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06 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador.

RULE 39 continued to Rule 65 107


(Certiorari)
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable 1) REPUBLIC V. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT, G.R. NO.142572, FEBRUARY 20, 2002 - DE LA
and enforceable. PAZ

Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed the SC petitions in the Southern Republic v. Carmel Development, G.R. No.142572, February 20, 2002 – (rule 65)
Hemisphere cases on the basis of, among others, lack of actual justiciable controversy
(or the ripening seeds of one), the   RTC  should  have  dismissed  ROQUE,  ET  AL.’  petition   Doctrine: Rule 46 primarily governs original actions for certiorari filed in the Court of
for declaratory relief all the same. Appeals but Rule 65 generally serves to supplement the same. Rules 46 and 65 co-exist
with each other and should be construed so as to give effect to every provision of both
It is well to note that ROQUE, ET AL. also lack the required locus standi to mount their rules. THEREFORE, the petition should be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate
constitutional challenge against the implementation of the above-stated provisions of original OR certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject
RA 9372 since they have not shown any direct and personal interest in the case. thereof.
While it has been previously held that transcendental public importance
dispenses with the requirement that the petitioner has experienced or is in Emergency Digest: Carmel filed a Complaint for recovery of possession with
actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, it must be stressed that preliminary injunction against DEPED and Caloocan. DEPED filed an MR of the Orders
cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether denying the Extension of Time to file an Answer and Declaring DEPED in default. The
different genus of constitutional litigation. RTC set aside the orders yet denied to dismiss the case. The RTC citing substantial
Towards this end, compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of compliance decided that DEPED should instead be allowed to submit an Answer. DEPED
harmful conduct necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi, as in this filed an MR. DEPED filed a Petition for Certiorari. CA dismissed stating that that the
case. To rule otherwise, would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus petition does not contain certified true copies of the assailed orders.
standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.
Rule 46 primarily governs original actions for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals but
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that Rule 65 generally serves to supplement the same. Rules 46 and 65 co-exist with each
the controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on other and should be construed so as to give effect to every provision of both rules.
the above-discussed   allegations   in   ROQUE,   ET   AL.’   petition,   remain   highly-speculative THEREFORE, the petition should be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate
and merely theorized. original OR certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject
It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being thereof. Clearly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging for certiorari filed by the Department of Education on the ground that it was
it. This ROQUE, ET AL. failed to demonstrate in the case at bar. accompanied by mere duplicate originals instead of certified true copies of the assailed
orders. Indeed, the copies of the orders attached to the petition were the copies
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General by the trial court as counsel of the
discussion on the availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to Department of Education. We note that the Order dated June 15, 1998 was duly signed
the ROQUE, ET AL. exists in the first place. by the presiding judge of the trial court. However, the Order dated August 17, 1998 falls
short of the requirements found in Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 3-96
All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifth requisites for an action for considering that it was not duly signed or initialed by the judge or other appropriate
declaratory   relief,   as   well   as   the   irrelevance   of   the   sixth   requisite,   ROQUE,   ET   AL.’   officer of the court nor does it bear the dry seal thereof. Instead, it contains the stamp
petition for declaratory relief should have been dismissed. Thus, by giving due course to mark  `ORIGINAL  SIGNED’  atop  the  name  of  the  presiding  judge. Still, there is substantial
the same, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC gravely abused its discretion. compliance with the requirement that the petition be accompanied by duplicate
originals of the orders being assailed since the Order dated June 15, 1998 is what is
being primarily assailed in the petition, while the Order dated August 17, 1998 was
C. REVIEW OF JUDGMENT OF COA OR COMELEC (RULE 64) merely the denial of the motion to reconsider the same. A liberal construction of the
Rules may be invoked in this instance to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible.
D. CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS (RULE 65)

Complete Digest:
D.1 CERTIORARI
Facts: Carmel Development, Inc. filed with a Complaint for recovery of possession
with preliminary injunction against the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
06 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 39 continued to Rule 65 108
(Certiorari)
and the Caloocan City School Board. Carmel sought to recover possession of a parcel of On August 17, 1998, the RTC denied the MR stating that the Motion is based on bare
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (64007)15807, allegedly occupied by assertions and no proof has been presented to substantiate their claims. Substantial
the Pangarap Elementary School and the Pangarap High School which were established compliance with the SC circular is sufficient.
by the Department of Education.
Dissatisfied, the Department of Education filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
DEPED filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer dated April 16, 1998 as well as 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals
a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss dated April 24, 1998. seeking   to   annul   the   trial   court’s   orders   dated June 15, 1998 and August 17,
1998. Carmel filed a Comment as well as a Supplemental Comment while the
On April 27, 1998, Carmel filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default alleging that Department of Education filed its Reply.
the period to answer had already lapsed since the subpoenas were served upon the
Department of Education and the School Board on April 2, 1998 and March 2, 1998, On   August   16,   1999,   the   Court   of   Appeals   dismissed   the   Department   of   Education’s  
respectively. RTC granted the motion to declare in default and allow presentation of petition for certiorari and denied on March 17, 2000 the motion to reconsider the same.
evidence ex parte. CA held that the petition does no contain certified true copies of the assailed orders.
Under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is required that the
In an Order dated April 29, 1998, the trial court declared the “Motion  for  Extension of petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the assailed orders and not by
Time to File Answer filed on April 28, 1998 by the Department of Education and the mere duplicate originals.
School  Board  as  moot  and  academic.”[7] Thereafter, in an Order dated April 30, 1998, the
trial   court   declared   that   “no   action   shall   be   taken   on   the Manifestation with Motion to Hence, this Petition.
Dismiss filed on April 30, 1998 by the Department of Education and the School Board
considering that the defendants have already been declared in default and have lost
their  standing  in  court.”[8] Issue:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
On May 14, 1998, the Department of Education filed a Motion for Reconsideration PETITION ON THE GROUND THAT IT WAS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY CERTIFIED
of the Orders dated April 27, 29 and 30, 1998 and to Lift Order of TRUE COPIES OF THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION BUT ONLY
Default It contended that it seasonably filed its motion for extension of time to file its DUPLICATE ORIGINALS. YES, DUPLICATES ALLOWED.
answer on April 16, 1998. It also claimed that it filed its motion to dismiss within the
reglementary period. It explained that the summons issued on March 23, 1998 was B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
received by the School Board on March 27, 1998 and not on March 2, 1998 as GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT WHEN
erroneously found by the trial court. The Department of Education further claimed THE   LATTER   DENIED  PETITIONER’S   MOTION  TO   DISMISS   NOTWITHSTANDING  
that Carmel failed to notify and furnish it with a copy of the motion to declare it in THE  FACT   THAT   PRIVATE   RESPONDENT’S   PLEADING  SHOWS   LITIS   PENDENTIA.    
default. Aside from praying for the lifting of the order of default, the Department of YES
Education likewise sought the dismissal of the case for violation of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94[10] on forum shopping. Carmel filed an Opposition C. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE
on June 8, 1998. RESPONDENT HAS COMPLIED WITH SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE
CIRCULAR NO. 04-94. NO
In an Order dated June 15, 1998, the RTC set aside its orders dated April 27, 29 and
30, 1998 and lifted the order of default. The trial court, however, denied the
dismissal of the case, saying that justice would be better served if DEPED was allowed Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
to submit their answer. Appeals dated August 16, 1999 and Resolution dated March 17, 2000 dismissing the
Department  of  Education’s  petition  are  SET  ASIDE.  The  complaint  filed  by  respondent  
The Department of Education filed a Manifestation with Motion for Carmel Development, Inc. against the Department of Education with the Regional Trial
Reconsideration of the Order dated June 15, 1998. It  contended  that  the  trial  court’s   Court of Caloocan City (Branch 125) in Civil Case No. C-18264 is DISMISSED without
finding  of  “substantial  compliance”  with  the  Supreme  Court  Circular  had  “no  factual  or   prejudice.
legal   bases   to   stand   on.” It also maintained that Carmel is engaged in forum SO ORDERED.
shopping. Carmel filed its Opposition dated July 31, 1998 claiming that the issues in the
other pending cases are different.
Ratio:
06 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 39 continued to Rule 65 109
(Certiorari)
First Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of the Petition accompanied by mere duplicate originals instead of certified true copies of the assailed
“The   filing   of   original   actions   for certiorari in the Court of Appeals is governed by orders.
Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that the petition Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 3-96 defines duplicate originals in this
for   certiorari   “be   accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true wise:
copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof x   x   x.” The same “1. The   “duplicate   original   copy”   shall   be   understood   to   be   that   copy   of   the  
Section  provides  that  “the  failure  of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing decision, judgment, resolution or order which is intended for and furnished to a
requirements  shall  be  sufficient  ground  for  the  dismissal  of  the  petition.” party in the case or proceeding in the court or adjudicative body which rendered
and issued the same. xxx.
This is the clear import of Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 46 (Original Cases) of the 1997 Rules 2. The duplicate original copy must be duly signed or initialed by the authorities
which read in pertinent parts: or the corresponding officer or representative of the issuing entity, or shall at least
“SECTION  1. Title of cases. – In all cases originally filed in the Court of Appeals, the party bear the dry seal thereof or any other official indication of the authenticity and
instituting the action shall be called the petitioner and the opposing party the completeness of such copy. xxx.”
respondent.
SEC. 2. To what actions applicable. – This Rule shall apply to original actions Indeed, the copies of the orders attached to the petition were the copies furnished
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto. to the Office of the Solicitor General by the trial court as counsel of the Department of
Except as otherwise provided, the actions for annulment of judgment shall be Education. We note that the Order dated June 15, 1998 was duly signed by the presiding
governed by Rule 47, for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus by Rule 65, and for quo judge of the trial court. However, the Order dated August 17, 1998 falls short of the
warranto by Rule 66. requirements found in Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 3-96 considering that
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. - x x x. it was not duly signed or initialed by the judge or other appropriate officer of the court
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof nor does it bear the dry seal thereof. Instead, it contains the stamp mark `ORIGINAL
on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the SIGNED’  atop  the  name  of  the  presiding  judge. Still, there is substantial compliance with
petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or the requirement that the petition be accompanied by duplicate originals of the orders
certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, being assailed since the Order dated June 15, 1998 is what is being primarily assailed in
such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents the petition, while the Order dated August 17, 1998 was merely the denial of the motion
relevant or pertinent thereto. xxx.” (Emphasis supplied) to reconsider the same. A liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in this
instance to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.
The  phrase  “[e]xcept   as  otherwise  provided”   means   exactly  what   it  says,  that   is,   except  
as otherwise provided in Rule 46, original actions for certiorari shall be governed by Second issue: Litis Pendentia
Rule 65. Rule 46 should be construed in relation to Rule 65 without rendering any of its
provisions useless. This   is   evident   in   Section   6   of   Rule   65   which   provides   that   “[i]n   DEPED says that there two other cases pending before another court (seeking
petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the provision recovery of possession of the parcel of land, enjoining the principal and other
of  Section  2,  Rule  56,  shall  be  observed.” representatives from building additional buildings of the same parcel of land, and an
action for declaration of ownership and quieting of title involving the same parcel of
This simply means that “the following rules which are of primary governance in the land.) In sum, the Department of Education argues that all three cases revolve
Court of Appeals, viz.: Rule 46 (Original Actions in the Court of Appeals), Rule 48 around the same parties' conflicting claims of ownership and possession over the
(Preliminary Conference), Rule 49 (Hearings on Oral Argument), Rule 51 (Judgment), same parcel of land. Carmel insists there is no forum shopping.
and Rule 52 (Motion for Reconsideration) have been expressly made applicable to An important issue of fact exists - whether there are two other similar cases
original actions in the Supreme Court save for those portions which deal strictly with pending in another court as alleged in the motion to dismiss. Since resolution of
and  are  specifically  intended   for  appealed  cases  in  the  Court  of  Appeals.” [17] (Emphasis this issue requires presentation of proof, the trial court should not have decided
supplied) the issue without giving the parties an opportunity to present proof of their
respective stand in a hearing duly held for that purpose.
In fine, Rule 46 primarily governs original actions for certiorari filed in the Court In light of Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 16, the appellate court erred in finding that
of Appeals but Rule 65 generally serves to supplement the same. Rules 46 and 65 there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in precipitately
co-exist with each other and should be construed so as to give effect to every denying the motion to dismiss without so much as a hearing and giving the party
provision of both rules. concerned an opportunity to present its proof. Verily, the charge of forum shopping
or litis pendentia, which works havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, requires the
Clearly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition presentation of proof and the Department of Education should have been given an
for certiorari filed by the Department of Education on the ground that it was opportunity to do so.
06 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 39 continued to Rule 65 110
(Certiorari)
retained counsel will be deemed substantial compliance with the rule. A certification
Third Issue: Compliance with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 against forum shopping executed by retained counsel should not pass muster in
We have ruled that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on a this case lest the objectives of the rule be subverted.
technicality. However, we find that remanding the case to the appellate court to resolve
the remaining issue will serve no useful purpose. It is more in consonance with the
2) JIAO ET AL. V. NLRC, G.R. NO. 182331, APRIL 18, 2012 – GERALDEZ
speedy disposition of justice for us to resolve this particular legal question since no
factual issues are involved.
The Supreme Court Circular, with minor modifications, has been incorporated in G.R. No. 182331 April 18, 2012
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1997 before Carmel filed
its complaint on March 17, 1998. The requirement of a certification against forum MA. CORINA C. JIAO, et al. vs. NLRC, GLOBAL BUSINESS BANK, METROBANK, et al.
shopping has likewise been adopted in Rules 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 64 and 65.[20]
The rule on certification against forum shopping is intended to prevent the
actual filing of multiple petitions or complaints involving identical causes of ER: The employees of Philbank were under a Gratuity Pay Plan which provided for 1
action, subject matter and issues in other tribunals or agencies as a form of forum month salary for every year of service in the event of separation without fault of the
shopping.[21] This is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant should not be employee. Eventually, Philbank merged with Globalbank, and the petitioners were
allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different forums, as this practice is redundated.  They  received  a   Special   Separation  Program   that  gave   them   150%  month’s  
detrimental to orderly judicial procedure. [22] salary for every year of service. After receiving their separation pay, they filed a
The rule expressly requires that a certification against forum shopping complaint  for  more  separation  pay,  saying  they  lacked  50%  of  a  month’s  salary  because  
should be attached to complaints or other initiatory pleadings filed before the 100% of the 150% rightfull belonged to them as separation pay (in other words,
courts. The rule also requires that the party, not counsel must certify under oath they want 200% salary: 100% separation pay and 100% gratuity pay). The LA ruled in
that he has not commenced any other action involving the same issues in the favor of the Banks. NLRC affirmed the LA. Without filing an MR, the petitioners went
courts or any other tribunal or agency. straight to the CA via Rule 65 certiorari. The CA dismissed for lack of an MR. Held: The
A cursory examination  of  Carmel’s  complaint  shows  that  the  certification  against   SC affirmed the CA, saying the petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the
forum shopping found at the end thereof was attested by its counsel Juan Victor R. determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense
Llamas and not by plaintiff or any of the principal parties as required by the rule. This with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, the petitioners must show a
is fatal to  Carmel’s  cause. concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so. Whimsical and arbitrary deviations
The certification against forum shopping must be by the plaintiff or any of the from the rules cannot be condoned in the guise of a plea for a liberal interpretation
principal parties and not by the attorney. It is mandatory that the certification be thereof.
executed by the petitioner himself, and not by the attorney. A certification against forum
shopping executed by counsel is cause for dismissal of the case. COMPLETE
In this case, Carmel admits that their lawyer signed the certification against forum
shopping. Carmel   now   asserts   that   their   lawyer’s   signature   must   be   accepted   as   Facts: [*Note: All the labor stuff has nothing to do for our class. No need to read them
substantial compliance with the requirements of the Supreme Court Circular intently.]
citing Robern Development Corporation vs. Quitain.[29] Regrettably, reliance on said case
is misplaced and could not relieve Carmel of the adverse effect of non-compliance. The
same could not be said of the instant case. Carmel does not claim or imply that Atty. 1. The numerous petitioners here were regular employees of Philbank. They were
Juan Victor R. Llamas who executed the certification against forum shopping was subject to a Gratuity Pay Plan for employees, wherein basically any separation
Carmel’s   internal   legal   counsel   or   corporate   officer   charged  with  monitoring   Carmel’s   without fault from the employee (reaching 60, death, sickness, resignation, etc.) will
legal cases before courts, tribunals or quasi-judicial agencies. For all intents and be paid 1 month salary for every year of service. (Old Plan)
purposes, he was merely a retained lawyer and his execution of the certification does 2. Another plan was devised by Philbank. Now, employees separated without fault
not constitute substantial compliance with the rule. shall be entitled to either one hundred percent (100%) of his accrued gratuity
The mandatory character of the requirement that the certification be signed by the party benefit or the actual benefit due him under the Plan, whichever is greater. (New
and not merely by the retained counsel is underscored by the Department of Plan)
Education’s   allegation   in  its   Motion   to   Dismiss   and   subsequent   pleadings   that   Carmel   is   3. Eventually, Philbank merged with Globalbank. Although Philbank was the surviving
actually engaged in forum shopping. The rationale for this requirement assumes greater entity, it opted to operate under the name Globalbank.
importance considering that the retained counsel may be unaware of the other pending 4. As a result of this merger, a Special Separation Program (SSP) was implemented
cases which he may not be handling. Surely, the policy of the rule to promote and and the petitioners were granted a separation package equivalent to one and a half
facilitate the orderly administration of justice will be undermined if certification by the
06 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 39 continued to Rule 65 111
(Certiorari)
month’s   pay   (or   150%   of   one   month’s   salary)   for   every   year  of   service  based   on   The petitioners claim that it was error for the CA to have dismissed their petition on the
their current salary. sole basis thereof. According to the petitioners, they had opted not to file a motion for
5. The petitioners here availed of the SSP and executed the Letters of Acceptance and reconsideration as the issues that will be raised therein are those that the NLRC had
Waiver and Quitclaims. already passed upon. The petitioners likewise invoke the liberal application of
6. Metrobank then acquired all the assets and liability of Globalbank. procedural rules.
7. Subsequently, petitioners filed separate complaints for non-payment of separation
pay  with  prayer  for  damages  and  attorney’s  fees. To begin with, the petitioners do not have the discretion or prerogative to determine the
a. The petitioners asserted that, under the Old Plan, they were entitled to an propriety of complying with procedural rules. This Court had repeatedly emphasized in
additional  50%  of  their  gratuity  pay  on  top  of  150%  of  one  month’s  salary   various cases involving the tedious attempts of litigants to relieve themselves of the
for every year of service they had already received. They insisted that consequences of their neglect to follow a simple procedural requirement for perfecting a
100% of the 150% rightfully belongs to them as their separation pay. petition for certiorari that he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the
Thus, the remaining 50% was only half of the gratuity pay that they are manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules. The
entitled to under the Old Plan. petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the determination of whether a motion for
b. They further allege they were defrauded into signing the quitclaims and reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement of filing a motion
that these were done without full knowledge of its legal implications. for reconsideration, the petitioners must show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason
8. In defense, Globalbank said that the additional 50% gratuity pay was already for doing so.
included in the computation of the separation pay. Further, the waivers should be
considered completely valid.
a. Metrobank disclaimed liability, saying it acquired Globalbank only after As the CA correctly noted, the petitioners did not bother to explain their omission and
this termination thing happened. Hence, there was no employment only did so in their motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition. Aside
relationship. from the fact that such belated effort will not resurrect their application for a writ of
9. Labor Arbiter ruled for the banks and against herein petitioners. NLRC affirmed the certiorari, the reason proffered by the petitioners does not fall under any of the
LA. recognized instances when the filing of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed
10. Petitioners went up to the CA via certiorari under Rule 65. with. Whimsical and arbitrary deviations from the rules cannot be condoned in the guise
a. Apparently, they did not MR the NLRC decision. of a plea for a liberal interpretation thereof. We cannot respond with alacrity to every
11. CA dismissed the petition for failing to file an MR of the decision under review claim of injustice and bend the rules to placate vociferous protestors crying and
before resorting to certiorari. It further ruled that this case did not fall under claiming to be victims of a wrong.
any of the recognized exceptions to the rule on MRs.
12. Petitioners filed an MR of the CA decision. Denied. Substantive Issues

Issues: In sum, the New Gratuity Plan and SSP are valid and must be given effect, inasmuch as
their provisions are not contrary to law; and, indeed, grant benefits that meet the
1. W/N it was an error for the CA to dismiss the petition for failing to file an MR before minimum amount required by the Labor Code. The petitioners have voluntarily sought
filing the petition under Rule 65 – NO. CA was correct. such   benefits   and   upon   their   receipt   thereof,   executed   quitclaims   in   Globalbank’s   favor.
2. Substantive – W/N they were entitled to the additional pay, the validity of the quit The petitioners cannot, upon a mere change of mind, seek to invalidate such quitclaims
claims, etc. – NO. Lower courts were correct. and renege on their undertaking thereunder, which, to begin with, is supported by a
substantial consideration and which they had knowingly assumed and imposed upon
themselves.
Employees lose. Banks win. CA decision affirmed.
We   hold  that  Metrobank  cannot   be  held  liable   for  the  petitioners’  claims.   The  liabilities  
Ratio: that   Metrobank   assumed   can   be   characterized   as   those   pertaining   to   Globalbank’s  
banking  operations.  They  do  not  include  Globalbank’s  liabilities  to  pay  separation pay to
The   petitioners’   unexplained   failure   to   move   for   the   reconsideration   of   the   NLRC’s   its former employees.
resolution before applying for a writ of certiorari in the CA is reason enough to deny
such application. While Metrobank is indeed a parent of Globalbank, one fact cannot be ignored – that
Globalbank has a separate and distinct juridical personality. In the instant case, none of
Procedural Issue
06 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 39 continued to Rule 65 112
(Certiorari)
these circumstances is present such as to warrant piercing the veil of corporate fiction In her Affidavit6 executed on May 5, 1999, Arcobillas admitted her mistake, apologized
and treating Globalbank and Metrobank as one. for it, and stated that she did not benefit from the unintentional misposting. She
narrated that she erroneously posted US$5,517.10, instead ofP5,517.10, which figure
represents the peso value of US$138.00. She honestly believed that the US$5,517.10 was
3) PNB V. ARCOBILLAS, 2013 - KING
correct because when added to the other on-line dollar transaction of US$1,004.60 the
result   was   US$6,521.70,   which   tallied   with   the   teller’s   machine   reading.   Arcobillas  
PNB v. Arcobillas, 2013 – KING, G.R. No. 179648 further explained that the heavy workload that day, a Friday coinciding with payroll day,
plagued with intermittent power interruptions, brought on a severe headache which
ER:
greatly affected her work performance.
Arcobillas, teller of PNB, wrongly credited the Savings account of Nomad-Spoor. Instead
of adding P5,517.00 to the account, that amount was added in dollars. ($5,517). Nomad- On   February   24,   2000,   PNB’s   Administrative   Adjudication   Panel   found   Arcobillas   guilty  
Spoor withdrew the amounts and ran away with all the money. PNB fired Arcobillas on of gross neglect of duty and meted upon her the penalty of forced resignation with
the ground of gross and habitual negligence. Arcobillas filed an illegal dismissal benefits, to take effect immediately upon her receipt thereof. Upon denial of her plea for
complaint. reconsideration, Arcobillas instituted a Complaint 7 for illegal dismissal with money
claims   against   PNB,   PNB’s   Senior   Manager   Reynald   A.   Rey   and   Senior   Vice-President
LA: reinstate Arcobillas. Rosauro C. Macalagay.

NLRC: same. Rule 65 with the CA. LA ruling

CA: same. But note here that CA took cognizance of the case without an MR of the NLRC PNB should reinstate Arcobilla. No finding of gross and habitual negligence. There was
decision – this was fatal. no bad faith involved.
SC:

The filing of a Motion for Reconsideration is not a mere technicality of procedure.27 It is Appeal to NLRC
a jurisdictional and mandatory requirement which must be strictly complied with. 28
PNB alleges that bad faith is not a requirement before an employer may dismiss an
A Motion for Reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party employee.
can resort to the special civil action for certiorari.
But NLRC still affirmed LA.
Thus,  PNB’s  "failure  to   file  a   Motion  for   Reconsideration  with  the  NLRC   before availing
itself of the special civil action for certiorari is a fatal infirmity."

Facts: CA  took  cognizance  of  PNB’s  petition  for  certiorari  even without PNB filing an MR of the
NLRC.
On May 15, 1998, the PNB Foreign Currency Denomination-Savings Account (FCD-S/A) Nevertheless, CA affirmed NLRC with a modification that the losses be shouldered as
No. 305703555-1 of Avelina Nomad-Spoor (Nomad-Spoor) was credited with follows:
US$138.00. However, instead of posting its peso equivalent of P5,517.10, Arcobillas, the
assigned administrative teller at PNB Bacolod-Lacson branch, erroneously posted PNB – 40%
US$5,517.10, resulting in an overcredit of US$5,379.10. Said amount was later
withdrawn by Nomad-Spoor on May 29, 1998 and June 8, 1998 to the damage of PNB in Arcobillas – 60%
the amount of P214,641.23.

The misposting was discovered only about seven months later. After investigation by
PNB’s   Inspection  and   Investigation   Unit   Arcobillas   was   administratively   charged with MR denied. Petition with the SC assailing the CA decision.
neglect of duty.5
06 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 39 continued to Rule 65 113
(Certiorari)
Issue: May a petition for certiorari against an NLRC decisions be entertained by the CA
despite the non-filing of a Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC? No
SC affirmed that Arcobillas should not be dismissed because there was no finding of
gross and habitual negligence.

Ratio:

The assailed CA Decision must be vacated and set aside.

PNB’s  failure  to  file  a  Motion  for Reconsideration with the NLRC before filing its Petition
for Certiorari before the CA is a fatal infirmity.

At the outset, the Court notes that after PNB received a copy of the August 31, 2004
Decision of the NLRC on October 14, 2004, it did not file any Motion for Reconsideration
such that the said Decision became final and executory on October 19, 2004. Instead,
PNB went directly to the CA to assail the NLRC Decision through a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which the said court took cognizance of.

"a [M]otion for [R]econsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved


party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari x x x. The rationale for the rule is
that the law intends to afford the NLRC an opportunity to rectify such errors or mistakes
it may have committed before resort to courts of justice can be had. Of course, the rule is
not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down exceptions when the filing of a [P]etition
for [C]ertiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a [M]otion for
[R]econsideration,"25 such as "(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court
a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings
have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d)
where, under the circumstances, a [M]otion for [R]econsideration would be useless; (e)
where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f)
where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relied by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower
court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and, (i) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or where public interest is involved."26 Here, PNB did not at all allege to
which of the above-mentioned exceptions this case falls. Neither did it present any
plausible justification for dispensing with the requirement of a prior Motion for
Reconsideration before the NLRC.

It bears to stress that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration is not a mere technicality
of procedure.27 It is a jurisdictional and mandatory requirement which must be strictly
complied with.28 Thus,   PNB’s   "failure   to  file   a   [M]otion   for   [R]econsideration   with   the  
NLRC before availing [itself] of the special civil action for certiorari is a fatal infirmity."
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 1

h. Judicial Partition (Rule 69) .....................................................................................................................55

C O N TE N TS 1) Sepulveda v. Pelaez, G.R. No. 152195, January 31, 2005 - AQUINO ..........................55
i. Ejectment (Rule 70) .....................................................................................................................................57
d. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus (Rule 65) ......................................................................... 2 1) Inocencio v. Hospicio de San Jose, 2013 – ARCEO ...............................................................57
d.2 Prohibition ................................................................................................................................................ 2 2) Serrano v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 162366, November 10, 2006 – BASCARA ................59
1) City Government of Quezon City v. Bayantel, G.R. No. 162015, March 6, 2006 – 3) Esteban v. Marcelo, 2013 – CHAN ................................................................................................61
LAGOS .................................................................................................................................................................. 2
4) Philippine Tourism Authority v. Sabandal-Herzentiel, 2013 – MUTI .......................63
2) LTFRB v. Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc., 2013 – LIBONGCO ............................. 5
j. Contempt (Rule 71) ......................................................................................................................................64
3) Vivas v. Monetary Board of the BSP, 2013 – LOPA ................................................................ 6
1) Curata v. PPA, G.R. No. 154211, June 22, 2009 – NARVASA ...........................................64
4) Corales v. Republic, 2013 – LUCENARIO..................................................................................... 9
2) Fuentes v. Albarracin, A.M. RTJ 05-1587, April 15, 2005 – PEREZ DE TAGLE .....67
d.3 Mandamus .............................................................................................................................................. 11
1) Raul Lambino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006 – MAGTAGNOB . 11
2) Esquivel v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 137237, September 17, 2002 – MUTI ............... 14
3) Dolot v. Paje, 2013 - NARVASA ................................................................................................... 16
e. Quo Warranto (Rule 66)........................................................................................................................... 19
1) Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009 – ORTIZ............................................... 19
2) Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting, G.R. No. 162272, April 7, 2009 -
PEREZ DE TAGLE ........................................................................................................................................ 22
f. Expropriation (Rule 67) ............................................................................................................................ 24
1) Bardillon v. Bgy. Masili, G.R. No. 146886, April 30, 2003 – PUNO .............................. 24
2) Republic v. Mangotara, G.R. No. 170375, July 7, 2010 - QUIJANO-BENEDICTO . 26
3) Republic v. Court of Appeals, July 7, 2010, - RAZON.......................................................... 28
3.5 Republic v. Court of Appeals, August 14, 2009 – PASCUAL ......................................... 32
4) NPC v. Santa Loro, G.R. No. 175176, October 17, 2008 – RESPICIO .......................... 36
5) Apo Fruits v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164195, December 4, 2009 – SANCHEZ
.............................................................................................................................................................................. 40
6) Republic v. Holy Trinity Development Corp., G.R. No. 172410, April 14, 2008 –
SUPERABLE ................................................................................................................................................... 42
g. Judicial Foreclosure (Rule 68)............................................................................................................... 44
1) Huerta Alba v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128567, September 1, 2000 – TANDOC
.............................................................................................................................................................................. 44
2) Bacaling v. Muya, G.R. No. 148404, April 11, 2002 – TEVES (sub – ORTIZ).......... 49
3) Monzon v. Relova, G.R. No. 171827, September 17, 2008 – TIU ................................. 51
4) Nagtalon v. UCPB, 2013 - VELASQUEZ ...................................................................................... 54
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 2

D. CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS (RULE 65) • Bayantel refused to pay the realty tax. It requested for the exemption of its real
properties but this was denied. So it appealed to the LBAA.
• Because of Bayantel’s refusal to pay the taxes, it was issued delinquency notices,
D.2 PROHIBITION warrants of levy and eventually a notice of public auction for its properties.
• Thus, Bayantel withdrew is appeal in the LBAA and filed a petition for prohibition
1) CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY V. BAYANTEL, G.R. NO. 162015, MARCH 6, with urgent application for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction. RTC granted
2006 – LAGOS and issued a TRO and preliminary injunction. RTC then rendered a decision
declaring Bayantel exempt from realty tax.
THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON • QC Govt thus filed this petition for review, assailing that the petition for prohibition
CITY, DR. VICTOR B. ENRIGA, Petitioners, vs. BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, of Bayantel was improper for failure of Bayantel to exhaust admin remedies
provided in the LGC.
INC., Respondent.
• The SC ruled Bayantel was correct in filing a petition for prohibition. Section 2 of
Rule 65 governs petitions for prohibition.
A bit long, but the ER is enough for purposes of the rem issue. o SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. – When the proceedings of any tribunal, …
are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
Doctrine: discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. – When the proceedings of any tribunal, … are without or course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise,
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the • In this case, Bayantel’s properties were already levied and about to be sold on
action or matter specified therein, or otherwise, granting such incidental reliefs as law public auction because of its failure to pay realty taxes. Thus, an appeal to the LBAA
and justice may require. would not have been a speedy and adequate remedy. Also, it should be noted that
before an appeal to the LBAA can be considered, there should be a prior payment
under protest of P43 M should be given. . It is thus understandable why Bayantel
Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to opted to withdraw its earlier appeal with the LBAA and, instead, filed its petition
judicial action can prosper, there is a well-settled exception in cases where the for prohibition with urgent application for injunctive relief. Moreover, one of the
controversy does not involve questions of fact but only of law. recognized exceptions to the exhaustion- of-administrative remedies rule is when,
as here, only legal issues are to be resolved.
ER
Facts:
• Bayantel was granted a franchise to operate radio stations for domestic
telecommunications and broadcasting. It owns several real properties in QC. The • This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to nullify the
law granting its franchise provides a taxing provision which says that it shall be decision and order of the RTC QC declaring the BayanTel exempt from real estate
liable to pay the same taxes on its real and personal property, exclusive of this tax and denying the QC Gov’t’s MR
franchise, as what other persons are required to pay. ( in the ratio, this really means • BAYANTEL is a legislative franchise holder under Republic Act (Rep. Act) No.
that it is liable for all other taxes except realty tax) 3259 to establish and operate radio stations for domestic telecommunications,
• The LGC then took effect, granting LGUs the power to levy realty tax. radiophone, broadcasting and telecasting.
• Congress then amended Bayantel’s franchise, containing the same taxing provision o Section 14 of RA 3259 provides:
(that it will pay the same taxes other people do, exclusive of its franchise) and o (a) The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its real estate,
adding that they shall pay a franchise tax. buildings and personal property, exclusive of the franchise, as other
• The QC Govt then issued a city ordinance, imposing realty tax on all real properties persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to
in QC and withdrawing tax exemptions. Tax declarations were then sent to pay.
Bayantel. o (b) The grantee shall further pay to the Treasurer of the Philippines each
year, within ten days after the audit and approval of the accounts as
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 3

prescribed in this Act, one and one-half per centum of all gross receipts territory covered by the franchise, the life span of the franchise, or the
from the business transacted under this franchise by the said grantee type of service authorized by the franchise.
• RA 7160 or the Local Govt Code then took effect, which grants local govt units • Bayantel wrote the office of the City Assessor seeking the exclusion of its real
within Metro Manila the power to levy tax on real properties. properties in the city from the roll of taxable real properties.
o The 2nd paragraph of Sec 234 of LGC withdrew any exemption from realty o Request was denied so Bayantel appealed with the Local Board of
tax previously granted to all persons, natural or juridical. Assessment Appeals (LBAA)
• RA 7633 then took effect, amending BAYANTEL’s franchise, containing the • Because Bayantel firmly believed in its exempt status, it refused to pay the realty
following tax provision: tax.
o SEC. 11. The grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the o Thus, Quezon City Treasurer sent out notices of delinquency for the total
same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive amount of P43,878,208.18, followed by the issuance of several warrants
of this franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter of levy against Bayantel’s properties preparatory to their sale at a public
may be required by law to pay. In addition thereto, the grantee, its auction
successors or assigns shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to three percent • Threatened, Bayantel withdrew its appeal with the LBAA and filed with the RTC QC
(3%) of all gross receipts of the telephone or other telecommunications a petition for prohibition with and urgent application for TRO and/or writ of
businesses transacted under this franchise by the grantee, its successors preliminary injunction
or assigns and the said percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes on this • On the eve of the set public auction, the RTC issued a TRO, followed by a writ of
franchise or earnings thereof. Provided, That the grantee, its successors or preliminary injunction.
assigns shall continue to be liable for income taxes payable under Title II • RTC rendered a decision declaring BAYANTEL exempt from realty tax and made the
of the National Internal Revenue Code …. xxx. prohibitory injunction permanent.
• Bayantel owned several real properties in QC on which it maintained various • Hence this petition on pure questions of law by the QC Govt.
telecommunications facilities. (Roosevelt St, Maginhawa St., and in Proj. 8) o They were assailing that Bayantel failed to exhaust admin remedies
• The QC GOVT, pursuant to the taxing power vested on local government units by provided in the LGC. And that Bayantel is not exempt from realty taxes.
Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, infra, in relation to Section 232 of the
LGC, supra, enacted City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93, otherwise known as the Quezon Issue:
City Revenue Code (QCRC),5 imposing, under Section 5 thereof, a real property tax
on all real properties in Quezon City, and, reiterating in its Section 6, the
withdrawal of exemption from real property tax under Section 234 of the LGC, [REM ISSUE] Whether Bayantel is required to exhaust administrative remedies before
supra. Furthermore, much like the LGC, the QCRC, under its Section 230, withdrew seeking judicial relief with the trial court? NO
tax exemption privileges in general, as follows:
o SEC. 230. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. – Unless otherwise Whether Bayantel’s real properties in Quezon City are exempt from real property taxes
provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or under its legislative franchise?
presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including
government owned or controlled corporations, except local water Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
districts, cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938, non-stock and non-
profit hospitals and educational institutions, business enterprises certified
by the Board of Investments (BOI) as pioneer or non-pioneer for a period Ratio:
of six (6) and four (4) years, respectively, … are hereby withdrawn
effective upon approval of this Code BAYANTEL is not required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking
• Thus, new tax declarations for Bayantel’s real properties in Quezon City were judicial relief
issued by the City Assessor and were received by Bayantel
• Meanwhile, RA 7925, Public Telecommunications Policy Act was passed which QC GOVT argues that Bayantel had failed to avail itself of the administrative remedies
envisaged to level the playing field among telecomm companies: provided for under the LGC, adding that the trial court erred in giving due course to
o Sec. 23 - Any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity granted Bayantel’s petition for prohibition. To QC GOVT, the appeal mechanics under the LGC
under existing franchises, or may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto constitute Bayantel’s plain and speedy remedy in this case.
become part of previously granted telecommunications franchises and
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the grantees of such
franchises: Provided, however, That the foregoing shall neither apply to The Court does not agree.
nor affect provisions of telecommunications franchises concerning
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 4

Petitions for prohibition are governed by the following provision of Rule 65 of the Rules Admittedly, Rep. Act No. 7633 was enacted subsequent to the LGC. Perfectly aware that
of Court: the LGC has already withdrawn Bayantel’s former exemption from realty taxes,
Congress opted to pass Rep. Act No. 7633 using, under Section 11 thereof, exactly the
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. – When the proceedings of any tribunal, … are without or same defining phrase "exclusive of this franchise" which was the basis for Bayantel’s
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC. In plain language, Section 11 of Rep. Act
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate No. 7633 states that "the grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law
be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the to pay." The Court views this subsequent piece of legislation as an express and real
action or matter specified therein, or otherwise, granting such incidental reliefs as law intention on the part of Congress to once again remove from the LGC’s delegated taxing
and justice may require. power, all of the franchisee’s (Bayantel’s) properties that are actually, directly and
exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise
With the reality that Bayantel’s real properties were already levied upon on account of
its nonpayment of real estate taxes thereon, the Court agrees with Bayantel that an The legislative intent expressed in the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" cannot be
appeal to the LBAA is not a speedy and adequate remedy within the context of the construed other than distinguishing between two (2) sets of properties, be they real or
aforequoted Section 2 of Rule 65. This is not to mention of the auction sale of said personal, owned by the franchisee, namely, (a) those actually, directly and exclusively
properties already scheduled on July 30, 2002. used in its radio or telecommunications business, and (b) those properties which are
not so used. It is worthy to note that the properties subject of the present controversy
are only those which are admittedly falling under the first category.
Moreover, one of the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion- of-administrative
remedies rule is when, as here, only legal issues are to be resolved. In fact, the Court,
cognizant of the nature of the questions presently involved, gave due course to the To the mind of the Court, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 effectively works to grant or
instant petition. As the Court has said in Ty vs. Trampe: delegate to local governments of Congress’ inherent power to tax the franchisee’s
properties belonging to the second group of properties indicated above, that is, all
properties which, "exclusive of this franchise," are not actually and directly used in the
xxx. Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to pursuit of its franchise. As may be recalled, the taxing power of local governments under
judicial action can prosper, there is a well-settled exception in cases where the both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions solely depended upon an enabling law.
controversy does not involve questions of fact but only of law. xxx. Absent such enabling law, local government units were without authority to impose and
collect taxes on real properties within their respective territorial jurisdictions. While
Lest it be overlooked, an appeal to the LBAA, to be properly considered, required prior Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 may be validly viewed as an implied delegation of power
payment under protest of the amount of P43,878,208.18, a figure which, in the light of to tax, the delegation under that provision, as couched, is limited to impositions over
the then prevailing Asian financial crisis, may have been difficult to raise up. Given this properties of the franchisee which are not actually, directly and exclusively used in the
reality, an appeal to the LBAA may not be considered as a plain, speedy and adequate pursuit of its franchise. Necessarily, other properties of Bayantel directly used in the
remedy. It is thus understandable why Bayantel opted to withdraw its earlier appeal pursuit of its business are beyond the pale of the delegated taxing power of local
with the LBAA and, instead, filed its petition for prohibition with urgent application for governments. In a very real sense, therefore, real properties of Bayantel, save those
injunctive relief. The remedy availed of by Bayantel under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules exclusive of its franchise, are subject to realty taxes. Ultimately, therefore, the inevitable
of Court must be upheld. result was that all realties which are actually, directly and exclusively used in the
operation of its franchise are "exempted" from any property tax
BAYANTEL is exempt from realty tax
With the LGC’s taking effect on January 1, 1992, Bayantel’s "exemption" from real estate
Indeed, the grant of taxing powers to local government units under the Constitution and taxes for properties of whatever kind located within the Metro Manila area was, by force
the LGC does not affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons, of Section 234 of the Code, supra, expressly withdrawn. But, not long thereafter,
pursuant to a declared national policy. The legal effect of the constitutional grant to local however, or on July 20, 1992, Congress passed Rep. Act No. 7633 amending Bayantel’s
governments simply means that in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing original franchise. Worthy of note is that Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633 is a virtual
powers, doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal corporations. reenacment of the tax provision, i.e., Section 14, supra, of Bayantel’s original franchise
under Rep. Act No. 3259. Stated otherwise, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 which was
deemed impliedly repealed by Section 234 of the LGC was expressly revived under
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 7633. In concrete terms, the realty tax exemption heretofore
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 5

enjoyed by Bayantel under its original franchise, but subsequently withdrawn by force - Following a bidding, LTFRB accredited Unitrans as one of the two insurance
of Section 234 of the LGC, has been restored by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 7633. providers. Stronghold Insurance was the lead insurer of Unitrans.
- LTFRB made a 5-year contract, embodied in a MOA, containing the following clause:
o WHEREAS, after the expiration of the contract for accreditation, all
2) LTFRB V. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., 2013 – LIBONGCO facilities used by the accredited management groups shall be donated to
the government. In consideration, however, of the initial investment and
ER: the assumption of initial risk, the two management groups herein shall be
given the right to match the best bid/proposal in event another
- During the first run of the LTFRB’s passenger personal accident insurance program, management group qualifies at the end of the term of this agreement.
Stronghold qualified as a bidder and ultimately was awarded a 5-year contract. It - Shortly before the first MOA expired and after its term was extended, LTFRB thrice
was embodied in a MOA. opened bidding for the accreditation of new insurance providers. In each round of
- Prior to the expiration of the first MOA, bidding was again conducted for the bidding, LTFRB required minimum peso capitalization for the lead and member
program. LTFRB required a minimum peso capitalization as well as minimum insurers.
number of minimum member insurers. - Unlike the first 2 references which allowed aggregation of the group members’
- Stronghold did not meet both requirement and was disqualified. It prayed for a writ capital to comply with the capitalization threshold, the third reference reckoned
of prohibition with the CA, which was granted. compliance with the minimum capital requirement for the lead and member
insurers single or on a per insurer basis. It also required a minimum of at least 10
Whether CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition, annulling LTFRB’s bidding
members for each group of insurers.
- Stronghold participated in the 3 biddings but failed to qualify in the third because
- The writ of prohibition lies upon a showing that the assailed proceedings "are
its group only had six members and its minimum capitalization, as the lead
[conducted] without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
insurers, was below the minimum. As such, was disqualified.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." It is the extra-jurisdictional nature of
- Before LTFRB can select the winning bids, Stronghold sought a writ of prohibition
the contested proceedings that grounds the issuance of the writ, enjoining a
form the CA to enjoin the LTFRB from opening the bid documents and to nullify the
tribunal or officer from further acting on the matter before it.
bidding proceedings.
- Stronghold made no claim that LTFRB lacked jurisdiction to implement the
o Stronghold theorized that “per insurer” basis for reckoning compliance
Program or to issue the References for each round of bidding to set the parameters
with the minimum capital requirement under the third bidding violated
for the accreditation of insurance providers. Rather, it rested its case on the theory
the right of first refusal under the first MOA but also the equal protection
that LTFRB acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
clause under the Constitution.
jurisdiction when LTFRB required in the Third Reference a minimum capital
- The CA merely required the LTFRB to file comment. This allowed the LTFRB to
requirement on a "per insurer" basis.
declare the winners of the bidding and sign the contract with 2 new groups of
insurers effective for 2 years.
Doctrine:
o LTFRB prayed for the dismissal of Stronghold’s petition on procedural and
- The standard under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of prohibition is "grave substantive grounds.
abuse of discretion" and not mere "abuse of discretion." The difference is not a - CA found merit in Stronghold’s petition and nullified the third round bidding. It
simple matter of semantics. Unlike the first category of errors which the lower enjoined the LTFRB from enforcing the second MOA until Stronghold shall have
tribunal commits in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the latter class of errors is been given the chance to exercise its right to match the best bidder.
committed by a lower tribunal devoid of jurisdiction or, alternatively, for exercising
Issue:
jurisdiction in an "arbitrary or despotic manner." By conflating "abuse of
discretion" with "grave abuse of discretion," the Court of Appeals failed to follow
Whether CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition, annulling LTFRB’s bidding
the rigorous standard of Rule 65, diluting its office of correcting only jurisdictional
errors.
Held:
COMPLETE
Ratio:
Facts:
- LTFRB created the passenger personal accident insurance program. Under the LTFRB Committed No Grave Abuse of Discretion
program, the LTFRB will accredit two groups of insurance providers, selected
through open bidding, to provide insurance policies to public utility vehicle
operators, covering their passengers against accident-related risks.
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 6

- The writ of prohibition lies upon a showing that the assailed proceedings "are confines them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. Its office is to
[conducted] without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion restrain subordinate courts, tribunals or persons from exercising jurisdiction over
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." It is the extra-jurisdictional nature of matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which
the contested proceedings that grounds the issuance of the writ, enjoining a it has cognizance.
tribunal or officer from further acting on the matter before it. - Prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which
o Stronghold made no claim that LTFRB lacked jurisdiction to implement would direct the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an
the Program or to issue the References for each round of bidding to set the act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is
parameters for the accreditation of insurance providers. Rather, it rested to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to
its case on the theory that LTFRB acted with grave abuse of discretion provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when LTFRB required in the - Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the
Third Reference a minimum capital requirement on a "per insurer" basis. issuance of the extraordinary writs is also within the competence of the CA or the
- The standard under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of prohibition is "grave RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writ must be presented to
abuse of discretion" and not mere "abuse of discretion." The difference is not a either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
simple matter of semantics. The writs governed by Rule 65 – certiorari, mandamus, redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts; or where
and prohibition – are extraordinary remedies designed to correct not mere errors exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and
of judgment (i.e., in the appreciation of facts or interpretation of law) but errors of with serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of
jurisdiction (i.e., lack or excess of jurisdiction). Unlike the first category of errors writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary
which the lower tribunal commits in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the latter class jurisdiction. The judicial policy must be observed to prevent an imposition on the
of errors is committed by a lower tribunal devoid of jurisdiction or, alternatively, precious time and attention of the Court.
for exercising jurisdiction in an "arbitrary or despotic manner." By conflating
"abuse of discretion" with "grave abuse of discretion," the Court of Appeals failed to Emergency Digest: Rural Bank of Faire, Inc. (RBFI) was a rural bank in Cagayan. Vivas et
follow the rigorous standard of Rule 65, diluting its office of correcting only al acquired the controlling interest of the bank and transformed it to EuroCredit
jurisdictional errors. Community Bank, Incorporated (ECBI). The BSP conducted a general examination on ECBI
o LTFRB committed no abuse of discretion, much less a grave one, in in 2007. Thereafter, they cancelled the rediscounting line of the bank. The bank issued
disqualifying Stronghold from the third round of bidding. It is not several resolutions basically saying that the bank had many unsound banking practices
disputed that Stronghold did not meet the minimum capitalization (transferred majority shares of RBFI without securing prior approval of the Monetary
required for a lead insurer under the Third Reference, leaving LTFRB no Board MB, did not obtain the prior approval of the BSP anent the establishment and
choice but to disqualify it. operation of the bank’s sub-offices). Come 2009, the bank was refusing to go thru another
general examination. BSP fined the bank and referred the matter to the Office of the
There was also no undue haste on the part of the LTFRB. It clearly complied with the Special Investigation (OSI) for the filing of appropriate legal action.OSI filed a complaint
posting/publication requirements. It was clearly Stronghold who experienced difficulty
for Estafa Through Falsification of Commercial Documents against certain officials and
in complying with the requirements.
employees of ECBI with the DOJ. MB eventually also released Resolution No. 276 putting
ECBI under receivership (grounds: unable to pay its liabilities, insufficient realizable
3) VIVAS V. MONETARY BOARD OF THE BSP, 2013 – LOPA assets to meet liabilities, cannot continue in business without involving probable losses
to its depositors and creditors, willfully violated a cease and desist order of the
ALFEO D. VIVAS, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE SHAREHOLDERS OF Monetary Board for acts or transactions which are considered unsafe and unsound
EUROCREDIT COMMUNITY BANK vs. THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO banking practices and other acts or transactions constituting fraud or dissipation of the
SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE assets of the institution. Assailing MB Resolution No. 276, Vivas filed this petition for
CORPORATION prohibition before this Court, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB for
prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking business and for placing it under
Topic: Special Civil Actions; Prohibition [Note: really confusing facts. I tried to simplify receivership. [So many complicated banking issues i don't understand but basically, SC
them in the ER. Super summary: ECBI had unsound banking practices so the BSP put said there was no GADLEJ, MB may forbid a bank from doing business and place it under
them under receivership] receivership without prior notice and hearing] As to the REM issues…
Doctrines:
-
Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court W/N petition for prohibition was the proper remedy? Nope! Certiorari dapat!
-
prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court
exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law, and prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law, and
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 7

confines them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. Its office is to January 2006. Internal audit conducted by Vivas et al showed the dismal operation of
restrain subordinate courts, tribunals or persons from exercising jurisdiction over the bank. Measures to revitalize the bank were introduced.
matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which - On December 8, 2006, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued the Certificate of
it has cognizance. Authority extending the corporate life of RBFI for another fifty (50) years. The BSP
- Prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which also approved the change of its corporate name to EuroCredit Community Bank,
would direct the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an Incorporated, (ECBI) as well as the increase in the number of the members of its
act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is BOD, from five (5) to eleven (11)
to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to - Pursuant to the Central Bank Act, the Integrated Supervision Department II (ISD II)
provide a remedy for acts already accomplished. of the BSP conducted a general examination on ECBI with the cut-off date of
- In this case, the petition for prohibition apparently seeks to prevent the acts of December 31, 2007. Exit conference was held on March 27, 2008 wherein BSP
closing of ECBI and placing it under receivership. Resolution No. 276, however, officials apprised Vivas et al of their findings. ECBI submitted its comments via a
had already been issued by the MB and the closure of ECBI and its placement letter dated April 8, 2008.
under receivership by the PDIC were already accomplished. Apparently, the - Sometime in April 2008, the examiners from the Department of Loans and Credit of
remedy of prohibition is no longer appropriate. Settled is the rule that prohibition the BSP arrived at the ECBI and cancelled the rediscounting line of the bank. Vivas
does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli. appealed the cancellation to BSP.5 Thereafter, the Monetary Board (MB) issued
Resolution No. 1255, dated September 25, 2008, placing ECBI under Prompt
W/N the case was properly filed before the SC? Nope! CA dapat! Corrective Action (PCA) framework because of the ff. findings:
- Section 4 of Rule 65 reads: - 1] negative capital of P14.674 million and capital adequacy ratio of negative
Section 4. When and where petition filed. — xxx If it involves the acts or 18.42%;
omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these - 2] CAMEL (Capital Asset Management Earnings Liquidity) composite rating of "2"
Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. with a Management component rating of "1"; and
-
That the MB is a quasi-judicial agency was already settled and reiterated in the case - 3] serious supervisory concerns particularly on activities deemed unsafe or
of Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank And Bangko Sentral Ng unsound.6
Pilipinas.30 - BSP letter dated September 30, 2008:
- Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible because it
- Furnished ECBI with a copy of the Report of Examination
simply ignored the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
- Directed ECBI’s BOD and senior management to
- Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court only on pure
1] infuse fresh capital of P22.643 million;
questions of law. In the case at bench, there are certainly factual issues as Vivas is
2] book the amount of P28.563 million representing unbooked valuation
questioning the findings of the investigating team.
reserves on classified loans and other risks assets on or before October 31,
- Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the
2008; and
issuance of the extraordinary writs is also within the competence of the CA or the 3] take appropriate action necessary to address the violations/exceptions
RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writ must be presented to noted in the examination.
either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the - Vivas moved for a reconsideration of Resolution No. 1255 on the grounds of non-
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts; or where
observance of due process and arbitrariness. The ISD II, on several instances, had
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and
invited the BOD of ECBI to discuss matters pertaining to the placement of the bank
with serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of
under PCA framework and other supervisory concerns before making the
writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary
appropriate recommendations to the MB. The proposed meeting, however, did not
jurisdiction. The judicial policy must be observed to prevent an imposition on the
materialize due to postponements sought by Vivas.
precious time and attention of the Court.
- BSP letter dated Feb 20, 2009 - directed ECBI to explain why it transferred majority
Facts: shares of RBFI without securing prior approval of the MB in violation of the Manual
- Rural Bank of Faire, Inc. (RBFI) was a duly registered rural banking institution with of Regulation for Banks (MORB)
principal office in Cagayan - BSP letter dated March 31, 2009 - ISD II required ECBI to explain why it did not
- Despite the records showing that the bank’s corporate life was to expire on May 31, obtain the prior approval of the BSP anent the establishment and operation of the
bank’s sub-offices.
2005, Vivas and his principals acquired the controlling interest of RBFI sometime in
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 8

- The scheduled March 31, 2009 general examination of the books, records and 3. W/N its GADLEJ to apply the general law embodied in Sec 30 of the New Central Bank
general condition of ECBI with the cut-off date of December 31, 2008, did not push as opposed to the specific law embodied in Sec 11 and 14 of the Rural Banks Act of
through. 1992
- In view of ECBI’s refusal to comply with the required examination, the MB issued 4. W/N MB acted with GADLEJ when it executed the law with manifest arbitrariness,
Resolution No. 726 dated May 14, 2009, imposing monetary penalty/fine on ECBI, abuse of discretion, and bad faith, violation of constitutional rights and to further
and referred the matter to the Office of the Special Investigation (OSI) for the filing of execute a mandate well in excess of its parameters.
appropriate legal action. 5. W/N the power delegated in favor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to place rural
- banks under receiverships is unconstitutional for being a diminution or invasion of the
BSP letter dated May 26, 2009 - advised ECBI to comply with MB Resolution No. 771,
powers of the Supreme Court, in violation of Section 2, Article VIII of the Philippine
which essentially required the bank to follow its directives. Constitution.
- ECBI kept delaying stating that they had unresolved issued subject of its appeal Held: WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DENIED.
before the MB and because Vivas was out of the country. ISD II denied and ordered Ratio:
the general examination to proceed.
- MB issued Resolution No. 823. Approved the issuance of a cease and desist order Vivas availed of the wrong remedy!
against ECBI, which enjoined it from pursuing certain acts and transactions that were - The MB issued Resolution No. 276, dated March 4, 2010, in the exercise of its power
considered unsafe or unsound banking practices, and from doing such other acts or under R.A. No. 7653. Under Section 30 thereof, any act of the MB placing a bank
transactions constituting fraud or might result in the dissipation of its assets. under conservatorship, receivership or liquidation may not be restrained or set aside
- OSI filed a complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Commercial Documents except on a petition for certiorari.
against certain officials and employees of ECBI with the DOJ. - Granting that a petition for prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy
- General examination of the books and records of ECBI was commenced and ended in under the circumstances obtaining.
December 2009. -
Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court
- ISD II reminded ECBI of the non-submission of its financial audit reports for 2007- prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or
2008 with a warning that failure to submit those reports and the written explanation exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law, and
for such omission shall result in the imposition of a monetary penalty confines them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. Its office is to
- MB Resolution No. 276 put ECBI under receivership on the following grounds: restrain subordinate courts, tribunals or persons from exercising jurisdiction over
- (a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which
business; it has cognizance.
- (b) has insufficient realizable assets to meet liabilities; - Prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which
- (c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its would direct the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an
act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is
depositors and creditors; and
to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to
- (d) has willfully violated a cease and desist order of the Monetary Board for
provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.
acts or transactions which are considered unsafe and unsound banking -
In this case, the petition for prohibition apparently seeks to prevent the acts of
practices and other acts or transactions constituting fraud or dissipation of the
closing of ECBI and placing it under receivership. Resolution No. 276, however, had
assets of the institution, and considering the failure of the Board of
already been issued by the MB and the closure of ECBI and its placement under
Directors/management of Eurocredit Bank to restore the bank’s financial
receivership by the PDIC were already accomplished. Apparently, the remedy of
health and viability despite considerable time given to address the bank’s
prohibition is no longer appropriate. Settled is the rule that prohibition does not lie
financial problems, and that the bank had been accorded due process, the
to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli.
Board, in accordance with Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7653 (The New
Central Bank Act), approved the recommendation of ISD II.
The Petition Should Have Been Filed in the CA
- Assailing MB Resolution No. 276, Vivas filed this petition for prohibition before this - Section 4 of Rule 65 reads:
Court, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB for prohibiting ECBI from
Section 4. When and where petition filed. — xxx If it involves the acts or
continuing its banking business and for placing it under receivership.
omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these
Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: -
1. W/N petition for prohibition was the proper remedy? Nope! Certiorari dapat! That the MB is a quasi-judicial agency was already settled and reiterated in the case
2. W/N the case was properly filed before the SC? Nope! CA dapat! of Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank And Bangko Sentral Ng
Pilipinas.30
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 9

- Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible because it business would probably result in the loss to depositors or creditors. In the case of
simply ignored the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas Monetary Board v. Hon. Antonio-Valenzuela,36 the Court
- Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court only on pure reiterated the doctrine of "close now, hear later," stating that it was justified as a
questions of law. In the case at bench, there are certainly factual issues as Vivas is measure for the protection of the public interest.
questioning the findings of the investigating team. - In light of the circumstances obtaining in this case, the application of the corrective
- Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the measures enunciated in Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653 was proper and justified.
issuance of the extraordinary writs is also within the competence of the CA or the Management take-over under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7353 was no longer feasible
RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writ must be presented to considering the financial quagmire that engulfed ECBI showing serious conditions of
either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the insolvency and illiquidity. Besides, placing ECBI under receivership would effectively
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts; or where put a stop to the further draining of its assets.
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and
with serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary - “There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation
jurisdiction. The judicial policy must be observed to prevent an imposition on the of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
precious time and attention of the Court. - Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he
The MB Committed No Grave Abuse of Discretion will have to do is enforce it.
- Vivas argues that implementation of the questioned resolution was tainted with -
Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations
arbitrariness and bad faith, stressing that ECBI was placed under receivership in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
without due and prior hearing, invoking Section 11 of R.A. No. 7353 which states that delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total
the BSP may take over the management of a rural bank after due hearing. He adds transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step
that because R.A. No. 7353 is a special law, the same should prevail over R.A. No. into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.”44
7653 which is a general law. -
In this case, under the two tests, there was no undue delegation of legislative
- The Court has taken this into account, but it appears from all over the records that authority in the issuance of R.A. No. 7653. To address the growing concerns in the
ECBI was given every opportunity to be heard and improve on its financial standing. banking industry, the legislature has sufficiently empowered the MB to effectively
-
BSP officials and examiners met with the representatives of ECBI, including Vivas, monitor and supervise banks and financial institutions and, if circumstances
and discussed their findings. warrant, to forbid them to do business, to take over their management or to place
-
There were also reminders that ECBI submit its financial audit reports for the them under receivership. The legislature has clearly spelled out the reasonable
years 2007 and 2008 with a warning that failure to submit them and a written parameters of the power entrusted to the MB and assigned to it only the manner
explanation of such omission shall result in the imposition of a monetary penalty. of enforcing said power. In other words, the MB was given a wide discretion and
- ECBI was heard on its motion for reconsideration. latitude only as to how the law should be implemented in order to attain its
objective of protecting the interest of the public, the banking industry and the
- For failure of ECBI to comply, the MB came out with Resolution No. 1548 denying economy.
its request for reconsideration of Resolution No. 726. Having been heard on its
motion for reconsideration, ECBI cannot claim that it was deprived of its right
under the Rural Bank Act. 4) CORALES V. REPUBLIC, 2013 – LUCENARIO

Close Now, Hear Later Corales vs. Republic (A lot of this digest was copy pasted from the previous digest
- At any rate, if circumstances warrant it, the MB may forbid a bank from doing made by Jech Tiu in REM DIGESTS 04, some changes in the ratio focusing on
business and place it under receivership without prior notice and hearing. (Section prohibition)
30 of R.A. No. 7653)
- The Court, in several cases, upheld the power of the MB to take over banks without ER: Corales was the Mayor of Nagcalran, Laguna for 3 consecutive terms. During his first
term, Corales appointed Dr. Angeles as Municipal Admistrator, which appointment was
need for prior hearing. It is not necessary inasmuch as the law entrusts to the MB the
approved by the Sangguniang Bayan (SB). The SB disapproved the reappointment of Dr.
appreciation and determination of whether any or all of the statutory grounds for the
Angeles during the second and third term of Corales. Nevertheless, Dr. Angeles
closure and receivership of the erring bank are present. The MB, under R.A. No. 7653,
continued to discharge the duties of such office and received salary therefor. Eventually,
has been invested with more power of closure and placement of a bank under
Andal (Provincial State Auditor) issued an Audit Observation Memorandum, requiring
receivership for insolvency or illiquidity, or because the bank’s continuance in
the comment of Corales on the finding that while Dr. Angeles is a de facto officer, it is
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 10

Corales who must shoulder the salary to be paid. Corales did not reply, but instead filed • Prohibition – To require the Office of the Provincial Auditor recall its AOM and
a petition for prohibition and mandamus in the RTC. CA eventually denied the Petition to eventually desist from collecting reimbursement from Corales
for Prohibition. The issue is W/N the CA was correct in dismissing the Petition for • Mandamus – To compel the then members of the Sangguniang Bayan to recall
Prohibition and Mandamus. HELD: No. CA was correct. its Resolutions denying confirmation Dr. Angeles’ appointment

Reason 1: The AOM issued by Andal was not conclusive on the liability of Corales to pay.
Hence, there being no clear legal wrong yet, such was premature and not yet ripe. - The OSG, on Andal’s behalf, filed a Motion to Dismiss (MTD) Corales’ Petition grounded
on lack of cause of action, prematurity, and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies –
Reason 2: What petitioners actually assail is Andal’s authority to request them to file the the issuance of the AOM was merely an initiatory step in the administrative
desired comment/reply to the AOM, which is beyond the scope of the action for investigation.
prohibition, as such request is neither an actionable wrong nor constitutive of an act
perceived to be illegal. Andal, being the Provincial State Auditor, is clothed with the - The RTCdenied the MTD – Andal was merely a nominal party.
authority to audit petitioners’ disbursements, conduct an investigation thereon and
render a final finding and recommendation thereafter. - Respondent Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA – as the RTC unjustly
denied the Republic’s right to actively prosecute the case.
Reason 3: Moreover, prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment
ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act - The CA granted the Petition.
perceived to be illegal, may only be resorted to when there is “no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” In this case, - Corales filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari to the CA decision. Corales argued
there were other administrative orders available which petitioners did not take. Hence, [RELEVANT TO TOPIC] that by filing a MTD on the ground of lack of cause of action, the
failure to do so is fatal to their action. Republic, in essence, admitted all the material averments and narration of facts stated
his petition. As such, what remains is a pure question of law and the judgment of the
Facts: Petitioner Corales was the Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for 3 RTC denying the MTD is no longer subject to any appeal or review by the CA. Instead, it
consecutive terms, i.e., the 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections. is already appealable and reviewable by the SC under Rule 45, as ruled in China Road v.
CA. It contested that its Petition for Prohibition should not have been dismissed.
• 1st term – Corales appointed petitioner Dr. Angeles to the position of Municipal
Administrator, whose appointment was unanimously by the Sangguniang Issue: Whether or not the CA exceeded its jurisdiction in denying the Petition for
Bayan (SB). Prohibition? No.
• 2nd term – Corales renewed the appointment the said appointment, but such
was disapproved by the SB due to nepotism. [NOTE] Even so, petitioner Dr. Held: Petition for Prohibition denied.
Angeles continued to discharge the functions and duties of his office for which
he received an annual salary of P 210K. Ratio:
- Maximo Andal (Andal), the Provincial State Auditor of Laguna, issued an Audit
Observation Memorandum (AOM, asking for a reply/comment from Corales. The AOM It is beyond doubt that the issuance of an AOM is, indeed, an initial step in the conduct of
states that: an investigative audit considering that after its issuance there are still several steps to
be conducted before a final conclusion can be made or before the proper action can be
• (1) Dr. Angeles’ appointment as Municipal Administrator during the second had against the Auditee. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner Corales’ claim that
and third terms was without legal basis; his comment thereon would be a mere formality.
• (2) But Dr. Angeles can be considered as a de facto officer entitled to the
emoluments of the office for the actual services rendered; The action therefore is not ripe for adjudication. The requisites of actual case and
• (3) Nonetheless, it is not the Municipality that should be made liable for the ripeness are absent in the present case. To repeat, the AOM issued by Andal merely
salary, but the appointing authority, Corales. requested petitioner Corales to comment/reply thereto. Truly, the AOM already
contained a recommendation to issue a Notice of Disallowance; however, no Notice of
Disallowance was yet issued. Similarly, there was no clear showing that petitioners,
- Instead of submitting his comment/reply thereon, Corales, together with petitioner Dr. particularly petitioner Corales, would sustain actual or imminent injury by reason of the
Angeles, opted to file a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against Andal and the issuance of the AOM.
then members of the Sangguniang Bayan before the RTC of San Pablo City, Laguna.
What petitioners actually assail is Andal’s authority to request them to file the desired
comment/reply to the AOM, which is beyond the scope of the action for prohibition, as
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 11

such request is neither an actionable wrong nor constitutive of an act perceived to be administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken
illegal. Andal, being the Provincial State Auditor, is clothed with the authority to audit from them and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency the
petitioners’ disbursements, conduct an investigation thereon and render a final finding opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.
and recommendation thereafter. Hence, it is beyond question that in relation to his audit
investigation function, Andal can validly and legally require petitioners to submit
D.3 MANDAMUS
comment/reply to the AOM, which the latter cannot pre-empt by prematurely seeking
judicial intervention, like filing an action for prohibition.
1) RAUL LAMBINO V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 174153, OCTOBER 25, 2006 – MAGTAGNOB
Moreover, prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the
defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be Lambino v Comelec
illegal, may only be resorted to when there is “no appeal or any other plain, speedy, Topic: Mandamus
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Note: Mandamus was only discussed in the Opinions after the Decision.
EMERGENCY DIGEST
The action for prohibition is premature since there are still many administrative
remedies available to petitioners to contest the said AOM. Section 1, Rule V of the 1997 Quick Facts:
Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, provides: “[a]n aggrieved party may appeal from • Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite to ratify their
an order or decision or ruling rendered by the Auditor embodied in a report, initiative petition (signed by millions of voters) to change the 1987 Constitution.
memorandum, letter, notice of disallowances and charges, Certificate of Settlement and COMELEC denied their request in a Resolution. Lambino group filed a petition for
Balances, to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency under audit.” From the mandamus and certiorari.
final order or decision of the Director, an aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission
proper.28 It is the decision or resolution of the Commission proper which can be Issue: WON Mandamus is proper? Was discussed only in the opinions part. Concurring
appealed to this Court said that Mandamus was properly denied because their petition did not present a clear
right to warrant the relief granted. In the dissenting, it said that Mandamus should have
In Fua, Jr. v. COA,30 citing Sison v. Tablang,31 this Court declared that the general rule is been granted because Lambino group has standing.
that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail himself
of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The premature Ratio:
invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The Ratio talked about the Constitutional provision re referendum and initiative. In short,
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal they said that the petition failed to comply with the Constitutional provision. It was not
reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides initiated by the people. No draft of the proposals was shown to them. It was a revision,
for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for not an amendment. Only an amendment of the constitution was allowed if it was
reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system initiated by the people.
of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and Doctrine:
dispose of the case. x x x. Moreover, courts have accorded respect for the Concurring opinion
specialized ability of other agencies of government to deal with the issues within Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who act to enforce a public right and to
their respective specializations prior to any court intervention. compel the persons of a public duty most especially when mandated by the
Constitution.99 However, under Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, for a
As one of the three (3) independent constitutional commissions, COA has been petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition is a
empowered to define the scope of its audit and examination and to establish the ministerial act or duty and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or
techniques and methods required therefor; and to promulgate accounting and person, and that petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the
auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and grant thereof. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate
expenditures or uses of government funds and properties. of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public official
Thus, in the light of this constitutionally delegated task, the courts must exercise caution and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty should be performed, such duty
when intervening with disputes involving these independent bodies, for the general is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of
rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first the same requires neither the exercise of an official discretion nor judgment.100
avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 12

To stress, in a petition for mandamus, petitioner must show a well defined, clear and committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition since
certain right to warrant the grant thereof.101 In this case, petitioners failed to establish Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that
their right to a writ of mandamus as shown by the foregoing disquisitions. Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance
Dissenting opinion as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people."
• The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or rules "as temporary devises to implement the system of initiative." (in short, OSG
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins sided with Lambino group)
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station x x x and there is no other plain, • Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved opposing the Lambino Group's petition. The opposing intervenors challenged (1)
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x. the Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature
gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's compliance with the
minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition
COMPLETE DIGEST: under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; 12 (4) the nature of the
Facts: proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided under
• Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups1 Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's
and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative
change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petitions to only one subject.
petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative • The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments.
petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of the Initiative and Referendum
Act ("RA 6735"). ISSUES:
• The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII
individuals constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with each legislative of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative- No.
district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also 2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the
million individuals. initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution -
• The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by 3. W/N COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) 4 and Sections 1-4 of Lambino Group's petition for mandamus – NO.
Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory
Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential HELD: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group
prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the RATIO:
following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification: There is no merit to the petition.
• DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For
SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER? following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to
• The Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating the Commision on Elections.
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their
initiative.7
• COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition PART 1 →NOT IMPORTANT FOR REM
for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution.
The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections8 1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
amend the Constitution.9 • Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision
• The Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This
to set aside the COMELEC Resolution and to compel the COMELEC to give due section states:
course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 13

• Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office;
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the 27

total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be o 3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x interim Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or
(Emphasis supplied) revisions to the Constitution.28
• The framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed • In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it
constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the
they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through
already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people initiative upon a petition."
should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature." 2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing
• The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative Revision through Initiatives
upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the • A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the
people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional
author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article
their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be XVII of the Constitution provides:
embodied in a petition.
• The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of ARTICLE XVII - AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group • Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet20 after the oral arguments o The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
when they filed their Memorandum. There is not a single word, phrase, or o A constitutional convention.
sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature • Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
changes is attached to it.
• The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift • The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between
from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and
government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to
proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may
the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution propose only amendments to the Constitution.
envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of • Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
the Constitution. constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of
• The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial
initiative filed with the COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions
intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change
Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets did not that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved.
contain the text of the proposed changes. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment
• In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment • In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the
with an indication in the signature sheet of such attachment. constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test:
• For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the
sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before signing. They could proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes, among which are: 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous
o 1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and existing provisions."36 The court examines only the number of provisions affected
thus members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;26 and does not consider the degree of the change.
o 2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its • The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in
members, who are almost all the present members of Congress, decide to the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far
call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the interim reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 14

revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a Constitution.99 However, under Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, for a
proper subject of inquiry. petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition
• Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is is a ministerial act or duty and not purely discretionary on the part of the board,
a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's officer or person, and that petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to
proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article warrant the grant thereof. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or
VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.40 tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to
Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a
unicameral legislature. duty upon a public official and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
• A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when should be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of an
reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A official discretion nor judgment.100
shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral- • To stress, in a petition for mandamus, petitioner must show a well defined, clear
Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.101 In this case, petitioners failed to
executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government. establish their right to a writ of mandamus as shown by the foregoing disquisitions.
• Dissenting opinion of J. Puno
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary • Neither is it necessary for said signatories to authorize Lambino and Aumentado to
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic file the petition for certiorari and mandamus before this Court.
requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a • SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station x x x and there is no other
terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the • Thus, any person aggrieved by the act or inaction of the respondent tribunal,
Lambino Group's Initiative board or officer may file a petition for certiorari or mandamus before the
appropriate court. Certainly, Lambino and Aumentado, as among the proponents of
5. Conclusion the petition for initiative dismissed by the COMELEC, have the standing to file the
The Lambino Group thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified petition at bar.
support to the agenda" of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This
forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign will" in
the present initiative. 2) ESQUIVEL V. OMBUDSMAN, G.R. NO. 137237, SEPTEMBER 17, 2002 – MUTI

Keywords: police vs. mayor; Ombudsman’s discretionary duty not subject to mandamus
PART 2 – MUST READ→ IMPORTANT FOR REM: MANDAMUS
ER: PO2 EDUARDO alleges that the ESQUIVELS brought him to the municipal hall where
SEPARATE CONCURRING of J. Callejo he was mauled and threatened because he was one of the officers who raided a jueteng
DISSENTING OF J. Puno den connected to mayor ESQUIVEL. Prior to his release, he was forced to sign a
(They said the same thing. Copied only portion re mandamus) statement that he was in good physical condition. After investigation, Deputy
• It is argued by petitioners that, assuming arguendo that the COMELEC is correct in Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution recommending that the ESQUIVELS be
relying on Santiago that RA 6735 is inadequate to cover initiative to the indicted for less serious physical injuries and grave threats. ESQUIVELS brought the
Constitution, this cannot be used to legitimize its refusal to heed the people's will. matter to the SC via certiorari, prohibition and MANDAMUS alleging grave abuse of
The fact that there is no enabling law should not prejudice the right of the discretion on the part of the Ombudsman when it failed to consider the admission of
sovereign people to propose amendments to the Constitution, which right has EDUARDO in his statement that he was in good physical condition as exculpatory
already been exercised by 6,327,952 voters. The collective and resounding act of evidence.
the particles of sovereignty must not be set aside. Hence, the COMELEC should be
Are the ESQUIVELS entitled to a writ of mandamus in this case? Mandamus is
ordered to comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution via a writ of
employed to compel the performance of a ministerial duty and NOT A DISCRETIONARY
mandamus. The submission of petitioners, however, is unpersuasive.
duty. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
• Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who act to enforce a public right and to
exercise of official discretion nor judgment. Hence, this Court cannot issue a writ of
compel the persons of a public duty most especially when mandated by the
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 15

mandamus to control or review the exercise of discretion by the Ombudsman, for it is • After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG forwarded the pertinent records to the
his discretion that is to be exercised and not that of the Court. When a decision has been Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action. The latter
reached in a matter involving discretion, mandamus may not be availed of to review or conducted a preliminary investigation and required the ESQUIVEL BROTHERS and
correct it, however erroneous it may be. Moreover, where another remedy is available their companions to file their respective counter-affidavits.
(i.e. appeal or motion to quash info), mandamus will not lie.
o In their joint counter-affidavit, ESQUIVEL BROTHERS and their
FACTS: companions denied the charges and alleged that EDUARDO is a fugitive
from justice with an outstanding warrant of arrest for malversation. They
• PO2 Herminigildo C. Eduardo (“EDUARDO”) and SPO1 Modesto P. Catacutan further alleged that the gun confiscated from EDUARDO was the subject of
(“CATACUTAN”), both residents of Jaen, Nueva Ecija, filed their respective an illegal possession of firearm complaint.
complaint-affidavits before the PNP – Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(PNP-CIDG). • Deputy Ombudsman issued the impugned resolution recommending that the
ESQUIVEL BROTHERS be indicted for the crime of less serious physical injuries, and
• They charged herein petitioners Antonio Prospero Esquivel (“ESQUIVEL”)
ESQUIVEL alone for grave threats. Ombudsman Desierto approved.
municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother, Mark Anthony “Eboy” Esquivel
(“EBOY”), barangay captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, with alleged illegal arrest, • Thereafter, separate informations for less serious physical injuries against the
arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats. ESQUIVEL BROTHERS and for grave threats against ESQUIVEL alone were filed
with the Sandiganbayan.
o Also included in the charges were other police and LTO officers of the Jaen
Municipal Police Force for dereliction of duty. • ESQUIVEL BROS moved for reconsideration of the resolution. They likewise filed a
motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation with the Office of the Special
• The initial investigation conducted by the PNP-CIDG showed that at about 12:30
Prosecutor (OSP). That motion was, however, denied by the OSP. They were
p.m., EDUARDO was about to eat lunch at his parents’ house at Jaen when
arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
ESQUIVEL and EBOY arrived with police officers and disarmed EDUARDO. They
then forced him to board their vehicle and brought him to the Jaen Municipal Hall. • ESQUIVEL BROS elevated the matter to this Court and filed this special civil action
for certiorari, prohibition, and MANDAMUS with prayer for PI and/or TRO seeks to
• While they were on their way to the town hall, ESQUIVEL mauled him with the use
annul and set aside: (1) the Ombudsman resolution finding prima facie case against
of a firearm and threatened to kill him. ESQUIVEL pointed a gun at him and
them, and (2) the order denying their MR.
said, “Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita, aaksidentihin kita dito, bakit mo ako
kinakalaban!” • ESQUIVEL BROS argue that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
when he failed to consider the admission of EDUARDO that he was in good physical
• Upon reaching the municipal hall, EBOY shoved EDUARDO inside an adjacent hut.
condition when he left the police station. With such admission, EDUARDO is now
ESQUIVEL then ordered one of the officers to kill him, saying “Patayin mo na iyan
estopped from claiming that he was injured since it is conclusive evidence against
at gawan ng senaryo at report.”
him and need not be proven in any other proceeding.
• At this point, according to CATACUTAN, he arrived to verify what happened to his o Public respondents counter that ESQUIVEL BROS raise a factual issue
teammate EDUARDO, but ESQUIVEL likewise threatened him and ordered one of which is not a proper subject of a certiorari action. They further postulate
the officers of the Jaen Police Station to file charges against EDUARDO. He once that being evidentiary in nature, its resolution can only be threshed out in
again struck EDUARDO in the nape with a handgun, while EBOY was holding the
a full-blown trial.
latter.
• EDUARDO then fell and lost consciousness. When he regained his consciousness,
he was told that he would be released. Prior to his release, however, he was forced ISSUE: whether mandamus is proper in this case – NO!!!
to sign a statement in the police blotter that he was in good physical condition.
• EDUARDO told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely maltreated and
HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit We find the
threatened because ESQUIVEL believed he was among the law enforcers who
present petition without merit.
raided a jueteng den in Jaen that same day. He surmised that the mayor disliked the
fact that he arrested members of crime syndicates with connections to the mayor.
He also presented a medical certificate showing the injuries he suffered and other
documentary evidence. RATIO:
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 16

NOTE: The ratio is divided into three: the propriety of issuing writ of (1) certiorari, (2) • Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
prohibition, and (3) mandamus. The discussion on mandamus is very short so I briefly ministerial duty, this being its chief use and NOT A DISCRETIONARY duty.
included the first 2 just in case Sir asks, but you can SKIP TO THE MANDAMUS part!
o The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
Re: CERTIORARI – not proper neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.
• The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable • Hence, this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to control or review the
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably exercise of discretion by the Ombudsman, for it is his discretion and
guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information. SC will not judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the Court.
ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers provided there is no grave abuse of discretion. • When a decision has been reached in a matter involving discretion, a writ of
mandamus may not be availed of to review or correct it, however erroneous it
• In this case, the ESQUIVEL BROS failed to establish that the Ombudsman acted with may be.
grave abuse of discretion in rendering the disputed resolution and order.
Moreover, as earlier discussed, petitioners had another remedy available in the
o The issue on EDUARDO’s admission was raised only in their MR. In his ordinary course of law. Where such remedy is available in the ordinary course of
opposition to said motion, EDUARDO did admit signing a document to the law, mandamus will not lie.
effect that he was in good physical condition when he left the police
station. However, the admission merely applied to the execution of said
document and not to the truthfulness of its contents. 3) DOLOT V. PAJE, 2013 - NARVASA

o Consequently, the said admission is evidentiary in nature and its MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-
probative value can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the SORSOGON,
merits.
vs.
• The ESQUIVEL BROS further theorize that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over their persons as they hold positions excluded in R.A. 7975. HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DENR
o Jurisprudence already held that municipal mayors fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Since brgy. Captain EBOY is a co- Topic: Mandamus
accused with mayor ESQUIVEL, Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over
him. ER: Dolot filed a petition for continuing mandamus and a TEPO, for some mining
companies have been mining iron ore without permits. That the governor of Sorsogon
Re: PROHIBITION – not proper apparently issued them some sort of permits, but he is without authority to do so. The
RTC summarily dismissed their case, under the ground that to maintain an action for
• First, writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself, commanding it to cease from
continuing mandamus there needs to be a final court decree, order or decision
the exercise of a jurisdiction to which it has no legal claim. As earlier discussed, the
that the public officials allegedly failed to act on. Is this correct? NO!
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over this case is clearly founded on law.
• Second, prohibition is granted only where no other remedy is available or sufficient The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to
to afford redress. The ESQUIVELS have another and complete remedy at law- compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law.” The petition should
through an appeal or otherwise. Also, they could have filed a motion to quash the mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right
informations at the first instance. They did make a belated oral motion for time to therein.
file a motion to quash the informations, but its denial is not a proper subject for
certiorari or prohibition because it is an interlocutory order. • It enjoys a distinct for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws
(Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules) it requires that:
• Third, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior court unless the • The petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a court
attention of the court whose proceedings are sought to be stayed has been called to may take further action;
the alleged lack of jurisdiction. The records show that ESQUIVELS only raised the o On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain
issue of the alleged lack of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan before this Court. supporting evidence as well as a sworn certification of non-
Re: MANDAMUS (IMPORTANT PART!!!) forum shopping.
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 17

▪ It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is Dolot,together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of
aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency, Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for continuing
instrumentality or its officer concerned. mandamus, damages and attorney’s fees with the RTC of Sorsogon, alleging:
o Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the
petition must contain substantive allegations specifically
constituting an actionable neglect or omission and must
establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of Sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by
the writ: Antones Enterprises etc. Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a
(1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the municipality;
performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the environmental
right; (2) the act to be performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and
officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty; landslide hazard;

(3) such duty results from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement
or violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4) there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law. After investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have the required
permit to operate; Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to
the operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue;
The DENR, despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of the people
of Matnog; and the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and
The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is the Local Government Code.
apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4,
Rule 1 of the Rules. The final court decree alluded to by the rules actually pertains to the
judgment or decree that that same court would eventually render in an environmental
case for continuing mandamus. The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, being the
designated environmental court. The case was summarily dismissed for lack of
• Such court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the jurisdiction.
government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and
to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. • The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
• It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a
final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that the
judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be 1. Whether it was correct in dismissing the case under the grounds that: (1)
entered in the court docket. there is no final court decree, order or decision that the public officials
A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to
with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed to attach
in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government
the court’s decision." or appropriate agency?

Continuing Mandamus
Facts:
(1) there is no final court decree, order or decision that the public officials
This case is an appeal through Rule 45 of a case for Continuing Mandamus, Damages and allegedly failed to act on;
Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Environment Protection
Order. The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay.
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 18

• Codified in Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a (1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the
distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a
enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered by Part II right; (2) the act to be performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its
(Civil Procedure). officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty;
• Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil
actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules (3) such duty results from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement
requires that: or violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4) there
o The petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.
court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the
petition outright.
• Courts must be cautioned, however, that the determination to give due course
to the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to
applied in a reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law and compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law.” The petition should
always with the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served. mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right
therein.

Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed under Rule
8, Section 1:
The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is
apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4,
Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer
thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station
in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental (c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an
law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the
another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper is fully satisfied.
court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting
evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law,
rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually
commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in an
judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall
petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of subsequently become final.
the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall
also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8,
Section 7 and such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction
On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting
over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as
evidence as well as a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks.
• It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act
• It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a
or omission of the government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned.
final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that the
Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the petition must contain
judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be
substantive allegations specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission
entered in the court docket.
and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the
A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance
writ, viz:
with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 19

in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under LIBAN V. GORDON
the court’s decision."

(2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; Doctrine:
(can skip)
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff.
The RTC is wrong in its decision that petitioners must first file a case with the Panel of However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the ROC, an individual may commence such an
Arbitrators. action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in
which case he can bring the action in his own name. The person instituting quo
• The Panel has jurisdiction over mining disputes. But the petition filed below warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is
does not involve a mining dispute. entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage.
• What was being protested are the alleged negative environmental impact of
the small-scale mining operation being conducted; the authority of the
Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining permits.
• Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a
disagreement between the parties as to some provisions of the contract ER:
between them, which needs the interpretation and the application of that
particular knowledge and expertise possessed by members of that Panel.
• Resort to the Panel would be completely useless and unnecessary.
Petitioners Liban et al. are officers of the Board of the QC Red Cross chapter. They filed a
petition in the SC to declare Senator Gordon, as having forfeited his seat in the
(3) the petitioners failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the Senate, upon his acceptance of the chairmanship of the Phil. National Red Cross as
complaint to the government or appropriate agency? provided by section 13, Art. VI of the Constitution which states that no member of
Congress may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government- owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to
attach judicial affidavits.

• As previously stated, Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified,


contain supporting evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn RESPONDENT Gordon challenges the petitioners’ legal standing to file a quo warranto
certification of non-forum shopping. petition (it appears that the petition had not been specifically designated as quo
• There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits, warranto). Petitioners claim that they are instituting the action as a taxpayer’s suit.
albeit not prohibited.
Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a fatal defect
such that the case should be dismissed. The RTC could have just required the petitioners
to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents.
Gordon also claimed that the PHIL NATIONAL RED CROSS is not a GOCC. Petitioners on
the other hand cited Camporedondo v. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC
Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC
Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate,
E. QUO WARRANTO (RULE 66) pursuant to Flores v. Drilon,[3] which held that incumbent national legislators lose their
elective posts upon their appointment to another government office.

1) LIBAN V. GORDON, G.R. NO. 175352, JULY 15, 2009 – ORTIZ


07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 20

ISSUE: w/n the petition is quo warranto (yes); w/n petitioners have legal standing (NO)

Petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of In his Comment, respondent Gordon asserts that
Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short,
petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public office against respondent, a public 1. petitioners have no standing to file this petition which appears to be
officer who allegedly committed an act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges that respondent
his public office. Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto, specifically under committed an act which, by provision of law, constitutes a ground for
Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the ROC. forfeiture of his public office.Petitioners do NOT claim to be entitled
to the Senate office of respondent.Under Section 5, Rule 66 of the
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff. Rules of CivPro, only a person claiming to be entitled to a public office
However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the ROC, an individual may commence such an usurped or unlawfully held by another may bring an action for quo
action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in warranto in his own name.
which case he can bring the action in his own name. The person instituting quo
warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is
entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage. In
the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of
respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition. ON this 2. If the petition is one for quo warranto, it is already barred by
basis alone, this petition should be dismissed. prescription since under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of CivPro,
the action should be commenced within one year after the cause of
Facts: the public officer’s forfeiture of office. In this case, respondent has
been working as a Red Cross volunteer for the past 40 years.
Respondent was already Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors
when he was elected Senator in May 2004, having been elected
Chairman in 2003 and re-elected in 2005.
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari filed with the
SC a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate.
Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the QC Red Cross Chapter while
respondent Gordon is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
Governors. 3. If the petition is treated as a taxpayer’s suit, petitioners cannot be
allowed to raise a constitutional question in the absence of any claim
that they suffered some actual damage or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal act of respondent. Furthermore,
taxpayers are allowed to sue only when there is a claim of illegal
During respondent’s incumbency as a member of the Senate, he was elected Chairman of disbursement of public funds, or that public money is being diverted
the PNRC. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of to any improper purpose, or where petitioners seek to restrain
Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section respondent from enforcing an invalid law that results in wastage of
13, Article VI of the Consti, which reads: public funds.

SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any
other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government- owned or controlled 4. If the petition is treated as one for declaratory relief, SC would have
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. no jurisdiction since original jurisdiction for declaratory relief lies
Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the with the RTC.
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 21

5. Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a GOCC and that the Petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of
prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Consti does not apply Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short,
in the present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public office against respondent, a public
office nor an employment. officer who allegedly committed an act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of
his public office. Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto, specifically under
Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the ROC.

Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff.
Issues: (if in a hurry, just read the first issue) However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the ROC, an individual may commence such an
1. (1) w/n petitioners may legally institute this petition (for quo warranto) action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in
against respondent – NO !!! (rem issue) which case he can bring the action in his own name. The person instituting quo
2. (2) w/n the PNRC is GOCC – NO, it is a private org performing public functions warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is
3. (3) w/n Section 13, Article VI of the Consti applies to the case of respondent entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage. In
who is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of
Senate - NO respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition. ON this
4. (4) w/n respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant basis alone, this petition should be dismissed.
to
Section 13, Article VI of the Consti - NO ------------------------------
Held: BONUS
(1) A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto. Section
1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides: (2) On Mar. 22, 1947, President Roxas signed RA No. 95, known as the PNRC Charter.
The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose
mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action for the usurpation of a most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social
public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in status, or political affiliation.
the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
The PNRC is a member of the National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, which is composed of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(International Federation), and the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, (National Societies). The Movement is united and guided by its 7 Fundamental
position or franchise; Principles. (Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service,
Unity, Universality)

The Fundamental Principles provide a universal standard of reference for all members
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by provision of law, constitutes a of the Movement. The PNRC, as a member National Society of the Movement, has the
ground for the forfeiture of his office; or duty to uphold the Fundamental Principles and ideals of the Movement.

The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring belligerents as


neutral workers during international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers
must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict. In the Philippines where
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being there is a communist insurgency and a Muslim separatist rebellion, the PNRC cannot be
legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. seen as government-owned or controlled, and neither can the PNRC volunteers be
identified as government personnel or as instruments of government policy. Otherwise,
the insurgents or separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies when the volunteers
tend to the wounded in the battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict areas.
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 22

To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be to the NTC to frustrate the exercise of the constitutional freedom speech, expression,
owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not and of the press. A more narrowly-tailored relief that is responsive to the cause of
own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any petitioner not only exists, but is in fact tailor-fitted to the constitutional framework of
appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by our government and the adjudication of legal and constitutional rights. Given the
contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation current status of the law, there is utterly no reason for this Court to subscribe to the
campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. theory that the NTC has the presumed authority to cancel licenses and CPCs issued to
due holders of legislative franchise to engage in broadcast operations
(3) The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the head of
any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the COMPLETE
PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his FACTS:
appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the • Respondents Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) and People’s
PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads Broadcasting Service, Inc. (PBS) were grantees of legislative franchises by virtue of
to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the two laws, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7477 and R.A. No. 7582.
Philippine Government. Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC • The CBS and PBS radio networks are two of the three networks that comprise the
Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment. Since it is not a well-known "Bombo Radyo Philippines.
government office or employment, his appointment is not prohibited. • Section 9 of R.A. No. 7477 and Section 3 of R.A. No. 7582 contain a common
provision predicated on the "constitutional mandate to democratize ownership of
public utilities.
• It further appears that following the enactment of these franchise laws, the NTC
2) DIVINAGRACIA V. CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING, G.R. NO. 162272, APRIL 7, 2009
issued four (4) Provisional Authorities to PBS and six (6) Provisional Authorities to
- PEREZ DE TAGLE
CBS, allowing them to install, operate and maintain various AM and FM broadcast
stations in various locations throughout the nation. These Provisional Authorities
ER:
were issued between 1993 to 1998, or after the enactment of R.A. No. 7477 and R.A.
CBS and PBS were grantees of legislative franchises by virtue of 2 laws. Divinagracia
No. 7582.
filed 2 complaints with the NTC, alleging that he was the actual and beneficial owner of
• Petitioner Santiago C. Divinagracia filed two complaints both dated 1 March 1999
12% of the stock of PBS and CBS separately, and that despite the laws mandating a
with the NTC, respectively lodged against PBS and CBS. He alleged that he was "the
public offering of at least 30% of the common stock of both entities, neither had done so.
actual and beneficial owner of Twelve percent (12%) of the shares of stock" of PBS
The NTC ruled that it was not competent to make that decision because it involved
and CBS separately, and that despite the provisions in R.A. No. 7477 and R.A. No.
constituted collateral attacks on the legislative franchises of PBS and CBS. It therefore
7582 mandating the public offering of at least 30% of the common stocks of PBS
ruled that a quo warranto proceeding was the appropriate remedy. Upon petition for
and CBS, both entities had failed to make such offering.
review under Rule 43 to the CA, that ruling was affirmed.
o Thus, Divinagracia commonly argued in his complaints that the failure on
the part of PBS and CBS "to comply with the mandate of their legislative
Issue: W/N quo warranto is the proper proceeding [Yes]
franchise is a misuse of the franchise conferred upon it by law and it
Held: The role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings, neatly complements continues to exercise its franchise in contravention of the law to the
the traditional separation of powers that come to bear in our analysis. The courts are detriment of the general public and of complainant who are unable to
entrusted with the adjudication of the legal status of persons, the final arbiter of their enjoy the benefits being offered by a publicly listed company.”
rights and obligations under law. The question of whether a franchisee is in breach of • The NTC issued a consolidated decision dismissing both complaints.
the franchise specially enacted for it by Congress is one inherently suited to a court of o It held that the complaints actually constituted collateral attacks on the
law, and not for an administrative agency, much less one to which no such function has legislative franchises of PBS and CBS since the sole issue for
been delegated by Congress. In the same way that availability of judicial review over determination was whether the franchisees had violated the mandate to
laws does not preclude Congress from undertaking its own remedial measures by democratize ownership in their respective legislative franchises.
appropriately amending laws, the viability of quo warranto in the instant cases does not o The NTC ruled that it was not competent to render a ruling on that issue,
preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative by abrogating the legislative the same being more properly the subject of an action for quo warranto to
franchises of respondents should it be distressed enough by the franchisees’ violation of be commenced by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the
the franchises extended to them. Philippines, pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
• After the NTC had denied Divinagracia’s motion for reconsideration, he filed a
Evidently, the suggested theory of petitioner to address his plaints simply overpowers petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals.
the delicate balance of separation of powers, and unduly grants superlative prerogatives
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 23

o The Court of Appeals rendered a decision upholding the NTC. The • Quo warranto is specifically available as a remedy if it is thought that a government
appellate court agreed with the earlier conclusion that the complaints corporation has offended against its corporate charter or misused its franchise.
were indeed a collateral attack on the legislative franchises of CBS and • Petitioners argue that since their prayer involves the cancellation of the provisional
PBS and that a quo warranto action was the proper mode to thresh out the authority and CPCs, and not the legislative franchise, then quo warranto fails as a
issues raised in the complaints. remedy.
o The argument is artificial. The authority of the franchisee to engage in
broadcast operations is derived in the legislative mandate. To cancel the
provisional authority or the CPC is, in effect, to cancel the franchise or
otherwise prevent its exercise. By law, the NTC is incapacitated to
ISSUES (pertinent to REM): frustrate such mandate by unduly withholding or canceling the
provisional authority or the CPC for reasons other than the orderly
WHETHER OR NOT THE CORRECT REMEDY IS AN ACTION FOR QUO WARRANTO administration of the frequencies in the radio spectrum.
UNDER RULE 66 OF THE RULES OF COURT. o What should occur instead is the converse. If the courts conclude that
private respondents have violated the terms of their franchise and thus
issue the writs of quo warranto against them, then the NTC is obliged to
cancel any existing licenses and CPCs since these permits draw strength
HELD: from the possession of a valid franchise. If the point has not already been
made clear, then licenses issued by the NTC such as CPCs and provisional
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs. authorities are junior to the legislative franchise enacted by Congress.
• The licensing authority of the NTC is not on equal footing with the franchising
authority of the State through Congress. The issuance of licenses by the NTC
implements the legislative franchises established by Congress, in the same manner
RATIO:
that the executive branch implements the laws of Congress rather than creates its
own laws. And similar to the inability of the executive branch to prevent the
• There is in fact a more appropriate, more narrowly-tailored and least restrictive
implementation of laws by Congress, the NTC cannot, without clear and proper
remedy that is afforded by the law. Such remedy is that adverted to by the NTC and
delegation by Congress, prevent the exercise of a legislative franchise by
the Court of Appeals - The resort to quo warranto proceedings under Rule 66 of the
withholding or canceling the licenses of the franchisee.
Rules of Court.
• And the role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings, neatly complements
• Under Section 1 of Rule 66, "an action for the usurpation of a public office, position
the traditional separation of powers that come to bear in our analysis. The courts
or franchise may be brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against a
are entrusted with the adjudication of the legal status of persons, the final arbiter of
person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises public office,
their rights and obligations under law. The question of whether a franchisee is in
position or franchise."
breach of the franchise specially enacted for it by Congress is one inherently suited
• Even while the action is maintained in the name of the Republic, the Solicitor
to a court of law, and not for an administrative agency, much less one to which no
General or a public prosecutor is obliged to commence such action upon complaint,
such function has been delegated by Congress. In the same way that availability of
and upon good reason to believe that any case specified under Section 1 of Rule 66
judicial review over laws does not preclude Congress from undertaking its own
can be established by proof.
remedial measures by appropriately amending laws, the viability of quo warranto
• The special civil action of quo warranto is a prerogative writ by which the
in the instant cases does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative
Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public
by abrogating the legislative franchises of respondents should it be distressed
office or exercises a public franchise.
enough by the franchisees’ violation of the franchises extended to them.
• It is settled that "[t]he determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or
• Evidently, the suggested theory of petitioner to address his plaints simply
whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more
overpowers the delicate balance of separation of powers, and unduly grants
properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto , the right to assert
superlative prerogatives to the NTC to frustrate the exercise of the constitutional
which, as a rule, belongs to the State ‘upon complaint or otherwise,’ the reason
freedom speech, expression, and of the press. A more narrowly-tailored relief that
being that the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury."
is responsive to the cause of petitioner not only exists, but is in fact tailor-fitted to
• A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the the constitutional framework of our government and the adjudication of legal and
purpose brought by the State because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful constitutional rights. Given the current status of the law, there is utterly no reason
exercise is primarily a concern of Government. for this Court to subscribe to the theory that the NTC has the presumed authority to
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 24

cancel licenses and CPCs issued to due holders of legislative franchise to engage in TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00). The expropriation was for the
broadcast operations construction of a multi-purpose hall for the use and benefit of BRGY constituents.

However, the first case was dismissed by the MTC ‘for lack of interest’ for failure of the
F. EXPROPRIATION (RULE 67) BRGY and its counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The MTC denied BRGY’s MR.

The second case for expropriation was filed in the RTC of Calamba. BARDILLON filed an
1) BARDILLON V. BGY. MASILI, G.R. NO. 146886, APRIL 30, 2003 – PUNO MTD alleging that it violated Section 19(f) of Rule 16 since BRGY’s cause of action is
barred by prior judgment (based on first case), pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.
DEVORAH E. BARDILLON v BARANGAY MASILI of Calamba, Laguna The MTD was denied on the ground that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the
expropriation proceeding. Therefore, there is no bar to the second case.
DOCTRINE
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within The CA concurred with the RTC.
the jurisdiction of regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject property.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms in the Issue:
pleading, this is merely incidental to the expropriation suit.
(1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the expropriation case;
ER (2) whether the dismissal of that case before the MTC constituted res judicata;
(3) whether respondent is guilty of forum shopping.
BRGY wanted to build a multi-purpose hall. BRGY filed a case for expropriation of a lot
owned by BARDILLON in the MTC. This case was dismissed by the MTC for lack of Ruling:
interest and failure of the BRGY and its counsel to appeal on pre-trial.
ON JURISDICTION
BRGY filed a second case for expropriation of same lot in the RTC. BARDILLON objected
by filing an MTD on the basis of Section 19(f) of Rule 16 wherein BRGY’s cause of action BARDILLON claims that the value of the land is only P11,448 and thus the MTC had
is barred by prior judgment (based on first case), pursuant to the doctrine of res jurisdiction over the case. On the other hand, the CA held that the assessed value of the
judicata. property was P28,960.[10] Thus, the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the
expropriation proceedings, because the amount involved was beyond the P20,000
The MTD was denied on the ground that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the jurisdictional amount cognizable by MTCs.
expropriation proceeding. Therefore, there is no bar to the second case. RTC issued writ
of possession to BRGY. An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals
with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take property for
On appeal, CA agreed with RTC public use. As such, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the
regional trial courts.
Issue: Whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the first expropriation case which would
result in res judicata based on prior judgment? – NO. In Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Francisco Pastor, the court said that the “primary
consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
Held: PETITION DENIED. RULING OF RTC and CA affirmed. instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property.
Hence, the courts determine: 1) the authority of the government entity, 2) the necessity
Ratio: An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls of the expropriation, and the 3) observance of due process. In the main, the subject of
within the jurisdiction of regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is
property. THUS, MTC never had jurisdiction and THEREFORE its judgment cannot be incapable of pecuniary estimation.”
considered a bar to the second proceeding in the RTC.
“True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for
FACTS the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is
merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only
Two complaints for eminent domain were filed by BRGY to expropriate 144 sqm land after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.”
owned by Bardillon (BARDILLON) when they failed to agree on the purchase price of
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 25

“Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano that ‘condemnation ON THE WRIT OF POSSESSION
proceedings are within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance,’ the forerunners of
the regional trial courts. The said case was decided during the effectivity of the Judiciary BARDILLON argues that the CA erred when it ignored the RTC’s Writ of Possession over
Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 in respect to RTCs, provided that courts of first instance her property, issued despite the pending Motion for Reconsideration of the ruling
had original jurisdiction over ‘all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not dismissing the Complaint. She is incorrect.
capable of pecuniary estimation.’ The 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were not
intended to change these jurisprudential precedents.” The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are
expressly and specifically governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
To reiterate, an expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the Procedure.
value of the land, because the subject of the action is the government’s exercise of
eminent domain -- a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. “SECTION 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized
government depositary. — Upon the filing of the complaint or at any
ON RES JUDICATA time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff
shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real
BARDILLON claims that the MTC’s dismissal of the first Complaint for eminent domain property involved if he deposits with the authorized government
was with prejudice, since there was no indication to the contrary in the Order of depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
dismissal. She contends that the filing of the second Complaint before the RTC should property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to
therefore be dismissed on account of res judicata. the orders of the court.

Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged, judicially acted upon or decided, or xxx
settled by judgment. It provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; “After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or
and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of
or cause of action. the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the
court with service of copies to the parties.”
The following are the requisites of res judicata: (1) the former judgment must be final;
(2) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; On the part of local government units, expropriation is also governed by Section 19 of
(3) it is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the second the Local Government Code.
actions -- an identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
“SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may,
Since the MTC had no jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings, the doctrine of res through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
judicata finds no application even if the Order of dismissal may have been an exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or
adjudication on the merits. welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment of
just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
ON FORUM SHOPPING pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has
BARDILLON claims that BRGY is guilty of forum shopping, because it scouted for been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted:
another forum after obtaining an unfavorable Decision from the MTC. Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately
take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
The test for determining the presence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at
pendentia are present in two or more pending cases, such that a final judgment in one least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
case will amount to res judicata in another. based on the current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the
The earlier case lodged with the MTC had already been dismissed when the Complaint expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court,
was filed before the RTC. Even granting arguendo that both cases were still pending, a based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
final judgment in the MTC case will not constitute res judicata in the RTC, since the property.”
former had no jurisdiction over the expropriation case.
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 26

Accordingly, in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate ground that the Republic was without legal personality to file the same because ISA was
entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and the plaintiff. MCFC argued that the Republic failed to move for the execution of the
substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15 percent of the fair market decision in the ISA case within the prescriptive period. In its Reply, the Republic
value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. referred to the Order (2001) of the RTC allowing the substitution of the Republic for ISA.

In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent after it RTC denied the Motion of the Republic for leave to file and to admit its Supplemental
had filed the Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount required was Complaint. Since no such motion for execution had been filed, the RTC ruled that its
proper, because it had complied with the foregoing requisites. Order dated November 16, 2001, which effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA
as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, was an honest mistake. The Republic filed a MR of the
The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly addressed to the RTC April 4, 2005 Order of the RTC. MCFC filed a MTD Civil Case No. 106. RTC denied MR of
in the course of the expropriation proceedings. If BARDILLON objects to the necessity of Republic and granted MTD. MR of Republic denied. Republic filed with SC the
the takeover of her property, she should say so in her Answer to the Complaint. The RTC consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45
has the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and 65.
and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it.
Issue:
1. W/N the owner of the property is an indispensable party in an expropriation
2) REPUBLIC V. MANGOTARA, G.R. NO. 170375, JULY 7, 2010 - QUIJANO-BENEDICTO
proceeding. - NOT NECESSARILY
2. 2. W/N forum shopping was committed by the Republic with the filing of the
REPUBLIC V. MANGUTARA (JULY 7, 2010) expropriation and reversion complaint. - NO
EMERGENCY DIGEST Held:
Before the Court are seven consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and a WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders the following judgment in the
Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, arising Petitions at bar:
from actions for quieting of title, expropriation, ejectment, and reversion, which all 1) In G.R. No. 170375 (Expropriation Case), the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review
involve the same parcels of land. The consolidated seven cases have for their common of the Republic of the Philippines. It REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Resolutions of the
genesis the 1914 case of Cacho v. Government of the United States and the 1997 Cacho RTC of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. It further ORDERS the reinstatement of the
case. These cases proceeded independently of each other in the courts a quo until they Complaint in Civil Case No. 106, the admission of the Supplemental Complaint of the
reached the SC, that consolidated the seven Petitions. Republic, and the return of the original record of the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings.
The Complaint for Expropriation was originally filed in 1983 by the Iron and Steel Ratio:
Authority (ISA), now the National Steel Corporation (NSC), against Maria Cristina The ISA case had already become final and executory, and entry of judgment was made
Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), and the latter’s mortgagee, the Philippine National Bank in said case on August 31, 1998. The RTC, in an Order, effected the substitution of the
(PNB). The Complaint was raffled to RTC-Branch 1, presided over by Judge Mangotara. Republic for ISA.
RTC dismissed the Complaint on another ground: that MCFC is not a proper party to the
ISA was created pursuant to PD No. 2729 in 1973. Its existence was extended until expropriation proceedings, not being the owner of the parcels of land sought to be
October 10, 1988. In 1982, President Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. expropriated.
2239, reserving in favor of ISA a parcel of land in Iligan City, measuring 30.25 hectares. Rule 67, Section 1 of the ROC provides that expropriation proceedings may be instituted
MCFC occupied certain portions of this parcel of land. When negotiations with MCFC even when "title to the property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic
failed, ISA filed a Complaint for Expropriation. The statutory existence of ISA expired of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals." The same rule provides
during the pendency of Civil Case No. 106, MCFC filed a Motion to Dismiss. RTC granted that a complaint for expropriation shall name as defendants "all persons owning or
the MTD. CA affirmed the dismissal. ISA appealed to SC, SC remanded the case to RTC to claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest" in the property sought to be
allow substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff (1998 Judgment). In an Order condemned. When the property already appears to belong to the Republic, there is no
(2001), RTC allowed the substitution of the Republic for ISA. sense in the Republic instituting expropriation proceedings against itself. It can still,
however, file a complaint for expropriation against the private persons occupying the
Alleging that Lots 1 and 2 involved in the 1997 Cacho case encroached and overlapped property. In such an expropriation case, the owner of the property is not an
the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106, Republic filed with the RTC a Motion for indispensable party.
Leave to File Supplemental Complaint and to Admit the Attached Supplemental Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 explicitly states that the parcels of land reserved to
Complaint seeking to implead Teofilo Cacho and Demetria Vidal and their respective NSC are part of the public domain, hence, owned by the Republic. LOI NO. 1277
successors-in-interest, LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH. MCFC opposed the Motion on the
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 27

recognized only the occupancy rights of MCFC and directed NSC to institute In its Reply, the Republic referred to the Order (2001) of the RTC allowing the
expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for said occupancy substitution of the Republic for ISA.
rights. Therefore, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party in the original
Complaint for Expropriation. RTC denied the Motion of the Republic for leave to file and to admit its Supplemental
The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it instituted both expropriation and Complaint. The RTC agreed with MCFC that the Republic did not file any motion for
reversion proceedings for the same parcels of land. The expropriation and reversion execution of the judgment of this Court in the ISA case. Since no such motion for
proceedings are distinct remedies that are not necessarily exclusionary of each other. execution had been filed, the RTC ruled that its Order dated November 16, 2001, which
The filing of a complaint for reversion does not preclude the institution of an action for effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, was an
expropriation. Even if the land is reverted back to the State, the same may still be honest mistake. The Republic filed a MR of the April 4, 2005 Order of the RTC.
subject to expropriation as against the occupants thereof.
MCFC filed a MTD Civil Case No. 106 for: (1) failure of the Republic to implead
COMPLETE DIGEST: indispensable parties because MCFC insisted it was not the owner of the parcels of land
sought to be expropriated; and (2) forum shopping considering the institution by the
Facts: (Relevant to EXPROPRIATION only) - G.R. No. 170375 Republic on October 13, 2004 of an action for the reversion of the same parcels subject
The Complaint for Expropriation was originally filed on August 15, 1983 by the Iron and of the instant case for expropriation.
Steel Authority (ISA), now the National Steel Corporation (NSC), against Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), and the latter’s mortgagee, the Philippine National Bank Judge Mangotara of RTC issued a Resolution, denying for lack of merit the MR of the
(PNB). The Complaint was raffled to RTC-Branch 1, presided over by Judge Mangotara. Order dated April 4, 2005 filed by the Republic, and granted the MTD. Judge Mangotara
justified the dismissal of the Expropriation Case thus:
ISA was created pursuant to PD No. 2729 in 1973, to strengthen, develop, and promote What the Republic seeks [herein] is the expropriation of the subject parcels
the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. Its existence was extended until October of land. Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain involves the
10, 1988. In 1982, President Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, taking of private lands intended for public use upon payment of just
reserving in favor of ISA a parcel of land in Iligan City, measuring 30.25 hectares, to be compensation to the owner x x x, then a complaint for expropriation must, of
devoted to the integrated steel program of the Government. MCFC occupied certain necessity, be directed against the owner of the land subject thereof. In the
portions of this parcel of land. When negotiations with MCFC failed, ISA was compelled case at bar, the decision of the Supreme Court in Cacho v. Government of the
to file a Complaint for Expropriation. United States x x x, decreeing the registration of the subject parcels of land in
the name of the late Doña Demetria Cacho has long attained finality and is
The statutory existence of ISA expired during the pendency of Civil Case No. 106, MCFC conclusive as to the question of ownership thereof. Since MCFC, the only
filed a Motion to Dismiss the case alleging the lack of capacity to sue of ISA. RTC granted defendant left in this case, is not a proper party defendant in this complaint
the MTD. MR denied. CA affirmed the dismissal. ISA appealed to SC, SC remanded the for expropriation, the present case should be dismissed.
case to RTC to allow substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff (1998). In an Order
(2001), RTC allowed the substitution of the Republic for ISA in Civil Case No. 106. RTC denied MR. Republic filed with SC the consolidated Petition for Review on
Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court,
Alleging that Lots 1 and 2 involved in the 1997 Cacho case encroached and overlapped respectively.
the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106, the Republic filed with the RTC a Motion
for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint and to Admit the Attached Supplemental Issue:
Complaint seeking to implead in Civil Case No. 106 Teofilo Cacho and Demetria Vidal 1. W/N the owner of the property is an indispensable party in an expropriation
and their respective successors-in-interest, LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH. proceeding. - NOT NECESSARILY
2. W/N forum shopping was committed by the Republic with the filing of the
MCFC opposed the Motion for leave to file and to admit the Supplemental Complaint on expropriation and reversion complaint. - NO
the ground that the Republic was without legal personality to file the same because ISA
was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106. MCFC argued that the Republic failed to move for Held:
the execution of the decision in the ISA case within the prescriptive period of five years, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders the following judgment in the
hence, the only remedy left was for the Republic to file an independent action to revive Petitions at bar:
the judgment. MCFC further pointed out that the unreasonable delay of more than six
years of the Republic in seeking the substitution and continuation of the action for 1) In G.R. No. 170375 (Expropriation Case), the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review
expropriation effectively barred any further proceedings therein on the ground of of the Republic of the Philippines. It REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Resolutions of the
estoppel by laches. RTC of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. It further ORDERS the reinstatement of the
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 28

Complaint in Civil Case No. 106, the admission of the Supplemental Complaint of the NSC are part of the public domain, hence, owned by the Republic. LOI NO. 1277
Republic, and the return of the original record of the case to the court of origin for recognized only the occupancy rights of MCFC and directed NSC to institute
further proceedings. expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for said occupancy
rights. Therefore, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party in the original
Ratio: Complaint for Expropriation.
The ISA case had already become final and executory, and entry of judgment was made
in said case on August 31, 1998. The RTC, in an Order, effected the substitution of the Assuming for the sake of argument that the owner of the property is an indispensable
Republic for ISA. party in the expropriation proceedings, the non-joinder of said party would still not
warrant immediate dismissal of the complaint for expropriation. In Vda. De Manguerra
The failure of the Republic to actually file a motion for execution does not render the v. Risos, the Court applied Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court even in case of non-
substitution void. A writ of execution requires the sheriff or other proper officer to joinder of an indispensable party.
whom it is directed to enforce the terms of the writ. The November 16, 2001 Order of
the RTC should be deemed as voluntary compliance with a final and executory judgment RTC did not first require the Republic to implead the alleged owner/s of the parcel of
of this Court, already rendering a motion for and issuance of a writ of execution land sought to be expropriated. Despite the absence of any order from the Court, the
superfluous. Republic – upon becoming aware that the parcels of land involved in the 1914 Cacho
case and 1997 Cacho case, claimed by Teofilo and LANDTRADE, and Vidal and
No substantive right was violated by the voluntary compliance by the RTC-Branch 1 AZIMUTH, encroached into and overlapped with the parcel of land subject of Civil Case
with the directive in the ISA case even without a motion for execution having been filed. No. 106 – sought leave of court to file a Supplemental Complaint to implead these four
To the contrary, the RTC-Branch 1 merely enforced the judicially determined right of the parties. The RTC did not take the Supplemental Complaint of the Republic into
Republic to the substitution. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and consideration. Instead, it dismissed outright the original Complaint for Expropriation
even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that against MCFC.
do not really impair the administration of justice. If the rules are intended to insure the
orderly conduct of litigation it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the Expropriation vis-à-vis reversion
protection of the substantive rights of the parties.71
The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it instituted both expropriation and
MCFC did not seek any remedy from the Order of the RTC. Consequently, the said Order reversion proceedings for the same parcels of land. The expropriation and reversion
already became final, which even the RTC itself cannot reverse and set aside on the proceedings are distinct remedies that are not necessarily exclusionary of each other.
ground of "honest mistake." The filing of a complaint for reversion does not preclude the institution of an action for
expropriation. Even if the land is reverted back to the State, the same may still be
RTC dismissed the Complaint on another ground: that MCFC is not a proper party to the subject to expropriation as against the occupants thereof.
expropriation proceedings, not being the owner of the parcels of land sought to be
expropriated. The RTC argued that since the exercise of the power of eminent domain Also, Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the filing of a complaint for
involves the taking of private land intended for public use upon payment of just expropriation even when "the title to any property sought to be condemned appears to
compensation to the owner, then a complaint for expropriation must be directed against be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the
the owner of the land sought to be expropriated. title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or
certainty specify who are the real owners."
Rule 67, Section 1 of the ROC provides that expropriation proceedings may be instituted
even when "title to the property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic Hence, the filing by the Republic of the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation
of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals." The same rule provides impleading Teofilo, Vidal, LANDTRADE, and AZIMUTH, is not necessarily an admission
that a complaint for expropriation shall name as defendants "all persons owning or that the parcels of land sought to be expropriated are privately owned. At most, the
claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest" in the property sought to be Republic merely acknowledged in its Supplemental Complaint that there are private
condemned. Clearly, when the property already appears to belong to the Republic, there persons also claiming ownership of the parcels of land. The Republic can still
is no sense in the Republic instituting expropriation proceedings against itself. It can consistently assert, in both actions for expropriation and reversion, that the subject
still, however, file a complaint for expropriation against the private persons occupying parcels of land are part of the public domain.
the property. In such an expropriation case, the owner of the property is not an
indispensable party.
3) REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS, JULY 7, 2010, - RAZON
Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 explicitly states that the parcels of land reserved to
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 29

Republic v. CA MCFC opposed on ground that REPUBLIC has no personality to sue at it failed to move
for execution of the ISA Case allowing substitution, within 5years. RTC denied
G.R. No. 170375 July 7, 2010 REPUBLIC’s Supplemental Complaint.

Doctrine: The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the MCFC then filed a Motion to Dismiss expropriation case for: (1) failure of the REPUBLIC
property condemned. They include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming to to implead indispensable parties because MCFC insisted it was not the owner of the
own the property. When property is taken by eminent domain, the owner is not parcels of land sought to be expropriated; and (2) forum shopping considering the
necessarily the only person who is entitled to compensation. The owner of the property institution by the REPUBLIC of an action for the reversion of the same parcels subject of
sought to be expropriated is not necessarily an indispensable party. the instant case for expropriation. RTC granted MTD. MR denied. Thus, REPUBLIC filed
this instant petition – Consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari under 45 and
Note: Before the Court are seven consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and a Petition for Certiorari under 65.
Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, arising
from actions for quieting of title, expropriation, ejectment, and reversion, which all Issue: WON the owner of the property is an indispensable party in an expropriation
involve the same parcels of land. This case is listed under EXPRORIATION so this digest case? NO
focuses only on the case on expropriation.
Ratio: On the substitution issue: SC said that a motion for execution was not necessary
Predecessor Cases: in this case, as the Order of RTC allowing substitution was already a voluntary
compliance with the SC decision which became final and executory.
1914 Cacho Case – The late Dona Demetria Cacho applied for registration of 2 parcels On indispensable party: Rule 67 Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that defendants
of land in Iligan City. The Land Registration Court ruled that Cacho was the owner of in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property to be
only a portion of land sought to be registered, while ownership of the rest of the land expropriated, and just compensation is not due to the property owner alone. Defendants
was not established, and registration of which was denied. in the case could be all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part
thereof or interest therein. In this case, it is undisputed that MCFC has possessory rights
1997 Cacho Case – 83 years later, Teofilo, claiming to be the sole heir of Dona Demetria, over the parcels of land sought to be expropriated. Also, assuming arguendo that the
filed before RTC a petition for reconstitution of 2 OCTs (probably covering the parcels of owner of the property is an indispensable party in the expropriation proceedings, the
land subject of 1914 Cacho Case). RTC granted reconstitution of DECREES only, as it was non-joinder of said party would still not warrant immediate dismissal of the complaint
not established that OCTs were issued in the LRC cases. CA reversed. In the SC, RTC for expropriation, as non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal.
decision was affirmed. As a result of the 1997 Cacho case, the decrees of registration In such a case, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. The
were re-issued bearing new numbers and OCTs were issued for the two parcels of land Court noted that REPUBLIC sough to implead all parties-in-interest in its Supplemental
in Doña Demetria’s name. Complaint, which however, was denied by the RTC.

Emergency Digest: On forum shopping: The expropriation and reversion proceedings are distinct remedies
that are not necessarily exclusionary of each other. The filing of a complaint for
Facts: Pres. Marcos issued PD2239 reserving in favor of Iron and Steel Authority (ISA), a reversion does not preclude the institution of an action for expropriation. Even if the
parcel of land in Iligan City to be devoted to the integrated steel program of the land is reverted back to the State, the same may still be subject to expropriation as
Government. But Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC) occupied certain against the occupants thereof.
portions of this parcel of land. When negotiations with MCFC failed, ISA was compelled
to file a Complaint for Expropriation.
Complete Digest:
During the pendency of the case for expropriation, the statutory existence of ISA
expired. Thus, MCFC filed a MTD alleging ISA’s lack of capacity to sue. RTC granted MTD. Facts:
ISA filed MR and moved to be substituted by the REPUBLIC, which was denied by RTC. • ISA was created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 2729 dated August 9,
CA affirmed TC. But in the SC, it finally ordered the substitution of ISA by the REPUBLIC, 1973, to strengthen, develop, and promote the iron and steel industry in the
to which the RTC issued an Order allowing the substitution.(ISA Case) Philippines. Its existence was extended until October 10, 1988.
• On November 16, 1982, during the existence of ISA, then President Ferdinand
Thereafter, alleging that lots subject of 1997 CACHO CASE encroached or overlapped E. Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, reserving in favor of ISA
with the parcels of land sought to be expropriated, REPUBLIC filed a Supplemental a parcel of land in Iligan City, measuring 302,532 square meters or 30.25
Complaint seeking to implead TEOFILO and other successors-in-interest of the lots. hectares, to be devoted to the integrated steel program of the Government.
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 30

MCFC occupied certain portions of this parcel of land. When negotiations with • It is apparent in the case at bar that the Republic availed itself of the wrong
MCFC failed, ISA was compelled to file a Complaint for Expropriation. mode of appeal by filing Consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 and
• When the statutory existence of ISA expired during the pendency of the for Certiorari under Rule 65, when these are two separate remedies that are
expropriation case, MCFC filed a Motion to Dismiss the case alleging the lack of mutually exclusive and neither alternative nor successive. Nevertheless, the
capacity to sue of ISA. RTC granted MTD. ISA filed MR and to be substituted by Court shall treat the Consolidated Petitions as a Petition for Review on
Republic. RTC denied the MR. CA affirmed RTC. On appeal to SC (ISA Case), the Certiorari under Rule 45 and the allegations therein as errors of judgment. As
Court remanded the case to RTC, which was ordered to allow the substitution the records show, the Petition was filed on time under Rules 45. Before the
of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff. Entry of Judgment was made in the ISA case lapse of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal under Rule 45, the Republic
on August 31, 1998. In an Order dated November 16, 2001, the RTC allowed filed with the Court a motion for extension of time to file its petition. The
the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in the expropriation case. Court, in a Resolution dated January 23, 2006, granted the Republic a 30-day
• Alleging that lots involved in the 1997 Cacho case encroached and overlapped extension, which was to expire on December 29, 2005. The Republic was able
the parcel of land subject of the expropriation, the Republic filed with the RTC to file its Petition on the last day of the extension period.
a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint dated October 7, 2004 and • The reliance of the Republic on the MWSS case to justify its mode of appeal is
to Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint dated September 28, 2004 misplaced, taking the pronouncements of this Court in said case out of context.
seeking to implead Teofilo Cacho and Demetria Vidal and their respective The issue in the MWSS case was whether a possessor in good faith has the
successors-in-interest, LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH. MCFC opposed the motion right to remove useful improvements, and not whether consolidated petitions
on the ground that the Republic was without legal personality to file the same under both Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court can be filed. Therein
because ISA was the plaintiff in the case since Republic failed to move for petitioner MWSS simply filed an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
execution of the judgment in ISA Case. RTC denied the Supplemental Rules of Court, but named the Court of Appeals as a respondent. The Court
Complaint. clarified that the only parties in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
• MCFC then filed a Motion to Dismiss the expropriation case for: (1) failure of Rules of Court are the appellant as petitioner and the appellee as respondent.
the Republic to implead indispensable parties because MCFC insisted it was The court which rendered the judgment appealed from is not a party in said
not the owner of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated; and (2) forum appeal. It is in the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
shopping considering the institution by the Republic on October 13, 2004 of an Court where the court or judge is required to be joined as party defendant or
action for the reversion of the same parcels subject of the instant case for respondent. The Court, however, also acknowledged that there may be an
expropriation. instance when in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, the petitioner-
• RTC Judge Mangatora dismissed the expropriation case. MR was denied. Thus, appellant would also claim that the court that rendered the appealed judgment
the instant consolidated petitions were filed before the Supreme Court. acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
in which case, such court should be joined as a party-defendant or respondent.
While the Court may have stated that in such an instance, “the petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is at the same time a
Issue: petition for certiorari under Rule 65,” the Court did not hold that consolidated
WON motion for execution was necessary to effect substitution? NO petitions under both Rules 45 and 65 could or should be filed.
WON owner of property is an indispensable party in an expropriation case? NO
WON there was forum shopping when Republic filed both expropriation case and MAIN: Proper parties in expropriation proceeding
reversion proceeding? NO • The ISA case had already become final and executory. The failure of the
Republic to actually file a motion for execution does not render the
Held: In G.R. No. 170375 (Expropriation Case), the Court GRANTS the Petition for substitution void. A writ of execution requires the sheriff or other proper
Review of the Republic of the Philippines. It REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Resolutions officer to whom it is directed to enforce the terms of the writ. The Order of the
dated July 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Iligan RTC should be deemed as voluntary compliance with a final and executory
City, Lanao del Norte. It further ORDERS the reinstatement of the Complaint in Civil judgment of the Court, already rendering a motion for and issuance of a writ of
Case No. 106, the admission of the Supplemental Complaint of the Republic, and the execution superfluous. Consequently, the said Order already became final,
return of the original record of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. which even the RTC itself cannot reverse and set aside on the ground of
No costs. “honest mistake.” Besides, no substantive right was violated by the voluntary
compliance by the RTC with the directive in the ISA case even without a
Ratio: (only portion pertinent to topic) motion for execution having been filed. To the contrary, the RTC merely
enforced the judicially determined right of the Republic to the substitution.
PROCEDURAL: Filing of Consolidated PetRevOnCert under 45 and PetOnCert under 65 While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 31

observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not • Also erroneous was the dismissal by the RTC-Branch 1 of the original
really impair the administration of justice. If the rules are intended to insure Complaint for Expropriation for having been filed only against MCFC, the
the orderly conduct of litigation it is because of the higher objective they seek occupant of the subject land, but not the owner/s of the said property.
which is the protection of the substantive rights of the parties. Dismissal is not the remedy for misjoinder or non-joinder of parties.
• Rule 67, Section 1 of the then Rules of Court described how expropriation According to Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court:
proceedings should be instituted:
SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. – Neither misjoinder nor non-
Section 1. The complaint. – The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped
the filing of a complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at
of condemnation, describe the real or personal property sought to be any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a
condemned, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. (Emphasis
or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as supplied.)
practicable, the interest of each defendant separately. If the title to any • Now, is the owner of the property an indispensable party in an action for
property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the expropriation? Not necessarily. Going back to Rule 67, Section 1 of the
Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is Rules of Court, expropriation proceedings may be instituted even when
otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy “title to the property sought to be condemned appears to be in the
or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect may Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals.”
be made in the complaint. (Emphases supplied.) The same rule provides that a complaint for expropriation shall name as
• For sure, defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of defendants “all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any
the property to be expropriated, and just compensation is not due to the part thereof or interest” in the property sought to be condemned.
property owner alone. As this Court held in De Knecht v. Court of Appeals: Clearly, when the property already appears to belong to the Republic,
there is no sense in the Republic instituting expropriation proceedings
The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of against itself. It can still, however, file a complaint for expropriation
the property condemned. They include all other persons owning, against the private persons occupying the property. In such an
occupying or claiming to own the property. When [property] is taken by expropriation case, the owner of the property is not an indispensable
eminent domain, the owner x x x is not necessarily the only person who is party.
entitled to compensation. In the American jurisdiction, the term ‘owner’ • In this case, the RTC-Branch 1 did not first require the Republic to
when employed in statutes relating to eminent domain to designate the implead the alleged owner/s of the parcel of land sought to be
persons who are to be made parties to the proceeding, refer, as is the rule in expropriated. Despite the absence of any order from the Court, the
respect of those entitled to compensation, to all those who have lawful interest Republic – upon becoming aware that the parcels of land involved in the
in the property to be condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee 1914 Cacho case and 1997 Cacho case, claimed by Teofilo and
in possession under an executory contract. Every person having an estate or LANDTRADE, and Vidal and AZIMUTH, encroached into and overlapped
interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled to share in the award. If with the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106 – sought leave of
a person claiming an interest in the land sought to be condemned is not made a court to file a Supplemental Complaint to implead these four parties. The
party, he is given the right to intervene and lay claim to the compensation. RTC-Branch 1 did not take the Supplemental Complaint of the Republic
(Emphasis supplied.) into consideration. Instead, it dismissed outright the original Complaint
• At the time of the filing of the Complaint for Expropriation in 1983, for Expropriation against MCFC.
possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over the parcels of land sought to be
expropriated were undisputed. In fact, Letter of Instructions No. 1277 dated ON FORUM SHOPPING:
November 16, 1982 expressly recognized that portions of the lands reserved • The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it instituted both
by Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, also dated November 16, 1982, for the expropriation and reversion proceedings for the same parcels of land. The
use and immediate occupation by the NSC, were then occupied by an idle expropriation and reversion proceedings are distinct remedies that are not
fertilizer plant/factory and related facilities of MCFC. necessarily exclusionary of each other.
• Being the occupant of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated, MCFC • The filing of a complaint for reversion does not preclude the institution of an
could very well be named a defendant. The RTC evidently erred in action for expropriation. Even if the land is reverted back to the State, the
dismissing the Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC for not being a same may still be subject to expropriation as against the occupants thereof.
proper party. • Also, Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the filing of a complaint for
expropriation even when “the title to any property sought to be condemned
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 32

appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private evidence. The court is proscribed from basing its judgment on speculations and
individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff surmises.
cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners.” Rule 67, • No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real property is necessary to grant
Section 9 of the Rules of Court further provides: consequential damages.

SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. – If the ownership of the


property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, EMERGENCY (is sufficient, but best to read Ratio of Complete digest.)
the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the • REYES is the owner of a prime lot along a national highway in Cagayan De Oro.
property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the • REPUBLIC, through DPWH, informed REYES via letter that DPWH will begin
same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the construction of a road extension over REYES’ property.
payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the court • REPUBLIC took possession of REYES’s property WITHOUT initiating expropriation
before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use proceedings
or purpose if entry has already been made. (Emphasis supplied.) • REYES objected to the taking of her property and rejected the Appraisal
Committee’s APPRAISAL of her property.
Hence, the filing by the Republic of the Supplemental Complaint for • REYES filed with RTC of CDO a COMPLAINT claiming JUST COMPENSATION and
Expropriation impleading Teofilo, Vidal, LANDTRADE, and AZIMUTH, is not DAMAGES against REPUBLIC.
necessarily an admission that the parcels of land sought to be expropriated are • The commissioners submitted their report, which considered the lot’s prime
privately owned. At most, the Republic merely acknowledged in its location (KP: see footnote). 1
Supplemental Complaint that there are private persons also claiming o Karen: Note that the size of the lot was 1,043 sqm
ownership of the parcels of land. The Republic can still consistently assert, in ▪ REPUBLIC said that they wanted to expropriate 663 sqm,
both actions for expropriation and reversion, that the subject parcels of land leaving 380 sqm to REYES
are part of the public domain. ▪ BUT in truth, they took 746 sqm, leaving only 297 sqm to
REYES.
▪ Of this 297 sqm left to REYES, the only USABLE portion
3.5 REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS, AUGUST 14, 2009 – PASCUAL is only a little over 50 sqm. (Karen: in the ratio, SC says
that because of this, REYES should be paid consequential
G.R. No. 160379. August 14, 2009.* damages kahit walang actual taking of the 297 sqm kasi nga
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINE through THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND hindi nya rin magagamit ng maayos)
HIGHWAYS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROSARIO RODRIGUEZ REYES, • Due to its small triangular size, this portion
respondents. would not command a good price if sold nor
would it be ideal for purposes of any building
LONG CASE construction.
• RTC RULING & AMENDED RTC RULING → FAVORED REYES. (Karen: BUT Note that
QUICKEST FACTS RTC Ruling did not really state clearly its basis for the just compensation)
REYES owns a prime lot which REPUBLIC took possession of WITHOUT expropriation o Declaring REYES as having the right to retain 590 sqm and ordering
proceedings. REYES filed a COMPLAINT claiming JUST COMPENSATION and DAMAGES the REPUBLIC to return 293 sqm of the 746 sqm taken
against REPUBLIC. Commissioners found that the USABLE area left to REYES after the o REPUBLIC→to pay P4.6MIO, the fair market value in 1990, as just
taking would be very small and would not be ideal for any building. RTC favored REYES, compensation for the 453 sqm
granting consequential damages to REYES (But RTC neglected to state in its ruling its o Damages: P185K
basis for the just compensation). Hence, on appeal, CA remanded the case to RTC for o Attorney’s fees: P10K plus costs of suit.
determination of just compensation. o REPUBLIC appealed to CA.
• CA RULING: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS→ REMANDED TO RTC the
DOCTRINE: determination of just compensation
• Although the determination of just compensation lies within the trial court’s
discretion, it should not be done arbitrarily or capriciously. The decision of the trial
1i.e. Commissioners considered the fact that the lot is strategically located along a National Highway in a
court must be based on all established rules, correct legal principles, and competent commercial district + lot is in front of a Coca Cola Plant and Shell Gas Station + it adjoins Palana Grocery Store and
a Bank + a few meters away is a Gaisano Mall, the Ororama Superstore and the Limketkai Mall Complex.
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 33

o CA said that the commissioners’ recommendations on just • No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real property is necessary to
compensation were NOT SUPPORTED BY VALID DOCUMENTS. grant consequential damages. If as a result of the expropriation made by
o UNCLEAR whether the RTC merely adopted the commissioners’ REPUBLIC, the remaining lot (i.e., the 297-square meter lot) of REYES suffers from
recommendations or the court made its own independent valuation an impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages may be awarded to
of the subject property REYES. On the other hand, if the expropriation results to benefits to the remaining
o CA held that a RECONVENING of the commissioners or an lot of REYES, these consequential benefits may be deducted from the awarded
appointment of new commissioners to determine just consequential damages, if any, or from the market value of the expropriated
compensation was necessary. property.
• REPUBLIC filed MR, but DENIED by CA. • To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the
• Hence, this appeal. market value of the property, to which should be added the consequential
damages after deducting therefrom the consequential benefits which may
ISSUES: arise from the expropriation, and if the consequential benefits exceed the
1. WON proper to REMAND of the case to the trial court to order the consequential damages, these items should be disregarded altogether as the
reconvening of the commissioners or appointment of new commissioners to basic value of the property should be paid in every case.
determine the consequential damages for the remaining 297-square meter
lot? PROPER! COMPLETE
2. WON consequential damages awarded for the lot which was retained by the FACTS
owner is tantamount to unjust enrichment on the part of the latter? NO (not CARPIO, J.:
directly stated in the case as an issue) • This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the CA Decision and Resolution. The
CA affirmed with modifications the Amended Decision of the RTC of Cagayan de
RATIO 1: Oro(RTC-CDO), Branch 19.
• Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of complaint for eminent domain with the • Private respondent Rosario Rodriguez REYES (REYES) is the absolute owner of a
appropriate court by the expropriator—if no such complaint is filed, the parcel of land identified as Lot 849-B and covered by TCT No. T-7194.
expropriator is considered to have violated procedural requirements, and hence, • The 1,043-square meter lot is situated on Claro M. Recto and Osmeña Streets,
waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of Cagayan de Oro City.2
commissioners to ascertain just compensation; When there is no action for • 6 Nov 1990: REYES received a letter from petitioner REPUBLIC of the Philippines
expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for damages or just (REPUBLIC), through the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on ascertainment of just requesting permission to enter into a portion of REYES’s lot consisting of 663
compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer applicable, and a trial square meters, and to begin construction of the Osmeña Street extension road.
before commissioners is dispensable. • 20 Dec 1990: REPUBLIC took possession of REYES’s property WITHOUT
• RTC’s decision is not clear as to its basis for ascertaining just compensation. initiating expropriation proceedings.
The trial court mentioned in its decision the valuations in the reports of the City • 4 & 7 Jan 1991: REYES sent letters to the DPWH stating her objection to the
Appraisal Committee and of the commissioners appointed pursuant to Rule 67. But taking of her property.
whether the trial court considered these valuations in arriving at the just • 16 May 1991: REYES sent a letter to the City Appraisal Committee (CAC) rejecting
compensation, or the court made its own independent valuation based on the the latter’s APPRAISAL of the subject property
records, was obscure in the decision. The trial court simply gave the total amount of o REYES requested the City Assessor for a REAPPRAISAL of her property,
just compensation due to the property owner without laying down its basis. Thus, but said request was DENIED.
there is no way to determine whether the adjudged just compensation is • 17 Mar 1992: REYES filed with RTC of CDO a complaint claiming just compensation
based on competent evidence. For this reason alone, a remand of the case to the and damages against REPUBLIC.
trial court for proper determination of just compensation is in order. • 30 June 1993: RTC appointed 3 commissioners to determine the subject property’s
o Although the determination of just compensation lies within the trial fair market value, as well as the consequential benefits and damages of its
court’s discretion, it should not be done arbitrarily or capriciously. expropriation.
The decision of the trial court must be based on all established rules, • 15 Sept 1993: 1 of 3 Commissioners, Beltran, submitted to the RTC a separate
correct legal principles, and competent evidence. The court is report, saying that she deems it just, fair and reasonable to adopt the market value
proscribed from basing its judgment on speculations and surmises. of P4K per square meter as the highest price obtaining and prevailing in 1990, the
RATIO 2:
2KP Trivia: This particular corner lot is in a prime location in CDO coz it’s on a major highway + very near
shopping malls and the old Coca Cola plant
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 34

time of the taking of the property and an additional value equivalent to 5% of the • 15 June 1995: AMENDED RTC RULING (KP: initial ruling is not relevant and is
market value as fixed for severance fee. substantially the same as amended5)→ STILL FAVORED REYES
• 13 Apr 1994: the scheduled hearing was reset to 19 May 1994, to give REYES o declaring the REYES as having the right to retain 590 sqm and ordering
(plaintiff) time to consider the offer of REPUBLIC (defendant) to amicably settle the the REPUBLIC to return 293 sqm of the 746 sqm taken
case and to accept the just compensation of P3,200 per square meter, or a total of o REPUBLIC→ to pay P4.6MIO, the fair market value in 1990, as just
P2.2MIO, for the 663-square meter portion of REYES’s lot. compensation for the 453 sqm
• 16 May 1994: REYES filed with the RTC an “Urgent Motion to Deposit The Amount o Damages: P185K
of P2.1MIO in Court,” alleging that REPUBLIC’s counsel previously manifested in o Attorney’s fees: P10K plus costs of suit.
open court that the amount of P2.1MIO was ready for release should the amount be • REPUBLIC appealed to CA.
acceptable to REYES, and praying that said amount of P2.1MIO be deposited by • CA RULING: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS the decision of the RTC. 6
REPUBLIC with the trial court. The RTC granted the motion in an Order dated 16 o The CA found that the commissioners’ recommendations on just
June 1994. compensation were not supported by valid documents.
• 21 Oct 1994: However, it was only on 21 October 1994 that REPUBLIC deposited o Also, it was unclear in the RTC decision whether the trial court merely
with the RTC Clerk of Court a Landbank check amounting to P2.1MIO as just adopted the commissioners’ recommendations or the court made its
compensation. own independent valuation of the subject property.
• 16 Jun 1994: Since the commissioners failed to submit their (collective) report, o Thus, the CA held that a reconvening of the commissioners or an
upon motion of REYES, the RTC issued an order appointing a new set of appointment of new commissioners to determine just compensation
commissioners. was necessary.
• 11 Oct 1994: the new commissioners submitted their report, which considered the o CA further held that the trial court’s order for REPUBLIC’s return of the
lot’s prime location (KP: see footnote)3 293-sqm lot had no legal basis and was no longer feasible since the lot
o For a fair assessment of the market value the Commissioners divided the was already part of the completed Sergio Osmeña extension road.
whole parcel of land into 3 parts, viz.: o Moreover, consequential damages should be awarded in lieu of actual
Portion Land Area CURRENT VALUE VALUATION as of damages for REYES’s alleged loss of income from the remaining 297-
(1994) 1990 (time of taking) square meter lot.
• REPUBLIC filed MR, but DENIED by CA.
Front portion 347.66 SQM PHP 18K – 20K PHP 10K – 12K • Hence, this appeal.
Middle portion 347.66 SQM PHP 16K – 18K PHP 8K – 10K
Rear/back 347.66 SQM PHP 14K – 16K PHP 6K – 8K ISSUES:
portion
TOTAL 1,043 SQM
52 June 1995: INITIAL RTC RULING→ FAVORED REYES
o The Commissioners also noted that what has been taken over and used by o declaring REYES as having the right to retain 590 sqm and ordering the REPUBLIC to return
210 sqm of the 663 sqm taken
the REPUBLIC is NOT ONLY 663 sqm BUT 746 sqm4 o REPUBLIC→ to pay P5.5MIO, the fair market value in 1990, as just compensation for the 536
o Likewise, Commissioners noted that the remaining USABLE portion left to sqm
the REYES will not actually be 297 sqm, but rather would only be a little o Damages: P185K
over 50 sqm. o Attorney’s fees: P10K plus costs of suit.
▪ Due to its small triangular size, this portion would not command 6 CA DECISION→ WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby MODIFIED.
a good price if sold nor would it be ideal for purposes of any 1. The case is REMANDED to the trial court which is ordered to reconvene the commissioners or appoint new
building construction. commissioners to determine, in accordance with this Decision, the amount of just compensation due to plaintiff-
appellee Rosario Rodriguez Reyes for the 746 square meters of land taken from her and consequential damages
to the 297-square meter portion left.
3i.e. strategically located along a National Highway in a commercial district + lot is in front of a Coca Cola Plant 2. Defendant-appellant DPWH is ordered to pay plaintiff-appellee the following amounts:
and Shell Gas Station + it adjoins Palana Grocery Store and a Bank + a few meters away is a Gaisano Mall, the a. the balance, if any, of just compensation to be finally determined after deducting the amount of
Ororama Superstore and the Limketkai Mall Complex. P2,121,600 DPWH previously advanced and deposited with the trial court;
b. 6% legal interest per annum on the amount it provisionally deposited from the time of taking up
4The undersigned Commissioners would however like to bring to the attention of the Honorable Court that in the to the time it is deposited with the trial court on October 21, 1994; and on the balance, if any, from
subdivision plan prepared by the City Engineer’s Office, the whole of plaintiff’s property was subdivided into the time of taking on December 20, 1990 until fully paid;
three (3) lots designated as follows: c. attorney’s fees of P20,000.00.
Lot 849-B-1 (Road Lot)-83 square meters; 3. Defendant-appellant City Government of Cagayan de Oro is relieved from any liability;
Lot 849-B-2 (Road Lot traversed by the RCDP Osmeña Extension Street)-663 SQM; 4. The award of P185,000.00 as actual damages is deleted;
Lot 849-B-3 remaining portion with an area of 297 square meters; 5. No pronouncement as to costs.
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 35

1. Whether the CA erred in ordering the remand of the case to the trial court, to order • In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we clarified that when there
the reconvening of the commissioners or appointment of new commissioners to is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for
determine the consequential damages for the remaining 297- square meter lot. NO damages or just compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on
ERROR. ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer
2. WON consequential damages awarded for the lot which was retained by the owner applicable, and a trial before commissioners is dispensable, thus:
is tantamount to unjust enrichment on the part of the latter? NOT UNJUST o “In this case, NPC appropriated Pobre’s Property without resort to
ENRICHMENT (not directly stated in the case as an issue) expropriation proceedings. NPC dismissed its own complaint for the
3. Whether the CA erred in ordering REPUBLIC to pay attorney’s fees. NO ERROR. second expropriation. At no point did NPC institute expropriation
proceedings for the lots outside the 5,554 square-meter portion
HELD: We find the appeal unmeritorious. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We subject of the second expropriation. The only issues that the trial
AFFIRM the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 15 November 2002 and Resolution dated court had to settle were the amount of just compensation and
17 September 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 50358. damages that NPC had to pay Pobre.
o This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC
RATIO: dismissed its complaint for expropriation. Since this case has been
PART 1: WON proper to remand of the case to the trial court to order the reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the provisions
reconvening of the commissioners or appointment of new commissioners to of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the just
determine the consequential damages for the remaining 297-square meter lot? compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. A trial
PROPER! before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable.”
• In this case, REPUBLIC took possession of the subject property without
• Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as sovereign, to take private initiating expropriation proceedings. Consequently, REYES filed the instant
property for public use upon observance of due process of law and payment of just case for just compensation and damages. To determine just compensation,
compensation. The Constitution provides that, “[p]rivate property shall not be the trial court appointed three commissioners pursuant to Section 5 of Rule
taken for public use without just compensation.” 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. None of the parties objected to such
• Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be appointment.
expropriated. Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market • The trial court’s appointment of commissioners in this particular case is not
value of the property are the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, improper. The appointment was done mainly to aid the trial court in determining
its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape, just compensation, and it was not opposed by the parties. Besides, the trial court is
location, and the tax declarations thereon. The measure is not the taker’s gain but not bound by the commissioners’ recommended valuation of the subject property.
the owner’s loss. To be just, the compensation must be fair not only to the owner The court has the discretion on whether to adopt the commissioners’ valuation or
but also to the taker. to substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the records. 7
• Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time it was • However, we agree with the CA that the trial court’s decision is not clear as to
taken from the owner and appropriated by the government. However, if the its basis for ascertaining just compensation. The trial court mentioned in its
government takes possession before the institution of expropriation proceedings, decision the valuations in the reports of the City Appraisal Committee and of
the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of the the commissioners appointed pursuant to Rule 67. But whether the trial court
filing of the complaint. The value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be considered these valuations in arriving at the just compensation, or the court
the basis for the determination of the value when the taking of the property made its own independent valuation based on the records, was obscure in the
involved coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. decision. The trial court simply gave the total amount of just compensation
• The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997 due to the property owner without laying down its basis.
Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that “[u]pon the o Thus, there is no way to determine whether the adjudged just
rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three compensation is based on competent evidence. For this reason alone,
(3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report
to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” 7Republic of the Philippines v. Santos, 225 Phil. 29, 35; 141 SCRA 30, 34 (1986), citing Manila Railroad Company
• However, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals that Rule 67 presupposes a v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286 (1915).
prior filing of complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by
Section 8 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, “the court may x x x accept the report and
the expropriator. If no such complaint is filed, the expropriator is considered render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners
to have violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the usual for further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the
procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the
plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the defendant just
commissioners to ascertain just compensation. compensation for the property so taken.”
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 36

a remand of the case to the trial court for proper determination of damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his
just compensation is in order. In National Power Corporation v. property so taken.”
Bongbong, we held that although the determination of just • An award of consequential damages for property not taken is not tantamount
compensation lies within the trial court’s discretion, it should not be to unjust enrichment of the property owner. There is unjust enrichment “when a
done arbitrarily or capriciously. The decision of the trial court must person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
be based on all established rules, correct legal principles, and money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity
competent evidence. The court is proscribed from basing its and good conscience.” Article 22 of the Civil Code provides that “[e]very person
judgment on speculations and surmises. who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
PART 2: WON consequential damages for the lot which was retained by the owner is ground, shall return the same to him.” The principle of unjust enrichment under
tantamount to unjust enrichment on the part of the latter? NO Article 22 requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid
basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at another’s expense or
• REPUBLIC’S CONTENTION: REPUBLIC questions the CA’s decision to remand the damage.
case to determine the consequential damages for the remaining 297-square meter • There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid
lot of REYES. REPUBLIC contends that no consequential damages may be awarded claim to such benefit.
as the remaining lot was “not actually taken” by the DPWH, and to award • As stated, consequential damages are awarded if as a result of the expropriation,
consequential damages for the lot which was retained by the owner is tantamount the remaining property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in
to unjust enrichment on the part of the latter. value. Thus, there is a valid basis for the grant of consequential damages to the
• REPUBLIC’s contention is unmeritorious. property owner, and no unjust enrichment can result therefrom.
• No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real property is necessary to
grant consequential damages. If as a result of the expropriation made by BONUS
REPUBLIC, the remaining lot (i.e., the 297-square meter lot) of REYES suffers PART 3: WON proper to order REPUBLIC to pay attorney’s fees? PROPER
from an impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages may be
awarded to REYES. On the other hand, if the expropriation results to benefits to • The Court of Appeals did not err in granting attorney’s fees to REYES. Article
the remaining lot of REYES, these consequential benefits8 may be deducted from 2208(2) of the New Civil Code provides that attorney’s fees may be awarded:
the awarded consequential damages, if any, or from the market value of the o (2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the
expropriated property. plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect
• We held in B.H. Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals that: his interest.
o “To determine just compensation, the trial court should first • Attorney’s fees may be awarded by a court if one who claims it is compelled to
ascertain the market value of the property, to which should be added litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect one’s interest by reason
the consequential damages after deducting therefrom the of an unjustified act or omission on the part of the party from whom it is sought. In
consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation. If the this case, REPUBLIC took possession of REYES’s real property without initiating
consequential benefits exceed the consequential damages, these expropriation proceedings, and over the latter’s objection. As a result, REYES was
items should be disregarded altogether as the basic value of the compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect her interests over her property.
property should be paid in every case.”
• Section 6 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
o “x x x The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages
4) NPC V. SANTA LORO, G.R. NO. 175176, OCTOBER 17, 2008 – RESPICIO
to the property not taken and deduct from such consequential
damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner
from the public use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of EMERGENCY
its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of
the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall NPC asked permission from Santa Loro to enter their lands and construct transmission
the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential lines. Santa Loro: Ok, just pay me just compensation. Santa Loro discovered his
neighbours got higher compensations. Santa Loro: I hereby rescind agreement. I will file
case in court. Case filed. Only issue is just compensation. RTC decided in favour of Santa
through summary judgment, as motioned.
8The consequential benefits that shall be deducted refer to the actual benefits derived by the owner on the
remaining portion of his land which are the direct and proximate results of the improvements consequent to the
expropriation, and not the general benefits which he receives in common with the community. (Regalado, Issue: RTC should have appointed commissioners to determine just compensation as
Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, p. 746)
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 37

per Rule 67 sec. 5.


Accordingly, respondents filed a Complaint[13] for Rescission of Agreement,
SC: nope. This is not an expropriation case per se. The case filed was rescission of Recovery of Possession of Parcels of Land, Removal of Tower and Transmission Lines,
agreement with damages. Therefore, the rules of court on expropriation does not apply. Damages and Other Reliefs, against the petitioner before the RTC.
The RTC may determine just compensation without referring to commissioners. lol.

During the Pre-trial Conference, the parties conceded that there was no dispute as
to the material fact that petitioner had taken portions of respondents’ lots. They also
FACTS agreed that the only issue for resolution by the RTC was the determination of the
amount of just compensation due the respondents for the portions of their land taken by
Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation duly organized the petitioner. Thus, respondents assented that they would file a Motion for Summary
under Philippine laws and vested with the power of eminent domain by its Charter Judgment.
under Republic Act No. 6395,[5] as amended by Presidential Decree No.
938.[6] Pursuant to its 230 KV Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project (Interconnection
Project), petitioner expropriated several parcels of land in the Municipality of Carmen
and City of Danao in the Province of Cebu, which will be traversed and affected by its
transmission towers and lines.
ISSUE
Among the lots affected by the petitioner’s Interconnection Project were
those owned by the respondents located in Dawis Sur, Carmen, Cebu. Respondent Santa Petitioner argues that although the Complaint filed by the respondents
Loro Vda. To be able to enter the said properties, petitioner obtained from each of the before the RTC was one for rescission of agreement and/or damages, it was
respondents Santa Loro Vda. De Capin and Spouses Quimco a “Permission to Enter for subsequently transformed into one for “reversed eminent domain”[24] where the
Construction of Transmission Line Project,” The permits were signed by the determination of the amount of just compensation was the issue. In fact, respondents’
respondents upon representation by the petitioner that it would pay them just Motion for Summary Judgment focused only on the payment of just
compensation for the intrusion into their properties. compensation. Resultantly, the RTC erred in resolving the respondents’ Complaint on
the basis of the provisions of the Rules of Court on Summary Judgment. The rules on
Thereafter, petitioner began to construct on respondents’ properties its summary judgment apply only to ordinary taking of properties. Instead of granting
power lines and transmission towers. Petitioner’s Interconnection Project affected respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment, the RTC should have appointed
portions of respondents’ properties. Upon its completion of the construction of the commissioners who would ascertain the amount of just compensation for the subject
power lines and transmission towers, petitioner imposed several restrictions upon the properties, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court.[25] Thus, the
respondents on the use of their lands, which included the prohibition against planting or determination of just compensation by the RTC based only on the pleadings submitted,
building anything higher than three meters below the area traversed by its transmission was palpably void.
lines as the high tension electric current passing through said lines pose danger to life
and limbs. Additionally, respondent-Spouses Quimco, holder of a Small Scale Quarry
Permit, were also prohibited from continuing their quarry business near petitioner’s
transmission towers because of the great possibility that the quarry might weaken the The Petition is bereft of merit.
foundation of the transmission towers. In other words, respondents lost substantial
amount of income due to the restriction imposed on their properties by the petitioner. RATIO
In this case, during the Pre-trial Conference, petitioner already admitted
Petitioner then paid respondents Santa Loro Vda. De Capin and Spouses that it had taken portions of respondents’ lands for the construction of its power lines
Quimco the amounts of P8,015.90[11] and P5,350.49,[12] respectively, for the portions and transmission towers pursuant to its Interconnection Project. However, the parties
of their lots affected by the Interconnection Project. Only later did respondents discover could not agree on the amount of just compensation or damages that petitioner should
that in comparison to the measly sums they were paid by petitioner, the other pay respondents for the lands taken. Respondents insist that they be paid the full
landowners within their area who resisted the expropriation of their properties in court market value of the portions of their lots taken by the petitioner, while petitioner
or who entered into compromise agreements with the petitioner were paid by believed that it was only bound to pay respondents easement fees, which was equivalent
petitioner the amount of P448.30 to P450.00 per square meter as just compensation for to 10% of the market value of the respondents’ lots as indicated in their tax declarations,
the portions of their properties similarly affected by the petitioner’s Interconnection pursuant to Section 3-A of petitioner’s Charter. Evidently, based on the foregoing, what
Project. remained for the determination of the RTC was the proper amount of damages due the
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 38

respondents for the portions of their lots taken by the petitioner.

Accordingly, respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment before the Petitioner herein cannot hide behind the mantle of protection of procedural laws
RTC when it has so arbitrarily violated respondents’ right to just compensation for their
properties taken for public use.

Futile is petitioner’s insistence that respondents’ Complaint is actually for Petitioner assured respondents that it will pay them just compensation for
“reversed eminent domain,” which requires the appointment of commissioners for the the portions of their lots needed for the Interconnection Project, on the basis of which
determination of just compensation, as provided under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Revised respondents agreed in good faith to allow petitioner to already enter their properties
Rules of Court, rather than the promulgation of a summary judgment. and build thereon. Yet, instead of paying respondents just compensation for the
portions of their lots taken, they were paid negligible amounts as easements fees.
It should be emphasized that the present case stemmed from a Complaint
for Rescission of Agreement, Recovery of Possession of Parcels of Land, Removal of More lopsided is the fact that the other landowners within their area who
Tower and Transmission Lines, Damages and Other Reliefs filed by the respondents resisted the taking of their properties were paid by petitioner way more than
against the petitioner. It was an ordinary civil action for the rescission of respondents’ respondents who voluntarily dealt with petitioner. Petitioner had to bring some of the
agreement with petitioner, as well as recovery of the possession of the lots taken, for resisting landowners to court in expropriation proceedings where petitioner willingly
failure of petitioner to comply with its obligation to pay just compensation for the paid just compensation for the said landowners’ properties, as determined by a panel of
respondents’ properties. Payment of just compensation or damages was an alternative commissioners. Petitioner entered into compromise agreements with the other
remedy, akin to specific performance by the petitioner of its obligation under its resisting landowners in which it likewise paid just compensation for the latter’s
agreement with respondents, which would prevent the rescission of the agreements properties. There is no rhyme or reason why respondents were the only ones paid with
altogether and the return of the possession of the properties to respondents. The easement fees, which were of much lesser values.
parties, at the Pre-Trial Conference, implicitly agreed to pursue the remedy for payment
of damages rather than rescission of the agreement. Clearly, the proceedings before the Petitioner attached to their Motion for Summary Judgment several pieces of
RTC were not for expropriation, but were for damages, to which Section 5, Rule 67 of the document in support of their allegations therein, and they furnished petitioner copies of
Revised Rules of Court is irrelevant. the same. The petitioner was given ample time to study, challenge, and controvert
respondents’ evidences, yet it failed to do so. The RTC only rightfully proceeded, based
Reference may be made to National Power Corporation v. Court of on its evaluation of the evidence on record, to render a Decision awarding to the
Appeals.[34] In the said case, after therein petitioner NAPOCOR withdrew its second respondents just compensation or damages for the taking of their lots, equivalent to the
Petition for Expropriation, what was left for the trial court’s determination was the fair market value thereof at the rate of P448.33 per square meter.
counterclaim of therein private respondent Antonino Pobre, contained in his Motion to
Dismiss, for damages. The Court ruled therein: Finally, petitioner cannot insist that it only acquired an easement of right of
way on the properties of the respondents and that it was liable to pay respondents only
“In this case, NPC appropriated [private respondent’s] an easement fee not exceeding 10% of the fair market value of the portions of their
Property without resort to expropriation proceedings. NPC property actually affected by the Interconnection Project, pursuant to Section 3-A(b) of
dismissed its own complaint for the second expropriation. At its Charter.
no point did NPC institute expropriation proceedings for the
lots outside the 5,554 square-meter portion subject of the Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a
second expropriation. The only issues that the trial court had corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a
to settle were the amount of just compensation and damages restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines
that NPC had to pay [private respondent]. also falls within the ambit of the term “expropriation.”[37]

This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when After petitioner’s transmission lines were fully constructed on portions of
NPC dismissed its complaint for expropriation. Since this case respondents’ lots, petitioner imposed restrictions thereon such as the prohibition
has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, against planting or building anything higher than three meters below the area traversed
the provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment by said lines. In addition, respondent-Spouses Quimco, holders of a Small Scale Quarry
of the just compensation to be paid were no longer Permit, Series of 1995,[38] were also prohibited from continuing their quarry business
applicable. A trial before commissioners, for instance, was near petitioner’s transmission towers because of the great possibility that it could
dispensable.” (Emphasis supplied.) weaken the foundation thereof. Hence, the respondent-spouses Quimco suffered
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 39

substantial loss of income. It is clear then that petitioner’s acquisition of an easement of may, through expropriation, be
right of way on the lands of the respondents amounted to an expropriation of the subjected to an easement of right-of-
portions of the latter’s properties and perpetually deprived the respondents of their way.”
proprietary rights thereon and for which they are entitled to a reasonable and just
compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature
taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission
the word “compensation” and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.[39] for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary
use.[41] (Emphasis supplied.)
As the Court thoroughly explained in National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez,[40]
viz:
Having established that petitioner’s acquisition of right-of-way easement over the
The trial court’s observation shared by the appellate portions of respondents’ lots was definitely a taking under the power of eminent
court show that “x x x While it is true that plaintiff [is] only domain, petitioner then is liable to pay respondents just compensation and not merely
after a right-of-way easement, it neverthelessperpetually an easement fee. The Court quotes with affirmation the ruling of the Court of Appeals
deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as on this matter:
manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants
that below said transmission lines no plant higher than three The [herein petitioner] vehemently insists that its Charter [Section 3A
(3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high- (b) of R.A. 6395] obliges it to pay only a maximum of 10% of
tension current conveyed through said transmission lines, the market value declared by the owner or administrator or
danger to life and limbsthat may be caused beneath said anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market
wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. To
only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter uphold such a contention would not only interfere with a
shallcontinually pay the taxes due on said affected portion judicial function but would also render as useless the
of their property.” protection guaranteed by our Constitution in Section 9, Article
III of our Constitution that no private property shall be taken
The foregoing facts considered, the acquisition of the for public use without payment of just compensation.
right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the power
of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in similar Moreover, the valuation of a property in the tax declaration cannot be an absolute
cases of easement of right-of-way where the Supreme Court substitute to just compensation. Stated differently, the market value stated in the tax
sustained the award of just compensation for private property declaration of the condemned property is no longer conclusive.[42] It is violative of due
condemned for public use (See National Power Corporation vs. process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax
Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665, 1984; Garcia vs. Court of documents is unfair or wrong. It is also repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and
Appeals, 102 SCRA 597, 1981). The Supreme Court, in Republic fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely
of the Philippines vs. PLDT, thus held that: prevail over the judgment of a court which is promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence, arguments pro and
“Normally, of course, the con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair
power of eminent domain results in and just determination have been judicially evaluated.[43] 10% of the market value of
the taking or appropriation of the expropriated property cannot in any way be considered as the fair and full
title to, and possession of, the equivalent to the loss sustained by the owner of the property, such would be 90% less
expropriated property; but no cogent than what is due him. Thus, we are of the conclusion that Section 3A of [petitioner’s]
reason appears why said power may Charter cannot prevail over the mandate of our Constitution on the payment of just
not be availed of to impose only a compensation. The court a quo did not commit an error when it held that the
burden upon the owner of [petitioner’s] charter encroached on the function of the court in determining just
condemned property, without loss compensation.[44]
of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that real property
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 40

5) APO FRUITS V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 164195, DECEMBER 4, 2009 – SANCHEZ cannot show bad faith, because the right to appeal is a remedy accorded by law. It is not
an unjustified delay.
Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) & Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI) v. CA & Land Bank

ER:
FACTS: [SOBRANG HASSLE NG PROCEDURAL HISTORY NG CASE NA ITO, pero sobrang
- Apo Fruits and Hijo Plantation (AFC and HPI, respectively) voluntarily offered simple lang siya concerning DELAY.]
to sell their 5 parcels of land to the DAR/Republic of the Phils because of the
Agrarian Reform Program. DAR initially valued their land to be 86 Million and - On October 12, 1995, Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc.
164 Million. AFC and HPI refused, prompting DAR to direct the Land Bank (HPI) offered to sell five parcels of land to the government through the Dep’t of
(LBP) to deposit 26 Million to AFC and 45 Million to HPI’s account. AFC and Agrarian Reform (DAR) for the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
HPI withdrew the money. The TCT was transferred to the Republic, to be o The DAR gave a Voluntary Offer to Sell to both AFC and HPI, with a
distributed to the individual farmers. valuation of 165,000 php per hectare. [AFC – 86 Million; HPI – 164
Million]
SUMMARY OF APPEALS (can skip this if you’re in a hurry, basta at the end, AFC and o Both AFC and HPI found the value to be unreasonably low, and
HPI were the Petitioners!): rejected the offer to sell.
- Due to the rejection, the DAR directed the Land Bank of the Philippines to
- AFC and HPI filed complaints in the DAR adjudication Board for proper deposit the amounts equivalent to their valuations in the names and for the
valuation, but the DARAB refused to render a decision. (aka they want more accounts of AFC and HPI.
money) o LBP deposited 26 Million to AFC’s account; and 45 Million to HPI’s
- AFC and HPI went to the RTC of Tagum City (acting as Special Agrarian Court), account.
which ruled that the value of the land is 1.383 BILLION PESOS. o Both AFC and HPI withdrew the amounts from LBP.
- LBP filed an MR, but the value was retained except for atty’s fees. - DAR directed the Register of Deeds of Davao to cancel the TCTs and transfer
- LBP filed a notice of appeal, but got denied because LBP v. De Leon was them to the Republic of the Philippines, which would be distributed to
decided—stating that appeals from RTCs acting as Special Agrarian Courts qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
should be via Petition for Review. - On 14 February 1997, AFC and HPI filed separate complaints for determination
- LBP filed a petition for review in the CA, which nullified the RTC decision. of just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Despite the
- AFC and HPI filed a joint MR in the CA, which the CA denied. lapse of more than three years from the filing of the complaints, the DARAB
- The DAR also filed an MR with the CA, but was denied for failure to state the failed and refused to render a decision on the valuation of the land.
material date. o Hence, two complaints for determination and payment of just
- AFC and HPI file a petition for review with the SC, which was partially granted. compensation were filed by AFC and HPI before Branch 2 of the
- Land Bank filed an MR at the 3rd division of the SC, WHICH DELETED THE Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum City (acting as a Special
ATTY’S FEES AND 12% interests (aka MAS MURA BABAYARAN NG Agrarian Court), which were subsequently consolidated.
REPUBLIC) o The RTC rendered a decision in favour of AFC and HPI, giving a value
- AFC and HPI filed the current case, arguing that interest and Atty’s fees of 1.383 BILLION php to the land. RTC ordered to pay in the amount
should be granted (they want more money). of 91-day T-bills, interest, attorney’s fees, costs of suit, and
Commissioner’s Fees.
Held: No. Interest is to be imposed on the just compensation only in case of delay - Land Bank filed an MR, on the ground that the RTC valued the land based on
in its payment, which fact must be sufficiently established, based on Article 2209 of the residential and industrial lands, and not agricultural. It also sought
Civil Code.9 In this case, there was no delay in payment, because the facts show that LBP reconsideration over the atty’s fees, interest, and the payment of the
already deposited the money in the accounts of AFC and HPI. Their subsequent appeals Commissioners.
o MR Result – the attorney’s fees has been modified, but for everything
else, it’s the same.
9Article 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of money and the - Land Bank filed a notice of appeal. However, during the appeal, the case of
debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon was decided, which ruled that the
proper mode of appeal of an RTC decision acting as a Special Agrarian Court is
the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the
via a petition for review.
absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum. o RTC denied the notice of appeal.
(1108)
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 41

- Land Bank filed a petition for certiorari, in the CA. The CA nullified the value of the property as between one who receives and one who desires to sell.
decision of the RTC. It is fixed at the time of the actual taking by the State.
- AFC and HPI filed a joint MR in the CA, which the CA denied. o Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is
- The DAR also filed an MR with the CA, but was denied for failure to state the deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final
material date. compensation must include interests on its just value, to be computed
- AFC and HPI file a petition for review with the SC, which was partially granted. from the time the property is taken up to the time when
- [note the deletions!!!] Land Bank filed an MR at the 3rd division of the SC, compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.
where the SC ruled that: - In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco however, the Court came to explicitly
o (1) The award of 12% interest rate per annum in the total amount of rule that interest is to be imposed on the just compensation only in case of
just compensation is DELETED. delay in its payment, which fact must be sufficiently established.
o (2) This case is ordered REMANDED to the RTC for further hearing Significantly, Wycoco was moored on Article 2209, Civil Code, which provides:
on the amount of Commissioners’ Fees. o Article 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of money
o (3) The award of attorney’s fees is DELETED. and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there
o (4) The Motion for Referral of the case to the Supreme Court sitting being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the
En Banc and the request or setting of the Omnibus Motion for Oral interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal
Arguments are all DENIED for lack of merit. In all other respects, our interest, which is six per cent per annum. (1108)
Decision dated 6 February 2007 is MAINTAINED.
- ALL (HPI, AFC and LBP) OF THEM FILED THEIR MOTIONS FOR THERE IS NO DELAY.
RECONSIDERATION, WHICH THE SC DENIED. There was entry of judgment on
May 16, 2008. - Land Bank did not incur delay in the payment of the just compensation.
- [sobrang kulit ng HPI and AFC] Even after entry of judgment, HPI and AFC As earlier mentioned, after AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell their lands
filed their (1) motion for leave to file and admit second motion for on October 12, 1995, DAR referred their VOS applications to Land Bank for
reconsideration; (2) second motion for reconsideration (with respect to the initial valuation. Land Bank initially fixed the just compensation at
denial of the award of legal interest and attorney's fees); and (3) motion to P165,484.47/hectare, that is, P86,900,925.88, for AFC, and P164,478,178.14,
refer the second motion for reconsideration to the Honorable Court en banc. for HPI.
- The en banc session hall took cognizance of their petition, hence the current - However, AFC and HPI rejected Land Bank’s initial valuation, prompting Land
case. Bank to open deposit accounts in the petitioners’ names, and to credit in said
accounts the amounts equivalent to their valuations. Although AFC withdrew
ISSUE: the amount of P26,409,549.86, while HPI withdrew P45,481,706.76, they still
filed with DARAB separate complaints for determination of just compensation.
Whether interest and attorney’s fees should be granted to AFC and HPI (NO) When DARAB did not act upon their complaints for more than three years, AFC
HELD: and HPI commenced their respective actions for determination of just
compensation in the Tagum City RTC, which rendered its decision
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petitioners’ second motion for reconsideration (with on September 25, 2001.
respect to the denial of the award of legal interest and attorney's fees), and reiterates the - It is explicit from LBP v. Wycoco that interest on the just compensation is
decision dated February 6, 2007 and the resolution dated December 19, 2007 of the imposed only in case of delay in the payment thereof which must be
Third Division. sufficiently established. Given the foregoing, we find that the imposition
of interest on the award of just compensation is not justified and should
therefore be deleted.
RATIO:
The taking of property under CARL is an exercise by the State of the power of eminent It must be emphasized that “pertinent amounts were deposited in favor of AFC and HPI
domain. A basic limitation on the State’s power of eminent domain is the constitutional within fourteen months after the filing by the latter of the Complaint for determination
directive that private property shall not be taken for public use without just of just compensation before the RTC”. It is likewise true that AFC and HPI already
compensation. collected P149.6 and P262 million, respectively, representing just compensation for the
subject properties. Clearly, there is no unreasonable delay in the payment of just
- Just compensation refers to the sum equivalent to the market value of the compensation which should warrant the award of 12% interest per annum in AFC and
property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market HPI’s favor.
in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 42

6) REPUBLIC V. HOLY TRINITY DEVELOPMENT CORP., G.R. NO. 172410, APRIL 14, 2008 Bulacan. Holy Trinity Realty and Development Corp. (“Holy Trinity”) was one
– SUPERABLE of the respondents.
• Per Republic Act 8974, TRB deposited P28,406,700.00 in the account of DPWH
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE TOLL REGULATORY in Land Bank Philippines-South Harbor Branch, representing 100% of the
BOARD (TRB), petitioners, vs. HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP., zonal value of the affected properties, in compliance with Sec. 4 of R.A. 89745
respondent. G.R. No. 172410. April 14, 2008. (NONS) (concerning expropriation of private property for national infrastructure
NSS: Please take note of the differences between RA 8974 and Rule 67 on the process of projects). TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the issuance of a Writ of
expropriation. Possession since it deposited the amount and thus, the issuance of the writ is
ministerial per Sec. 2, Rule 67.
EMERGENCY RECIT • This was granted by the RTC in March 2002. In October 2002, per the Sheriff’s
QUICK FACTS: The TRB sought to expropriate several parcels of land for its report that the landowners are not voluntarily vacating the properties sought
construction and expansion of NLEX. One of the affected landowners is Holy Trinity. to be expropriated, TRB filed an Omnibus Motion requesting the help of the
TRB deposited an amount representing 100% of the zonal value of the properties PNP to implement the writ of execution.
sought to be expropriated. Later on, Holy Trinity wanted to withdraw the deposit for its • Relevantly, in March 2003, Holy Trinity filed a Motion to Withdraw
land, including interest. This was opposed by TRB on the ground that the landowner is Deposit before the RTC, seeking to withdraw the amount due to it for the
only entitled to the deposit, and not the interest. The RTC originally ruled in favor of land expropriated amounting to P22,968,000.00, including the interest that
Holy Trinity but later on reversed. The CA ruled in favor of Holy Trinity and ruled that accrued thereon. The RTC allowed the withdrawal of the principal amount
the deposit belongs to Holy Trinity per the rule of accession, and the interest is since Holy Trinity already proved absolute ownership over the land sought to
considered fruits of the principal amount. be expropriated and paid taxes thereon. However, the issue on the accrued
interest was to be threshed out in a subsequent hearing.
ISSUE: Whether the interest belongs to Holy Trinity, per the rule of accession? • During the proceedings, the DPWH reported that the DPWH Expropriation
YES!! account, including the deposit of TRB, was earning interest. In March 2004,
the RTC ruled that the interest properly belongs to Holy Trinity, as it is
HELD: Preliminarily, the expropriation being done is for a national government considered fruits per the principle of accession.
infrastructure project. Thus, RA 8974 should govern the expropriation proceedings and • TRB filed a MR, arguing that the payment of interest on money deposited
not Rule 67, Sec. 2. Under RA 8974, the government agency should pay 100% of the and/or consigned for the purpose of securing a writ of possession was
zonal value of the property sought to be expropriated. Once paid, such amount sanctioned neither by law nor by jurisprudence. During the proceedings, the
automatically becomes the property of the landowner. Per the right of accession, the RTC issued the Order of Expropriation.
civil fruits—the interest that accrued on the amount—belong to the landowner. Here, • In February 2005, the RTC granted TRB’s MR and ruled that the issue of
TRB paid Holy Trinity the amount required by law, and the principal amount belongs to payment of interest should determined before the Board of Commissioners
Holy Trinity, and that includes the interest that accrued thereon, pursuant to the who will likewise determine the payment of just compensation. Holy Trinity’s
principle of accession. MR of this order was denied so Holy Trinity went to the Court of Appeals.
• The Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari of Holy Trinity and
DOCTRINE: RA 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the vacated the order of the RTC that stated that a Board of Commissioners should
property owner than Rule 67, applies in instances when the national government determine the issue of interest. The CA ruled that the interest, which
expropriates property "for national government infrastructure projects." Thus, if accrued on the amount deposited in the expropriation account, belongs
expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than to Holy Trinity by virtue of accession.
national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode
prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply. Also, by virtue of the principle of accession, the ISSUE: Whether the interest that accrued from the deposit made in the expropriation
interest that accrued on the deposit paid by the expropriating agency belongs to the proceedings belong to the landowner? YES, per the principle of accession.
landowner, since it is considered as civil fruits.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 21
April 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 90981, which set aside the 7 February 2005 and 16 May
FACTS: 2005 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO
The government through the Toll Regulatory Board (“TRB”) sought to ORDERED.
expropriate parcels of lands that would be affected by the construction,
rehabilitation and expansion of the North Luzon Expressway. It filed a RATIO:
Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation and raffled to Branch 85, Malolos TRB’s Arguments
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 43

• First, the owner of the properties is only entitled to the exact amount current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
deposited per Sec. 4 of RA 8974: (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or
Section 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. – Whenever it is structures using the replacement cost method, while under Rule 67,
necessary to acquire real property for the right-of-way, site or the initial deposit should be equivalent to the assessed value of the
location for any national government infrastructure project through property for purposes of taxation.
expropriation, the appropriate implementing agency shall initiate the o Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be
expropriation proceedings before the proper court under the exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve at
following guidelines: present as the solitary guideline through which the State may
expropriate private property. For example, Section 19 of the Local
(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the Government Code governs as to the exercise by local government
defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance.
owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) And then there is RA. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings
one hundred (100%) percent of the value of the property based intended for national government infrastructure projects.
on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal o RA 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable
Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances
structures as determined under Section 7 hereof. when the national government expropriates property "for national
• and Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court: government infrastructure projects." Thus, if expropriation is
Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized engaged in by the national government for purposes other than
government depositary. – Upon the filing of the complaint or at national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard
anytime thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply.
shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real • Here, since the expropriation is for a national government infrastructure
property involved if he deposits with the authorized government project, the procedure under RA 8974 should be followed.
depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank Ownership of the Interest
subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, • Under Art. 440 of the Civil Code, the right of accession is conferred by
unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate ownership of the principal property.10
of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines • The principal property in the case at bar is part of the deposited amount in the
payable on demand to the authorized government depositary. expropriation account of DPWH which pertains particularly to HTRDC. Such
• Second, since there are 2 stages in an expropriation proceedings, the amount, determined to be P22,968,000.00 of the P28,406,700.00 total deposit,
determination of interest will only happen during the second stage which is was already ordered by the RTC to be released to HTRDC or its authorized
where just compensation is determined. representative.
• Third, the account where the deposit is found is in the name of DPWH and not • The CA correctly held that Holy Trinity is the owner of the deposited amount,
Holy Trinity, and thus, it does not exclusively belong to DPWH. then the latter should also be entitled to the interest which accrued thereon.
• The deposit was made in order to comply with Section 4 of Republic Act
Difference between RA 8974 and Rule 67, Sec. 2 No. 8974, which requires nothing less than the immediate payment of
• TRB failed to distinguish between the expropriation procedures under 100% of the value of the property, based on the current zonal valuation
Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Republic Act No. 8974 of the BIR, to the property owner.
and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court speak of different procedures, with the • Pursuant to Republic v. Gingoyon, the plain intent of RA 8974 is to supersede
former specifically governing expropriation proceedings for national the system of deposit under Rule 67. According to the Senate deliberations, the
government infrastructure projects. payment of 100% of the value of the property is to favor the landowners.
• In Republic v. Gingoyon, the Court pointed out the crucial differences between • The intention of the TRB in depositing such amount through DPWH was
the two: clearly to comply with the requirement of immediate payment in
o With respect to the issuance of a writ of possession, RA. 8974 Republic Act No. 8974, so that it could already secure a writ of possession
mandates immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing over the properties subject of the expropriation and commence
of the complaint while under Rule 67, what is required is only initial implementation of the project.
deposit with an authorized government depositary.
o With respect to the initial deposit, RA 8974 requires payment the 10Art. 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced
market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 44

• TRB contends that Holy Trinity is only entitled to the amount equivalent to the • DPWH is merely a trustee of the amounts deposited in its account, since these
zonal value of the property, and that is correct pursuant to RA 8974. are merely initial payment for the landowners of the properties subject of the
• By depositing the said amount required by law in the Land Bank account, expropriation, until said landowners are allowed by the RTC to withdraw the
TRB is already considered to have paid the same to Holy Trinity, and it same.
became the owner thereof. The amount earned interest after the deposit; As a final note, TRB does not object to Holy Trinity’s withdrawal of the amount of
hence, the interest should pertain to the owner of the principal who is P22,968,000.00 from the expropriation account, provided that it is able to show (1) that
already determined as Holy Trinity. The interest is paid by Land Bank on the property is free from any lien or encumbrance and (2) that it is the absolute owner
the deposit, and the TRB cannot claim that it paid an amount more than what it thereof. The said conditions do not put in abeyance the constructive delivery of the
is required to do so by law. said amount to HTRDC pending the latter’s compliance therewith. Article 1187 of
• TRB cited NAPOCOR v. Angas and Land Bank v. Wycoco to support its the Civil Code provides that the "effects of a conditional obligation to give, once
contention that the Board of Commissioners should determine the payment of the condition has been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the
interest. However these cases are not applicable to this case. obligation." Hence, when Holy Trinity with the given conditions, as determined by the
• The issue in Angas is whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of RTC in its order, the effects of the constructive delivery retroacted to the actual date of
interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the applicable law is the deposit of the amount in the expropriation account of DPWH.
Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate, or
Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal rate at 12% per annum. We
ruled in Angas that since the kind of interest involved therein is interest by G. JUDICIAL FORECLOS URE (RU LE 68)
way of damages for delay in the payment thereof, and not as earnings from
loans or forbearances of money, Article 2209 of the Civil Code prescribing the
1) HUERTA ALBA V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 128567, SEPTEMBER 1, 2000 –
6% interest shall apply. In Wycoco, on the other hand, we clarified that
TANDOC
interests in the form of damages cannot be applied where there is prompt and
valid payment of just compensation.
ER: For the facts of the case, the ER will suffice. You can go straight to ratio for the
• The case at bar, however, does not involve interest as damages for delay
doctrines.
in payment of just compensation. It concerns interest earned by the
amount deposited in the expropriation account.
• Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing agency of the Huerta Alba mortgaged four parcels of land in favor of Intercon, a banking institution.
government pays just compensation twice: (1) immediately upon the filing of Intercon assigned its rights over the mortgaged properties to Syndicated Management.
the complaint, where the amount to be paid is 100% of the value of the Syndicated Management sought to judicially foreclose these properties. RTC and CA
property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR (initial ruled in favor of Syndicated Management. Huerta Alba went to SC via certiorari. SC
payment); and (2) when the decision of the court in the determination of just denied. SC’s decision became final and executory and was entered in the Book of Entries
compensation becomes final and executory, where the implementing agency of Judgment. Syndicated Management filed a writ of execution with the trial court that
shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the rendered the judgment. It was granted. Huerta Alba sought to nullify the order by filing
just compensation as determined by the court (final payment). a motion to quash stating that the 150-day period for EQUITY REDEMPTION has not
• Holy Trinity never claimed interest due to delay of the two payments yet lapsed. This was denied. Heurta Alba appealed to the CA. CA denied the appeal as
enumerated. Here, Holy Trinity is actually claiming the payment made to it well. Huerta Alba filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Clarification seeking
already. Being the owner of the amount paid, HTRDC is claiming, by the right of "clarification" of the date of commencement of the one (1) year period for the RIGHT OF
accession, the interest earned by the same while on deposit with the bank. REDEMPTION of the properties in question . (Ngayon lang ni-raise yung one year right
• That the expropriation account was in the name of DPWH, and not of Holy of redemption…delaying tactics). CA denied. The pertinent part of the CA decision: the
Trinity, is of no moment. The CA correctly held that the amount deposited question of whether the Syndicated Management Group,. Inc., is a bank or credit institution
transferred by operation of law to Holy Trinity, and the interests that accrued was never brought before us squarely, and it is indeed odd and strange that petitioner
on that amount are considered civil fruits. Huerta Alba would now sarcastically ask a rhetorical question in its motion for
o Bank interest partake the nature of civil fruits under Art. 442 of clarification. Note that in a judicial foreclosure, there is no right of redemption except if
the New Civil Code. And since these are considered fruits, one is a banking institution.
ownership thereof should be due to the owner of the principal.
Undoubtedly, being an attribute of ownership, the [HTRDC’s]
right over the fruits (jus fruendi), that is the bank interests, must
be respected. ISSUES:
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 45

1. W/on Huerta Alba is entitled to Right of Redemption. –Nope, only equity of - In a complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage with preliminary injunction filed
redemption because Huerta Alba is not a banking institution. before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, the herein private respondent Syndicated
2. W/on Huerta Alba is estopped in invoking the right of redemption of Management sought the foreclosure of four (4) parcels of land mortgaged by petitioner
Syndicated Management’s predecessor-in-interest Intercon (banking Huerta Alba to Intercon Fund Resource, Inc. ("Intercon").
institution)for failing to raise the argument at the earliest opportunity. –yes
-the RTC ruled in favor of Syndicated Management
HELD:
-Huerta Alba appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals which
1.Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, no equivalent right of redemption exists. dismissed the case on June 29, 1993 on the ground of late payment of docket fees.
The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale 'when confirmed be an order of the court. .
. . shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in -Huerta Alba went to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.' Such rights 112044, which this court resolved to dismiss on December 13, 1993, on the finding that
exceptionally 'allowed by law' (i.e., even after confirmation by an order of the court) are the Court of Appeals erred not in dismissing the appeal of petitioner.
those granted by the charter of the Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938),
and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337). These laws confer on the mortgagor, his
successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the right to redeem -A motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of its petition in G.R. No. 112044 was
the property sold on foreclosure — after confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale denied with finality in the Supreme Court's Resolution promulgated on February 16,
— which right may be exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from the date 1994. On March 10, 1994, leave to present a second motion for reconsideration in G.R.
of registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry of Property. No. 112044 or to submit the case for hearing by the Court en banc was filed, but to no
avail. The Court resolved to deny the same on May 11, 1994.
But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a
mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or banking institution. On March 14, 1994, the Resolution dated December 13, 1993, in G.R. No. 112044
became final and executory and was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
2. In light of the aforestated facts, it was too late in the day for petitioner Huerta Alba to
invoke a right to redeem under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 (General Banking Act). -Syndicated Management filed with the trial court of origin a motion for execution of the
Petitioner Huerta Alba failed to assert a right to redeem in several crucial stages of the Decision promulgated on April 30, 1992 in Civil Case No. 89-5424. The said motion was
proceedings. A party to a case who failed to invoked his claim in the main case, while granted on July 15, 1994.
having the opportunity to do so, will be precluded, subsequently, from invoking his
claim, even if it were true, after the decision has become final, otherwise the judgment -Huerta Alba filed with the same trial court an Urgent Motion to Quash and Set Aside
may be reduced to a mockery and the administration of justice may be placed in Writ of Execution ascribing to it grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Writ
disrepute." of Execution.

Petitioner Huerta Alba has only itself to blame for not alleging at the outset that the -To support its motion, petitioner Huerta Alba invited attention and argued that the
predecessor-in-interest of the private respondent Syndicated Management is a credit records of the case were still with the Court of Appeals and therefore, issuance of the
institution. Thus, when the trial court, and the Court of Appeals repeatedly passed upon writ of execution was premature since the 150-day period for petitioner Huerta Alba to
the issue of whether or not petitioner Alba had the right of redemption or equity of pay the judgment obligation had not yet lapsed and Huerta Alba had not yet defaulted in
redemption over subject properties in the decisions, resolutions and orders, particularly the payment thereof since no demand for its payment was made by the private
in Civil Case no. 89-5424, CA-G.R. CV No. 39243, CA-G.R. SP No. 35086, and CA-G.R. SP respondent.
No. 38747, it was unmistakable that the petitioner was adjudged to just have the equity
of redemption without any qualification whatsoever, that is, without any right of -In Huerta Alba's own words, the dispute between the parties was "principally on
redemption allowed by law. the issue as to when the 150-day period within which Huerta Alba may exercise its
equity of redemption should be counted."
COMPLETE
-The trial court denied the motion to quash
FACTS:
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 46

- Challenging the said order granting execution, petitioner Huerta Alba filed once more On December 23, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner Huerta Alba's motion for
with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari and prohibition with reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 35086. Absent any further action with respect to the
preliminary injunction, docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 35086, predicated on the same denial of the subject motion for reconsideration, private respondent Syndicated
grounds invoked for its Motion to Quash Writ of Execution. Management presented a Second Motion for Confirmation of Certificate of Sale before
the trial court.
On September 6, 1994, the scheduled auction sale of subject pieces of properties
proceeded and the private respondent Syndicated Management was declared the As regards the Decision rendered on September 30, 1994 by the Court of Appeals in CA
highest bidder. Thus, private respondent Syndicated Management was awarded subject G.R. SP No. 35086 it became final and executory on January 25, 1995.
bidded pieces of property. The covering Certificate of Sale issued in its favor was
registered with the Registry of Deeds on October 21, 1994. On February 10, 1995, the lower court confirmed the sale of subject properties to the
private respondent. The pertinent Order declared that all pending incidents relating to
On September 7, 1994, petitioner Huerta Alba presented an Ex-Parte Motion for the Order dated September 26, 1994 had become moot and academic. Conformably, the
Clarification asking the trial court to "clarify" whether or not the twelve (12) month Transfer Certificates of Title to subject pieces of property were then issued to the
period of redemption for ordinary execution applied in the case. private respondent.

On September 26, 1994, the trial court ruled that the period of redemption of subject On February 27, 1995, petitioner Huerta Alba filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion
property should be governed by the rule on the sale of judicially foreclosed property for Clarification seeking "clarification" of the date of commencement of the one (1) year
under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court. period for the redemption of the properties in question.

Thereafter, petitioner Huerta Alba then filed an Exception to the Order dated September - In its Resolution dated March 20, 1995, the Court of Appeals merely noted such Motion
26, 1994 and Motion to Set Aside Said Order, contending that the said Order materially for Clarification since its Decision promulgated on September 30, 1994 had already
altered the Decision dated April 30, 1992 "which declared that the satisfaction of the become final and executory; ratiocinating thus:
judgment shall be in the manner and under the regulation that govern sale of real estate
under execution." - We further ruled that the one-hundred fifty day period within which
petitioner may exercise its equity of redemption should be counted, not from
Meanwhile, in its Decision of September 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals resolved the the receipt of respondent court of the records of Civil Case No. 89-5424 but
issues raised by the petitioner in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 35086, holding that the one hundred- from the date petitioner was notified of the entry of judgment made by the
fifty day period within which petitioner may redeem subject properties should be appellate court.
computed from the date petitioner was notified of the Entry of Judgment in G.R. No.
112044; and that the 150-day period within which petitioner may exercise its equity of But we never made any pronouncement on the one-year right of redemption of
redemption expired on September 11, 1994 petitioner because, in the first place, the foreclosure in this case is judicial. and as such the
mortgagor has only the equity not the right of redemption . . . While it may be true that
- Petitioner Huerta Alba moved for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of under Section 78 of R.A. 337 as amended, otherwise known as the General Banking Act,
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 35086. In its Motion for Reconsideration dated October 18, a mortgagor of a bank, banking or credit institution, whether the foreclosure was done
1994, petitioner theorized that the period of one hundred fifty (150) days should not be judicially or extrajudicially, has a period of one year from the auction sale within which
reckoned with from Entry of Judgment but from receipt on or before July 29, 1994 by to redeem the foreclosed property, the question of whether the Syndicated Management
the trial court of the records of Civil Case No. 89-5424 from the Court of Appeals. So also, Group,. Inc., is a bank or credit institution was never brought before us squarely, and it is
petitioner maintained that it may not be considered in default, even after the expiration indeed odd and strange that petitioner would now sarcastically ask a rhetorical question
of 150 days from July 29, 1994, because prior demand to pay was never made on it by in its motion for clarification."3
the private respondent. According to petitioner Huerta Alba, it was therefore, premature
for the trial court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment.

ISSUES:
The trial court deferred action on the Motion for Confirmation of the Certificate of Sale
in view of the pendency of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No.
1. W/on Huerta Alba is entitled to Right of Redemption. –Nope, only equity of
35086.
redemption because Huerta Alba is not a banking institution.
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 47

2. W/on Huerta Alba is estopped in invoking the right of redemption of the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt
Syndicated Management’s predecessor-in-interest Intercon(banking within the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final, in accordance with
institution) for failing to raise the argument at the earliest opportunity. –yes Rule 68, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation.

Held: Section 2, Rule 68 provides that —

1. From the various decisions, resolutions and orders a quo it can be gleaned that '. . If upon the trial . . the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to
what petitioner has been adjudged to have was only the equity of redemption be true, it shall ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage
over subject properties. On the distinction between the equity of redemption debt or obligation, including interest and costs, and shall render judgment for
and right of redemption, the case of Gregorio Y. Limpin vs. Intermediate the sum so found due and order the same to be paid into court within a period
Appellate Court,7 comes to the fore. Held the Court in the said case: of not less than ninety (90) days from the date of the service of such order, and
that in default of such payment the property be sold to realize the mortgage
"The equity of redemption is, to be sure, different from and should not be debt and costs.'
confused with the right of redemption.
This is the mortgagor's equity (not right) of redemption which, as above stated,
The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage – understood in the sense of a may be exercised by him even beyond the 90-day period 'from the date of
prerogative to re-acquire mortgaged property after registration of the service of the order,' and even after the foreclosure sale itself, provided it be
foreclosure sale – exists only in the case of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such order of confirmation,
mortgage. No such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure except only no redemption can be effected any longer."8 (Emphasis supplied)
where the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or banking
institution.

Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the 2. Petitioner Huelta Alba failed to seasonably invoke its purported right under
mortgagor the right of redemption within one (1) year from the registration of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337.
the sheriff's certificate of foreclosure sale.

Petitioner Huelta Alba avers in its petition that the Intercom, predecessor in interest of
Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no equivalent right of the private respondent, is a credit institution, such that Section 78 of Republic Act No.
redemption exists. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale 'when 337 should apply in this case. Stated differently, it is the submission of petitioner that it
confirmed be an order of the court. . . . shall operate to divest the rights of all the should be allowed to redeem subject properties within one year from the date of sale as
parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such a result of the foreclosure of the mortgage constituted thereon.
rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.' Such rights exceptionally
'allowed by law' (i.e., even after confirmation by an order of the court) are
those granted by the charter of the Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747 The pivot of inquiry here therefore, is whether the petitioner seasonably invoked its
and 2938), and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337). These laws confer on the asserted right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 to redeem subject properties.
mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the
mortgagor, the right to redeem the property sold on foreclosure — after Petitioner theorizes that it invoked its "right" in "timely fashion", that is, after
confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale — which right may be confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale, and within one (1) year from the date
exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from the date of registration of registration of the certificate of sale. Indeed, the facts show that it was only on May 2,
of the certificate of sale in the Registry of Property. 1995 when, in opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, did petitioner
file a Motion to Compel Private Respondent to Accept Redemption, invoking for the very
But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of first time its alleged right to redeem subject properties under to Section 78 of R.A. No.
a mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or banking institution. In 337.
such a case, the foreclosure sale, 'when confirmed by an order of the court. . .
shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their In light of the aforestated facts, it was too late in the day for petitioner to invoke a right
rights in the purchaser.' There then exists only what is known as the equity of to redeem under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. Petitioner failed to assert a right to redeem
redemption. This is simply the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish in several crucial stages of the proceedings.
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 48

For instance, on September 7, 1994, when it filed with the trial court an Ex-part Motion answer regarding any right thereunder. It bears stressing that the applicability of
for Clarification, petitioner failed to allege and prove that private respondent's Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 hinges on the factual question of whether or not private
predecessor in interest was a credit institution and therefore, Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 respondent's predecessor in interest was a credit institution. As was held in Limpin, a
was applicable. Petitioner merely asked the trial court to clarify whether the sale of judicial foreclosure sale, "when confirmed by an order of the court, . . shall operate to
subject properties was execution sale or judicial foreclosure sale. divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser,
subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law'," 10 which confer on the
So also, when it presented before the trial court an Exception to the Order and Motion to mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the
Set Aside Said Order dated October 13, 1994, petitioner again was silent on its alleged right to redeem the property sold on foreclosure after confirmation by the court of the
right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337, even as it failed to show that private respondent's judicial foreclosure sale. Thus, the claim that petitioner is entitled to the beneficial
predecessor in interest is a credit institution. Petitioner just argued that the provisions of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 —since private respondent's predecessor-in-
aforementioned Order materially altered the trial court's Decision of April 30, 1992. interest is a credit institution — is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim which
should have been averred in petitioner's answer to the compliant for judicial
foreclosure.
Then, too, nothing was heard from petitioner on its alleged right under Section 78 of R.A.
No. 337 and of the predecessor in interest of private respondent as a credit institution,
when the trial court came out with an order on February 10, 1995, confirming the sale ". . . A counterclaim is, most broadly, a cause of action existing in favor of the
of subject properties in favor of private respondent and declaring that all pending defendant against the plaintiff. More narrowly, it is a claim which. if established,
incidents with respect to the Order dated September 26, 1994 had become moot and will defeat or in some way qualify a judgment or relief to which plaintiff is
academic. otherwise entitled It is sometimes defined as any cause of action arising in
contract available against any action also arising in contract and existing at the
time of the commencement of such an action. It is frequently defined by the
Similarly, when petitioner filed on February 27, 1995 a Motion for Clarification with the codes as a cause of action arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in
Court of Appeals, seeking "clarification" of the date of commencement of the one (1) the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or connected with the
year redemption period for the subject properties, petitioner never intimated any subject of the action."11 (emphasis supplied)
alleged right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 nor did it invite attention to its present
stance that private respondent's predecessor-in-interest was a credit institution.
Consequently, in its Resolution dated March 20, 1995, the Court of Appeals ruled on the "The counterclaim is in itself a distinct and independent cause of action, so that
said motion thus: when properly stated as such, the defendant becomes, in respect to the
matters stated by him, an actor, and there are two simultaneous actions
pending between the same parties, wherein each is at the same time both a
"But we never made any pronouncement on the one-year right of redemption plaintiff and a defendant. Counterclaim is an offensive as well as a defensive
of petitioner because, in the first place, the foreclosure in this case is judicial, plea and is not necessarily confined to the justice of the plaintiff's claim. It
and as such. the mortgagor has only the equity. not the right of redemption . . . represents the right of the defendant to have the claims of the parties
While it may be true that under Section 78 of R.A. 337 as amended, otherwise counterbalanced in whole or in part, and judgment to be entered in excess, if any.
known as the General Banking Act, a mortgagor of a bank, banking or credit A counterclaim stands on the same footing, and is to be tested be the same rules,
institution, whether the foreclosure was done judicially or extrajudicially, has a as if it were an independent action."12 (emphasis supplied)
period of one year from the auction sale within which to redeem the foreclosed
property, the question of whether the Syndicated Management Group. Inc., is
bank or credit institution was never brought before us squarely, and it is indeed The very purpose of a counterclaim would have been served had petitioner alleged in its
odd and strange that petitioner would now sarcastically ask a rhetorical answer its purported right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337:
question in its motion for clarification."9 (Emphasis supplied).
". . . The rules of counterclaim are designed to enable the disposition of a whole
If petitioner were really acting in good faith, it would have ventilated before the Court of controversy of interested parties' conflicting claims, at one time and in one
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 35086 its alleged right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337; but action, provided all parties' be brought before the court and the matter
petitioner never did do so. decided without prejudicing the rights of any party."13

Indeed, at the earliest opportunity, when it submitted its answer to the complaint for The failure of petitioner to seasonably assert its alleged right under Section 78 of R.A.
judicial foreclosure, petitioner should have alleged that it was entitled to the beneficial No. 337 precludes it from so doing at this late stage case. Estoppel may be successfully
provisions of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 but again, it did not make any allegation in its invoked if the party fails to raise the question in the early stages of the proceedings. 14
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 49

Thus, "a party to a case who failed to invoked his claim in the main case, while having redemption, which is simply the right of the petitioner to extinguish the mortgage and
the opportunity to do so, will be precluded, subsequently, from invoking his claim, even retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the 90-day period
if it were true, after the decision has become final, otherwise the judgment may be after the judgment became final. There being an explicit finding on the part of the Court
reduced to a mockery and the administration of justice may be placed in disrepute." 15 of Appeals in its Decision of September 30, 1994 in CA-G.R. No. 35086 — that the herein
petitioner failed to exercise its equity of redemption within the prescribed period,
All things viewed in proper perspective, it is decisively clear that the trial court erred in redemption can no longer be effected. The confirmation of the sale and the issuance of
still allowing petitioner to introduce evidence that private respondent's predecessor-in- the transfer certificates of title covering the subject properties to private respondent
interest was a credit institution, and to thereafter rule that the petitioner was entitled to was then, in order. The trial court therefore, has the ministerial duty to place private
avail of the provisions of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. In effect, the trial court permitted respondent in the possession of subject properties.
the petitioner to accomplish what the latter failed to do before the Court of Appeals, that
is, to invoke its alleged right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 although the Court of 2) BACALING V. MUYA, G.R. NO. 148404, APRIL 11, 2002 – TEVES (SUB – ORTIZ)
Appeals in CA-G.R. no. 35086 already found that 'the question of whether the Syndicated
Management Council Group, Inc. is a bank or credit institution was never brought before
(the Court of Appeals) squarely." The said pronouncement by the Court of Appeals BACALING V. MUYA
unerringly signified that petitioner did not make a timely assertion of any right under
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 in all the stages of the proceedings below. ER: please read full digest☺ Magulo yung case, peace☺

Verily, the petitioner has only itself to blame for not alleging at the outset that the Spouses Bacaling were the owners of 3 parcels of land that were subsequently
predecessor-in-interest of the private respondent is a credit institution. Thus, when the subdivided into 110 sublots. The landholding was processed and approved by the
trial court, and the Court of Appeals repeatedly passed upon the issue of whether or not National Urban Planning Commission. The Bureau of lands approved the corresponding
petitioner had the right of redemption or equity of redemption over subject properties subdivision plan for purposes of developing the property into a low-cost residential
in the decisions, resolutions and orders, particularly in Civil Case no. 89-5424, CA-G.R. community, to be known as Bacaling-Moreno subdivision.
CV No. 39243, CA-G.R. SP No. 35086, and CA-G.R. SP No. 38747, it was unmistakable that
the petitioner was adjudged to just have the equity of redemption without any In 1957, spouses obtained a loan from GSIS, secured by a REM over the land for the
qualification whatsoever, that is, without any right of redemption allowed by law. development of the subdivision. The spouses defaulted so the mortgaged property was
foreclosed. (note: in 1989, through a SC case, Nenita was able to recover possession)
The "law of case" holds that petitioner has the equity of redemption without
any qualification. PETITIONERS CLAIM:
That respondents Muya et. al, clandestinely entered and took possession of the land in
There is, therefore, merit in private respondent's contention that to allow petitioner to 1972. They took advantage of the problematic peace and order situation at the onset of
belatedly invoke its right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 will disturb the "law of the martial law and the foreclosure of the lots by GSIS.
case." However, private respondent's statement of what constitutes the "law of the case"
is not entirely accurate. The "law of the case" is not simply that the defendant possesses RESPONDENTS CLAIM
an equity of redemption. As the Court has stated, the "law of the case" holds that
petitioner has the equity of the redemption without any qualification whatsoever, that They were legally instituted by Bacaling's administrator/overseer as tenant-tillers of
is, without the right of redemption afforded by Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. Whether or the subject parcels of land. In 1974, their relationship with the landowner was
not the "law of the case" is erroneous is immaterial, it still remains the "law of the case". changed to one of leasehold. They religiously delivered their rental payments to
A contrary rule will contradict both the letter and spirit of the rulings of the Court of Bacaling as agricultural lessor. In 1980, they secured certificates of land transfer in their
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35086, CA-G.R. CV No. 39243, and CA-G.R. 38747, which names for the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots. They have made various payments to the
clearly saw through the repeated attempts of petitioner to forestall so simple a matter as Land Bank of the Philippines as amortizing owners-cultivators of their respective tillage.
making the security given for a just debt to answer for its payment.
OTHER NOTES:
Hence, in conformity with the ruling in Limpin, the sale of the subject properties, as
confirmed by the Order dated February 10, 1995 of the trial court in Civil Case No. 89- In 1977- City Council of Iloilo enacted Zoning Ordinance No. 212 declaring the one
5424 operated to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights hundred ten (110) sub-lots as "residential" and "non- agricultural.
in private respondent. There then existed only what is known as the equity of
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 50

IN 1978- Nelita Bacaling was able to register the subject property as the Bacaling- Sps. Bacaling were the owners of three (3) parcels of land.
Moreno Subdivision with the National Housing Authority and obtained a license to sell
the subject one hundred ten (110) sub-lots comprising the said subdivision to
consummate the original and abiding design to develop a low-cost residential
community.
In 1955, the lots were subdivided into one hundred ten (110) sub-lots.
IN 1989- SC case case wherein Nenita was able to recover possession of the property.

In 1990, petitioner Jose Juan Tong bought from Nelita Bacaling the subject lots. The said
sale was effected after Bacaling had repurchased the subject property from the The landholding was processed and approved as "residential" or "subdivision" by the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). National Urban Planning Commission (NUPC). The Bureau of Lands approved the
corresponding subdivision plan for purposes of developing the said property into a low-
Petitioner Tong (together with Bacaling) filed a petition for cancellation of the cost residential community which the spouses referred to as the Bacaling- Moreno
certificates of land transfer against respondents with the Department of Agrarian Subdivision.
Reform (DAR) Region VI Office in Iloilo City. The DAR, however, dismissed the
petition on the ground that there had been no legitimate conversion of the In 1957, a real estate loan amounting to P600,000.00 was granted to the spouses
classification of the 110 sub-lots from agricultural to residential prior to October Bacaling by GSIS for the development of the subdivision.
21, 1972 when Operation Land Transfer under P.D. No. 72 took effect.
To secure the repayment of the loan, the Bacalings executed in favor of the GSIS a real
ISSUE: W/N the respondent are agricultural lessee? estate mortgage over their parcels of land including the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots.

HELD NO:
The Bacalings failed to pay the amortizations on the loan and consequently the
mortgage constituted on the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots was foreclosed by the GSIS.
The requisites in order to have a valid agricultural leasehold relationship are: (1) The
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) The subject matter
After a court case that reached all the way to the SC ,Nelita Bacaling (by then a widow)
of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) There is consent between the parties to the
in 1989 was eventually able to restore to herself ownership of the one hundred ten
relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
(110) sub-lots.
production; (5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and (6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee. According to the Petitioners (Bacaling and Jose Jan Tong) , in 1972, respondents Muya
and 4 otherpersons, clandestinely entered and occupied the entire sub-lots and grabbed
exclusively for themselves the said lots. Apparently, respondents took advantage of the
We find that the first, third and sixth requisites are lacking in the case at bar. One
problematic peace and order situation at the onset of martial law and the foreclosure of
legal conclusion adduced from the facts in Government Service Insurance System
the lots by GSIS. They sowed the lots as if the same were their own, and altered the
v. Court of Appeal provides that GSIS, not Bacaling, was the owner of the subject
roads, drainage, boundaries and monuments established thereon.
properties from 1961 up to 1989 as a result of the foreclosure and confirmation of
the sale of the subject properties.
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that in 1964 they were legally instituted by
Although the confirmation only came in 1975, the ownership is deemed to have Bacaling's administrator/overseer as tenant-tillers of the subject parcels of land. In
1974, their relationship with the landowner was changed to one of leasehold. They
been vested to GSIS way back in 1961, the year of the sale of the foreclosed
religiously delivered their rental payments to Bacaling as agricultural lessor. In 1980,
properties. This is due to the fact that the date of confirmation by the trial court of
they secured certificates of land transfer in their names for the one hundred ten (110)
the foreclosure sale retroacts to the date of the actual sale itself.[The confirmation
sub-lots. They have made various payments to the Land Bank of the Philippines as
of sale is not provided in the full case]
amortizing owners-cultivators of their respective tillage.

COMPLETE
In 1977, however, the City Council of Iloilo enacted Zoning Ordinance No. 212 declaring
the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots as "residential" and "non- agricultural." In 1978,
Facts: Nelita Bacaling was able to register the subject property as the Bacaling-Moreno
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 51

Subdivision with the National Housing Authority and to obtain therefrom a license to We find that the first, third and sixth requisites are lacking in the case at bar. One
sell the subject one hundred ten (110) sub-lots comprising the said subdivision to legal conclusion adduced from the facts in Government Service Insurance System
consummate the original and abiding design to develop a low-cost residential v. Court of Appeal sprovides that GSIS, not Bacaling, was the owner of the subject
community. properties from 1961 up to 1989 as a result of the foreclosure and confirmation of
the sale of the subject properties.

In 1990, petitioner Jose Juan Tong bought from Nelita Bacaling the subject lots. The said
sale was effected after Bacaling has repurchased the subject property from the Although the confirmation only came in 1975, the ownership is deemed to have
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). To secure performance of the contract been vested to GSIS way back in 1961, the year of the sale of the foreclosed
of absolute sale and facilitate the transfer of title of the lots to Jose Juan Tong, Bacaling properties. This is due to the fact that the date of confirmation by the trial court of
appointed him in 1992 as her attorney-in- fact, under an irrevocable special power of the foreclosure sale retroacts to the date of the actual sale itself.[The confirmation
attorney. of sale is not provided in the full case]

Petitioner Tong (together with Bacaling) filed a petition for cancellation of the Thus, the respondents cannot validly claim that they are legitimate and recognized
certificates of land transfer against respondents with the Department of Agrarian tenants of the subject parcels of land for the reason that their agreement to till the land
Reform (DAR) Region VI Office in Iloilo City. The DAR, however, dismissed the was not with GSIS, the real landowner. There is no showing that GSIS consented to such
petition on the ground that there had been no legitimate conversion of the tenancy relationship nor is there proof that GSIS received a share in the harvest of the
classification of the 110 sub-lots from agricultural to residential prior to October tenants. Consequently, the respondents cannot claim security of tenure and other rights
21, 1972 when Operation Land Transfer under P.D. No. 72 took effect. Bacaling accorded by our agrarian laws considering that they have not been validly instituted as
and Tong appealed to the DAR Central Office but their appeal was similarly agricultural lessees of the subject parcels of land. And from the time Bacaling recovered
rejected the motion for reconsideration failed to overturn the ruling of the Central the subject properties from GSIS up to the time the former changed her legal position in
Office Order. the instant case, Bacaling has consistently disclaimed respondents as her alleged
tenants.
On September 19, 1997, Bacaling and Tong appealed the adverse DAR Orders to the
Office of the President which reversed the Decision. The Certificates of land transfers The respondents argue that GSIS cannot be considered as the owner of the said
were cancelled. properties from 1961 up to 1989 inasmuch as the foreclosure proceedings that started
in 1957 only attained finality during its promulgation by this Court in 1989.
Respondents contend that GSIS was the owner of the said parcels of land only from
Respondents elevated the OP Decision to the Court of Appeals on a petition for review 1989.
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. On January 2001, the Court of Appeals
reversed the OP Decision and validated the certificates of land transfers. We disagree. The pendency of the GSIS case cannot be construed as a maintenance of
status quo with Bacaling as the owner from 1957 up to 1989 for the reason that what
ISSUE: W/N the respondent are agricultural lessee? [No] [This is important because if was appealed to this Court was only the issue of redemption, and not the validity of the
they are agricultural lessees, they will have a right to the land.] foreclosure proceedings including the public auction sale, the confirmation of the public
auction sale and the confirmation and transfer of ownership of the foreclosed parcels of
HELD: On the issue of whether the private respondents are agricultural tenants and land to GSIS. The ownership of GSIS over the subject parcels of land was not disputed. It
entitled to the benefits accorded by our agrarian laws, we rule in the negative. The was the existence of the right to redeem in a judicial foreclosure that was the subject of
requisites in order to have a valid agricultural leasehold relationship are: (1) The parties the controversy. We ruled that there was no longer any right of redemption in a judicial
are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) The subject matter of the foreclosure proceeding after the confirmation of the public auction. Only foreclosures of
relationship is agricultural land; (3) There is consent between the parties to the mortgages in favor of banking institutions and those made extrajudicially are subject to
relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural legal redemption. Since GSIS is not a banking institution and the procedure of the
production; (5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural foreclosure is not extrajudicial in nature, no right of redemption exists after the judicial
lessee; and (6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or confirmation of the public auction sale of the said lots.
agricultural lessee.
3) MONZON V. RELOVA, G.R. NO. 171827, SEPTEMBER 17, 2008 – TIU
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 52

ER: Monzon executed in favor of two separate payees, the Spouses Relova and Perez - The winning bidder in the extrajudicial foreclosure, Addio Properties (Addio),
(Spouses), promissory notes, which were secured by a REM over two separate lots (Lot paid the amount of about 5M, [NOTE] leaving about 1.6M as residue.
2A and Lot 2B). Deeds of Sale were later executed by Monzon in favor of the Spouses. It
turns out, however, that Monzon was also a mortgagor of Coastal Corporation (CLC). CLC - The Spouses claim that the residue, which is in the custody of Atty. Luna,
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage, which included Lots 2A and 2B. The winning should be turned over to them pursuant to Sec. 4 of Rule 68.
bid of Addio Properties (Addio) was more than the mortgage debt to CLC, resulting in a
residue. The Spouses filed a Petition for Injunction against Monzon and Atty. Luna
(Branch Clerk of Court, RTC Tagaytay), seeking that the residue in the custody of Atty.
Luna be delivered to them based on Sec. 4, Rule 68. Were the Spouses entitled to the - Monzon, in her Answer, claimed:
residue? Nay! Here, CLC extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage, in which case, the
applicable law is Act 3135, as amended, and not Rule 68, which refers to judicial - That the Petition should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
foreclosure of mortgage. Unlike Sec. 4 of Rule 68, Act 3135 does not grant to junior
encumbrances the right to receive any residue after settling the principal debt. Instead, - That the Spouses could no longer ask for the enforcement of the PNs because
Act 3135 only gives second mortgagees the right to redeem the foreclosed property she had already performed her obligation to them by way of dacion en pago.
pursuant to Sec. 6 thereof. In other words, the Spouses invoked the incorrect law,
making their action dismissible for failure to state a cause of action as against Atty. Luna. - That the Spouses could still claim the portions sold to them, if they would
[NOTE] However, the case was not dismissed as to Monzon because the petition of the only file the proper civil cases.
Spouses can be construed as a money claim. If that were the case, then the doctrine that
a mortgage creditor has the option of waiving the security and enforcing his credit - That as regards the residue, the Spouses cannot acquire the same without a
against all the properties of the debtor in an ordinary action, comes into play. Thus, writ of preliminary attachment or a writ of garnishment in accordance with
upon REMAND of the case to the RTC, the Spouses must be asked if they will choose to the provisions of Rule 57 and Sec. 9(c) of Rule 39.
go with this option.

COMPLETE
- During the hearing, Monzon and her counsel was absent and, thus, the RTC allowed the
Facts: The Spouses Relova and the Spouses Perez (collectively, the Spouses) filed against Spouses to present evidence ex parte. The RTC later rendered a Decision in favor of the
Atty. Luna, Clerk of Court (Branch 18, RTC Tagaytay) and Monzon a Petition for Spouses.
Injunction.
- The RTC held that the Spouses are entitled to the residue, which was to be
- The Spouses alleged that in December 1998, Monzon in favor of the Spouses divided among them, such that Atty. Luna had to deliver the same to them.
Perez a promissory note (PN) secured by a lot (Lot 2A) in Tagaytay
City. Monzon later executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot 2A in favor of the
Spouses Perez.
- Monzon filed a Notice of Appeal. Monzon claims that the RTC gravely erred in
rendering its Decision because she was not giving a chance to present her evidence.
- The Spouses also claim that in March 1999, Monzon executed another PN,
this time in favor of the Spouses Relova, which PN was also secured by a lot
(Lot 2B). Monzon later executed a Deed of Conditional Sale over Lot 2B in favor
of the Spouses Relova.
- [REMEMBER] Addio filed before the RTC a Motion for Intervention. The RTC granted
the motion.

- In October 1999, the Coastal Lending Corporation (CLC) extrajudicially foreclosed lots
belonging to Monzon, including the portions mortgaged and later sold to the Spouses.
- The CA dismissed the appeal and subsequent MR of Monzon.
- It turns out that Monzon was indebted to CLC [NOTE] for about 3M.

- JT: The date of the mortgage in favor of CLC was never mentioned in
- Thus, Monzon filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. Monzon stressed
the case.
that she was never declared in default by the RTC [THIS IS TRUE] and, thus, the proper
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 53

thing to do was to have set the case for hearing for the reception of the evidence.
Monzon argued that had she been given the opportunity to present her evidence, she
would have been able to prove that there was no more obligation to the Spouses due to (2.1) Sec. 4 of Rule 68 is the basis of the Spouses alleged cause of action entitling them to
the dacion. the residue of the amount paid in the foreclosure sale.

Issues: SEC. 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale.— xxx and when there


shall be any balance or residue, after paying off the
(1) Whether or not Monzon was properly declared in default? No. [BONUS mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid to junior
KNOWLEDGE] encumbrancers in the order of their priority xxx

(2) Whether or not the claim of the Spouses as to the residue was proper? No – failure
to state a cause of action! Case is DISMISSED as against to Atty. Luna, but
REMANDED with respect to Monzon. - However, Rule 68 governs the judicial foreclosure of mortgages. Extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgages, which was what transpired in this case, is governed by Act
3135, as amended. Moreover, AM 99-10-05-0 provides for the procedure to be
observed in the conduct of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
Held:

(1) Here, despite the fact that Monzon was not declared in default, the RTC,
nevertheless, applied the effects of a default order under Sec. 3 of Rule 9. However, - [IMPORTANT] Neither Act 3135, as amended, nor A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 grants to
failure to appear in hearings is not a ground for the declaration of a defendant in junior encumbrancers the right to receive the balance of the purchase price. The only
default. Failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period, and not right given to second mortgagees is the right to redeem the foreclosed property
failure to appear at the hearing, is the sole ground for an order of default (Rosario, et pursuant to Sec. 6 of Act 3135, as amended.
al. vs. Alonzo, et al., L-17320, June 29, 1963), except the failure to appear at a pre-trial
conference wherein the effects of a default on the part of the defendant are
followed, that is, the plaintiff shall be allowed to present evidence ex parte and a
judgment based thereon may be rendered against the defendant (Section 5, Rule 18). SEC. 6. Redemption. xxx any person having a lien on the
Also, a default judgment may be rendered, even if the defendant had filed his answer, property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust
under the circumstance in Sec. 3(c), Rule 29. under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at
any time within the term of one year from and after the
• Thus, the effects of default are followed only in three instances: date of the sale xxx
o (1) When there is an actual default for failure to file a responsive
pleading;
o (2) Failure to appear in the pre-trial conference; and
o (3) Refusal to comply with modes of discovery under the - Even if, for the sake of argument, Rule 68 is to be applied to extrajudicial foreclosure of
circumstance in Sec. 3(c), Rule 29. mortgages, such right can only be given to second mortgagees who are made parties to
• It must be noted, however, that such failure to attend hearings despite due the judicial foreclosure. While a second mortgagee is a proper and in a sense even a
notice, when committed during hearing dates for the presentation of the necessary party to a proceeding to foreclose a first mortgage on real property, he is not
complainant’s evidence, would amount to the waiver of such defendant’s right an indispensable party, because a valid decree may be made, as between the mortgagor
to object to the evidence presented during such hearing, and to cross-examine and the first mortgagee, without regard to the second mortgage; but the consequence of
the witnesses presented therein. Nevertheless, it would not amount to a a failure to make the second mortgagee a party to the proceeding is that the lien of the
waiver of the defendant’s right to present evidence during the trial dates second mortgagee on the equity of redemption is not affected by the decree of
scheduled for the reception of evidence for the defense. It would be an entirely foreclosure.
different issue if the failure to attend of the defendant was on a hearing date
set for the presentation of the evidence of the defense, but such did not occur
in the case at bar.
→ [THUS] It is clear that the Spouses do not have a cause of action against Atty. Ana Liza
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 54

Luna for the delivery of the residue. 4) NAGTALON V. UCPB, 2013 - VELASQUEZ

Nagtalon vs UCPB (Short case)


(2.2) The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to waive his security Doctrine: Any question regarding the validity of ther mortgage or its foreclosure is not
and bring, instead, an ordinary action to recover the indebtedness with the right to a legal groud for refusing the issuance of a writ of exectuion/possession.
execute a judgment thereon on all the properties of the debtor including the subject
matter of the mortgage, subject to the qualification that if he fails in the remedy elected
by him, he cannot pursue further the remedy he has waived.
ER: Spouses Nagtalon mortgaged several lands in Aklan to secure a credit
• So, while the case should indeed be dismissed against Atty. Luna, the same is accommodation with UCPB. The spouses defaulted so UCPB foreclosed extra judicially.
not necessarily true with respect to Monzon. Other than the Spouses’ prayer When the redemption period expired (1 year), UCPB asked for a writ of possession. It
that the residue be delivered, they also pray for a judgment declaring Monzon was opposed by the spouses saying that there is a pending case for the declaration of
liable for such amounts. Said prayer may constitute a cause of action for nullity of foreclosure among others. The spouses said the issuance of the writ is no
collection of sum of money against Monzon. longer ministerial and cannot be issued because of the pending case.
• But because construing the Spouses’ Petition for Injunction to be one for a
collection of sum of money would entail a waiver by them of the mortgage
executed over the subject properties, there must be utmost caution before
making such construction. Thus, upon the REMAND of this case to the RTC, Issue: W/N the pending case will bar the issuance of the writ. NO
the Spouses should be ordered to manifest whether the Petition for Injunction
should be treated as a complaint for the collection of a sum of money.
• Two possible scenarios:
o If the Spouses answer in the affirmative, then the case shall proceed Ratio: It has long been held in jurisprudence that the pendency of a case will not bar the
with the presentation of the evidence for the defense. If Monzon issuance of the writ. Only equitable reasons will bar the issuance. The SC also said there
would be successful in proving her defense of dacion en pago, there are 3 exemptions: 1.) Gross inadequacy of purchase price; 2.) Third party claiming right
would, in effect, be a double sale of the mortgaged properties: the adverse to debtor/mortgagor; 3.) Failure to pay surplus proceeds of the sale to the
same properties were sold to the Spouses and to intervenor Addio. mortgagor.
▪ If, pursuant to the rules on double sales, the Spouses are
entitled to the properties, their remedy is to file the proper
action to recover possession.
▪ If, pursuant to said rules, Addio Properties, Inc. is entitled to Facts:
the properties, the Spouses’ remedy is to file an action for
damages against Monzon. Spouses Nagtalon entered into a credit accommodation agreement with UCPB. It was
o If the Spouses answer in the negative, the case shall be dismissed, secured by a REM over several parcels of land in Kalibo, Aklan. The spouses failed to pay
without prejudice to the exercise of their rights as mortgage and the properties were extrajudicial foreclosed with UCPB being the highest bidder.
creditors. The one year period of redemption lapsed. UCPB filed an ex parte petition for the
▪ If the Spouses’ mortgage contract was executed before the issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC.
execution of the mortgage contract with Addio, then the
Spouses would be the first mortgagors. Pursuant to Art.
2126 of the Civil Code, they would be entitled to foreclose
the property as against any subsequent possessor thereof. Spouses Nagtalon opposed the same citing the pendency of Civil Case 6602 (for
▪ If the Spouses mortgage contract was executed after the declaration of nullity of foreclosure, fixing of true indebtedness, redemption, damages
execution of the mortgage contract with Addio, then the and injunction with temporary restraining order). The stipulations in the credit
Spouses would be the second mortgagors. As such, they are agreement and interest in the promissory notes were being challenged for bein void.
entitled to a right of redemption pursuant to Sec. 6 of Act Spouses allege that the issuance of the writ is no longer ministerial due to the pendency
3135, as amended. of the case.
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 55

RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. MR denied. UCPB went up to CA on certiorari (65). Exceptions to the rule when issuance of writ is not ministerial: 1.) Gross inadequacy of
purchase price; 2.) Third party claiming right adverse to debtor/mortgagor; 3.) Failure
to pay surplus proceeds of the sale to the mortgagor.

CA reversed RTC: it is ministerial to isue a writ of possession after the lapse of the
redemption but there are exeptions and the case was not one of them. Equitable H. JUDICIAL PARTITIO N (RULE 69)
circumstances must first be shown to deferr the issuance of the writ. Spouses failed to
show such circumstance.
1) SEPULVEDA V. PELAEZ, G.R. NO. 152195, JANUARY 31, 2005 - AQUINO

PEDRO SEPULVEDA, SR., substituted by SOCORRO S. LAWAS, Administratrix of His


Issue: whether the pendency of a civil case challenging the validity of the credit Estate, petitioner, vs. ATTY. PACIFICO S. PELAEZ, respondent.
agreement, the promissory notes and the mortgage can bar the issuance of a writ of
possession after the foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged properties and the lapse of Emergency Recit: Pacifico Pelaez (PELAEZ) filed a complaint for recovery of possession
the one-year redemption period. and ownership of property against his granduncle PEDRO. The property was inherited
from DIONISIA. However, PEDRO made it appear that he was the owner of DULCE’s
(Pelaez’s mother) share. PEDRO died intestate and was substituted by SOCORRO.
SOCORRO adduced evidence that SANTIAGO (Pedro’s brother, Pelaez’s other
Held: NO. CA CORRECT. We see no merit in the petition, and rule that the CA did not
granduncle) died intestate and was survived by his wife, PAZ and their minor
commit any reversible error in the assailed decision.
children. It was pointed out that PELAEZ failed to implead PAZ and her minor children
as parties-defendants in the complaint. PELAEZ also failed to implead his father
RODOLFO. Issue is whether the complaint should have been dismissed for the failure of
Ratio: PELAEZ to implead all indispensable parties. The Supreme Court held that the absence
of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
function of the court, which cannot be enjoined or restrained, even by the filing of a civil Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition, all
case for the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure and consequent auction sale. Once persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants. Hence, the trial court
title to the property has been consolidated in the buyer’s name upon failure of the should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
mortgagor to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period, the writ of
possession becomes a matter of right belonging to the buyer. His rights are already that Facts:
of an owner.
• Atty. Pacifico Pelaez (PELAEZ) filed a complaint against his granduncle, Pedro
Sepulveda, Sr. (PEDRO), for the recovery of possession and ownership of his
one-half (1/2) undivided share of several parcels of and for the partition
Rule on issuance of writ as established in Spouses Ruben and Violeta Sagun vs. PBCom thereof among the co-owners.
and CA pursuant to ACT 3135: a writ of possession may be issued either (1) within the • The 11 lots were among the 25 parcels of land which PELAEZ’s mother, Dulce
one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or (2) after the lapse of the Sepulveda (DULCE), inherited from her grandmother, Dionisia Sepulveda
redemption period, without need of a bond (ex parte motion). (DIONISIA) under the Project of Partition submitted by PEDRO as the
administrator of the former’s estate.
• Under the said deed, PEDRO appeared to be the owner of an undivided portion
while his brother, Santiago Sepulveda (SANTIAGO), was the undivided owner
Past cases already showed that any question regarding the validity of ther mortgage or of one-half (1/2) of the parcels of land. DULCE and her uncles, PEDRO and
its foreclosure is not a legal groud for refusing the issuance of a writ of SANTIAGO, were likewise indicated therein as the co-owners of the eleven
exectuion/possession. other parcels of land, each with an undivided one-third (1/3) share thereof.
• In his complaint, the PELAEZ alleged that his mother DULCE died intestate and
was survived by her husband Rodolfo Pelaez (RODOLFO) and her mother
Carlota Sepulveda (CARLOTA). DULCE’s grandfather Vicente Sepulveda
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 56

(VICENTE) died intestate. According to PELAEZ, CARLOTA repeatedly estate of the deceased spouse equal to that which by way of legitime
demanded the delivery of her mother’s share but PEDRO refused to do so. corresponds or belongs to each of the legitimate children or descendants who
DULCE and PELAEZ demanded the same but to no avail. have not been bettered or have not received any share in the one-third share
• PELAEZ further narrated that his granduncle executed an affidavit, stating that destined for betterment.
he was the sole heir of DIONISIA when she died intestate when, in fact, the • Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in an action for
latter was survived by her three sons. PEDRO also executed a Deed of Absolute partition, all persons interested in the property shall be joined as
Sale over the property in favor of the City of Danao. defendants.
• In his answer to the complaint, PEDRO admitted having executed a deed of sale • Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.- A person having the
over the parcel of land in favor of Danao City, but averred that the latter failed right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed,
to pay the purchase price thereof; besides, PELAEZ had no right to share in the setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate
proceeds of the said sale. He likewise denied having received any demand for description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as
the delivery of DULCE’s share of the subject properties. defendants all the other persons interested in the property.
• During the trial, PEDRO died intestate. A petition for the settlement of his • Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are
estate was filed. His daughter, petitioner Socorro Sepulveda Lawas (SOCORRO) indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the
was appointed administratrix of his estate. joinder of the said parties.
• According to the SOCORRO, DULCE and PEDRO had a verbal agreement • The mere fact that PEDRO has repudiated the co-ownership between him and
wherein the 11 parcels of land would serve as the latter’s compensation for his the respondent does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to take
services as administrator of DIONISIA’s estate. cognizance of the action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition, the
• SOCORRO likewise adduced evidence that SANTIAGO died intestate and plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject property;
was survived by his wife, Paz Velez Sepulveda (PAZ) and their minor and, second, the conveyance of his lawful shares.
children. It was pointed out that PELAEZ failed to implead PAZ and her • De Mesa v. Court of Appeals: The first stage of an action for judicial partition
minor children as parties-defendants in the complaint. and/or accounting is concerned with the determination of whether or not a co-
• Trial court rendered judgment in favor of PELAEZ. ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise
• The trial court ruled that PELAEZ’s action for reconveyance based on legally proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties
constructive trust had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed; that he interested in the property.
was entitled to a share in the proceeds of the sale of the property to Danao o This phase may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the
City; and that the partition of the subject property among the adjudicatees desired partition either because a co-ownership does not exist or a
thereof was in order. partition is legally prohibited.
• CA affirmed the trial court decision. o It may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-
ownership does in truth exist, that partition is proper in the
premises, and that an accounting of rents and profits received by the
Issue: Whether the complaint should have been dismissed. defendant from the real estate in question is in order.
▪ In the latter case, “the parties may, if they are able to agree,
Held: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of make partition among themselves by proper instruments of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 43758 and of the Regional Trial Court are SET conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to dismiss the complaint without agreed upon by all the parties.”
prejudice. No pronouncement as to costs. ▪ In either case, whether the action is dismissed or partition
and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and
may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
Ratio: • The second stage commences when the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition ordered by the court.
• The Rule 65 petition is granted for the sole reason that PELAEZ failed to o In that event, partition shall be effected for the parties by the court
implead as parties, all the indispensable parties in his complaint. with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
• It appears that when PELAEZ filed the complaint, his father, RODOLFO, was o This second phase may also deal with the rendition of the accounting
still alive. Thus, when his mother DULCE died intestate, she was survived by itself and its approval by the Court after the parties have been
RODOLFO and PELAEZ. accorded the opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the
• Gamis v. Court of Appeals: Under articles 807 and 834 of the old Civil Code the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just shares in
surviving spouse is a forced heir and entitled to a share in usufruct in the the rents and profits of the real estate in question.
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 57

• PELAEZ failed to implead the following indispensable parties: his father, 2. The death of German did not terminate the lease. The rights and obligations in
RODOLFO; the heirs of SANTIAGO, namely, PAZ and their children; and the City a lease contract are transmissible to the heirs except when the same are not
of Danao which purchased the property. transmissible by nature, stipulation or law. Sec. 6 of the contract refers to
• RODOLFO is an indispensable party he being entitled to a share in usufruct, transfers inter vivos and not mortis causa.
equal to the share of the respondent in the subject properties. 3. Sec. 6 of the lease contract did not prohibit subleasing. Transfer of lease is
• Indeed, the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for different from sublease. In a sublease, the lessee becomes a lessor to a
the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is sublessee but the juridical relation between the lessor and lessee is not
not before the court that the action should be dismissed. Thus, the plaintiff is dissolved. Ramon had a right to sublease the since the lease contract did not
mandated to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that the contain any stipulation forbidding subleasing;
absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and 4. HDSJ did not commit tortious interference, as it entered into contracts with
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as Ramon’s former sublessees for purely economic reasons;
to those present. 5. The Inocencios do not have the right to lease the buildings to third persons
• One who is a party to a case is not bound by any decision of the court, after the termination of their lease contract with HDSJ;
otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to due process. 6. HDSJ should have reimbursed German half of the value of the improvements as
• The failure of the private respondent to implead the other heirs as parties- of 2001. If HDSJ is not willing to reimburse the Inocencios, then the latter
plaintiffs constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court and the appellate court’s should be allowed to demolish the buildings.
exercise of judicial power over the said case, and rendered any orders or
judgments rendered therein a nullity
COMPLETE DIGEST
FACTS:
HDSJ leased a parcel of land in Pasay to German Inocencio. It was effective for
1 year, and was renewed for 1-year periods. Sec. 6 of the last written contract (31 May
1951) provides: “This contract is nontransferable unless prior consent of the lessor
I. EJECTMENT (RULE 7 0) is obtained in writing.” German built 2 buildings that he subleased. HDSJ postponed the
effectivity of increase in rentals "to give him (German) ample time to make the
1) INOCENCIO V. HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE, 2013 – ARCEO necessary rental adjustments with his sublessees."

ANALITA P. INOCENCIO, substituting for RAMON INOCENCIO (Deceased) v.


HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE (HDSJ) German died. Ramon (son) did not notify HDSJ of German’s death. He collected
the rentals from the sublessees and paid the rentals and taxes.

EMERGENCY DIGEST
HDSJ’s administrator, Five Star, notified Ramon that HDSJ is terminating the
• HDSJ leased a parcel of land to German Inocencio. Sec. 6 of the contract: “This lease effective 31 March 2001. It refused Ramon’s request for renegotiation because
contract is nontransferable unless prior consent of the lessor is obtained in the latter has "continually subleased the premises to 20 families and to a commercial
writing.” German built 2 buildings that he subleased. German died. Ramon (son) establishment without the knowledge and consent of the lessor. On 3 March 2005, HDSJ
collected the rents from the sublessees and paid the rents to HDSJ. HDSJ notified sent a letter to Ramon: (1) reiterating that the lease contract was terminated on 31
Ramon that it is terminating the lease effective 31 Mar. ‘01. On 3 Mar. ‘05, HDSJ March 2001; (2) demanding payment for unrealized fruits; and (3) giving him 30 days to
reiterated the termination of the lease and gave Ramon 30 days to vacate. On 28 vacate.
Jun. ‘05, HDSJ filed a Complaint before the MTC for unlawful detainer. MTC, RTC,
and CA all ruled for HDSJ. SC HELD:
1. The action for unlawful detainer was not barred by prescription. The 1-year
period under Rule 70 should be counted from the date of last demand to vacate, The sublessees received notices to vacate. HDSJ’s Patalastas stated that it is
because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful. willing to have an amicable arrangement with the sublessees, thus some sublessees
HDSJ’s last demand: 3 Mar. ‘05, filing of complaint 28 Jun. ‘05. The complaint refused to pay rents to Ramon. HDSJ entered into lease contracts with Ramon’s former
was filed within the proper period; sublessees.
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 58

defendant to vacate the real property, because only upon the lapse of that period
does the possession become unlawful.
On 28 June 2005, HDSJ filed a Complaint before the MTC Pasay for unlawful
detainer against Ramon and his sublessees. It alleged that illegal occupation started
since 31 March 2001. Ramon died after filing an Answer. His wife, Analita, substituted
him. HDSJ’s last demand was made on 3 March 2005, and it filed the complaint for
unlawful detainer on 28 June 2005. Thus, the complaint was filed within the period
provided under the Rules of Court.

MTC ruled for HDSJ based on Sec. 6 of the contract. RTC denied Analita’s
appeal and MR. Analita then filed a Rule 42 petition for review with the CA, which
affirmed RTC but modified the award for damages. 2. The death of German did not terminate the lease. (See Art. 1311 of CC)11 A
lease contract is not essentially personal in character. The rights and obligations therein
are transmissible to the heirs except when the same are not transmissible by (1) nature,
(2) stipulation or (3) law. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a
ISSUES: contract, which involves a property right, and the rights and obligations thereunder pass
to the successors or representatives of the deceased. Nonperformance is not excused by
1. WON the action for unlawful detainer was barred by prescription. [1st demand: 1 Mar. death of the party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of
’01; 2nd demand: 3 Mar. ’05; Complaint: 28 Jun. ‘05] (NO) the contract.

2. WON the death of German terminated the lease contract. (NO)

3. WON Sec. 6 of the lease contract prohibited subleasing. (NO) Sec. 6 of the contract refers to transfers inter vivos, not mortis causa.
What it seeks to avoid is for the lessee to substitute a third party in place of the lessee
4. WON HDSJ committed tortious interference. (NO) without the lessor’s consent. Art. 1649 of the CC: “The lessee cannot assign the lease
without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.” In any case,
5. WON Inocencio has the right to lease the building to third persons even after the HDSJ also acknowledged that Ramon is its month-to-month lessee in a demand letter
termination of the lease contract with HDSJ. (NO) dated 1 March 2001.12

6. WON Inocencio should be reimbursed for the value of the buildings. (YES)

3. Sec. 6 of the lease contract did not prohibit subleasing. Sec. 6 of the
contract requires written consent of the lessor before the lease may be assigned or
HELD: PARTLY GRANTED. CA Decision is AFFIRMED with modification. The case is transferred. In assignment, there is a novation by the substitution of the person of one
REMANDED to the MTC for determination of the value or the improvements to be paid of the parties - the lessee. Only two persons remain in the juridical relation - the lessor
to lnocencios, if HDSJ desires to keep the same. Otherwise, the Inocencios can demolish and the assignee who is the new lessee. Assignment of lease (Art. 1649 of the CC) is
the buildings at their expense. different from sublease (Art. 1650). In a sublease, the lessee becomes in turn a lessor to

RATIO: 11Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
1. The action for unlawful detainer was not barred by prescription. Sec. 1, stipulation or by provision of law ...
Rule 70 provides that actions for unlawful detainer must be filed "within 1 year after
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession." In Republic v. Sunvar, we held
12 We acknowledge the fact HDSJ has been accepting the payment of your rentals since the demise
that: The one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case is not counted from the of German. Hence, an implied contract of lease between the two of you exists. However, since
there is no stipulation as to the period of the contract and you are paying a monthly rental to our
expiration of the lease contract. Indeed, the last demand for petitioners to vacate is the
client, the period for the lease is on a month-to-month basis (Art. 1687). Thus as of this date, your
reckoning period for determining the one-year period in an action for unlawful detainer.
contract should expire on March 31, 2001.
Such one-year period should be counted from the date of plaintiff’s last demand on
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 59

a sublessee. However, the juridical relation between the lessor and lessee is not before German’s demise, during the subsistence of a valid contract of lease. HDSJ did not
dissolved. prohibit German from constructing the buildings. Thus, HDSJ should have reimbursed
German half of the value of the improvements as of 2001. If HDSJ is not willing to
reimburse the Inocencios, then the latter should be allowed to demolish the buildings.

Ramon had a right to sublease the premises since the lease contract did not
forbid subleasing. Art. 1650 of the CC: “When in the contract of lease of things there is 2) SERRANO V. GUTIERREZ, G.R. NO. 162366, NOVEMBER 10, 2006 – BASCARA
no express prohibition, the lessee may sublet the thing leased, in whole or in part,
without prejudice to his responsibility for the performance of the contract toward the Serrano vs Gutierrez
lessor.” The sublease contracts were valid.
The Gutierrez spouses filed a forcible entry case against Serrano et al. The Gutierrez
spouses alleged that they are the owners of a piece of agricultural land situated in
Pampanga and that Serrano et al entered into the said land, constructed concrete
4. HDSJ did not commit tortious interference. Art. 1314 of CC: “Any third structures on it and dumped truckload of filling materials into said property without the
person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other knowledge and consent of the Gutierrez spouses. They further alleged that Serrano et al
contracting party.” Tortious interference elements: (1) valid contract; (2) knowledge on refused to demolish the structure and vacate the premises even after demand. The MTC
the part of the third person of the contract; and (3) interference of the third person dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because it found that the real issue involved
without legal justification or excuse. The third element is lacking. There was no tortious the question of ownership, whereas it held that it can only resolve the issue of mere
interference if the intrusion was impelled by purely economic motives. HDSJ entered possession de facto. On appeal the RTC exercised its jurisdiction over the case by
into agreements with Ramon’s former sublessees for purely economic reasons. invoking its power under the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 8, Rule 409 of the Rules of Court
which states that “If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss
the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with
5. The Inocencios do not have the right to lease the buildings to third the preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and
persons after the termination of their lease contract with HDSJ. They claim that as additional evidence in the interest of justice.”(The RTC ruled in favor of the Gutierrez
owners of the buildings (which are distinct and separate from the land), they have a Spouses). Serrano et al argue that the trial court erroneously applied the said provision
right to lease the same to third persons, even after termination of the lease contract with of the law in deciding the ejectment case brought to it on appeal by the Gutierrez
HDSJ. We do not agree. The lease of a building includes the lease of the lot and spouses. They contend that since the MTC acted without jurisdiction, the RTC can only
consequently, the rentals of the building include the rentals of the lot. As correctly decide the case on appeal if it has original jurisdiction. They proffer that the assessed
pointed out by HDSJ: “When the Inocencios leased the buildings to third parties, they also value of the subject property is less than P20,000.00, thus outside the jurisdiction of the
"leased" to the third parties the plot of land on which the buildings stood — either by RTC.
implied transfer of the lease covering the plot of the land, or by sublease.” When the
contract with HDSJ ended on 31 March ‘01, Ramon lost his status as lessee of the land, • Whether or not it is the RTC erred in applying the 2nd paragraph of Section 8,
and therefore, had no authority to sublease the land. Rule 40 of the Rules of Court – YES
• Whether or not the MTC erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction-
YES
• Whether or not the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the case- YES
6. CA erred in not applying Art. 1678 of the Civil Code. 13 It applies if the
improvements were: (1) introduced in good faith; (2) useful; and (3) suitable to the use Ratio:
for which the lease is intended, without altering the form and substance. The
aforementioned requisites are satisfied in this case. The buildings were constructed • The MTC clearly erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. As the law
now stands, inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve questions of ownership
13If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which whenever it is necessary to decide the question of possession in an ejectment
the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon case.
the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that • The RTC blundered in applying the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40 of the
time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, Rules of Court as it deals with an appeal from an order of dismissal but the
even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more case was tried on the merits. Clearly, the Section is inapplicable to the present
impairment upon the property leased than is necessary. ... case since, as the Court of Appeals correctly held, the MTC had jurisdiction
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 60

over this ejectment case even if the question of possession could be resolved • Serrano et al filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals
without passing upon the issue of ownership. questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground that the instant case
• The assessed value of the subject property does not remove the case from the involves an agricultural land and thus, appropriate jurisdiction vested with the
RTC jurisdiction as the amount involved is immaterial for purposes of the DARAB. They further questioned the adjudication of ownership in a mere
RTC's appellate jurisdiction. All cases decided by the MTC are generally ejectment case.
appealable to the RTC irrespective of the amount involved. • The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
• Gutierrez spouses have established by preponderance of evidence their claim • Serrano et al filed their motion for reconsideration but this was denied.
of ownership over the subject property. It is settled law that a certificate of • Serrano et al argue that the trial court erroneously applied the second
title is the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court in deciding the ejectment
case brought to it on appeal by the Gutierrez spouses. They contend that since
Facts: the MTC acted without jurisdiction, the RTC can only decide the case on appeal
if it has original jurisdiction. They proffer that the assessed value of the subject
• Spouses Anselmo and Carmelita Gutierrez (Gutierrez spouses) filed a property is less than P20,000.00, thus outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.
complaint for forcible entry with application for a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction with temporary restraining order Issues
and damages against Federica M. Serrano, Lucila M. Razon, Armando Layug
and Romeo Morales (Serrano et al.) before the MTC of Lubao, Pampanga. Whether or not it is the RTC erred in applying the 2 nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule
• The subject of the complaint was a piece of untenanted agricultural land 40 of the Rules of Court – YES
situated at San Roque Dau I, Lubao, Pampanga Whether or not the MTC erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction- YES
• The complaint alleged, among others, that the Gutierrez spouses are the Whether or not the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the case- YES
registered owners of the said piece of land and that Serrano et al by means of
strategy and stealth, criminally entered into the said land and constructed
concrete structures on it and dumped truckload of filling materials into said Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
property without the knowledge and consent of the Gutierrez spouses, thus G.R. SP No. 67395 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of attorney's fees
rendering the land unsuitable for agricultural purposes for which it is is DELETED. Costs against petitioners.
intended. They further alleged that upon demand to vacate premises and
demolish the structures therein, Serrano et al refused to do so. Ratio:
• Serrano et al denied the allegations in the complaint and claimed that the
subject land was a portion of the estate of Albino Morales, and as heirs of • The MTC clearly erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Section 33
Albino Morales, they were in actual, adverse, continuous and physical of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, states:
possession thereof. o Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
• The MTC ordered the parties to submit their position papers and evidence to unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant
support their corresponding claims. The Gutierrez spouses’ presented the raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
original certificate of title, deed of absolute sale, and transfer certificate of title, possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
among others, to prove their claim of ownership. On the other hand, Serrano et ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
al presented tax declaration receipts as proofs of tax payment. determine the issue of possession.
• The MTC found that the real issue involved the question of ownership and not • Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court further affirms this provisional
mere possession de facto since both parties claimed that they were the determination of ownership in ejectment cases, thus:
absolute, lawful and legal owners of the aforesaid property. Thus, it refused to o Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant raises
assume jurisdiction by insisting that it can only resolve the issue of possession the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
de facto and not de jure, and consequently, dismissed the case for lack of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
jurisdiction. ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
• The RTC rendered its Decision ordering Serrano et al to vacate the premises determine the issue of possession.
and surrender possession of subject lot to the Gutierrez spouses. Although it • As the law now stands, inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve
approved of the dismissal by the MTC for lack of jurisdiction, it invoked its questions of ownership whenever it is necessary to decide the question
power under the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 409 of the Rules of Court of possession in an ejectment case.
and deemed itself (the RTC) capable of resolving the issue of ownership and
thus ruling in favor of the Gutierrez spouses.
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 61

• Corollarily, the RTC erred when it agreed with the MTC's decision to dismiss o SECTION 22. Appellate jurisdiction. Regional Trial Courts shall
the case. Along with the erroneous premise, the RTC also blundered in exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan
applying Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. The provision reads: Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
o Sec. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be
jurisdiction. If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in
dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial the court of origin such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of submitted by the parties orrequired by the Regional Trial Courts. The
affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be
subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction appealable by Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals which may
thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the case was originally give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the
filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a
further proceedings. reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be
o If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without reviewed.
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on • Primarily, the above quoted provision vests upon the RTC the exercise of
appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective
without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and territorial jurisdictions. Clearly then, the amount involved is immaterial for
additional evidence in the interest of justice. purposes of the RTC's appellate jurisdiction. All cases decided by the MTC
• The first paragraph contemplates an appeal from an order of dismissal issued are generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of the amount involved.
without trial of the case on the merits. On the other hand, the second • The Gutierrez spouses have established by preponderance of evidence their
paragraph deals with an appeal from an order of dismissal but the case was claim of ownership over the subject property.They presented the original
tried on the merits. Both paragraphs, however, involve the same ground for certificate of title, deed of absolute sale, and transfer certificate of title, among
dismissal, i.e., lack of jurisdiction. Clearly, the Section is inapplicable to the others, to prove their claim of ownership. In contrast, Serrano et al merely
present case since, as the Court of Appeals correctly held, the MTC had introduced as evidence tax declarations and official receipts of tax payments.
jurisdiction over this ejectment case even if the question of possession could • It is settled law that a certificate of title is the best proof of ownership of a
be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership. piece of land. The Court categorically declared in Spouses Camara v. Spouses
• Nonetheless, the RTC had appellate jurisdiction over the case and its decision Malabao that a party's declaration of real property, his payment of realty taxes
should be deemed promulgated in the exercise of that jurisdiction. and his designation as owner of the subject property in the cadastral survey or
• Serrano et al submit that the assessed value of the subject property removes even in the records of an agency such as the former Ministry of Agrarian
the case from the RTC jurisdiction by citing Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. Reform Office cannot defeat a certificate of title, as the latter is the absolute
129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691 and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person
o SECTION 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall whose name appears therein.
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
▪ In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
3) ESTEBAN V. MARCELO, 2013 – CHAN
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, Esteban vs Marcelo
where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and ER
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction The Late Gabriel Esteban, substituted by his son, Mark, had been in possession of a
over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, parcel of land since the 1950s. In 1960s Gabriel’s sister constructed a foundry shop. In
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the 1970s, the foundry shop’s operations were failing so they just allowed the Marcelo’s
to reside therein for a monthly rental fee of P50.00. In 2001, they payment of rental fees
• We do not agree. At first glance, it appears that based on the P13,300.00
stopped. On October 31, 2005, Gabriel sent a demand letter to Marcelo’s requiring them
assessed value of the subject property as declared by the Gutierrez spouses,
to settle their arrears and to vacate within 5 days from receipt. Marcelo’s failed to
the RTC would have no jurisdiction over the case. But the above-quoted
comply so Gabriel filed an unlawful detainer case. MeTC ruled for Gabriel. RTC affirmed.
provision refers to the original jurisdiction of the RTC.
Marcelo’s appealed to the CA. CA reversed the RTC.
• The RTC's appellate jurisdiction, as contrasted to its original jurisdiction, is
provided in Section 22 of the same Act, thus:
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 62

CA claims that from the year of dispossession in 2001 until 2005, the year of filing of the that mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not a sufficient
complaint for ejectment, more than a year had passed. This means that the action should ground to nullify a trial court’s decision.
no longer be one of an accion interdictal, which is cognizable by the MeTC. It was - Esteban argues that the case has been properly filed as an accion interdictal
already an accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC. cognizable by the MeTC and was filed on December 6, 2005, or within the one-
year prescriptive period counted from the date of the last demand on
ISSUE – Is it still an accion interdictal? YES!!! October 31, 2005; hence, the MeTC had proper jurisdiction over the case.

RATIO - Revised Rules of Court clearly state that there should first be a demand to pay ISSUE – Whether the filing of the accion interdictal cognizable by the MeTC was proper.
or to comply with the terms of the lease and a demand to vacate before unlawful YES!!!
detainer arises. Mere failure to pay rents does not ipso facto make unlawful tenant's
possession of the premises. It is the owner's demand for tenant to vacate the premises, HELD - WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the petition for review
when the tenant has failed to pay the rents on time, and tenant’s refusal or failure to on certiorari. The decision dated January 1 7, 2011 and the resolution dated July 15, 20
vacate, which make unlawful withholding of possession. In cases where there were II of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112609 are hereby REVERSED and SET
more than one demand to pay and vacate, the reckoning point of one year for filing ASIDE. The decision dated January 13, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 211,
the unlawful detainer is from the last demand as the lessor may choose to waive Mandaluyong City, in Civil Case No. 20270, is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the
his cause of action and let the defaulting lessee remain in the premises. respondents spouses Rodrigo and Carmen Marcelo.

FACTS RATIO
- The Late Gabriel Esteban, substituted by his son, Mark Esteban, had been in - Petition of Esteban is meritorious. Revised Rules of Court clearly state that
possession of a piece of land located at 702 Tiaga St., Barangka Drive, there should first be a demand to pay or to comply with the terms of the lease
Mandaluyong City, since the 1950s. and a demand to vacate before unlawful detainer arises.
- 1960s = Gabriel’s sister constructed a foundry shop at the property. - Mere failure to pay rents does not ipso facto make unlawful tenant's
- 1970s = Foundry operations were unproductive so respondetns-spouses possession of the premises. It is the owner's demand for tenant to vacate the
Rodrigo and Carmen Marcelo (Marcelo’s) were allowed to reside therein for a premises, when the tenant has failed to pay the rents on time, and tenant’s
monthly rental fee of P50.00. refusal or failure to vacate, which make unlawful withholding of possession.
- March 2001 = Marcelo’s stopped paying the rental fee. - in cases where there were more than one demand to pay and vacate, the
- October 31, 2005 = Gabriel sent a demand letter to Marcelo’s requiring them to reckoning point of one year for filing the unlawful detainer is from the last
settle their arrears and to vacate within 5 days from receipt thereof. demand as the lessor may choose to waive his cause of action and let the
- Marcelo’s failed to comply so Gabriel filed an unlawful detainer case against defaulting lessee remain in the premises
them.
- MeTC ruled that there was a valid ground for ejectment. RTC affirmed MeTC - OTHER MATTERS
ruling. o CA was wrong for ruling that Marcelo’s were protected by PD1517.
This decree does not apply to them. In Sps. Frilles v. Sps. Yambao, the
- Marcelo’s appealed to the CA. CA reversed the RTC. It ruled that from the year Court declared that the purpose of the law is to protect the rights of
of dispossession in 2001 (year when paying of rent stopped), until 2005 (year legitimate tenants who have resided for 10 years or more on parcels
of filing of the complaint for ejectment), more than a year had passed. of land situated in declared Urban Land Reform Zone. For P.D. 1517
o Therefore, the case no longer involved an accion interdictal to apply, the tenants must have been a legitimate tenant for ten (10)
cognizable by the MeTC. It was already an accion publiciana that years who have built their homes on the disputed property. These
should have been filed before the RTC. circumstances do not obtain in the present case as it was not the
o Therefore, MeTC had no jurisdiction and the decision was a nullty. respondents-spouses who built their dwelling on the land;
o CA also said that Marcelo’s cannot be evicted because thay are o Issues not raised may not be considered and ruled upon. As the
protected by Section 6, PD 151714. Also, they qualify as beneficiaries petitioner correctly observed, the respondents-spouses never
under Section 16, RA 7279. intimated, directly or indirectly, that they were seeking the
o MR DENIED. MR was based on Esteban’s failure to effect a protection of RA 7279.
substitution of parties upon the death of Gabriel. CA said, however, Marcelo’s claim that the present petition is irregular because the compulsory heirs (co-
owners) have not been impleaded. While all co-owners are real parties in interest in
suits to recover properties, anyone of them may bring an action for the recovery of co-
14PROCLAIMING URBAN LAND REFORM IN THE PHILIPPINES AND
owned properties.
PROVIDING FOR THE IMPLEMENTING MACHINERY THEREOF
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 63

4) PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY V. SABANDAL-HERZENTIEL, 2013 – MUTI o They, however, claimed that the sale was tainted with force and
intimidation and hence void, including the subsequent transactions
Keywords: implied use of force in unlawful entry covering the same property.

ER: PTA filed a forcible entry complaint against the TAPALESES and SABANDAL. PTA • Notwithstanding the sale, they remained in actual and physical possession of the
alleges that they entered into a portion of the subject property by force, strategy and subject property and even introduced improvements thereon. Consequently, absent
stealth, planted coconut trees, introduced improvements and fenced the area. TAPALES any proof of prior possession on the part of PTA, they claimed that the forcible
argued that PTA has no proof of prior possession. MCTC and RTC ruled in favor of PTA. entry complaint must necessarily be dismissed.
CA reversed. Did PTA fail to prove its prior possession? More specifically, does PTA The MCTC Ruling: in favor of PTA
need to prove the use of force in the unlawful entry? NOOO!
• MCTC ordered TAPALESES to: (a) vacate the property and remove all the
In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession and that the improvements introduced therein; (b) pay PTA monthly rental from the date of
defendant deprived him of his possession by means of FISTS15. Possession in the eyes of judicial demand until they have effectively vacated the premises; and (c) pay the
the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the
costs of suit.
ground.
• The MCTC declared that PTA is the lawful owner of the subject property and had
Here, PTA is the lawful possessor as shown by its deed of sale, tax declarations, and act
been in prior possession thereof as shown by the following: (a) the deed of sale; (b)
of leasing portions of the property. Its supposed failure to describe in detail the manner
the tax declarations; and (c) its act of leasing portions of the subject property to
of TAPALESES and SABANDAL’s entry is inconsequential. Proving the fact of unlawful
others in the exercise of its right of ownership and possession.
entry and the exclusion of the lawful possessor would necessarily imply the use of force.
David v. Cordova: “the action of forcible entry can be maintained even though NO force is o In contrast, TAPALESES failed to substantiate their claim of ownership
used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of and possession. Neither have they established any relationship with
planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.” ABRENICA, the previous owner of the subject property.
o On the other hand, SABANDAL never claimed to be the owner of the same
and even acknowledged PTA’s ownership when she offered to buy back
FACTS:
the land.
• Petitioner Philippine Tourism Authority (now Tourism Infrastructure and The RTC Ruling: in favor of PTA pa rin!
Enterprise Zone Authority) (“PTA”) is the owner of the subject property and other
parcels of land located in Cebu since 1981 when it bought the same from Tri-Island • TAPALESES’ appeal to the RTC was dismissed for their failure to file a
Corporate Holdings, Inc. (“TRI-ISLAND”). memorandum on appeal as required under Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the ROC. Their
MR was also denied.
o It had then been in actual, physical, continuous, and uninterrupted
possession of the subject property and had declared the same for taxation • Only SABANDAL appealed before the CA via a petition for review under Rule 42.
purposes.
The CA Ruling: in favor of SABANDAL
• In 1997, however, respondents Pedro Tapales, Luis Tapales, Romeo Tapales
(“TAPALESES”), and SabandalHerzenstiel (“SABANDAL”) by force, strategy and • The CA declared SABANDAL as the lawful possessor of the subject property.
stealth entered into a portion of the subject property, on which they proceeded to • It held that RTC should have relaxed the rules on procedure in the interest of
cut down some coconut trees, introduced improvements and fenced the area. substantial justice and for a full determination of the rights of the parties taking
• PTA made demands to vacate, which respondents ignored, prompting the filing of a into account the subsequent compliance of the respondents.
forcible entry complaint against them before the MCTC of Cebu. • CA found PTA to have failed to establish prior possession of the subject property
• In their Answer with Counterclaim, the TAPALESES acknowledged that the subject and rebut SABANDAL’s claim of continued physical possession in spite of the sale of
property had already been sold by its administrator, Josefina Abrenica the subject property to TRI-ISLAND during which, SABANDAL leased and converted
(“ABRENICA”), to TRI-ISLAND. the property into a resort.
• PTA filed MR which was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

15 Force Intimidation Stealth Threats Strategy


07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 64

ISSUE: whether the TAPALESES and SABANDAL may be lawfully ejected from the is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground
subject property – YES!!! and excluding the other party.”
• Arbizo v. Santillan: “it has been held that the acts of unlawfully entering the
disputed premises, erecting a structure thereon, and excluding therefrom the prior
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The CA Decision and Resolution are
possessor would necessarily imply the use of force, as in this case.”
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The MCTC Decision is REINSTATED.
The Court upholds the findings and conclusions of the MCTC, adjudging PTA to be the
lawful possessor of the subject property, square as they are with existing law and
RATIO:
jurisprudence.
• In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior
possession of the disputed property and that the defendant deprived him of his
possession by any of the means provided for in Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Rules, namely:
force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.
J. CONTEMPT (RULE 71 )
• In this case, SABANDAL failed to establish their prior and continued possession of
the subject property after its sale in favor of PTA in 1981. On the contrary, they
even admitted in their answer to the complaint that PTA exercised dominion over 1) CURATA V. PPA, G.R. NO. 154211, JUNE 22, 2009 – NARVASA
the same by instituting caretakers and leasing portions thereof to third persons.
Curata v. PPA
• Suffice it to state that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man
has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in
possession.
o Thus, finding PTA’s assertion to be well-founded, the MCTC properly [Note: This is a super long case with 7 consolidated petitions. And Mr. Geraldez already
adjudged PTA to have prior possession over the subject property as tackled one of these. For today’s purposes, I am sticking to the case topic as specified in
against SABANDAL, who never claimed ownership or possession thereof. our syllabus, namely contempt (Rule 71). The other GR Nos. are omitted from this
• PTA’s supposed failure to describe in detail the manner of TAPALESES and digest.]
SABANDAL’s entry into the subject property is inconsequential. Jurisprudence
states that proving the fact of unlawful entry and the exclusion of the lawful
possessor – as PTA had sufficiently demonstrated – would necessarily imply the
use of force. Norby’s ER (just in case a background is needed): The Batnagas Port Zone was placed
• Estel v. Heirs of Recaredo P. Diego, Sr.: “Unlawfully entering the subject property under the administrative jursidiction of the Philippine Ports Authority. Pursuant
and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use thereto, the PPA filed a complaint to expropriate 185 lots in Batangas. The RTC split the
of force and this is all that is necessary. In order to constitute force, the affected owners according to their counsel. and pertinent to our case is the Dimayacyac
trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. No other proof is necessary. In group (representing Curata, et al.). The RTC had 3 commissioners come up with the fair
the instant case, it is, thus, irrefutable that respondents sufficiently alleged that the market value of the lots, and they came up with a Php 4,800 per square meter figure.
possession of the subject property was wrested from them through violence and The judge then ordered that the owners be compensated at the amount of Php 5,500 per
force.” square. Soon after, the RTC issued writs of execution and a notice of garnishment of
PPA’s bank accounts.
• David v. Cordova: “The words ‘by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth’
include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully
enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession
therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of
the person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the ER: Phil. Ports Authority (PPA) filed a petition to cite Paterno V. Tac-an for contempt
latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the when said judge issued Orders in defiance of the CA-issued temporary restraining
property, the action of forcibly entry and detainer can unquestionably be orders (TROs) and writs of preliminary injunction. He keeps trying to execute his
maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as orders, despite the CA enjoining him. Judge Tac-an also held a hearing on the
consolidated cases despite having received a cease and desist order from the CA.
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 65

Whether the retirement of Judge Tac-an has rendered moot the petition to cite
said respondent for contempt. No! 7. The filing by PPA of a petition for certiorari with the CA questioning order 3,
The objective of criminal contempt is to vindicate public authority. Contempt of order 4, the Writ of Execution and Notices of Garnishments.
court applies to all persons, whether in or out of government. Thus, it covers
government officials or employees who retired during the pendency of the petition for 8. (Order 5) granting the execution of the Supplemental Order. [Judge Tac-an
contempt. While there is still no definitive ruling on this issue when the respondent order]
charged with contempt has retired, we apply by analogy the settled principle in
administrative disciplinary cases that separation from service does not render the case 9. (Order 6) directing DBP to deliver PPA’s deposit of PhP 441,067,893.63 to the
moot and academic. Cruz Group.
Whether respondent Judge Tac-an is guilty of indirect contempt for alleged
disregard of the CA resolutions. Yep! 10. (Order 6) directing the BT to hold in escrow PPA’s investments in treasury
Despite a cease and desist order enjoining him from further proceeding with the case, he bills.
continued to hear and make orders upon the case. Judge Tac-an violated four (4)
resolutions/processes of the CA, namely: the January 10, 2000 TRO, the March 15, 2005 11. The CA issued a TRO enjoining respondent judge from implementing and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the April 19, 2005 TRO and the June 3, 2005 Resolution, enforcing orders 3, 4 the Writ of Execution, and Notices of Garnishment against the
for which he is hereby fined PhP 30,000 for each violation. National Treasury and several banks.
a. The TRO was valid up to March 10, 2005.
Based on the totality of the foregoing circumstances, the Court finds Judge Paterno
Tac-an guilty of indirect contempt of court. His acts are contumacious, continuing acts 12. The issuance by Judge Tac-an, despite the effectivity of the TRO, of the
in clear disobedience and disrespect of the resolutions of the CA. following orders, to wit:
a. February 1, 2005 Order directing the issuance of a writ of execution
A person guilty of indirect contempt may be punished by a fine not exceeding PhP of the November 24, 2004 Supplemental Order;
30,000 or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both. He is ordered to pay a b. February 2, 2005 Writ of Execution;
fine in the total amount of PhP 120,000. c. February 3, 2005 Notice of Garnishment addressed to the Phil
Veterans Bank.

13. PPA then filed a Supplemental Petition assailing the February 1, 2005 Order,
the Writ of Execution and the Notice of Garnishment against PVB.
With regard to the citation of Judge Paterno Tac-an for contempt, these are the facts:
14. A writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA’s Ninth Division in relation to
1. (Order 1) fixing in general the just compensation of PhP 5,500 per square the assailed orders and processes subject of the Resolution granting the TRO.
meter for the lots of defendant-owners excluding the Dimayacyac Group. [Judge Tac-an
order] 15. On April 19, 2005, the issuance by the CA’s Ninth Division of a TRO against
Judge Tac-an, which orders him or any other acting under his authority from
2. (Order 2) listing the names of the lot owners represented by different lawyers implementing abovementioned orders.
led by Atty. Cruz (Cruz Group), the tax declarations of the lots, the area, and the
compensation to be paid for each lot. 16. On April 14, 2005, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by the Bureau of
Treasury (BT).
3. (Order 3) granting the motion for execution of the August 23, 2000 Order filed
by the Cruz Group. 17. On April 20, 2005, the Order issued by Judge Tac-an setting the BT’s
Manifestation and Motion for hearing on April 25, 2005.
4. (Order 4) granting the motion of the Cruz Group for the issuance of a writ of a. Such hearing failed to push through because of the filing by the BT of another
execution. Manifestation and Motion praying that it be excused from attending the
hearing.
5. The issuance of a Writ of Execution.
18. On June 3, 2005, the issuance by the CA’s 10th Division of a Resolution
6. The issuance of a Notices of Garnishment addressed to the National Treasury, enjoining respondent Judge from further proceeding with the case.
DBP, PNB and PVB (w/ a supplemental Order).
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 66

19. Despite the CA cease-and-desist Order in the consolidated cases, Judge Tac-an a. Yet on February 1, 2005, Judge Tac-an issued an order directing that a
proceeded with a hearing of the case. Writ of Execution be issued to implement the Supplemental Order (order
4).
20. PPA filed a petition before the CA to cite Judge Tac-an for contempt. b. On February 2, 2005, he also issued the Writs of Execution and a Notice of
Garnishment addressed to PVB.
CA: It denied PPA’s “Petition to Cite Respondent Paterno V. Tac-an in Contempt” for lack
of merit, reasoning this way: From these facts, it is clear that Judge Tac-an violated the January 10, 2005 TRO.
• According to PPA, Judge committed indirect contempt of
Court when he conducted a hearing despite the issuance of a [TRO]. 1. On March 15, 2005, Judge Tac-an was already notified that a writ of preliminary
o But the scheduled hearing on did not injunction was issued against him, prohibiting and restraining him from executing
push through because the Bureau of Treasury filed the orders he previously made.
a Manifestation and Motion praying that it be a. To effectively restrain Judge Tac-an, CA again issued another TRO
excused from attending the hearing. notwithstanding the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
First Division SC: the issue is in view of the compulsory retirement of Judge specifically prohibit Judge Tac-an from implementing certain orders,
Tac-an. which were designed to implement the May 29, 2001 and November 18,
2004 Orders, all relating to the payment of just compensation to the Cruz
This is an MR. Group.
Whether the retirement of Judge Tac-an has rendered moot the petition to
cite said respondent for contempt. No! 2. Despite the writ of preliminary injunction and the TRO, Judge Tac-an still acted on
The objective of criminal contempt is to vindicate public authority. It is an effective the Manifestation and Motion of the Bureau of Treasury pertaining to the money
instrument of preserving and protecting the dignity and authority of courts of law. Any deposited by PPA with said bureau, when he knew fully well that such incident was
act or omission that degrades or demeans the integrity of the court must be sanctioned, already subject of the injunctive writ and the CA TRO, which was a clear breach of
lest it prejudice the efficient administration of justice if left unpunished. said processes.
a. By such act, Judge Tac-an betrayed his intention to continue implementing
Contempt of court applies to all persons, whether in or out of the compensation order in favor of the Cruz Group.
government. Thus, it covers government officials or employees who retired during the
pendency of the petition for contempt. Otherwise, a civil servant may strategize to avail 3. Again on April 26, 2005, Judge Tac-an issued another order further implementing
himself of an early retirement to escape the sanctions from a contempt citation, if he the Writ of Execution and ordering the BT to deliver the escrowed proceeds, again
perceives that he would be made responsible for a contumacious act. in violation TRO and injunctive writ.

While there is still no definitive ruling on this issue when the respondent 4. Lastly, Judge Tac-an set and conducted a hearing of the case.
charged with contempt has retired, we apply by analogy the settled principle in
administrative disciplinary cases that separation from service does not render the case 5. June 21, 2005, the Judge was already notified of the CA Resolution ordering him to
moot and academic. “cease and desist from further proceeding in such case.
a. Yet, over the objection in open court by petitioner PPA, he continued with
Whether respondent Judge Tac-an is guilty of indirect contempt for alleged the hearing of (1) the “Motion for the Release of Additional Sum for
disregard of the CA resolutions. Yep! Humanitarian Purposes.” and (2) the “Urgent Motion for Immediate
Payment of the 100% zonal valuation of the properties.
We find that Judge Tac-an committed contumacious acts in utter disobedience of
the Resolutions of the CA. Consider the following: He continued to act on the civil case even if there is a clear directive to cease and desist
and altogether stop acting on said case and wait for further instructions from the
1. April 20, 2005 setting the Manifestation and Motion of the Bureau of Treasury for appellate court.
hearing on April 25, 2005, he was already aware of the TRO that prohibited him
from implementing orders 3, 4 the Writ of Execution, and Notices of Garnishment. Based on the totality of the foregoing circumstances, the Court finds Judge Paterno
Tac-an guilty of indirect contempt of court. His acts are contumacious, continuing acts
2. The TRO was effective for sixty (60) days from notice to the party enjoined. in clear disobedience and disrespect of the resolutions of the CA.
Assuming that the January 10, 2005 TRO was received by the trial court on the
same day, the TRO lapsed on March 9, 2005.
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 67

A person guilty of indirect contempt may be punished by a fine not exceeding PhP Section 4 of Rule 71, however, provides that proceedings for indirect contempt may be
30,000 or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both. Judge Tac-an violated initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an
four (4) resolutions/processes of the CA, namely: the January 10, 2000 TRO, the March order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should
15, 2005 Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the April 19, 2005 TRO and the June 3, 2005 not be punished for contempt. There is no way for this Court to initiate indirect
Resolution, for which he is hereby fined PhP 30,000 for each violation. Let this serve as contempt proceedings against complainants for the injury was not committed against
a warning to all trial courts to strictly comply with the resolutions and orders of the this tribunal, but against respondent judge.
appellate courts and this Court. The Court rules that Judge Paterno Tac-an is guilty of
indirect contempt and is, thus, ordered to pay a fine in the total amount of PhP 120,000. The penalty as recommended by the OCA cannot be sustained and the question of
whether the complainants should be penalized for filing the instant complaint is best
litigated in a separate proceeding, if warranted, within the confines of Rule 71 of the
2) FUENTES V. ALBARRACIN, A.M. RTJ 05-1587, APRIL 15, 2005 – PEREZ DE TAGLE Revised Rules of Court.

Barredo-Fuentes v. Judge Albarracin

ER:

Facts: Judge Albarracin granted an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an order
specifically directing Sheriff Aguinaldo Del Campo to enforce the writ of execution and
special writ of demolition, including the demolition of defendants’ buildings and other Facts:
improvement. Complainants in this admin case allege that respondent judge’s acting on
an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion without hearing and without the motion served on the • The instant case arose from an administrative case filed by Barredo-Fuentes et
complainants. The OCA eventually recommended that he administrative case be al [complainants] against Judge Albarracin [respondent].
dismissed for lack of merit and that complainants be FINED in the amount of Ten o The admin case refers to respondent judge’s acting on an Urgent Ex-
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) each for filing this baseless harassment Parte Motion without hearing and without the motion served on the
administrative case complainants.
o The Urgent Ex-Parte Motion sought the issuance of an order
specifically directing Sheriff Aguinaldo Del Campo to enforce the writ
of execution and special writ of demolition, including the demolition
Issue: Were the recommendations of the OCA correct? of defendants’ buildings and other improvement.
• [GPT SUMMARY OF THE FACTS]
o In the cases [3 forcible entry cases], the complainants here were the
defendants. They lost the 3 cases but filed a case to annul the
Held: First recommendation: correct! No basis. Just see the facts. Not too important for
judgments.
REM, more ethics etc. o Despite the pendency of the case to annul the judgments, the
plaintiffs in the forcible entry case eventually filed an Urgent Ex Parte
Motion to the Court to issue an order to the sheriff to execute the
writs of execution and special writ of demolition.
Second recommendation. Incorrect!
o The judge granted this motion despite the motion not being served to
Assuming that the acts of the complainants may be considered as “delaying tactics,” the complainants and not being set for hearing, contrary to the
remedial action may be enforced against them through contempt of court proceedings. A provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of
brief review of the rules governing contempt proceedings is useful. Court.
o The OCA eventually received this complaint and acted in the
Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade following manner:
the administration of justice would constitute indirect contempt. The employment of ▪ After a perusal of the evidence on record, the Office of the
delaying tactics to obstruct the administration of justice falls under this category. Court Administrator (OCA) ruled that complainants have no
basis for their charges. Complainants’ contention that
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 68

respondent judge should not have acted on the motion for


issuance of special writ of demolition due to the pendency Ratio:
of the petition for annulment of the decisions in the subject
cases with the RTC is baseless.
▪ It would not bar respondent judge from acting on the said
motion considering that there was no TRO or injunction to [GPT – SKIPPED THE PORTION ON THE FIRST RECO – basically, for the first reco, the SC
prevent him from proceeding with the subject cases. affirmed what the OCA said in the FACTS portion above]
▪ Further, the decisions in the subject cases had already
become final and executory. However, due to the numerous
delaying tactics employed by complainants the same
remained unexecuted. RE: THE OCA’s SECOND RECO
▪ The OCA concluded that the allegation that respondent
judge violated Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised • As to the recommendation to impose fine on the complainants, we rule that the
Rules of Court had no leg to stand on. circumstances of the case fail to warrant such course of action. The OCA cannot
▪ The ex-parte motion was merely to request the branch just penalize complainants by way of imposing fine on them without the
sheriff to implement the special writ of demolition which benefit of a thorough determination of the liability based on evidence adduced
had long been issued by the court after several hearings. by the parties. They must be given an opportunity to refute the charges by
▪ As such, it could be considered as a non-litigable motion adducing evidence on specific charges against them, not in a mere
which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing administrative case which involves a matter different from the alleged
the rights of herein complainants. culpability of the complainants. This requirement is fundamentally a part of
▪ Thus, the OCA recommended that the administrative case due process enshrined in the Constitution[17] that a person can only be
be dismissed for lack of merit and that complainants be penalized for a charge of which he was sufficiently informed and only after he
FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos was given an opportunity to be heard and present evidence to prove the
(P10,000.00) each for filing this baseless harassment contrary.
administrative case • Nonetheless, assuming that the acts of the complainants may be considered as
“delaying tactics,” remedial action may be enforced against them through
contempt of court proceedings. A brief review of the rules governing contempt
proceedings is useful.
• Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court,
Issue: such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigant or their witnesses
during litigation.
• There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct contempt and
W/N the recommendations [see below] of the OCA are correct: indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed when a person is guilty of
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt
(1) that the administrative case be dismissed for lack of merit [YES, CORRECT]; and the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court,
offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a
(2) that complainants be FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do
(P10,000.00) each for filing this baseless harassment administrative case IS so. Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out
CORRECT? [NO, INCORRECT] of the presence of the court. Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice would
constitute indirect contempt. The employment of delaying tactics to obstruct
the administration of justice falls under this latter category.
Held: • Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the following
requisites prior to conviction of indirect contempt: (a) a charge in writing to be
filed; (b) an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court; and (c) to be heard by himself or
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we modify the conclusion reached by the OCA.
counsel. With respect to constructive contempts or those which are committed
The administrative case filed against Judge Romeo C. Albarracin is hereby DISMISSED.
07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 69

without the actual presence of the court, it is essential that a hearing be


allowed and the contemner permitted, if he so desires, to interpose a defense
to the charges before punishment is imposed. The proceedings for punishment
of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. The modes of procedure and rules
of evidence adopted in contempt proceedings are similar in nature to those
used in criminal prosecutions.
• Section 4 of Rule 71, however, provides that proceedings for indirect contempt
may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was
committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. There is no way for
this Court to initiate indirect contempt proceedings against complainants for
the injury was not committed against this tribunal, but against respondent
judge.
There is no basis for this Court to initiate contempt proceedings or condemn the
complainants to suffer the penalty for contempt, considering that the “contemptuous”
act was not directed against the Court itself. The penalty as recommended by the OCA
cannot be sustained and the question of whether the complainants should be penalized
for filing the instant complaint is best litigated in a separate proceeding, if warranted,
within the confines of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.