Fernando Lopez vs Gerardo Roxas

Facts:
Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the candidates for Vice President in the 1965 elections. Lopez
won the election. Roxas appealed his loss before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). The PET was
created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that:
“There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the Vice-
president elect of the Philippines.”
In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the law and he sought
to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez averred that the PET is unconstitutional
for it was not provided for in the constitution. Also, since the PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the
other ten members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly appealed before the SC or that
there may be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is appealed before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.
HELD: Yes. In coming up with the PET, the Congress merely conferred a new function to the Supreme
Court. Such is within its power, the Constitution allowed Congress to determine which body should decide
controversies relating to the election of the President or the Vice President. RA 1793 did not create another
court within the SC for pursuant to the Constitution, “the Judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in
such inferior courts as may be established by law”
The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the fundamental law vests in the judicial branch of the
government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but “the” judicial power under our political
system, and, accordingly, the entirety or “all” of said power, except, only, so much as the Constitution
confers upon some other agency, such as the power to “judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications” of members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested
by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal,
respectively.
Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such
rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable and
demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this
reason, the Constitution ordains that “Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts”, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law.
The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely added the court’s
jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC additional
functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid because the determining of election contests is
essentially judicial.
Judicial Power
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
 Jose Angara vs Electoral Commission

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted
for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On
Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15,
1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8
confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far
been filed. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the election
of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a
resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec.
Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed
period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.

Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission
taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l
Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.

Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.
HELD:
In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution.
1) Yes. The government established by the Constitution follows the theory of separation of powers of the
legislative, the executive and the judicial. In cases of conflict between the several departments and among
the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional
mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.That judicial
supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the
power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which
is the source of all authority.
2) No. The Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the
other two departments of the government. It is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
Under the organic law prevailing before the (1935) Constitution went into effect, each house of the
legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members.
The (1935) Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect
to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.
Such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and
carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the
time and manner of filing protests.
The avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ
pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National
Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting
said contests.
Section 4 of article VI of the (1935) Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each
house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of
its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by
resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner
of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses
of contest.
Confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before such
member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been
filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power
to prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly
should be filed.
Doctrine:

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a
check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject
to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it,
by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has
also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the
National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of
a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine
what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate
funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The
Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
(Garcia v. Macaraig)

DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner Diocese of Bacolod is a Roman Catholic diocese and is represented in this petition by its
Bishop, the Most Rev. Vicente M. Navarra. Petitioner Bishop Navarra is also filing this petition in his
individual and personal capacity as the questioned orders are personally directed at him and also as a
concerned citizen, as the issues raised herein are matters of paramount and transcendental importance to
the public which must be settled early given the far-reaching implications of the unconstitutional acts of
the respondents.

Named as respondents are the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and its Election Officer of Bacolod
City Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon.

On 21 February 2013, the petitioners have caused to be placed on the front wall of the Bacolod Cathedral
two sets of Tarpaulin, each sized 6x10 feet, with the message Conscience Vote (Team Buhay/Team
Patay (Team Patay Tarpaulin). The Team Patay Tarpaulin contained the names of both Anti- and Pro-
Reproductive Health Law senatorial candidates.

In their special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners
sought the nullification of the 22 February 2013 order issued by respondent Atty. Majarucon, which orders
them to remove the supposed oversized Team Patay Tarpaulin of the Diocese of Bacolod. They also
sought to nullify the 27 February 2013 order issued by the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which
orders the immediate removal of the Team Patay Tarpaulin and threatening the petitioner Bishop of
Bacolod with the filing of an election offense if he fails to cause its immediate removal.

On March 5, 2013, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents COMELEC and Atty. Majarucon from removing the Team Patay Tarpaulin.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in directly filing their petition before
this court
Held:

Case
Firestone Ceramics vs CA / Republic vs CA
FACTS:

 This case involves a 99-hectare land presumptively belonging to the Republic of the Philippines,
which land had been adjudicated to private individuals by a court alleged to be without jurisdiction.
 The assailed decision does not indicate the classification of the land in question, when the herein
private respondents obtained their decree of registration thereover.
 Since the validity of the said decision and the original certificate of title as well as transfer certificates
of title issued pursuant thereto hinges on the classification of subject area at the time it was so
adjudicated, determination of the validity of the disposition thereof is in order.
 Petitioner filed Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc these consolidated cases

ISSUE:

WON the SC should hear the case en banc

HELD:
YES. Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, as amended by the Resolution of November 18, 1993: the
following are considered en banc cases:

1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive

agreement, law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question;
2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty;
3. Cases raising novel questions of law;
4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission,
Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit;
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of
the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of
more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both;
7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed;
8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof
merit the attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual
membership of the court en banc; and
9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of
sufficient importance to merit its attention.

In Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, the Court conceded that it is not infallible. Should
any error of judgment be perceived, it does not blindly adhere to such error, and the parties
adversely affected thereby are not precluded from seeking relief therefrom, by way of a motion for
reconsideration. In this jurisdiction, rectification of an error, more than anything else, is of
paramount importance.

On March 8, 2000, the Third Division voted 4-1 to deny petitioners' motion to transfer these cases to the
Banc. Thus, on March 14, 2000, the Court deliberated on the consulta and thereafter, voted 9-5 to accept
the cases for the Banc to pass upon in view of the finding that the cases above entitled are of sufficient
importance to merit its attention. Evidently, the action of the Court under the premises is a legitimate
and valid exercise of its RESIDUAL POWER within the contemplation of paragraph 9 of the
Resolution En Banc of November 18, 1993, which reads: "All other cases as the court en banc by a
majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention."

Untenable is the contention of Justice Panganiban that the Chief Justice and the eight (8) Associate Justices
who voted to treat these consolidated cases as En Banc cases, have not given any cogent or compelling
reason for such action. Considering that paragraph 9 of the Resolution of this Court dated November 18,
1993, has been cited to support the majority opinion, it is decisively clear that these consolidated cases
have been found to be of sufficient importance to merit the attention and disposition of the entire Court en
banc and therefore, the prayer of the Republic of the Philippines and the private petitioners for the Court en
banc to hear and resolve their pending motions for reconsideration, is meritorious. The aforesaid finding
by the Court constitutes a reason cogent and compelling enough to warrant the majority ruling that
the Court En Banc has to act upon and decide petitioners' motions for reconsideration.
It bears stressing that where, as in the present cases, the Court En Banc entertains a case for its
resolution and disposition, it does so without implying that the Division of origin is incapable of
rendering objective and fair justice. The action of the Court simply means that the nature of the cases
calls for en banc attention and consideration. Neither can it be concluded that the Court has taken undue
advantage of sheer voting strength. It was merely guided by the well-studied finding and sustainable opinion
of the majority of its actual membership — that, indeed, subject cases are of sufficient importance meriting
the action and decision of the whole Court. It is, of course, beyond cavil that all the members of this highest
Court of the land are always embued with the noblest of intentions in interpreting and applying the germane
provisions of law, jurisprudence, rules and Resolutions of the Court — to the end that public interest be duly
safeguarded and rule of law be observed.

In the two consolidated cases under consideration, however, the Motions for Reconsideration of the
petitioners, Republic of the Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending and unresolved.

Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues raised, let alone the enormous value of
the area in litigation, which is claimed as government property, there is merit in the prayer of petitioners that
their pending motions for reconsideration should be resolved by the Court En Banc.

WHEREFORE, these consolidated cases are considered and treated as en banc cases

Carpio-Morales v CA

 A complaint was filed by Atty. Renato Bondal and Nicolas Enciso VI before the Ombudsmans
against Binay, Jr and other public officers of City of Makati charging them of of Plunder and
violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City
Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).
 A Special Panel of Investigators created by the Ombudsman to conduct a fact-finding investigation
charged them with 6 administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases for violation of Section 3
(e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).
<See Notes Letter “A” for their violation/s)
 Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, the subject preventive
suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6)
months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.53 The Ombudsman ruled that the
requisites for the preventive suspension of a public officer are present,54 finding that:
o (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that
 (1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati
City had attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project;
 (2) the documents on record negated the publication of bids; and
 (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of
funds; and
o (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service;
o (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and
 o (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access to public records and allow
them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice the
investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them.
o Binay’s Contentions;
-that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of
the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were
undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V
transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second
term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the
administrative cases against him moot and academic.
In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed
to show that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining that he did
not participate in any of the purported irregularities.62 In support of his prayer for injunctive
relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office,
having won by landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the
condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain the charges against him, his
suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the
person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.
 In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the
Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition99 before this Court, arguing that the condonation
doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of
issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the
condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it
during the administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because
Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013

Issue:

1. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the
implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman; -YES
2. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in
CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against
Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine -NO

Held:

1. OMB contends that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive writ against her
office to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution.
She advances the idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770]
likewise insulated it from judicial intervention,"157particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally
obtainable from the courts,"158 claiming that said writs may work "just as effectively as direct
harassment or political pressure would."
 Gonzales III v. Office of the President is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the
Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other constitutional bodies. the
concept of Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:
 First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its
constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless
the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made;cralawlawlibrary

Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to
use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its] functions;168hence, its budget cannot be
strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to impair said
functions; and

Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks of
the office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.

Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman
frompolitical harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics."

 That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to
insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are
apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all.
Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a
provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the
concept's rationale of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.

2. As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed
injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. To recount, the March 16,
2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia,
Jr., while the April 6, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject WPI was based on the cases
of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely following settled
precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be
concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution above.
Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly issued.

With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve the main petition
forcertiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 on the merits. However, considering that the Ombudsman, on
October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr. administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty of
dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office, for
the present administrative charges against him, the said CA petition appears to have been mooted.313 As
initially intimated, the preventive suspension order is only an ancillary issuance that, at its core, serves the
purpose of assisting the Office of the Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no more purpose -
and perforce, dissolves - upon the termination of the office's process of investigation in the instant
administrative case.
 Fabian vs. Desierto G.R. No. 129742,
Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and President of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondent Nestor
Agustin was the District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District.

PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction project including those under the FMED.
Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties. Fabian tried to
terminate their relationship but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of
employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned
administrative case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.

A complaint sought the dismissal of Agustin for violation of Section 19, R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989) and Section 36 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive
suspension. The case later led to an appeal to the Ombudsman. Ombudsman found private respondent
guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension without pay for 1 year. After private
respondent moved for reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that the private respondent’s new
counsel had been his classmate and close associate, hence, he inhibited himself.- and transferred the
case to the Deputy Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and in the order exonerated the
private respondents from the administrative charges.

Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act
of 1989) that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days
from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

RULING:
No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription
in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this
Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of
Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction
would unnecessarily burden the Court.
DUNCANO V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 191894, July 15, 2015

Doctrine:

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director and
higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.

Facts:
Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758.3 On March
24, 2009,4 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case
against him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713. Duncano wilfully, unlawfully
and criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the
year 2002.

Prior to his arraignment, petitioner, Duncano filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to Defer the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest7 before respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division. He asserted that under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249,10 the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction to try and hear the case because he is an official of the executive branch occupying the position
of a Regional Director but with a compensation that is classified as below Salary Grade 27.

The OSP argued that the position of Regional Director was specifically mentioned without indication as to
its salary grade signifies the lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such position, regardless of salary
grade, fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This issue, it is claimed, was
already resolved in Inding. Finally, the OSP contended that the filing of the motion to dismiss is premature
considering that the Sandiganbayan has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

On August 18, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Second Division promulgated its Resolution denying the instant
Motion to Dismiss for being devoid of merit. It ruled that the position of Regional Director is one of those
exceptions where the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not Salary Grade 27.
Petitioner insists that respondent court lacks jurisdiction over him, who is merely a Regional Director with
Salary Grade 26. On the contrary, the OSP maintains that a Regional Director, irrespective of salary grade,
falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Issue:
Whether, according to P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, only Regional
Directors with Salary Grade of 27 and higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Held:
Petitioner, Duncano is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he hold any
position particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues, his case is, in fact,
on all fours with Cuyco.
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director and
higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office. In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner
admittedly occupied the position of Director II with Salary Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of
jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending
petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed for.
Assistant Chief, Personnel Division of the BIR shows that, although petitioner is a Regional Director of the
BIR, his position is classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26.

There is no merit in the OSP’s allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground that
respondent court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.
ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
Facts:
Leo Echegaray was convicted and was to be executed by lethalinjection (RA 8177) The SupremeCourt
issued a temporaryrestraining order restraining the execution of said party. Saidexecution was setfor Jan.
4, 1999 but the petitioner filed his VeryUrgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on Dec. 28, 1998. TheCourt
wasin recess at the time but a Special Session was called to deliberate onsaid matters.
Furthermore,Congress was a new one with about 130new members whose views on capital punishment
werestillunexpressed. The suspension was temporary (until June 15, 1999,unless it sooner becomes
certainthat no repeal or modification of thelaw is going to be made). It was alleged that sine it is already
finalandexecutory, the Supreme Court has lost its jurisdiction with thecase.
Issue:
Whether or not in issuing the temporary restraining order, the Supreme Court has gone beyondits
jurisdiction since the case isalready final.
Ruling:
It is not beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. What the SC could not do is alter the
decision. In the case at hand, the SCdid nothing of the sort. Jurisprudence tells us “the finality of
a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor thecase. By the finality of
the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even afterthe
judgment has become final, the court retains its jurisdiction to executeand enforce it. There is adifference
between the jurisdiction of thecourt to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend,modify oralter the
same. The former continues even after the judgment hasbecome final for the purpose of enforcement of
judgment; the latterterminates when the judgment becomes final. For after the judgmenthas become final,
facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.
I: WON the court loses its jurisdiction on a decided case with a final judgment.

R: The SC does not lose its jurisdiction over a case with a final judgment rendered upon it. What it cannot
do is modify or amend the final decision. The court held that by finality of judgment, the court loses its
jurisdiction to amend the decision but retains its power to execute or enforce it. There is a difference
between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter a
decision. The former continues for the purpose of enforcing the judgment while the latter terminates after
the final judgment is rendered for after the judgment becomes final, facts and circumstances may
transpire which may render the execution unjust or impossible.

OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INC., respondents.

Parties:
• Petitioner - Indian GOCC
• Respondent - Philippine private corporation
Underlying transaction:
• Contact for the respondent to supply to petitioner 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement
• Consideration: $477,300.00 through a confirmed letter of credit

Events:
• Feb 1983 - Indian company ONGC entered into a contract with domestic company PACIFIC, where the
latter was to supply ONGC with 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement, in consideration of ONGC’s payment
of $477k through a letter of credit in favor of PACIFIC
• The oil well cement was loaded and shipped but due to a dispute between ship owner and respondent,
the cargo was held up in Bangkok and did not reach its point destination.
• Despite having already received payment and several demands by the petitioner, the private respondent
failed to deliver the oil well cement
• Upon negotiations, they agreed that the private respondent will replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil
well cement with Class "G" cement. However, on inspection, the Class "G" cement did not conform to the
petitioner's specifications
• The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant
to Clause 16 of their contract
• Arbitrator ruled in favor of petitioner awarding him USD 899,603.77. The award was confirmed by the
foreign court.

• Despite the award and demands by petitioner, respondent refused to pay. Petitioner then filed a complaint
with the RTC of Surigao City for the enforcement of the foreign judgment.
• The RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that the Arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute on
the ground that the referral to the arbitrator under Clause 16 of their contract is erroneous. The breach
consisting of the non-delivery of the purchased materials, should have been properly litigated before a
court of law, pursuant to Clause No. 15
• On appeal, the CA affirmed RTC ruling. The CA likewise noted that judgment of the foreign court did not
contain any statement of facts and law upon which the award was based; hence, the judgment cannot be
enforced by any Philippine court
• MR was denied, thus petition for review on certiorari

Issues:

I. Whether the Arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute

• Yes. The real issue that was bought to the Arbitrator was the non-conformity of the Class "G" cement
with the specifications agreed upon, and no longer the non-delivery of the oil well cement which was
supposedly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts as set forth in Clause 15.
• Clause 16 pertain only to matters involving the technical aspects of the contract
• Clause 15: All questions, disputes and differences, arising under out of or in connection with this supply
order, shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court

II. Whether the foreign judgment is enforceable in this jurisdiction

• Yes. The foreign court adopted the findings of facts and law of the arbitrator as contained in the latter's
Award Paper
 • The constitutional provision that decisions must express the facts and the law on which it is based does
not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals
• Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact
that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of
the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. This Court has held that matters of remedy
and procedure are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum.

• The contention that respondent was not accorded due process is likewise without merit. The essence
of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one
may have in support of one's defense.
• A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until
the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the
giving of due notice therein. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment (Pacific
Cement) had the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity which it failed to do in the
instant case.

3. WON foreign court is enforceable despite PACIFIC’s allegation that it is “bereft of statement of facts &
law upon which the award of ONGC was based” – YES –
The foreign court’s categorical declaration that “Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be part of the decree” means
that it adopted the findings of facts and law of the arbitrator, which contained exhaustive discussions of the
parties’ claims & defenses and the arbitrator’s subsequent evaluation.
=> CA erred in saying that this was a “simplistic decision, containing only the dispositive portion” - In this
jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the
decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court

DE CASTRO VS. JBC

FACTS:

This is a consolidated case which assails the constitutionality of the action of former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo by appointing a Chief Justice 7 days after the Presidential election in 2010.

After the compulsory retirement of former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, the position of Chief Justice was left
vacant. Section 4 (1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution states that, "vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from occurrence thereof," from a, "List of nominees prepared by the Judicial Bar
Council for every vacancy" furthermore, Section 15, Article VII was also taken into consideration which
prohibits the President or the Acting President from making appointments within two (2) months immediately
before the next Presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

The JBC agreed that the vacant position must be filled and there were five (5) candidates for the position
from the most senior of the Associates of the court and one of them is Associate Justice Reynato C. Corona
who was chosen by the President and was appointed for the position of Chief Justice.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice since the Constitution do not apply to the Supreme Court. If the framers of the Constitution intended
the prohibition to apply in the Supreme Court then it should have expressly stated it in the Constitution.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the President can appoint the successor of the Chief Justice..

RULING:

Yes, the President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice as the prohibitions in the Constitution.

If the framers of the Constitution intends that the prohibition shall apply to the appointment of Chief Justice,
then they should have expressly stated it in the Constitution under Section 15 (THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT), Article VII and Section 4 (1), Article VIII (JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT).

Section 14, Section 15 and Section 16 refers only to the appointments made in the Executive Department.