Port Technology and Logistics Research, 2008. Vol. 1(1), Pp.

54-59

Logistical Administration in a Threatened Coastal

Environment: New Challenges for our Defense
Operators.

C. Onyemechi1, D.E Onwuegbuchunam1, L.l Okoroji2, J. Ihediwa1

1
Department of Maritime Management Technology,
2
Department of Transport Management Technology,
Federal University of Technology Owerri, Nigeria.

ABSTRACT

The work reviews the new challenges posed to both naval and military bases as
they face new and sophisticated scenarios in protecting human, materials and
economic resources in the coastal states. Effective approaches for logistical
equipment mobilization were suggested. Existing transport options available to
the military and naval units were assessed based on hypothetical scenarios
requiring quick interventionism. The logistical requirements of a South Eastern
Military in the area of facility management were analyzed pointing out likely
strengths and weaknesses.

1. INTRODUCTION
The sophisticated nature of crimes in the coastal states has indeed posed new
challenges for both the military and naval units in this region. In reaction to these,
the governments of these States have reacted by providing little logistical
equipment in the area of fleet acquisition to help counter the adverse situation.
Others include the mounting of road blocks at strategic entry and exit points to
these States. In a threatened coastal environment where a war scenario for
instance in the form of foreign aggression is envisaged, the logistical requirement
would go beyond ordinary visible imaginations. In this situation logistical
requirements would be two-fold. The first will concern itself with civilian logistical
requirements for evacuation. The other will affect military logistical requirements
for quick interventionism, offense and counter measure attacks.

In this sense adequate physical distribution facilities in terms of terminals, fast

speed rail systems, a well developed inland waterways with workable shipping
and inland port facilities, as well as air transport systems become compulsory. An

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assessment of logistical facilities in the face of a threatened coastal environment

thus ought to be carried out as an instrument of national security.

1.1 Problem Definition

The developmental objectives of Nigeria require strategic planning that should
seek to protect every individual and facilities available in our nation. In this
regards the adequacy of existing as well as envisaged transport and logistical
facilities ought to be reassessed in different scenarios: a peace scenario and a war
scenario. Such analysis will bring out planning strategies that will justify
investments in the physical distribution sector that will ensure logistical facility
sufficiency at both war and peace time.

1.2 Objectives
This paper sets out to investigate the logistical needs of both civilian and military
units under different scenarios. A hypothetical threatened coastal environment is
used as a case study.

2. BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW

Methods which can possibly be deployed by terrorist using the maritime realm for
their operation have been identified to include the following;
i. Terrorist may consider using commercial container ships to smuggle
chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) materials for an unconventional
attack on land or at major port facilities (top commercial ports of the world).

ii. They may apply the Trojan horse technique by using a fishing trawler, re-
supply ship, tug or similar innocuous-looking vessel to transport weapons
and other battle related material.

iii. They may also resort to vessel hijacking as fund raising exercise to support
campaign of political violence directed toward ethnic or religious designs.

iv. They may decide to scuttle a ship in a narrow SLOG in order to block or
disrupt maritime traffic.

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v. They may opt to hijack an LNG carrier and then detonate it as a floating
weapon, or a collision weapon.

vi. They may also use small or high speed boat to attack an oil tanker or
offshore energy platform in a bid to inflate international petroleum prices,
or cause major oil pollution.

vii. Finally, they may decide to attack a cruise liner or passenger ferry to cause
mass casualties by contaminating the ships food supply, or detonating an
onboard or submersible improvised device (IED), or even by attacking the
vessel with a small attack craft. Greenberg et al., (2006).

The maritime domain has been seen as an area vulnerable to terrorist attack.
Maritime terrorism by definition constitutes of terrorist acts and activities:

a. Within the maritime environment

b. Meted against vessel or fixed platforms at sea or in port or against any of

their passengers or personnel.

c. Against coastal facilities or settlements including tourist resorts, port areas

and port towns or cities, (Quentin, 2003). The vulnerability of ships in the
maritime domain is even worsened by the presence of choke points where
ships are required to lower their speed. Major chokepoints include the
straits of Malacca, Bab el Mandeb, Hormuz, Bosporus, Dardanelles, Dover,
Gibraltar, the Suez, Panama and Keele Canals.

3. METHODOLOGY
Vulnerability analysis of the sufficiency of our logistical facilities under different
threat scenarios was carried out. The effects of attacks were graded from minimal
to excessively great consequences. The attack categories under peace time fall
into two groups.

i. Attacks involving small explosives, hijacking, food or water contamination.

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ii. Assaults employing larger munitions with a potential to kill hundreds of

people depending on the location of vessel. Greenberg et al., (2006).

Under a war scenario the situation might go out of control involving troop attacks,
withdrawals, and massive movement of civilian populations from one city to
another. The effectiveness of Radar countermeasure (RCM) equipment would
come into play. Accurate defection of enemy aircrafts, ships and submarines using
electronic devices, sensors, sonar, magnetometers become compulsory.

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
During peace time like we have now the attack potentials of militants and pirates
currently disturbing the Niger-Delta coastal environment can be assessed to
constitute of two parts. The first is those attacks targeted against human
resources and those attacks targeted against production and allied facilities. A
security strategy that will deal adequately with the activities of such groups partly
has to do with adequate logistical defense mobilization and partly with increased
government development efforts in the region.

Logistical defense mobilization constitutes of two aspects;

i. Provision of adequate coastal surveillance equipment and

ii. Provision of adequate logistical equipment for defense at both the land, sea
and air modes. Government development efforts viewed as a security
strategy will require creation of efficient accessibility to major living areas in
the region, provision of fresh water via borehole drilling and location of
peace defense centers in the area's most troubled zones.

4.1 Training Needs

Given the numerous human and capital facilities in our coastal region, the
necessity for protection in the face of threat becomes paramount. Training should
be given to our defense operatives in the area of anti-terrorist operations,
amphibious operations, coastguard operations and logistics. This will enable them
provide adequate security in the face of threat in the region.

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4.2 Logistical Requirements During War Time

Under a siege the logistical needs of a coastal nation will be enormous. While the
defense operators would be involved in mobilizing attack against the foe using
modern electronic weapon fire controls, magnetic anomaly detectors MAD, the
radar system's countermeasures etc. Existing civilian populations adjacent to the
coastline may consider withdrawals towards the hinterland. Quick transfers of city
population will require adequate physical distribution equipment in the form of
speed trains, underground trains, and very wide road networks linking the coastal
zone with the hinterland. These facilities are presently absent from the zone.
However, for a nation aspiring to super power position in the continent, these
facilities are necessary. The absence of these facilities is simply pointers to the
vulnerability of the nation to enemy attack during war situations. A master plan
therefore that will incorporate these logistical needs into the nations plan can
only be seen as a step towards the superpower position in the world and African
region.

5. CONCLUSION
Logistical needs therefore are paramount to a nation's economic and social well
being both at peace time and at war time. The application of scenario analysis
using peace and war time scenario therefore exposes the vulnerability of our
developmental efforts under threat. Such analysis will ensure a development
targeted at full logistical sufficiency for our civilized needs. It also ensures
protection at all times.

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6. REFERENCES
Greenberg et al., (2006). Maritime Terrorism Risk and Liability. RAND Center for
Terrorism Risk Management Policy.

Navord (1971). Weapons Systems: Fundamentals Elements of Weapons Systems.

Commander Naval Ordinance Systems Command, NAVORD OP 3000 Vol.1,
First Edition.

Quentin Sophia (2003), Shipping Activities: Targets of Maritime Terrorism,

MIRMAL Vol. 2.

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