Henares, Jr. v. LTFRB and DOTC G.R. No.

158290 October 23, 2006

HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L. HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE BELO
HENARES, and CRISTINA BELO HENARES, petitioners, vs. LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY
BOARD and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.

INSTANT FACTS: Petitioners insist that it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government
agencies clothed with power to regulate and control motor vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with
the same agencies' awareness and knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air
pollutants, they challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents
Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.

According to petitioners, Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is the policy statement
that bestows on the people the right to breathe clean air in a healthy environment, as
enunciated in Oposa. The implementation of this policy is articulated in Rep. Act No. 8749
particularly Section 4 which states that, when there is an omission by the government to
safeguard a right, in this case their right to clean air, then, the citizens can resort to and
exhaust all remedies to challenge this omission by the government.

The Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his position that the respondent government
agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as
alternative fuel. The Solicitor General explains that the function of the DOTC is limited to
implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law only goes
as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG
as alternative engine fuel. The Solicitor General avers that the petition should be addressed to
Congress for it to come up with a policy that would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.
ISSUE: Whether LTFRB can be compelled to require PUVs to use CNG through a writ of
Mandamus.
HELD: NO. First, there is an executive order (E.O. No. 290) implementing a program on the
use of CNG by public vehicles which took effect on February 24, 2004, hence, to a certain
extent, the instant petition had been mooted. A thorough reading of the executive order assures
us that implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed. Second, regrettably,
however, a writ of mandamus is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of
an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the
respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Further,
mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the
obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. The need for future changes in both
legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especially
when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm.
It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we have
placed on the protection of the environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as
the statistics are on air pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the
environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring
resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in
particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty
on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for
public utility vehicles. It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide
first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by
herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
FACTS: Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents
Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
Petitioners, citing statistics from studies made by various agencies and institutions on the high
growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership in the Philippines, including diesel-powered
vehicles, two-stroke engine powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air
pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action against the bane
of air pollution and related environmental hazards.
Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and
liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine
combustions – have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the
overall quality of life. For instance, carbon monoxide (CO), when not completely burned but
emitted into the atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With
prolonged exposure, CO affects the nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak
hearts.
Petitioners refer us to the study of the Philippine Environment Monitor 2002, stating that in four
of the country's major cities, Metro Manila, Davao, Cebu and Baguio, the exposure to PM 10, a
finer PM which can penetrate deep into the lungs causing serious health problems, over 2,000
people die prematurely, and over 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis.
Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines' studies in 1990-91 and 1994 showing
that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive
pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers;
and the prevalence of respiratory symptoms among school children and among child vendors.
The studies also revealed that the children in Metro Manila showed more compromised
pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly due to
the emissions of PUVs.
To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs, petitioners propose
the use of CNG. According to petitioners, CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane
which although containing small amounts of propane and butane, is colorless and odorless and
considered the cleanest fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants than coal and
petroleum. Although, according to petitioners, the only drawback of CNG is that it produces
more methane, one of the gases blamed for global warming.
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of
mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."
For respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General, cites Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court and explains that the writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy since
the writ may be issued only to command a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act
that is required to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled,
there being no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that petitioners invoke,
prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of motor vehicles. Sadly too, according to the
Solicitor General, Rep. Act No. 8749 does not even mention the existence of CNG as alternative
fuel and avers that unless this law is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs, the
respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as alternative fuel.
The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to implement Rep. Act No.
8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC. Moreover, he says, it is the Department of Energy
(DOE), under Section 26 of Rep. Act No. 8749, that is required to set the specifications for all
types of fuel and fuel-related products to improve fuel compositions for improved efficiency and
reduced emissions. He adds that under Section 2117 of the cited Republic Act, the DOTC is
limited to implementing the emission standards for motor vehicles, and the herein respondents
cannot alter, change or modify the emission standards. The Solicitor General opines that the
Court should declare the instant petition for mandamus without merit.
Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess the administrative and regulatory
powers to implement measures in accordance with the policies and principles mandated by
Rep. Act No. 8749, specifically Section 2 and Section 21. Petitioners state that under these laws
and with all the available information provided by the DOE on the benefits of CNG, respondents
cannot ignore the existence of CNG, and their failure to recognize CNG and compel its use by
PUVs as alternative fuel while air pollution brought about by the emissions of gasoline and
diesel endanger the environment and the people, is tantamount to neglect in the performance of
a duty which the law enjoins.
Lastly, petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners insist that the writ in fact should be
issued pursuant to the very same Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court that the
Solicitor General invokes.
ISSUES:
Whether the petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before the Supreme Court.
Whether the respondents can be compelled through a writ of Mandamus to require Public Utility
Vehicles to used Compressed Natural Gas.
HELD:
YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this Court.
Even respondents do not question their standing. This petition focuses on one fundamental
legal right of petitioners, their right to clean air. Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing
before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of the Court's discretion,
be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of
technicality under the principle of the transcendental importance to the public, especially so if
these cases demand that they be settled promptly.

NO. First, there is an executive order (EO 290) implementing a program on the use of CNG by
public vehicles which took effect on February 24, 2004. A thorough reading of the executive
order assures us that implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed. To a certain
extent, the instant petition had been mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290.

Second, regrettably, however, a writ of mandamus is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to

compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that
mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use
CNG. Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate
branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. The need for future changes
in both legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court,
especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm.

Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and
leeway or the coequal branches to address by themselves the environmental problems raised
in this petition. In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a balanced
and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-
generational justice" in Oposa, where we upheld the right of future Filipinos to prevent the
destruction of the rainforests, so do we recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners and the
future generation to clean air.

In Oposa we said that if the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is now explicitly found in
the Constitution even if the right is "assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers [of the Constitution] that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution
itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far
when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come."

It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we have
placed on the protection of the environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as
the statistics are on air pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the
environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring
resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in
particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty
on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for
public utility vehicles. It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the
specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners
before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

CASE: Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers v. Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (G.R. Nos.
187836 and 187916)
DATE: 25 November 2014
PONENTE: J. Perez

FACTS

On 12 October 2001, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by oil companies

(Chevron, Petron and Shell) and Department of Energy for the creation of a Master Plan
to address and minimize the potential risks and hazards posed by the proximity of
communities, business and offices to Pandacan oil terminals without affecting security
and reliability of supply and distribution of petroleum products.
On 20 November 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) enacted Ordinance No.
8027 which reclassifies the land use of Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas
from Industrial II to Commercial I.
Owners and operators of the businesses affected by the reclassification were given six
(6) months from the date of effectivity to stop the operation of their businesses. It was
later extended until 30 April 2003.
On 4 December 2002, a petition for mandamus was filed before the Supreme Court
(SC) to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
Unknown to the SC, the oil companies filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila an
action to annul Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory
injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. The same was issued in favor of
Chevron and Shell. Petron, on the other hand, obtained a status quo on 4 August 2004.
On 16 June 2006, Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved Ordinance No. 8119 entitled “An
Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations
of 2006 and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto”.
This designates Pandacan oil depot area as a Planned Unit Development/Overlay
Zone.
On 7 March 2007, the SC granted the petition for mandamus and directed Mayor
Atienza to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027. It declared that the objective of the
ordinance is to protect the residents of manila from the catastrophic devastation that will
surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
The oil companies filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) on the 7 March 2007
Decision. The SC later resolved that Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and that it
was not impliedly repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 as there is no irreconcilable conflict
between them.
SC later on denied with finality the second MR of the oil companies.
On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of Mayor Alfredo Lim (Mayor Lim), the SP
enacted Ordinance No. 8187. The Industrial Zone under Ordinance No. 8119 was
limited to Light Industrial Zone, Ordinance No. 8187 appended to the list a Medium and
a Heavy Industrial Zone where petroleum refineries and oil depots are expressly
allowed.
Petitioners Social Justice Society Officers, Mayor Atienza, et.al. filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8187. Their contentions
are as follows:
It is an invalid exercise of police power because it does not promote the general welfare
of the people
It is violative of Section 15 and 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution as well as health
and environment related municipal laws and international conventions and treaties,
such as: Clean Air Act; Environment Code; Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law; Civil
Code provisions on nuisance and human relations; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; and Convention on the Rights of the Child
The title of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8119 when
it actually intends to repeal Ordinance No. 8027
On the other hand, the respondents Mayor Lim, et.al. and the intervenors oil companies
contend that:
The petitioners have no legal standing to sue whether as citizens, taxpayers or
legislators. They further failed to show that they have suffered any injury or threat of
injury as a result of the act complained of
The petition should be dismissed outright for failure to properly apply the related
provisions of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and/or the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases relative to the appropriate remedy available
The principle of the hierarchy of courts is violated because the SC only exercises
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance
under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
It is the function of the SP to enact zoning ordinance without prior referral to the Manila
Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals; thus, it may repeal all or part of zoning
ordinance sought to be modified
There is a valid exercise of police power
On 28 August 2012, the SP enacted Ordinance No. 8283 which essentially amended
the assailed Ordinance to exclude the area where petroleum refineries and oil depots
are located from the Industrial Zone. The same was vetoed by Mayor Lim.

ISSUES

WON there are violations of environmental laws

WON the principle of hierarchy of courts is violated
WON the petitioners have legal standing to sue
WON Ordinance No. 8187 is unconstitutional in relation to the Pandacan Terminals

RULING

None. The scope of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is embodied in
Section 2, Part I, Rule I thereof. It states that the Rules shall govern the procedure in
civil, criminal and special civil actions before the MeTCs, MTCCs, MTCs and MCTCs,
and the RTCs involving the enforcement or violations of environmental and other related
laws, rules and regulations such as but not limited to: R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances
and Hazardous Waste Act; R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act; Provisions in C.A. No. 141;
and other existing laws that relate to the conservation, development, preservation,
protection and utilization of the environment and natural resources.

Notably, the aforesaid Rules are limited in scope. While, indeed, there are allegations of
violations of environmental laws in the petitions, these only serve as collateral attacks
that would support the other position of the petitioners – the protection of the right to life,
security and safety.

No. The SC held that it is true that the petitions should have been filed with the RTC, it
having concurrent jurisdiction with the SC over a special civil action for prohibition, and
original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.

However, the petitions at bar are of transcendental importance warranting a relaxation

of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but
to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. (Jaworski v. PAGCOR, 464 Phil. 375)

Yes. The SC referred to their Decision dated 7 March 2007 which ruled that the
petitioners in that case have a legal right to seek the enforcement of Ordinance No.
8027 because the subject of the petition concerns a public right, and they, as residents
of Manila, have a direct interest in the implementation of the ordinances of the city.

No different are herein petitioners who seek to prohibit the enforcement of the assailed
ordinance, and who deal with the same subject matter that concerns a public right.

In like manner, the preservation of the life, security and safety of the people is
indisputably a right of utmost importance to the public. Certainly, the petitioners, as
residents of Manila, have the required personal interest to seek relief to protect such
right.

Yes. In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative to the
continued stay of the oil depots, the SC followed the same line of reasoning used in its 7
March 2007 decision, to wit:

“Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of promoting a sound urban
planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of the residents of Manila.
The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from
catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance
from industrial to commercial.

The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban
Development of the City of Manila which recommended the approval of the ordinance:

The depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and highly volatile
products which include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel,
gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil among others;
The depot is open to attack through land, water and air;
It is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacañang Palace; and
In case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could spread to the
neighboring communities.

The Ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the
inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or
wrongly, as a representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist target.
As long as there is such a target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It
therefore becomes necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat.”

The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The Pandacan oil
depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence
of any convincing reason to persuade the Court that the life, security and safety of the
inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, the SC
holds that the Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and
unconstitutional.

For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one point or another, no
matter how remote it is as perceived by one or some, the SC cannot allow the right to
life be dependent on the unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and theories of probability
have no place in situations where the very life of not just an individual but of residents of
big neighbourhoods is at stake.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

Ordinance No. 8187 is declared unconstitutional and invalid with respect to the
continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals.
The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is ordered to cease and desist from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8187 and to oversee the relocation and transfer of the oil
terminals out of the Pandacan area
The oil companies shall, within a non-extendible period of forty-five (45) days, submit to
the RTC Manila, Branch 39 an updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule,
which relocation shall be completed not later than six (6) months from the date the
required document is submitted.

1.
Metro Iloilo Water District vs. Court of Appeals, 454 SCRA 249 , March 31, 2005
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 1995 is SET ASIDE and the
case is ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings, with costs against
respondents.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Petitiondated November 9, 1995 filed by the Metro Iloilo Water District assailing the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 1995 which affirmed the trial court’s Order3 dismissing
the petitions for injunction filed by petitioner against private respondents.
Petitioner is a water district. Its service areas encompass the entire territorial areas of Iloilo City
and the Municipalities of Ma-asin, Cabatuan, Santa Barbara and Pavia.
In April and May of 1993, petitioner filed nine (9) individual identical petitions for injunction with
prayer for preliminary injunction against private respondents which read:
4.—That pursuant to the provisions of Section 31 (a) of P.D. 198, the petitioner as a Water
District was authorized to adopt laws and regulations governing the drilling, maintenance and
operation of wells within its boundaries for purposes other than single family domestic use on
overlying land, with then provision that any well operated in violation of such regulations shall be
deemed an interference with the waters of the district;
5.—That by virtue of said authorization, the petitioner promulgated its “Rules Governing Ground
Water Pumping and Spring Development Within the Territorial Jurisdiction of the Metro Iloilo
Water District,” Section 3 which read:
“Ground Water Pumping and Spring Development. Except when the use of water is for single
family domestic use, no person shall withdraw ground water within the jurisdiction of the District
without first securing a waterpermit from the Council and no person shall engage in the
business of drilling wells without first registering as well driller with the Council; Provided, that
the person drilling his own well or through the services of a qualified well driller shall comply with
the standards and requirements established
6.—That the respondent withdrawn ground water within the jurisdiction of the petitioner, without
first securing a Water Permit from the National Water Resources Council nor had its well driller
registered as such with said council, and sold said water to commercial and other consumers in
Iloilo City.
7.—That the unauthorized withdrawal of ground water by the respondent without permit is in
violation of the rules and regulations prescribed.
8.—That the act of the respondent in continuing to withdraw ground water without Permit , is in
violation of the Water Code of the Philippines, and unless such act is restrained, will cause great
loss upon the petitioner.
In their respective answers, private respondents uniformly invoked the lack of jurisdiction of the
trial court, contending that the cases were within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
National Water Resources Council (Water Council) under Presidential Decree No. 1067,
otherwise known as the Water Code of the Philippines (Water Code). In addition, private
respondents denied the allegations
The trial court dismissed the petitions in March 17, 1994, ruling that the controversy was within
the original jurisdiction of the Water Council, involving, as it did, the appropriation, exploitation
and utilization of water, and factual issues which were within the Water Council’s competence.
In addition, the trial court held that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the
doctrine of “primary administrative jurisdiction.”
Petitioner sought the review of the order of the trial court dismissing the petitions, on the ground
that the trial court failed to adhere to this Court’s rulings, which upheld the regular courts’
jurisdiction over disputes which involve not the settlement of water rights but the enjoyment of
the right to water use for which a permit had already been granted.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition. The appellate court ratiocinated:
The controversy in this case was the fact that the petitioner was granted water rightsand the
respondents also extracted or withdrew ground water within the same jurisdiction.
While at first impression this case involves a violation of the petitioner’s enjoyment of a right to
water use, the fact is that it actually involves also a dispute over the appropriation, utilization,
and protection of waters because the respondents have allegedly engaged in withdrawal of
ground water without a permit from the NWRC. Therefore, Art. 88 of P.D. No. 1067 giving the
NWRC original jurisdiction over the cases is applicable.
Thus the petition for review. The sole issue in this petition, as presented by petitioner, is:
DID THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOILO HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE PETITIONS?27
Petitioner states that as a water district, it has the right to prevent interference with the water of
the district; and to enforce such right, it is given the remedies of commencing, maintaining, or
intervening in, defending or entering into appropriate actions or proceedings.
In asserting the jurisdiction of the regular courts over its petitions and the propriety of its filing of
the petitions before the trial court, petitioner invokes the ruling of the Court in Amistoso v.
Ong,28 as reiterated in Santos v. Court of Appeals,29 that where the issue involved is not the
settlement of a water rights dispute, but the enjoyment of a right to water use for which a permit
was already granted, the regular court has jurisdiction and not the Water Council.
Petitioner insists that there is no occasion to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Water Council
in this case since there is no question of appropriation, exploitation, utilization, development,
control, conservation and protection of water. The only dispute, according to petitioner, pertains
to the act of private respondents in extracting ground water from the territory of petitioner as a
water district and selling the same within its service area, or more succinctly, private
respondents’ interference with the granted right of petitioner over ground water within its
territorial jurisdiction.30
Private respondents, for their part, staunchly invoke Article 88 of the Water Code, which grants
original jurisdiction over all disputes relating to the appropriation, utilization, exploitation,
development, control, conservation and protection of waters to the Water Council.31
Art. 88 of the Water Code provides:
The Council shall have original jurisdiction over all disputes relating to appropriation, utilization,
exploitation, development, control, conservation and protection of waters within the meaning
and context of the provisions of this Code.
We find merit in the petition.
The petitions filed before the trial court were for the issuance of an injunction order for
respondents to cease and desist from extracting or withdrawing water from petitioner’s well and
from selling the same within its service areas.34 The petitions contained factual allegations in
support of the prayer for
injunction,
In essence, the petitions focus on the violations incurred by private respondents by virtue of
their alleged unauthorized extraction and withdrawal of ground water within petitioner’s service
area, vis-à-vis petitioner’s vested rights as a water district. At issue is whether or not private
respondents’ extraction and sale of ground water within petitioner’s service area violated
petitioner’s rights as a water district. It is obvious that the petitions raise a judicial question.
A judicial question is raised when the determination of the question involves the exercise of a
judicial function, i.e., the question involves the determination of what the law is and what the
legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in controversy, a judicial question is
properly addressed to the courts.35
Petitioner had an approved Water Rights Grant from the Department of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications. The trial court was not asked to grant petitioner the right to
use but to compel private respondents to recognize that right. Thus, we declared that the trial
court’s jurisdiction must be upheld where the issue involved is not the settlement of a water
rights dispute, but the enjoyment of a right to water use for which a permit was already
granted.40
In like manner, the present petition calls for the issuance of an injunction order to prevent private
respondents from extracting and selling ground water within petitioner’s service area in violation
of the latter’s water permit. There is no dispute regarding petitioner’s right to ground water within
its service area. It is petitioner’s enjoyment of its rights as awater district which it seeks to assert
against private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 1995 is SET ASIDE and the
case is ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings, with costs against
respondents.
215 Phil. 197
CUEVAS, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Order of the

defunct Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VI
dated January 14, 1981, dismissing its Civil Case No. p-153,
for lack of jurisdiction.

The pertinent antecedents are as follows:

On July 27, 1978, petitioner as plaintiff, filed before the then Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, a complaint for Recognition of Easement with
Preliminary Injunction and Damages. The complaint which was docketed in
the aforesaid Court as Civil Case No. p-153 among others alleged, that
plaintiff (now petitioner) and defendant Epifania Neri (one of the herein
private respondents) are the owners of adjoining parcels of agricultural land
situated in Cauayanan, Tinambac, Camarines Sur; that an irrigation canal
traverses the land of defendant Neri through which irrigation water from the
Slimod River passes and flows to the land of the petitioner for the latter's
beneficial use; and that respondent Neri, owner of the land on which said
irrigation canal exists and Senecio Ong, the cultivator of the said property,
despite repeated demands refused to recognize the rights and title of the
petitioner to the beneficial use of the water passing through the aforesaid
irrigation canal and to have petitioner's rights and/or claims annotated on
the Certificate of Title of respondent Neri….. Hence, the filing of the said
complaint.
In their Answer, private respondents denied the existence of any right on
the part of the petitioner to the use of the canal mentioned in the complaint
nor any contract, much less any deed or encumbrance on their property
and assert that they have not performed any act prejudicial to the petitioner
that will warrant the filing of the complaint against them. By way of
affirmative and special defenses, private respondents alleged that
petitioner's complaint states no cause of action and that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the same.
Issues having been joined, trial was held. After petitioner has rested his
case by a formal offer of his testimonial and documentary evidences,
private respondents instead of presenting their evidence, filed a motion to
dismiss. In the said motion, respondents contend that the instant case,
involving as it does development, exploitation, conservation and utilization
of water resources falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National
Water Resources Council pursuant to P.D. NO. 424, Section 2(b) and
Section 88 thereof. Acting on private respondents' motion, respondent
Judge dismissed petitioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction in an Order
dated January 14, 1981. The pertinent portion of that Order reads as
follows:
"x x x The basis of the motion to dismiss are the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 424 and the Water Code known as Presidential Decree No.
1067. In opposing the motion to dismiss, plaintiff contends that the present
action does not involve water dispute and that since the present action was
filed before the court prior to the effectivity of the Presidential Decree No.
424, it is the old law on the matter that should be applied. These
contentions of the plaintiff are without merit. The complaint belies the
plaintiff's contention. Allegations in the complaint are explicit regarding the
claim of the right of plaintiff over the water passing through his land. The
right over irrigation water not having been shown as established or vested
or that said vested right, if any, has not been alleged to be registered in
accordance with the water code, the provisions of Presidential Decrees 424
and 1067 shall govern. As stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Abe-
Abe vs. Manta, No. L-4827, May 31, 1979, 90 SCRA 523, to wit:
"It is incontestable that the petitioner's immediate recourse is to ventilate
their grievance with the National Water Resources Council which, as
already noted, is the administrative agency exclusively vested with original
jurisdiction to settle water rights disputes under the water code under
Presidential Decree No. 424.
The code assumes that it is more expeditious and pragmatic to entrust to
an administrative agency the settlement of water rights disputes rather than
require the claimants to go directly to the court where the proceedings are
subject to unavoidable delays which are deterimental to the parties x x x
That jurisdiction of the Council under Section 2(b) of Presidential Decree
No. 424 is reaffirmed in Sec. 88 of the Water Code and in Section 3(d)
thereof which provides that 'the utilization, exploitation, development,
conservation and protection of water resources shall be subject to the
control and regulation of the government through Council."
Failing to obtain a favorable reconsideration of the Order of dismissal,
petitioner now comes before Us through the instant petition contending:
(1) That the case at bar is not to settle any water dispute between the
parties but a complaint which calls purely for a determination of the right of
the plaintiff to have an established right amounting to an easement
annotated on the certificate of title of the defendant, hence the question is
judicial which may be taken cognizance of by the respondent court;
(2) That since the case was filed on July 26, 1972, which was before the
effectivity of P.D. NO. 424, therefore even if defendant's contention is
correct - that the case involved water rights dispute - the old law on water
applies and not the present water code of the Philippines of 1976;
otherwise, the Court shall lose jurisdiction by subsequent legislation
contrary to the well-settled rule that once jurisdiction is acquired it cannot
be lost;
(3) That the herein defendant can no longer raise the question of plaintiff's
right to the beneficial use of irrigation water since the right to use had
already been determined, decided and laid to rest when the Department of
Public Works, Transportation and Communications awarded petitioner
Water Rights Grant after complying with all the legal requirements such as
publication, payment of fees, survey, investigation, etc.; and
(4) That the issue in the case at bar which was erroneously overlooked by
the respondent Judge does not involve a determination of the right of the
parties to the utilization, conservation and protection of the parties'
respective water rights, hence it does not fall within the competence nor
jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council.
In a Resolution promulgated on August 11, 1982, we required the
respondents to comment on the petition. Private respondents' COMMENT
was filed on March 2, 1984. Petitioner's REPLY thereto on the other hand
was filed on May 10, 1984.
We considered the COMMENT as an Answer and gave due course to the
petition.
Private respondents contend that the assailed order of dismissal was in
order since a mere cursory reading of the complaint shows that petitioner
claims for the right to use water coming from the Silmod River and prays
that his right to the utilization thereof be respected and not be disturbed
and/or obstructed by the respondents. On its face then, the dispute is on
the use, conservation and protection of the right to water either by the
petitioner or by the private respondents. The annotation of the alleged
encumbrance on the title of the private respondent is merely the relief
prayed for on the basis of the claim to the use and protection of water
passing through the land of the respondents. And since the controversy
hinges on the right to use and protect the water from the Silmod River that
passes on the land of the private respondents to the petitioner's property,
the proper authority to determine such a controversy is the National Water
Resources Council which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over such
question pursuant to P.D. NOS. 424 and 1067.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
Private respondents' insistence that what is involved in the instant case is
the right to use, exploit and convey water is controverted by the
"STIPULATION OF FACTS" entered into between them and the petitioner
in the court below which was approved in an Order dated February 20,
1975, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
"1. That there exists an irrigation canal for the use of the defendants
diverting water coming from the Silmod River, Tinambac, Camarines Sur,
passing on the ricelands of the latter to the plaintiff's land irrigating the land
of the latter, although plaintiff claims it existed since 1952 up to the present,
but disputed by the defendants.
2. That the plaintiff has an approved water rights Grant issued by the
Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, which
plaintiff claims it for beneficial use to irrigate their land from the Silmod
River and defendants dispute said claim.
3. That as of now, defendants have no approved Water Rights Grant issued
by the proper authorities for the use of the water for irrigation purposes
from the Silmod River. However, defendants have a pending application for
Water Rights, the water of which shall pass thru a different irrigation canal.
4. That one of the defendants' predecessors-in-interest, Abundio Barallas
had a written contract with the plaintiff, which defendants claim easement
of aqueduct. Defendants are questioning the legality, enforceability and
validity of such contract.
x x x x x
6. That defendants refused to surrender their Transfer Certificate of Title of
her land for purposes of annotation of the contract, allegedly an easement
of aqueduct, on the ground that she questions the validity, enforceability,
legality and therefore they are not bound by the same."
From the foregoing stipulations, private respondents admit that petitioner,
then plaintiff, has an approved Water Rights Grant issued by the
Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications. Private
respondents, however, contend that the said grant does not pertain to the
beneficial use of irrigation water from Silmod River. The records, however,
do not show any other irrigation water going to petitioner's property passing
thru respondents' lot aside from that coming from the Silmod River.
Respondents' controversion of petitioner's right to irrigation water
specifically from Silmod River is undoubtedly a lame denial.
Aside from this admission, the record clearly discloses an approved Water
Rights Grant in favor of petitioner. Dr. Bienvenido V. Amistoso, which was
approved on November 13, 1973 by the Acting Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, David M. Consunji. (Exh. I) The grant was made
three (3) years before the promulgation of P.D. 1067 on December 31,
1976, known as the Water Code of the Philippines, which revised and
consolidated the laws governing ownership, appropriation, utilization,
exploitation, development, conservation and protection of water resources
thereby repealing among others, the provisions of the Spanish Law of
Water of August 3, 1866, the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, and the Civil
Code of the Philippines on ownership of water, easement relating to water
and of public water and acquisitive prescription on the use of water which
are inconsistent with the provisions of said Code (Art. 10, P.D. 1067).
The water rights grant partakes the nature of a document known as a water
permit recognized under Article 13 of P.D. 1067, which provides:
"Article 13. Except as otherwise herein provided, no person, including
government instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall appropriate water without a water right, which shall be
evidenced by a document known as a water permit.
Water right is the privilege granted by the government to appropriate and
use water."
As to the validity of the WATER RIGHTS GRANT of Amistoso upon the
promulgation of P.D. 1067 on December 31, 1976, the governing provision
of law is found in the Transitory and Final Provisions of P.D. 1067. It falls
under "acts and contracts under the regime of old laws". Article 97
provides, thus:
"Article 97. Acts and contracts under the regime of old laws, if they are valid
in accordance therewith, shall be respected, subject to the limitations
established in this Code. Any modification or extension of these acts and
contracts after the promulgation of this Code, shall be subject to the
provisions hereof."
It may be observed that the WATER RIGHTS GRANT of Amistoso does not
fall under "claims for a right to use water existing on or before December
31, 1974" which under P.D. 1067 are required to be registered with the
National Water Resources Council within two (2) years from promulgation
of P.D. 1067, otherwise it is deemed waived and the use thereof deemed
abandoned. It is no longer a mere "claim" inasmuch as there was already a
GRANT by the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications (the official then authorized to issue said grant) on
November 13, 1973 after complying with all the requirements then
prescribed by law for such grant.
The grant contradicts the erroneous findings of the respondent Judge, and
incontrovertibly entitles petitioner to the beneficial use of water from Silmod
River. That right is now a vested one and may no longer be litigated anew
so as to bring petitioner's case within the jurisdiction of the National Water
Resources Council. To resurrect that issue - - right to the use of irrigation
water from Silmod River - - will be violative of the rule on res judicata which
also applies with equal vigor and effect to quasi judicial tribunal (Brillantes
vs. Castro, 99 Phils. 497, Ipekdjian Merchandising, Inc. vs. Court of Tax
Appeals, 9 SCRA 72, September 30, 1963).
As correctly postulated by the petitioner, the court a quo is not being asked
to grant petitioner the right to use but to compel private respondents to
recognize that right and have the same annotated on respondent Neri's
Torrens Certificate of Title. Resort to judicial intervention becomes
necessary because of the closure made by the respondents of the irrigation
canal thus depriving the petitioner to continue enjoying irrigation water
coming from Silmod River through respondents' property. The interruption
of the free flow of water caused by the refusal to re-open the closed
irrigation canal constituted petitioner's cause of action in the court below,
which decidedly do not fall within the domain of the authority of the National
Water Resources Council.
Respondents, however, rely very heavily on the dictum laid down in the
Abe-Abe vs. Manta, No. L-4827, May 31, 1979, 90 SCRA 524, wherein it
was held that -
"It is incontestable that the petitioner's immediate recourse is to ventilate
their grievance with the National Water Resources Council which, as
already noted, is the administrative agency exclusively vested with original
jurisdiction to settle water rights disputes under the water code and under
Presidential Decree No. 424.
The Code assumes that it is more expeditious and pragmatic to entrust to
an administrative agency the settlement of water rights disputes rather than
require the claimants to go directly to the court where the proceedings are
subject to unavoidable delays which are detrimental to the parties x x x
That jurisdiction of the Council under Section 2(b) of Presidential Decree
No. 424 is reaffirmed in Section 88 of the Water Code and in Section 3(d)
thereof which provides that 'the utilization, exploitation, development,
conservation and protection of water resources shall be subject to the
control and regulation of the government through the Council."
The said pronouncement, however, finds no application to the instant case
for in there, both petitioners and respondent have no established right
emanating from any grant by any governmental agency to the use,
appropriation and exploitation of water. In the case at bar, however, a grant
indubitably exists in favor of the petitioner. It is the enjoyment of the right
emanating from that grant that is in litigation. Violation of the grantee's right,
who in this case is the petitioner, by the closure of the irrigation canal, does
not bring the case anew within the jurisdiction of the National Water
Resources Council.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the Honorable respondent Judge of January
14, 1981, is hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondents are hereby ordered to
RECOGNIZE petitioner's EASEMENT of water and to surrender to the
Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur the owner's duplicate Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 14216 covering respondent Epifania Neri's property
so that petitioner's right to the beneficial use of said irrigation canal and
water passing through the same may be annotated thereon. v SO
ORDERED.