United States vs.

Nixon, Snoddy and Gilbreth

777 F. 2d 958 2 December 1985
FACTS:
David Paige, a DEA agent posing as a drug dealer, used three confidential
informants; James McMillan, Donald Smith, and James Marshall, to garner information
about illicit drug dealing activity by the three defendants; Donald Gilbreth, David Snoddy,
and Arthur Tommy Nixon. When he was arrested, Nixon was carrying $50,000 cash and the
deeds to two farms he owned in Alabama and Tennessee. The defendants were charged
with conspiring to commit an offense against the United States.
On cross-examination of Scott Ray, the prosecuting attorney asked the witness
whether he knew if the bus was "used to transport large quantities of cocaine." Defense
counsel reacted by questioning the government's good faith basis for suggesting that fact to
the jury. At a post-verdict bond hearing for the defendants, the government produced two
pictures that had been seized by Alabama law enforcement officers at the home of
defendant Snoddy's brother pursuant to a search warrant for marijuana unrelated to the
charges made in this case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecutor lacked a good faith basis for asking three defense character
witnesses whether they knew that defendants Snoddy and Gilbreth transported cocaine on
a bus owned by them.

HELD:
No, the prosecutor did not lack good faith. The government had a good faith basis
for asking the questions.
We note only that the potential for abuse here, by wafting before the jury "did you
know?" type questions that have no basis in fact but which can be fatal to the defendant,
has led to the imposition of two safeguards that should be complied with before such
questions may be asked in the presence of a jury. After hearing argument and evidence
from both parties the district court found that the government had a good faith basis for
asking the questions.

United States vs. Jackson

549 F. 3d 963 17 November 2008
FACTS:
Jackson, a prisoner, argued with another inmate, Brown, while a third inmate,
Gulley, watched. A fight broke out. Brown, bleeding profusely, collapsed and was soon
pronounced dead.
Jackson had Brown’s blood on his clothes and an injury to his palm consistent with
recent use of a shank. He was apprehended. He was placed in a special housing unit. When
guards tried to place another inmate in the special housing unit with him, he told officials
that he would kill the inmate if the inmate were not removed. Jackson claimed that Brown
pulled out a shank.
 At sentencing, the government presented evidence of Jackson’ other convictions,
including multiple counts of armed robbery and various firearms charges, and testimony
about his poor disciplinary record in prison. An expert witness for the government who
had conducted psychiatric evaluations of Jackson testified that there was a high probability
that he would commit violent crimes in the future.
Jackson presented evidence of a poor home life growing up, low intelligence, post-
traumatic stress disorder, and institutionalization.

ISSUE:
Whether BROWN’S prison disciplinary records were admissible in evidence and Jackson
was deprived to present a complete defense.
HELD:
No. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a), character evidence is generally not
admissible “for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion․ ” The rules make an exception, however, and permit the introduction of
“evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an
accused․ ”
The disciplinary records that Jackson attempted to introduce, however, involved
specific instances of conduct. Under Rule 405, such evidence is admissible only if Brown's
violent character was “an essential element of [Jackson's] defense.”
Brown's prior specific acts were not admissible to prove his alleged inclination for
violence.
The disciplinary records would not be even arguably relevant unless they
demonstrated that the guards had in fact caught Brown with a shank.

Boyd vs. US
142 US 450 Jan. 4, 1892
J. Harlan

FACTS:

Boyd and Standley were indicted for the murder of Dansby as charged in the first
count. In the night of Apr. 6, 1890, Boyd, Standley and Davis called to the ferryman, Martin
Byrd, to come and set them over the creek.

The principal witness for the prosecution at the trial was Martin Byrd. When
presented as a witness, the defendants objected to him as incompetent by reason of the fact
that he had been convicted of the crime of larceny and sentenced to the penitentiary.
However, as requested by the District Attorney, he was given a full and unconditional
pardon for serving out his term of 1 year and for good behavior.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the evidence as to the several robberies committed prior to the
murder should be admitted in the case of murder against Dansby.

HELD:

No, the evidence should not be admitted. The charge made no reference to the
robberies committed upon Brinson, Mode, and Hall, except as they may have been in the
mind of the court when it referred to "these other crimes." It is true, as suggested by
counsel for the government, that no exception was taken to the charge. But objection was
made by the defendants to the evidence as to the Brinson, Mode, and Hall robberies, and
exception was duly taken to the action of the court in admitting it. That exception was not
waived by a failure to except to the charge.

United States vs. Cunningham

103 F. 3d 553 26 December 2008
FACTS:
Constance Cunningham was sentenced to 84 months in prison after being convicted
by a jury of tampering with a consumer product "with reckless disregard for the risk that
another person will be placed in danger of death or bodily injury and under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to such risk."
Cunningham acknowledged having once been a Demerol addict. She said the
problem was in the past and to prove this she offered to have her blood and urine tested for
Demerol.
The blood test was negative but the urine test positive, which was consistent with
recent use, since Demerol remains in the urinary tract longer than in the bloodstream. The
government believes that Cunningham was stealing Demerol from the syringes in order to
feed a Demerol addiction.
Cunningham argues that merely withholding pain medication does not "place"
anyone "in danger of ... bodily injury."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the bad acts of Cunningham may be admitted in evidence.

HELD:
Yes. Evidence of prior conduct may be introduced (subject to the judge's power to
exclude it under Rule 403 as unduly prejudicial, confusing, or merely cumulative) for other
purposes, for example to show the defendant's motive for committing the crime with which
he is charged.
The evidence of her addiction was thus admissible, unless the judge decided that its
prejudicial effect--the effect that is inherent in any evidence that a jury, however instructed,
might use to draw the forbidden inference that once a thief always a thief--clearly
outweighed its probative value.
United States vs. Gonzales
110 F. 3d 936 (1997)
FACTS:
Believing that the three were planning to steal a car, Crowe retrieved his off-duty
revolver and a cordless telephone from his apartment.
Crowe dialed 911. Unable to get through, he handed the phone to his girlfriend and
asked her to place the call. As Crowe approached the sidewalk in front of his house, he saw
both Gonzalez and Colon draw guns and begin to run in Crowe's direction--the whole time
looking over their shoulders in the direction they had been facing while earlier crouching
by the fence. Police officers Sapienza and Parks arrived at the scene in a marked patrol car.
Sapienza took custody of Colon while Crowe retrieved one of the weapons discarded by the
defendants. Crowe also gave the officers a description of Esteban and Emilio Gonzalez.
Officer Coakley, after hearing a description of the white Corsica over the police
radio, spotted a car fitting that description, pulled it over, and arrested its driver, Emilio
Gonzalez.
Later that evening, after securing the crime scene, a police officer found a second
gun in the bushes near the spot where Crowe reported seeing Colon and Gonzalez
discarding their weapons. No evidence of spent shell casings or ballistic damage was found.
Prior to trial, the government sought an in limine ruling from the district court
permitting the government to introduce the testimony of George Mascia describing a
break-in and burglary attempt at his home, located around the corner from Crowe's
residence, at about the time of Crowe's confrontation with the defendants.
Colon and Gonzales were indicted, and are now appealing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence was sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.
HELD:
Yes. Defendants' contention that the evidence against them was insufficient is based
on the absence of any physical evidence to corroborate Crowe's testimony. They argue that
although Crowe testified that he and the defendants exchanged gunfire, no bullet casings
were ever found, nor was any damage to property ever detected. In addition, neither
defendant's fingerprints were found on the guns recovered. These and other defects in
proof are particularly significant, defendants argue, given the unreliability of Crowe's
testimony at trial.
Where the government’s case is based primarily on eyewitness testimoney
describing criminal activity, any lack of corroboration goes only to the weight of the
evidence, not to its sufficiency. The weight is a matter for argument to the jury, not a
ground for reversal on appeal.

Jones vs. States

376, S.W., 2d 842 (1964)
FACTS:
The indictment alleged that the appellant took money from the person and
possession of D. M. Hause without his knowledge and without his consent, and with the
intent to deprive him of its value and to appropriate it to her use and benefit. The
indictment further alleged a prior conviction in the State of California for Grand Theft, and
a conviction prior to the commission of that offense in the State of Oklahoma for Grand
Larceny. The prior convictions were proved as alleged. The state relied upon circumstantial
evidence to show appellant's guilt of theft of money from the person and possession of D.
M. Hause.
The state was also permitted to introduce evidence to the effect that the appellant,
on or about December 31, 1962, went to the place of business of an Orthopedic Brace
Company, where Mr. Hess, was at work at his bench, put her hand on him like she was
trying to keep from falling and acting "as if she was trying to solicit a street job," and as
though she was drugged or doped.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it was correct for the Court to admit and consider the evidence.
HELD:
Yes. The evidence regarding the conduct of the appellant and the loss of money from
the billfold of Mr. Hess, the brace maker, and from the owner of the Transmission Shop was
admitted over the objection that it was "irrelevant and immaterial, highly prejudicial. It is
at a time different and subsequent to the date alleged in the indictment of December the
13th." The evidence was offered and was admitted only for the purpose of showing
identity, intent, motive, malice or common plan or scheme. The intent of the appellant in
making physical contact with Mr. Hause was material and was uncertain. Proof that the
money was taken as well as the intent of the appellant rested upon the circumstances.

United States vs. Jones

455 F. 3d 800 1 August 2006
FACTS:
Jones was indicted by a grand jury and charged with knowingly and intentionally
possessing with intent to distribute five or more grams of crack cocaine. Trial originally
was scheduled for June 10, 2002. At the close of the prosecution's case during trial, the
Government asked the court to take judicial notice of Jones' prior conviction for the
unlawful delivery of a controlled substance in Macon County, Illinois.
Jones filed a motion requesting that his prior conviction not be entered into
evidence because the conviction was "not relevant to proving any fact in issue other than
[his] propensity to commit the crime charged," that it was too remote in time to be
admissible and that any probative value would be outweighed by the prejudice that it
would cause him.
ISSUE:
Whether the district court erred in admitting his previous conviction into evidence.
HELD:
NO. First, it is proper to admit the evidence on the issue of intent. Second, an 8-year old
conviction is not too old to be admissible. Third, a conviction is sufficient to support a jury
finding that a defendant committed a similar act – not an issue in this appeal. Fourth, the
conviction was not more prejudicial than probative. Here, the trial court offered a limiting
instruction, and it was held that such instructions "are effective in reducing or eliminating
any possible unfair prejudice from the introduction of Rule 404(b) evidence."

United States vs, Wales

977 F. 2d 1323
FACTS:
Robert Smyth Wales entered the United States at Honolulu International Airport on
a flight which he boarded in Singapore. He checked the "no" box on a customs declaration
form to deny that he was carrying more than $10,000. Customs agents found he was
carrying $48,000. He was arrested and charged with knowingly and willfully making a false
statement on a customs declaration form he gave to an officer of the United States Customs
Service. The jury found him guilty. The district court sentenced him to 14 months’
imprisonment, followed by supervised release for 2 1/2 years, a fine of $15,000 and a
special assessment of $50. On appeal, Wales contends the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction and the district court erred in several evidentiary rulings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to convict Wales of knowingly and willfully
making a false statement on a customs declaration form.

HELD:
Yes. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts may be admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Wales's deceitful attempt to clean out his safe deposit box before the government
could examine its contents was clearly an attempt to conceal the $150,000 in gold coins.
This evidence was consistent with the government's theory of the case that Wales had a
motive for submitting a false customs declaration: to conceal his assets and to avoid an
explanation of their source. The use of this evidence to prove motive was proper.

United States vs. Le Compte 131 F. 3d 767 22 December 1997

FACTS:
LeCompte was charged with child sex offenses, specifically the abuse of his second
wife’s 11-year-old niece “CD”, allegedly committed in January 1995. The actual incidents of
molestation allegedly occurred while she was lying on a couch at her aunt's, with her
siblings sleeping on the floor next to her. LeCompte allegedly joined her on the couch,
forced her to touch his penis, and touched her breasts.
For alleged sex offenses committed by LeCompte during his first marriage between
1985 and 1987, the government offered evidence to support the case of CD. The alleged
(first) victim, “TT”, testified that LeCompte had played games with her at her aunt's house,
had exposed himself to her, had forced her to touch his penis, and had touched her private
parts.
ISSUE:
Whether TT’s testimony is admissible in LeCompte’s retrial or whether the first trial
foreclosed consideration of admissibility under a different rule of evidence on retrial

HELD: Yes. The sexual offenses committed against T.T. were substantially similar to those
allegedly committed against C.D. By comparison, the differences were small. In particular,
the District Court itself acknowledged that the time lapse between incidents “may not be as
significant as it appears at first glance.
Moreover, the danger of unfair prejudice noted by the District Court was that
presented by the “unique stigma” of child sexual abuse, on account of which LeCompte
might be convicted not for the charged offense, but for his sexual abuse of T.T. This danger
is one that all propensity evidence in such trials presents. It is for this reason that the
evidence was previously excluded, and it is precisely such holdings that Congress intended
to overrule.

People vs. Lauga GR No. 186228 15 March 2010

FACTS:
Appellant Lauga was charged of qualified rape by his daughter. At around 10pm,
appellant woke up the victim, removed his pants and slid inside the blanket covering the
victim and removed her pants and underwear. He proceeded to have carnal knowledge of
her daughter by threatening her with his fist and a knife. Soon after, the victim’s brother
arrived and saw her crying. Appellant claimed he scolded the victim for staying out late.
While on their way to their maternal grandmother’s house, victim recounted to her
brother what happened to her. They later told the incident to their grandmother and uncle
who sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting. Banting found appellant in his house
wearing only his underwear. He was invited to the police station to which he obliged.
Appellant admitted to Banting that he indeed raped her daughter because he was unable to
control himself.
The trial court convicted the accused for qualified rape. Upon appeal, the CA
affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant’s extrajudicial confession without counsel admissible in

evidence?

HELD: Negative. Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as

in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform
functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus,
without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific
scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-
related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional
rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the
Miranda Rights, is concerned.

Corinthian Gardens vs. Spouses Tanjangco

Facts:
Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65, a relocation survey was necessary.
Before, during and after the construction of the said house, Corinthian conducted periodic
ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to
the Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian. Unfortunately, after the Cuasos
constructed their house employing the services of C.B. Paraz & Construction Co., Inc. (C.B.
Paraz) as builder, their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos Lot 69 by 87 square
meters.
The Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the
latter failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit against the
Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with Damages.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA has legal basis to increase unilaterally and without proof the amount
prayed for in the Complaint.

Held:
Petitioners argue that the MTC may take judicial notice of the reasonable rental or the
general price increase of land in order to determine the amount of rent that may be
awarded to them.
Indeed, courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a
disputed property. However, petitioners herein erred in assuming that courts, in
determining the amount of rent, could simply rely on their own appreciation of land values
without considering any evidence. As we have said earlier, a court may fix the reasonable
amount of rent, but it must still base its action on the evidence adduced by the parties.

The reasonable amount of rent could be determined not by mere judicial notice, but by
supporting evidence:
x x x A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The court
may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. Before taking such judicial notice, the court must allow the parties to be heard
thereon. Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in
question without supporting evidence.
Truly, mere judicial notice is inadequate, because evidence is required for a court to
determine the proper rental value. But contrary to Corinthian's arguments, both the RTC
and the CA found that indeed rent was due the Tanjangcos because they were deprived of
possession and use of their property. This uniform factual finding of the RTC and the CA
was based on the evidence presented below. Moreover, in Spouses Catungal v. Hao, we
considered the increase in the award of rentals as reasonable given the particular
circumstances of each case. We noted therein that the respondent denied the petitioners
the benefits, including rightful possession, of their property for almost a decade.
Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos were deprived of possession and use of
their property for more than two decades through no fault of their own. Thus, we find no
cogent reason to disturb the monthly rental fixed by the CA.
All told, the CA committed no reversible error.

People vs. Muit

Facts:
One afternoon, Julaton,a relative of Ferraer arrived at the latter’s house with Pancho
Sr., Pancho Jr., Dequillo and other 4 men. Julaton introduced them to Ferraer. Pancho Sr.
said to Ferraer that they wanted to use his house as a safe house for their “visitor”. They
said that their line of work is kidnap for ransom. They planned the crime in Ferraer’s house
and waited for the call from Romeo to inform them when the victim would be at the
construction site. The group received a call from Rome on informing them that the victim
was already at the construction site, and so they went there to carry out their plan. At the
construction site, Muit and other members of the group pointed their guns at the victim
and his companion and ordered them to lie prostrate on the ground. After getting the keys
ot the Pajero from Seraspe (driver of the Pajero), they forced the victim to board the
vehicle with Muit driving it. They immediately reported the kidnapping of the victim to the
police and the kidnappers were intercepted by the group led by Supt. Arcadio. The
kidnappers refused to surrender and engaged the police in a shootout in which the victim
was among the casualties. Muit was one of the two persons who survived the shootout, but
he was apprehended by the police.
The prosecution presented the father of the victim, Ferraer as state witness and
extrajudicial confessions of Pancho Jr., and Dequillo which were executed with the
assistance of Atty. Mallare. Muit executed 2 extrajudicial confessions: the first statement
was made in which he was assisted by Atty. Vergara and the second statement was made
with assistance of Atty. Solomon and witnessed by his uncle and his brother. The defense
presented Dequillo, Pancho Jr. and Muit who used denials and alibis as their defense.
PanchoJr. and Dequillo said that they were tortured and forced to sign the written
confession of their participation in the crimes. On the other hand, Muit denied havinh
knowledge of the crime and denied knowing the persons whose names appeared in his 2
extrajudicial confessions.
Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions of the appellants are admissible as evidence
against them.
Held:
Yes, the extrajudicial confessions of Pancho Jr., Dequillo and Muit strengthened the case
against them. There is nothing in record to support the claim that they were tortured into
executing their extrajudicial confessions. One of the indications of voluntariness in the
execution of appellants’ extrajudicial statements is that each contains many details and
facts which the investigating officers could not have known and could not and could not
have supplied, without the knowledge and information given by appellants.
Rule 130 Sec. 33. Confession
The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or
of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against
him.

The rule that an extrajudicial confession is evidence only against the person making it
recognizes various exceptions. One exception is where several extrajudicial statements
have been made by several persons charged with an offense and there could have been no
collusion with reference to said confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material
respects identical is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants and is admissible
against other persons implicated therein. They are also admissible as circumstantial
evidence against the persons implicated therein to show the probability of their actual
participation in the commission of the crime. Therefore, the roles which Muit and his
companions played in the actual commission of the crime were described in their
statements. As for Dequillo, he was the one who procured the guns used by the group.
Pancho Jr served as the driver of the back-up vehicle and Romeo was the group’s
informant. They should be held liable because of the existence of conspiracy duly proved.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of CA.

People vs. Satorre

Facts:
Appellant Herminiano Satorre alias Emiano Satorre, a 19-year old farmer, was
charged with Murder for killing Romero Pantiligan with the use of a .38 paltik revolver.
On arraignment, appellant pleaded “not guilty”. Trial on the merits then ensued.
Gliceria Saraum, wife of the victim Romero Pantilgan, testified that at 2:00 a.m. of
May 25, 1997, she and her two children were asleep inside the house of her parents at
Tagaytay, Calidngan, Carcar, Cebu. Her mother, Florida Saraum, was also in the house. Her
husband, Romero, went out to attend a fiesta. While she was asleep, she was awakened by
a gunshot. Gliceria got up and went out to the porch, where she found her dead husband
lying on the ground. Blood oozed out of a gunshot wound on his head.
Rufino Abayata, a barangay kagawad, testified that around 7:00 a.m. of May 25,
1997, his fellow barangay kagawad, Pio Alvarado, fetched him from his house and,
together, they went to verify a report regarding a dead person on the porch of the Saraum
residence. Upon confirming the incident, they reported the matter to the Carcar Police.
Rufino further narrated that appellant’s father, Abraham Satorre, informed them that it was
appellant who shot Pantilgan. They looked for appellant in the house of his brother, Felix
Satorre, at Dumlog, Talisay, Cebu, but were told that he already left. Nevertheless,
appellant’s brothers, Margarito and Rosalio Satorre, went to Rufino’s house and
surrendered the gun which was allegedly used in killing Pantilgan.
Flavio Gelle narrated that he accompanied appellant and his father, Abraham, to the
Barangay Captain where appellant admitted killing Pantilgan. Thereafter, appellant was
detained.
Corroborating Gelle’s story, Cynthia Castañares, Barangay Captain, testified that
Abraham Satorre and Gelle brought appellant to her residence where he confessed having
killed Pantilgan. Appellant allegedly informed her that he killed Pantilgan because the
latter struck him with a piece of wood. That same evening, she went to the Carcar Police
Station with appellant where she executed an affidavit. She further averred that appellant
voluntarily narrated that he killed Pantilgan with the use of a handgun which he wrestled
from his possession.
Dr. Plebia Villanueva, Municipal Health Officer of Carcar, Cebu certified that the cause of
Pantilgan’s death was gunshot wound.
Bonifacio Ayag, NBI Ballistician, testified that the deformed bullet taken from
Pantilgan’s head wound was fired from the gun surrendered by appellant’s brothers to the
Carcar Police.
Denying the charges against him, appellant claimed that he was asleep inside his
house at the time of the incident. He alleged that Rufino Abayata had a grudge against him
because of an incident when he tied Rufino’s cow to prevent it from eating the corn in his
farm. He denied having confessed to the killing of Pantilgan. He disclaimed ownership
over the paltik .38 revolver and stated that he could not even remember having
surrendered a firearm to Castañares.
Abraham Satorre corroborated appellant’s testimony. He denied having accompanied
appellant to Castañares’ house to surrender him.
Appellant’s brother, Rosalio Satorre, claimed that he never accompanied appellant
to Castañares’ house to surrender. His other brother, Felix, also testified that he never
surrendered any firearm to anybody.
Issue:
Whether or not the confession was validly made.
Held:
On the question of whether a confession is made voluntarily, the age, character, and
circumstances prevailing at the time it was made must be considered. Much depends upon
the situation and surroundings of the accused. This is the position taken by the courts,
whatever the theory of exclusion of incriminating statements may be. The intelligence of
the accused or want of it must also be taken into account. It must be shown that the
defendant realized the import of his act.
In the case at bar, appellant was a 19-year old farmer who did not even finish first
grade. Granting that he made the confession in the presence of Barangay Captain
Castañares, he may not have realized the full import of his confession and its consequences.
This is not to say that he is not capable of making the confession out of a desire to tell the
truth if prompted by his conscience. What we are saying is that due to the aforesaid
personal circumstances of appellant, the voluntariness of his alleged oral confession may
not be definitively appraised and evaluated.
At any rate, an extrajudicial confession forms but a prima facie case against the party by
whom it is made. Such confessions are not conclusive proof of that which they state; it
may be proved that they were uttered in ignorance, or levity, or mistake; and hence, they
are, at best, to be regarded as only cumulative proof which affords but a precarious support
and on which, when uncorroborated, a verdict cannot be permitted to rest.
Appellant allegedly admitted before policemen that he killed Pantilgan. His
statement was not taken nor was his confession reduced into writing. This circumstance
alone casts some doubt on the prosecution’s account that appellant freely and voluntarily
confessed killing Pantilgan. It raises questions not only as to the voluntariness of the
alleged confession, but also on whether appellant indeed made an oral confession.
A confession is not required to be in any particular form. It may be oral or written,
formal or informal in character. It may be recorded on video tape, sound motion pictures,
or tape. However, while not required to be in writing to be admissible in evidence, it is
advisable, if not otherwise recorded by video tape or other means, to reduce the confession
to writing. This adds weight to the confession and helps convince the court that it was
freely and voluntarily made. If possible the confession, after being reduced to writing,
should be read to the defendant, have it read by defendant, have him sign it, and have it
attested by witnesses.
Indeed, an extrajudicial confession will not support a conviction where it is
uncorroborated. There must be such corroboration that, when considered in connection
with confession, will show the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient corroboration of a confession. It is not necessary that the
supplementary evidence be entirely free from variance with the extrajudicial confession, or
that it show the place of offense or the defendant’s identity or criminal agency. All facts
and circumstances attending the particular offense charged are admissible to corroborate
extrajudicial confession.

People vs. Villacorta

Facts:
Julie Gil was charged with the crime of Destructive Arson with Homicide. She set fire
on a residential house located at No. 603 Sulucan St., Sampaloc, in said city, owned by
ANGGE ARGUELLES, by then and there pouring kerosene on a mattress placed in a room of
said house then occupied by the said accused and ignited it with a lighter, knowing it to be
occupied by one or more persons, thereby causing as a consequence thereof, damage to the
said house and adjacent houses. On the occasion and by reason of said fire, one RODOLFO
CABRERA, a resident/occupant of said house sustained burn injuries which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death.
Issue:
Whether or not the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
Yes. The perpetrator can be established through positive identification.

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that
of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of
positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case
as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of
the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances
where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a
crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the
perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the
persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission
of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence
constituting an unbroken chain, leads to the only fair and reasonable conclusion,
which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If
the actual eyewitness are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or
accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an
eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and
unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because
it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to
circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the
absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be
denied proper protection. [Emphasis supplied] [People vs Gallarde]
She was the person who had the motive to commit the crime, and the series of
events following her threat to cause chaos and arson in her neighborhood -- the fire that
started in her room, and her actuations and remarks during, as well as immediately before
and after the fire-- sufficiently points to the accused-appellant as the author of the said
crime.

Bank of Commerce vs. Manalo

Facts:
Boston Bank, now petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing the
CA rulings. It maintains that, as held by the CA, the records do not reflect any schedule of
payment of the 80% balance of the purchase price, or P278,448.00. Petitioner insists that
unless the parties had agreed on the manner of payment of the principal amount, including
the other terms and conditions of the contract, there would be no existing contract of sale
or contract to sell.47 Petitioner avers that the letter agreement to respondent spouses
dated August 22, 1972 merely confirmed their reservation for the purchase of Lot Nos. 1
and 2, consisting of 1,740.3 square meters, more or less, at the price of P200.00 per square
meter (or P348,060.00), the amount of the downpayment thereon and the application of
the P34,887.00 due from Ramos as part of such downpayment.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner or its predecessors-in-interest, the XEI or the OBM, as seller, and
the respondents, as buyers, forged a perfect contract to sell over the property.
Held:
No. A careful examination of the factual backdrop of the case, as well as the
antecedental proceedings constrains us to hold that petitioner is not barred from asserting
that XEI or OBM, on one hand, and the respondents, on the other, failed to forge a perfected
contract to sell the subject lots.
There is no evidence on record to prove that XEI or OBM and the respondents had
agreed, after December 31, 1972, on the terms of payment of the balance of the purchase
price of the property and the other substantial terms and conditions relative to the sale.
Indeed, the parties are in agreement that there had been no contract of conditional sale
ever executed by XEI, OBM or petitioner, as vendor, and the respondents, as vendees.
On the other hand, the records do not disclose the schedule of payment of the
purchase price, net of the downpayment. Considering, however, the Contracts of
Conditional Sale (Exhs. "N," "O" and "P") entered into by XEI with other lot buyers, it would
appear that the subdivision lots sold by XEI, under contracts to sell, were payable in 120
equal monthly installments (exclusive of the downpayment but including pre-computed
interests) commencing on delivery of the lot to the buyer.
The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of the purchase
price of lots purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments does not constitute
evidence that XEI also agreed to give the respondents the same mode and timeline of
payment of the P278,448.00.
Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at
another time, although such evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of
conduct or the intent of the parties.
Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts.
Courts must contend with the caveat that, before they admit evidence of usage, of habit or
pattern of conduct, the offering party must establish the degree of specificity and frequency
of uniform response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but
rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in nature. The offering party must allege and prove
specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of habit. The examples offered in
evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must be numerous enough to base on
inference of systematic conduct. Mere similarity of contracts does not present the kind of
sufficiently similar circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion.
In determining whether the examples are numerous enough, and sufficiently
regular, the key criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response. After all,
habit means a course of behavior of a person regularly represented in like circumstances. It
is only when examples offered to establish pattern of conduct or habit are numerous
enough to lose an inference of systematic conduct that examples are admissible. The key
criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response or ratio of reaction to
situations.
As a consequence, respondents and XEI (or OBM for that matter) failed to forge a
perfected contract to sell the two lots; hence, respondents have no cause of action for
specific performance against petitioner. Republic Act No. 6552 applies only to a perfected
contract to sell and not to a contract with no binding and enforceable effect.

Rimorin vs. People

Facts:
On October 12, 1979, Col. Panfilo Lacson, then Chief of the Police Intelligence Branch
of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group (MISG for brevity), received information
that certain syndicated groups were engaged in smuggling activities somewhere in Port
Area, Manila. It was further revealed that the activities [were being] done at nighttime and
the smuggled goods in a delivery panel and delivery truck [were] being escorted by some
police and military personnel. He fielded three surveillance stake-out teams the following
night along Roxas Boulevard and Bonifacio Drive near Del Pan Bridge, whereby they were
to watch out for a cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 bound for Malabon. Nothing came
out of it. On the basis of his investigation, [it was discovered that] the truck was registered
in the name of Teresita Estacio of Pasay City.
At around 9:00 oclock in the evening of October 14, 1979, Col. Lacson and his men
returned to the same area, with Col. Lacson posting himself at the immediate vicinity of the
2nd COSAC Detachment in Port Area, Manila, because as per information given to him, the
said cargo truck will come out from the premises of the 2nd COSAC Detachment in said
place. COSAC stands for Constabulary Off-Shore Anti-Crime Battalion. The night watch
lasted till the wee hours of the following morning. About 3:00 a.m. an Isuzu panel came out
from the place of the 2nd COSAC Detachment. It returned before 4:00 a.m. of same day.
At around 5 minutes before 4:00 oclock that morning, a green cargo truck with Plate
No. T-SY-167 came out from the 2nd COSAC Detachment followed and escorted closely by a
light brown Toyota Corona car with Plate No. GR-433 and with 4 men on board. At that
time, Lt. Col. Panfilo Lacson had no information whatsoever about the car, so he gave an
order by radio to his men to intercept only the cargo truck. The cargo truck was
intercepted. Col. Lacson noticed that the Toyota car following the cargo truck suddenly
made a sharp U-turn towards the North, unlike the cargo truck which was going south.
Almost by impulse, Col. Lacsons car also made a U-turn and gave chase to the speeding
Toyota car, which was running between 100 KPH to 120 KPH. Col. Lacson sounded his
siren. The chase lasted for less than 5 minutes, until said car made a stop along Bonifacio
Drive, at the foot of Del Pan Bridge. Col. Lacson and his men searched the car and they
found several firearms, particularly: three (3) .45 cal. Pistol and one (1) armalite M-16 rifle.
He also discovered that T/Sgt. Ernesto Miaco was the driver of the Toyota car, and his
companions inside the car were Sgt. Guillermo Ferrer, Sgt. Fidel Balita and Sgt. Robartolo
Alincastre, the four of them all belonging to the 2nd COSAC Detachment. They were found
not to be equipped with mission orders.
When the cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 was searched, 305 cases of blue seal
or untaxed cigarettes were found inside said truck. The cargo truck driver known only as
Boy was able to escape while the other passengers or riders of said truck were
apprehended, namely: Police Sgt. Arturo Rimorin of Pasay City Police Force, Pat. Felicisimo
Rieta of Kawit Police Force, and Gonzalo Vargas, a civilian.
Issue:
Whether or not it was necessary to present the seized goods to prove the corpus delicti.
Held:
No. Failure to present the Blue Seal cigarettes in court is not fatal.
The Court, on several occasions, has explained that corpus delicti refers to the fact of the
commission of the crime charged15 or to the body or substance of the crime.16 In its legal
sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom17 or to
the body of the person murdered.18 Hence, to prove the corpus delicti, it is sufficient for the
prosecution to be able show that (1) a certain fact has been proven — say, a person has
died or a building has been burned; and (2) a particular person is criminally responsible for
the act.19
Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that
even a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and
warrant a conviction therefor.20 Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial
evidence.21
Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the corpus delicti had been competently established by
respondent's evidence, which consisted of the testimonies of credible witnesses and the
Custody Receipt22 issued by the Bureau of Customs for the confiscated goods.
The Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Habeas Corpus Case Reynaldo De Villa GR No. 158802 17 November 2004

FACTS:
By final judgment dated February 1, 2001, in People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo de Villa
the Supreme Court found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza (12 yrs and 10
mos of age), his niece by affinity; sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusión perpetua;
and ordered him to pay the offended party civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of the suit,
and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child born of the rape. Petitioner is
currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.

Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, we are once more faced with the
question of Reynaldo de Villa's guilt or innocence.

Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges that during
the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine
once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victim's child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator
was only informed during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioner's case that
DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity. This information was apparently
furnished by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-Death Penalty Task Force, which
took over as counsel for petitioner.

Thus, petitioner's brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood type test and DNA
test in order to determine the paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a result of the
rape. This relief was implicitly denied in our Decision of February 21, 2001.

On March 16, 2001, Reynaldo de Villa filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the
Decision, wherein he once more prayed that DNA tests be conducted. The Motion was
denied with finality in a Resolution dated November 20, 2001.14 Hence, the Decision
became final and executory on January 16, 2002.

Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges. Having been informed that DNA
tests required a sample that could be extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator asked Billy
Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask
Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup. Leahlyn readily agreed and did so. Billy Joe took the
sample home and gave it to the petitioner-relator, who immediately labeled the cup as
"Container A."

Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa.

These samples were placed in separate containers with distinguishing labels and
temporarily stored in a refrigerator prior to transport to the DNA Analysis Laboratory at
the National Science Research Institute (NSRI).

Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample given by
Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by
Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of the donors of the samples, save for the sample
given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA Analysis Laboratory.

After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March 21, 2003, which
showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the children whose samples
were tested, due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers in
petitioner's sample and those of any of the other samples, including Leahlyn's.

ISSUSE: Whether or not the DNA analysis shows that petitioner is not the father of Leahlyn
and thus based on the fact that Leahlyn was sired as a result of the alleged rape, cannot
stand and must be set aside.

Whether or not a new trial may be granted to consider the alleged newly discovered
DNA evidence.

HELD:
It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendoza's paternity is not central to the issue
of petitioner's guilt or innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely
different question, separate and distinct from the question of the father of her child.
Recently, in the case of People v. Alberio, we ruled that the fact or not of the victim's
pregnancy and resultant childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was
raped. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which
the victim bore was fathered by the purported rapist, or by some unknown individual, is of
no moment in determining an individual's guilt.

In the instant case, however, we note that the grant of child support to Leahlyn Mendoza
indicates that our Decision was based, at least in small measure, on the victim's claim that
the petitioner fathered her child.

The fact of the child's paternity is now in issue, centrally relevant to the civil award of child
support. It is only tangentially related to the issue of petitioner's guilt. However, if it can be
conclusively determined that the petitioner did not sire Leahlyn Mendoza, this may cast the
shadow of reasonable doubt, and allow the acquittal of the petitioner on this basis.

Be that as it may, it appears that the petitioner relies upon erroneous legal grounds in
resorting to the remedy of a motion for new trial. A motion for new trial, under the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, is available only for a limited period of time, and for very
limited grounds. Under Section 1, Rule 121, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a
motion for new trial may be filed at any time before a judgment of conviction becomes
final, that is, within fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or notice. Upon finality of the
judgment, therefore, a motion for new trial is no longer an available remedy.

In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of purportedly "newly-
discovered evidence", i.e., the DNA test subsequently conducted, allegedly excluding
petitioner from the child purportedly fathered as a result of the rape.

The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus has long attained finality, and entry of judgment was made as far back as January
16, 2002. Moreover, upon an examination of the evidence presented by the petitioner, we
do not find that the DNA evidence falls within the statutory or jurisprudential definition of
"newly- discovered evidence".

A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the
following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise
of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that that, if admitted, it would
probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable
diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to
secure it.

In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, we
nonetheless find that it does not meet the criteria for "newly-discovered evidence" that
would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving paternity could have been discovered
and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence.

Petitioner-relator's claim that he was "unaware" of the existence of DNA testing until the
trial was concluded carries no weight with this Court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of
DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the part of
petitioner's counsel. In either instance, however, this negligence is binding upon petitioner.

Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by petitioner
and his counsel, we are not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright
acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is conclusively proven
that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory,
still stand, with Aileen Mendoza's testimony and positive identification as its bases. The
Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that the pregnancy of the victim has never
been an element of the crime of rape. Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to
conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged. Although
petitioner claims that conviction was based solely on a finding of paternity of the child
Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our conviction was based on the clear and convincing
testimonial evidence of the victim, which, given credence by the trial court, was affirmed on
appeal.

*** If sir asks about the Habeas Corpus, say that it is not applicable on this case. Very
broadly, the writ applies "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which a person
has been deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person has been
withheld from the person entitled thereto. The most basic criterion for the issuance of the
writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom
of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual's liberty is
restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Concomitant to
this principle, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to directly assail a judgment
rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was
not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct of the
proceedings.

Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of liberty, the writ of habeas
corpus has very limited availability as a post-conviction remedy. In the recent case of Feria
v. Court of Appeals,25 we ruled that review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in very specific instances, such as
when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction
to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is
void as to such excess.26

In this instance, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to assail a final judgment of
conviction, without, however, providing a legal ground on which to anchor his petition. In
fine, petitioner alleges neither the deprivation of a constitutional right, the absence of
jurisdiction of the court imposing the sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been
imposed upon him.

In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek the review of
findings of fact long passed upon with finality. This relief is far outside the scope of habeas
corpus proceedings.

Jose vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 118441-42 18 January 2000

FACTS: Petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corporation (MCL) is the operator-lessee of a
public utility bus (Bus 203). On February 22, 1985, at 6 am Bus 203, then driven by
petitioner Armando Jose, collided with a red Ford Escort driven by John Macarubo on
MacArthur Highway, in Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. As a result of the collision, the
left side of the Ford Escort’s hood was severely damaged while its driver, John Macarubo,
and its lone passenger, private respondent Rommel Abraham, were seriously injured. The
driver and conductress of Bus 203 rushed Macarubo and Abraham to the nearby Fatima
Hospital where Macarubo lapsed into a coma. Despite surgery, Macarubo failed to recover
and died five days later. Abraham survived, but he became blind on the left eye which had
to be removed. In addition, he sustained a fracture on the forehead and multiple lacerations
on the face, which caused him to be hospitalized for a week.
On March 26, 1985, Rommel Abraham, represented by his father, Felixberto,
instituted Civil Case No. 2206-V-85 for damages against petitioners MCL and Armando Jose
in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela.
On July 17, 1986, the spouses Jose and Mercedes Macarubo, parents of the deceased John
Macarubo, filed their own suit for damages in the same trial court, where it was docketed
as Civil Case No. 2428-V-86, against MCL alone.
On the other hand, MCL filed a third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo, registered
owner of the Ford Escort on the theory that John Macarubo was negligent and that he was
the "authorized driver" of Juanita Macarubo. The facts show that Rommel Abraham and
John Macarubo were at a party and therefore no sleep and can be assailed that he was not
fit to drive the car. The pictures taken of the two vehicles (Exh. 1, 2 and 3) will clearly show
that the MCL bus was at its proper lane and not in an overtaking position while the car
driven by John Macarubo was positioned in a diagonal manner and crossed the line of the
MCL, which is an indication of an overtaking act. If it were the bus that was overtaking at
the time, the car would have been thrown farther away from the point of the impact.
RTC: The trial court rendered judgment on September 28, 1989, dismissing both civil cases
against MCL and ruling favorably on its third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo,
ordering the latter to pay MCL P54,232.12 as actual damages, P24,000.00 for lost income,
and P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Rommel Abraham, the Macarubo spouses, and third-party defendant Juanita Macarubo
then appealed
CA: Reversed the RTC Ruling making MCL and Armando Jose Liable to the private
respondents
ISSUE: whether or not it was the driver of Bus 203 or that of the Ford Escort who was at
fault for the collision of the two vehicles
HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court also
dismissed the two cases filed against MCL and Armando Jose as well as the third-party
complaint filed against Juanita Macarubo. The Court upheld the trial court in relying on the
photographs rather than on Rommel Abraham's testimony which was obviously biased and
unsupported by any evidence. Physical evidence prevails over testimonial evidence, where
the physical evidence established ran counter to the testimonial evidence. The Court also
ruled that private respondents' failure to prove Jose's negligence during the trial is fatal to
prove MCL's vicarious liability because before the presumption of the employer's
negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees can arise, the negligence of the
employee must first be established. With regard to the dismissal of the third-party
complaint by MCL against Juanita Macarubo, the Court, however, held that the mere
allegation of MCL that John Macarubo is the "authorized driver" without further alleging
that he was the son, ward, employee, or pupil of the registered owner is not sufficient to
make the latter vicariously liable for negligence under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MCL
should have presented evidence to prove that Juanita Macarubo was the employer of
John Macarubo or that she is in any way liable for John Macarubo's negligence under
existing laws.

G.R. No. 168169 February 24, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ALBERTO TABARNERO and GARY TABARNERO
PONENTE: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS: On 27 March 2000, warrants for the arrest of Gary and Alberto were issued by the
RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. On April 22, 2001, Gary surrendered to Barangay Tanod Alarma.
When he was arraigned, he pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. During this time,
Alberto remained at large. Gary admitted having killed Ernesto, but claimed that it was an
act of self-defense during the pre-trial conference. An inverted reverse trial ensued.
Gary, a 22-year-old construction worker at the time of his testimony in June 2001, testified
that he stayed in Ernesto’s house from 1997 to 1999, as he and Mary Jane were living
together. Mary Jane is the daughter of Teresita Acibar, the wife of Ernesto. However, Gary
left the house shortly before the incident because of a misunderstanding with Ernesto
when the latter allegedly stopped the planned marriage of Gary and Mary Jane, who was
pregnant at that time. Gary was still allegedly in his house at around 11:40 p.m. with his
friend, Richard Ulilian; his father, co-appellant Alberto; his mother, Elvira; and his brother,
Jeffrey. Overcome with emotion over being separated from Mary Jane, Gary went to
Ernesto’s house, but was not able to enter as no one went out of the house to let him in. He
instead shouted his pleas from the outside, asking Ernesto what he had done wrong that
caused Ernesto to break him and Mary Jane up, and voicing out several times that he loved
Mary Jane and was ready to marry her. When he Gary was about to leave, the gate opened
and Ernesto purportedly struck him with a lead pipe. Ernesto was aiming at Gary’s head,
but the latter blocked the blow with his hands, causing his left index finger to be broken.
Gary embraced Ernesto, but the latter strangled him. At that point, Gary felt that there was
a bladed weapon tucked at Ernesto’s back. Losing control of himself, Gary took the bladed
weapon and stabbed Ernesto, although he cannot recall how many times he did so.
According to Gary, Ernesto fell to the ground, and pleaded, "saklolo, tulungan niyo po ako"
three times. Gary was stunned, and did not notice his father, co-appellant Alberto, coming.
Alberto asked Gary, "anak, ano ang nangyari?" To which Gary responded "nasaksak ko po
yata si Ka Erning," referring to Ernesto. Gary and Alberto fled, ran, since they were afraid
allegedly out of fear. Gary denied that he and Alberto conspired to kill Ernesto. He claims
that it was he and Ernesto who had a fight, and that he had no choice but to stab Ernesto,
who was going to kill him.
Gary’s sister, Gemarie Tabarnero, testified that she was a childhood friend of Mary Jane.
Gemarie attested that Mary Jane was Gary’s girlfriend from 1995 to 1999. Sometime in
1999, Gary and Mary Jane were prevented from talking to each other. On the night of the
incident, Gemarie observed that Gary was crying and seemed perplexed. Gary told Gemarie
that he was going to Ernesto’s house to talk to Ernesto about Mary Jane. Gary allegedly did
not bring anything with him when he went to Ernesto’s house.
In the meantime, Alberto was apprehended. He pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charge.
However, while Alberto’s defense is denial and not self-defense like Gary’s, the court
decided to proceed with the reverse inverted trial, as it had already started that way.
Edilberto Alarma (Alarma), a barangay tanod, testified that while he was in a meeting at
around 4:00 p.m. on April 22, 2001, Gary arrived and told him of his intention to surrender
to him. Gary told him that he was responsible for the "incident happened at Daang Riles."
Together with his co- fellow barangay tanod Zaldy Garcia, Alarma brought Gary to the
Malolos Police Station, where the surrender was entered in the blotter report.
Appellant Alberto, a construction worker employed as leadman/foreman of Alicia Builders,
was 45 years old at the time of his testimony. He testified that at the time when of the
incident, he was living in Norzagaray, Bulacan. However, he went to visit his children, Gary
and Gemarie. Before going to sleep, he realized that Gary was not in the place where he
would usually sleep. When Gary did not show up, he proceeded to Daang Bakal, where Gary
had many friends. He saw Gary and asked him what happened and why he was in a hurry,
to which Gary replied: "Wag na kayong magtanong, umalis na tayo, napatay ko po yata si
Kuya Erning." Alberto and Gary ran in different directions. Alberto passed through the
railways and exited in front of the capitol compound to wait for a jeepney going to Sta.
Maria, his route toward his home in Norzagaray. He claims that he had no knowledge of the
accusation that he conspired with Gary in killing Ernesto. It was three months after the
incident that he came to know that he was being charged for a crime. At this time, he was
already residing in Pampanga, where he was assigned when his engineer, Efren Cruz, got
secured a project in said place. Later, Alberto learned from his sibling, whom he talked to
by phone, that Gary had already surrendered. He did not consider surrendering because,
although he wanted to clear his name, nobody would work to support his family. He said
that he had no previous misunderstanding with Ernesto.
The first to testify for the prosecution was its eyewitness, Emerito Acibar, the brother of
Mary Jane, was inside their house in Daang Bakal with his brother and his stepfather,
Ernesto, at around eleven o’clock on the night of the incident. He heard somebody calling
for Ernesto, but ignored it. He then heard a "kalabog," followed by Ernesto’s plea asking for
help. Emerito was about to go outside, but, while he was already at the door of their one-
room house, he saw Ernesto being held by a certain Toning "Kulit" and another person,
while Gary and Alberto were stabbing Ernesto with a fan knivesfe. Emerito lost count of the
number of thrusts made by Gary and Alberto, but each inflicted more than one, and the last
stab was made by Alberto. Emerito shouted for help. The four assailants left when
somebody arrived, allowing Emerito to approach Ernesto and bring him to the Bulacan
Provincial Hospital.
On cross-examination, Emerito confirmed that Gary and Mary Jane used to reside in
Ernesto’s house. On the date of the incident, however, Gary had already left the house,
while Mary Jane had moved to Abra with Teresita. According to Emerito, his family did not
know that Mary Jane and Gary had a relationship because they treated Gary like a member
of the family. Ernesto got mad when they found out about Gary and Mary Jane’s
relationship. On the night of the incident, Emerito was fixing his things inside their house
when he heard someone calling from for the outside, but was not sure if it was Gary.
Emerito neither saw Ernesto leaving the room, nor the fight between Ernesto and Gary. All
he saw was the stabbing, which happened seven to eight meters away from the doorway
where he was standing him. He was sure that there were four assailants, two of whom went
to a bridge 8 to 10 meters from the incident, where they boarded a yellow XLT-type car.
SPO2 Ronnie Morales testified that he was on duty at the police station on the night of
October 23, 1999. During that night, Emerito reported at the police station that Ernesto had
been stabbed. SPO2 Morales and Emerito proceeded to the Bulacan Provincial Hospital,
where SPO2 Morales saw Ernesto in the operating room, very weak due to multiple
injuries. While in the presence of the two doctors on duty, SPO2 Morales asked Ernesto
who stabbed him. Ernesto answered that the assailants were the father and son, Gary and
Alberto Tabarnero from Longos, Bulacan.
Cross-examined, SPO2 Morales clarified Emerito did not inform them that he witnessed the
incident. SPO2 Morales did not find it odd that Emerito did not tell him who the suspects
were when Emerito reported the incident, because they immediately proceeded to the
hospital, considering that the victim, Ernesto, was still alive. Ernesto was not able to affix
his signature on the Sinumpaang Salaysay because he could no longer talk after the fourth
question. SPO2 Morales further stated that he could not remember talking to Emerito on
their way to the hospital, since they were in a hurry. The government physician at the
Bulacan Provincial Hospital who prepared Ernesto’s death certificate, Dr. Apollo Trinidad,
clarified that Ernesto died on October 25, 1999. However, considering the admission by the
defense of the fact of death, the cause thereof, and the execution of the death certificate, the
prosecution did not proceed to solicit these facts from no longer questioned Dr. Trinidad on
these matters.
RTC: convicted Gary and Alberto of the crime of murder.
CA: affirmed the conviction with modification as regards exemplary damages
ISSUE: Whether or not Dying declaration of the victim is admissible in court?
SC: While Ernesto was not able to testify in court, his statement is considered admissible
under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made under the
consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his
death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death.
In applying this exception to the hearsay rule, we held as follows:
"It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a realization by the
decedent that his demise or at least, its imminence -- not so much the rapid eventuation of
death -- is at hand. This may be proven by the statement of the deceased himself or it may
be inferred from the nature and extent of the decedent’s wounds, or other relevant
circumstances."
In the case at bar, Ernesto had nine stab wounds which caused his death within the next 48
hours. At the time he uttered his statement accusing Gary and Alberto of stabbing him, his
body was already very rapidly deteriorating, as shown by his inability to speak and write
towards the end of the questioning.
We have considered that a dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence, for no
person who knows of his impending death would make a careless or false accusation. When
a person is at the point of death, every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is
induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth. It is hard to fathom that
Ernesto, very weak as he was and with his body already manifesting an impending demise,
would summon every remaining strength he had just to lie about his true assailants, whom
he obviously would want to bring to justice

SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. ERIC GAN

G.R. No. 150464 June 27, 2006
CORONA, J.:

FACTS: Eric Gan opened a current account with petitioner at its Soler Branch in Santa Cruz,
Manila. Petitioner alleged that it had an agreement with respondent wherein the latter
would deposit an initial amount in his current account and he could draw checks on said
account provided there were sufficient funds to cover them. Furthermore, under a special
arrangement with petitioner’s branch manager then, Mr. Qui, respondent was allowed to
transfer funds from his account to another person’s account also within the same
branch. Respondent availed of such arrangement several times by depositing checks in his
account and even before they cleared, he withdrew the proceeds thereof and transferred
them to the other account. These transactions were covered by what were known as "debit
memos" since respondent had no sufficient funds to cover the amounts he transferred.
Later on, respondent purportedly incurred an overdraft or negative balance in his account.
The overdraft balance came up to P153,757.78. According to petitioner, respondent
refused to heed petitioner’s repeated demands for payment. For almost 8 years the total
obligation of respondent reached P297,060.01, inclusive of interest.7
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against respondent to recover
the P297,060.01 with 12% interest per annum until fully paid, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses and costs of suit.
Respondent denied liability to petitioner for the said amount. He contended that the
alleged overdraft resulted from transactions done without his knowledge and consent.

RTC: dismissed the complaint. It held that petitioner was not able to prove that respondent
owed it the amount claimed considering that the ledger cards it presented were merely
hearsay evidence.

CA: affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the CA erred in not ruling that the ledger cards and the
testimony of Mr. Patricio Mercado constituted the best evidence of the transactions made
by the respondent relative to his account.

HELD:
The entries in the ledger, as testified to by Mercado, were not competent evidence to prove
that respondent consented to the transfers of funds. These entries merely showed that the
transfers were indeed made and that Qui approved them. Petitioner’s claim that
respondent availed of a special arrangement to transfer funds from his account to another
person’s account was a bare allegation that was never substantiated. Admittedly, Mercado
had no personal knowledge of this arrangement. In fact, when asked about the details of
the alleged consent given by respondent to the transfers, he stated that he could not
remember because respondent talked to Qui and not to him. Petitioner could have
presented Qui whom they alleged allowed the special arrangement with respondent. But it
did not.
Neither can we accept petitioner’s argument that the entries made by Mercado in the
ledger were competent evidence to prove how and when the negative balance was
incurred. Petitioner invokes Section 43 of Rule 130:

Entries in the course of business. – Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions
to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to
know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made
the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.

Under this exception to the hearsay rule, the admission in evidence of entries in corporate
books required the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a
duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

The ledger entries did not meet the first and third requisites.

There is good reason why evidence of this nature is incorrigibly hearsay. Entries in
business records which spring from the duty of other employees to communicate facts
occurring in the ordinary course of business are prima facie admissible, the duty to
communicate being itself a badge of trustworthiness of the entries, but not when they
purport to record what were independent agreements arrived at by some bank officials
and a client. In this case, the entries become mere casual or voluntary reports of the official
concerned. To permit the ledgers, prepared by the bank at its own instance, to substitute
the contract as proof of the agreements with third parties, is to set a dangerous precedent.
Business entries are allowed as an exception to the hearsay rule only under certain
conditions specified in Section 43, which must be scrupulously observed to prevent them
from being used as a source of undue advantage for the party preparing them.

Gravador v. Mamigo
G.R. No. L--24989 July 21, 1967
FACTS:
Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Sta.
Catalina, Negros Oriental on August 15, 1964 when he was advised by the Superintendent
of Schools Angel Salazar, Jr., through Teodulfo Dayao, of his separation from the service on
the ground that he had reached the --war records which included that stated that he was
born on November 26, 1897 (He was thus 66 years, 8 months and 22 days old on record).
On August 31, 1964, petitioner, through a letter, protested that the date of his birth
is not November 26, 1897, rather, it was December 11, 1901. Attached was the affidavit of
Lazaro Bandoquillo and Pedro Sienes who were their neighbors as far back as during the
lifetime of the parents of petitioner.
The Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental ruled that Gravador was born on
December 11, 1901 and ordered his reinstatement, back wages and damages amounting to
P52, 400. Respondent Eutiquio Mamigo, the District Supervisor, appealed directly to the
Supreme Court. Mamigo alleged that it was error on the part of the trial court to rely solely
on post-- date of birth -- these records, respondent contends, were only manufactured since
it was believed that the original pre--war records had been lost or destroyed.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court correctly relied on post--war records?
HELD:
Yes. While a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may
nevertheless testify as to his age which he learned from his parents and relatives and his
testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition. In his application for back pay
filed with the Department of Finance and when he asked the GSIS and the Civil Service
Commission to correct the date of his birth, he repeatedly asserted that his birthday was on
December 11, 1901.
A cadastral survey as far back as 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was then 23
years old, cannot be ignored. Made ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this statement
is at once a declaration regarding pedigree within the intendment and meaning of section
39 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. December 11, 1901 is established as the date of birth
of the petitioner not only by evidence of family tradition but also by the declaration ante
litem motam of a deceased relative.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs.

Hon. SECRETARY OF LABOR LEONARDO QUISUMBING and MERALCO EMPLOYEES and
WORKERS ASSOCIATION (MEWA), respondent.
PONENTE:Martinez

FACTS: MEWA is the duly recognized labor organization of the rank-and-file employees of
MERALCO. On September 7, 1995, MEWA informed MERALCO of its intention to re-
negotiate the terms and conditions of their existing 1992-1997 Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) covering the remaining period of two years starting from December 1,
1995 to November 30, 1997. MERALCO signified its willingness to re-negotiate through its
letter dated October 17, 1995 and formed a CBA negotiating panel for the purpose. On
November 10, 1995, MEWA submitted its proposal to MERALCO, which, in turn, presented
a counter-proposal. Thereafter, collective bargaining negotiations proceeded. However,
despite the series of meetings between the negotiating panels of MERALCO and MEWA, the
parties failed to arrive at “terms and conditions acceptable to both of them.”

On April 23, 1996, MEWA filed a Notice of Strike with the National Capital Region Branch of
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practices.
The NCMB then conducted a series of conciliation meetings but the parties failed to reach
an amicable settlement. Faced with the imminence of a strike, MERALCO on May 2, 1996,
filed an Urgent Petition with the Department of Labor and Employment praying that the
Secretary assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute and to enjoin the striking employees
to go back to work.

The Labor Secretary granted the petition.

Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective memoranda and on August 19, 1996, the
Secretary resolved the labor dispute through an Order,containing the following awards
(among others):

“ECONOMIC DEMANDS

Wage increase - P2,300.00 for the first year covering the

period from December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1996
- P2,200.00 for the second year covering
the period December 1, 1996 to November 30, 1997.

On August 30, 1996, MERALCO filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the
Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ordering the grant of a P4,500.00 wage increase, as well as a new and
improved fringe benefits, under the remaining two (2) years of the CBA for the rank-and-
file employees.

MERALCO filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration on September 18, 1995,
alleging that the Secretary of Labor did not properly appreciate the effect of the awarded
wages and benefits on MERALCO’s financial viability.

MEWA likewise filed a motion asking the Secretary of Labor to reconsider its Order on the
wage increase, leaves, decentralized filing of paternity and maternity leaves, bonuses,
retirement benefits, optional retirement, medical, dental and hospitalization benefits, short
swing and payroll treatment. On its political demands, MEWA asked the Secretary to rule
its proposal to institute a Code of Discipline for its members and the union’s representation
in the administration of the Pension Fund.

On December 28, 1996, the Secretary issued an Order resolving the parties’ separate
motions, the modifications of the August 19, 1996 Order being highlighted hereunder:
Economic Demands
2) Wage Increase:
First year - P2,200.00 per month;
Second year - P2,200.00 per month.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed this petition contending that the Secretary of Labor gravely
abused his discretion in awarding wage increases of P2,200.00 for 1996 and P2,200.00 for
1997 (among others).

The union disputes the allegation of MERALCO that the Secretary abused his discretion in
issuing the assailed orders arguing that he acted within the scope of the powers granted
him by law and by the Constitution. No reversible abuse of discretion attended the
Secretary’s decision because the Secretary took all the relevant evidence into account,
judiciously weighed them, and rendered a decision based on the facts and law. Also, the
arbitral award should not be reversed given the Secretary’s expertise in his field and the
general rule that findings of fact based on such expertise is generally binding on this Court.

ISSUE: Did the Secretary properly consider and appreciate the evidence presented before
him?

HELD: We find, based on our consideration of the parties’ positions and the evidence on
record, that the Secretary of Labor disregarded and misappreciated evidence, particularly
with respect to the wage award.

We begin with a discussion on the wages issue. The focal point in the consideration of the
wage award is the projected net income for 1996 which became the basis for the 1996
wage award, which in turn - by extrapolation - became the basis for the (2nd Year) 1997
award. MERALCO projected that the net operating income for 1996 was 14.7% above the
1999 level or a total net operating income of 4.171 Billion, while the union placed the 1996
net operating income at 5.795 Billion.

MERALCO based its projection on the increase of the income for the first 6 months of 1996
over the same period in 1995. The union, on the other hand, projected that the 1996
income would increase by 29% to 35% because the “consumption of electric power is at its
highest during the last two quarters with the advent of the Yuletide season.” The union
likewise relied heavily on a newspaper report citing an estimate by an all Asia capital
financial analyst that the net operating income would amount to 5.795 Billion.

We find after considering the records that the Secretary gravely abused his discretion in
making this wage award because he disregarded evidence on record. Where he considered
MERALCO’s evidence at all, he apparently misappreciated this evidence in favor of claims
that do not have evidentiary support. To our mind, the MERALCO projection had every
reason to be reliable because it was based on actual and undisputed figures for the first six
months of 1996.On the other hand, the union projection was based on a speculation of
Yuletide consumption that the union failed to substantiate. In fact, as against the union’s
unsubstantiated Yuletide consumption claim, MERALCO adduced evidence in the form of
historical consumption data showing that a lengthy consumption does not tend to rise
during the Christmas period. Additionally, the All-Asia Capital Report was nothing more
than a newspaper report that did not show any specific breakdown or computations.
While the union claimed that its cited figure is based on MERALCO’s 10-year income
stream, no data or computation of this 10-year stream appear in the record.

While the Secretary is not expected to accept the company-offered figures wholesale in
determining a wage award, we find it a grave abuse of discretion to completely disregard
data that is based on actual and undisputed record of financial performance in favor of the
third-hand and unfounded claims the Secretary eventually relied upon. At the very least,
the Secretary should have properly justified his disregard of the company figures. The
Secretary should have also reasonably insured that the figure that served as the starting
point for his computation had some substantial basis.

The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its position
regarding the wage issue cannot be an accurate basis and conclusive determinant of
the rate of wage increase. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides:

Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements of matters of interest to

persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other
published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant
matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that
occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein.

Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical, may be

admitted only "if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that
occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein." As correctly held in
our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper account and
not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no
persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were
presented. Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that
businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in their occupation. Besides, no
evidence was presented that the publication was regularly prepared by a person in
touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable.
Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not admissible.6 In the same
manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence when
the source of the reports is available.7 With more reason, mere analyses or projections
of such reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the report in this case
can be easily made available considering that the same is necessary for compliance
with certain governmental requirements.