SOLOMON BOYSAW AND ALFREDO M. YULO JR.

Plaintiff-appellees.
Versus

INTERPHIL PROMOTIONS, INC., LOPE SARREAL SR.

And MANUEL NIETO JR.
Defendant-appellants.

G.R. No. L-22590 March 20, 1987

FACTS:
On May 1, 1961, Solomon Boysaw and his then Manager, Willie Ketchum, signed with Interphil Promotions
Inc. represented by Lope SArreal Sr., a contract to engage Gabriel “Flash” Elorde in a boxing contest for the junior
lightweight championship of the world. It was stipulated that the bout would be held at the Rizal Memorial Stadium in
Manila on September 30, 1961 or not late than 30 days thereafter should a postponement be mutually agreed upon
and that Boysaw would not prior to the date of the boxing contest, engage in any other such contest without the
written consent of the Interphil Promotions.
However, before September 30, 1961, Boysaw entered into a non-title bout on June 19, 1962 and without
consent from Interphil Promotions.
On July 2, 1961, Ketchum assigned to J. Amado Araneta the managerial rights over Solomon Boysaw. But
on September 1, 1961, J. Amado Araneta assigned to Alfredo J. Yulo Jr. the managerial rights. On the same date, on
behalf of INterphil, Sarreal wrote a letter to Games and Amusement Board (GAB) expressing concern over reports
that there had been a switch of managers in the case of Boysaw.
After the series of conferences, the GAB scheduled Elorde-Boysaw fight on November 4, 1961. Yulo refused
to accept the change. However, he change his mind and decided to accept the fight date provided that the same was
promoted by Besa.
While an Elorde-Boysaw fight was eventually staged, the fight contemplated in May 1, 1961 boxing contract
never materialized.
As a result, Yulo and Boysaw sued Interphil for damages allegedly due to the latter refusal to honor their
commitments under the boxing contract of May 1, 1961.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the offending party in a reciprocal obligation may compel the other party for specific
performance?

HELD:
No. Evidence established that the contract was violated by Boysaw when, without the approval or consent
of Interphil, he fought a boxing match in Las Vegas. Another violation was theassignment and transfer of the
managerial rights over Boysaw
without the knowledge or consent of Interphil.
While the contract imposed no penalty for such violation, this does not grant any of the parties the unbridled
liberty to breach it with impunity. Our law on contracts recognizes the principle that actionable injury inheres in every
contractual breach.

Article 1170 of the civil code provides those who in the performance of their obligations are
guilty of fraud, negligence or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are
liable for damages.

Article 1191 of the Civil Code provides, The power to rescind

obligations is implied, in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is
incumbent upon him.

The contract in question gave rise to reciprocal obligations.Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from
the same cause, and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is
dependent upon the obligation of the other. They are to be performed simultaneously, so that the performance of one
is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other.
The power to rescind is given to the injured party. Where the plaintiff is the party who did not perform the
undertaking which he was bound by the terms of the agreement
to perform, he is not entitled to insist upon the performance of the contract by the defendant, or recover damages by
reason of his own breach.
BUENAVENTURA ANGELES, ET. AL
 Plaintiff-appellees.
Versus

URSULA TORRES CALASANZ, ET. AL.

Defendant-appellants.

G.R. No. L-42283 March 18, 1985

FACTS:
Ursula Torres Calasanz and Buenaventura Angeles and Teofila Juani entered into a contract to sell a piece
of land located in Cainta Rizal for the amount of P 3,920.00 plus 7% interest per annum on December 19, 1957.
Angeles made a downpayment of P 392.00 upon the execution of the contract. They promise to pay the
balance in a monthly instalment of P 41.20 until fully paid, the instalment being due and payable on the 19 th day of
each month. They paid the monthly instalments until July 1966, when their aggregate payment already amounted to
P 4,533.38.
On December 7, 1966, Calasanz, wrote Angeles a letter requesting the remittance of past due accounts.
On January 28, 1967, Calasanz cancelled the contract because Angeles failed to meet subsequent
payments. Calnsanz denied the letter with their plea for reconsideration of the said cancellation.
Angeles filed a case before the Court of First Instance to compel Calasanz to execute in their favour the
final deed of sale alleging inter alia that after computing all subsequent payments for the land in question, they fund
out that they have paid the total amount including interest, realty taxes and incidental expenses.
Calasanz alleged in their answer that Angeles violated par. 6 of the contract to sell when they failed and
refused to pay and/or offer to pay monthly instalments corresponding to the month of August 1966 for more than 5
months, thereby constraining them to cancel the said contact.
The Court rendered judgment in favour of the plaintiff, hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract to sell has been automatically and validly cancelled by Calasanz.

HELD:
No, the general rule is that rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach, but
only for such substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the parties in making agreement.
The breach of the contract alleged by Calasanz is so slight considering that Angeles had already paid monthly
installments for almost nine years. In only a short time, the entire obligation would have been paid. To sanction the
rescission made by Calasanz will work injustice to Angeles and unjustly enrich Calasanz.

Article 1234 of the Civil Code which provides that: If the obligation has been substantially
performed in good faith, the obligor may recover as though there had been a strict and complete
fulfillment, less damages suffered by the obligee.

Also militates against the unilateral act of the Calasanz in cancelling the contract.
Thus, since the principal obligation under the contract is only P3,920.00 and the plaintiffs-
appellees have already paid an aggregate amount of P4,533.38, the courts should only order the
payment of the few remaining instalment but not uphold the cancellation of the contract. Upon
payment of the balance of P671.67 without any interest thereon, the defendant must immediately
execute the final deed of sale in favor of the plaintiffs and execute the necessary transfer of
documents, as provided in par.12 of the contract.