Sec. 23.

Declaration of a State of War; Emergency Powers

Delegation of Emergency Powers/Military Powers

SANLAKAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (2004)

MAINPOINT: Power exercised by the President in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling
out the armed forces is in consonance with her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-
Chief.

FACTS: 300 junior officers and enlisted men from the AFP staged a mutiny by storming the
Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City. The mutineers cried of corruption and demanded
for the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chief of the PNP. The
President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion
and called on the AFP to suppress the rebellion. After negotiations, the President lifted the state of
rebellion through Proclamation No. 435. Petitioner contends that the declaration of a state of
rebellion by the President is an indirect exercise of emergency powers. That under Section 23 (2),
Art. VII, such exercise of emergency powers is exclusive to Congress, and that the declaration
made by the President thus results to the latter’s usurpation of their said exclusive power

ISSUE: Whether or not said declaration constitutes exercise of emergency powers

RULING: Power exercised by the President in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the
armed forces is in consonance with her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.
There was no instance wherein the President has acted beyond her powers as both Chief Executive
and Commander-in-Chief

AMPATUAN v. PUNO

MAINPOINT: The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency
in the three places mentioned. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President.

FACTS: After the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing
“the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be allowed
by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence. 3 days
later, she also issued AO 273 transferring supervision of the ARMM to the DILG. She
subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO the term “transfer” used to
“delegate”. The petitioners claimed that the President’s issuances encroached the ARMM’s
autonomy, that it constitutes an invalid exercise of emergency powers, and that the President had
no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. They want Proc. 1946 and
AO 273 be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called
out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the said areas.

RULING: The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under
Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

“In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.”

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to
exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not
need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

Sec. 24. Bills Originating in the House of Representatives

GUINGONA v. CARAGUE

MAINPOINT: Section 3, Article XVIII recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, LOI and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." The argument of petitioners that the
said presidential decrees are inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI is untenable. The
framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including
existing presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced to mere "bills" that must
again go through the legislative.

FACTS: Petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service
in the 1990 budget authorized by P.D. No. 81 as Amended by P.D. No. 1177, and by P.D. No.
1967. Petitioners argue that the decrees of then President Marcos became functus oficio when he
was ousted and so the legislative power was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the
Constitution was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new legislation by Congress
providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress has not approved any such law; and thus the
said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on
no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced.

That it is inoperative under Section 3, Article XVIII which provides ––

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed, or revoked."

And that the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24, Article VI: All appropriation, revenue
or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.

ISSUE: Whether the PDs became inoperative when Pres. Marcos was ousted and/or the PD’s are
inconsistent with constitution Section 24 and 27 of Article VI.

RULING: No. Section 3, Article XVIII recognizes that:

"All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, LOI and other executive issuances
not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked."

Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or,
are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked. The argument of petitioners that the said presidential
decrees are inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI is untenable. The framers of the
Constitution did not contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including existing
presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced to mere "bills" that must again go
through the legislative. The only reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the Constitution
which refer to "bills" is that they mean appropriation measures still to be passed by Congress. If
the intention of the framers thereof were otherwise they should have expressed their decision in a
more direct or express manner.

TOLENTINO V. SEC. OF FINANCE

MAINPOINT: It is not the law-but the (revenue) bill-which is required by the Constitution to
'originate exclusively' in the House of Representatives. Such bill may undergo extensive changes
in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole, since Senate's power includes not
only to 'concur with amendments' but also to 'propose amendments.'

FACTS: The VAT is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on
the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system
and enhance its administration by amending the NIRC. One contention is that RA 7716 did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the
Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197
and S. No. 1630. Also contended that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24

“All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments”.

RULING: It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate
exclusively in the HR. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the
House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to
propose amendments. The initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an
increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the HR and
as a result of the Senate action to concur and amend, a distinct bill may be produced. The
Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill so long as action by the
Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. Also, upon the certification of a bill
by the President to be urgent, the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and
distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

ALVAREZ V. GUINGONA

MAINPOINT: It is not the law-but the (revenue) bill-which is required by the Constitution to
'originate exclusively' in the House of Representatives. Such bill may undergo extensive changes
in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole, since Senate's power includes not
only to 'concur with amendments' but also to 'propose amendments.

FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of RA 7720: “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago”. April
18, 1993, HB No. 8817 after 3 public hearings conducted by the House Committee, submitted to
the House a favorable report, with amendments. HB No. 8817 was passed by the House on Second
Reading and was approved on Third Reading On January 18, 1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted
to the Senate. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243 was filed just after
the House of Representatives had conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817.

Senate Committee conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Then, said committee submitted
Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation that it be approved without
amendment, taking into consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was on all fours with SB No.
1243. Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading and was approved
on Third Reading. The HR, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the
amendments proposed by the Senate. The enrolled bill was signed by the Chief Executive on May
5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720.

ISSUE: Whether considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No.

RULING: Yes. In the enactment of RA No. 7720, there was compliance with Section 24, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was
filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursor not only of RA 7720 in
question but also of SB No. 1243. Further, in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance: It is not the law-
but the (revenue) bill-which is required by the Constitution to 'originate exclusively' in the House
of Representatives. Such bill may undergo extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be
a rewriting of the whole, since Senate's power includes not only to 'concur with amendments' but
also to 'propose amendments.'

SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORP. V. THE PHILIPPINE CEMENT

MAINPOINT: For such to be a due delegation of tax, legislation must be complete and defined
in terms of what specific measures the public official can enforce. In this case, the Safeguard
Measure Act (SMA) provides measures as to what the Secretary of DTI may enforce as a safeguard
measure which in effect imposes a form of tax as regulation. The executive power to impose
definitive safeguard measures is but a delegated power. The power of taxation which is, by nature
and by command of the fundamental law, a preserve of the legislature

FACTS: Respondent an association of domestic cement manufacturers, filed with the DTI an
application for the imposition of a definitive safeguard measure on the importation of gray Portland
cement. It alleged that gray Portland cement was being imported in increased Quantities causing
declines in domestic production, capacity utilization, market share, sales and employment, as well
as depressed local prices. Petitioner, a domestic corporation engaged in the business of cement
opposed respondent’s application. - In accordance with the procedure laid down in RA 8800, the
Bureau of Import Services of the DTI conducted a preliminary investigation, after which it justified
the imposition of provisional measures. DTI issued an Order imposing a provisional measure in
the form of a safeguard duty equivalent to P20.60 per 40-kg bag on all importations of gray
Portland cement for a period not exceeding 200 days from the date of issuance by the BOC. Tariff
Commission found no cause for Safeguard Measures. Respondent appealed in the CA. The CA
granted petition in part and DTI released a MO imposing Safeguard Measures.

ISSUE:

RULING: Section 28(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution confirms the delegation of legislative
power, yet ensures that the prerogative of Congress to impose limitations and restrictions on the
executive exercise of this power:

“The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government”

This delegation of the taxation power by the legislative to the executive is authorized by the
Constitution itself. The Constitution also grants the delegating authority (Congress) the right to
impose restrictions and limitations on the taxation power delegated to the President but with
observance of the restrictions and limitations imposed by Congress. The SMA empowered the DTI
Secretary, as alter ego of the President. And so the DTI Secretary authority is derived from the
SMA; it does not flow from any inherent executive power. The law did not grant the executive
official full and uninhibited discretion to impose such measures. The legislative intent should be
given full force and effect, as the executive power to impose definitive safeguard measures is but
a delegated power. The power of taxation which is, by nature and by command of the fundamental
law, a preserve of the legislature.

Appropriation of Public Revenue for Public Purpose

PASCUAL V. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS

MAINPOINT: The rule is that if the public advantage or benefit is merely incidental in the
promotion of a particular enterprise, such defect shall render the law invalid. On the other hand, if
what is incidental is the promotion of a private enterprise, the tax law shall be deemed “for public
purpose”.
FACTS: Governor Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction,
upon the ground that RA No. 920, which appropriates funds for public works particularly for the
construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the feeder roads, however,
as alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and
planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging to
private respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not
connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway. The
respondents' contention is that there is public purpose because people living in the subdivision will
directly be benefitted from the construction of the roads, and the government also gains from the
donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by its owner to the government.

ISSUE: Whether or not the incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the
purpose of justifying an expenditure of the government

RULING: No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenue for anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of the
expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the
interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus
the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to
the state, which results from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private
enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money. The test of the
constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to
promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although
each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.

Sec. 25. Rules on Appropriation

DPWH vs. RONALDO QUIWA

MAINPOINT: (This I cannot really relate to the Rules of Appropriation since there was no
mention of any provision except that there was no prior appropriation for the DPWH project which
is why they refuse to pay the contractors)

FACTS: DPWH engaged contractors, including the respondents, for the urgent rehabilitation of
the affected river systems after the ragedy of Mt. Pinatubo. The contractors signed written
agreements with Engineer and Project Manager II of the DPWH. It is undisputed that the
contractors have completed their assigned rehabilitation works. But DPWH refused to pay the
contractors for the reason that the contracts were invalid due to non-compliance with legal
requirements.

ISSUE: Whether, in the absence of the legal requirements, a valid contract between the DPWH
and the plaintiffs exists

RULING: Where there was no appropriation and where the contracts were considered void due
to technical reasons. It has been settled in several cases that payment for services done on account
of the government, but based on a void contract, cannot be avoided. This exercise of equity to
compensate contracts with the government was repeated in Eslao vs. COA, (COA), was ordered
to pay the company of petitioner for the services rendered by the latter in constructing a building
for a state university, notwithstanding the contracts violations of the mandatory requirements of
law, including the prior appropriation of funds therefor.

GOH V. BAYRON and COMELEC

MAINPOINT: To be valid, an appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a specific

purpose. However, in this case, that purpose “to conduct elections” maybe broken down by related
sub-categories so even if not spelled out, regulation, special and recall elections are covered.

FACTS: Petitioner filed a recall petition to the COMELEC due to loss of trust and confidence
against the respondent Hon. Lucilo R. Bayron by violating the provisions of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and other related gross negligence, dishonesty and immaturity as mayor of
the Puerto, Princessa City. COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9864 wherein the said
resolution found the recall petition sufficient in form and substance but the funds of any recall
elections were suspended. Respondent filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and
Clarification for the dismissal of the recall petition. That as stated in the said resolution, does not
have an appropriation in the 2014 GAA and it does not provide the COMELEC with legal authority
to commit public funds for the recall process.

ISSUE: Whether the 2014 General Appropriations Act (GAA) has no budget for the conduct of
recall election therefore said recall cannot be conducted.

RULING: The 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform
its constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections. There is no need for supplemental
legislation to authorize the COMELEC to conduct recall elections for 2014. When the Commission
receives a budgetary appropriation for its “Current Operating Expenditures,” such appropriation
includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions, including the conduct of recall
elections.

Limits on Power to Appropriate

BRILLANTES VS. CONCEPCION

MAINPOINT: The sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election
of President and Vice-President. And, NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizen’s arm to conduct
the “unofficial counting of votes for the national or local elections.

FACTS: Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the
assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which provides for the electronic transmission of advanced
result of “unofficial” count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption
and usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-
President and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens’
accredited arm, to conduct the “unofficial” quick count as provided under pertinent election laws.
Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the exercise of its executive and
administrative power “to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections” Comelec
added that the issue is beyond judicial determination.

ISSUE: Whether Resolution No. 6712 issued by the COMELEC in authorizing the use of election
funds in consolidating the election results should be declared VOID, as it is unconstitutional.

RULING: The assailed resolution usurps. Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further
bolstered by RA 8436. The sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the
election of President and Vice-President. And Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize
NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizen’s arm to conduct the “unofficial counting of votes for the
national or local elections. The quick count under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation would not
only be preemptive of the authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking
constitutional and/or statutory basis. Moreover, the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise
contravened the constitutional provision that “no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

Prohibition on “riders” in appropriation bills

GARCIA V. MATA

MAINPOINT: Any provision contained in the body of the act that is fairly included in this
restricted subject or any matter properly connected therewith is valid and operative. But, if a
provision in the body of the act is not fairly included in this restricted subject, like the provision
relating to the policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive duty of reserve
officers of the AFP, such provision is inoperative and of no effect.

FACTS: The subject of RA 1600, as expressed in its title, is restricted to “appropriating funds for
the operation of the government”. However, paragraph 11 of RA 1600 provides: “After the
approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for more than two years during any period of
five consecutive years”. Respondents contend that the said provision is unconstitutional as "it
was indeed a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure in violation of the
constitutional inhibition against "riders" to the general appropriation act." It was indeed a new
and completely unrelated provision attached to the Appropriation Act.

ISSUE: Whether the said provision violates the rule on “riders”

RULING: Yes. The said provision has no relevance or pertinence whatsoever to the budget or to
any appropriation item contained therein since it refers to the fundamental government policy
matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the
AFP. If a provision in the body of the act is not fairly included in this restricted subject, like the
provision relating to the policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive duty of
reserve officers of the AFP, such provision is inoperative and of no effect. It confers no right and
affords no protection.

ATITIW V. ZAMORA

MAINPOINT: When a provision is not germane to the subject or purpose of the bill in which it
is incorporated, it shall be deemed unconstitutional pursuant to Art VI, Sec. 25(1) and Sec 26(1)

FACTS: President Aquino promulgated E.O. No. 220 creating the CAR to administer the affairs
of government in the Cordilleras. Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress enacted RA 6766 (An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region). However, the creation
of an autonomous region was overwhelmingly rejected in all of the Cordilleras in a plebiscite
except for the Ifugao province. Ifugao alone cannot validly constitute the CAR and upheld the
disapproval of the Organic Act. The Court also declared E.O. No. 220 to be still in force and effect.
President Estrada signed into law the 2000 GAA which includes the assailed Special Provisions:
“1. Use of Fund. The amounts appropriated shall be used to wind up the activities and operations
of the CAR, including the payment of separation and retirement benefits of all affected officials
and employees…” President Estrada issued E.O. No. 270 extending the implementation of the
winding up of operations of the CAR.

ISSUE: Whether the assailed special provisions in RA 8760 is a rider and as such is
unconstitutional.

RULING: No. The assailed Special Provision directing appropriations for the Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR), which provides for the expenditures to for activities and pay
separation and retirement benefits of all affected officials and employees is not a rider. A rider is
a provision which is alien to or not germane to the subject or purpose of the bill in which it is
incorporated. The rationale against riders is to preserve the unity of subject matter of the bill.
The Special Provision pertains to appropriations for CAR, it is particular, unambiguous and
appropriate, hence, it meets the germaneness standard.

FARINAS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

MAINPOINT: An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with
or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing
for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

FACTS: Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding
of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Elections Practices”. The
inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006 constitutes a
proscribed rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of
media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices. Sec 67 of the OEC
imposes a limitation of officials who run for office other than the one they are holding in a
permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the
certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Sec 67 of the OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor
germane to the subject matter of RA 9006.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.

RULING: No. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of the RA
9006 does not violate "one subject-one title rule." To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of
the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. An
act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions,
no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general subject.

Transfer of Funds

DEMETRIA V. ALBA

MAINPOINT: PD 1177 empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one to
any program, project or activity of any department included in the GAA or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in
the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard
the standards set in the fundamental law, but likewise goes beyond the tenor.

FACTS: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of

Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the “Budget Reform Decree of 1977.” The said
PD authorizes the President to transfer any fund appropriated for different departments to any
program, project or activity of any department on the grounds among others, allowing the President
to override the safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.

ISSUE: Is it unconstitutional?

RULING: Yes. PD 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said Section 16 (5)
Article VIII. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law,
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond its tenor. Such
constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

LIGA V. COMELEC

MAINPOINT: Funds needed by the Commission to defray expenses for holding regular and
special elections, referenda and plebiscites shall be provided in the regular appropriation of the
Commission. In case of deficiency, the amount provided shall be augmented from the special
activities funds in the GAA and those specifically appropriated for the purpose in special laws.

FACTS: Based on information learned from newspaper reports, petitioners questioned what they
perceive as "the threatened illegal transfer, disbursement and use of public funds in a manner
contrary to the Constitution and the law" for the conduct of the barangay elections. Petitioners
claim that in the GAA of 1994, only P137,878,000 were appropriated by Congress for barangay
elections. Respondent alleges that it intends to fund the barangay elections from the P137,878,000
appropriated and from its own savings resulting from unused funds. The Solicitor General defends
the COMELEC as allowed by Sec. 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution and Sections 17 and 19 of
the General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1994, viz:

"(5). No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President,
the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the HR, the Chief Justice of the SC, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations."

RULING: Funds needed by the Commission to defray the expenses for the holding of regular and
special elections, referenda and plebiscites shall be provided in the regular appropriation of the
Commission which, upon request, shall immediately be released to the Commission. In case of
deficiency, the amount so provided shall be augmented from the special activities funds in the
general appropriation act and from those specifically appropriated for the purpose in special laws.

Note: Case is dismissed for lack of evidence of such illegal transfer. They only based it from news
report without confirmation or official statement from COMELEC.

NAZARETH V. VILLAR

MAINPOINT: Article VI, Section 29 (1) of the 1987 Constitution firmly declares that: “No
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
This constitutional edict requires that the GAA be purposeful, deliberate, and precise in its
provisions and stipulations.

FACTS: Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to provide a program for human resources development
in science and technology in order to achieve and maintain talent and manpower for science and
technology mastery. Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants additional allowances and benefits (Magna
Carta benefits) to the covered officials and employees of the DOST. Funds shall be appropriated
from GAA of the year.

DOST RDIX Nazareth released the Magna Carta for covered officials and employees covering
year 1998 despite absence of specific appropriation in GAA. Subsequently COA issued several
notices of disallowance disapproving payment of Magna Carta benefits. Provision for use of
savings of GAA was vetoed by the President. DOST Sec Dr. Uriarte Jr requested from the Office
of the President for authority to utilize DOST’s savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits which
exec sec Ronaldo Zamora approved. Nazareth lodged an appeal with COA urging the lifting of
disallowances. Her appeal was anchored by Memorandum from Exec Sec Zamora.

ISSUE: Whether the act of Exec Sec Zamora is Valid?

RULING: No. The plain language of the constitutional restriction leaves no room for the
petitioner’s posture. Art.VI Sec.25(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

There must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an
appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. So long as
there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a specified amount of public fund,
savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes. This interpretation is consistent not
only with the Constitution and the GAAs, but also with the degree of flexibility allowed to the
Executive during budget execution in responding to unforeseeable contingencies.

PICHAY V. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

MAINPOINT: The President has continuing authority to reorganize the Executive Department as
provided by E.O. 292 (Admin Code of 1987) under Sec 31 in order to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency

FACTS: Petition prayed to declare unconstitutional EO No. 13 (Abolishing the Presidential Anti-
Graft Commission) and Transferring Its Investigative, Adjudicatory and Recommendatory
Functions to the Office of The Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, Office of the
President. And prayed for to prohibit respondents from administratively proceeding against
petitioner based on the executive order.

EO No. 12 issued by PGMA created the PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate cases
for possible graft and corruption against presidential appointees and to submit its report and
recommendations to the President (embodied in Sec 4 and 8 of EO No. 12). President Aquino III
issued EO No. 13 abolished the PAGC and transferred its functions to the Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). Finance Secretary Purisima filed before the IAD-
ODESLA a complaint for grave misconduct against Pichay and other members of the Board of
Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) due to the purchase by the LWUA
of 445k shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. Pichay contends that the President is not
authorized under any law to create the IAD-ODESLA and that by creating such, the President has
usurped the powers of congress (to create a public office, appropriate funds and delegate quasi-
judicial functions to administrative agencies) and that of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE: Unconstitutional?

RULING: No! The President has continuing authority to reorganize the Executive Department as
provided by E.O. 292 (Admin Code of 1987) under Sec 31 in order to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency. It is the task of the Office of the President as the nerve center of the Executive
Branch "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency". The abolition of the PAGC and the
transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is within the prerogative
of the President pursuant to E.O. 292.

PILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ

MAINPOINT: Section 25(5), no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations,
and under Section 29(1), no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law. While Section 25(5) allows as an exception the realignment of savings
to augment items in the general appropriations law for the executive branch, such right must and
can be exercised only by the President pursuant to a specific law.

FACTS: Petitioners wants to declare unconstitional and void some of the provisions in the General
Appropriation Bill of 1994 which was passed and approved. Among other special provisions in
question are:
 To allow the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being
managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System
 Authorize members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels"
allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets (because petitioners, the
Senate President and the Speaker of the HR, but not the individual members of Congress
are the ones authorized to realign the savings as appropriated.

RULING: Valid contentions?

1. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment.
Allowed. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the
pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System
is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. Under Section 25(5),
no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, and under Section 29(1)

“no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law. While Section 25(5) allows as an exception the realignment of savings to augment items
in the general appropriations law for the executive branch, such right must and can be exercised
only by the President pursuant to a specific law.”

The provision grants the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the HR the power to augment
items in an appropriation act for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
appropriations, whenever there is a law authorizing such augmentation.

2. Authorize members of Congress to propose and identify projects and to realign their operating
budgets. The members of Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment for their
operating expenses. However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the HR who shall
approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of approval, these two officials will have to
see to it that:
1. The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures
from which the same are to be taken; and
2. The transfer or realignment is for the purposes of augmenting the items of expenditure to
which said transfer or realignment is to be made.