War and Glory The Myth of Spartan Milita

War and Glory: The Myth of Spartan Militarism
By
Joshua Payne Trosch
Dr. William Bubelis, Thesis Advisor
A Thesis presented to
the Department of Classics,
Washington University in St. Louis
in partial fulfillment of the requirement of the degree of
Bachelor of Arts with Honors
March 26, 2015

Μολὼν λαβέ
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 4
Chapter One Thucydides Book One: Analyzing Military Enthusiasm 14

in the Vote for War
Chapter Two Herodotus Book Seven: Reconsidering Military Deference 28

at Thermopylae
Chapter Three Sparta’s Institutions: Why Sparta Went to War 44
Chapter Four Spartan Character: Sparta as an Inherently Fearful Polis 56
Conclusion 61
Bibliography 65
3
Introduction
The city-state of classical Sparta has played a pivotal role in shaping our
understanding of the Greek world. Located in the fertile watershed of the southern
Peloponnese, Sparta emerged as a regional hegemony, contributing significantly to the
political dynamic of the period. Its greatest contribution, however, is said to be its
participation in the famous military conflicts of the classical period.1 Sparta, after all, was
a military society, so defined by the laws set forth by its mythical lawgiver Lycurgus
some time in the eighth century BCE.2 Its institutions were designed to make the Spartan
phalanx an impenetrable wall of spears and shields. Behind these spears and shields stood
fearless Spartan men, each willing and ready to die selflessly for the perpetuity of Sparta,
each a paradigm of the principles and attitudes embodied by Lycurgus’ laws.3 It is
precisely this understanding of Sparta, this notion of a definitively military society in
which every Spartan man, woman, and child lived and died for the welfare of mother-
Sparta, which I aim to challenge. To this end, I will focus on a narrow facet of this
understanding, calling its historicity into question.
1
A significant portion of the surviving literature on Sparta in the classical period addresses its
role in either the Persian Wars or the Peloponnesian War in Herodotus’ Histories and Thucydides
History of the Peloponnesian War respectively. In these wars, Sparta was either a notable
military leader or a major player. See Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 174.
2
Kennel, Spartans: A New History, 38-9. While the extent to which Lycurgus was a real person is
dubious, if he did exist it is likely he instituted his constitution at some point in or around the
eighth century, during which Sparta experienced a period of conquest and consolidation that
Kennel marks as the end of “legendary” Spartan history.
3
This is a general concept that, while noted in various forms in several sources, cannot be traced
to any one contemporary or ancient source. For contemporary evidence of this concept see
Section I of the Introduction.
4
In this thesis I challenge the notion that when Sparta decided upon war, this
decision was definitively militaristic. I understand this concept of militarism as an
“exaltation of military virtues and ideals.”4 These virtues and ideals may reasonably
include courage or bravery, preparedness, respect for one’s superiors, and honor to name
just a few. As such, I will narrow in on two primary consequences of this definition.
First, militarism presupposes a marked enthusiasm for war. This is to say that the
glorification of military virtues and ideals manifests as a love for or delight in the
inherent virtues of war and battle, such as bravery, an honorable death, or the joy of
combat. Second, this understanding of militarism presupposes deference to military
authority. In other words, the exaltation of military virtues and ideals, notably respect for
one’s superiors, incites one to concede or defer to the authority of military figures or
institutions. If the reasons Sparta provided for going to war resounded either with a sense
in which they delighted in the prospect of war or with a sense in which war was
undertaken because of military demands, then those reasons should be considered
characteristically militaristic.
I I start by identifying the reason why this thesis is being written. This
identification highlights both the way in which Sparta is perceived today as well as the
repercussions this skewed perception has for our understanding of Spartan society.
The problem this thesis faces is an understanding of Spartan society that depicts
Spartan decisions for war as definitively militaristic. Contemporary allusions to Sparta,
ranging from sports franchises to popular culture, betray this understanding. Michigan
State University, the seventh largest university in the United States, has the Spartan as its
4
Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, s.v. “militarism,” accessed April 15, 2015,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/militarism.
5
athletic mascot. This choice of mascot is by no means arbitrary; the most prominent and
well-known sculpture on campus, called “The Spartan,” is of a tall, muscular man with
his hoplite helmet in hand. Fearless, he looks off with a stern expression into the distance.
The Spartan is ever ready and looking forward to the battle ahead. In this way, this piece
embodies the virtues of militarism with which Sparta is associated.
As comically inaccurate as it is, Frank Miller’s 1998 Graphic Novel 300 and Zack
Snyder’s 2006 film of the same name are highly indicative of the type of decision-making
that defines the myth of Spartan militarism. 5 In the 2006 film 300, there are numerous
instances indicative of this type of behavior from which one can choose, but perhaps the
most well known occurs roughly fifteen minutes into the film. King Leonidas, displeased
with a Persian emissary’s demand that Sparta pay tribute to Xerxes, kicks the emissary
down a bottomless pit in the center of Sparta herself. The king, still sweating from a
wrestling match that ended not a minute prior, warns the messenger that “Spartans have a
reputation to consider,” and forty-five seconds later he exclaims loudly, “this is Sparta!”
and proceeds to draw his sword and kick the messenger down the pit while Spartan
bystanders join in to liquidate the rest of the emissary’s party.6 One is left with the image
of a warrior king ever prepared for battle, short tempered, and fearless in the face of a
threat. King Leonidas does what Spartan reputation demands: he violently decides upon
war. 7
5
By and large the image it gives of Spartan society is a dramatic idealization. See Cartledge,
"Another View,” n.p. Also Ephraim, "Sparta? No. This is madness," n.p.
6
Miller, 300 #1. n.p.
7
One might suspect that this action is what is most indicative of militaristic behavior in the scene
in question, but Herodotus suggests that both the Athenians and the Spartans really did cast
Darius’ heralds into a pit. Therefore, while possibly interpreted as evidence for militarism, it may
in fact have been politically motivated-a way to match their Athenian rivals. See Purvis,
Landmark Herodotus, 539.
6
This understanding is tremendously problematic because it has repercussions both
for how we generally think about Sparta and for how we read about Sparta. Intuitively,
we should want to approximate historical truth in the study of classical history.
Moreover, this false conception instills a one-dimensional understanding of classical
Sparta, one that depicts Spartans as war-crazed. Therefore, failure to recognize the
dynamic nature of Spartan society, given the pivotal role Sparta played in the ancient
world, has implications for how we understand the classical period and the phenomenon
of the polis.
This conception of militarism acts as a distorting lens through which we read
staple authors, notably Herodotus and Thucydides, forcing us to wrongly transplant
militarism into their work. When reading Thucydides, for instance, many are quick to
claim that at times he is “buying into” a false-conception about Spartans.8 A closer
analysis of the text in accordance with considerations of historical circumstances,
however, reveals that this is not the case. We should not, therefore, think that
Thucydides intends to propagate the aforementioned false-conception. While there are,
no doubt, authors to whom this false conception can be attributed, Herodotus and
Thucydides perhaps should not be counted among them.
II The scholarly field concerned with debunking inaccurate understandings about
Sparta in general is known as the Spartan Mirage. While the Spartan Mirage is a
relatively young field of study and has only just taken off in the past two decades or so, it
contains a wealth of original research. This research has been largely successful in
8
Luraghi, "Thucydides and Spartan Power," 186-89. Luraghi suggests in his treatment on
political dynamics in Thucydides that while a superficial analysis suggests Thucydides was
“under the spell of the Spartan Mirage,” an in-depth analysis shows that he made a conscious
effort to avoid such false conceptions.
7
eroding the skewed understandings that have persisted for nearly two and a half
millennia.
Generally speaking, the Spartan Mirage is the notion that our understanding of
Spartan society is distorted. Upon its inception the Spartan Mirage alluded to a much
more specific historical concern. First posited by Francois Ollier in the 1930’s, the
Spartan Mirage (‘le mirage spartiate’) is a claim about how Greco-Roman Antiquity
idealized Sparta.9 Ollier’s concern was mainly that the authors of antiquity had offered a
largely inaccurate account of Spartan history, one that depicted Sparta as a purely
military society, with little consideration paid to other no less significant features of the
Spartan world. Ollier’s work focused on the extent to which these ancient authors
idealized Sparta as a sort of military utopia. These original Laconophiles include Plato,
Xenophon and Plutarch, figures of antiquity whose writings point to a marked
approbation for Sparta.10 The goal of the Spartan Mirage, then, was to call into question
the validity of the ancient sources, reasonably calling into question other classical sources
such as Aristotle, Herodotus, and Thucydides, from whom we similarly draw many of our
conclusions about Spartan society.11
Though the Spartan Mirage suffered a slight setback in the mid-twentieth century
with the rise of Nazism and the self-identification to the Spartan model made by the
Third Reich, it evolved in the later half of the twentieth century into a more general
9
Ollier, Le mirage spartiate, n.p.
10
Cartledge, "Introduction, ” 2. Both Plato, in his Laws, and Plutarch, in Parallel Lives, are
largely considered to be inspirations for this idealization.
11
Aristotle’s blatant dislike for Spartan society is by no means a new theme. Therefore, while one
cannot claim that he idealizes Sparta, he remains a source of information on Spartan society. For
a brief treatment of Aristotle’s criticism of Spartan institutions prior to the inception of the
Spartan Mirage see Sihler, "Aristotle's Criticisms of the Spartan Government," 439-43.
8
critique of both positive and negative idealizations of classical Sparta.12 This resurgence
was coupled both by the emergence of archaeological evidence that supported aspects of
the Spartan Mirage as well Elizabeth Rawson’s invaluable work on how distorted
understandings about Sparta have evolved over time.13 Therefore, what follows delves
into more recent work within the Spartan Mirage and its relevance to the question of
militarism.
Generally speaking, the specific branch of the Spartan Mirage with which this
thesis is concerned is associated with the inception of the International Sparta Seminar, a
series of annual conferences and publications started by Stephen Hodkinson and Anton
Powell that attempts to sift through the historical validity of the aforementioned positive
and negative idealizations. Of particular note to my research are the volumes, Sparta:
Comparative Approaches (2009), Sparta and War (2006), Spartan Society (2004), the
unaffiliated but related Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta (2009) by Hodkinson,
and The Shadow of Sparta (1994) edited by both Hodkinson and Powell. Each of these
volumes includes a collection of essays that address the historical validity of the ancient
textual or archeological sources as they relate to the titular question. Also worth noting
are Geoffrey de Ste. Croix and Paul Cartledge, the invaluable work of whom engages in
similar criticisms of false-conception of Spartan society. I maintain, however, that the
treatment within this thesis subscribes to the approach held by Hodkinson and Powell
more so than Ste. Croix or Cartledge, as the latter two argue in favor of retaining certain
perspectives on Spartan society that the former associate with a distorted understanding.14
12
Hodkinson, “Was Classical Sparta a Military Society?” 115-29.
13
Rawson, The Spartan Tradition, n.p. Rawson’s treatment of Spartan perception over time is an
invaluable source for understanding how dynamic and varied these understandings really were.
14
Hodkinson, introduction, xvi.
9
Hodkinson offers a roughly similar treatment to my own in Was Classical Sparta
a Military Society? (2006). While he touches on many of the same questions of textual
interpretation, he is largely concerned with the extent to which the various facets of
Spartan society were designed or modeled around a general military purpose. That is to
say, he analyzes the extent to which certain institutions or practices were indicative of a
state that was concerned almost exclusively with its military institutions. Therefore, all
other facets of Spartan society ought to exist for the benefit of these institutions. He
concludes ultimately that they did not. That being said, Hodkinson’s account does not
narrow in specifically on the nature of Sparta’s decisions to go to war, so while his
treatment is tremendously helpful, it acts only as a starting point from which I try to
address the problem of analyzing the militaristic nature of Sparta’s war decisions.15
I propose a two-pronged approach to solving the aforementioned problem. The
first horn of this approach is an in-depth textual analysis of the works of Herodotus and
Thucydides, notably those sections that address the decision to go to war, with the goal of
highlighting the extent to which the decision was militaristic.16 Because there are no
primary sources that survive from Sparta written by Spartans (save for a paltry number of
inscriptions), any account of the historical circumstances will rely primarily upon the
works of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle, supplemented by the
16
An earlier version of this thesis included an analysis of the extent to which this is the case in
Xenophon’s Anabasis. It was ultimately removed because I felt that pointing to decisions in the
Anabasis that were not indicative of militarism would not contribute to the notion that we
wrongly impose this false conception upon ancient sources. Xenophon is rightly thought to be an
originator of this false conception in some capacity, so any treatment of this kind would not carry
much weight.
10
later work of Plutarch. The goal then is to draw sufficient evidence from both these
sources in favor of the notion that Spartans did not go to war for war’s sake.
The second horn of this approach involves an in-depth account of what reasons Sparta did
actually provide, if not militaristic ones, for going to war. Furthermore, it turns to what
reasons do we have to think that militarism, in itself, was fundamentally incompatible
with Spartan character.
A comprehensive analytical treatment of every decision to go to war found in
Herodotus or Thucydides would go well beyond the scope of this essay. Therefore, this
thesis will focus upon what I maintain to be those decisions that are typically perceived to
be highly indicative of militarism. For Thucydides, this decision is found in the Spartan
vote in Book One of the History of the Peloponnesian War, wherein the Spartans vote on
whether or not to enter into war with Athens. I am choosing this scene because of the
considerable amount of literature that has been devoted towards breaking down how
Thucydides means for his reader to understand Spartan character; there is a sense in
which Thucydides tries to speak to Spartan character in this particular scene.17 I will,
therefore, attempt to construct an analysis of the text that demonstrates the extent to
which this depiction of Spartan character is not in line with militarism.
For Herodotus, this decision is found in the choice to remain at Thermopylae in
Book Seven of the Histories. I am making this decision not by virtue of the quantity of
scholarly treatment, though significant, but because of the general legend that surrounds
this scene. The story of the last stand at Thermopylae is possibly one of the most well
known military last stands of all time. Its treatment in popular culture is immense,
17
Tigerstedt, The Legend of Sparta, 128-129. Hodkinson, “Was Classical Sparta a Military
Society?” 119.
11
having been subject to numerous books, films, poems, etc.18 Therefore, the argument that
it is not, after all, indicative of militarism, will have greater weight than other lesser
known scenes.
III This thesis is divided into four chapters. The goal of this brief section is to
explain what each Chapter entails.
The purpose of Chapters One and Two is to offer an in-depth textual analysis of
the works of Herodotus and Thucydides respectively, notably those sections that address
the decision to go to war, with the goal of highlighting the extent to which militarism is
not present. Therefore, in Chapter Two I look at the extent to which Thucydides, in the
Spartan vote in Book I, believes the Spartan decision was militaristic with reference to
Spartan enthusiasm for war. It argues that the vote to go to war was formatted in such a
way as to sway the outcome. Furthermore, there is no reason to think that the apparent
militarism the scene demonstrates is, according to Thucydides, a unique Spartan feature.
In Chapter Two I look at the extent to which Herodotus characterizes the Spartan
decision to remain at Thermopylae as militaristic in reference to deference to war. It
argues that the Spartans did not remain at Thermopylae out of a sense of military
deference, but out of a sense of moral obligation. We have no reason to think that
Herodotus believed this sense of obligation was uniquely Sparta. And finally, the
reasoning underlying the decision to remain is unrelated to militarism.
The purpose of Chapter Three is to offer an in-depth account of what reasons
Sparta did actually provide, if not militaristic ones, for going to war. Therefore, Chapter
Three approaches this account at the institutional level, analyzing the extent to which the
18
I could not even attempt to create an exhaustive list of examples. A quick Internet search of
“Thermopylae” reveals the extent to which this is the case.
12
institutions of Spartan society, outside its military institutions, were indicative of
militarism. It argues that an analysis of the roles and workings of Sparta’s institutions
reveals that their behavior was far from militaristic. Rather, when they decided to go to
war they did so out of their own varied political, economic, or religious interests, not out
of an exaltation of military virtues or ideals. One might argue that Sparta’s institutions
are not indicative of larger social militarism, which is why Chapter Four offers a brief
treatment on the extent to which Spartan character was incompatible with militarism; it
should not be considered the case that the Spartan populace exalted military virtue.
Therefore, the reader should take away the following notion: Classical Sparta was
not a monolith. It was, like many other poleis, a highly dynamic society, one comprised
of men and women with very much the same worries, ambitions, and fears as one might
expect to find elsewhere. Generally speaking, when Sparta decided upon war it did not
do so militaristically, giving us no reason to think that Spartans were in any hurry to
sacrifice their lives for war and the glory it might offer. By engaging the narrow question
of militarism, I hope to contribute to a discipline that has fundamentally altered the way
we understand classical Sparta today.
13
Thucydides Book One: Analyzing Sparta’s Military Enthusiasm in the Vote
for War
In Book One of his history of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides depicts a scene
during which Sparta formally declares war against the growing Athenian superpower
(1.79-87). The staple features of this scene are the speeches given by Archidamus, a
Spartan King, and Sthenelaidas, an Ephor, respectively. Thucydides holds that before
these speeches were given the Spartans had decided, after hearing from both the
Corinthians and Athenians, upon war against Athens. At the same time, however,
Thucydides alludes to the possibility that in the instant war was declared Sthenelaidas
intentionally skewed the voting process through means of a non-anonymous, standing
vote. In other words, Thucydides points to a certain degree of hesitation and political
conflict in the decision made amongst the Spartans. It may be worthwhile, then, to
further analyze Thucydides' illustration of Spartan military enthusiasm in light of his
decision to highlight this specific instance. To this end, this chapter aims to answer the
following questions: How does Thucydides define what is and is not considered a facet of
Spartan military ideology at certain key moments? And, why does Thucydides pick this
specific scene to go about doing so?
I A vital moment for the sake of defining Thucydides' perception of Spartan
military ideology is that in which Sthenelaidas calls for a standing rather than oral vote
14
amongst the Spartans and the decision to go to war is subsequently pronounced.
Militarism assumes that Spartans are accordingly eager for any and all military
opportunities, delighting in the prospect of engaging in battle. At the same time, the way
in which Sthenelaidas goes about procuring the Spartan vote for war might suggest an
alternative interpretation of Sparta’s military ideology. Therefore, Thucydides challenges
the notion that the Spartans are enthusiastic for war, pointing to the appearance of
military enthusiasm in this particular moment as a consequence of deception, not
militarism.
The notion that the Spartans are enthusiastic for war stems in part from Spartan
traditions associated with song and libation. One such poem recorded by Tyrtaeus reads,
For 'tis a fair thing for a good man to fall and die fighting in the van for his
native land... let us fight with a will for this land, and die for our children and
never spare our lives. (Lycurg, Leocr. 107, 1-2, 9-10) 19
This passage suggests that the Spartans consider death in battle, amongst all other
alternatives, to be the most glorious passing a Spartan might achieve – the military, ideal
way to die. Certainly, then, when faced with the option of going to war, according to this
passage, a Spartan would be compelled to pursue it for glory's sake, choosing to fight
rather than to spare his own life in peace. On those traditions emerging from the Spartan
constitution itself, Xenophon points to the penalties associated with cowardice. He holds
that the constitution was framed in such a way that those who cower from war are held in
disgrace, socially ostracized from their fellow Spartans.20 One might conclude, then, that
19
Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus, Lycurg. 1-2, 9-10.
20
Dillon and Garland, Documents, 6.15, 9.1-6. Ostracism is not to be taken literally, as it refers to
an exclusion from Spartan institutions such as the messes, political office, and at times citizenship
(e.g. the battle of Sphakteria - 13.11 Thucy. 4.27-28.5, 38.5-39.9.)
15
the Spartans who, when faced with possible disgrace should their unwillingness to go to
war become apparent, voted for war following Sthenelaidas' call for an standing vote did
so out of this fear of social ostracism. Upon being forced to stand, to make his vote
public, no man would, in accordance with this reasoning, vote against war.21 Also,
Xenophon was an Athenian. Therefore, one might assume that Thucydides, also an
Athenian and a contemporary of Xenophon, understood this cultural perception, this
virtue of Spartan courage. This does not imply, however, that he believed it was a
definitive and practiced part of Spartan military ideology overall. What follows, then,
addresses another possible facet of Spartan military ideology, deceit.
A number of authors, among them Aristophanes and Xenophon, allude to this
notion of Spartan deceitfulness in their own writings. In Peace, Aristophanes depicts the
Spartans as tricksters, frequently comparing them to sly foxes and wolves. Furthermore,
this is not traditionally viewed, he holds, as one of the Spartans' better qualities. He
alludes to a number of characters in Acharnians, Peace, and Lysistrata who are depicted
as deceitful, and all of whom act as hindrances to the protagonist. Furthermore, these
characters are considered warlike; the choruses of old men found in Lysistrata, for
example, illustrate this implicit, associative relationship between deceit and warlike
behavior.22 This allusion might suggest that where there is deceit involved, it is usually
used for the purpose of inciting military action. Xenophon alludes to those practices in
the agoge that taught Spartan boys to be deceitful. This notion of deceit goes hand in
hand with preparing boys to be more "warlike."23 This notion, consequently, becomes
21
While the final vote for war was not unanimous, Thucydides notes that it was a decided
majority (1.87)
22
Harvey, "Lacomica,” 38-39.
23
Dillon and Garland, Documents, 6.49, 2.1-8.
16
cemented in these young boys' minds, implying that they are defined as such in their later
years in service to Sparta both as soldiers and state leaders. Therefore, deceit was not
necessarily perceived by the Spartans to be an evil. Rather, it was a Spartan privilege to
be admired by virtue of their freedom to do so as granted by their constitution.24 The
two aforementioned authors, however, were Athenian. Therefore, Thucydides likely
adopted this notion of deceit, and, as will be discussed shortly, applied it accordingly.
Having now established the role deceit might play in Spartan military ideology, this paper
turns to analyzing how Thucydides characterizes the ideology behind this moment.
Thucydides points to this deceitfulness in his depiction as the single possible facet
of Spartan military ideology behind Sthenelaidas' decision to skew the vote and influence
the subsequent decision. Within the narrative itself, Thucydides states that Sthenelaidas
claimed he could not distinguish whether the oral vote was overall for war, and as such,
he required each voter to literally rise and move to a certain spot that was designated for
or against it. His thinking, however, was quite different:
ἀλλὰ βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς φανερῶς ἀποδεικνυμένους τὴν γνώμην

ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν μᾶλλον ὁρμῆσαι.
wanting to make the Spartans declare themselves openly and urge them on more
effectively to war. (1.87.2) 25
Thucydides' notion of deceit, itself not too dissimilar from those articulated earlier, holds
that Spartans often think one thing and say or do another. Sthenelaidas is doing exactly
that, thinking that a standing vote will incite this false eagerness and saying, essentially,
24
Harvey, "Lacomica," 285. Plutarch points to the alleged slogan, "no word goes beyond those
doors" (Lyk.12). Also, "When someone accused a Spartan of lying, he replied: 'that's right. We
are free men..." (Plut. Mor. 234f).
25
Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides: Books I - III, 131.
17
that he hasn't the best ear.26 I stipulated earlier that a fear of social ostracism might have
prompted the voters to vote yes; Sthenelaidas was counting on this fear. If this is the case
then it suggests that the Spartans were not initially set upon war, as Sthenelaidas felt the
need to deceive them, to make their votes public, in order to incite this eagerness. This
next section, then, addresses the question of whether or not this notion of military
enthusiasm is displayed by either of the two speakers in question.
II This paper moves now to the speeches of Archidamus and Sthenelaidas
respectively. Thucydides asserts that immediately following the speech given by the
Athenian emissary, the Spartans had already decided upon war:
καὶ τῶν μὲν πλεόνων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αἱ γνῶμαι ἔφερον, ἀδικεῖν τε τοὺς
Ἀθηναίους ἤδη καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι ἐν τάχει.27
The opinions of the majority all led to the same conclusion; the Athenians were
open aggressors, and war must be declared at once. (1.79.2)28
He offers no evidence, however, to support this claim; there is nothing resembling an
early vote, and if there was he chose to exclude it. Therefore, it is possible that he
included this stipulation for the sake of setting up the aforementioned speeches in an
attempt to further demonstrate how an eagerness for battle was innately anti-Spartan.
Thucydides' depiction of Archidamus points to a picture of Spartan military
ideology built upon a degree of calculated reasoning. It should be noted that Archidamus
was not entirely against the prospect of war with Athens, only against the rashness with
26
Bradford, "The duplicitous Spartan," 71.
27
28
Crawley, The Peloponnesian War, 1.79.2.
18
which the Spartans wanted to proceed. He argues, rather, that the Spartans should
exhaust possible diplomatic solutions before declaring war:
ἀλλὰ ὅπλα μὲν μήπω κινεῖν,πέμπειν δὲ καὶ αἰτιᾶσθαι.
But do not take up arms yet. Let us first send and complain to them. (1.82.1)29
The reasons Archidamus might argue as such are twofold. First, he asserts (1.84.1) that
the Spartans must exercise βράδυ (‘slowness’) when considering such an issue.30 The
Spartan sense of discipline that emerges by virtue of their military training fosters this
notion; a slow, calculated approach towards war is, or should be considered, inherently
Spartan.31 At the same time, however, he urges the Spartans to prepare for war
nonetheless:
κάν τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐξαρτύεσθαι.
we should make our own preparations. (182.1)32
This preparation does not refer, however, to mobilization, but rather, to fundraising, as
Sparta lacked the financial means by which, according to Archidamus, they might
successfully challenge the Athenian superpower. It is worth noting that military
preparation should be considered a staple military virtue. Therefore, if we are to think
that Archidamus’ proposal is indicative of Spartan military ideology, then we might think
29
30
31
Wassermann, "The Speeches of King Archidamus,” 195-196. This approach may, however,
have run counter to Spartan military success, as it led to missed military opportunities (1.8.96, 5).
32
Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides: Books I - III, 127 Hornblower points out that
Archidamus' assertion that the Spartan finances were inadequate at the time is historically
accurate (Greek World, 101, 127).
19
that this is a sign of militarism. If that is the case, however, then it only supports the
notion that the decision to go to war was not militaristic, as the Spartan vote is ultimately
against Archidamus. That being said, I talked earlier about how the nature of the
standing vote might have skewed the results, leading the Spartans to a decision that they
otherwise would not have made - in this case, to decide upon war while unprepared.
Could it be said, therefore, that the Spartans, generally speaking, exalt military
preparedness? That the Spartans were not prepared for war with Athens might suggest
that they did not exalt this military virtue. It is not as though the Athenian superpower
simply appeared one day, but rather it had grown slowly over time. Therefore, that
Sparta did not adequately equip itself in light of the emergence of the Athenian
hegemony might speak against military preparedness as a facet of Spartan military
ideology.
The second reason, then, as to why Archidamus argues for an alternative solution
is that he is aware of the eagerness for battle inherent in the young Spartans, a feature
distinct from what Thucydides considers to be definitively Spartan, and proposes a
diplomatic solution with the possibility in mind that should no peace be possible it would
still allow the Spartans time to adequately prepare for the inevitable confrontation.33
What follows is Thucydides' case that Sthenelaidas' speech, itself arguing for immediate
military response, is not in line with Spartan military ideology.
Sthenelaidas' speech, then, unlike that of Archidamus, appeals to the Spartans'
emotions rather than their reason. While his speech is primarily a response to that given
by the Athenians, it does respond to Archidamus' to a point, addressing the
aforementioned notion of slowness, or delay:

33
Wassermann, "The Speeches of King Archidamus in Thucydides," 195
20
οὐδὲ μελλήσομεν τιμωρεῖν: οἱ δ᾽ οὐκέτι μέλλουσι κακῶς πάσχειν.
we will not... put off [lit. 'delay'] helping them, for they cannot put off their
troubles. (1.86.2) 34
He turns the question of slowness away from declaring war against Athens to aiding their
allies, making the question more about prompt allied support than open war against
Athens. As such, he appeals to the audiences' sympathy; he essentially urges them to
help those who cannot help themselves. His careful choice of words, “ἀγαθοί “(1.86.3)
and “ἀξίως “(1.86.5), further moralizes his case, in which case their repetition serves that
end.35 His goal, one may infer, was to reignite whatever moral indignations were
apparent prior to Archidamus' speech, hoping to invigorate the Spartans with a sense of
military eagerness that was otherwise dissipated by Archidamus' traditional Spartan
approach. Why exactly Sthenelaidas sought to challenge Archidamus and traditional
Spartan military ideology, however, will come up in the following section of this paper.
The question remains, however, as to why Thucydides believes one speaker
represents what is typically considered in line with a Spartan military ideology and
another does not. One might argue that there is, perhaps, a change in the notion itself, a
shift from a traditional ideology towards the ideology preached by Sthenelaidas. The
answer might be found in Archidamus' case for caution in aiding their allies:
μόνοι γὰρ δι᾽αὐτὸ εὐπραγίαις τε οὐκ ἐξυβρίζομεν καὶ ξυμφοραῖς

ἧσσον ἑτέρων εἴκομεν.
34
35
Smith, The Peloponnesian War, 146. In the context of “brave” allies (186.3). “Deserving or
befitting' the dignity of Sparta” (1.86.5). See Allison, June, "Sthenelaidas' Speech," 12,14.
21
it is a policy which has saved us from growing insolent in prosperity or giving
way under adversity, like other men. (1.84.2)36
He argues against rushing to the aid of their allies without careful thought and for the sole
purpose of satisfying their own vanity and their own desires for glory and success. The
reason this is so vital is that it serves in opposition to what he holds are Athenian, or
generally non-Spartan, characteristics. Athens is thus insolent by virtue of their military
success, as they go to war for vanity's sake. 37 For that reason, the Spartans must be
different, must maintain their military ideology. This is not to say, as will be discussed
shortly, that the two states always act consistently as opposites, only that Archidamus is,
in this instance and according to Thucydides, a paragon of Spartan military leadership.
III There is no evidence to place Thucydides in Sparta at the time at which these
speeches were given. Therefore, the goal here is to discern why Thucydides might have
chosen to include this specific scene in his critique of Spartan military ideology, to
pinpoint what made this instance so vital to this end. The parallel that emerges in light of
the Sicilian Expedition of Book VI suggests that Thucydides presented much of the
content up to this point as what the characters ought to have said in accordance with his
critique, as I shall hope to show below.
Both the instance in question and the debates preceding the Sicilian Expedition
mark the beginning of two separate phases in the war. The first phase, the Archidamian,
was defined by Spartan invasions into Attic territory. The second phase was itself
36
Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides: Books I - III, 128. This policy is one of
‘σωφροσύνη,' prudence, (1.84.2) in light of military success or failure.
37
Wassermann, "The Speeches of King Archidamus in Thucydides," 195, 196. "Ruthless
ambition," "self-assured pride of the Athenians."
22
defined by the aforementioned expedition. Alcibiades, the Athenian statesmen and
general, makes the same case for war as offered previously by Sthenelaidas:
ἐπειδή γε καὶ ξυνωμόσαμεν.
we have sworn to help them. (6.18.1) 38
The priority, again, lies in the allies who have appealed to the regional power, Athens in
this case, for aid. One may posit that Thucydides made this notion of aiding their allies a
staple aspect of each speech for the purpose of highlighting these parallel appeals.
Similarly, Nicias, also an Athenian statesmen and general, argues against haste:
ὥστε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ηὐξῆσθαι.
so as to recruit our strength both in money and in men. (6.12.1) 39
Again, the case is not made entirely against war, only against immediate declaration and
mobilization on the grounds that the state lacks sufficient resources.40 One may surmise,
then, that Thucydides chose these two strikingly similar scenes to demonstrate how each
state reacts, or would have reacted in accordance with their respective military ideologies,
when faced with similar situations. What follows, then, is why Thucydides depicts these
four speakers as he does.
38
Hornblower, Simon, A Commentary on Thucydides: Books 5.25-8.109, 350. “them” are the
Egesta.
39
Smith, The Peloponnesian War: Books V and VI, 204.
40
Westlake, "Nicias in Thucydides," 61. Thucydides disagrees with Nicias' assertion that the state
is ill-prepared for war (6.26.2), suggesting he is not a complete parallel of Archidamus, whom
Thucydides appears to hold in higher regard.
23
The parallel offered by the Sicilian Expedition points to a repeating notion of
political conflict between the two pairs of focal speakers. This notion is perhaps best
demonstrated by Thucydides' depiction of Alcibiades' political relation to Nicias:
ὢν καὶ ἐς τἆλλα διάφορος τὰ πολιτικὰ.
who was always his political enemy. (6.15.2) 41
Thucydides point to a rivalry between the two speakers, suggesting that much of what he
credits them with saying is likely shaped to adhere to this fact.42 Therefore, Alcibiades'
case for war was less perhaps out of his own warmongering insomuch as it was an
attempt to challenge Nicias. If in fact this urgency on Alcibiades' part to go to war was
politically inspired, how might the earlier situation at Sparta be perceived as parallel?
This answer lies in how the speakers appeal to their respective audiences. Both Nicias
and Archidamus are depicted as having appealed to reason, both well aware of the glory
and fame young men associated with military incursions; yet still, they urge patience:
ὥστε μήτε ἀπειρίᾳ ἐπιθυμῆσαί τινα τοῦ ἔργου,ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ πάθ
οιεν (1.80.1) ... καίτοι ἔγωγε καὶ τιμῶμαι ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου.
41
Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides: Books 5.25-8.109, 338.
42
Westlake, H D, "Nicias in Thucydides," 61. Nicias may have only agreed to lead the expedition
despite his reservations as a result of this rivalry (Cohen, op. cit 233) though it is more likely he
feared further damaging his reputation at home.
24
no one of them, therefore, is eager for war through lack of experience, as would
be the case with most men... and yet I get honour from this sort of thing'
(1.80.1, 6.9.2)43
The reason they fail, then, is that they address the virtues held by the older members of
their audience. 44 Granted, if both make a similar case, is Nicias, then, acting like a
Spartan? At the same time, Sthenelaidas and Alcibiades appeal to emotion, and while
Thucydides offers nothing that directly states that Sthenelaidas was out to ingratiate his
name, his argument, or rather pandering, for war would no doubt ingratiate himself with
the lust for war Archidamus articulates just prior to his speech. Therefore, is
Sthenelaidas acting like an Athenian, in accordance with what Archidamus previously
argued? One may conclude, then, that political ambitions and subsequent discourse are
largely responsible for instilling an eagerness for battle insofar as this is what Thucydides
depicts. If this is in fact the case, what follows addresses the possibility that any notions
of Spartan or Athenian military ideology are strictly nominal.
The two previous discussions in this section point, then, to a larger picture,
namely, a notion that the facets of military ideology that have been the focus of this
chapter up to this point are universal. This is evident in Nicias' declaration that no one
who is against the war ought to vote for it to maintain his or her own appearance, to bend
to social pressures and μὴ καταισχυνθῆναι, ‘not to be ashamed’ (6.13.1).45 As
43
Smith, History of The Peloponnesian War: Books I and II, 134. Archidamus refers to the men
of his own generation in the audience. Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides: Books 5.25-
8.109, 325. This is the “honor” that comes from leading a military expedition.
44
Wassermann, "The Speeches of King Archidamus in Thucydides," 195.
45
Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides: Books 5.25-8.109, 335. This alludes to the fear of
appearing a coward to their fellow Athenians should they agree the expedition to be impractical
25
previously discussed, Thucydides holds that Sthenelaidas called for a non-anonymous
vote with the intention that such a vote would compel people to vote for the war; they
would vote out of fear of being thought a coward. Nicias recognizes this to be a common
problem, as the Athenians appear to be just as prone. After Alcibiades speaks, Nicias
makes a second plea to the Athenians. This plea, however, is a ploy of deceit. He
stresses the magnitude of military force needed to secure a victory in hopes of
discouraging the Athenians:
οὐ ναυτικῆς καὶ φαύλου στρατιᾶς μόνον δεῖ.
more is needed than an insignificant naval force. (6.21.1) 46
His plan backfires:
πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ὥρμηντο.
they were more eager than ever. (6.24.2) 47
Nicias tells the Athenians he is in support of the war if all the necessary, and
uncommonly extensive, preparations are made, while at the same time intending for them
to forfeit their eagerness in light of the seemingly impossible task ahead. One may
conclude, then, that Thucydides chose these two scenes to demonstrate that the facets of
'military ideology' associated with each state are, in the end, common human traits.
46
Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides: Books 5.25-8.109, 357.
47
Ibid., 360. Hornblower notes that while it may seem odd to send Nicias, having just protested
against the war, in command of the expedition, (26.1) it could be that his hesitation, his apparent
humility, perhaps, served as a counter to Athenian impiety scandals
26
The discussion up to this point suggests that Thucydides was trying to highlight
an entirely different set of qualities inherent in all military ideologies. Amongst these are
fear and ambition, two qualities that Thucydides' speakers, no doubt by virtue of their
being human and further attesting to his skill as an historian, possess. Therefore, we
should not think that, according to Thucydides, militarism, understood as a marked
eagerness or enthusiasm for war, is in line with Spartan military ideology. Therefore,
what follows in the following chapter addresses the passive type of militarism posited in
my Introduction, narrowing in upon Leonidas’ last stand at Thermopylae.
27
Herodotus Book Seven: Reconsidering Military Deference at Thermopylae
In Book Seven of the Histories Herodotus describes the reasoning underlying
Leonidas’ decision not to abandon Thermopylae upon learning of Ephialtes’ treachery
(7.219-234). Herodotus condones the decision to fight, and it is the praise of this
sacrifice that is so often interpreted as proof that Herodotus recognizes the unique
militarism that is definitive of Spartan behavior in the eyes of some.48 However,
Herodotus’ account for Leonidas’ reasoning is not so simple, as he notes a number of
external factors that conceivably weighed upon Leonidas’ decision to remain. It will,
therefore, be worthwhile to explore the extent to which Herodotus offers the type of
praise that is so often interpreted as indicative of supporting a militaristic conception of
Spartan behavior. To this end, this chapter aims to answer the following questions: What
allegedly militaristic characteristic is it exactly that Herodotus seems to be praising in the
Spartans? And, what reasons do we have to think that, in fact, this characteristic is not
intended to be a reflection of Spartan militarism?
48
See discussion on 300 film and militarism in Introduction. Also see Chapter Four for the
implicit connection between militarism and the notion of a “beautiful death.”
28
I Unlike the scene in the Chapter One, there is no apparent hesitation among the
Spartans in their decision to remain at Thermopylae. Herodotus presents his reader with
resolute Spartan men, who are set in their decision to die. However, the degree to which
he is praising them for their militarism, and their decision to remain for the reward of war
itself, ought to be considered contentious. Therefore, this section looks to identify what
characteristic it is, precisely, that Herodotus holds in such high regard.
Herodotus notes the composure and wit of the Spartans in the face of their
inevitable doom. He highlights Leonidas’ composure upon allowing the allied Greeks to
leave:
ταύτῃ καὶ μᾶλλον τὴν γνώμην πλεῖστος εἰμί, Λεωνίδην, ἐπείτε

ᾔσθετο τοὺς συμμάχους ἐόντας ἀπροθύμους καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας
συνδιακινδυνεύειν,κελεῦσαι σφέας ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι, αὐτῷ δὲ ἀπιέναι
οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν: μένοντι δὲ αὐτοῦ κλέος μέγα ἐλείπετο.
I, however, tend to believe that when Leonidas perceived that the allies were
dispirited and unwilling to run all risks with him, he told then to depart. For
himself, however, it was not good to leave; if he remained, he would leave a name
of great fame. (7.220.2)49
Faced with such impossible odds, Leonidas, having already elected to remain, might have
entreated his allies to stay in order to increase the odds of survival or delay the inevitable.
However, Leonidas, aware that the allies want to leave, simply allows them to do so.
Without objection, he accepts his fate, and rather than risking the lives of others he
calmly allows the allies to leave, showing no signs of the fearful pleading that one might
otherwise expect. That being said, he is cognizant of the glory that comes with such a
49
Godley, Histories, 7.220.2.
29
sacrifice. Therefore, seeing that his allies are afraid, he does not bother trying to reassure
them. He wants to keep the glory for his own name. In this way, he acts rather selfishly -
hardly an object of praise, particularly in the military sphere. Granted one might argue
that this selfish desire for glory, which is so extreme that he refuses to share it with the
allies, is in fact a mark of militarism, for he pursues battle because he values the military
ideal of glory in battle. However, Herodotus’ use of κλέος suggests that this is not the
case. He is aware of how his death would affect his name or story into perpetuity, but he
does not seem to pursue glory, understood as a military ideal, for glory in and if itself, but
rather he pursues it for his own sake or his name’s sake. In other words, he does not exalt
military glory but the notion that this sacrifice will benefit his memory; glory here is the
means, not the end. Therefore, even if Herodotus is praising Leonidas’ composure in the
face of death, this composure is not a mark of militarism.
Herodotus’ most famous reference to Spartan wit comes in the form of Dienekes’
clever response to a Trachinian’s warning about the Persian missile barrage. Dienekes
says in a speech before the Greeks that his response to this warning was the following:
εἰ ἀποκρυπτόντων τῶν Μήδων τὸν ἥλιον ὑπὸ σκιῇ ἔσοιτο πρὸς

αὐτοὺς ἡ μάχη καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἡλίῳ.
If the Medes hid the sun, they could fight them in the shade instead of in the sun.
(7.226.2).50
He means to suggest that the Medic missile/arrow barrage will provide shade for the
Greeks to fight under, granting them relief from the hot Greek sun. Furthermore,
50
30
Herodotus praises this instance of courageous behavior (7.226.1).51 Like composure in
the face of death, Laconic wit could be treated as a staple militaristic, Spartan
characteristic. It reflects an enthusiasm for war insofar as the playfulness of laconic wit
suggests not only that the Spartans were composed in the face of death and battle but that
they delighted in and enjoyed the prospect of the coming battle. Insofar as Dienekes’
joke is concerned, it humorously implies that the Spartans were, in fact, looking forward
to the battle, as it would offer them relief from the sun. It is not clear, however, that
Herodotus draws any connection between Laconic wit and militarism. Herodotus offers
numerous examples of Laconic wit in the Histories.52 However, he gives us little reason
to think that this wit is a virtue of Sparta’s military ideology, having said almost nothing
about Spartan military education. In contrast to the notion that Spartans are simple-
headed, narrow-minded military machines, Plato maintains that the Spartans are in fact
very clever, and one should not be inclined to think that Spartan education is devoid of
training in rhetoric and philosophy.53 If Herodotus agrees with Plato, then we should be
hesitant to draw any connection between Laconic wit and militarism, as one should not
confuse their natural tendency to jest with an eagerness for battle. Many of the other
witty expressions from Thermopylae do not come from Herodotus but from Simonides
and ultimately figures like Plutarch, including the latter’s report of a saying made famous
by its association with the battle, Μολὼν λαβέ (‘come and take them!’) (Apoph. 51.11).54
Therefore, while Plutarch’s proclivity to include Laconic wit in military situations might
point to an association between wit and enthusiasm for war, the same cannot be
51
Ibid., 7.226.1.
52
Godley, Histories, 3.46. The Spartans mock a plea from the Samians, dismissing their analogy
of a bag “wanting” flour.
53
Plato, “Protagoras,” 342b, d-3.
54 Plutarch, Moralia, apoph. 51.1.
31
confidently said of Herodotus. Of course, even if one is to entertain the possibility that
Herodotus believes that telling this joke reflects an excitement for war and a sincere
enthusiasm for the battle ahead, it has no bearing on the actual decision to go to war. In
other words, even if he both praises Spartan wit and sees it as a reflection of the joy the
Spartans find in battle, it cannot be said that the Spartans have chosen to face such a
death because they were witty. Rather, they were witty because they just chose to face
such a death.
II The militaristic characteristic with which Herodotus is concerned is a sense of
obligation. One might argue that he praises the extent to which the decision to remain is
motivated by an obligation to defer to military authority. That is to say, the Spartans
remain at the Hot Gates, choose to fight the Persians despite certain doom, because they
adhere unquestionably to their military command. I maintain, however, that this is a
misconception and that while the Spartans do remain out of a sense of obligation, this
obligation does not stem from militarism. Herodotus states that some believe Leonidas
allows the allies to leave because he did not think it fitting for the Spartans to desert their
post at the Hot-Gates:
αὐτῷ δὲ καὶ Σπαρτιητέων τοῖσι παρεοῦσι οὐκ ἔχειν εὐπρεπέως

ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν τάξιν ἐς τὴν ἦλθον φυλάξοντες ἀρχήν .
but felt it not fitting for himself and the Spartans to desert that post which they
had come to defend at the beginning. (7.220.1)55
Their post is their military assignment. They were sent by Sparta to defend the Hot-Gates,
and they cannot stray from that command regardless of the circumstances. In other
55
32
words, this deferral to military authority, to their assigned post, reflects an unwavering
obligation to the battle at hand.
This notion of obedience or deferral appears again in the epitaph of Simonides
that Herodotus quotes, but we find here reason to doubt that Herodotus is concerned,
specifically, with military authority. The epitaph of Simonides reads:
“ὦ ξεῖν᾽, ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε
κείμεθα τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι” (7.228.2)56
Frank Miller, in his graphic novel 300, provides a translation of this verse that reads:
Go tell the Spartans, passerby, that here
by Spartan law we lie.57
While ῥῆμα translates roughly to ‘something spoken,’ different variations of this epitaph,
including one by Strabo, replace ῥῆμα with νομίμοις (‘comfortable to custom’),
corroborating a translation closer to obedience to law.58 However, there is no reason to
think that Leonidas was legally bound to remain at Thermopylae in light of such
unfavorable odds.59 As such, in an attempt to avoid reading into Herodotus through the
lens of later interpretations, I posit that we should understand ῥῆμα prima facie as
alluding to what the Spartans were told to do – their military orders. I maintain,
therefore, that this epigraph was intended to be sarcastic. Unlike the epitaph to Megistias
(7.228.3), it is written in the first person and, therefore, is meant to be read in the voice of
56
57
Miller, 300 #5, n.p.
58
Macan, Herodotus, 7.228.2. Cicero (Tusc. 1. 42. 101) offers the translation,
“dic hospes Spartae, nos te hic vidisse iacentes, dum sanctis patriae legibus obsequimur.”
59
Grant, "Leonidas' Last Stand," 15.
33
a Spartan. Furthermore, this graphic epitaph is briefer and arguably terser than the
Megistias epitaph, as the former expresses the same information as the latter, albeit in
less words; it tells us who died (the Spartans; Megistias), where they died (we lie here;
Slain by the Medes who crossed the Spercheius river), and why they merit such an honor
(obedient to their commands; The seer knew well his coming doom, / But endured not to
abandon the leaders of Sparta) (7.228.2-3).60 Finally, I noted earlier in this chapter that
Herodotus praises laconic wit. Therefore, the epitaph’s perspective, brevity, and
terseness lend credence to the view that it is another example of laconic wit. This is to
suggest that the Spartans found humorous the idea that military orders would incite them
to undertake such a sacrifice. If anything, the Spartan decision disregards military
authority. The Spartans act in such a way that runs contrary to the interests of their
military. Their defeat, which Herodotus tells us they are sure will come, means the loss
of at least three hundred highly trained Spartan soldiers, the loss of several officers and
captains to be sure, and the loss of a King. None of these, one might assume, are assets
the Spartan military would be keen to lose in a single battle, particularly one that can be
avoided. Therefore, if the Spartans remained out of a sense of obligation, it was not an
obligation to military authority but to their own convictions.
The notion that the Spartans had a tendency to disregard military authority
appears in later authors, such Plutarch, giving credence to the view that the Spartans were
not concerned with military interests when they decided to remain at Thermopylae.
Plutarch says of the tendency of Spartan men to sneak out to see their wives,
καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οὕτως ἔπραττε, τοῖς μὲν ἡλικιώταις συνδιημερεύων

καὶ συναναπαυόμενος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν νύμφην κρύφα μετ᾽ εὐλαβείας
60
Godley, histories, 7.228.2-3.
34
φοιτῶν, αἰσχυνόμενος καὶ δεδοικὼς μή τις αἴσθοιτο τῶν ἔνδον
And so he continued to do from that time on, spending his days with his
comrades, and sleeping with them at night, but visiting his bride by stealth and
with every precaution, full of dread and fear lest any of her household should be
aware of his visits. (Lyc. 15.4)61
He makes it clear that this is by no means an encouraged act, as the couples fear the very
real repercussions of their actions should they be caught. Still, this disregard for military
authority, disregard for the military rules that dictate their sleeping arrangements, speaks
to the argument that the Spartans, despite their military institutions, acted on fairly
universal urges, in this instance, love and lust – and in the other instance, honor.
Granted, one might argue that the aforementioned convictions are definitively,
uniquely Spartan. Herodotus argues that part of the reason Leonidas sends the allies
away is so that the Spartans exclusively might gain the distinction accompanied by the
upcoming massacre:
ταῦτά τε δὴ ἐπιλεγόμενον Λεωνίδην, καὶ βουλόμενον κλέος

καταθέσθαιμούνων Σπαρτιητέων.
Considering this and wishing to win distinction for the Spartans alone.
(7.220.4).62
Therefore, one might argue that it is by virtue of Spartan military training, a consequence
of being told that there is no higher aspiration than to enjoy the virtues of battle, that
Leonidas and his Spartans decide as they do; they, more so than their allies, relish the
opportunity to achieve glory and honor.
61
Perrin, Plutarch's Lives, Lyc. 15.4.
62
35
Herodotus suggests, however, that this obsession with glory and honor is held in
common by all Greeks. He notes in Book Eight, for instance, a conversation between
Tigranes and Mardonius:
‘παπαῖ Μαρδόνιε, κοίους ἐπ᾽ἄνδρας ἤγαγες μαχησομένους ἡμέας, οἳ

οὐ περὶ χρημάτων τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιεῦνται ἀλλὰ περὶ ἀρετῆς.’
“Good heavens, Mardonius, what kind of men are these that you have pitted us
against? It is not for money they contend but for glory of achievement!”(8.26.3).63
This characteristic that Herodotus seems to be praising does not seem to be unique to the
Spartans, as it is held by all Greeks to be a virtue, one which they all strive, when
possible, to put into practice. Of course, the question then emerges as to why it is the
Spartans and not the other Greeks present (save perhaps for the Thespians) that actually
demonstrate this characteristic, that choose to remain to fight. Having up to this point
accounted for the possibly militaristic characteristic that Herodotus praises, what follows
analyses the extent to which Herodotus depicts its exercise to be unique to the Spartans
by virtue of external, non-militaristic factors, not by virtue of their being Spartans.
III This chapter turns now to the reasoning Herodotus maintains is behind the
Spartan decision to remain. Although, as posited in the previous section, Herodotus gives
a picture of the Spartans as having a sense of obligation to remain that is unique amongst
the Greeks in this situation (save for the Thespians), he gives the reader reason to doubt
that this sense of obligation is a consequence of militarism, painting a picture of the
Spartans as having made the decision to act in accordance with a universal Greek virtue
63
36
that others could not have made by virtue of fundamental religious, political, and tactical
circumstances.
Herodotus maintains first and foremost that Leonidas’ decision to remain was in
some capacity influenced by oracular prophecy. He states that at the war’s inception the
Oracle at Delphi had delivered a prophecy to the Spartans that presented them with two
options in the face of the coming Persian invasion. The final verses of the prophecy read
as follows:
ὑμῖν δ᾽, ὦ Σπάρτης οἰκήτορες εὐρυχόροιο, ἢ μέγα ἄστυ ἐρικυδὲς

ὑπ᾽ ἀνδράσι Περσεΐδῃσι πέρθεται, ἢ τὸ μὲν οὐχί, ἀφ᾽ Ἡρακλέους δὲ
γενέθλης πενθήσει βασιλῆ φθίμενον Λακεδαίμονος οὖρος.
“For you, inhabitants of wide-wayed Sparta,

Either your great and glorious city must be wasted by Persian men,
Or if not that, then the bound of Lacedaemon must mourn a dead king, from
Heracles' line.” (7.220.4)64
That is to say, either Sparta falls or a king dies. What he seems to suggest then is that
Leonidas, cognizant of this prophecy, decided that the oncoming, inevitable slaughter
would be the catalyst for his death and a guarantee, therefore, of Spartan perpetuity.
Granted, it is likely that no such prophecy existed and that it was added after the fact.65
That it is not historical truth, however, is irrelevant, as, again, the concern here is the
picture Herodotus presents to us and our tendency to read it through the lens of a
distorted understanding of Spartan decision making.66 Herodotus, it seems, gives
64
65
66
See Flower, ‘“Spartan 'Religion' and Greek 'Religion,’” footnote 1.
37
considerable credence to the impact of this prophecy on Leonidas, and, if we are to lend
credence to the notion that the Spartans were particularly religious or superstitious when
compared to other Greeks, then there might be something to be said for this factor’s
weight on the decision to remain.67
One might argue that Herodotus is inconsistent in asserting that Leonidas strictly
adhered to prophecy, as he leads his forces to the Hot Gates during the Karneia, a festival
dedicated to Apollo:
τούτους μὲν τοὺς ἀμφὶ Λεωνίδην πρώτους ἀπέπεμψαν

Σπαρτιῆται, ἵνατούτους ὁρῶντες οἱ ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι στρατεύωνται
μηδὲ καὶ οὗτοιμηδίσωσι, ἢν αὐτοὺς πυνθάνωνται ὑπερβαλλομένους:
μετὰ δέ, Κάρνεια γάρσφι ἦν ἐμποδών .
The Spartans sent the men with Leonidas on ahead so that the rest of the allies
would see them and march, instead of medizing like the others if they learned that
the Spartans were delaying. At present the Carneia was in their way.
(7.206.1)68
How could it be said that Leonidas is committed to Apollo and would heed Apollo’s
prophecy if he is willing to abandon the Karnea? However, the text suggests that it was
the Spartan state, not Leonidas, which made the decision to send an advance group.
Leonidas does not seem to have shown any initiative to leave early. 69 If Leonidas is as
pious as Herodotus suggests him to be – having chosen to heed the prophecy to his doom
– then we should think that the presence of this prophecy in the text allows Herodotus’
Leonidas to act in a way that the other present Greeks could not; he sincerely believes,
Most scholars reject the notion that Leonidas remained behind for religious reasons. This is
irrelevant to the purposes of this Chapter, as I am here concerned with interpreting Herodotus’
own opinion.
67
See Chapter Three on religious adherence.
68
69
Macan, Herodotus, 7.206.
38
according to Herodotus, that his sacrifice will ensure Spartan perpetuity. If these
religious or oracular considerations allowed or even encouraged the Spartans to exercise
this sense of obligation in a way that the other Greeks could not, then what follows turns
to the extent to which political considerations had a similar effect.
As previously noted, Herodotus tells us that the glory of the sacrifice at
Thermopylae does not belong to the Spartans alone, as the Thespians and Thebans
decided to remain behind as well. He maintains, however, that the latter of these
companies was forced to remain behind by the Spartans as hostages. Herodotus states,
τούτων δὲ Θηβαῖοι μὲν ἀέκοντες ἔμενον καὶ οὐ βουλόμενοι: κατεῖχε

γὰρσφέας Λεωνίδης ἐν ὁμήρων λόγῳ ποιεύμενος.
The Thebans remained against their will and desire, for Leonidas kept them as
hostages. (7.222.1).70
It seems somewhat odd that the Thebans could have been kept as hostages, as the only
way they could have been coerced into staying in the face of what Herodotus makes clear
is certain doom is if they had been threatened with death by the Spartans, staying behind
only to live a bit longer. What is far more likely, however, is that the Thebans stayed
behind willingly, and Herodotus’ depiction is an instance of anti-Theban sentiment on his
part.71 Herodotus tells us that Thebes was medizing at the time, undergoing a substantial
70
Herodotus, The Histories, trans. A. D. Godley, 7.221.1.
71
Macan, Herodotus, 7.222.1. Plutarch (Mor. 865) is highly critical of Herodotus’ depiction.
This may be written this way because of the Theban position in the war at this time. Flower,
"Simonides, Ephorus, and Herodotus," 371 notes that Diodoros’ account of the battle puts 400
Thebans at Leonidas’ side voluntarily, suggesting an alternative reading that may have
39
political shift. It is for this reason, he holds, that Leonidas chooses to recruit a company
from amongst them:
ὅτι σφέων μεγάλως κατηγόρητο μηδίζειν: παρεκάλεε ὦν ἐς

τὸν πόλεμον, θέλων εἰδέναι εἴτε συμπέμψουσι εἴτε καὶ ἀπερέουσι ἐκ
τοῦ ἐμφανέος τὴν Ἑλλήνων συμμαχίην. οἳ δὲ ἀλλοφρονέοντες
ἔπεμπον.
because they were accused of medizing; he summoned them to the war wishing to
know whether they would send their men with him or openly refuse the Hellenic
alliance. They sent the men but intended something quite different. (7.205.3).72
Because of this shift, it is likely that Thebes was split between pro-Persian and anti-
Persian sentiments. One might assume, then, that the group that was sent ahead, though
reluctantly by the medizing Thebans, was mostly anti-Persian. When faced with the
onslaught that awaited them, this group, had they chosen to return to Thebes, would not
have been welcome.73 They would be returning to a city that surely would have punished
them for fighting against the Persians, giving them legitimate reasons to remain at the
Hot Gates. To leave the Hot Gates while the Thebans remained would have been a
political catastrophe for the Spartans. Therefore, one might surmise that the Spartans
were allowed and in fact encouraged to act as they did, to choose to fight in accordance
with a sense of honor, because of their vested interest in not being outdone by their
political adversaries, and Herodotus, though he slanders the Thebans, gives the reader a
picture of the political situation in Thebes that illuminates the aforementioned decision.
What follows turns to the extent to which tactical and strategic considerations may have
highlighted Herodotus’ anti-Theban sentiments. He provides a list of corroborating authors

offered in his footnote 34 (he does not hold this view).
72
Goldey, Histories, 7.205.3.
73
Lazenby, The Defence of Greece, 144-45.
40
allowed the Spartans to act in accordance with this sense of obligation while others could
not.
Herodotus gives the reader reason to think that the Spartans, and the Spartans
alone, were positioned to act tactically as they did. He maintains that when news reaches
the Greeks about Ephialtes’ treachery and Xerxes’ discovery of a pass that goes behind
the Greek lines, the Greeks convene a meeting. Herodotus tells us the following:
ἐνθαῦτα ἐβουλεύοντο οἱ Ἕλληνες, καί σφεων ἐσχίζοντο αἱ γνῶμαι:

οἳ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔων τὴν τάξιν ἐκλιπεῖν
The Hellenes then took counsel, but their opinions were divided. Some advised
not to leave their post. (7.219.2)74
The second half of this statement, starting with οἳ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ, informs the reader that
the Greeks were split on whether or not to remain at the Hot Gates. One possible reading
is that this debate was over the virtuous merits of staying. On one hand the Greeks can
stay and die and achieve glory, and, on the other hand, the Greeks can leave, abandon
their posts, and return, if they can, to their cities. However, one might read this as a
debate over the strategic or tactical benefits of staying or leaving. The text is ambiguous,
but should they stay, the Spartans might accomplish certain strategic goals, though surely
at a great price.
One might suppose that the decision to remain was made with certain tactical
goals in mind, as Herodotus tells us after all that the final, hopeless stand of the Spartans
and their allies was successful in at least some capacity. After noting the death of
Leonidas, Herodotus tells us,
74
41
Ξέρξεώ τε δὴ δύο ἀδελφεοὶ ἐνθαῦτα πίπτουσι μαχόμενοι.
Two brothers of Xerxes accordingly fought and fell there. (7.225.1)75
Even though Herodotus describes the final assault as a desperate, wild bloodbath fought
at one point with teeth and fists, this frenzy does not begin until after two of Xerxes’
brothers are killed. They no doubt would have held prominent military positions.
Therefore, a calculated strategy might have been needed to ensure that they were both
killed. It goes without saying that the Spartans were the best equipped to carry out such a
maneuver; while their militaristic character is in question their military skill is not.
Diodoros (11.9) suggests that the night before the final assault, Leonidas attempted a
stealth attack against Xerxes’ camp, making it as far as Xerxes’ tent and suggesting that
eliminating the military hierarchy was a prerogative.76 Therefore, one might surmise that
the Spartans decided upon an organized assault against prominent figures of the Persian
military in an attempt to maximize their gains in light of their inevitable loss, and after
this is accomplished the Spartan ranks dissolve and the bloodbath ensues. Therefore, one
may surmise that although the Spartans no doubt acted valiantly, their decision to do so
was inspired not by any internal sense of duty greater than that of their allies – a result of
their militaristic upbringing – but a consequence of circumstances that allowed them to
act in accordance with a universal Greek virtue.
The purpose of this chapter has been twofold. First, I posited that Herodotus does
not show that the Spartans remained out of deference to military authority, nor is their
75
76Macan, Reginald W, Herodotus: The Seventh, Eighth, & Ninth Books, With Introduction, Text,
Apparatus, Commentary, Appendices, Indices, 7.219.2.
42
defining characteristic, an obligation to a sense of honor, glory, or duty, shown to be
definitively Spartan. Next, I argued that the decision to remain could not be attributed
solely to this defining characteristic, as there were certain external factors that permitted
and in fact encouraged the Spartans to decide as they did. I maintain that the account
Herodotus offers is often read through the lens of a misplaced understanding of Spartan
militarism. However, while we are given much reason to doubt the historical accuracy of
the account one should not be inclined to look to this account as a major participant to the
myth of Spartan militarism.
43
Sparta’s Institutions: Why Sparta Went to War
If the decision to go to war was not militaristic, then what was it? In other words,
when Sparta went to war, what reasons did it have to do so? To answer this question, I
will examine three distinct institutions of Spartan society: The political, the economic,
and the religious. The goal of this examination is twofold. First, I want to establish that
these three institutions, generally understood, had a direct influence on the decision to go
war. This is to say that when Sparta went to war (or chose not to go to war), these
institutions provided the reasons for their doing so. Second, I want to argue that the
reasons these institutions lent to the decision were not militaristic; while they influenced
the decision, it was not in pursuit of militarism. My analysis of the textual evidence
shows both that these institutions had tremendous influence on the decision to go to war
and that their decisions were by no means militaristic. Rather, these institutions acted in
accord with their own respective interests, often refusing or deterring the prospect of war.
Thus, we find reason to doubt that Sparta decided to go to war militaristically.
I The political organization of classical Sparta was characterized by a mixture of
hereditary diarchy, and gerontocracy. The four major political entities, the Diarchy,
Ephorate, Gerousia, and Assembly were distinct both in reference to their composition
and to their larger role in Spartan society.77 The dynamic that existed between these
political entities was one of checks, as each entity competed with one another for political
and legal power. This political dynamic had two major components. The first
77
Hodkinson, "Social Order,” 104.
44
component is the internally hostile relationship that existed between the two kings and
their families. The second component is the external relationship that stood between the
Diarchy and the Ephorate. As such, I maintain that insofar as Sparta’s political institution
influenced the decision to go to war, the decision itself was not militaristic but, rather,
was largely driven by political interests.
We have reason to doubt that the Spartan kingship was wholly and
unquestionably obedient to Spartan law. On the contrary, Spartan kings seem to have
been able to extend and manipulate the law to a degree by means of their personality,
their character, and their public perception.78 Moreover, the hostility between the two
kings manifested primarily as a sort of competition for public perception, as this
perception was the means to greater political freedom. When Agis II failed to defeat the
Argives in 418, Thucydides tells us, the Spartan populace was furious, threatening to tear
down his home and fine him substantially (5.63)79. In other words, popular perception
mattered. It mattered that Agis II did not ultimately battle with Argos, and it matters so
much that the Spartan population threatened to do everything short of killing or banishing
the king to show it.80
In the pursuit of positive public perception and, therefore, greater political
authority, the diarchy would internally check itself, as one king attempted to quell the
authority of the other by limiting his ability to gain the popular favor that came with
78
Millender, "The Spartan Dyarchy,” 14
79
Ibid., 13. After this episode the king was assigned ten advisors without whom he could not
march to war.
80 One might suggest that this action points to a degree of militarism amongst the general
population, as they were notably angry after being deprived of war. See Chapter Four for why it
was probably not the case that Spartan character was militaristic. One might interpret their anger
as a consequence of their inherent fear; a failure to engage in battle might be interpreted as
weakness or vulnerability, exposing the Spartans to danger.
45
military success.81 We see, for instance, that when Cleomenes leaves for Athens to put
Isagoras in power, his Eurypontid counterpart Demaratus recalled him (Her. 5.74-6). As
a result, Cleomenes would latter successfully attempt to delegitimize his counterpart and
replace him with Leotychidas (6.61-67.1).82 Because the diarchy was largely dependent
upon public perception for augmenting personal authority, a given king had a vested
interest both in achieving military success, on his own part, and in preventing it, as any
success won by his counterpart might mitigate his own authority. Therefore, we have
reason to doubt that the kingship acted militaristically, as the decision to go to war (or not
got to war) was a consequence of a kings’ own political ambitions.
The second component of this political game then is the dynamic that existed
between the Diarchy and the Ephorate. Herodotus suggests that the Ephorate was both
able to directly interfere in a King’s behavior and to impose certain checks upon him. The
Ephorate and the Gerousia were able to coerce King Anaxandridas II into taking a second
wife when his first had been unable to bear him a son and heir to the hereditary line.83
This episode suggests that the Ephorate possessed the means by which to coerce the king,
though whether through threat or political promise is unclear, when they had a vested
interest in the outcome, which, in this case, was likely state stability. Moreover, the
Ephorate was heavily involved in military campaigns beyond the power to appoint
81
See Hamilton, “Spartan Politics and Policy," 295. “The two kings, coming from rival houses
and meant to serve as a check on one another... The extent to which a given king provided
political leadership or direction would depend, of course, on his personality....” Also see
Thomas, "On the Role of the Spartan Kings," 260. “... it was only when a king revealed his
personal powers of leadership through successful military direction that his policy was likely to
prevail. When, on the other hand, [he] was judged to be militarily unsuccessful... his initiative
was likely to be overruled....”
82
Millender, "The Spartan Dyarchy,” 11.
83
Ibid., 12.
46
commanders, as they sent representatives to accompany the king on campaign.84 In other
words, the Ephorate made sure that the king did not act in accordance with some interest
other than its own. The Ephorate alone was able to imprison or punish the king, and
there is reason to think that they did so when they perceived a king’s military behavior to
be inappropriate. Thucydides tells us, for instance, that Pleistoanax was exiled on
accusations of bribery in 446, having failed to complete the invasion of Attica (Thuc.
2.21.1; 5.16.3; 1.114.2).85 This episode is important because it demonstrates the extent to
which a Spartan king might decide against war and the extent to which the Ephorate
could check the authority of the king.
Xenophon gives us a similar picture of the Ephorate’s ability to check the King’s
ability to go to war in his conflicting images of Agesilaus. One image paints Agesilaus
as wholly obedient to the will of the Ephorate, abandoning his ambition to destroy Persia
in deference to the home authorities (Xen. 1.36).86 Another scene, however, shows
Agesilaus to be less so, as he refuses to lead an expedition against Mantinea in 385
(5.2.4) and Thebes in 379 (5.2.13).87 Here again one sees a Spartan king refusing the
option of going to war in favor of peace. This lack of uniform decision making suggests
that Agesilaus, rather than pursuing war for war’s sake at every possible occasion,
pursued war when he wanted to insofar as he risked no rebuttal from the Ephorate, whom
we have seen did have the ability to check the king with punitive threats. Therefore, we
do not see Sparta’s political institutions decising upon war because of the virtues and
ideals of war but going to war, or refusing to go to war, out of their own respective
84
Millender, "The Spartan Dyarchy," 11.
85
Ibid., 13.
86
Ibid., 19.
87
Ibid., 21.
47
interests. Having up to this point looked at the political sphere, what follows turns to the
question of economic influence over the decision to go to war.
II The Spartan economy was largely defined by a hierarchy of social classes. The
lowest class was comprised of Helots, a state-owned population of slaves from
Lakedaimon and neighboring Messenia. The Helots functioned as the primary source of
unskilled labor for the Spartan economy. The Perioikoi were free citizens of Lakedaimon
who contributed to the Spartan economy as laborers, tradesmen, and artisans, but who
lacked the same political rights and military obligations as the Spartans.88 Plutarch
claims that Spartan citizens were discouraged from working in the same trades as the
Perioikoi (Lyc. 24), suggesting that there existed a pronounced distinction between the
economic affairs of the Perioikoi and Helots and the military concerns of the Spartan
citizenry. However, we have reason to think that this was not the case, that Spartans
were, in fact, engaged in the production of essential goods and artistic pieces, such as
vases that clearly depict definitively Spartan ideals.89As such, I maintain that the
economic sphere had a profound affect on the decision to go to war. Furthermore, we
have no reason to think that this effect was markedly militaristic.
One might suppose that the systematized enslavement of the Helots was an
economic institution that instigated military action. Plutarch tells us that every so often,
the Krypteia, an elite squadron of young Spartan men, would go into Helot settlements at
night and massacre the local population (Lyc. 28.2).90 Other times, citing Aristotle, the
Ephors would declare war upon the Helot population, exempting any would-be murderer
88
Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 140, 153-155,
89
Ridley, “The Economic Activities of the Perioikoi,” 281-292.
48
from impiety or criminal charges (Lyc. 28.2). Plutarch’s account of the murder of the
Helots is largely problematic. In some instances the Krypteia seems to operate freely, at
liberty to slay whatever Helots happen to pass by. In other instances, they would slay
only the strongest of the Helots. In Book Four Thucydudes recounts an incident whereby
2,000 Helots are massacred in a clandestine operation because of their notable bravery.91
The murder of the strongest and the bravest would suggest an attempt to quell potential
rebellion. Therefore, the exact purpose of the Krypteia is unclear.
While one prevailing theory maintains that the Krypteia functioned as a sort of
regulating mechanism designed to quell potential rebellion and, therefore, ensure
economic stability, other have posited that it functioned as a sort of training program in
stealth warfare.92 The former theory would support the notion that the systematic murder
of the helots was military action driven by the need for stability amongst the primary
labor force. On the other hand, the annual Ephorate declaration of war against the Helot
population points to an alternative interpretation whereby Helots were murdered for
symbolic reasons. This is to say that the annual massacre was a reenactment of the
Spartan conquest of Messenia, which was symbolically significant insofar as it constantly
reignited the hostile sentiments upon which the institution of Helot slavery was
founded.93 Therefore, while there may be evidence to suggest it, it is difficult to say
definitively that the occasional massacre of the Helot population was a consequence of
economic demands.
91
Harvey, "The Clandestine Massacre of the Helots,” 206-7. Harvey argues, however, that the
incident to which Thucydides is referring would not have been publicly known. Rather, it would
have been carried out in secret and the ultimate effect would have left the other Helots unsure of
what had actually happened. Therefore, one might have reason to suspect that the purpose was to
eliminate potential threats for rebellion, not to send a message.
92
See Whitby, "Two Shadows,” 106-7.
93
Ibid., 106.
49
Instead, one can argue that the concept of xenia in Sparta, made possible only by
the unequal distribution of wealth, influenced the decision to go to war. According to
Plutarch (Mor. 226c-d) and (Lyc. 8.3), Lycurgus’ constitution implemented an economic
system that relied upon the exchange of iron bars as currency and the relatively equal
distribution of land as its foundation.94 There is reason to think, however, that this
system was largely not in effect, as there is cause to doubt the use of iron bars and the
equal distribution of land. The extent to which iron bars were the exclusive form of
currency in classical Sparta is dubious.95 While Sparta did not mint its own coinage until
the Hellenistic period, it is likely that it had access to gold and silver currency. 96
Furthermore, by the fifth century the distribution of land had become largely unequal, as
elite classes of Spartans emerged who controlled larger shares of land, and, therefore,
greater wealth.97 The combination of these two, the possession of movable wealth and
the creation of elite Spartan groups, would have contributed to the establishment of xenia,
or guest-friendship, in Spartan society, as wealthy, elite Spartans were able to form gift
and favor-exchanging connections with other Greek peoples.
There is reason to think, therefore, that the presence of xenia is Sparta conditioned
the decision to go to war. Cartledge (1982) argues that the Spartan campaign against
Polykrates in 525 (Hdt. 3.56) was a consequence of elite Spartan assistance to their xenoi
in Samos.98 Beyond this, it seems to be the case that the Spartans relied heavily upon the
94
Hodkinson, Property and Wealth, 154-56.
95
Ibid., 160-65. Iron currency might have existed concurrently, as there are examples of iron
coins having been in circulation elsewhere. It could have had a conversion rate and was not
deemed worthless.
96
Ibid., 154. Despite the influx of gold and silver in Sparta by Lysander in 404, the prohibition
on gold and silver currency was shortly after retained, albeit entirely ignored.
97
Ibid., 399. Aristotle attests to the unequal distribution of wealth (Pol I. 1270a11-18).
98
Ibid., 348.
50
xenoi both of the royal houses of Sparta and of the oligarchs in the greater Peloponnese
for acquiring troops and supplies in time of war. Xenophon tells us, for instance, that the
Spartan commander Antalkidas was given twenty ships by the satrap Ariobarzanes to
defend the Hellespont in 387 by virtue of xenia between their two families.99 Therefore,
we should think that the decision to go to war was conditioned by xenia, by whether or
not one could secure the means by which to undergo a military campaign. Granted, it is
not enough just to show that economics could lead to war, for it must also be shown that
economics could prevent war.
We find evidence in favor of the notion that economic needs outweighed the
desire to go to war. This is to say that the two, militarism and economics, were at odds
with one another in Sparta. Thucydides tells us that during the vote on whether to go to
war against Athens, Archidamus entreats the Spartans to delay military action until they
have procured sufficient wealth to finance the campaign. He urges his fellow Spartans
that, “war is a matter not so much of arms as of money, which makes arms of use... First,
then, let us provide money, and not allow ourselves to be carried away by the talk of our
allies before we have done so...” (1.83.1-3).100 He maintains that at the time being it
would be foolish to start such a campaign, as the Spartans lack the material means - the
wealth - by which to do so. In other words, no matter how desperately one may seek war,
economic conditions must take priority. Granted, the Spartans ultimately vote in favor of
war. However, the reasons as to why this is ultimately the case has much to do with the
nature of the vote itself, not its respective arguments.101 Nonetheless, Archidamus’
maxim about war and wealth gives the reader reason to think that the Spartans were
99
Hodkinson, Property and Wealth, 346.
100
Crawley, The Peloponnesian War, 83.1-3.
101
See Chapter One for a detailed discussion on the dubious nature of the vote.
51
cognizant of the extent to which economic concerns outweighed military ambition.
Therefore, having just discussed the possible role of Spartan economics on the decision to
go to war, what follows turns to the influence of religious institutions.
III While Sparta maintained a pantheon and a religious tradition that was more or
less common to most Greek-speaking peoples of the classical period, there is reason to
think that Sparta was unique insofar as it adhered more strictly to religious or oracular
obligations. Suffice it to say, Lycurgus’ laws, and ultimately Lycurgus himself, were
considered fundamentally divine in nature. The essential underlying institutional
structure of Spartan society was directly linked to Lycurgus and the divine sanction of the
Great Rhetra. Therefore, because Sparta’s institutions were at their core religiously
sanctioned institutions, religious adherence was understandably emphasized in Spartan
society; participation in Spartan society presupposed religious adherence.102
This notion of strict adherence may have catalyzed the decision to go to war.
Herodotus states in Book Seven of the Histories that the Spartan decision to remain at
Thermopylae was such an instance. Leonidas and his small force of Spartan hoplites
decided to remain not despite their inevitable doom but because of their inevitable doom,
as a Delphic oracle had prophesized that either a Spartan king must die, i.e. Leonidas, or
Sparta would burn (7.220).103 An in-depth analysis of this episode can be found in
Chapter Four. Suffice it to say, this episode speaks to the notion that an increased
adherence to religion and oracular prophecy played a significant role in the decision to go
102
Flower, ‘“Spartan 'Religion' and Greek 'Religion,’” 193. Flower posits that this notion can be
separated into two separate albeit related truths about Spartan religion. First, Spartans paid more
attention to religious scruples than other Greeks. Second, religion was the “bedrock” of society
because Lycurgus’ laws were sanctioned by Apollo. I take the argument for why religious
adherence is so crucial offered above to be what he had in mind when he says the two are related.
103
Ibid.
52
to war or, in this case, to engage in battle. That being said, there is reason to believe that
no such prophecy existed and that Herodotus added the Delphic prophecy to Book Seven
only after the fact. 104 Furthermore, many scholars have rejected Herodotus’ claim that
the Spartans remained for religious motives.105
Herodotus offers another such instance in Book Five: Herodotus tells us that the
Spartans decided to adhere to a Delphic prophecy to expel the Peisistratidae from Athens
in 510, “despite close ties of guest friendship, because ‘they put the things of the god
above the things of men” (5.63).106 In this episode, again, the Spartan’s strict adherence
to religious obligation drove the decision to go to war. However, there is some possible
inconsistency with Herodotus’ account, as violating guest-friendship (ξενία) would have
in itself been a sacrilegious act.107 Still, whether or not these accounts are historically
valid, they are consistent with the notion of strict religious adherence echoed elsewhere in
Herodotus and Xenophon as well as implicitly in Thucydides.108 In other words,
Herodotus finds religious adherence to be a palatable reason – one his audience would
presumably accept - for Sparta to go to war.
One might argue that the act of going to war because of oracular prophecy is in
itself militaristic. Spartan religion, though largely similar to the religions and beliefs of
other Greek states, was arguably unique, as it had unique traditions and practices that
104
105
Flower, ‘“Spartan 'Religion' and Greek 'Religion,'” 193, footnote 1.
106
Ibid., 198. Quote taken from Flower, not Herodotus.
107
See Herman, Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City, n.p. for a comprehensive treatment of
the concept of ξενία.
108 See Flower, ‘“Spartan 'Religion' and Greek 'Religion,'” 198 for the claim that the Argives
exploit Spartan piety in Thucydides. Also, Ibid., 200 for Xenophon’s belief that Agesilaus is
sincerely pious. For a treatment on discerning the underplayed religious features of the
Peloponnesian War in Thucydides see Hornblower, "The Religious Dimension to the
Peloponnesian War," 169-97.
53
existed largely to reinforce the lessons and virtues of Lycurgus’ reforms, emphasizing the
fundamental role of heroes and other military themes. Spartan kings, as definitively
religious figures, were treated upon their deaths to heroic honors and given funerals that
served to venerate them beyond what one would have found in other city-states.109
Furthermore, one would have found heroic statues in Sparta dedicated to the not so long
deceased, which would themselves have been venerated in the fashion of gods.110
Moreover, Plutarch attests that Spartan deity statues were often armed and were so
equipped to inspire military excellence.111 Therefore, to go to war for the sake of Spartan
religion, to go to war in the name of religious adherence, was to go to war for the sake of
military excellence.
However, this increased sense of adherence seems to have been great enough also
to postpone military action, not just incite it. In other words, the two - war and religion -
were at odds with one another. Herodotus attributes the Spartan absence from Marathon
and the unusually small force sent to Thermopylae to coincidence with the Karneia
(6.106).112 Also, he maintains that the Spartans were unable to fight Maridonius in 479
because of the Hyakinthia (9.7).113 Thucydides likewise maintains that the Argive
democrats waited for the Gymnopadia in 417 before attacking the oligarchs, taking
advantage of Spartan religious adherence. For this same reason, “the Spartans postponed
109
Flower, ‘“Spartan 'Religion' and Greek 'Religion,'” 213.
110
Ibid., 211.
111
See Ibid., 205, 212-213. Plutarch (Mor. 239a) argues that armed deity statues were intended to
inspire military excellence, establishing a connection between the realm of battle and the realm of
the divine. Though Plutarch would have visited Sparta long after the classical period, his account
of the prevalence of hero sculptures is consistent with the general archeological evidence, as
“Laconia was an area exceptionally rich in hero shrines” (212-13). Pausanias relates a similar
account of the statue of an armed Aphrodite both on Cythera (3.23.1) and Corinth (2.5.1).
112
Ibid., 198.
113
Ibid.
54
giving military aid to Argos” (5.28).114 Therefore, we have reason to think that the
decision to go to war, if it was religiously influenced, was in conflict with militarism, as
religious obligations took precedence over the prospect of war.
This chapter analyzed the roles of Spartan institutions in the decision to go to war.
The results suggest that Spartan institutions, when they did influence the decision to go to
war, did not do so militaristically. Rather, the decision was largely a consequence of the
distinct non-militaristic interests of the political, economic, and religious institutions of
classical Spartan society, as these institutions acted in accordance with their own
respective prerogatives. One might argue that these institutions alone are not indicative of
the whole of Spartan society, that while the reasons to go to war were not militaristic, this
is not to say that Spartans in general were militaristic. Therefore, what follows presented
a theory against the notion that Spartan character was itself militaristic.
114
Flower, ‘“Spartan Religion’ and Greek ‘Religion,’” 198.
55
Spartan Character: Sparta as an Inherently Fearful Polis
One might contest that the treatment thus far is insufficient, as it might still be the
case that Spartans were militaristic insofar as the general populace was itself eager for
war and deferred to military authority. This is to say that the general populace was
unable to act on this militarism, for the decision to go to war was the prerogative of the
state’s institutions. In other words, Sparta’s political, economic, and religious
institutions, as the instigators of Spartan military action, did not represent the whole of
the Spartan populace, so it is worthwhile to briefly note the extent to which Spartan
character was itself not militaristic.
I To say that Spartan character was not militaristic is to claim that Spartans did
exalt military values and ideal. However, there is a sense in which the Spartans glorified
war in the form of a beautiful death, namely, the notion that the greatest way in which
one could hope to die was in military service to the state. In other words, one of the
reasons military action was valuable in and of itself was because it might entail the
ultimate fulfillment of one’s life, namely, his death in battle. This notion is evident in
what is arguably Plutarch’s most famous expression concerning a beautiful death: ἢ τὰν
ἢ ἐπὶ τᾶς (‘Either [with] it [your shield] or on it’) (Mor, 241.16).115 One should either
return with his shield, implying victory, or return as a corpse on his shield, implying that
he did not abandon his shield but faced death with courage. This is how a Spartan ought
to die. Granted, we have reason to doubt the historicity underlying this expression, as it
is unlikely that Spartans would have carried their war-dead back from battle. While we
115 Babbitt, Moralia, 241.16.
56
may have reason to doubt the historicity underlying this expression, this notion of a
beautiful death appears elsewhere in the ancient literature. Pericles notes in his famous
Funeral Oration in Book One, for instance, that,
...while in education, where our rivals from their very cradles by a painful
discipline seek after manliness, at Athens we live exactly as we please, and yet are
just as ready to encounter every legitimate danger (2.39.1)... So died these men as
became Athenians (2.43.1)... And surely, to a man of spirit, the degradation of
cowardice must be immeasurably more grievous than the unfelt death which
strikes him in the midst of his strength and patriotism! (2.43.6)116
While both the Spartans and the Athenians courageously die on behalf of their state, the
Athenians do not need the same military institutions to instill the courage necessary for
this to be the case. Rather, they are by nature courageous. Therefore, Thucydides
endorses the view that Spartans was perceived, by Pericles at the very least, to hold this
notion of a beautiful death. That being said, it does not necessarily follow that holding a
concept of the beautiful death translates into pursuit of a beautiful death. In other words,
it could be the case that they believed the best way to die was to die courageously in
battle in service of Sparta, but it is not necessarily the case that Spartans then actively
sought out war in pursuit of this death.
II On the contrary, I maintain that the Spartans were a generally fearful people,
averse to the prospect of war. Generally speaking, Spartans were not uniformly
courageous in the face of battle. Numerous sources point to the existence of tremblers.
These tremblers were those Spartans who demonstrated cowardice in battle and were
116 Crawley, The Peloponnesian War, 2.43.6.
57
subsequently punished severely for their lack of courage.117 Granted, the extent to which
one would have needed to display cowardice as to merit the label trembler is unclear. In
Xenophon’s account of the battle of Lechaion in 390, three hundred and fifty Spartans
“escaped” the battle but did not earn the title trembler (Hell. 4.5.17). At Leuctra in 371,
however, Plutarch notes that the retreat merited disgrace per Spartan custom.118 One
might argue that the difference between these two events lies in the retention of the
shield, having been retained in the former but abandoned in the latter. As such, the
Spartans used abandonment of one’s shield as an indicator of flight from the hoplite line
and, therefore, an indicator of cowardice. Because it was such a massively cumbersome
item, abandoning one’s shield “was a reliable criterion” to judge that a soldier had fled.
If one retains his shield, however, then there is less reason to think that he displayed
cowardice.119 Therefore, that Spartan tremblers were punished so severely suggests that
Spartans were, generally speaking, a courageous people, ready and willing to face death,
and sought to severely punish those who did not and were not.
That being said, one might argue that the severity of the punishments enacted
upon the tremblers points to a preponderance of fear in Spartan society. There is reason
to think, after all, that fear played a significant role in Spartan religion, for at some point
the Spartans established a shrine to Fear (φοβόν), unique amongst the Poleis.120 Sparta’s
military institutions were designed in such a way as to apprehend fear in battle. Constant
military training and conditioning from a young age was intended to turn warfare into an
117
Ducat, "The Spartan Tremblers," 1. See Epps, "Fear in Spartan Character," 16-17 for an
account of the varied punishments a trembler might face, including public humiliation and social
ostracism.
118
Ducat, "The Spartan Tremblers, " 11. Xenophon never uses the term for tremblers employed
by Plutarch, οἱ τρέσαντες, but characterizes them indirectly as κακός or εἲ τις ἀποδειλιάσειε.
119
Ibid., 12.
120
Flower, ‘“Spartan Religion’ and Greek ‘Religion,’” 211-212.
58
efficient, mechanized process that was executed by force of habit. This in turn eliminates
any room for fear and replaces it with trust in preset movements. However, in an attempt
to mechanize and systematize the military sphere, Sparta’s military institutions increased
Spartan fearfulness by making Spartans dependent upon this systemization.121
Thucydides says of the Spartans in Book Four,
After the severe and unexpected blow that had befallen them on the island, the
occupation of Pylos and Cythera, and the apparition on every side of a war whose
rapidity defied precaution, they lived in constant fear of internal revolution ...
and became more timid than ever in military matters, finding themselves involved
in a maritime struggle, which their organisation had never contemplated...and
thus scarcely dared to take the field... they had lost all confidence in themselves.
(4.55.1-2,4)122
Upon learning that their method of battle is not conducive to the tactics of the Athenians,
the Spartans panic. This is to suggest that the Spartans relied heavily upon the rigid
systemization of their military institutions, for when that system failed them they had a
tendency to panic. Therefore, Tremblers were punished and humiliated not because
Spartans loved courage but because Spartans feared the subversive nature of cowardice.
Moreover, one should not be inclined to think that the Spartans were enthusiastic for war,
as in the absence of a rigid military system, the Spartans become “timid... in military
matters.”123 Furthermore, one should not be inclined to think that the Spartans deferred
to military authority, but rather, it seems to be the case that they relied upon military
authority, that Spartans adhered to their rigid military system because the alternative was
“constant fear.” This does not conflict, however, with the notion that Spartans
disregarded military authority at times. Recall, Plutarch notes that when young men
121
Ducat, “The Spartan Tremblers,” 13-14.
122
Ibid., 16. Also Crawley, The Peloponnesian War, 4.55.1-2,4.
123
See Chapter One, Section II for an argument against military preparedness.
59
snuck out of barracks to meet their wives they were afraid.124 They feared the
consequences of what this disregard would entail. Furthermore, while Leonidas
disregarded Sparta’s military by remaining at Thermopylae and sacrificing valuable
soldiers and military leaders, he exercised his own military authority as king, retaining
military order. The phalanx only breaks apart, as I noted in Chapter Two, when the
Spartans achieve their tactical goals. Therefore, panic, chaos, and fear only take hold
where the military structure, the plan so to speak, ends.
The purpose of this chapter was to argue against the notion that Spartan character,
understood separately from Spartan institutions, was militaristic. To this end, I employed
the example of Spartan tremblers to highlight the way in which Spartans treated
cowardice. As such, their harsh treatment might suggest that they valued courage and
sought to deter cowardice. I posit, however, that this treatment is more likely indicative
of a fear of cowardice than it is of a love of courage. Spartans were reliant upon their
military institutions. When military structure broke down, the Spartan fell into a frenzied
state of panic and fear. Therefore, it should not be said that Spartan character was,
generally speaking, militaristic.
60
Conclusion
This thesis has argued that classical Sparta was not a militaristic society. We
have reason to doubt that when Sparta decided upon war, this decision was
characteristically militaristic. In this respect, these decisions reflected neither military
enthusiasm nor military deference.
I In Chapters One and Two I offered an analysis of critical moments of alleged
militarism in the seminal works of Thucydides and Herodotus, analyzing the former’s
vote in Book One in Chapter Three and the latter’s final stand at Thermopylae in Chapter
Four. We have reason to doubt that the respective works of Thucydides and Herodotus
intentionally participate in the propagation of the militarism in question. On the contrary,
their writings give no indications of militarism in critical scenes involving the decision to
go to war. This analysis relied primarily upon the respective works of these two classical
authors, contemporary commentaries, and contemporary work on the Spartan Mirage. In
Chapter Three of this thesis I offered a treatment of the historical evidence against
militaristic decisions, relying both upon ancient sources and the literature of the
contemporary Spartan Mirage. To his end, Chapter Three explored the roles of Sparta’s
institutions, turning in Chapter Four to the nature of Spartan character.
We have reason to believe that Spartan institutions declared war out of non-militaristic
interests. Furthermore, while one may doubt that the institutions of Spartan society were
actually indicative of larger social militarism, there is reason to think that Spartan
character was equally incompatible with militarism. Rather, Spartan character, in respect
61
to the question of militarism, was averse to the prospect of war and deferred to military
authority as a consequence of fear.
II I want to conclude this thesis by highlighting objects for further study. These
include two subjects that I had initially wanted to touch upon but ultimately did not and a
question this thesis raises that I believe deserves further consideration.
The first subject is a theoretical, abstract approach to the question of militarism.
This entails a theoretical approach to the phenomenon of norm-crossover, which might
be understood as the adaptation of military norms into general society. Because military
institutions played such an integral role in Spartan society, might it have been the case
that Spartan citizens, having cultivated certain norms while in the agoge, continued to act
in accordance with these norms in every day life? While the research herein might imply
that this was not the case, why might that be so? In other words, how theoretically would
this process of norm-crossover occur? If it did not, why is that the case? An earlier
version of this thesis addressed this subject, but it was removed because I felt it was
insufficient.
The second subject is a side-by-side comparison of how certain features of
militarism, such as an eagerness for war, manifest in Spartan society as opposed to, say,
Cretan society. This would entail using other poleis as control variables for certain
features of militarism. In other words, in order to discern whether or not Sparta was
militaristic, one would use other city-states as standards of militarism to which Spartan
behavior would be compared. By using other poleis as foils for Spartan behavior, one
could better discern the extent to which a Spartan approach to war was definitively
unique amongst the Greeks. This is how I had originally planned to format this thesis,
62
but I had abandoned it due to changing interests. Given these omitted subjects, what
follows looks at a question this thesis raises that I believe merits further consideration.
The limited chronological scope of this thesis raises an important question about
militarism over time. While this thesis looked at a fairly narrow window of time, albeit a
significant one, might it have been the case that militarism was an historical reality at
different points in time? Put another way, while this thesis argued that Spartan decisions
for war in the classical period were inconsistent with militarism, might the conditions of
earlier or later periods of Spartan history, particularly those closer to the establishment of
the Lycurgan constitution, have been conducive to militarism? It does not seem
farfetched to suppose that the novelty of Lycurgus’ Sparta had a profound ideological
effect on Spartan society, one that gradually diminished over time. One might suppose
that such a phenomenon is apparent in the emergence of rigid, utopian-esque societies,
wherein adherence to their original ideological tenets fades over time. On the other hand,
one might argue that changing historical circumstances effected militarism. Might a
study of changing political or economic institutions over time reveal pockets of increased
or decreased militarism, if present at all? I offer this for further consideration.
While the Spartan Mirage is an expansive field of study and the question of
militarism only a notably small facet of it, debunking the myth of Spartan militarism has
implications for how we understand and perceive classical Sparta. It subverts a
provincial conception of Spartan society, one that unfairly characterizes a highly dynamic
people as a one-dimensional, war-crazed social experiment. It has resounding
implications not only for the study of Sparta and antiquity today but for the study of any
63
such society shrouded in the myth of militarism. It acts as a foil with which to compare
other apparent instances of the phenomenon of militarism.
64
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68

War and Glory The Myth of Spartan Milita

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War and Glory: The Myth of Spartan Militarism

Dr. William Bubelis, Thesis Advisor

March 26, 2015

Chapter One Thucydides Book One: Analyzing Military Enthusiasm 14

Chapter Two Herodotus Book Seven: Reconsidering Military Deference 28

Chapter Three Sparta’s Institutions: Why Sparta Went to War 44

Chapter Four Spartan Character: Sparta as an Inherently Fearful Polis 56

Peloponnese, Sparta emerged as a regional hegemony, contributing significantly to the

each a paradigm of the principles and attitudes embodied by Lycurgus’ laws.3 It is

precisely this understanding of Sparta, this notion of a definitively military society in

understanding, calling its historicity into question.

decision was definitively militaristic. I understand this concept of militarism as an

combat. Second, this understanding of militarism presupposes deference to military

undertaken because of military demands, then those reasons should be considered

Spartan decisions for war as definitively militaristic. Contemporary allusions to Sparta,

embodies the virtues of militarism with which Sparta is associated.

we should want to approximate historical truth in the study of classical history.

Moreover, this false conception instills a one-dimensional understanding of classical

This conception of militarism acts as a distorting lens through which we read

staple authors, notably Herodotus and Thucydides, forcing us to wrongly transplant

claim that at times he is “buying into” a false-conception about Spartans.8 A closer

analysis of the text in accordance with considerations of historical circumstances,

Thucydides intends to propagate the aforementioned false-conception. While there are,

Thucydides perhaps should not be counted among them.

II The scholarly field concerned with debunking inaccurate understandings about

Xenophon and Plutarch, figures of antiquity whose writings point to a marked

conclusions about Spartan society.11

similar criticisms of false-conception of Spartan society. I maintain, however, that the

narrow in specifically on the nature of Sparta’s decisions to go to war, so while his

I propose a two-pronged approach to solving the aforementioned problem. The

works of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle, supplemented by the

reasons do we have to think that militarism, in itself, was fundamentally incompatible

with Spartan character.

A comprehensive analytical treatment of every decision to go to war found in

which this depiction of Spartan character is not in line with militarism.

For Herodotus, this decision is found in the choice to remain at Thermopylae in

explain what each Chapter entails.

decision to remain at Thermopylae as militaristic in reference to deference to war. It

reasoning underlying the decision to remain is unrelated to militarism.

The purpose of Chapter Three is to offer an in-depth account of what reasons

do so militaristically, giving us no reason to think that Spartans were in any hurry to

we understand classical Sparta today.

intentionally skewed the voting process through means of a non-anonymous, standing

further analyze Thucydides' illustration of Spartan military enthusiasm in light of his

specific scene to go about doing so?

I A vital moment for the sake of defining Thucydides' perception of Spartan

alternative interpretation of Sparta’s military ideology. Therefore, Thucydides challenges

military enthusiasm in this particular moment as a consequence of deception, not

Athenian and a contemporary of Xenophon, understood this cultural perception, this

addresses another possible facet of Spartan military ideology, deceit.

A number of authors, among them Aristophanes and Xenophon, allude to this

necessarily perceived by the Spartans to be an evil. Rather, it was a Spartan privilege to

be admired by virtue of their freedom to do so as granted by their constitution.24 The

two aforementioned authors, however, were Athenian. Therefore, Thucydides likely

or against it. His thinking, however, was quite different:

ἀλλὰ βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς φανερῶς ἀποδεικνυμένους τὴν γνώμην

enthusiasm is displayed by either of the two speakers in question.

II This paper moves now to the speeches of Archidamus and Sthenelaidas

Athenian emissary, the Spartans had already decided upon war:

He offers no evidence, however, to support this claim; there is nothing resembling an

Thucydides' depiction of Archidamus points to a picture of Spartan military

exhaust possible diplomatic solutions before declaring war:

ἀλλὰ ὅπλα μὲν μήπω κινεῖν,πέμπειν δὲ καὶ αἰτιᾶσθαι.