULING: It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate
exclusively in the HR. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the
House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to
propose amendments. The initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an
increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the HR and
as a result of the Senate action to concur and amend, a distinct bill may be produced. The
Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill so long as action by the
Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. Also, upon the certification of a bill
by the President to be urgent, the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and
distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

ALVAREZ V. GUINGONA

MAINPOINT: It is not the law-but the (revenue) bill-which is required by the Constitution to
'originate exclusively' in the House of Representatives. Such bill may undergo extensive changes
in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole, since Senate's power includes not
only to 'concur with amendments' but also to 'propose amendments.

FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of RA 7720: “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago”. April
18, 1993, HB No. 8817 after 3 public hearings conducted by the House Committee, submitted to
the House a favorable report, with amendments. HB No. 8817 was passed by the House on Second
Reading and was approved on Third Reading On January 18, 1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted
to the Senate. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243 was filed just after
the House of Representatives had conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817.

Senate Committee conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Then, said committee submitted
Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation that it be approved without
amendment, taking into consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was on all fours with SB No.
1243. Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading and was approved
on Third Reading. The HR, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the
amendments proposed by the Senate. The enrolled bill was signed by the Chief Executive on May
5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720.

ISSUE: Whether considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No.

RULING: Yes. In the enactment of RA No. 7720, there was compliance with Section 24, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was
filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursor not only of RA 7720 in
question but also of SB No. 1243. Further, in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance: It is not the law-
but the (revenue) bill-which is required by the Constitution to 'originate exclusively' in the House
of Representatives. Such bill may undergo extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be
a rewriting of the whole, since Senate's power includes not only to 'concur with amendments' but
also to 'propose amendments.'

SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORP. V. THE PHILIPPINE CEMENT

MAINPOINT: For such to be a due delegation of tax, legislation must be complete and defined
in terms of what specific measures the public official can enforce. In this case, the Safeguard
Measure Act (SMA) provides measures as to what the Secretary of DTI may enforce as a safeguard
measure which in effect imposes a form of tax as regulation. The executive power to impose
definitive safeguard measures is but a delegated power. The power of taxation which is, by nature
and by command of the fundamental law, a preserve of the legislature

FACTS: Respondent an association of domestic cement manufacturers, filed with the DTI an
application for the imposition of a definitive safeguard measure on the importation of gray Portland
cement. It alleged that gray Portland cement was being imported in increased Quantities causing
declines in domestic production, capacity utilization, market share, sales and employment, as well
as depressed local prices. Petitioner, a domestic corporation engaged in the business of cement
opposed respondent’s application. - In accordance with the procedure laid down in RA 8800, the
Bureau of Import Services of the DTI conducted a preliminary investigation, after which it justified
the imposition of provisional measures. DTI issued an Order imposing a provisional measure in
the form of a safeguard duty equivalent to P20.60 per 40-kg bag on all importations of gray
Portland cement for a period not exceeding 200 days from the date of issuance by the BOC. Tariff
Commission found no cause for Safeguard Measures. Respondent appealed in the CA. The CA
granted petition in part and DTI released a MO imposing Safeguard Measures.

ISSUE:

RULING: Section 28(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution confirms the delegation of legislative
power, yet ensures that the prerogative of Congress to impose limitations and restrictions on the
executive exercise of this power:

“The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government”

This delegation of the taxation power by the legislative to the executive is authorized by the
Constitution itself. The Constitution also grants the delegating authority (Congress) the right to
impose restrictions and limitations on the taxation power delegated to the President but with
observance of the restrictions and limitations imposed by Congress. The SMA empowered the DTI
Secretary, as alter ego of the President. And so the DTI Secretary authority is derived from the
SMA; it does not flow from any inherent executive power. The law did not grant the executive
official full and uninhibited discretion to impose such measures. The legislative intent should be
given full force and effect, as the executive power to impose definitive safeguard measures is but
a delegated power. The power of taxation which is, by nature and by command of the fundamental
law, a preserve of the legislature.

Appropriation of Public Revenue for Public Purpose

PASCUAL V. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS

MAINPOINT: The rule is that if the public advantage or benefit is merely incidental in the
promotion of a particular enterprise, such defect shall render the law invalid. On the other hand, if
what is incidental is the promotion of a private enterprise, the tax law shall be deemed “for public
purpose”.
FACTS: Governor Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction,
upon the ground that RA No. 920, which appropriates funds for public works particularly for the
construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the feeder roads, however,
as alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and
planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging to
private respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not
connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway. The
respondents' contention is that there is public purpose because people living in the subdivision will
directly be benefitted from the construction of the roads, and the government also gains from the
donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by its owner to the government.

ISSUE: Whether or not the incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the
purpose of justifying an expenditure of the government

RULING: No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenue for anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of the
expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the
interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus
the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to
the state, which results from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private
enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money. The test of the
constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to
promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although
each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.

Sec. 25. Rules on Appropriation

DPWH vs. RONALDO QUIWA

MAINPOINT: (This I cannot really relate to the Rules of Appropriation since there was no
mention of any provision except that there was no prior appropriation for the DPWH project which
is why they refuse to pay the contractors)

FACTS: DPWH engaged contractors, including the respondents, for the urgent rehabilitation of
the affected river systems after the ragedy of Mt. Pinatubo. The contractors signed written
agreements with Engineer and Project Manager II of the DPWH. It is undisputed that the
contractors have completed their assigned rehabilitation works. But DPWH refused to pay the
contractors for the reason that the contracts were invalid due to non-compliance with legal
requirements.

ISSUE: Whether, in the absence of the legal requirements, a valid contract between the DPWH
and the plaintiffs exists

RULING: Where there was no appropriation and where the contracts were considered void due
to technical reasons. It has been settled in several cases that payment for services done on account
of the government, but based on a void contract, cannot be avoided. This exercise of equity to
compensate contracts with the government was repeated in Eslao vs. COA, (COA), was ordered
to pay the company of petitioner for the services rendered by the latter in constructing a building
for a state university, notwithstanding the contracts violations of the mandatory requirements of
law, including the prior appropriation of funds therefor.

GOH V. BAYRON and COMELEC

MAINPOINT: To be valid, an appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a specific

purpose. However, in this case, that purpose “to conduct elections” maybe broken down by related
sub-categories so even if not spelled out, regulation, special and recall elections are covered.

FACTS: Petitioner filed a recall petition to the COMELEC due to loss of trust and confidence
against the respondent Hon. Lucilo R. Bayron by violating the provisions of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and other related gross negligence, dishonesty and immaturity as mayor of
the Puerto, Princessa City. COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9864 wherein the said
resolution found the recall petition sufficient in form and substance but the funds of any recall
elections were suspended. Respondent filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and
Clarification for the dismissal of the recall petition. That as stated in the said resolution, does not
have an appropriation in the 2014 GAA and it does not provide the COMELEC with legal authority
to commit public funds for the recall process.

ISSUE: Whether the 2014 General Appropriations Act (GAA) has no budget for the conduct of
recall election therefore said recall cannot be conducted.

RULING: The 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform
its constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections. There is no need for supplemental
legislation to authorize the COMELEC to conduct recall elections for 2014. When the Commission
receives a budgetary appropriation for its “Current Operating Expenditures,” such appropriation
includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions, including the conduct of recall
elections.

Limits on Power to Appropriate

BRILLANTES VS. CONCEPCION

MAINPOINT: The sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election
of President and Vice-President. And, NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizen’s arm to conduct
the “unofficial counting of votes for the national or local elections.

FACTS: Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the
assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which provides for the electronic transmission of advanced
result of “unofficial” count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption
and usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-
President and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens’
accredited arm, to conduct the “unofficial” quick count as provided under pertinent election laws.
Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the exercise of its executive and
administrative power “to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections” Comelec
added that the issue is beyond judicial determination.

ISSUE: Whether Resolution No. 6712 issued by the COMELEC in authorizing the use of election
funds in consolidating the election results should be declared VOID, as it is unconstitutional.

RULING: The assailed resolution usurps. Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further
bolstered by RA 8436. The sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the
election of President and Vice-President. And Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize
NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizen’s arm to conduct the “unofficial counting of votes for the
national or local elections. The quick count under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation would not
only be preemptive of the authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking
constitutional and/or statutory basis. Moreover, the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise
contravened the constitutional provision that “no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

MAINPOINT:
FACTS:

ISSUE:
RULING: