The Subversion Of Our Democratic Political

Spaces & What It Means For Sri Lanka’s

Future

Featured image courtesy Vikalpa

DAYAPALA THIRANAGAMA- 06/04/2018

Introduction

Since Independence in 1948, Sri Lanka has witnessed three unsuccessful

armed struggles. Two of these (1971 and 1987-89) have been confined mainly
to the Sinhalese South. The last one in the North and East of Sri Lanka waged
an armed campaign for almost 30 years until the Tami Tigers were defeated
in 2009. The manner of the Sri Lanka’s state victory created acute political
wounds and left unresolved the fundamental problems that gave rise to Tamil
militancy. The devastating effects of all three armed campaigns conducted by
the state and non-state actors have scarred democratic governance in the
country and its commitment to pluralism. These violent struggles have torn
apart Sri Lanka’s social fabric and hindered economic wellbeing of its
citizens. It has damaged the continuing efforts to create a healthy and
pluralistic democracy for our young and fragile nation.

When SWRD Bandaranaike first attempted to reach an understanding

between the Tamil and the Sinhalese in 1957, faced stiff opposition. James
Manor observed ‘ this was an important moment in the Island’s political
history. It marked a first cycle in a pattern, which recurred as central and
poisonous feature of the political process at critical junctures. The party in
power strives to foster communal accommodation. The majority party in
opposition manipulates Sinhalese parochialism to wreck that attempt ‘. [1]
This destructive cycle has continued, damaging fragile ethnic relations and the
political unity as a nation.

The successive armed campaigns and the cumulative damage of the 30-year
civil war has landed massive blows to democratic pluralism and narrowed our
political space. Where democratic activity should have expanded and
deepened people’s understandings of the collective challenges facing all
citizens, it has instead narrowed them. Rather than healing ethnic frictions, it
has exploited them. It has been too easy for the Sinhalese political leadership
to whip up narrow nationalist sentiments to bolster their voter base. Even 30
years the Manor’s observation pattern has not changed despite the obvious
need for a political settlement after a long and brutal war.

Even 30 years after Manor’s observation the pattern has not changed despite
the obvious need for a just political settlement after a long and brutal war. It
has become a severe testing ground of the country’s political leaders and as
well as the leading political parties particularly of their political honesty and
responsibility towards plural democracy. There is a huge gap between
political promises and the willingness of their leadership to achieve them.

Democratic Political Space and Pluralism

Modern democracy cannot offer meaningful freedom and basic rights unless
it is able to expand and deepen the democratic political space incorporating
diverse needs of the people it serves. If the space is not dynamic enough to
incorporate such needs the potential for political emancipation becomes a
difficult task. ”Pluralism lies at the very core of modern democracy: if we
want a more democratic society, we need to increase that pluralism and make
room for multiplicity of democratically managed forms of associations and
communities’ [2].

However, the introduction of the Westminster model of majoritarian

democratic governance to Sri Lanka in 1948 without any accommodation of
an inclusive multi-ethnic notion meant Sri Lanka was politically and
constitutionally unprepared for what was to come. The new nation came into
being with democratic and emancipatory aspirations amongst its ethnically
diverse communities –but without the means to meet them. However, this was
a logical extension of British colonial policy that had begun prior to
Independence. Nissan and Stirrat have highlighted a major paradox at the
heart of Sri Lankan polity under colonial rule. “On the one hand all citizens in
Sri Lanka were to be treated equally: the island was subject to one set of rules
and one set of governors; in terms of citizenship, all should be equal. Yet at
the same time, British rule substantialized heterogeneity, formalizing cultural
difference and making it the basis for political representation. This should not
be interpreted as the manifestation of a wish to ‘divide and rule; it was done
out of misguided ‘liberal’ sentiments which sought to protect different
customs of different races”[3]. However, this British policy and its
continuation since Independence thus favored the further growth of
majoritarian Sinhala Buddhist sentiments. Sinhala Buddhist supremacy
occupied as the hegemonic ideology of the post -Independence political space,
marginalizing minority communities and their right to be equal citizens. This
marginalization has continued with utmost vigor despite some reformist zeal
shown by the Sinhala leaders, which has tended to evaporate overnight when
they faced with vociferous Sinhala Buddhist opposition,

The social and political spaces within a country or society are crucially
important for human affairs and for any bond that is forged by the people as
a collective. Limiting this space either politically and socially has an impact on
human freedom and dignity. For an example the white rule in South Africa
restricted and segregated political and social space on the basis of race or
color and gender. Such spaces in a country should function without any
restriction based on one’s nationality, language, religion or colour, gender or
sexual orientation. ‘This is because whenever human beings come together be
it in private or socially, be it in public or politically –a spaces in a country are
generated that simultaneously gathers them into it and separates them from
one another. Every such space has its own structure that changes over time
and reveals itself in a private context as custom, in a social context as
convention, and in public context as laws, constitutions, statutes, and the like.
Whenever people come together, the world thrust itself between them, and it
is in this in between space that all human affairs are conducted’ [4]. If public
space is restricted by the discriminatory laws based on personal
characteristics, human freedom and dignity will be deeply affected.

In Sri Lanka, since Independence, such discriminatory laws were introduced

for the first time by depriving the citizenship rights of the Tamil community
of Indian origin in the hill country. ‘Of these, most notable were, first, the
Citizenship Act of 1948,the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act
of 1949, and Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Act of 1949) which
deprived the great majority of the Indian Tamil residents in Sri Lanka of
their citizenship rights and franchise’ [5]. This set the scene for a post-
independence political era where citizen’s rights were not protected or
enhanced, but communities and groups were discriminated against by the
state. . Already, the project for democratic pluralism had suffered a setback.
Sri Lanka was now ready for a journey towards violence, the suppression of
minority sentiments, and their democratic rights with Sinhala Buddhist
supremacist tendencies occupying the driving seat.

The introduction of ‘the Sinhala Only Bill’ in 1956 as an election pledge of the
1956 general election, in which Bandaranaike was elected to power set the
ground for communal disharmony between Sinhalese and Tamils as never
before. It created decades of friction and sowed the seeds for the violent
confrontation that finally engulfed the country. In 1956 the Federal party’s
negotiations on behalf of the Tamils, with autonomy for the North and
Eastern Provinces on the basis of federalism, parity status for the Sinhala and
Tamil languages, and the citizenship status of the Indian residents could have
formed the basis for a democratic solution. However, it was strongly opposed
by the hardline Sinhala Buddhist extremists whipping up anti-Tamil
sentiment and political opposition within parliament led by the UNP (United
National Party). That set off waves of communal outbursts and violent
communal clashes all over the country in May 1958.
After the 1958 communal clash, in 1966 there was another attempt by the
UNP (United National Party) government to introduce a devolved political
power structure through District Councils but this was opposed by the SLFP
(Sri Lanka Freedom Party) who were now in opposition along with the
traditional left wing parties, namely the LSSP (Lanka Sama Samaja Party)
and the CP (Communist Party). The wreckers were successful again.

Left Parties and Democratic Pluralism

The role played by the Sri Lankan left wing parties and their lack of
commitment to oppressed Tamil people in the North and East as well the
upcountry Tamils of Indian origin provides a useful lesson in how they
effectively drove the Tamil community into the hands of extremist
organizations. The traditional radical left parties committed this mistake
when they turned their back on the oppressed Tamils in the North and East
and in the upcountry areas. But the radical left also took significant steps
forward in excluding the Tamils – ideologically politically and
organizationally – from their ranks shattering any hope of their liberation in
unity with the Sinhalese in the South.

Sri Lanka’s project for democratic pluralism had already come under attack
from both the Right and the Left when the 1970’s began. In 1972, the then
SLFP government in coalition with traditional left parties the LSSP and the
CP introduced a new Constitution and accorded the foremost place to
Buddhism as the state religion, which meant it was the duty of the State to
protect and foster Buddhism. The Constitution also recognized Sinhala as the
state language. These moves enshrined discrimination within Sri Lanka’s
Constitution and within our democratic and social life.

Along with these developments, there had been dozens of secretive and radical
left wing political groups in formation in the South, amongst the rural Sinhala
Buddhist youth, making preparations for the armed struggle. By the end of
1960’s the JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna/People’s Liberation Front)
emerged as the largest and most successful militant organization. In their
political camps, they introduced in their indoctrination program a class
entitled ‘Indian Expansionism’ which branded the Indian Tamils of the up-
country as an alien force who would be sent back to India by their
revolutionary government. They also did not do political or organizational
work in the North and East in the Tamil areas. When they attacked police
stations on 5 April 1971, in their abortive insurrection, the JVP’s ideological
and political practice was further revealed as to what they really meant in
their exclusion of Tamils. There was no military activity in the Tamil
dominant areas in the North and East as well as the upcountry tea growing
areas.

By the late 1970’s the Northern youth organized themselves in armed groups
similar to the process that took place in the South in the mid 1960’s. By this
time it appeared that sections of the Tamil community felt peaceful agitation
had been exhausted. The TULF (Tamil Liberation United Front) fought the
1977 general election on the slogan for a separate Tamil Sate in the North and
East and received a landslide victory – but it had no mechanism or political
vision to make it a reality. The armed groups filled that vacuum by the end
1970’s and continued to do so afterwards.

The communal clashes that erupted in 1983, in which Tamils were attacked,
killed and their properties were burnt down in Colombo, was a turning point
for the Tamil community. Many Tamils in their thousands had to be sheltered
in refugee camps in Colombo and others went back to the North and East.
The youths who were affected by daily anti-Tamil discrimination were now
confronted by this unprecedented communal violence by Sinhalese mobs.
Many joined the armed groups in the North to be trained as fighting carders.
They also had established rear-guard bases in Tamil Nadu in India. They
were able to extend their theatre of war to the South that made the Sri
Lankan state very vulnerable. India made efforts to facilitate a peaceful
settlement but it appeared both sides were hardening their positions.

In 1987, India had worked out with the Sri Lanka Government to offer
devolution of power under 13th Amendment to the Provinces. The Sinhala
hardliners and all opposition Sinhala political parties branded it as a sell out
which would lead to separation of the country. India sent the IPKF (Indian
Peace Keeping Force) to facilitate the implementation of the package in the
North and East.
The JVP who were then a banned organization at the time falsely accusing of
supporting the communal clashes in July 1983 launched an armed struggle
against the supposed division of the country by the Jayewardene regime in
collusion with India. According to them, this was a patriotic war to unite the
country. They opposed the devolution of power under the 13thAmendment
and asked the government to send the IPKF back to India. Anyone who
supported the devolution package became a military target. They killed
thousands and the government used similarly barbaric methods of killings
and abductions to put down the rebellion. The JVP’s military campaign was
an extension of their 1971 insurrection. This time they not only excluded the
Tamils – they demonstrated their violent opposition to an ethnically inclusive
democracy itself.

In the meantime the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam) were also
embroiled in military clashes with the IPKF. Both the LTTE in the North and
East and the JVP in the South had similar approaches in dismantling the
basic democratic rights of the people and closing the democratic space
violently. Both groups were unable to deal with political dissent, branding all
critics as traitors. Many thousands in the South who supported the devolution
paid the ultimate price. The LTTE destroyed all the other armed groups in
the North becoming the “sole representative” of the Tamil people. The LTTE
also forcibly expelled the Muslim community from Jaffna in October 1990
giving people only 24-hours notice to leave, a tragedy amounting to the ethnic
cleansing of Tamil areas. It was also a narrowing of Tamil identity and the
Tamil community. The LTTE made clear that it mirrored the intolerance
shown by the Sri Lankan state towards minority communities.

By 1990, the government had defeated the JVP armed struggle and now they
have become a legally recognized party. In 2009, the government decimated
the entire Tamil Tiger leadership and they do not exist today as a meaningful
organization. However, their defeat has left a huge political vacuum created
by the unresolved issues arising out of the 30-year brutal war and the failure
of the Sri Lankan state to make any progress in the creation of a democratic,
pluralistic country.

The JVP also supported the war efforts of the Sri Lankan state and this
further eroded trust of the Tamil people who had historically placed their
trust on the Left wing parties to gain justice and equality for their community.
The JVP as the radical left in the country, ideologically and politically could
not draw a line between the democratic rights of the Tamil community and
the parochialism of the Sinhala Buddhist Forces in the country. Theoretically
they envisaged that once they captured power, a democratic transformation
was possible. They have not entirely changed their theoretical and political
positions but have shown some willingness to change their hardline
approach. But they are still classical Marxists. ‘The classic conception of
socialism supposed that the disappearance of private ownership of the means
of production would set up a chain of effects, which over the whole historical
epoch would lead to the extinction of all forms of subordination. Today we
know that this is not so (Local and Moufee, [6]. In refusing to understand this,
the radical left as well as the traditional left could offer only equality and
justice to the Tamil community once they are in power in the distant future –
and not before.

Aftermath of the War

Why, when the Tamil Tigers were defeated, did the prospects for a
sustainable political settlement look as bleak as ever? The Sinhalese political
elites seem to take the view that military terms imposed by the battle that
decimated the Tiger leadership should be accepted as the condition of peace.
The military victory in 2009 was followed by a huge wave of triumphalism
that refused to countenance any concessions or measures to tackle social and
political injustices.
The current regime that came to power promising a new Constitution to
reform the state structure has now started delaying any progress through to
the next stage. The security forces are still holding on to houses and lands
taken from the people during the war even though some progress was made
solely due to the agitation carried out by those affected. There are the other
crucial issues of those who were made to disappear without any trace –
thousands youths- which have not been addressed. No death certificates have
been issued for those who are disappeared and missing. The war widows of
about 60,000 single mother headed households are without any financial
support.

The issue of the existing political prisoners has not been resolved. The JVP
political prisoners of the 1971 insurrection and of the 1987-89
armed campaign were pardoned and released but there are Tamil political
prisoners who have not been offered pardon. We are now witnessing a
political situation worse than that before the civil war began but the Sri
Lankan state still has not made any concession that would reassure a
community that underwent a war that they never demanded.

Roeder and Rothchild have highlighted the importance of political concessions

after a civil war to lay the foundations for peace and democracy ‘The dilemma
of power sharing emerges from the gap between the promises needed to
initiate the transition and the performance necessary to consolidate peace and
democracy. At the end of a civil war, parties’ agreement to accept the
constraints associated with power sharing institution is a powerful signal of
their commitment to resolve future disputes peacefully and not to abuse the
other side once it has laid down its arms. In particular, the willingness of the
majority to tie its hand or at least to submit to rule a power sharing
government is a costly signal that may convince the minorities of the
majority’s commitment to treat them fairly’ [7]. Such gestures or
commitments from the majority community are not forth coming in Sri
Lanka. The Sinhala leadership’s commitment and capacity to build a
sustainable democracy is very limited and the fear of contracting their voter
base in the South is a real political nightmare for them compared to creating
a lasting political solution by tackling the thorny political issue of
reconciliation with the Tamil community. They have become entangled in the
corrupt political web, ensnared by populism and a loss of their political soul.

How long will it take for Sinhala hardline forces to understand that the Tamil
community needs to have a dignified existence and political rights in order to
be [i]equal citizens? Despite the Tamil moderate leadership’s assurance to live
in a united Sri Lanka there is no such accommodative gestures to reassure the
Tamil community. ‘A nation never has a real interest in being annexed or
holding on to a country despite itself. The desire of nations to be together is
the only real criterion that must be always be taken into account’ [8].

The victory against the LTTE has not addressed the Tamil community’s real
and just demand for democracy and justice. They continue to be excluded
within a nation, which fought a 30-year war to keep Sri Lanka united. They
are forced to live within a nation which doesn’t recognize them; as a feelings
that they are compelled to live in a country that does not make them part of
the Sri Lanka nation. ‘This situation cannot but make men into nationalists,
and it is better to try and deal with the conditions which engender nationalism
than to preach at its victims and beg them to refrain from feeling what, in
their circumstances, it is only too natural to feel’ [9]. The inability of the
current regime to reassure the moderate Tamil leadership will only
strengthen the hardliners in the Tamil community over time and this will
increase further the nationalist feelings in the Tamil community.

The possibility of another armed uprising is very remote and the regional and
the Indian concerns would not encourage such an outcome. However,
dynamics in the Tamil community could change in view of the hopelessness
that prevails without resolving at least the issue that has arisen after the war.
When it comes to national humiliation and loss of dignity one should not take
anything for granted. In the late 1970’s, the relative peace in the Jaffna society
was so conspicuous that any observation on the proliferation of armed groups
would have belonged to the fanciful world of nationalist political discourse.
However, they emerged. They were real. They lasted for decades. ‘Finally, it is
imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality that
may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal
comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the
past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as
wiling to die for such limited imaginings’ [10]. While Sinhala supremacist
forces felt more comfortable facing the violent LTTE rather than the
democratic demands of the civilian community, is the responsibility of the
State to deal with the political reality of the challenges facing all Sri Lankans.

Conclusion

The State and the armed actors who claim to be the agents of liberation have
attacked Sri Lanka’s democratic pluralist project – and its prospects. The
Tamil community has been left in a worse situation after the 30-year war than
before and now they have no one to stand by them but themselves. With
mounting difficulties in sustaining their families and the community is in
fragile political circumstances after a barbaric war, it is inevitable that
resentment will grow and nationalist sentiments will grow with them. Unless
the Sri Lankan state and the Sinhala political class and the parties in the
South can reformulate their political strategy towards democratic
inclusiveness the political unity as a nation state will be an unstable entity.

The greatest challenge for Sri Lanka now is to liberate our people from the
oppression of the past and create resilient and democratic structures for a
peaceful future that does not repeat the mistakes of the past. It is a challenge
that must be grasped by our political leaders before it is too late.

References
[1] James Manor, The Expedient Utopian, Bandaranaike and Ceylon,
Cambridge: 1985, Cambridge University Press, P.269.
[2] Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political, London: 2005,Verso, P.98.
[3] Elizabeth Nissan and R.L.Stirrat, ‘The Generation of Communal
Identities” in Sri Lanka History and Roots of Conflict, Jonathan Spencer, ed.
London: 1990:Routledge, p.29.
[4] Hannah Arendt, The Promise of Politics, New York: 2005 Choke Books,
p.106.
[5] K.M.de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, and Colombo: Vijitha Yapa
Publications, p.605.
[6] Ernesto Laclau & Chantale Mouffe, Hegemony & Socialist Strategy,
Towards Radical Democratic Politics, London, 1985,Verso, p.178.
[7] Philip G.Roeder and Donald Rothchild”Dilemmas in State Building in
Divided Societies”, in Philip G.Roeder and Donald Rothchild, eds. Sustainable
Peace, Power and Democracy After Civil Wars, Ithaca and London:
2005Cornell University Press, p.13.
[8] Earnest Renan,”Qu’est-ec qu’unecnation?”in Nationalism, John
Hutchinson and Anthony D,.Smith eds.Oxsford:1994:Oxford University
Press,p.18.
[9] Ernest Gellner, Nationalism, Phoenix: 1997,p.103.
[10] Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London: Verso, p.7
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