Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE :PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SHIRLEY A. CASIO, Accused-appellant.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

"Chicks mo dong?"1

With this sadly familiar question being used on the streets of many of our cities, the fate of many
desperate women is sealed and their futures vanquished. This case resulted in the rescue of
two minors from this pernicious practice. Hopefully, there will be more rescues. Trafficking in
persons is a deplorable crime. It is committed even though the minor knew about or consented
to the act of trafficking.

This case involves Republic Act No. 9208,2 otherwise known as the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons
Act of 2003."3

Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation of Republic Act No. 9208, Section 4(a),
qualified by Section 6(a). The information against accused, dated May 5, 2008, states:

That on or about the 3rd day of May 2008, at about 1:00 o’clock A.M., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate
intent, with intent to gain, did then and there hire and/or recruit AAA, a minor, 17 years old and
BBB for the purpose of prostitution and sexual exploitation, by acting as their procurer for
different customers, for money, profit or any other consideration, in Violation of Sec. 4, Par. (a),
Qualified by Sec. 6, Par. (a), of R.A. 9208 (Qualified Trafficking in Persons).

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

The facts, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM),5 a nongovernmental organization,

coordinated with the police in order to entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu
City.6

Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1 Albert Luardo,
and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso composed the team of police operatives.7 PO1 Luardo and PO1
Veloso were designated as decoys, pretending to be tour guides looking for girls to entertain
their guests.8 IJM provided them with marked money, which was recorded in the police blotter.9

The team went to Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and 25. These rooms were adjacent
to each other. Room 24 was designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of
the police team.10

PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu
City’s red light district. Accused noticed them and called their attention by saying "Chicks mo
dong?" (Do you like girls, guys?).11

During trial, PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso testified that their conversation with accused went as
follows:
Accused: Chicks mo dong?(Do you like girls, guys?)

PO1 Luardo: Unya mga bag-o? Kanang batan-on kay naa mi guests naghulat sa motel. (Are
they new? They must be young because we have guests waiting at the motel.)

Accused: Naa, hulat kay magkuha ko. (Yes, just wait and I’ll get them.)12

At that point, PO1 Luardo sent a text message to PSI Ylanan that they found a prospective
subject.13

After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB, private complainants in this
case.14 Accused: Kining duha kauyon mo ani? (Are you satisfied with these two?)

PO1 Veloso: Maayo man kaha na sila modala ug kayat? (Well, are they good in sex?)15 Accused
gave the assurance that the girls were good in sex. PO1 Luardo inquired how much their
serviceswould cost. Accused replied, "Tag kinientos" (₱500.00).16

PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo convinced accused to come with them to Queensland Motel. Upon
proceeding toRoom 24, PO1 Veloso handed the marked money to accused.17

As accused counted the money, PO1 Veloso gave PSI Ylanan a missed call. This was their pre-
arranged signal. The rest of the team proceeded to Room 24, arrested accused, and informed
her of her constitutional rights. The police confiscated the marked money from
accused.18 Meanwhile, AAA and BBB "were brought to Room 25 and placed in the custody of the
representatives from the IJM and the DSWD."19

During trial, AAA testified that she was born on January 27, 1991. This statement was supported
by a copy of her certificate of live birth.20

AAA narrated that in 2007, she worked as a house helper in Mandaue City. In March 2008 she
stopped working as a house helper and transferred to Cebu City. She stayed with her cousin,
but she subsequently moved to a boarding house. It was there where she met her friend, Gee
Ann. AAA knew that Gee Ann worked in a disco club. When Gee Ann found out that AAA was no
longer a virgin, she offered AAA work. AAA agreed because she needed the money in order to
helpher father. AAA recalled that she had sex with her first customer. She was paid ₱200.00 and
given an additional ₱500.00 as tip. For the first few weeks, Gee Ann provided customers for
AAA. Eventually, Gee Ann brought her to Barangay Kamagayan, telling her that there were
more customers in that area.21

AAA stated that she knew accused was a pimp because AAA would usually see her pimping
girls to customers in Barangay Kamagayan.22 AAA further testified that on May 2, 2008, accused
solicited her services for a customer. That was the first time that she was pimped by
accused.23 Accused brought her, BBB, and a certain Jocelyn to Queensland Motel.24

AAA testified that Jocelyn stayed inthe taxi, while she and BBB went to Room 24. It was in
Room 24 where the customer paid Shirley. The police rushed in and toldAAA and BBB to go to
the other room. AAA was then met by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
personnel who informed her that she was rescued and not arrested.25

AAA described that her job as a prostitute required her to display herself, along with other girls,
between 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. She received ₱400.00 for every customer who selected her.26

The prosecution also presented the police operatives during trial. PSI Ylanan, SPO1 Mendaros,
and SPO1 Altubar testified that after PO1 Veloso had made the missed call to PSI Ylanan, they
"rushed to Room 24 and arrested the accused."27 SPO1 Altubar retrieved the marked money
worth ₱1,000.00 from accused’s right hand "and upon instruction from PCINSP Ylanan recorded
the same at the ‘police blotter prior operation’. . . ."28

The trial court noted that AAA requested assistance from the IJM "in conducting the operation
against the accused."29
 Version of the accused

In defense, accused testified thatshe worked as a laundry woman. On the evening of May 2,
2008, she went out to buy supper. While walking, she was stopped by two men on board a blue
car. The two men asked her if she knew someone named Bingbing. She replied that she only
knew Gingging but not Bingbing. The men informed her that they were actually looking for
Gingging, gave her a piece of paper witha number written on it, and told her to tell Gingging to
bring companions. When accused arrived home, she contacted Gingging. Gingging convinced
her to come because allegedly, she would be given money by the two males.30 Ruling of the trial
court

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City found accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt and held31 that:

Accused had consummated the act of trafficking of person[s] . . . as defined under paragraph
(a), Section 3 of R.A. 9208 for the purpose of letting her engage in prostitution asdefined under
paragraph [c] of the same Section; the act of "sexual intercourse" need not have been
consummated for the mere "transaction" i.e. the ‘solicitation’ for sex and the handing over of the
"bust money" of Php1,000.00 already consummated the said act.

....

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused, SHIRLEY A. CASIO, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of trafficking in persons under paragraph (a), Section 4 as qualified under paragraph (a),
Section 6 of R.A. 9208 and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of TWENTY (20) YEARS and to
pay a fine of ONE MILLION (Php1,000,000.00).

Finally, accused is ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings.

SO ORDERED[.]32

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the fine and awarded
moral damages. The dispositive portion of the decision33 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Decision dated 10 August 2010 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in
Cebu City in Crim. Case No. CBU-83122 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The accused-
appellant is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
Php2,000,000 and is ordered to pay each of the private complainants Php150,000 as moral
damages.

SO ORDERED.34

Accused filed a notice of appeal35 on August 28, 2013, which the Court of Appeals noted and
gavedue course in its resolution36 dated January 6, 2014. The case records of CA-G.R. CEB-CR
No. 01490 were received by this court on March 17, 2014.37

In the resolution38 dated April 29, 2014, this court resolved to notify the parties that they may file
their respective supplemental briefs within 30 days from notice. This court also required the
Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women to confirm the confinement of
accused.39

Counsel for accused40 and the Office of the Solicitor General41 filed their respective
manifestations, stating that they would no longer file supplemental briefs considering that all
issues had been discussed in the appellant’s brief and appellee’s brief filed before the Court of
Appeals. Through a letter42 dated June 17, 2014, Superintendent IV Rachel D. Ruelo confirmed
accused’s confinement at the Correctional Institution for Women since October 27, 2010.
The sole issue raised by accused iswhether the prosecution was able to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

However, based on the arguments raised in accused’s brief, the sole issue may be dissected
into the following:

(1) Whether the entrapment operation conducted by the police was valid, considering
that there was no prior surveillance and the police did not know the subject of the
operation;43

(2) Whether the prosecution was able to prove accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt
even though there was no evidence presented to show that accused has a history of
engaging in human trafficking;44 and

(3) Whether accused was properly convicted of trafficking in persons, considering that
AAA admitted that she works as a prostitute.45

Arguments of accused

Accused argues that there was no valid entrapment. Instead, she was instigated into committing
the crime.46 The police did not conduct prior surveillance and did not evenknow who their subject
was.47 Neither did the police know the identities of the alleged victims.

Accused further argues that under the subjective test, she should be acquitted because the
prosecution did notpresent evidence that would prove she had a history of engaging in human
trafficking or any other offense. She denied being a pimp and asserted that she was a laundry
woman.48 In addition, AAA admitted that she worked as a prostitute. Thus, it was her decision to
display herself to solicit customers.49

Arguments of the plaintiff-appellee

The Office of the Solicitor General, counsel for plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines,
argued that the trial court did not err in convicting accused because witnesses positively
identified her as the person who solicited customers and received money for AAA and
BBB.50 Entrapment operations are valid and have been recognized by courts.51Likewise, her
arrest in flagrante delicto is valid.52 Hence, the trial court was correct in stating that accused had
"fully consummated the act of trafficking of persons. . ."53

We affirm accused Shirley A. Casio’s conviction.

I.

Background of Republic Act No. 9208

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN CTOC) was
"adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession"54 on November 15, 2000. The UN
CTOC is supplemented by three protocols: (1) the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; (2) the Protocol against the Smuggling
of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and, (3) the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition.55

On December 14, 2000, the Philippines signed the United Nations "Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children" (Trafficking
Protocol).56 This was ratified by the Philippine Senate on September 30, 2001.57 The Trafficking
Protocol’s entry into force was on December 25, 2003.58

In the Trafficking Protocol, human trafficking is defined as:

Article 3 Use of terms For the purposes of this Protocol:

 (a) "Trafficking in persons" shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent
of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar
to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;

(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth
in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in
subparagraph (a) have been used;

(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the
purpose of exploitation shall be considered "trafficking in persons" even if this does not
involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;

(d) "Child" shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.

Senator Loren Legarda, in her sponsorship speech, stated that the "Anti-Trafficking Act will
serve as the enabling law of the country’s commitment to [the] protocol."59

Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada also delivered a sponsorship speech and described trafficking in
persons as follows:

Trafficking in human beings, if only to emphasize the gravity of its hideousness, is tantamount to
modern-day slavery at work. It is a manifestation of one of the most flagrant forms of violence
against human beings. Its victims suffer the brunt of this insidious form of violence. It is
exploitation, coercion, deception, abduction, rape, physical, mental and other forms of abuse,
prostitution, forced labor, and indentured servitude.

....

As of this time, we have signed the following: the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women; the 1995 Convention on the Rights of the Child; the United
Nations Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and their Families; and the United
Nations’ Resolution on Trafficking in Women and Girls, among others.

Moreover, we have also expressed our support for the United Nations’ Convention Against
Organized Crime, including the Trafficking Protocol in October last year.

At first glance, it appears thatwe are very responsive to the problem. So it seems.

Despite these international agreements, we have yet to come up with a law that shall squarely
address human trafficking.60

During the interpellation of Republic Act No. 9208, then numbered as Senate Bill No. 2444,
Senator Teresa Aquino-Oreta asked if there was a necessity for an anti-trafficking law when
other laws exist that cover trafficking.61

Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada explained:

At present, Mr. President, the relevant laws to the trafficking issue are the Revised Penal Code,
Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act, R[epublic] A[ct] No.
6955 or the Mail-Order Bride Act, and Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act.
These laws address issues such as illegal recruitment, prostitution, falsification of public
documents and the mail-order bride scheme. These laws do not respond to the issue of
recruiting, harboring or transporting persons resulting in prostitution, forced labor, slavery and
slavery-like practices. They only address to one or some elements of trafficking independent of
their results or consequence.62(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Republic Act No. 9208 was enacted in order to fully address the issue of human
trafficking. Republic Act No. 9208 was passed on May 12, 2003, and approved on May 26,
2003.

II.

Elements of trafficking in persons

The elements of trafficking inpersons can be derived from its definition under Section 3(a) of
Republic Act No. 9208, thus:

(1) The actof "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons

with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders."

(2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another; and

(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the

prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs."63

On January 28, 2013,Republic Act No. 1036464 was approved, otherwise known as the
"Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012." Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 was
amended by Republic Act No. 10364 as follows:

SEC. 3. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:

"(a) Trafficking in Persons – refers to the recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,
transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat, or use of force, or
other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs.

"The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the
purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any form of consideration for
exploitative purposes shall also be considered as ‘trafficking in persons’ even if it does not
involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)

Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been expanded to
include the following acts:

(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer,
maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders;"

(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of
the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person"

(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the
removal or sale of organs" (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals found thatAAA and BBB were recruited by accused when their services
were peddled to the police who acted as decoys.65 AAA was a child at the time that accused
peddled her services.66 AAA also stated that she agreed to work as a prostitute because she
needed money.67 Accused took advantage of AAA’s vulnerability as a child and as one who need
money, as proven by the testimonies of the witnesses.68

III.

Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208.

Accused claims that AAA admitted engaging in prostitution even before May 2, 2008. She
concludes that AAA was predisposed to having sex with "customers" for money.69 For liability
under our law, this argument is irrelevant. As defined under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No.
9208, trafficking in persons can still becommitted even if the victim gives consent.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.— As used in this Act:

a. Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring,

or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes ata minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the
removal or sale of organs.

The recruitment transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation shall also be considered as "trafficking in persons" even if it does not involve any of
the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.70 (Emphasis supplied)

The victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means
employed by perpetrators of human trafficking.71 Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or
deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given outof his or her own free will.

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9208 enumerates the different acts of trafficking in persons.
Accused was charged under Section 4(a), which states:

SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons.— It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or judicial, to
commit any of the following acts.

a. To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means,

including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training
or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,
forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;72

Republic Act No. 9208 further enumerates the instances when the crime of trafficking in persons
is qualified.

SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons.— The following are considered as qualified trafficking:
a. When the trafficked person is a child;

b. When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the
"Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995" and said adoption is for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation,forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt
bondage;

c. When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed

committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group;
 d. When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who
exercise authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a
public officer or employee;

e. When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any member of
the military or law enforcement agencies;

f. When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies; and

g. When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended party
dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immunod eficiency
Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). (Emphasis supplied)73

Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 defines "child" as:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.— As used in this Act:

....

b. Child- refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen (18)
but isunable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.74

Based on the definition of trafficking in persons and the enumeration of acts of trafficking in
persons, accused performed all the elements in the commission of the offense when she
peddled AAA and BBB and offered their services to decoys PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo in
exchange for money. The offense was also qualified because the trafficked persons were
minors.

Here, AAA testified as to how accused solicited her services for the customers waiting at
Queensland Motel. AAA also testified that she was only 17 years old when accused peddled
her. Her certificate of live birth was presented as evidence to show that she was born on
January 27, 1991.

The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused committed the
offense of trafficking in persons, qualified by the fact that one of the victims was a child. As held
by the trial court:

[T]he act of "sexual intercourse" need not have been consummated for the mere "transaction"
i.e. that ‘solicitation’ for sex and the handing over of the "bust money" of Php.1,000.00 already
consummated the said act.75

IV.

Validity of the entrapment operation

In People v. Doria,76 this court discussed the objective test and the subjective test to determine
whether there was a valid entrapment operation:

. . . American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of
intent" test laid down in Sorrells v. United States to determine whether entrapment actually
occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit the offense
charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents. All
relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character traits, his past offenses, activities, his
eagerness in committing the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of
mind before the crime. The predisposition test emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit
the offense rather than the officer's misconduct and reflects an attempt to draw a line between a
"trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal." If the accused was found to
have been ready and willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment
defense will fail even if a police agent usedan unduly persuasive inducement.
Some states, however, have adopted the "objective" test. . . . Here, the court considers the
nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. The inquiry is focused
on the inducements used by government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his
predisposition to commit the crime.For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police
conduct. The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely
to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the
offense; for purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person would normally resist
the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully.
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)77

Accused argued that in our jurisprudence, courts usually apply the objective test in determining
the whether there was an entrapment operation or an instigation.78 However, the use of the
objective test should not preclude courts from also applying the subjective test. She pointed out
that:

Applying the "subjective"test it is worth invoking that accusedappellant procures income from
being a laundry woman. The prosecution had not shown any proof evidencing accused-
appellant’s history in human trafficking or engagement in any offense. She is not even familiar to
the team who had has [sic] been apprehending human traffickers for quite some
time.79 (Citations omitted)

Accused further argued that the police should have conducted a prior surveillance before the
entrapment operation.

Time and again, this court has discussed the difference between entrapment and instigation. In
Chang v. People,80this court explained that:

There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension
of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the
accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin
of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens reaoriginates from the mind of the criminal. The
idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer
conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and
carries it into execution.81

Accused contends that using the subjective test, she was clearly instigated by the police to
commit the offense. She denied being a pimp and claimed that she earned her living as a
laundrywoman. On this argument, we agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals:

[I]t was the accused-appellant who commenced the transaction with PO1 Luardo and PO1
Veloso by calling their attention on whether they wanted girls for that evening, and when the
officers responded, it was the accused-appellant who told them to wait while she would fetch the
girls for their perusal.82

This shows that accused was predisposed to commit the offense because she initiated the
transaction. As testified by PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo, accused called out their attention by
saying "Chicks mo dong?" If accused had no predisposition to commit the offense, then she
most likely would not have asked PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo if they wanted girls.

The entrapment would still be valid using the objective test. The police merely proceeded to D.
Jakosalem Street in Barangay Kamagayan. It was accused who asked them whether they
wanted girls. There was no illicit inducement on the part of the police for the accused to commit
the crime.

When accused was arrested, she was informed of her constitutional rights.83 The marked money
retrieved from her was recorded in the police blotter prior to the entrapment operation and was
presented in court as evidence.84

On accused’s alibi thatshe was merely out to buy her supper that night, the Court of Appeals
noted that accused never presented Gingging in court. Thus, her alibi was unsubstantiated and
cannot be given credence.85
With regard to the lack of prior surveillance, prior surveillance is not a condition for an
entrapment operation’s validity.86 In People v. Padua87 this court underscored the value of
flexibility in police operations:

A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or buy-bust operation,
the conduct of which has no rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is a trait of good police work.
However the police carry out its entrapment operations, for as long as the rights of the accused
have not been violated in the process, the courts will not pass on the wisdom thereof. The police
officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the need for prior
surveillance.88 (Citations omitted)

This flexibility is even more important in cases involving trafficking of persons. The urgency of
rescuing the victims may at times require immediate but deliberate action on the part of the law
enforcers.

V.

Imposition of fine and award of damages

The Court of Appeals properly imposed the amount of 2,000,000.00. Section 10 (b) of Republic
Act No. 9208 provides that:

SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions.— The following penalties and sanctions are hereby
established for the offenses enumerated in this Act:

....

c. Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos (₱2,000,000.00) but not more than
Five million pesos (₱5,000,000.00);

However, we modify by raising the award of moral damages from ₱150,000.0089 to ₱500,000.00.
We also award exemplary damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00. These amounts are in
accordance with the ruling in People v. Lalli90 where this court held that:

The payment of ₱500,000 as moral damages and ₱100,000 as exemplary damages for the
crime of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which
states:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
 ....

The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of
seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a
prostitute without one’s consent and to be sexually violated four to five times a day by different
strangers is horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, and social humiliation when she was trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since
the crime of Trafficking in Persons was aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award
of exemplary damages is likewise justified.91

Human trafficking indicts the society that tolerates the kind of poverty and its accompanying
desperation that compels our women to endure indignities. It reflects the weaknesses of that
society even as it convicts those who deviantly thrive in such hopelessness. We should continue
to strive for the best of our world, where our choices of human intimacies are real choices, and
not the last resort taken just to survive. Human intimacies enhance our best and closest
relationships. It serves as a foundation for two human beings to face life’s joys and challenges
while continually growing together with many shared experiences. The quality of our human
relationships defines the world that we create also for others.

Regardless of the willingness of AAA and BBB, therefore, to be trafficked, we affirm the text and
spirit of our laws. Minors should spend their adolescence moulding their character in
environments free of the vilest motives and the worse of other human beings. The evidence and
the law compel us to affirm the conviction of accused in this case.

But this is not all that we have done. By fulfilling our duties, we also express the hope that our
people and our government unite against everything inhuman. We contribute to a commitment
to finally stamp out slavery and human trafficking.

There are more AAA's and BBBs out there. They, too, deserve to be rescued. They, too, need to
be shown that in spite of what their lives have been, there is still much good in our world.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
June 27, 2013, finding accused Shirley A. Casio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, and sentencing her to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱2,000,000.00, with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence
Law) in accordance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346.92

The award of damages is likewise MODIFIED as follows:

Accused is ordered to pay each of the private complainants:

(1) ₱500,000.00 as moral damages; and

(2) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

ATT E S TAT I O N

I attest that the· conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached iri consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1888 dated November 28, 2014.

1
Rollo, p. 4. The English translation for this is, "Do you like girls, guys?" "Chicks" is a
colloquial term for girls in Cebuano.

2
An Act to Institute Policies to Eliminate Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and
Children, Establishing the Necessary Institutional Mechanismsfor the Protection and
Support of Trafficked Persons, Providing Penalties for its Violations, and for Other
Purposes.

3
Note that the offense was committed on May 2, 2008, prior to the enactment of Rep.
Act No. 10364, which amended Rep. Act No. 9208. Thus, the provisions of Rep. Act No.
9208 cited in this case are the original provisions.

4
CA rollo, p. 8. Although the information states, "3rd day of May 2008," the record of the
case shows that the offense was committed on May 2, 2008.

5
International Justice Mission, Get To Know Us <https://www.ijm.org/get-to-know-us>
(visited November 26, 2014). International Justice Mission or IJM is a United States-
based human rights organization, founded in 1997, which aims to "protect the poor from
violence." International Justice Mission, Where We Work <https://www.ijm.org/where-we-
work> (visited November 26, 2014). At present, IJM has partner offices in Canada,
United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Germany. IJM also has field offices in Latin
America,India, Africa, Southeast Asia including the Philippines.

6
Rollo, p. 4.

7
Id. at 6.

8
Id. at 4.

9
Id.

10
Id.
11
Id.

12
Id. at 4–5.

13
Id. at 5.

14
Id.

15
Id.

16
Id.

17
Id.

18
Id.

19
Id.

20
CA rollo, p. 9.

21
Id. at 10.

22
Id.

23
Rollo, p. 6.

24
CA rollo, pp. 10–11.

25
Id. at 11.

26
Id. at 10.

27
Id. at 12.

28
Id.

29
Id.

30
Rollo, p. 6.

31
CA rollo, pp. 9–13.

32
Id. at 13.

Rollo, pp. 3–13. The decision was penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos
33

Santos and concurred in by Associate Justices Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and Maria
Elisa Sempio Diy of the Nineteenth Division.

34
Id. at 13.

35
Id. at 14.

36
Id. at 16–17.

37
Id. at 1.

38
Id. at 19–20.

39
Id. at 19.
40
Id. at 30–32. The manifestation was dated July 14, 2014.

41
Id. at 22–24. The manifestation was dated July 14, 2014.

42
Id. at 21.

43
CA rollo, p. 33.

44
Id. at 37.

45
Id.

46
Id. at 32.

47
Id. at 33.

48
Id. at 36–37.

49
Id. at 37.

50
Id. at 72–73.

51
Id. at 74–75.

52
Id. at 75–76.

53
Id. at 72.

54
United Nations Human Rights, Protocol to Prevent, "Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime"
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ProtocolTraffickingInPersons.aspx
> (visited November 26, 2014).

55
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto"
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/treaties/CTOC/> (visited November 26, 2014).

56
United Nations Treaty Collection <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY& mtdsg_no=XVIII-12- &chapter=18&lang=en> (visited: November 26,
2014).

Sponsorship speech of Senator Loren Legarda, delivered on December 10, 2002.

57

Record of the Senate, Volume II, No. 42, Twelfth Congress, Second Regular Session,
October 15–December 18, 2002, p. 617; Record of the Senate, Volume III, No. 62,
February 12, 2003, p. 383.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Signatories to the United Nations
58

Convention against Transnational Crime and its Protocols"

<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/signatures.html> (visited November 27,
2014).

Sponsorship speech of Senator Loren Legarda, delivered on December 10, 2002.

59

Record of the Senate, Volume II, No. 42, Twelfth Congress, Second Regular Session,
October 15–December 18, 2002, p. 617.

Record of the Senate, Volume II, No. 42, Twelfth Congress Second Regular Session,
60

October 15–December 18, 2002, p. 614–616.

 Record of the Senate, Volume III, No. 60, Twelfth Congress, Second Regular Session,
61

January 13–June 5, 2003, p. 364.

Record of the Senate, Volume III, No. 60, Twelfth Congress, Second Regular Session,
62

January 13–June 5, 2003, p. 364.

63
Rep. Act No. 9208 (2003), sec. 3(a). Note that thisdefinition is the original definition,
considering that the crime was committed prior to the enactment of Rep.Act No. 10364.
In the resolution of this case, we use the provisions in Rep. Act No. 9208 prior to its
amendment.

64
An Act Expanding Rep. Act No. 9208 entitled "An Act to Institute Policies to Eliminate
Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, Establishing the Necessary
Institutional Mechanisms for the Protection and Support of Trafficked Persons, Providing
Penalties for its Violations and for Other Purposes."

65
Rollo, p. 6.

66
Id. at 5.

67
Id.

68
Id. at 5–6.

69
CA rollo, p. 37.

Considering that Shirley A. Casio committed the offense in 2008, we apply the original
70

definition of "trafficking in persons."

71
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Human Trafficking FAQs"

<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/ en/human-trafficking/faqs.html> (visited

November 26, 2014).

72
Rep. Act No. 9208, sec. 4 prior to its amendment by Rep. Act No. 10364.

73
Rep. Act No. 9208, sec. 6 prior to its amendment by Rep. Act No. 10364.

74
This definition was maintained in Rep. Act No. 10364.

75
CA rollo, p. 13.

76
361 Phil. 595 (1999) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].

77
Id. at 611–612.

78
CA rollo, pp. 35–36.

79
Id. at 36–37.

80
528 Phil. 740 (2006) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].

81
Id. at 751, citing Araneta v. Court of Appeals, 226 Phil. 437, 444 (1986) [Per J.
Gutierrez, Jr., Second Division]; See also People v. Quiaoit, Jr., 555 Phil. 441, 449
(2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]; People v. Cortez, 611 Phil. 360 (2009) [Per
J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division]; People v. Tapere, G.R. No. 178065, February 20, 2013,
691 SCRA 347, 358–359 [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

82
Rollo, pp. 9–10.
83
Id. at 5.

84
CA rollo, p. 12.

85
Rollo, p. 11.

86
Id. at 10.

G.R. No. 174097, July 21, 2010, 625 SCRA 220 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First
87

Division].

88
Id. at 239.

89
Rollo, p. 13.

90
G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011, 659 SCRA 105 [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

91
Id. at 126.

92
An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines (2006)

Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 states:

"Sec.3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or

whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act,
shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."
 SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 195419

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Present:

- versus - CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,

SERENO,

HADJA JARMA LALLI y PURIH, REYES, and

RONNIE ARINGOY y MASION, PERLAS-BERNABE,* JJ.

and NESTOR RELAMPAGOS (at large),

Accused.

HADJA JARMA LALLI y PURIH and Promulgated:

RONNIE ARINGOY y MASION,

Accused-Appellants. October 12, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case
This is a consolidated criminal case filed against the accused-appellants for the crimes
of Illegal Recruitment (Criminal Case No. 21930) and Trafficking in Persons
(Criminal Case No. 21908).

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, in its Decision dated 29
November 2005 (RTC Decision),1 found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons committed by a
syndicate, and sentenced each of the accused to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment plus payment of fines and damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
(CA) in Cagayan de Oro, in its Decision dated 26 February 2010 (CA
Decision),2 affirmed in toto the RTC Decision. The accused-appellants appealed to
this Court by filing a Notice of Appeal3 in accordance with Section 3(c), Rule 122 of
the Rules of Court.

The Facts

The findings of fact of the RTC, which were affirmed in toto by the CA, are as
follows:

In the evening of June 3, 2005, while Lolita Sagadsad Plando, 23 years old,
single, was in Tumaga, Zamboanga City on her way to the house of her
grandfather, she met Ronnie Masion Aringoy and Rachel Aringoy Caete.
Ronnie greeted Lolita, Oy, its good you are here (oy, maayo kay dia ka).
Rachel asked Lolita if she is interested to work in Malaysia. x x x Lolita was
interested so she gave her cellphone number to Ronnie. After their
conversation, Lolita proceeded to her grandfathers house.

xxx

On June 4, 2005, at about 7:00 oclock in the morning, Lolita received a text
message from Ronnie Aringoy inviting her to go to the latters house. At 7:30 in
the morning, they met at Tumaga on the road near the place where they had a
conversation the night before. Ronnie brought Lolita to the house of his sister
in Tumaga. Lolita inquired what job is available in Malaysia. Ronnie told her
that she will work as a restaurant entertainer. All that is needed is a passport.
She will be paid 500 Malaysian ringgits which is equivalent to P7,000.00 pesos
in Philippine currency. Lolita told Ronnie that she does not have a passport.
Ronnie said that they will look for a passport so she could leave immediately.
Lolita informed him that her younger sister, Marife Plando, has a passport.
Ronnie chided her for not telling him immediately. He told Lolita that she will
leave for Malaysia on June 6, 2005 and they will go to Hadja Jarma Lalli who
will bring her to Malaysia. Ronnie sent a text message to Lalli but the latter
replied that she was not in her house. She was at the city proper.

On June 5, 2005, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening, Ronnie Aringoy and
Rachel Aringoy Caete arrived on board a tricycle driven by Ronnie at the house
where Lolita was staying at Southcom Village. Ronnie asked if Lolita already
had a passport. Lolita said that she will borrow her sisters passport. Ronnie,
Rachel and Lolita went to Buenavista where Lolitas other sister,
Gina Plando was staying. Her sister Marife Plando was there at that time. Lolita
asked Marife to let her use Marifes passport. Mariferefused but Lolita got the
passport. Marife cried. Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita proceeded to Tumaga.
Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita went to the house of Hadja Jarma Lalli just two
hundred meters away from the house of Ronnie in Tumaga. Ronnie introduced
Lolita to Hadja Jarma, saying Ji, she is also interested in going to Malaysia.
Lolita handed a passport to Hadja Jarma telling her that it belongs to her
sister Marife Plando. Hadja Jarma told her it is not a problem because they
have a connection with the DFA (Department of Foreign Affairs)
and Marifes picture in the passport will be substituted with Lolitas picture.
Nestor Relampagosarrived driving an owner-type jeep. Hadja Jarma introduced
Nestor to Lolita as their financier who will accompany them to Malaysia.
x x x Lolita noticed three other women in Hadja Jarmas house. They were
Honey, about 20 years old; Michele, 19 years old, and another woman who is
about 28 years old. The women said that they are from Ipil, Sibugay Province.
Ronnie told Lolita that she will have many companions going to Malaysia to
work. They will leave the next day, June 6, and will meet at the wharf at 2:30 in
the afternoon.

On June 6, 2005, Lolita went to Zamboanga City wharf at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon bringing a bag containing her make-up and powder. She met at the
wharf Hadja Jarma Lalli, Ronnie Aringoy, Honey and Michele. Ronnie gave to
Lolita her boat ticket for the vessel M/V Mary Joy bound for Sandakan,
Malaysia; a passport in the name of Marife Plando but with Lolitas picture on
it, and P1,000.00 in cash. Hadja Jarma, Lolita, Honey, Michele and two other
women boarded the boat M/V Mary Joy bound for Sandakan.
Ronnie Aringoy did not go with them. He did not board the boat.
x x x After the boat sailed, Hadja Jarma Lalli and
Nestor Relampagos approached Lolita and her companions. Nestor told them
that they will have a good job in Malaysia as restaurant entertainers. They will
serve food to customers. They will not be harmed.

M/V Mary Joy arrived at the port of Sandakan, Malaysia at 10:00 oclock in the
morning of June 7, 2005. After passing through the immigration
office, Hadja Jarma Lalli, Nestor Relampagos, Lolita, Honey, Michele and two
other women boarded a van for Kota Kinabalu. x x x At the hotel,
Nestor Relampagos introduced to Lolita and her companions a Chinese Malay
called Boss as their employer. After looking at the women, Boss brought Lolita,
Honey, Diane and Lorraine to a restaurant near the hotel. Diane and Lorraine
were also on baord M/V Mary Joy when it left the port of Zamboanga for
Sandakan on June 6, 2005. When they were already at the restaurant, a Filipina
woman working there said that the place is a prostitution den and the women
there are used as prostitutes. Lolita and her companions went back to the hotel.
They told Hadja Jarma and Nestor that they do not like to work as prostitutes.
x x x After about five minutes, another person called boss arrived.
x x x [T]hey were fetched by a van at about 7:00 oclock in the evening and
brought to Pipen Club owned by Boss Awa, a Malaysian. At the club, they were
told that they owe the club 2,000 ringgits each as payment for the amount given
by the club to Hadja Jarma Lalli and Nestor Relampagos. They will pay for the
said amount by entertaining customers. The customers will pay 300 ringgits for
short time services of which 50 ringgits will go to the entertainer, and 500
ringgits for over night service of which 100 ringgits will be given to the
entertainer. Pipen Club is a big club in a two-storey building. There were about
100 women working in the club, many of them were Filipina women.

Lolita Plando was forced to work as entertainer at Pipen Club. She started
working at 8:30 in the evening of June 14, 2005. She was given the number 60
which was pinned on her. That night, she had her first customer who selected
her among the other women at the club. He was a very big man, about 32 years
old, a Chinese-Malay who looked like a wrestler. The man paid for short time
service at the counter. Lolita was given by the cashier a small pink paper. She
was instructed to keep it. A small yellow paper is given to the entertainer for
overnight services. The customer brought Lolita to a hotel. She did not like to
go with him but a boss at the club told her that she could not do anything. At
the hotel, the man poked a gun at Lolita and instructed her to undress. She
refused. The man boxed her on the side of her body. She could not bear the
pain. The man undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. He had
sexual intercourse with her every fifteen minutes or four times in one hour.
When the customer went inside the comfort room, Lolita put on her clothes and
left. The customer followed her and wanted to bring her back to the hotel but
Lolita refused. At about 1:00 oclock in the morning of June 15, 2005, Lolita
was chosen by another customer, a tall dark man, about 40 years old. The
customer paid for an overnight service at the counter and brought Lolita to
Mariner Hotel which is far from Pipen Club. At the hotel, the man told Lolita to
undress. When she refused, the man brought her to the comfort room and
bumped her head on the wall. Lolita felt dizzy. The man opened the shower and
said that both of them will take a bath. Lolitas clothes got wet. She was crying.
The man undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. They stayed at the
hotel until 11:00 oclock in the morning of June 15, 2005. The customer used
Lolita many times. He had sexual intercourse with her every hour.

Lolita worked at Pipen Club from June 14 to July 8, 2005. Every night, a
customer used her. She had at least one customer or more a night, and at most,
she had around five customers a night. They all had sexual intercourse with her.
On July 9, 2005, Lolita was able to contact by cellphone at about 10:00 oclock
in the morning her sister Janet Plando who is staying at Sipangkot Felda x x x.
Janet is married to Said Abubakar, an Indonesian national who is working as a
driver in the factory. x x x Lolita told Janet that she is in Labuan, Malaysia and
beg Janet to save her because she was sold as a prostitute. Janet told Lolita to
wait because her husband will go to Pipen Club to fetch Lolita at 9:00 oclock
that evening of that day. x x x She told Janet to instruct her husband to ask for
No. 60 at Pipen Club. x x x At 9:00 oclock in the evening, Lolita was told by
Daddy Richard, one of the bosses at the club, that a customer requested for No.
60. The man was seated at one of the tables. Lolita approached the man and
said, good evening. The man asked her is she is the sister of Janet Plando.
Lolita replied that she is, and asked the man if he is the husband of her sister.
He said, yes. The man had already paid at the counter. He stood up and left the
place. Lolita got her wallet and followed him. x x x Lolita told her sister about
her ordeal. She stayed at her sisters house until July 22, 2005. On July 21, 2005
at 7:00 oclock in the evening, a policeman went to her sisters house and asked
if there is a woman staying in the house without a passport. Her sister told the
policeman that she will send Lolita home on July 22. At dawn on July 22,
Lolita and her brother-in-law took a taxi
from Sipangkot Felda to Mananamblas where Lolita will board a speedboat
to Sibuto, Tawi-Tawi. x x x

Upon arrival in Zamboanga City on July 24, 2005, Lolita went directly to the
house of her eldest sister Alejandra Plando Maywilaat Sta.
Catalina, Zamboanga City. She left her things at her sisters house and
immediately went to the sister of Ronnie Aringoy in Tumaga. Ronnie was not
there. She asked Russel, niece of Ronnie, to call for the latter. Ronnie arrived
and said to her, so you are here, you arrived already. He said he is not involved
in what happened to her. Lolita asked Ronnie to accompany her to the house of
Nestor Relampagos because she has something to get from him. Ronnie
refused. He told Lolita not to let them know that she had already arrived from
Malaysia.

Lolita was advised to file a complaint with the police regarding her ordeal in
Malaysia. On August 2, 2005, at past 9:00 oclock in the morning,
Lolita Plando went to Zamboanga Police Office at Gov. Lim Avenue to file her
complaint. x x x

In her Counter-Affidavit (Exh. 1; 1-A-Lalli), Hadja Jarma Lalli admitted that

she met Lolita Plando on June 6, 2005 on board M/V Mary Joy while the said
vessel was at sea on its way to Sandakan, Malaysia. The meeting was purely
coincidental. By coincidence also, Hadja Jarma, Nestor Relampagos and
Lolita Plando boarded the same van for Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. Upon arrival,
they parted ways. They did not see each other anymore at Kota Kinabalu,
Malaysia. She did not know what happened to them. She went to
Kota Kinabalu to visit his son-in-law. She denied having recruited
Lolita Plando for employment abroad (Exh. 1; 1-A). x x x

In his Counter-Affidavit (Exh. 1-Aringoy), Ronnie Aringoy affirmed that he

personally knows Lolita Plando since she was a teenager and he knows for a
fact that her name is Cristine and not Marife as she purports it to appear.
Sometime in the first week of June 2005, Lolita borrowed P1,000.00 from
Ronnie because she wanted to go to Malaysia to work as a guest relation officer
(GRO). Ronnie lent her P1,000.00. He told her that he knows a
certain Hadja Jarma Lalli, distant neighbor, who frequents to Malaysia and with
whom she can ask pertinent information on job opportunities. The entries in
Philippine Passport No.MM401136 issued to Hadja Jarma Lalli on January 29,
2004 (Exh. 2; 2-A to 2-Q) showed that she traveled to Malaysia no less than
nine (9) times within the period from March 2004 to June 2005.

xxx

Nora Mae Adling, ticketing clerk of Aleson Shipping Lines, owner of the
vessel M/V Mary Joy 2 plying Zamboanga City to Sandakan, Malaysia route
and of M/V Kristel Jane 3, testified that Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger
tickets for her travel to Sandakan, not only for herself but also for other women
passengers.

xxx

Ronnie Aringoy submitted the Affidavit of his witness Rachel Caete (Exh. 2)
and the Joint Affidavits of witnesses MerceditaSalazar
and Estrella Galgan. Rachel Canete declared that Lolita Plando whom she
knows as Cristine Plando worked as a GRO (guest relation officer) and
massage attendant at Magic 2 Videoke and Massage Parlor, that
Lolita Plando has four children sired by different men; and that she knows for a
 fact that Lolita Plando has been going to and from Malaysia to work in bars.
When she testified in court, Rachel did not present other evidence to
substantiate her allegations. Mercedita Salazar and Estrella Galgandeclared in
their Joint Affidavit that Lolita Plando who is known to them
as Marife Plando was their co-worker as massage attendant and GRO (guest
relation officer) at Magic 2 Massage Parlor and Karaoke bar where she used the
names Gina Plandoand Cristine Plando. She worked in the said establishment
for nine months from February to October 2002. She has four children from
four different men. No other evidence was submitted in court to prove their
assertions.4

The Decision of the Trial Court

The Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision on 29 November 2005, with its
dispositive portion declaring:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused HADJA JARMA LALLI y PURIH and
RONNIE ARINGOY y MASION GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in
Criminal Case No. 21908 of the Crime of Trafficking in Persons defined in
Section 3(a) and penalized under Section 10(c) in relation to Sections 4(a) and
6(c) of Republic Act No. 9208 known as the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2003 and in Criminal Case No. 21930 of the crime of Illegal Recruitment
defined in Section 6 and penalized under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No.
8042 known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 and
SENTENCES each of said accused:

1. In Criminal Case No. 21908, to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT

and to pay a fine of P2,000,000.00 pesos;

2. In Criminal Case No. 21930, to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT

and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 pesos;
 3. To pay the offended party Lolita Plando y Sagadsad, jointly and severally, the
sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and

4. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.5

The trial court did not find credible the denials of the accused-appellants over the
candid, positive and convincing testimony of complainant Lolita Plando (Lolita). The
accused, likewise, tried to prove that Lolita was a Guest Relations Officer (GRO) in
the Philippines with four children fathered by four different men. However, the trial
court found these allegations irrelevant and immaterial to the criminal prosecution.
These circumstances, even if true, would not exempt or mitigate the criminal liability
of the accused. The trial court found that the accused, without a POEA license,
conspired in recruiting Lolita and trafficking her as a prostitute, resulting in crimes
committed by a syndicate.6 The trial court did not pronounce the liability of accused-
at-large Nestor Relampagos (Relampagos) because jurisdiction was not acquired over
his person.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

On 26 February 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC Decision and
found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal
Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in affirming in toto the RTC Decision.

The Ruling of this Court

We dismiss the appeal for lack of merit.

We modify and increase the payment of damages in the crime of Trafficking in

Persons from P50,000 to P500,000 for moral damages and P50,000 to P100,000 for
exemplary damages.
 Grounds for Appeal

In his Appeal Brief,7 Ronnie Aringoy (Aringoy) admits that he referred Lolita to a
certain Hadja Jarma Lalli (Lalli),Aringoys neighbor who frequents Malaysia and from
whom Lolita could ask pertinent information on job opportunities. 8Aringoy claims
that he learned later that Lolita left for Malaysia. 9 He denies knowing Relampagos to
whom Lolita paid P28,000 as placement fee for finding her work in Malaysia. 10

Aringoy presented three witnesses: his niece

Rachel Aringoy Caete (Rachel), Mercedita Salazar (Mercedita),
and EstrellaGalgan (Estrella). In her testimony, Rachel declared that: (1) Lolita is a
GRO and Massage Attendant at Magic 2 Videokeand Massage Parlor; (2) Lolita has
four children sired by different men; and (3) Lolita has been travelling to Malaysia to
work in bars. Mercedita and Estrella, on the other hand, declared in their testimonies
that Lolita was their co-worker as Massage Attendant and GRO in Magic 2
Massage Parlor and Karaoke Bar from February to October 2002. 11

Aringoy assailed the credibility of Lolitas testimony because of inconsistencies with

regard to: (1) Lolitas grandfathers status and name; (2) the persons (Ronnie and
Rachel) who approached Lolita to talk about the job opportunity in Malaysia; (3)
certain statements in Lolitas testimony that were not alleged in her Sworn Statement;
(4) payment of placement fee of ₱28,000; and (5) names of the other female recruits
who were with Lolita in the boat going to Sandakan and Kota
Kinabalu.12 Aringoy likewise claims that he was never included in the initial
complaint filed by Lolita, and Lolitas statements about her meetings with
him, Lalli and Relampagos on 3, 4, 5 and 6 June 2005 were not corroborated by any
witness.13

On the other hand, in her Appeal Brief,14 Lalli claims that she simply met Lolita on 6
June 2005 on board the ship M/V Mary Joy bound for Sandakan,
Malaysia.15 Lalli denies having met Lolita prior to their meeting on board M/V Mary
Joy.16 Lalli claims she was going to Malaysia to visit her daughter and son-in-law who
was a Malaysian national.17 Lallifurther claims that she only spoke to Lolita aboard
the ship for idle conversation to pass away the time. 18 In this conversation, she learned
that Lolita was with a party of girls accompanied by Relampagos, and the latter was
bringing them to Malaysia to work as sales ladies. 19 Lalli admits that
Lolita, Relampagos and the other girls rode in Lallis van in Sandakan, driven by a
friend of Lallis son-in-law.20 They all rode together because Relampagos talked to the
van driver, requesting if he and his party of girls could board the van and pay their
fare when they reach the city proper of Kota Kinabalu. 21 Lalli boarded the van with
Lolita, Relampagos and their companions.22 Upon reaching her destination, Lalligot
off the van, leaving Lolita, Relampagos and their other companions to continue their
journey towards the city proper of Kota Kinabalu. 23 After spending several days in
Malaysia with her daughter and son-in-law, Lalli went to Brunei to visit a cousin on
12 June 2005, and headed back to Malaysia on 14 June 2005. 24

Lalli assails the credibility of Lolita due to inconsistencies in her testimony with
regard to: (1) Lolita not being in Southcom Village on 5 June 2005 at 6:00 p.m., as she
claimed, but in Buenavista Village; and (2) Lolitas claim that Lalliand Relampagos on
12 June 2005 brought the girls to Labuan, when in fact, Lalli was already in Brunei on
12 June 2005, as evidenced by the stamp in her passport. 25

Credibility of Testimonies

Both Aringoy and Lalli, in their respective Appeal Briefs, assail the testimony of
Lolita due to its alleged inconsistency on immaterial facts, such as the status of Lolitas
grandfather, the name of the village she was in, the date she was brought to Labuan,
Malaysia, and the like. In a long line of cases, the Court has ruled that inconsistencies
pointed out by the accused in the testimony of prosecution witnesses relating to minor
details do not destroy the credibility of witnesses. 26 On the contrary, they indicate that
the witnesses were telling the truth and not previously rehearsed. 27

The clear material inconsistency in this case, however, lies in the testimonies of
accused Aringoy and Lalli. Aringoyadmitted that he referred Lolita to a
certain Hadja Jarma Lalli, his neighbor who frequents Malaysia and with whom Lolita
could ask pertinent information on job opportunities. 28 Lalli, on the other hand, denies
having met Lolita prior to their meeting on board M/V Mary Joy on 6 June
2005,29 and claims that her meeting with Lolita was purely coincidental. 30Lalli admits
that, even if she met Relampagos, Lolita and their companions only on that day on
board M/V Mary Joy, she allowed these people to ride with her in Malaysia using the
van driven by the friend of Lallis son-in-law.31 Lastly, Lalliclaims that she often goes
to Malaysia to visit her daughter and son-in-law. 32 However, this does not explain
why Lallipurchased boat tickets, not only for herself, but for the other women
passengers going to Malaysia.33 From March 2004 to June 2005, Lalli traveled to
Malaysia no less than nine (9) times.34 Nora Mae Adling, ticketing clerk
of Aleson Shipping Lines, owner of the vessel M/V Mary Joy 2
plying Zamboanga City to Sandakan, Malaysia route and of M/V Kristel Jane 3,
testified in open court that Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to
Sandakan, not only for herself but also for other women passengers. 35 Clearly, it is not
Lolitas testimony that is materially inconsistent, but the testimonies
of Lalli and Aringoy.

Aringoy presented his witnesses Rachel, Mercedita and Estrella to impeach the
credibility of Lolita by alleging that Lolita was a Massage Attendant and GRO in a
massage parlor and videoke bar. His witness Rachel further declared that Lolita, at the
young age of 23 years, already had four children sired by four different men, and had
been previously travelling to Malaysia to work in bars. These bare allegations were
not supported by any other evidence. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Lolita
previously worked in a Karaoke Bar and Massage Parlor and that she had four
children from different men, such facts cannot constitute exempting or mitigating
circumstances to relieve the accused from their criminal liabilities. It does not change
the fact that the accused recruited Lolita to work in Malaysia without the requisite
POEA license, thus constituting the crime of illegal recruitment. Worse, the accused
deceived her by saying that her work in Malaysia would be as restaurant entertainer,
when in fact, Lolita would be working as a prostitute, thus, constituting the crime of
trafficking.

The facts found by the trial court, as affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, are, as a
general rule, conclusive upon this Court, in the absence of any showing of grave abuse
of discretion.36 The Court, however, may determine the factual milieu of cases or
controversies under specific circumstances, such as:

(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or

impossible;
(2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures;
(4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court;
(8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.37

In this case, none of these exceptions to the general rule on conclusiveness of facts are
applicable. The Court gives weight and respect to the trial courts findings in criminal
prosecution because the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having
heard the witnesses in person and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial.38For this reason, the Court adopts the findings of fact of the trial court,
as affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, there being no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the lower courts.

Criminal Case No. 21930 (Illegal Recruitment)

Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042) defines illegal recruitment, as follows:

[I]llegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,

transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includes referring, contact services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or
non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines.

xxx

Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be

considered an offense involving economic sabotage.

xxx

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a

group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one
another. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as

the Labor Code of the Philippines, defines authority as follows:

Authority means a document issued by the Department of Labor authorizing a

person or association to engage in recruitment and placement activities as a
private recruitment entity.

Section 7 of RA 8042 provides for the penalty of illegal recruitment committed by a

syndicate (which constitutes economic sabotage), as follows:

(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic
sabotage as defined therein.
It is clear that a person or entity engaged in recruitment and placement activities
without the requisite authority from the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), whether for profit or not, is engaged in illegal recruitment. 39 The Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), an agency under DOLE created by
Executive Order No. 797 to take over the duties of the Overseas Employment
Development Board, issues the authority to recruit under the LaborCode. The
commission of illegal recruitment by three or more persons conspiring or
confederating with one another is deemed committed by a syndicate and constitutes
economic sabotage,40 for which the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less
than ₱500,000 but not more than ₱1,000,000 shall be imposed. 41

The penalties in Section 7 of RA 8042 have already been amended by Section 6 of

Republic Act No. 10022, and have been increased to a fine of not less than ₱2,000,000
but not more than ₱5,000,000. However, since the crime was committed in 2005, we
shall apply the penalties in the old law, RA 8042.

In People v. Gallo,42 the Court enumerated the elements of syndicated illegal

recruitment, to wit:

1. the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment
and placement defined under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices
enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code;

2. he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully

engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and

3. the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more persons

conspiring or confederating with one another. 43

Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines defines recruitment and placement
as any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising
for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not, provided, that any person
or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or
more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

Clearly, given the broad definition of recruitment and placement, even the mere act of
referring someone for placement abroad can be considered recruitment. Such act of
referral, in connivance with someone without the requisite authority or POEA license,
constitutes illegal recruitment. In its simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed
by persons who, without authority from the government, give the impression that they
have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes. 44
In this case, the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court,
found Lalli, Aringoy and Relampagos to have conspired and confederated with one
another to recruit and place Lolita for work in Malaysia, without a POEA license. The
three elements of syndicated illegal recruitment are present in this case, in particular:
(1) the accused have no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; (2) the accused engaged
in this activity of recruitment and placement by actually recruiting, deploying and
transporting Lolita to Malaysia; and (3) illegal recruitment was committed by three
persons (Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos), conspiring and confederating with one
another.

Aringoy claims and admits that he only referred Lolita to Lalli for job opportunities to
Malaysia. Such act of referring, whether for profit or not, in connivance with someone
without a POEA license, is already considered illegal recruitment, given the broad
definition of recruitment and placement in the Labor Code.

Lalli, on the other hand, completely denies any involvement in the recruitment and
placement of Lolita to Malaysia, and claims she only met Lolita for the first time by
coincidence on board the ship M/V Mary Joy. Lallis denial does not deserve credence
because it completely conflicts with the testimony of Aringoy who claims he referred
Lolita to Lalli who had knowledge of the job opportunities in Malaysia.

The conflicting testimonies of Lalli and Aringoy on material facts give doubt to the
truth and veracity of their stories, and strengthens the credibility of the testimony of
Lolita, despite allegations of irrelevant inconsistencies.

No improper motive could be imputed to Lolita to show that she would falsely testify
against the accused. The absence of evidence as to an improper motive entitles Lolitas
testimony to full faith and credit.45

Aringoy claims that no conspiracy existed in illegal recruitment, as he denies even

knowing Relampagos, who is currently at-large. Lalli denies any involvement in the
illegal recruitment, and claims that she only met Relampagos through Lolita on board
the ship M/V Mary Joy on 6 June 2005, and learned that Relampagos was bringing
Lolita and their other girl companions to Malaysia to work as sales ladies.

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.

In People v. Lago,46 the Court discussed conspiracy in this wise:

 The elements of conspiracy are the following: (1) two or more persons came to
an agreement, (2) the agreement concerned the commission of a felony, and (3)
the execution of the felony was decided upon. Proof of the conspiracy need not
be based on direct evidence, because it may be inferred from the parties
conduct indicating a common understanding among themselves with respect to
the commission of the crime. Neither is it necessary to show that two or more
persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the
details of an unlawful scheme or objective to be carried out. The conspiracy
may be deduced from the mode or manner in which the crime was perpetrated;
it may also be inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common
purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. 47

In this case, Lolita would not have been able to go to Malaysia if not for the concerted
efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos. First, it was Aringoy who knew Lolita,
since Aringoy was a neighbor of Lolitas grandfather. It was Aringoywho referred
Lolita to Lalli, a fact clearly admitted by Aringoy. Second, Lolita would not have
been able to go to Malaysia if Lalli had not purchased Lolitas boat ticket to Malaysia.
This fact can be deduced from the testimony of Nora Mae Adling (Nora), ticketing
clerk of Aleson Shipping Lines, owner of the vessel M/V Mary Joy 2
plying ZamboangaCity to Sandakan, Malaysia route and of M/V Kristel Jane 3. Nora
testified in open court that Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to
Sandakan, not only for herself but also for other women passengers. Lallis claim that
she only goes to Malaysia to visit her daughter and son-in-law does not explain the
fact why she bought the boat tickets of the other women passengers going to
Malaysia. In fact, it appears strange that Lalli visited Malaysia nine (9) times in a span
of one year and three months (March 2004 to June 2005) just to visit her daughter and
son-in-law. In Malaysia, it was Relampagos who introduced Lolita and her
companions to a Chinese Malay called Boss as their first employer. When Lolita and
her companions went back to the hotel to tell Relampagos and Lalli that they did not
want to work as prostitutes, Relampagos brought Lolita and the girls on board a van
to Sangawan China Labuan, where they stayed in a room for one night. The next day,
they were picked up by a van and brought to Pipen Club, where Lolita and her
companions worked as prostitutes. To date, accused Relampagos is at large and has
not been brought under the jurisdiction of the courts for his crimes.

Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily

withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or
continuance of criminal proceedings.48 The unexplained flight of an accused person
may as a general rule be taken into consideration as evidence having a tendency to
establish his guilt.49 Clearly, in this case, the flight of accused Relampagos, who is still
at-large, shows an indication of guilt in the crimes he has been charged.

It is clear that through the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos, Lolita
was recruited and deployed to Malaysia to work as a prostitute. Such conspiracy
among Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos could be deduced from the manner in which
the crime was perpetrated each of the accused played a pivotal role in perpetrating the
crime of illegal recruitment, and evinced a joint common purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest.

For these reasons, this Court affirms the CA Decision, affirming the RTC Decision,
declaring accused Ronnie Aringoy y Masion and Hadja Jarma Lalli y Purih guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate
in Criminal Case No. 21930, with a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
₱500,000 imposed on each of the accused.

Criminal Case No. 21908 (Trafficking in Persons)

Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 (RA 9208), otherwise known as the Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, defines Trafficking in Persons, as follows:

Trafficking in Persons refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer

or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victims consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of
force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power
or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving
or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a
minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale
of organs. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Section 4 of RA 9208 enumerates the prohibited acts of Trafficking in Persons, one of

which is:

(a) To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any

means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas
employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or
debt bondage.
The crime of Trafficking in Persons is qualified when committed by a syndicate, as
provided in Section 6(c) of RA 9208:

(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is

deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed
in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as
a group.

Section 10(c) of RA 9208 provides for the penalty of qualified trafficking:

(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00).

The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act is a new law passed last 26 May 2003, designed
to criminalize the act of trafficking in persons for prostitution, sexual
exploitation, foced labor and slavery, among others.

In this case, Aringoy claims that he cannot be convicted of the crime of Trafficking in
Persons because he was not part of the group that transported Lolita from the
Philippines to Malaysia on board the ship M/V Mary Joy. In addition, he presented his
niece, Rachel, as witness to testify that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work
in bars. On the other hand, Lalli denies any involvement in the recruitment and
trafficking of Lolita, claiming she only met Lolita for the first time on board M/V
Mary Joy going to Malaysia.

The testimony of Aringoys niece, Rachel, that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia
to work in bars cannot be given credence. Lolita did not even have a passport to go to
Malaysia and had to use her sisters passport when Aringoy, Lalliand Relampagos first
recruited her. It is questionable how she could have been travelling to Malaysia
previously without a passport, as Rachel claims. Moreover, even if it is true that Lolita
had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars, the crime of Trafficking in Persons
can exist even with the victims consent or knowledge under Section 3(a) of RA 9208.
Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only limited to
transportation of victims, but also includes the act of recruitment of victims for
trafficking. In this case, since it has been sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt,
as discussed in Criminal Case No. 21930, that all the three accused
(Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one another to
illegally recruit Lolita to become a prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are also
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons
committed by a syndicate under RA 9208 because the crime of recruitment for
prostitution also constitutes trafficking.

When an act or acts violate two or more different laws and constitute two different
offenses, a prosecution under one will not bar a prosecution under the other. 50 The
constitutional right against double jeopardy only applies to risk of punishment twice
for the same offense, or for an act punished by a law and an ordinance. 51 The
prohibition on double jeopardy does not apply to an act or series of acts constituting
different offenses.

DAMAGES

Lolita claimed actual damages of ₱28,000, which she allegedly paid to the accused as
placement fee for the work of restaurant entertainer in Malaysia. The trial court did
not award this amount to Lolita. We agree and affirm the trial courts non-award due to
Lolitas inconsistent statements on the payment of placement fee. In her sworn
statement, Lolita alleged that she paid ₱28,000 as placement fee to Lalli. 52 On cross-
examination, however, she admitted that she never paid ₱28,000 to the accused. 53

We, however, modify and increase the payment of damages in the crime of Trafficking
in Persons from ₱50,000 to ₱500,000 as moral damages and ₱50,000 to ₱100,000 as
exemplary damages.

The Civil Code describes moral damages in Article 2217:

Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendants wrongful act for omission.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are awarded in addition to the payment of
moral damages, by way of example or correction for the public good, as stated in the
Civil Code:

Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example

or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated
or compensatory damages.

Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil

liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines
and shall be paid to the offended party.

The payment of ₱500,000 as moral damages and ₱100,000 as exemplary damages for
the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code, which states:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and
35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in

No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
 The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the
action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.

The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the

crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be
trafficked as a prostitute without ones consent and to be sexually violated four to five
times a day by different strangers is horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that
Lolita experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation when
she was trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in
Persons was aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary
damages is likewise justified.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26

February 2010, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City
dated 29 November 2005, finding accused Lalli and Aringoy guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons committed by a
syndicate, with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. In Criminal Case No. 21908, each of the accused is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of ₱2,000,000;

2. In Criminal Case No. 21930, each of the accused is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of ₱500,000;

3. Each of the accused is ordered to pay the offended party

Lolita Plando y Sagadsad, jointly and severally, the sum of ₱500,000 as moral
damages, and ₱100,000 as exemplary damages for the crime of Trafficking in
Persons; and to pay the costs.

The Court cannot pronounce the liability of accused-at-large Nestor Relampagos as

jurisdiction over his person has not been acquired.

SO ORDERED.
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice
* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1114 dated 3 October 2011.

1 CA rollo, pp. 40-58.

2 Id. at 209-222.

3 Id. at 224-225, 255-256.

4 Id. at 42-53.

5 Id. at 58.

6 Id. at 53-57.

7 Id. at 167-179.

8 Id. at 171.

9 Id. at 172.

10 Id.

11 Id.

12 Id. at 173-174.

13 Id. at 175.

14 Id. at 64-85.

15 Id. at 77.

16 Id.

17 Id.

18 Id. at 78.

19 Id.

20 Id. at 79.

21 Id.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Id. at 80-83.

26 People v. Martinada, G.R. Nos. 66401-03, 13 February 1991, 194 SCRA 36, 44.

27 Id.
28 CA rollo, p. 171.

29 Id. at 77.

30 Id. at 78.

31 Id. at 79.

32 Id. at 77.

33 Id. at 52.

34 Id. at 51.

35 Id. at 52.

36Cosmos Bottling Corporation v. Nagrama, Jr., G.R. No. 164403, 4 March 2008, 547 SCRA 571,
584, citing The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Co. v. Gramaje, 484 Phil. 880 (2004).

37 Reyes v. Court of Appeals (Ninth Division), 328 Phil. 171, 180 (1996) citing Floro v. Llenado, 314 Phil. 715
(1995).

38 Supra note 26 at 41.

39 Section 6, Republic Act No. 8042.

40 Id.

41 Section 7, Republic Act No. 10022.

42 G.R. No. 187730, 29 June 2010, 622 SCRA 439.

43Id. at 451, citing People v. Soliven, 418 Phil. 777 (2001) and People v. Buli-e, 452 Phil. 129 (2003).

44 People v. Lapis, 439 Phil. 729, 740 (2002).

45 People v. Bodozo, G.R. No. 96621, 21 October 1992, 215 SCRA 33, 37, citing Araneta, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-43527, 3 July 1990, 187 SCRA 123.

46 411 Phil. 52 (2001).

47Id. at 59, citing People v. Fegidiro, 392 Phil. 36 (2000) and People v. Francisco, 388 Phil. 94 (2000).

48 United States v. Alegado, 25 Phil. 510, 511 (1913).

49 Id.

50 People v. Tac-an, 261 Phil. 728, 746 (1990).

51 Section 21, Article III, 1987 Philippine Constitution.

52 CA rollo, p. 174.

53 Id.

G.R. No. 210798, September 14, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BEVERLY VILLANUEVA Y MANALILI @ BEBANG, Accused-Appellant.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 210798, September 14, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BEVERLY VILLANUEVA Y MANALILI @

BEBANG, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 dated 10 May 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 05027. The CA affirmed the 28 January 2011 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Las Pinas City, Branch 254 in Criminal Case No. 07-0417, finding accused-appellant, Beverly
Villanueva y Manalili, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 6 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9208.

On 18 May 2007, an Information for the violation of Sec. 6 of R.A. 9208 was filed against
accused-appellant. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

That sometime during the period from April 25, 2007 up to May 17, 2007, in the city of Las
Pinas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being the owner/manager of ON TAP VIDEOKE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously recruit and hire [AAA],3 a 13- year old minor, to work as a Guest Relations Officer
(GRO) of said establishment, thereby exploiting and taking advantage of her vulnerability as a
child.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of NOT GUILTY. 5 A Petition for Bail was
granted and accused-appellant was allowed to post bail. The public prosecutor manifested that
they will adopt the evidence presented during the hearing of the Petition for Bail as the same
evidence in the main case, with the further manifestation that other witnesses will be presented
by the prosecution.6 Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

The Facts

The antecedent facts as culled from the CA decision and records of the case are summarized as
follows:

On 25 April 2007, AAA ran away from home after finding out that she was adopted
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

and after being scolded by her mother, who became the private complainant in this case. The
friends of AAA informed private complainant that AAA was staying at the On Tap Videoke Bar,
working as a Guest Relations Officer. Private complainant sought assistance from the Channel 2
TV program "XXX" to regain custody over AAA. Private complainant, accompanied by the TV
crew, lodged a preliminary complaint with the Southern Police District (SPD) Headquarters of
Taguig City against On Tap Videoke Bar and a task force was created for the rescue of AAA.
Police Officer 1 Ariel Sullano (PO1 Sullano), accompanied by private complainant was tasked to
go inside the videoke bar to talk to AAA. PO2 Thaddeus Abas (PO2 Abas) and the other police
officers were stationed outside the bar, awaiting the predetermined signal. After the operation,
AAA was taken to the SPD headquarters, together with accused-appellant and five (5) other
videoke bar employees who were without the necessary Mayor's and Health Permits. Private
complainant executed a complaint-affidavit against On Tap Videoke Bar and AAA was endorsed
to the Social Development Center of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD)-Las Pinas. Accused-appellant and the five (5) apprehended employees were booked,
investigated and underwent medical examinations.

On 17 May 2007, accused-appellant and the five (5) employees were referred to the inquest
prosecutor with charges for violation of R.A. No. 7610 7 and working without Mayor's/ Health
Permit, respectively. The Office of the City Prosecutor charged accused-appellant with human
trafficking under R.A. 9208, instead of violation of R.A. 7610 for the reason that accused-
appellant "recruited and exploited AAA, a 13-year old minor, to work as a GRO in her bar by
taking advantage of her vulnerability as a child."8chanrobleslaw
On 24 May 2007, a Petition for Bail was filed by accused-appellant, alleging that the evidence of
guilt was not strong. The prosecution presented the testimonies of PO2 Abas and the private
complainant to prove otherwise.

Meanwhile, on 31 May 2007, an Affidavit of Desistance9 was executed by private complainant,

which formed part of the exhibits. The Affidavit of Desistance was executed after the private
complainant had the opportunity to talk to AAA after the rescue operation and after AAA revealed
that she was merely allowed to stay at the videoke bar after she ran away from home. 10chanrobleslaw

PO2 Abas testified as to the filing of the complaint and the entrapment and rescue operation
conducted. He narrated that during the operation, he was stationed a couple of blocks from the
videoke bar;11 and that upon the execution of the pre-arranged signal, he and his companion
officers rushed to the bar to take custody of AAA and other girls working without permits. 12 On
cross-examination, PO2 Abas admitted that he was only acting based on the preliminary
complaint filed by private complainant;13 and that he was not aware of why AAA was in the
viedoke bar or who had custody over AAA.14 When asked about the other details of the
investigation and the operation, he failed to give coherent answers and insisted that his only
designation was to secure the GROs and the other persons in the videoke bar. 15chanrobleslaw

The prosecution then presented private complainant as the second witness. She recounted the
details of the rescue operation and the subsequent filing of the complaint against accused-
appellant. On cross-examination, she clarified that she had never been to the videoke bar before
the rescue operation;16 and that when she saw her daughter in the videoke bar, she was neither
drinking, singing, nor smoking.17When asked about the conversation she had with her daughter
after the rescue, private complainant revealed that AAA claimed that she was neither hired nor
recruited as a GRO at the videoke bar.18Private complainant further narrated that she signified
her lack of intention to pursue her complaint against accused-appellant after hearing the side of
her daughter.19 Unfortunately, while the trial was ongoing, AAA absconded from DSWD custody,
resulting in the prosecution's failure to obtain her testimony.

The Petition for Bail was granted by the court and accused-appellant was allowed to post bail. To
supplement the testimonies of the witnesses presented during the bail hearing, the prosecution
offered the testimony of P/Chief Insp. Jerome Balbontin (PCI Balbontin). He narrated that on May
16, 2007, the private complainant, accompanied by the TV crew, reported that her missing 13-
year old daughter was seen working as a GRO at the On Tap Videoke Bar. 20 According to the
witness, he was not present during the operation21 but he sent SPO1 Camaliga, PO2 Andador,
PO1 Sullano, PO2 Abas, PO2 Espinosa, among others, to conduct the surveillance and
rescue.22 He further narrated that after the rescue operation, the TV crew interviewed the child at
the police station;23 and that unfortunately, the footage of said interview and the rescue
operation could not be obtained.24chanrobleslaw

The defense presented Wilfred Aquino (Aquino), the videoke bar waiter, as first witness. He
testified as to the events which transpired during the rescue operation. He narrated that two
male individuals asked him to call AAA; that AAA approached their table to speak with them; and
that after five minutes, the policemen announced the rescue operation.25cralawred The witness
insisted that accused-appellant was not aware of AAA's stay in the videoke bar because it was
her father, Rosito Villanueva, Sr., who allowed AAA to stay in the videoke bar. 26 Wilfred also
insisted that AAA has been staying in the videoke bar for two weeks before the rescue operation;
and that during such stay; she was always in the kitchen helping therh wash glasses. 27 On cross-
examination, he testified that his immediate superior was Rosito Villanueva, Jr., (Villanueva, Jr.)
accused-appellant's brother, who was the one managing the videoke bar.28chanrobleslaw

Villanueva, Jr. was the second witness for the defense. He testified as to the circumstances
surrounding AAA's stay in the videoke bar. He claimed that while he was on vacation, his father
took over the management of the videoke bar and allowed the temporary stay of AAA, upon the
request of their employee.29 Like Aquino, Villanueva, Jr. claimed that accused-appellant was
unaware of AAA's stay in the videoke' bar because accused-appellant had no hand in the daily
operations and management. On cross-examination, he testified that the videoke bar was merely
registered under his sister's name; and that all earnings belonged to him because the videoke
bar was put up by his sister for him.30chanrobleslaw

Accused-appellant maintained that at the time the raid was conducted, she was at her sister's
house. Her brother called her to apprise her of the situation, prompting her to rush to the bar to
handle the situation. She went with the authorities to the SPD Headquarters and presented
herself as the registered owner of the videoke bar. Accused-appellant vehemently denied hiring
and/or recruiting AAA as a GRO, insisting that she was not involved in the day-to-day operations.
Asserting that she was unaware that AAA was staying at the bar, accused-appellant explained
that she merely provided capital for the business and that her brother, Villanueva, Jr., was the
one managing the same. Both accused-appellant and her brother aver that it was their father
who allowed AAA to stay at the videoke bar upon the request of one of the waiters.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC found accused-appellant's denial unavailing and incredible, considering that the
corroborating testimonies came from witnesses who were not disinterested. The court found it
impossible for accused-appellant unaware of AAA's stay in the videoke bar, given that she was
the registered owner thereof. The RTC gave weight on the successful rescue operation conducted
by the police and the TV crew. In sum, the court ruled that despite the failure of the
prosecution to present AAA in court, the circumstantial pieces of evidence were sufficient
to establish accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, for the reason that a direct link
between accused-appellant's commission of the crime and the minor victim was
established.31 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding accused BEVERLY VILLANUEVA y MANALILI @ "BEBANG" GUILTY
of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 6 of Republic Act 9208, the Court hereby
sentences her to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of 3 Million pesos. Her
license/permit to operate the ON TAP VIDEOKE BAR is ordered cancelled. 32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Accused-appellant challenged the RTC decision on appeal, alleging that the lower court relied on
the weakness of the defense rather than on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution.
Accused-appellant argued that the same set of evidence, which was the basis for granting the
petition for bail, was merely adopted in the main case. Thus, accused-appellant contends that
there can be no conclusion other than that the prosecution failed to substantiate the allegations
in the Information. Moreover, accused-appellant insisted that the lower court erred in not giving
the private complainant's Affidavit of Desistance due weight and consideration.

The appellate court found the appeal bereft of merit. Enumerating the different circumstantial
evidence presented, the CA ruled that the conviction was warranted. The appellate court held
that the "[affidavit of desistance is] not the sole consideration that can result to an
acquittal"33 hence, in view of the lack of circumstances to support the Affidavit of Desistance,
acquittal was not warranted. The pertinent and dispositive portions of the decision
read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, the trial court did not err in imposing upon accused-appellant the penalty of life
imprisonment and fine of P3,000,000.00. The order for the cancellation of her permit to operate
the ON TAP VIDEOKE BAR is also correct, x x x
xxxx

WHEREFORE, the trial court's Decision dated January 28, 2011 is AFFIRMED.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Resolution35 dated 3 October 2013, the Court of Appeals gave due course to accused-
appellant's Notice of Appeal.

On 19 February 2014,36 we required the parties to submit their respective supplemental

briefs. Accused-appellant filed a supplemental brief;37 whereas the Office of the Solicitor
General adopted all the arguments raised in its brief, in lieu of filing a supplemental brief.

Our Ruling

The crux of the controversy is whether the circumstantial pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution inexorably lead to the conclusion that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking. After a thorough review of the facts and evidence on
record, we rule for accused-appellant's acquittal.

Qualified Trafficking

The elements of trafficking in persons, derived from the expanded definition found in Section
3(a) of R.A. No. 9208 as amended by R.A. No. 10364, are as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer,
maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge,
within or across national borders;"

(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability
of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person;" and
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or
sale of organs."
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation shall still be considered "trafficking in persons" even if it does not involve any of the
means set forth in the first paragraph of Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208. 38 Given that the person
allegedly trafficked in the case at bar is a child, we may do away with discussions on whether or
not the second element was actually proven.

In an attempt to prove the first element, the prosecution stresses the fact that accused-appellant
is the registered owner of the On Tap Videoke Bar. The prosecution insists that by merely being
the registered owner, accused-appellant necessarily committed the act of recruiting, maintaining
or harboring AAA. Such contention is misplaced. Recruiting, harboring, or maintaining a person
for the purpose of exploitation are acts performed by persons who may or may not be registered
owners of establishments. Thus, being the registered owner per se does not make one criminally
liable for the acts of trafficking committed in the establishment. What the prosecution should
have done was to prove the act of trafficking by other means, and not by mere showing that
accused-appellant was the registered owner. The defense, on the other hand, countered the
allegation by presenting testimonies of Aquino, an employee of the videoke bar; Villanueva, Jr.,
manager of the videoke bar and brother of accused-appellant; and accused-appellant herself.
The RTC found accused-appellant's denial and the corroborating testimonies as unavailing and
incredible, for the reason that such testimonies did not come from disinterested witnesses. This
Court is not unaware of the longstanding doctrine that findings of facts and assessment of
credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court, which is in the best position to
observe the witnesses' demeanor while being examined.39 However, we take exception from such
rule, considering that there are facts and circumstances which if properly appreciated, could alter
the outcome of the case. That the defense witnesses are closely related to accused-appellant —
one being the brother and manager of the videoke bar and the other being an employee—is not
a sufficient reason to disregard their testimonies. The declaration of interested witnesses is not
necessarily biased and incredible.40 More importantly, there was no evidence suggesting that the
testimonies of the witnesses were untruthful to begin with.

The prosecution likewise failed to prove the third element—that the recruiting, maintaining or
harboring of persons is for the purpose of exploitation. Curiously, AAA was seen by the
prosecution witnesses at the videoke bar only on the day the rescue operation was conducted.
That AAA was exploited could not be proven by her mere presence at the videoke bar during the
rescue operation. The prosecution should have presented evidence as to the nature of work done
by AAA, if any. Testimonies as to how often AAA was seen in the bar while entertaining
customers could have also lent credence to the prosecution's contention that she was in the
videoke bar because she was being exploited.

Lack of Direct Evidence

Since AAA was not presented in court, the prosecution was not able to offer direct evidence
showing that accused-appellant actually recruited, harbored or maintained AAA in the videoke
bar for the purpose of exploiting her. Neither can private complainant's testimony which merely
revolved around the filing of the complaint be considered direct evidence. Private complainant's
testimony, if considered in light of all the other evidence, is weak. Private complainant testified
roughly a month after the Affidavit of Desistance was executed and filed; thus, she had every
opportunity to deny the execution of the Affidavit during the cross-examination. Instead of
denying the veracity of such Affidavit, private complainant confirmed its truthfulness and
accuracy.41 Though it can be said that private complainant's affirmative answers were only
prompted by the leading questions asked by the defense lawyer during cross-examination, it
cannot be denied that the prosecution did not even bother to rebuild its case during re-direct
examination. On re-direct examination, private complainant merely testified as to matters
regarding AAA's adoption.42 She also claimed that she came to know of accused-appellant's
trafficking activities through AAA's friends whose identities she cannot remember. 43 However, on
re-cross examination, private complainant admitted that she did not validate such information
before she reached out to the TV program and the authorities.44chanrobleslaw

A review of the scarce jurisprudence on human trafficking would readily show that a successful
prosecution for human trafficking, to a certain extent, relies greatly on the entrapment
operation.45 In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the authorities for the purpose of
capturing the perpetrator in flagrante delicto.46 Thus, it can be said that testimonies of the
apprehending officers regarding the entrapment operation are crucial for a conviction, most
especially in cases where the victim is unable to testify. In People v. Casio, 47 the conviction for
Qualified Trafficking was brought about by the categorical testimonies of the authorities who
conducted the entrapment, on top of the victim's testimony. In the said case, the police
 operatives testified as to the actual unfolding of circumstances which led. them to believe that a
crime was being committed in flagrante delicto, to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

During trial, PO1 Luardo and PO1 Velosa testified that

their conversation with accused went as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Accused: Chicks mo dongl (Do you like girls, guys?)

PO1 Unya mga bag-o? Kanang batan-on kay naa mi

Luardo: guests naghulal sa motel. (Are they new? They
must be young because we have guests waiting
at the motel)

Accused: Naa, hulal kay magkuha ko. (Yes, just wait

and I'll get them)

At that point, PO1 Luardo sent a text message to PSI

Ylanan that they found prospective subject.

After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB,

private complainants in this case.

Accused: Kining duha kauyon mo anil? (Are you satisfied

with these two?)

PO1 Maayo man na kaha na sila modala ug kayaf?

Veloso: (Well, are they good in sex?)
Similarly, the prosecution in the case at bar built their case around the entrapment operation
and the successful rescue of AAA; but unfortunately for the prosecution, both PO2 Abas and PCI
Balbontin are incompetent to testify as to matters which occurred during the actual execution of
the rescue and entrapment because both witnesses were not present during the operation. The
testimonies of PO2 Abas and the Chief Inspector pale in comparison with the testimonies of the
police operatives in Casio.48Oddly, the prosecution failed to present witnesses who could testify
as to the actual conversation that transpired between the undercover authorities and AAA. The
testimony of defense witness Aquino, the waiter, is the only evidence on record which narrated
certain details surrounding the unfolding of the rescue operation. Aquino merely observed that
upon being called by the two men, who turned out to be undercover policemen, AAA approached
their table and after five minutes, policemen announced the operation.49 AAA's act of
approaching the table of the customers after being called is not unequivocal enough as to dispel
any other possible scenarios that could have occurred during their 5-minute conversation. In the
absence of any evidence categorically showing that a crime was being committed in flagrante
delicto or that AAA was performing the tasks of a GRO when she approached the table, this Court
cannot uphold accused-appellant's conviction based on the rescue operation alone.

Circumstantial evidence did not

establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt

While it is recognized that the lack of direct evidence does not ipso facto bar the finding of
guilt,50 we still hold that acquittal is in order for the reason that the circumstantial evidence
presented does not lead to the inescapable conclusion that accused-appellant committed the
crime. Circumstantial evidence is deemed sufficient for conviction only if: (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.51 It is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented constitutes an unbroken chain
which leads to only one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion
of others, as the guilty person.52 The appellate court anchored accused-appellant's conviction on
the following circumstantial evidence:

Firstly, AAA was at the On Tap Videoke when the police, accompanied by private
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

complainant and the crew of the TV program XXX, conducted its rescue operation on May 16,
2007.

Secondly, while accused-appellant denied recruiting AAA, she was wearing a sexy attire at the
time of the rescue. Even defense witnesses Rosito Villanueva, Jr. and Wilfred Aquino admitted
that AAA wore sexy attires at the videoke bar.
Notably, AAA's attire was similar to the uniform of the videoke bar's GROs. x x x

xxxx

Thirdly, accused-appellant showed propensity of hiring workers without permits. Although the
purpose of the rescue operation was to recover AAA, five other (5) workers of the videoke bar
were also arrested and booked because they were working thereat without the requisite
Mayor's /Health permits.

Fourthly, it appeared that AAA was doing some kind of work at the videoke bar. As testified by
defense witness Willfred Aquino and Rosito Villanueva, Jr.:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q: What was she doing there aside from
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
staying there, Mr. Witness?
A: She was helping in the washing of the
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
glasses in the kitchen, Sir.

xxxx

Q: When the police arrived, AAA was there

inside the Videoke Bar?
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 Witness:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A: She was at the back of the kitchen.

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

COURT:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

What was she doing at the kitchen wearing

that seductive dress, washing the dishes?

No, your honor. During that times she

A: was just standing at the back and
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
whenever we needed something like
glass, she would hand us the glass.53
We rule that the circumstantial evidence cited by the appellate court does not lead to the
inescapable conclusion that accused-appellant committed the crime, let alone that a crime was
actually committed. As previously mentioned, the mere presence of AAA at the videoke bar does
not prove that accused-appellant was maintaining or harboring her for the purpose of
exploitation. In fact, such was the holding of the RTC when it granted accused-appellant's
petition for bail. Nowhere in the text of R.A. No. 9208 can it be inferred that a presumption
arises by the mere fact of presence of a child in a videoke bar or similar establishment. Our
survey of jurisprudence likewise does not reveal such established presumption. More to the
point, the constitutive crime of trafficking through harboring or receipt of a person must be
specifically for purposes of exploitation. In other words, establishing mere presence without
establishing the purpose therefor cannot be considered as an element of trafficking. In this case,
the private complainant's affidavit of desistance categorically explained the child's presence in
the videoke bar—for humanitarian reasons of providing shelter to a runaway minor.

That AAA was wearing skimpy clothing similar to those worn by the GROs at the videoke bar
during the rescue operation is not inconsistent with the defense's position that AAA merely
sought refuge and shelter at the bar after she ran away from home. It is highly possible that AAA
borrowed clothes from the videoke bar employees, considering that she ran away from home and
was unable to take all her belongings with her. That accused-appellant showed propensity for
hiring workers without permits is irrelevant in the case at bar. One may be equipped with the
proper permits and yet still be guilty of trafficking. Accused-appellant's propensity for not
following ordinances does not necessarily prove commission of the crime of human trafficking.
Lastly, even if it be conceded that AAA was washing dishes at the back of the kitchen, such
circumstance is still not inconsistent with the defense's position. As a token of gratitude for
allowing her to temporarily stay at the bar, AAA could have voluntarily done the chores. From
the foregoing, it is obvious that the totality of circumstantial evidence will not lead to an
inescapable conclusion that accused-appellant committed the crime charged. It bears stressing
that "where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, then the evidence does not meet or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for
conviction."54chanrobleslaw

Reproduction at trial of evidence

presented in the bail hearing

The prosecution manifested that they will adopt the evidence presented during the hearing of the
Petition for Bail as the same evidence in the main case, with a further manifestation that other
witnesses will be presented during the trial. In fact, a side by side comparison of the RTC Order
granting accused-appellant's petition for bail and the RTC Decision convicting accused-appellant
would reveal that summaries of witnesses' testimonies contained in the former were merely lifted
and copied verbatim in the latter.

After an evaluation of the evidence and after hearing the testimonies of PO2 Abas and private
complainant, the Petition for Bail was granted by the RTC, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
At this moment the prosecution failed to substantiate the allegations in the information that
accused recruited and hired minor [AAA] to work as Guest Relations Officer (GRO) of her
establishment, thereby exploiting and taking advantage of her vulnerability as a child. The mere
presence of the minor at the establishment, cannot by itself, prove the fact of hiring and
recruitment. It is unfortunate at this juncture, none of the prosecution witnesses was able to
testify on this regard, and was only able to confirm the minor's presence at the videoke bar.
Even the alleged mother of the minor testified that she never saw [AAA] drinking, smoking or
singing at the establishment. She further testified that the minor admitted to her that she was
never hired to work at the establishment and the she was only there in order for her to have a
place to stay and reside.

xxx This court is bound by the principle that in all criminal cases, all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the accused, xxx From the evidence presented so far, without touching on the actual
merits and proceedings of the instant case, this court cannot at this point say that the evidence
against the accused is strong."55
It should be noted that when the prosecution witnesses were presented during the bail hearing,
they were subjected to cross, re-direct and re-cross-examinations, as well as inquiries by the
court; thus, as expected, the court no longer recalled the witnesses for additional examination
during the trial. Unfortunately for the prosecution, they were only able to present one more
witness, PCI Balbontin, before they finally rested their case.

While the Court is aware that a bail hearing is merely for the purpose if determining whether the
evidence of guilt is strong and that the same is not an adjudication upon the merits, we note that
in the case at bar, the RTC Order granting the petition for bail casts doubt upon accused-
appellant's conviction. In its Order granting the petition for bail, the RTC noted that none of the
prosecution witnesses testified as to the fact of hiring and recruitment. Considering that the only
additional witness the prosecution presented during trial was PCI Balbontin, it baffles this Court
why the RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt when the Chief Inspector's
testimony was limited to procedural details regarding the filing of the complaint, forming of the
task force and the interview conducted by the TV crew. If the Chief Inspector's additional
testimony was only limited to those matters, it follows that when the prosecution rested its case,
not one of their witnesses testified as to the fact of hiring and recruitment and neither did the
documentary evidence submitted establish the same. Before this Court is essentially the same
set of evidence that was evaluated by the RTC when it ruled that the evidence of guilt was not
strong; we thus see no reason why the same set of evidence, only supplemented by a testimony
regarding irrelevant procedural matters, would warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

Ei incumbit probatio qui elicit,

non qui negat -- he who asserts,
not he who denies, must prove

Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that the Constitution presumes a
person is innocent until he is proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 56 Countless times,
this Court has elucidated that the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own weight and
not rely on the weakness of the defense. The prosecution cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the defense's evidence for it has the onus probandi in establishing the guilt
of the accused. In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution failed to
pass the test of moral certainty necessary to warrant accused-appellant's conviction. From the
foregoing, we rule that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving accused-
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 10 May 2013
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05027 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, BEVERLY VILLANUEVA y MANALILI @
BEBANG is hereby ACQUITTEDof the charge of violation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208
or Qualified Trafficking. Her immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby ORDERED, unless she
is being held for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Correctional Institution for Women,
Mandaluyong City, by personal service, for immediate implementation. The Director shall submit
to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of the copy of the Decision, the jaction taken
thereon.

Carpio,*J., Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Del Castillo, **

and Reyes, JJ., concur.

ORDER OF RELEASE

TO: The Director

Bureau of Corrections
1770 Muntinlupa City

Thru: Superintendent
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION FOR
WOMEN
1550 Mandaluyong City
GREETINGS:

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court on September 14,

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

2016 promulgated a Decision in the above-entitled case, the dispositive portion of which
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
10 May 2013 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05027 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For failure of
the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond breasonable doubt, BEVERLY VILLANUEVA y MANALILI
@ BEBANG is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of Section 6 of Republic Act No.
9208 or Qualified Trafficking. Her immediate RELEASE from detention is
hereby ORDERED, unless she is being held for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Correctional Institution for Women,
Mandaluyong City, by personal service, for immediate implementation. The Director shall submit
to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of the copy of the Decision, the action taken
thereon.

SO ORDERED."
NOW, THEREFORE, You are hereby ordered to immediately release BEVERLY VILLANUEVA y
MANALILI @ BEBANG unless there are other causes for which she should be further detained,
and to return this Order with the certificate of your proceedings within five (5) days from notice
hereof.

GIVEN by the Honorable PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR., Chairperson of the Third Division
of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 14th day of September 2016.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court

By:
(SDG)MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG III
Deputy Division Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

*
Additional Member per Raffle dated 14 September 2016.

**
Additional Member per Raffle dated 2 September 2016.

1
Rollo, pp. 3-27; Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices
Francisco P. Acosta and Angelita A. Gacutan concurring.
2
Records, pp. 381-391; Penned by Presiding Judge Gloria Butay Aglugub.

3
The real name of the victim is withheld to protect her privacy. See People v. Cabalquinto, 533
Phil. 703 (2006).

4
Records, p. 1.

5
Id. at 85.

6
Id. at 172-175.

7
An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation, and for Other
Purposes; otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

8
Records, p. 2.

9
Id. at 133-134.

10
TSN, 3 July 2007, p. 25.

11
TSN, 19 June 2007, p. 18.

12
Id. at 19.

13
Id. at 52.

14
Id. at 51.

15
Id. at 50.

16
TSN, 3 July 2007, p. 16.

17
Id. at 17-18.

18
Id. at 21.

19
Id. at 22.

20
TSN, 4 September 2007, p. 6.

21
Id. at 19.

22
Id. at 9

23
Id. at 10.

24
Id. at 16.

25
cralawred TSN, 11 June 2009, p. 12.

26
Id. at 25.

27
Id. at 22.

28
Id. at 29.

29
TSN, 3 December 2009, p. 11.

30
Id. at 24-25.

31
Records, p. 391.

32
Id.

33
Rollo, p. 25.
34
Id. at 25-26.

35
CA rollo, p. 237.

36
Rollo, pp. 40-41; Resolution dated 19 February 2016.

37
Id. at 51-71.

38
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or
receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or,
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits lo achieve the consent of a person having control
over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation shall also be considered as "trafficking in persons" even if it does not involve any of
the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.
39
Cirerav. People ofthe Philippines, G.R. No. 181843, 14 July 2014, 730 SCRA 27, 43.

40
People v. Sison, 267 Phil. 679, 684 (1990).

41
Id. at 36.

42
Id. at 27-34.

43
Id. at 34.

44
TSN, July 3, 2007, p. 36.

45
See People v. Casio, G.R. No. 211465, 3 December 2014, 744 SCRA 113, 124.

46
People v. Gatong-0, 250 Phil. 710, 711 (1988).

47
Supra note 45.

48
Id.

49
TSN, 11 June 2009, pp. 32-36

50
People v. Biglete, 688 Phil. 199, 207 (2002).

51
Sec. 4 Rule 133, Revised Rule? of Court.

52
People v. Canlas, 423 Phil. 66f, 677 (2001); People v. Calonge, 637 Phil. 435,454 (2010)

53
Rollo, pp. 21-33.

54
Franco v. People, G.R. No. 191 185, 1 February 2016.

55
Records, pp. 141-142.

56
Franco v. People, supra note 54.