Direct Contempt - A Means of Judicial Tyranny?

392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Direct Contempt: A Means of Judicial Tyranny?
ANNOTATION
DIRECT CONTEMPT: A MEANS OF JUDICIAL

TYRANNY?
By *
ROGELIO E. SUBONG
_____________
§ I . Introduction, p. 393
§ II. Definition of Contempt, p. 396
§ III. Definition of Contempt Under the Rules of
Court, p. 397
1. Direct Contempt under Rule 71, Sec. 1, p. 398

2. Indirect Contempt under Rule 71, Sec. 3, p. 398
§ IV. Rationale of the Power of Contempt of Court,

p. 399
§ V. Nature of Contempt Proceedings, p. 400
§ VI. Types or Kinds of Contempt, p. 401
1. Direct contempt, p. 401

2. Indirect contempt, p. 401
3. Distinctions between these two (2) types of
contempt, p. 401
a) Essence, p. 401
b) Mode of prosecution, p. 402
c) Penalty, p. 403
d) Remedies of contemnor, p. 404
§ VII. Some Cases Mostly on Direct Contempt, p. 406

§ VIII. The Case Under Annotation, Silas Y. Cañada
vs. Judge Ildefonso B. Suerte, supra, p. 420
§ IX. Some Thoughts on the Case Under
Annotation, p. 422
_______________
* A.B. (UP) & LL.B. (UP)., Member, Board of Editorial Staff, Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).
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a) There was no categorical classification of the

alleged offense of complainant whether it was direct
contempt or indirect contempt, p. 422
b) It would appear that the type of contempt
committed was indirect contempt, p. 423
c) The campaign to weed the judiciary of misfits and
unfits is boldly evident in this ruling, p. 424
d) A strong signal on other judges of similar
proclivities, p. 424
§ X. Conclusion, p. 424
_______________
§ I. Introduction
Dispensing justice is the ultimate art as life is art. It does

not involve merely lining up inanimate objects or stacking
newly pressed clothes in a closet which may be done neatly
and orderly. It is dealing with a most intractable,
implacable, and elusive variable·the human behavior. It is
a kind of Holy Grail of the secular world·ever pursued yet
seemingly impossible at attainment. Perhaps the problem
lies with perception. When is it attained or when is there
enough of it? In a litigation, the winning party is wont to
proclaim that justice is indeed alive with the verdict; on the
other hand, the losing party, is likely to grieve that justice
is in fact dead with it. Of course, there are times when even
counsel and his own client differ in their views. In a
criminal case, a lawyer for the accused cabled (or „texted‰)
him about his acquittal: „I am pleased to tell you that
justice has triumphed!‰ The reply was not as excited as the
glad tidings: „Please appeal immediately.‰
No Magic Bullet
There lies the problem of judges tasked to dispense justice.
There is no magic bullet to rein in human behavior in a
litigation. There is a constant pull from opposite directions
between too little or too much. Will he be a mere potted
plant or an alert Rambo in the courtroom? If he gets too
passive and wimpy, he would be gobbled up by litigants and
lawyers. There was a judge in Quezon City
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who cut a pitiful sight as he pleaded with a nasty lawyer to

please adjust his calendar to that of the courtÊs. And the
lawyer (who was later disbarred for other mischiefs) had
the gumption to dictate the date available in his calendar
for the court to follow. On the other hand, there was a
criminal circuit judge in Pasig City notorious for running a
tight sala. He once bragged that he was so feared in his
court that when its stenographer learned that she was in
for his judicial wrath, she did not wait for it anymore, but
directly went to jail.
However, if the judge comes out blazing as a third
combatant in the courtroom, except perhaps the proverbial
kitchen sink, all charges are likely to be hurled at him,
from gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion,
corruption, manifest partiality, intellectually challenged
rulings („stupid‰), etc. So there is this search for that
balance between appropriate judicial action and abuse of
judicial power. A judge personifies the force and efficacy of
the law and the mighty power of the state behind it. The
courtroom is the battleground of wills of litigants, their
lawyers and the judge. With the cavemen and those
primitive denizens of this earth, issues were resolved by
hurling spears at their opponents in physical combat. Now,
it is supposedly more civilized by hurling words and
arguments in legal proceedings. But this is a species of
combat just the same where at times emotions run high
given the lives and fortunes at stake, so much so that the
third person in the ring, so to speak, gets involved in the
process or in the melee.
Indeed, the judge had to be circumspect in his
deportment and rulings during judicial proceedings.
Otherwise, he would be accused of bias, partiality and/or
ignorance. He has to control the proceedings, the litigants
and their lawyers, lest the proceedings would degenerate
into disorder, confusion and ultimately disaster. Thus the
Constitution and the law have armed the court with that
inherent power of self-defense and/or counter-offense
through the power of contempt. It has elevated it to the
level of „implied constitutional power‰ (Fontelera vs.
Amores, 70 SCRA 37 [1976]). There are two (2) kinds of
contempt powers: a) direct contempt and b) indirect
contempt. Direct contempt involves swift and immediate-
response actions of the trial judge to deal with or suppress
misbe-
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havior or challenge to his authority made right before him

or near him (in facie curiae) or during a hearing or similar
proceedings (e.g., ocular inspection, factual investigation,
etc.). On the other hand, indirect contempt pertains to
other kinds of misbehavior that tended to embarrass the
court or belittle its authority not in its presence but at
some distance of place and time, which does not warrant
immediate sanction upon the erring party.
Tendency to Resort to Indirect Contempt

But judges sometimes or at most times, see the
misbehavior or show of defiance on or off the court not only
as a disparaging attitude towards the court and the
authority he represents but also as a sneering affront upon
his person. Thus they either lose sight of the distinction
between the two (2) types of contempt and tend to often
invoke direct contempt so as to immediately sanction the
supposed contemnor. Or in their desire to hit hard they
exceed all bounds of legality. This exercise of the power of
direct contempt could be misused and abused, sad to say.
As the High Court noted in Paredes-Garcia vs. CA, 261
SCRA 693 (1996):
„Indeed, the contempt power could easily tempt a judge to make its
exercise nothing more than a camouflage for a wounded pride, a
burning prejudice, revenge, a misplaced passion or selfish motives.‰
The case of Silas Y. Cañada vs. Judge Ildefonso Suerte

under A.M. No. RTJ-04-1875 promulgated on November 9,
2005 demonstrates the extent to which the power of direct
contempt has been used not for the purpose of quelling acts
of misbehavior before a court but as a weapon of vengeance
to oppress and subject a litigant to the hardship and
embarrassment of unwarranted incarceration. A study of
this decision will also accord us the opportunity to review
the concept of contempt power particularly direct contempt
and the latest provisions regarding its prosecution, penalty,
and the remedies of the party subjected thereto.
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§ II. Definition of Contempt of Court
The definitions of contempt in American as well as in

Philippine jurisdiction as developed and honed from
numerous contempt cases decided by our Supreme Court
are just about the same. The underlying idea in both
jurisdictions is that it is defiance of a court of justice or any
misbehavior and insulting outburst (orally or in print)
before or near it and even outside or elsewhere and even
after the termination of a case, which tend to embarrass or
diminish the dignity of the former. The judiciary through
its courts is the weakest institution in the tripartite system
of our government. It can only be as effective as the respect
and deference that it has mustered. If it loses that respect
and high regard of the citizenry, a fatal blow has been
inflicted upon it. The country may sink into anarchy
because courts cannot anymore grant and enforce any
reliefs. Especially so if in the process of adjudicating
claims, the courtroom becomes a Taiwanese legislature
where lawmaking sometimes turns into a brawl. Under
this situation, the judge cannot impose order and decorum
for an unhampered search for the truth. Hence, the judicial
system suffers.
1. Definitions from authorities·
Thus contempt of court has been defined as „Any willful

disobedience to or disregard of, a court order or any misconduct in
the presence of a court; action that interferes with a judgeÊs ability
to administer justice or that insults the dignity of the court;
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. There are both civil
and criminal contempt; the distinction is often unclear.‰
(http://www.lectlaw.com/def/c118.htm)
Corpus Juris Secundum defines Contempt of Court „as a
disobedience to the court, by acting in opposition to the authority,
justice and dignity thereof. It signifies not only a willful disregard
or disobedience of the courtÊs order, but such conduct as tends to
bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into
disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of
justice.‰ (Vicente J. Francisco, „The Revised Rules of Court of the
Philippines,‰ Vol. IV-B, p. 260, 1973 2d., citing 17 C.J.S. 4-5)
BallentineÊs Law Dictionary defines contempt of court as
„conduct tending to bring the authority and administration of the
law into disre-
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spect or disregard, interfering with or prejudicing parties or their

witnesses during the litigation or otherwise, tending to impede,
embarrass, or obstruct the court in the discharge of its duties.‰
(Third Edition, p., 259, citing 17 Am J2d Contpt Sec. 3)
BlackÊs Law Dictionary defines contempt of court as „any act
which is calculated to embarrass, hinder or obstruct court in
administration of justice, or which is calculated to lessen its
authority or its dignity. Committed by a person who does any act in
willful contravention of its authority or dignity, or tending to
impede or frustrate the administration of justice or by one whom
being under the courtÊs authority as a party to a proceeding therein,
willfully disobeys its lawful order or fails to comply with an
undertaking which he has given.‰ (Abridged Fifth Edition, p. 168)
2. Definition from jurisprudence
Our jurisprudence usually uses about the same definition of

contempt of court as „a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity
of the court, such conduct as tends to bring the authority and
administration of law into disrespect or to interfere with or
prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation. It is
defined as a disobedience to the court by setting up an opposition to
its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful
disregard or disobedience of the courtÊs orders but such conduct as
tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of
law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due
administration of justice‰ (Abad vs. Somera, 187 SCRA 75 (1990),
citing Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA 112 [1985] and cited in Quinio vs.
CA, 335 SCRA 522 [2000]).
The common denominator in all these definitions is that

contempt of court contemplates of defiance, disrespect,
obstruction, disobedience, and belittling of a court.
§ III. Definition of Contempt of Court Under the

Rules of Court
The above definitions of contempt of court however

comprehend direct and indirect or constructive contempt.
Let us reproduce the separate definitions under the Rules
of Court of these two (2) types of contempt.
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1. Direct Contempt under Rule 71, Sec. 1:
„Direct contempt punished summarily.·A person guilty of

misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect
toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to
be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or
deposition when lawfully requested to do so, may be summarily
adjudged in contempt by such court x x x.‰
Actually, this is not a definition of direct contempt but an

illustration when a person becomes guilty of direct
contempt by committing misbehavior or conduct before a
court or near it which tended to obstruct or interrupt
proceedings, disrespect towards the court, offensive actions
towards others in court and refusal to be sworn to and
answer as a witness, which justify a court to summarily
adjudge a person in direct contempt.
2. Indirect Contempt under Rule 71, Sec. 3:
„Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.·After

charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed
by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty
of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his

official duties or in his official transactions;
b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,
or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who
after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property
by the judgment or process of any court of competent
jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter
into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing
acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs
the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled
thereto.‰
xxx xxx xxx
Again, the above provision is not also a definition of indirect

contempt but enumerations of the steps in the filing of complaint
for indirect contempt and of the acts which may be classified as
such by the court.
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§ IV. Rationale of the Power of Contempt of Court
There is always the possibility of litigants, lawyers and

even third parties to behave in a disorderly and defiant
manner before or near a court as to disrupt or mar the
proceedings or even far from a sitting court aimed to
demean the latter. The Constitution and the laws have
recognized in the court or judge this inherent power of
contempt. This is a weapon of defense, even offense, and
self-preservation. As intimated above, the life and efficacy
of the judiciary depend largely upon its standing in the
community. If it cannot command respect and is only
regarded with disparagement it is virtually dead as an
institution. When dispensing justice cannot be done
effectively, the results are disastrous. History has shown
that a people may forego or forbear material needs, but
when their thirst for justice is not quenched, such is a
combustible fuse for revolution.
Specifically, the purpose of the power of contempt is to
„vindicate the authority and maintain the dignity of the
court‰ (V.J. Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court, Vol. IV-
B, p. 262, 1973 ed., citing State vs. Orleans Civ. Dist. Ct.,
112 La. 182, 36 SCRA 315). And to uphold its zealously
guarded image of dignity and capability, it is empowered to:
a) forthwith inflict the appropriate penalty of fine or
imprisonment or both upon the guilty party as an incident
in a basic proceeding to prevent its derailment, and b) to
compel the performance usually of a positive act with the
imposition of fine and incarceration unless the contemnor
obeys what he refuses to. In this situation, the freedom of
the contemnor depends upon him, or „he carries the keys to
his prison in his own pockets.‰ (Galvez vs. Republic Surety
& Insurance Co., Inc., 105 Phil. 944 [1959]).
This case of continued incarceration until obedience or
compliance with the order of a court, involves a battle of
pride and will until one of them blinks. And the court
would be under tremendous pressure to give in if there is
adverse publicity about the reasonableness and propriety of
its jail order. The contemnor is also in the same
predicament given the threat or continued incarceration. A
mother was imprisoned for more than two (2) years upon
orders
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of an American court until she disclosed where she hid her

child in a custody battle with her husband. Neither the
court nor the mother would give in despite adverse
publicity over the draconian order of the former and
hardships from indefinite imprisonment of the latter. It
was painfully ironic for the mother who thought that the
suit would bring her and her child together during the
pendency of the suit.
§ V. Nature of Contempt of Court Proceedings
A contempt proceeding has been classified early on since

the famous 1933 case of Slade Perkins vs. Director of
Prison, 58 Phil. 271 (1933) as a sui generis. It defies being
categorized either as „criminal action‰ or a „civil action.‰
Sui generis means „of its own kind, peculiar, for example, a
statutory proceeding for declaratory judgment‰
(BallantineÊs Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 1236).
Perhaps, this is a euphemism for a legal mongrel.
It partakes of the nature of a criminal action because of
the sanctions pursuant to a declaration of guilty for
contempt of court, fine and imprisonment. If the contempt
is direct, the affront and disrespect is in facie curiae or in
the face of the court, the prosecutor in a sense is the State.
On the other hand, if the contempt is indirect or
constructive, it then partakes of the nature of a civil action
when the actual goal is to accord relief to a private party-
litigant wherein the recalcitrant party is compelled to obey
court orders or to satisfy the demands of a litigant by
virtue of the basic legal action. The prosecutor is a party-
litigant. Thus explains its being civil in nature, because of
its remedial and coercive effect usually upon a litigant or in
some instances, upon third parties involved in the case.
A contempt proceeding is an adjunct or auxiliary action
arising from a main case. There is no original action for
contempt because there is yet no court proceeding to
disrupt, court order to defy or trial judge to denigrate in his
handling of the case. It is usually an offshoot of a main
controversy where litigants, counsel and even third parties
with particular involvement in a case may have a run-in
with the court. In any case, even as it is not an
independent
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or initiatory action, it is classified under our Rules of Court
as a Special Civil Action.
§ VI. Types or Kinds of Contempt of Court
As already set forth above, there are two (2) kinds of

contempt:
1. Direct contempt·as defined by the Rules of Court:

„misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court (in facie
curiae) as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the
same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to
answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or
deposition when lawfully requested so to do.‰ (Rule 71, Sec.
1). This is the subject of this Annotation;
2. Indirect contempt·where the misbehavior verbal or written
is committed not in facie curiae or not in the presence of or
so near a court or judge as to interrupt or disrupt judicial
proceedings, e.g., contemptuous acts committed outside of
the court in session, misbehavior of an officer of a court in
the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or
injunction granted by a court or judge, any abuse of or any
unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a
court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper
conduct tending, directly, or indirectly to impede obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice, etc. Actually, Rule 71,
Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court has not provided for definition of
indirect contempt, but it enumerated situations which may
be considered as indirect contempt.
It is also sometimes referred to as constructive contempt;
3. Distinctions between these two (2) types of contempt:
a) Essence·
The essence of direct contempt is that it is committed in the

presence of the presiding judge usually in the course of hearing or
judicial proceedings. The essence of indirect contempt is that it is
committed away from the presence of the court or the presiding
judge. In fact, it could be committed far from the court demeaned
and even after the case in question has been decided, as when a
local paper or an announcer in a province viciously denounces a
judge for his decision of a case in Manila. The rule before is that
contempt applies only to pending cases but lately, it also
402

applies to cases already decided „where such punitive action is

necessary to protect the court and its dignity and to vindicate it
from acts or conduct intended or calculated to degrade, ridicule or
bring the court into disfavor and thereby erode or destroy public
confidence in that court.‰ (People vs. Godoy, 243 SCRA 64 [1995]).
b) Mode of prosecution·
In direct contempt, the sanction is swiftly and immediately

imposed upon commission of the offense or misbehavior. There is
actually no prosecution since the contemnor is „summarily adjudged
in contempt.‰ A litigant who yells at the judge or makes similar
outbursts even against others or inflicts physical harm against
anyone in court may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt and
penalized right off. In fact, some judges are so squeamish about the
slightest distraction that they regard a ringing cellphone as
„contemptuous behavior.‰ Years ago when beepers were in vogue, a
Quezon City judge sent to jail for a few hours a man whose
pocketbell beeped while inside a courtroom. Just like that. The poor
fellow who furiously tried to stop the beep was not even allowed to
explain. Most courtrooms have prominent signs/warnings to turn off
or put in silent mode cellphones. Some prohibit entry into and
egress from courtrooms during proceedings. A Sandiganbayan
justice used to go into sudden outburst even from a barely audible
whisper while his court was in session.
If one is „summarily adjudged‰ with direct contempt it would
seem that it is immediately executory. However, in Oclarit vs.
Paderanga, 350 SCRA 260 [2001], it was held:
„Even then, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or

enforceable. The contemner must be afforded a reasonable remedy to
extricate or purge himself of the contempt. Thus in the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, the Court introduced a new provision
granting a remedy to a person adjudged in direct contempt by any court.
Such person may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of
certiorari or prohibition. In such case, the execution of the judgment
shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition provided the
contemner files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment
and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should
the petition be decided against him.‰
In spite of the above holding, direct contempt is still immediately

executory unless a petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed and
bail is secured. In the meantime the order of direct contempt should
be immedi-
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ately executory unless the court suspends execution of such order

and gives the contemnor a chance to avail of his remedies.
All kinds of distractions may be considered as species of direct
contempt depending upon the idiosyncrasies of the judge. The point
is that the finding and holding of guilty is made right off under the
principle that order, solemnity, and decorum have to be maintained
in court.
As to indirect contempt, the contemnor must be formally
charged, allowed to comment thereto and thereafter a hearing is
held where he may defend himself or avail of counsel. While this
necessarily arises from a basic case, this may be treated as a
separate incident and decided separately or included in the
resolution of the main case. What readily comes to mind is the case
of Finance Secretary Cesar Purisima, one of the so-called „Hyatt 10‰
who resigned in protest and disgust from the Pres. Gloria M. Arroyo
cabinet. In their dramatic announcement of their mass resignations
in July, 2005, Sec. Purisima charged that the president was
influencing the Supreme Court to delay the resolution of the Value
Added Tax case then pending before it. He was ordered to show
cause why he should not be cited for contempt thereafter.
When the VAT case was resolved by the High Court, it included a
finding of contempt on Sec. Purisima who was ordered to pay a fine
of P20,000.
c) Penalty·
The penalty for direct contempt is set forth in Rule 71, Section 1,
a „fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a
court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two
hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if
it be a lower court.‰
The tenor of the penalty provision is about similar to that in the
Rules of Court of 1940 and 1964. The amount of fine was however
increased in keeping with the present standards of living. The 1964
Rules of Court provided that the contemnor shall be „punished by
fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a superior court, or a judge
thereof or by fine not exceeding ten pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be an inferior court.‰
Under present living standards, the amounts of fine of

P2,000.00 and P200.00 for Regional Trial Court or of
equivalent or higher
404

rank and for inferior court, respectively, are still fleabite. It

is however the prison term that comes out as the more
effective sanction and deterrent.
On the other hand, the following are the penalty
provisions for indirect contempt, under Rule 71, Sec. 7:
i) Against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent

or higher in rank·is „a fine not exceeding thirty
thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
months, or both‰;
ii) Against a lower court·a „fine not exceeding five
thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1)
month, or both‰;
iii) if the contempt is for violation of a writ of injunction,
temporary restraining order or status quo order·
contemnor „may also be ordered to make complete
restitution to the party injured by such violation of the
property involved or such amount as may be alleged
and proved.‰ This is enforceable by a writ of execution;
iv) And if the contempt consists in the refusal or omission
to do an act which can be complied with by the
contemnor·„he may be imprisoned by order of the
court concerned until he performs it.‰ The previous
provision is that „he may be imprisoned by order of a
superior court until he performs it.‰ In other words, if
by superior court the RTC is included, the municipal
court before cannot incarcerate contemnor until
compliance. With this new provision, which used the
word „court‰ the inferior court can now also exercise
such power;
d) Remedies of contemnor·
Under direct contempt, the contemnor cannot avail of the
remedy of appeal but the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. In
other words, appeal is not an appropriate resort owing to the
urgency and the interlocutory nature of the order or resolution of
the finding of direct contempt. It does not dispose of the main issue
but only incidents therein. If appeals were allowed, there might be a
scenario where a contempt ruling is separately appealed and then
an adverse ruling on the main case is also appealed. There would be
two (2) separate appeals from the same case.
Besides, a contempt ruling mainly involves discretion which had
to be quashed by a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The special civil actions of certiorari
and prohibition
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are viewed with urgency and should be given priority in their

resolution by the appellate courts. Ordinary appeals may not
provide the immediate remedy prayed for.
Direct contempt imposed by the municipal court used to be
appealable to the RTC while that imposed by the latter was no
longer appealable to the High Court. Under Rule 71, Sec. 3, the
orders of contempt of municipal courts and of the RTC are both no
longer appealable but they may be challenged by Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Then earlier too, petition for Habeas Corpus was also resorted to
especially when the order of direct contempt included
imprisonment. (Tinangan vs. Perlas, L-23965, Jan. 30, 1968, 130
Phil. 402; 22 SCRA 394). Now, it would seem that the weight of
authority is that it may still be availed of only in extreme cases. But
Habeas Corpus should exclude the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition the moment the former is resorted to since the latter is
also „a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.‰ In other words,
petitions for certiorari and prohibition may only be filed when there
has been no availment of other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, like Habeas Corpus. (Florenz
Regalado, Remedial Law Compedium, Eighth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 818).
Thus, Rule 71, Sec. 2 provides the following steps that may
be undertaken by a person „summarily adjudged‰ with
direct contempt:
i. He may file a motion for reconsideration if the penalty

is only fine and no imprisonment since this is usually
required before resort to certiorari. Although this
petition could be immediately resorted to without such
motion in excepted cases. e.g., extreme urgency, patent
violation of law, etc., especially if there is a jail
component to the penalty. Appeal cannot be availed of
from the order of contempt by both the municipal court
and the Regional Trial Court;
ii. To suspend execution of the order pending resolution of
the petition, the contemnor should file a motion for
grant of bail and pay or put up the corresponding bond
issued by the court which issued the order of direct
contempt. This is mandatory for that court to fix the
bond. Otherwise, this would be another point against
the respondent judge. In the case under Annota
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tion, this refusal to fix a bond was considered as gross

ignorance of law.
If this bond were not allowed for the temporary release
of the contemnor, as a matter of right, then the filing
of the petition for certiorari or prohibition would be
useless;
iii. The bond shall included an undertaking by the
contemnor „that he will abide by and perform the
judgment should the petition be decided against him.‰
As to indirect contempt, there is the remedy of appeal,

since there is not much urgency because even the order of
imprisonment may not be immediate until finality and
there is the suspension of the order upon filing a bond.
Thus it is so provided: „the judgment or final order or a
court in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the
proper court as in criminal cases, but execution of the
judgment or final order shall not be suspended until a bond
is filed by the person adjudged in contempt x x x.‰ ( Rule
71, Sec. 11)
§ VII. Some Cases Mostly on Direct Contempt
a) In re: Marcelino Aguas, 1 Phil. 1 (1901)·

The first case in our Philippine Reports at the turn of the 20th
century involved direct contempt. This was noted as a testament to
the courage of a Filipino lawyer who stood up against a hostile court
as early as then. This case held that there was no contempt by a
lawyer who protested the treatment of his witness by the court. In a
trial before the CFI of Pampanga in 1900 more than 100 years ago,
the trial judge had earlier advised a witness to look at him instead
at the lawyer Atty. Marcelino Aguas while testifying. The witness
did not heed his directive. Suddenly, this judge stood up and
approached the witness and shook him (per the lawyer) or turned
him around (per the judge) with the following words: „Lingon ang
mucha.‰
This prompted Atty. Aguas to protest this action as coercive of
the witness. He asked that this occurrence be made of record and
the hearing be postponed. Thereafter, the clerk entered into the
record the incident that the lawyer was „wanting in respect‰ for
using „improper phrases,‰ and that he interrupted opposing counsel
in previous hearings. He was cited in contempt and suspended from
practice for twenty days. Atty. Aguas appealed the ruling which was
denied. But a hearing was granted
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wherein it was adduced from the witnesses of the judge that during
the questioned incident he rose from his seat with a „menacing
attitude‰ and „with a voice and body trembling‰ as he protested the
action of the judge as „coercive of the witness.‰ The judge reaffirmed
its earlier finding of contempt.
Held: Judgment reversed. The High Court found that the action
of the judge in seizing the witness by the shoulder and „turning him
about was unwarranted and an interference with that freedom from
unlawful personal violence to which every witness is entitled while
giving testimony in a court of justice.‰ The High Court noted that
according to the witnesses and the judge, the lawyerÊs „attitude was
menacing‰ (bastante amenazadora) when he made the protest.
However, it concluded that: „The specific act from which it was
inferred that his attitude was menacing should have been testified
to by the witnesses and found by the court and failing that, the
record does not show concrete facts sufficient to justify the
conclusion that he was disrespectful to the court or offensive to its
dignity.‰
b) People vs Abaya, 43 Phil. 247 (1922)·
In this case the High Court held that appeal cannot be resorted
to in case of summary proceedings for contempt. The defendant in
this case was a chief clerk in the office of the district engineer in
Ilocos Sur. He was subpoenaed to appear before the district auditor
of said province and to testify therein pursuant to the latterÊs
authority to conduct such investigation. Defendant appeared but
refused to take oath and to testify claiming that he was not
authorized by his immediate superior. The auditor reported the
incident to the CFI and the provincial fiscal filed a complaint for
violation of pertinent provisions of the Administrative Code for
refusal to testify.
After hearing, he was found guilty as charged (of contempt) and
was sentenced to pay P25.00 plus costs. Defendant appealed.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The High court held that: „We do not
think that appeal to this court lies in the present case.‰ It further
declared that: „Such cases are punished summarily and it was
clearly not the intention of the legislators that they should be
appealable. The fact that in the trial of the present case the court
below may have observed greater formality that ordinarily required
in summary proceedings does not, of course, alter the character of
the offense charge or affect the question of the appealability of the
judgment.‰
408

c) Carag vs. Warden of the Jail, 53 Phil. 85 (1929)·

Habeas Corpus was denied against an order of direct contempt
issued within the jurisdiction of the court. In a hearing in an
election case before the CFI of Cagayan the lawyer for the contestee
was asked by the judge what were the counter-protest and defense
of his client. He replied that they were general denials and special
defenses. Then he was directed to read them aloud as set forth in
his pleadings. The lawyer refused claiming hoarse voice even as the
judge insisted that he read his pleading in open court. It got to a
point that the judge threatened counsel with punishment if he
refused to read his pleading but the latter was adamant. So right
then and there, the judge ordered the sheriff to jail counsel for
„disobedience and insubordination.‰ Thereafter an Order was issued
formalizing the confinement of counsel for such refusal to obey the
order of the court to read his claims and defenses in the case.
He instituted a petition for Habeas Corpus claiming among
others that the „judge was without legal power or authority to make
summary or direct contempt of acts which from their nature, did
not constitute such summary or direct contempt.‰
Held: Petition dismissed. The High Court found that under the
Code of Civil procedure prevailing at the time, the defendant „may
read his answer as his statement of defense, if the judge so directs.‰
It did not accord credence to the claim of the lawyer that he had a
hoarse voice as he was audible enough to make the verbal exchange
with the judge. „The evidence cannot be reviewed for the purpose of
determining the guilt or innocence of the person detained. The
justice or propriety of the commitment is not open to review. If the
court in committing a person for contempt acted within its
jurisdiction, its action, is final and the writ of Habeas Corpus will
not lie (28 C.J. pp. 96-98).‰
d) Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271 (1933)·
This was an original action for Habeas Corpus before the
Supreme Court filed by Idonah Slade Perkins seeking her release
from custody of the Director of Prisons pursuant to a contempt
order by the CFI of Manila for disobedience to its final judgment.
This must have been a celebrated case in the 1930s since this
involved a prominent couple then fighting over their conjugal
properties. After a protracted litigation which earlier reached the
High Court (Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205 [1933]) the wife,
Idonah Slade Perkins was directed by the CFI to render accounting
of all conjugal properties, deliver those that pertained to her
husband and
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execute the necessary deeds of transfer therefor. She refused to obey

this order and was adjudged guilty of contempt of court and
committed to prison until she complied with the same.
She filed this petition for writ of Habeas Corpus charging that
the commitment order was unlawful and that she was entitled to be
discharged therefrom. She questioned the jurisdiction of the CFI to
issue the commitment order.
Held: Writ denied. The High Court noted that the CFI had
jurisdiction over the offense charged against Mrs. Idonah Slade
Perkins, contempt of court, of her person who was properly brought
before the court, and jurisdiction to hear the charge, receive
evidence against her and her defense and thereafter decide on the
issue. It cited a provision of the Code of Civil Procedure which
extended the writ „to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty‰ but such writ was not
allowed if the confinement or detention was „by virtue of a court
order‰ and that „the court or magistrate had jurisdiction to issue
the process, rendered the judgment, or make the order.‰
The High Court however indicated to Mrs. Perkins that „in order
to purge herself of contempt,‰ all that she had to do is to obey the
court order. In other words, she held the „keys to her prison in her
pocket,‰ so to speak.
What is significant about the decision is that it made
authoritative pronouncements on the nature of contempt as a
sanction. Generations of lawyers refer to this decision for nuggets of
holdings on the concept of contempt proceedings. The following are
some holdings which now seem commonplace:
„The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence
is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court and
consequently, to the due administration of justice.‰ (citation) „The
exercise of this power is as old as the English history itself and has
always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts.
Being a common-law power, inherent in all courts the moment the courts
of the United States were called into existence they become vested with
it. It is a power coming to us from the common law, and, so far as we
know, has been universally admitted and recognized.‰ (citation)
The statute has divided contempt into two kinds: Â(1) Direct contempt,
which may be published (punished) summarily; and (2)
410

constructive contempt (or indirect contempt) which may be punished only

after due hearing.Ê
xxx
The exercise of the power to punish contempt has a twofold aspect,
namely: First, the proper punishment of the guilty party for his
disrespect to the court or its order, and the second, to compel his
performance of some act or duty required of him by the court, which he
refuses to perform. x x x Due perhaps to this twofold aspect of the
exercise of the power to punish them, contempts are classified as civil or
criminal. A civil contempt has been defined as the failure to do something
ordered to be done by a court or a judge in a civil case for the benefit of
the opposing party therein and a criminal contempt, as conduct that is
directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting
judicially as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority and
dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act.‰
e) Cornejo vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950)

This case involved a lawyer who filed a strongly worded
memorandum in a case even as he was not a counsel therein. Atty.
Miguel Cornejo was first approached by a litigant to handle his case
before the court. He however referred it to another lawyer. In the
course of the proceedings, Atty. Cornejo was presented as a witness
but he was virtually prevented from testifying by the continuous
objections of opposing counsel which were sustained by the trial
judge.
Feeling frustrated, Atty. Cornejo left the witness stand and went
to counselÊs table and tried to enter his appearance so that he can
„say as counsel what he had been prevented from saying as
witness.‰ This plea was denied by the trial judge as there was
already a lawyer of record and proper formalities were not observed
as to his entry of appearance.
After a few days, Atty. Cornejo filed a memorandum assailing the
judgeÊs partiality for the plaintiff for urging the lawyer for the
defendant „to fix the case as his situation is hopeless‰ and further
protested therein the „unjust, hostile, vindictive and dangerous
attitude of the judge.‰ Copies of said memorandum were sent to the
Secretary of Justice, the Supreme Court, etc.
The trial judge reacted with an order explaining that it was
usual practice for the court to explore the possibility of amicable
settlement. He further required Atty. Cornejo to explain why he
should not be cited for contempt for appearing in court when he was
not a counsel in the case,
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„for offensive language, for misbehavior in the presence of the court

and for publishing his memorandum‰ by furnishing copies thereof
to certain government entities.
Atty. Cornejo answered the order and then he filed this Petition
for Prohibition before the High Court. Meanwhile, the case was
decided against defendant and he was cited for contempt by the
trial court and fined P100 with imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Thus this issue was included for resolution by the High Court. He
further prayed for the reversal of the decision against defendant, as
if he were counsel of the latter.
Held: Petition denied. The High Court held that „no appeal lies
from an order of a superior court declaring a person in direct
contempt thereof.‰ Then it held that the submission of a
memorandum was contemptuous because Atty. Cornejo was not a
counsel in the case, it contained offensive language against the trial
court and it was published by furnishing copies to other government
entities. The court reproduced a portion of the memorandum where
Atty. Cornejo prayed that it „be taken as a protest against what he
believes to be unjust, hostile, vindictive and dangerous attitude or
conduct of the presiding Judge.‰
f) Patricio vs. Suplico, 196 SCRA 140 (1991)·
This is a petition for certiorari to nullify, among others reliefs,
the direct contempt order issued against petitioner. Shortly after
the EDSA revolution, in line with the campaign to purge the
judiciary of misfits, some 20 lawyers in Capiz province, signed a
petition asking for the removal of CFI judge Enrique Suplico of that
province. Petitioner who also signed the petition then filed a motion
for inhibition of said judge from hearing some 17 criminal cases
pending before his sala. He alleged as ground his having signed this
petition and attached thereto the copy of the same.
The judge replied with an order denying the motion, citing
petitioner guilty of direct contempt and imposing fine with jail term
in case of inability to pay the same. This order was challenged
before the High Court.
Held: Order set aside. The High Court reiterated those settled
principles about the power of contempt vested upon the courts:
„All courts have the inherent power to punish for contempt, this being
essential to their right of self-preservation. Under the Rules of Court,
contempt is classified into direct, and indirect or constructive.‰
412

It also discussed several distinctions between direct and indirect

contempt which were also discussed in this Annotation. It did not
categorically rule whether the alleged offense was direct contempt
but it was the drift of its findings. It concluded:
„Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or

arrogant belligerence, a virtual defiance of the court. No such attitude is
discernible in the statements of the motion for inhibition or the petition
thereto annexed.‰
g) De Guia vs. Guerrero, Jr., 234 SCRA 625 (1994)·

This was a complaint for ignorance of the law against a judge
who ordered the incarceration of an assistant prosecutor merely
because he requested for a brief suspension of hearing for a valid
reason. During a trial of a criminal case in the province of Laguna,
an assistant provincial prosecutor Agosila asked for suspension of
hearing to secure xerox copy of a Torrens title which was presented
during the hearing. Whereupon, the trial judge instead of acceding
to the request held the asst. prosecutor in direct contempt of court
„to teach him a lesson‰ for delaying the hearing and for failure to
investigate the pertinent records with the Register of Deeds.
Held: Judge fined for erroneously citing the fiscal in direct
contempt. The High Court found „lack of impropriety in the conduct
of Agosila to merit a direct contempt.‰ It also failed „to see any
contumacious attitude on the part of Agosila to delay the
proceedings of the court.‰ And it also seriously doubted the choice of
remedy of the judge on the request for suspension of hearing. It
reiterated the settled rule that the power of contempt is an inherent
power of the court to preserve and protect its dignity from
misbehavior and contumacious refusal to obey its lawful orders.
However, it must be exercised judiciously and sparingly·and „as a
last resort when all other alternative courses of action are
exhausted in the pursuit of maintaining respect to the court and its
processes.‰
h) Wicker vs. Arcangel, 252 SCRA 444 (1996)·
This was a petition for certiorari assailing the orders of a trial
judge citing a lawyer and his client in direct contempt. In a
complaint for annulment of certain deeds of sale of a Forbes Park
property, the presiding judge was the subject of a derogatory motion
for inhibition by the petitioner through counsel. He alleged that the
judge was „personally recruited‰ for the case by a lawyer and that
his partiality and integrity were doubtful. Incensed by this motion,
the judge issued an order directing
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VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 9, 2005 413

plaintiff and counsel to show cause why they should not be cited for
contempt for the „malicious, derogatory and contemptuous‰
allegations in the motion. And finding the explanation not
satisfactory, the judge issued an order citing them in contempt to
suffer five (5) days of imprisonment and P100 fine each. They filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied. Then petitioners
submitted their „profuse apologies‰ to the trial judge but thereafter
submitted another pleading belittling the intellectual competence of
the judge to the effect that he „simply cannot do in the RTC of
Makati.‰
Held: The trial judge was justified in citing petitioners in
contempt. It found that: „The allegations (about his being
„recruited‰ for the case) are derogatory to the integrity and honor of
respondent judge and constitute an unwarranted criticism of the
administration of justice in this country.‰ His assignment to Makati
City was by virtue of an Administrative Order issued the High
Court. And the personal attack on his intellectual competence
confirmed the „contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant
belligerence‰ in the basic motion for inhibition.
The High Court clarified the nature of the offense of petitioners:
„What is involved in this case is an instance of direct contempt,
since it involves a pleading allegedly containing derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in
which the proceedings are pending, as distinguished from a
pleading filed in another case. The former has been held to be
equivalent to Âmisbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a
court or judge as to interrupt the proceeding before the sameÊ within
the meaning of Rule 71, Section 1 of the Rules of Court and,
therefore, direct contempt.‰
i) Veluz vs. Babaran, 298 SCRA 471 (1997)·
The judge in this case was charged with grave abuse of authority
and/or ignorance of law when it cited complainant in contempt and
ordered his indefinite incarceration. The incident stemmed from a
case of forcible entry and detainer against complainant. The
contemptuous offense happened during an ocular inspection of the
disputed parcel of land. When asked whether his lawyer sent a
representative, complainant suddenly pulled out a long bolo and
tried to hack the judge and the lawyer for the plaintiff. This caused
them to scamper away in fear. Thereafter, the judge issued an order
citing complainant in contempt and ordering the police to put him
behind bars „until further orders from the court.‰ Thus this
complaint against the trial judge.
414
Held: The judge was justified in citing complainant in direct

contempt except that he erred in ordering his indefinite
incarceration in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 71 which provided the
penalty then to be one (1) day imprisonment and P10.00 fine. The
High Court ratiocinated:
„ComplainantÊs act of rushing towards respondent and Atty. Salun-at

with a long bolo evidently aimed at preventing the latterÊs entry to the
disputed land for the scheduled ocular inspection/relocation survey
coupled with complainantÊs threatening remarks hurled at them as they
were fleeing undoubtedly constitute direct contempt of court deserving to
be summarily punished. Respondent was therefore, justified in holding
complainant liable for direct contempt of court. However, when
respondent ordered complainantÊs indefinite incarceration, he cannot be
said to have acted in accordance with law.‰
j) Zarate vs. Balderian, 329 SCRA 558 (2000)·

This was a complaint for gross ignorance of the law and serious
misconduct against a judge. This trial judge based in Cavite
Province issued an order of direct contempt against a counsel for
the accused in an accident case before his sala for his failure to
appear during the hearing. He ordered his arrest and indefinite
incarceration which was effected in Makati City while said lawyer
was attending a hearing to the latterÊs embarrassment.
Held: Judge was guilty of gross ignorance and suspended.
Holding the lawyer guilty of direct contempt for failure to appear at
a hearing was „manifestly erroneous‰ citing Silva vs. Lee, Jr., 169
SCRA 512 (1989) which ruled that such failure does not constitute
direct contempt. The High Court also held that such absence during
the hearing amounted to indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule
71. „This provision however, also states that indirect contempt can
be sanctioned only after the proper charge has been filed and the
respondent has been given the opportunity to be heard. In the
instant case, neither requisite was met, as the Order for
complainantÊs arrest was issued summarily.‰
k) Bugaring vs. Espano, 349 SCRA 687 (2001)·
This was Petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals upholding the Order of the RTC judge citing a
lawyer with direct contempt allegedly committed in the course of
proceedings therein. In this case, counsel for the plaintiff filed a
motion to cite for contempt a Register of Deeds but ironically was
the one declared in con-
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VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 9, 2005 415

tempt. During the hearing on this motion, the lawyer insisted on

marking his exhibits even as the trial judge expressed the desire to
allow the counsel for the Register of Deeds to file a written
opposition to the motion. It got to a point that the judge banged his
gavel to stop counsel from further talking and insisting on his
desire to mark his exhibits. The judge was further provoked when
the lawyer declared, among other statements, that he „knew better‰
than the court and that he had been winning his certiorari cases.
He was cited in direct contempt, fined P3,000 and sent to jail for
three (3) days which he paid and served. He challenged the ruling
before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the ruling of the trial
court except that it directed the return of P1,000 out of the fine of
P3,000 as the limit was only P2,000.
Held: CA ruling affirmed. The High Court held:
„Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary

evidence marked to the extent of interrupting the opposing counsel and
the court showed disrespect to said counsel and the court, was defiant of
the courts system for an orderly proceeding, and obstructed the
administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt is inherent to
all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceeding and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of
the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice. Direct
contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as
to the case at bar, and can be punished summarily without hearing.
Hence, petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in the
actuation of the respondent Judge in issuing the contempt order inside
her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend
himself or make and immediate reconsideration. The records show that
petitioner was cited in contempt of court during the hearing in the sala of
respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for reconsideration of the
contempt order on the same day.‰
l) Oclarit vs. Paderanga, 350 SCRA 260 (2001)·

This was a special civil action for certiorari assailing the order of
contempt issued against a lawyer made in open court during a
hearing. Before a RTC judge in Cagayan de Oro, petitioner-lawyer
tried to submit a compromise agreement forged before the barangay
which was opposed by the other counsel. The court ruled that the
compromise agreement was only signed before the barangay captain
but should have been before the
416

court. While petitioner continued to explain the validity of said

compromise agreement, the trial judge repeatedly ordered him to
„shut up.‰ Petitioner requested the trial judge not to shout at him
but at this point he was cited in contempt „for settling the case
before the barangay captain.‰ Petitioner remarked that the judge
was „becoming very arrogant.‰ The judge forthwith issued a verbal
order holding petitioner in direct contempt, fined P1,000 and
ordered jail for one (1) day. He paid the fine and served the jail
term.
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Certiorari. The issues were
whether petitioner was guilty of direct contempt and if so, whether
the order need not state the facts upon which it was based, and if
said order was immediately executory.
Held: Petitioner was not guilty of direct contempt. The High
Court held that there was „nothing contumacious‰ in submitting a
compromise agreement signed before a barangay captain since this
practice is allowed. And the trial judge should have expressed the
facts upon which his order of contempt was based. As to whether
the order is immediately executory, the High Court held:
„Even then, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or

enforceable. The contemner must be afforded a reasonable remedy to
extricate or purge himself of the contempt. Thus, in the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, the Court introduced a new provision
granting a remedy to a person adjudged in direct contempt by any court.
Such person may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of
certiorari or prohibition. In such case, the execution of the judgment
shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition provide the
contemner files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment
and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should
the petition be decided against him.‰
Finding that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion in

issuing the order of contempt as it was he who repeatedly shouted
at petitioner, the High Court made the unique directive: it ordered
the trial judge to reimburse the fine he imposed from his own
pocket and directed the Court Administrator to file an
administrative case against the offending judge.
m) Eballa vs. Paas, 362 SCRA 369 (2001)·
The petitioner in this case who was declared in contempt filed a
complaint for ignorance of law and discourtesy. Petitioner was the
accused in a case for trespass to dwelling and malicious mishchief.
During her
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arraignment, her counsel of record did not appear and she

requested for postponement claiming having filed a motion for
reinvestigation but which was wrongly filed with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasay City. She refused to sign the certificate of
arraignment and made known her refusal in a loud voice for which
she was cited in direct contempt and jailed for three (3) hours.
Held: Charge of ignorance of law dismissed. The High Court
found that the order of direct contempt was proper owing to the
behavior of petitioner during her arraignment. It reiterated the
settled rule that the remedy of direct contempt was a petition for
certiorari or prohibition under Rule 71, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
n) Soriano et al. vs. CA, et al., 363 SCRA 725 (2001)·
This is a petition questioning among other matters, the ruling of
contempt upon a lawyer issued by the trial court. In a trial
involving implied contract for services the lawyer for the defendant
moved for the inhibition of the trial judge who denied the motion.
This resulted in the filing of „Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration‰
whose tenor was not to the liking of the judge. He promptly issued
an order to show cause why the lawyer should not be cited for
contempt. And during one of the hearings scheduled for the
promulgation of judgment on the contempt charge, counsel failed to
appear but just the same the court found him guilty of direct
contempt ordered jailed for five (5) days and fined P100.00. This
order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It cited the innuendoes
made by counsel about the intellectual competence of the trial
judge., i.e., „a first year law student‰ would know the interpretation
of a provision of the pertinent Supreme Court circular on
injunction, that „one had the right to assume that this Court was
sufficiently acquainted with the principle,‰ and the „court could not
get correctly even this elementary fact,‰ etc.
Thus resort to the Supreme Court was undertaken. Among other
incidents this ruling was assailed through a petition for review for
certiorari and mandamus.
Held: Order of direct contempt reversed but both judge and
lawyer were admonished „to observe strictly the strictures of the
profession.‰ The High Court held that the remedy of direct
contempt was certiorari or prohibition which was correctly resorted
to by said lawyer. It then concluded:
„After a perusal of the charges of direct contempt of court, we find that

Atty. PadillaÊs innuendoes are not necessarily disrespectful
418

to the court as to be considered contumacious. A lawyerÊs remarks

explaining his position in a case under consideration do not necessarily
assume the level of contempt that justifies the court to exercise the
power of contempt. Courts must be slow to punish for direct contempt.
This drastic power must be used sparingly in cases of clearly
contumacious behavior in facie curiae.‰
o) Guillen vs. Canon, 373 SCRA 70 (2003)·

This is a complaint for unjust order and ignorance of the law
against a judge for erroneously citing with direct contempt
occupants on a land for allegedly disobeying his injunction order. In
an eviction case involving residents of a one hectare land, the judge
issued a preliminary mandatory injunction in favor of the plaintiff.
The occupants were reported to have violated the injunction when
they tried to make some repairs on their houses, etc. Upon being
told through affidavits that his injunction order was not being
followed, he forthwith issued the direct contempt order against
some defendants.
Held: Judge found guilty of issuing unjust orders. The High
Court found that the judge failed to observe proper procedure in the
prosecution for contempt. It noted that the occupants were charged
with direct contempt contrary to Section 1, Rule 71 which pertains
to „behavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same.‰ The offense, if any „was
actually indirect contempt since this pertains to Âdisobedience to a
lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court.Ê ‰ The
proper steps for indirect contempt was not followed as the judge
immediately issued the orders of arrest upon being formally and
orally informed of alleged disobedience of his injunction. The
procedure under Section 4, Rule 71 was not observed requiring a
separate complaint for contempt to be filed, docketed, heard and
decided separately.
p) Torrente vs. Sardido, 396 SCRA 11 (2003)·
This case pertained to another judge who also cited a lawyer in
contempt and directed him to pay a fine for failure to appear during
a hearing. He further ordered the latter to reimburse the expenses
of the opposing party, for asking for postponement during the
hearing. This order was challenged.
Held: Failure to appear may constitute indirect contempt and it
needed a hearing before sanction is imposed. The High Court also
recited the usual principles on the exercise of the power of
contempt.
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„With regard to the matter of contempt, it must be remembered that the

power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve
order in judicial proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of
justice. The courts must exercise the power of contempt for purposes that
are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the
judges but for the functions they exercise. These judges have time and
again been enjoined to exercise their contempt power judiciously,
sparingly with utmost restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the
same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court not for
retaliation or vindication.
„In the case at bar, the fine imposed on counsel for complainant as
well as the order for him to reimburse the expenses of private
complainant are unjust because both he and his counsel were not given
an opportunity to explain their side. In short, respondent summarily
imposed the sanctions on complainant and counsel. Such conduct of
respondent is highly improper and only too deserving of reproof x x x.‰
q) Ruiz vs. How, 413 SCRA 333 (2003)·

This is a charge against a trial judge for oppression, grave abuse
of authority, and gross ignorance of the law. A stenographer who
was at loggerheads with the judge was issued a strongly worded
memorandum by the latter to forthwith return his periodic
Performance Ratings which she failed to submit at once. In said
memorandum the judge even accused said stenographer of having
charged him „madaraya.‰ Owing to previous incidents between the
two, the stenographer received the memorandum under protest and
made notations therein which was not to liking of the judge. This
resulted in a citation for direct contempt which sent the
stenographer to jail for 24 hours.
Held: Judge was guilty of abuse of authority and fined by the
High Court. While the High Court found that the charges against
the judge „may be without basis, he cannot escape liability for
injudicious and careless wielding of the courtÊs power of contempt
which resulted in the summary incarceration of complainant
without giving her the opportunity to be heard and present evidence
in her defense.‰
It cited Patricio vs. Suplico, 196 SCRA 146 (1991) on the
distinction between direct contempt („misbehavior in the presence
of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same‰) and indirect contempt (misbehavior
of an officer of a court in the perfor-
420

mance of his official duties, or „disobedience of or resistance to a

lawful writ, process, order judgment or command of a court‰).
It further delineated that: „Wicker v. Arcangel, 252 SCRA 444
(1996) made it clear that in case of indirect or constructive
contempt, the contemner may be punished only Âafter charge in
writing has been filed, and opportunity given to the accused to be
heard by himself and counselÊ whereas in a direct contempt, the
respondent may be summarily adjudged in contempt.‰
„Consideration of these legal propositions patently discloses the

impropriety of finding complainant guilty of direct contempt. The willful
display of abusive and disrespectful language hurled by complainant
towards the court did not constitute direct contempt but may, if at all,
amount to indirect contempt.‰ At the time the derogatory statements
were made, there were no proceedings or the judge was then performing
judicial functions.
It concluded that: „Under Sec. 1 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules

of Court, to constitute direct contempt, the alleged misbehavior
must have been committed in the presence of or so near a court as
to obstruct or interrupt proceedings before the court.‰
xxxx
„Judges are however enjoined to exercise such power judiciously and
sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the
same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not
for retaliation of vindictiveness.‰
§ VIII. The Case Under Annotation, Silas Y. Cañada
vs. Judge Ildefonso B. Suerte, Supra.
This case under Annotation titled of Silas Y. Cañada vs.

Judge Ildefonso B. Suerte, supra., pertained to a verified
letter-complaint filed by complainant against a trial judge
in Cebu Province for arbitrary detention punished under
the Revised Penal Code, the Anti-graft Law and Canons of
Judicial Ethics for citing him in contempt of court resulting
in his arrest and incarceration without opportunity for bail.
The complainant who was an accused in a criminal case
before the sala of the respondent judge had filed a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals.
421
VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 9, 2005 421

In this petition, complainant executed and attached an

Affidavit in support of the CA Petition.
While the contents of the affidavit were not set forth in
the decision, it must have contained allegations that did
not sit well with the judge who forthwith issued the
challenged contempt order imposing fine of P3,000 and
indefinite imprisonment of complainant. Through counsel
he exerted efforts for his release but the judge would not
relent unless he withdrew this allegedly offending affidavit.
He was thus imprisoned until he was released on the 14th
day when his counsel filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and the latter issued such writ.
Thus, this complaint before the High Court. When
required to comment, Respondent Judge merely adverted
to the CA case which he claimed resolved the legality of his
contempt order. His curt declaration was that: „No illegal
arrest and no arbitrary detention.‰
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) which
investigated the complaint found the judge „guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and procedure.‰
Held: The High Court agreed with the findings of the
OCA. Since he was already dismissed for similar abuses in
his office, he was meted the hefty fine of P40,000 to be
deducted from his accumulated leave credits. And in case
they were insufficient, he was also directed to personally
pay the fine which is subject to writ of execution in the
event failure to do so.
The High Court found the following errors committed by
the respondent judge:
a) The CA decision in the criminal case which was

used by Respondent Judge as to have allegedly
resolved this charge of illegal contempt order had
nothing to do with it. It was even so clarified in that
decision.
b) If there was valid ground to cite complainant for
direct contempt by the RTC, the period of
imprisonment under Rule 71, Sec. 1 „should not
exceed ten days.‰ In this case imprisonment was
indefinite;
c) Respondent who also cited for direct contempt
complainantÊs counsel for attaching the latterÊs
affidavit in a motion for inhibition filed
422

with the trial court, was also erroneously assessed a fine of

P3,000. Under Rule 71, Sec. 1, the limit to such fine is
P2,000;
d) The trial judge refused to allow complainant to post

bail as required under Rule 71, Sec. 3 when he
wrote in the face of the arrest warrant: „No Bail
Recommended.‰ The High Court also faulted the
judge for his refusal to allow bail: „In the present
case, respondent effectively prevented complainant
from resorting to his right to post a bond as
provided for under the above-cited provision of the
Rules of Court by indicating in the arrest warrant
he issued that complainant is not entitled to bail. In
doing so, respondent unduly deprived the latter of
his prized and fundamental right to liberty, a right
which is protected and guaranteed by our
Constitution.‰
The High Court found that „respondentÊs patent and gross
violations of the provisions of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
particularly Sections 1 and 2 thereof, cannot be denied nor
justified. Respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of law and
procedure. It cited Dantes vs. Caguioa: „Thus where the
law violated is so elementary, like Rule 71 which provides
the scope of a judgeÊs authority to punish for contempt and
the procedure to be followed for a judge not to know it or to
act as if he does not know it constitutes gross ignorance.‰
§ IX. Some Thoughts on the Case Under Annotation
This Cañada vs. Suerte, supra, case is an administrative

case and not one of those cases resolved through regular
decisions by the High Court. However, it is striking because
of the reassertion of the basic principles surrounding the
imposition of direct contempt and the importance of
allowing bail if conditions. It also demonstrated the
extreme displeasure of the High Court in the utterly
arbitrary and despotic actions of a trial judge. As expected,
there was no kid glove treatment on this offending judge
for the High Court even expressed the desire to dismiss
him had he not been already dismissed for previous similar
infractions.
In any case, the following may be culled from this ruling:
a) There was no categorical classification of the alleged offense of

complainant whether it was direct contempt or indirect contempt·
From
423
VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 9, 2005 423

the affidavit attached to his letter complaint complainant alleged

that Respondent Judge immediately cited him for contempt because
he was at once ordered arrested and jailed for executing an affidavit
which was attached to his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in
a criminal case filed with the CA;
The High Court did not state categorically what precisely was
the type of contempt committed. It merely argued that „granting
that there is valid ground for respondent judge to cite complainant
in direct contempt of court‰·but it did not finally categorize the
type of contempt committed. It could have been clearer if it had
clarified the type of the offense for future reference;
b) It would appear that the type of contempt committed was
indirect contempt·From the recitals in the affidavit (not the
offending affidavit) attached to the letter-complaint, the offense was
indirect contempt which the High Court failed to denominate. If it
had done so, it could have also pointed out that there was violation
of Rule 71, Sec. 3 setting forth the procedure in the initiation and
imposition of indirect contempt. The ground for citing complainant
for contempt was his having executed an affidavit which was
attached to the Petition for Certiorari in another court or before the
CA. It has been held in that:
„The use of contemptuous language against a particular judge in

pleadings presented in another court or proceedings constitute indirect
contempt; if said pleading is submitted before the same judge, it would be
direct contempt.‰ (Ang vs. Castro, G.R. No. 66371, May 15, 1985, 136
SCRA 453. Please see Wicker vs. Arcangel, supra.)
In other words, the judge issued the contempt order on

complainant because his offending affidavit was attached to his
Petition for Certiorari with the CA, which is „another court.‰ Hence
the actual offense, if it was an offense, was indirect contempt. On
the other hand, the contempt on complainantÊs lawyer for having
attached said affidavit in the Motion to Inhibit in the court of
respondent for which the latter was separately penalized with a fine
of P3000 was direct contempt.
In any case, since the High Court did not categorically

state that the contempt imposed upon complainant as
indirect contempt, it necessarily did not further fault the
latter with non-observance of due process under Rule 71,
Sec. 3 when it imposed said contempt order.
424

c) The campaign to weed the judiciary of misfits and unfits is boldly

evident in this ruling·The High Court appears to be so infuriated
in this case that while the OCA only recommended P10,000 fine, it
imposed P40,000 to be even charged against his accrued leave and if
insufficient to be paid personally. This is obviously subject to writ of
execution. It also would have wanted to dismiss anew Respondent
Judge „due to the seriousness of the offense,‰ had he not been
previously dismissed and because it was the second time he was
„found guilty of a similar infraction.‰
The surprise is that the High Court forgot to also direct the
respondent judge to at least reimburse the P3,000 fine on
the lawyer of complainant because the offense, if at all, was
indirect contempt and the summary fine was illegal in line
with the ruling of Oclarit vs. Paderanga, 350 SCRA 260
(2001).
d) A strong signal on other judges of similar proclivities·The ruling

should send a strong warning to like-minded judges who think that
the robe they put on or the bench upon which they are perched
entitles them to act like petty tyrants in the courtroom.
§ X. Conclusion
Judges by reason of their position and the authority and

power of the State they represent are clothed with power
and moral ascendancy the moment they enter their
courtroom. They have the power of separation and union
over the personal lives of people, the power of wealth and
destitution over their fortunes and yes, the power of life
and death over them in their criminal actuations. They can
be despots in robes or impartial arbiters of the law and
even-handed dispensers of justice.
The Constitution and the law saw to it that they are well
protected as they go about their bounden tasks inside the
courtroom. They have that inherent power of contempt
whether direct (misbehavior in facie curiae) or indirect
contempt, (misbehavior outside its presence and even at a
later time). They are appropriate judicial weapons when
properly and evenly applied. But when abused, they
became instruments of oppression, sadism, cruelty and
tyranny.
425
VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 9, 2005 425

Especially the power of direct contempt which allows the

immediate incarceration of the hapless party. It is at once a
curtailment of freedom and liberty and due process under
the guise of maintaining discipline and preserving the
dignity of the court. Here is a clash between sacrosanct
constitutional guarantees of due process and the bill of
rights of liberty and freedom as against the preservation of
the dignity of the court. The power of contempt is viewed as
an „implied constitutional right‰ while due process and the
bill of rights are clear and unmistakable constitutional
guarantees. Yet, it is only through direct contempt that
disregard of personal liberty and freedom and due process
or prior hearing is allowed and their curtailment is swift
and immediate.
But this cannot be allowed indefinitely and the exercise
must be prudent, corrective, preservative and not for
vindictive ends. Otherwise, this is nothing short of judicial
tyranny. A review of some of the cases on direct and
indirect contempt readily shows that judges have been
mostly less than prudent, even petty in the exercise of the
power of contempt. One of the mysteries of human
psychology is the sudden Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde
transformation of the Filipino driver once he sits before the
steering wheel of a car or vehicle. The gentle fellow
suddenly becomes a raging maniac or just plain mean
oblivious of basic road courtesies. What is it about the
wheels of a car that makes him suddenly combative?
Some judges who are mostly once legal practitioners
outside their sala are approachable regular guys. Perhaps,
it may also be asked: What is it about the donning of
judicial robe or being perched on the bench that transforms
them into Prussian drill sergeants oozing with sarcasm and
even expletives at the slightest distraction and no one
seems to be doing right by him. It is so farfetched from the
cause of quelling misbehavior for a „Hanging Judge‰ in the
City of Manila used to shout at a terrified witness who
forgot to use „sir‰ in his answers to examining counsel:
„Say ÂsirÊ or the court will cite you in contempt!‰ Or to
sarcastically dismiss the explanation of jail guards that
they were late by a few minutes in bringing in prisoners for
trial that morning because of traffic, that they „should have
left yesterday!.‰ It is also unthinkable that a trial judge
would immediately cite with direct contempt
426

and ordered jailed an Asst. Public Prosecutor who merely
asked for a brief suspension of the hearing to have a
document photocopied (De Guia vs. Guerrero, Jr., 234
SCRA 625 [1994]). It was also utterly petty for a judge to
immediately jail a fiscal over the translation of the
testimony of a witness during a hearing which the latter
wanted to prevail into the records (Delgra, Jr. vs. Gonzales,
31 SCRA 237 [1970]). In this case under Annotation, it
was sheer vindictiveness for a judge to imprison
indefinitely a party who executed and attached an affidavit
in a Petition before the Court of Appeals. The judge did not
even demonstrate what were the allegations in the
affidavit that he found offensive or contemptuous. And to
aggravate matters, he refused to grant bail and would only
recall the contempt order if complainant withdrew that
affidavit before the CA. This is nothing short of curtailing
his right to litigate. No pun intended, but for this similar
infraction, Judge Suerte did leave up to his name as he was
severely punished.
After all is said and done, the ideal behavior of the trial
judge still largely depends upon him according to his lights.
But constant firm reminders like this case under
Annotation that exceeding the limits of the exercise of
power of contempt, especially direct contempt will not go
unpunished by the High Court should rein in his wayward
impulses. To some judges, it may be too late in the day to
reinvent themselves, but it will always do well for them to
hearken to the eloquent warning of Justice Butte many
years ago in his Dissenting Opinion in Lualhati vs. Albert,
57 Phil. 86 (1932):
„The law confers upon the courts this power to punish summarily
for direct (criminal) contempt; but this power has its limitations,
otherwise, it would become a means of judicial tyranny. It is
conditioned upon the exercise of a sound discretion. Each case must
be judged in the light of its special facts and circumstances.‰
··o0o··
427
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Direct Contempt - A Means of Judicial Tyranny?

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392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Direct Contempt: A Means of Judicial Tyranny?

DIRECT CONTEMPT: A MEANS OF JUDICIAL

1. Direct Contempt under Rule 71, Sec. 1, p. 398

§ IV. Rationale of the Power of Contempt of Court,

1. Direct contempt, p. 401

§ VII. Some Cases Mostly on Direct Contempt, p. 406

VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 9, 2005 393

a) There was no categorical classification of the

Dispensing justice is the ultimate art as life is art. It does

394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

who cut a pitiful sight as he pleaded with a nasty lawyer to

VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 9, 2005 395

havior or challenge to his authority made right before him

Tendency to Resort to Indirect Contempt

The case of Silas Y. Cañada vs. Judge Ildefonso Suerte

396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

§ II. Definition of Contempt of Court

The definitions of contempt in American as well as in

1. Definitions from authorities·

Thus contempt of court has been defined as „Any willful

VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 9, 2005 397

spect or disregard, interfering with or prejudicing parties or their

Our jurisprudence usually uses about the same definition of

The common denominator in all these definitions is that

§ III. Definition of Contempt of Court Under the

The above definitions of contempt of court however

398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

1. Direct Contempt under Rule 71, Sec. 1:

„Direct contempt punished summarily.·A person guilty of

Actually, this is not a definition of direct contempt but an

2. Indirect Contempt under Rule 71, Sec. 3:

„Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.·After

a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his

Again, the above provision is not also a definition of indirect

VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 9, 2005 399

§ IV. Rationale of the Power of Contempt of Court

There is always the possibility of litigants, lawyers and

400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

of an American court until she disclosed where she hid her

§ V. Nature of Contempt of Court Proceedings

A contempt proceeding has been classified early on since

VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 9, 2005 401

§ VI. Types or Kinds of Contempt of Court

As already set forth above, there are two (2) kinds of

1. Direct contempt·as defined by the Rules of Court:

The essence of direct contempt is that it is committed in the

402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

applies to cases already decided „where such punitive action is

In direct contempt, the sanction is swiftly and immediately

„Even then, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or

In spite of the above holding, direct contempt is still immediately

VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 9, 2005 403

ately executory unless the court suspends execution of such order

Under present living standards, the amounts of fine of

404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

rank and for inferior court, respectively, are still fleabite. It

i) Against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent

VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 9, 2005 405

are viewed with urgency and should be given priority in their

i. He may file a motion for reconsideration if the penalty

406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tion, this refusal to fix a bond was considered as gross