Project Management Journal ■ Volume 48, Number 6 ■ December 2017/January 2018

December 2017/January 2018

Volume 48
Number 6

5 The Past and Present of Megaprojects

Jonas Söderlund, Shankar Sankaran, and Christopher
Biesenthal
17 Symbolic Megaprojects: Historical Evidence of a Forgotten
Dimension
Marcos Lopez Rego, Helio Arthur Reis Irigaray, and
Renato Lago P. Chaves
29 The Three Secrets of Megaproject Success: Clear Strategic
Vision, Total Alignment, and Adapting to Complexity
Aaron Shenhar and Vered Holzmann
47 The Multivocality of Symbols: A Longitudinal Study of the
Symbolic Dimensions of the High-Speed Train Megaproject
(1995–2015)
Alfons van Marrewijk
60 Stakeholder Value Constructs in Megaprojects: A Long-Term
Assessment Case Study
Pernille Eskerod and Karyne Ang
76 Competitive Precinct Projects: The Five Consistent Criticisms
of “Global” Mixed-Use Megaprojects
Mike Harris
93 Dynamic Sublimes, Changing Plans, and the Legacy of a
Megaproject: The Case of the 1966 Soccer World Cup
Alex G. Gillett and Kevin D. Tennent
117 Symbols, Sublimes, Solutions, and Problems: A Garbage Can
Project Management Institute

Model of Megaprojects
John Steen, Jerad A. Ford, and Martie-Louise
Verreynne
132 A Reflection of the State-of-the-Art in Megaproject Research:
The Oxford Handbook of Megaproject Management
Jonas Söderlund

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 December 2017/January 2018
Volume 48, Number 6

Th e Pr o fe s s i o n a l Re s e a r ch Jo u r n a l o f t h e Pr o j e c t M a n a g e m e n t I n s t i tu t e

3 From the Editors

Gary Klein, College of Business and Administration, University of Colorado Colorado Springs,
Colorado, USA
Monique Aubry, Professor, School of Business and Management, Université du Québec à Montréal,
Canada

PAPERS
5 The Past and Present of Megaprojects
Jonas Söderlund, Shankar Sankaran, and Christopher Biesenthal

1 7 Symbolic Megaprojects: Historical Evidence of a Forgotten Dimension

Marcos Lopez Rego, Helio Arthur Reis Irigaray, and Renato Lago P. Chaves

2 9 The Three Secrets of Megaproject Success: Clear Strategic Vision, Total Alignment,
and Adapting to Complexity
Aaron Shenhar and Vered Holzmann

4 7 The Multivocality of Symbols: A Longitudinal Study of the Symbolic Dimensions

of the High-Speed Train Megaproject (1995–2015)
Alfons van Marrewijk

6 0 Stakeholder Value Constructs in Megaprojects: A Long-Term Assessment Case Study

Pernille Eskerod and Karyne Ang

7 6 Competitive Precinct Projects: The Five Consistent Criticisms of

“Global” Mixed-Use Megaprojects
Mike Harris

9 3 Dynamic Sublimes, Changing Plans, and the Legacy of a Megaproject:

The Case of the 1966 Soccer World Cup
Alex G. Gillett and Kevin D. Tennent

117 Symbols, Sublimes, Solutions, and Problems: A Garbage Can Model of Megaprojects
John Steen, Jerad A. Ford, and Martie-Louise Verreynne

132 A Reflection of the State-of-the-Art in Megaproject Research:

The Oxford Handbook of Megaproject Management
Jonas Söderlund

138 Calendar of Events

139 Project Management Journal ® Author Guidelines
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From the Editors:
Introducing the Special
Issue on Megaprojects—
“Symbolic and Sublime”
Gary Klein, College of Business and Administration,
University of Colorado Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA
Monique Aubry, Professor, School of Business and Management,
Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada
We complete our 2017 volume of Project Management
®
Journal with a special issue on megaprojects—projects
of enormous scope with associated increases in ben-
efits, complexity, risks, and resources. Megaprojects tackle
“powerful economic, social and symbolic roles in society”
(Flyvbjerg, 2014). Success entails tangible and intangible
benefits to large populations, providing widespread ser-
vices, promoting advancements to achieving recognition,
advancing public health, caring for the environment, and
enhancing transportation and logistic infrastructures.
The topic foreshadows an emergence of even greater
megaprojects in 2018, with expectations that dramatic
amounts of money will be invested in megaprojects
around the world, in all nations and among partnerships
of nations. Performance is historically poor, with no trend
of doing better (Flyvbjerg, 2017).
Scholars have long considered the topic of mega-
projects, although particularly strong attention has been
placed on the topic this past year. We do not claim this
topic to be more important than others, but we recognize
this is a field in which research has great potential to
make a difference in the world. Indeed, the recent book
by Alvesson, Gabriel, and Paulsen (2017) calls for social
science to be meaningful not to the researcher’s ego, but
rather to specific groups and even society as a whole.
The research on megaprojects has such potential. We, as
scholars, must continue working to change the negative
pattern of poor performance, all in a context of challenges
in environmental threats, political uncertainty, human
migration, extreme weather situations, and other serious
concerns with wide scope and impact.
This final issue in the 2017 volume continues the objec-
®
tive of Project Management Journal to provide in-depth
consideration of specific current concerns in the discipline
Project Management Journal, Vol. 48, No. 6, 3–4
© 2017 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
Photo credit: Photo credit:
Markus Bullick Émilie Tournevache
of project management through special issues, in addition
to independent, quality studies on project management
topics. Agile development projects, project networks, and
process studies of project organizing are scheduled for
publication in the near future. Currently, there are two
open calls for papers on the topics of: (1) exploratory proj-
ects and (2) career paths and systems for project managers.
For exploratory projects, the strategic roles of innova-
tion and exploration in today’s competitive environment
have given birth to a research stream in the management
of exploration projects for which neither the goals nor the
means to attaining them are defined from the outset. This
work links the project, innovation, entrepreneurship, and
discovery management literature with a new approach
to projects as experimental learning processes for which
new management principles, such as selectionism and
sequential learning, have been defined. From the same
perspective, this literature underlines the need to differen-
tiate between the management processes for exploratory
projects—since the traditional stage-gate approach often
results in failure—and to develop new appraisal methods
for their “expansive” nature. We are only at the begin-
ning of this research. Thus, the goal of this special issue
is continual development of exploratory project research.
Full papers must be submitted by 28 February 2018.
For career paths and systems, the literature alludes to
a relationship between project team management and the
performance of projects. While “project management” has
developed into a recognized profession, the routes into
the profession and progression within the profession have
little-recognized structure. To a number of scholars, project
management has been and continues to be the ‘acciden-
tal profession’ (Richardson, Earnhardt, & Marion, 2015).
Rarely does a project management career begin within
the profession. The typical project management career fol-
lows as a consequence of another career within the industry
(Marion, Richardson, & Earnhardt, 2014). How well do we
understand these entry routes? Do we understand what
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  3
 Introducing the Special Issue on Megaprojects—“Symbolic and Sublime”
influences their progression? Career paths are, in part, a func-
tion of organizational structures, which may comprise training,
clear-cut career pathways, appraisal and feedback mechanisms,
and other factors. Full papers must be submitted by 30 June
2018.
More information on the calls for papers of these special
issues is on the Project Management Institute website:
PMI.org (go to the Learning tab to find the Project Manage-
®
ment Journal ).
References
Alvesson, M., Gabriel, Y., & Paulsen, R. (2017). Return to
meaning: A social science with something to say. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
4  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
Flyvbjerg, B. (2014). What you should know about
megaprojects and why: An overview. Project Management
Journal, 45(2), 6–19.
Flyvbjerg, B. (2017). Introduction: The iron law of megaproject
management. In The Oxford handbook of megaproject
management (pp. 1–18). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Marion, J. W., Richardson, T. M., & Earnhardt, M. P. (2014).
Project manager insights: An analysis of career progression.
Organisational Project Management, 1(1), 53–73.
Richardson, T. M., Earnhardt, M. P., & Marion, J. W. (2015).
Is project management still an accidental profession? A
qualitative study of career trajectory. SAGE Open, 5(1),
2158244015572098.
 The Past and Present of Megaprojects
PAPERS
Jonas Söderlund, BI Norwegian Business School, Norway
Shankar Sankaran, University of Technology Sydney, Australia
Christopher Biesenthal, WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management, Germany
Megaprojects on the Rise
Megaprojects are “large-scale, complex ventures that
typically cost US$1 billion or more, take many years to
develop and build, involve multiple public and private
stakeholders, are transformational, and impact millions
of people” (Flyvbjerg, 2017, p. 2). While megaprojects
are often differentiated by the amount of their capital
investment, they are also characterized in other ways. For
example, Zhai, Xin, and Cheng (2009, p. 99) state that mega-
projects exhibit “extreme complexity, substantial risks,
long duration and extensive impact on the community,
economy, technological development, and environment of
the region or even the whole country.” On the other hand,
taking a sociological perspective, Gellert and Lynch (2003,
pp. 15–16) consider megaprojects as ‘displacements’ by
stating that megaprojects are “projects which transform
landscapes rapidly, intentionally, and profoundly in very
visible ways, and require coordinated applications of capi-
tal and state power.” Indeed, looking at society through
its megaprojects would reveal its ambitions, problems, as
well as its future outlooks.
Merrow (2011, p. 12), one of the world’s leading mega-
project analysts, adds that many megaprojects “end up
being disappointing to their sponsors; a fewer number
turn out to be destroyers of shareholder wealth; and a few
are horrendous with respect to anything and everything
involved—the investing companies, the local population
and the environment.” To be sure, this is a problem that
has been addressed over the years and something that
analysts and scholars have pointed out many times. And
if we agree that megaprojects are important and that their
performance is poor, then scholars and practitioners have
a joint responsibility for improving their performance.
It is interesting to note that despite all the negative
performance that megaprojects have purportedly had,
surprisingly, more and more of them are being built.
Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rottengatter (2003) refer to this
phenomenon as the ‘megaproject paradox.’ Perhaps even
more fascinating is that, not only are more of them being
planned and built; they are also becoming increasingly
ambitious. For instance, Flyvbjerg (2017) has equated the
size of several contemporary megaprojects being built
as exceeding the gross domestic product (GDP) of many
nations, citing projects such as the Joint Strike Fighter,
Project Management Journal, Vol. 48, No. 6, 5–16
© 2017 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
which is predicted to cost close to US$400 billion. He pre-
dicts that soon we will be looking at ‘terraprojects,’ observ-
ing that “there is no indication that the relentless drive to
scale is abating in megaproject development. Quite the
opposite; scale seems to be accelerating” (p. 5).
One reason for such acceleration in megaprojects
can be gleaned from the projections of infrastructure
to meet the world’s ever-increasing needs for economic
growth and improvements. McKinsey (Garemo, Matzinger,
& Palter, 2015) estimates that the world needs to spend
about US$57 trillion on infrastructure by 2030 to keep
up with the expected GDP growth. The Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
estimates that “global infrastructure investment needs
of US$6.3 trillion per year over the period of 2016–2030
to support growth and development,” which exceeds the
figure proposed by McKinsey (Mirabile, Marchal, & Baron,
2017). However megaprojects are not only large-scale
infrastructure projects; for example the Business Insider
(Desjardins, 2017), which lists the world’s nine largest
megaprojects includes a theme park valued at US$64 bil-
lion in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, as a megaproject.
Urban planners, including Altshuler and Luberoff (2003),
have predicted that buildings, including stadiums and
museums, will take the shape of megaprojects in the future
(see also Siemiatycki, 2017).
According to futurist Thomas Frey from the Da Vinci
Institute, megaprojects are expected to increase rapidly to
24% of the global GDP in the coming ten years. He predicts
that projects initiated to control extreme weather, handle
large amounts of data, and solve human problems, such
as diseases, will also be organized as megaprojects in the
future. In that respect, there seems to be a general consen-
sus among many leading analysts that megaprojects are not
only on the rise, they are also increasing in size and variety.
Moreover, there seems to be consensus pertaining to
the poor performance of megaprojects. Researchers refer
to the “under-performance of megaprojects” and call to
the discipline to refocus its tools and techniques to better
cope with the challenges of contemporary megaprojects
(see, for instance, Lenfle & Loch, 2017). The project man-
agement community is still struggling to find consistent
ways to improve the performance of megaprojects in
the engineering, construction, and defense sectors. It
is ill prepared to propose ways to handle megaprojects
that will arise in non-traditional areas such as human
conditions and addressing the effects of climate change
(Frey, 2016).
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  5
 The Past and Present of Megaprojects
Thus, we need a better understanding of megaprojects
because they are increasing in numbers and magnitude in
addition to being applied in new sectors still with limited
experience from the management of large-scale projects
and complex systems integration. A wider perspective will
most certainly be needed, including research from diverse
disciplines following different approaches. In sum, mega-
projects will be carried out at the edge of technological and
institutional complexity—putting extreme demands on the
management capabilities of those tasked with putting these
projects in place, calling for better support and better under-
standing of how to address the managerial and organizational
challenges involved. There is an urgent need for research, not
only revealing and documenting the many challenges associ-
ated with the management of megaprojects but, equally, more
knowledge about how to cope with them, how to build man-
agement capabilities, and how to improve the cooperation
and coordination within megaprojects.
Megaprojects as Science and Symbols
Megaprojects can be viewed as some of the most interesting
phenomena in social science. They represent the major achieve-
ments by collectives to influence the progress and direction of
society and the mustering of collective strength to infuse major
institutional change. Indeed, launching a megaproject is a way
of getting attention, a way of getting things done—of creating
dreams and high aspirations. South Africa’s high speed metro-
politan transport network has been described as “Glitz, glamour
and the Gautrain” and as ‘political symbols’ (Westhuizen, 2007).
Megaprojects typically function as mechanisms to infuse trail
making (Hirschman, 1967)—establishing a new path of develop-
ment and order transformation (Eisenstadt, 1995). Indeed, they
oftentimes operate as institutional projects—spearheading the
change of institutional frameworks as well as beliefs and norm
systems (Holm, 1995).
Historically megaprojects have had enormous importance​
—ranging from the cathedrals built to protect society from its
worst enemies to current high-tech megaprojects, such as the
Large Hadron Collider (the world’s largest and most powerful
particle accelerator), launched to ensure the sustainability of
technology and research advancements in physics. In both
these cases, people and experts travel far to take part in these
important societal projects. The Freemasons travelled to the
cathedrals, assisting the church and local communities in
realizing their dream of a new cathedral; and scientists take
part in various large-scale projects, working as post-doctorates
and later on as directors of research in building the global
knowledge of physics and science. The projects function as
“action localities” (Grabher, 2004) that activate latent ties, build
new ties for collaboration and learning and establish future ties
shaping the direction of industrial and technological develop-
ments. They are important, thus understanding their nature
and dynamics is certainly an important task for social science.
6  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
Megaprojects attract our attention, appeal to our senses,
attract media attention, and, recently, have been receiving
increasing scholarly attention. An overall and intriguing ques-
tion pertains to the issue of why megaprojects exist. Indeed,
one might simply answer: because they are needed, because
they generate value, and because they have proposed a con-
vincing and attractive business case. Understanding the ratio-
nale underlying the decision to implement a megaproject will
lead us to look further into what seems to drive the megaproject
business and why megaprojects are considered attractive to
decision makers who are pushing these ventures forward. What
are the features of megaprojects that make them so attractive to
decision makers and to societies at large? Why do they seem to
be increasing in numbers despite reports of poor performance?
Flyvbjerg (2014) introduced the framework of the four
sublimes of megaprojects from which he explained the factors
that drive megaproject development and that play a signifi-
cant role in megaproject decision making. He identified the
technological, political, economic, and the aesthetic sublimes
as the most important ones to explain the rapid expansion of
the business of the megaproject (see Table 1).
An additional reason (or sublime), which has been
pointed out by Thomas Frey is ‘community pride.’ Frey states
that “everyone loves to tell stories about the big things their
community accomplished” (Frey, 2016, p. 1), of making sure
that this particular community is superior to all others. Pro-
ducing megaprojects constitutes the symbol of such success;
however, there are many challenges looming for those think-
ing that megaprojects will be the shortcut to success.
Type of Sublime Characteristic
Technological The excitement engineers and technologists
derive from pushing the envelope for what is
possible in the “longest–tallest–fastest” types
of projects.
Political The personal satisfaction politicians get from
building monuments to themselves and their
causes, and from the visibility this generates
with the public and media.
Economic The prestige business people and trade
unions get from making lots of money and
creating jobs from megaprojects, including
for contractors, workers in construction and
transportation, consultants, bankers, investors,
landowners, lawyers, and developers.
Aesthetic The pleasure designers and people who love
good design derive from building and using
something very large that is also iconic and
beautiful, such as the Golden Gate Bridge in
San Francisco, California.
Table 1: The ‘four sublimes’ that drive megaproject development
(Flyvbjerg, 2017, p. 6).
 Why then are megaprojects so challenging? Why are they
so difficult to champion and so difficult to manage? According
to Flyvbjerg (2017), there are ten main factors that decision
makers and other significant actors working on the implemen-
tation of megaprojects tend to overlook. We summarize Flyvb-
jerg’s main points and discuss them in further detail below.
  1. Megaprojects are inherently risky because of long plan-
ning horizons, nested interfaces, and complexity. It nor-
mally takes several decades from the initial planning to
the completion of the project.
  2. Megaprojects are often led by planners and managers with-
out complete understanding and domain experience, which
might create weak leadership and dysfunctional leadership
configurations. It is difficult to integrate knowledge across
professional and disciplinary fields of knowledge.
  3. Megaprojects are typically multi-actor processes involv-
ing multiple stakeholders with diverse and conflicting
institutional backgrounds. It is often difficult to establish
governance mechanisms across institutional regimes and
cultures (see for instance Dille & Söderlund, 2011; Levitt &
Scott, 2017).
  4. Megaprojects often build on non-standard technology and
design, which shapes a uniqueness bias among planners
and managers who tend to see their projects as difficult
compared with other projects, thus making it difficult to
learn from history and experience. Learning is an inherent
problem in the context of megaprojects—learning from one
or fewer (March, Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991) is a common situa-
tion in megaproject contexts (see also Prencipe & Tell, 2001).
  5. Megaprojects are typically overcommitted and centered
on a specific kind of project concept at an early stage, cre-
ating various kinds of lock-ins, leaving no room for alter-
natives. This could lead decision makers to give priority to
less favorable megaprojects as the weakest one runs the
risk of surviving, only because it arrived at the table earlier
than the better ones.
  6. Megaprojects are like big businesses, which might create
principal–agent problems and optimism bias. It is difficult
to evaluate performance, cause–effect relationships, and
to govern performance, since there are so many factors
potentially influencing a particular cause of action.
  7. Megaproject scope and ambition levels will change signifi-
cantly during the life of the project. Actors learning something
along the way, solutions that were thought of as fitting turn
out to be obsolete, and other things enter the project at a later
stage as features that are critical for the up-to-date standard
of the systems that the megaproject is supposed to deliver.
  8. Megaprojects are high-risk activities with overexposure to
“black swans” (Taleb, 2007)—extreme events with massively
negative outcomes. For megaprojects, rare and improbable
events occur more often than we tend to think. Individuals’
way of thinking is typically limited in scope and focused on
the average situations. However, average situations are less
relevant to irregular situations, such as megaprojects.
 9. Megaprojects often fail to account for the complexity
and unplanned events that are inherent in their imple-
mentation. Individuals are rational but only to a limited
extent (Simon, 1976), and they tend to find it difficult to
fully comprehend the complexity of complex and nested
decision-making and management situations.
10. Megaprojects are built on misinformation about costs,
schedules, benefits, and risks. The result is “cost overruns,
delays, and benefit shortfalls that undermine project via-
bility during project delivery and operations” (Flyvbjerg,
2017, p. 8). This problem tends to lead to challenges for
implementation—as problems need to be fixed while
“flying the plane.” Overall, this is a fundamental manage-
ment problem that often leads to fragile megaprojects—
megaprojects falling apart because of lack of direction and
common ground (Merrow, 2011).
The question is, however, not about why we should do
major planned change and large-scale societal projects, but
rather why projects need to be this large, and why we need
to implement them as ‘projects’—as temporary organizations
with defined beginnings and explicit end dates. In that respect,
one might ask: What are the economic and technical ratio-
nales underlying megaprojects? An obvious alternative is to
implement them as smaller piecemeal initiatives, as a series of
small-scale projects. This kind of analysis renders many more
theoretical triggers and represents a key question pertaining to
why a particular phenomenon exists in the first place. Similar
explorations and debates have taken place in many other fields
of scientific inquiry, including why cities exist, why nations
exist, why tribes exist, why communities exist, and so forth. The
question for management and organization scholars obviously
relates to classic debates about why large firms exist—what are
the advantages of the scale and scope of megaprojects? This
also paves the way for an analysis of the managerial and organi-
zational challenges associated with them (Söderlund, 2011b).
We know a great deal about their importance, we are becoming
increasingly aware of their prevalence, and we certainly know
a lot about their problems. We know far less, however, about
their management and organization. This needs to change.
The Progress of Megaproject Research
The research on megaprojects has also developed rapidly in
recent years, reflecting the importance and progress they have
made in society at large. A number of special issues have
appeared in scholarly journals, creating an abundant amount
of literature on megaprojects, for example, the International
Journal of Project Management (2011 and 2017), Organization,
Technology and Management in Construction (2012), Interna-
tional Journal of Architecture Engineering and Construction
(2014), Journal of Management and Engineering (2015), Urban
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  7
 The Past and Present of Megaprojects
Policy and Research (2017), and the International Journal of
Managing Projects in Business (2018). It is especially encouraging
to see that megaprojects have taken a more prominent role in
management and organization studies (Van Marrewijk, 2015) as
well as economic geography (Grabher & Thiel, 2014; Rasagam,
Engman, Gurcanlar, & Fernandes, 2014) and urban planning
(Steele, 2017). Despite the impressive and important progress—
with a number of achievements made related to better stories
(more empirical examples, intriguing case studies, etc.) as well
as better constructs (more fine-grained theoretical approaches,
developed perspectives, etc.)—there remains a dearth of detailed
stories of major projects shaping society and the theories we
might rely on to understand and explain their nature and dynam-
ics. The idea with this special issue was to push the boundaries of
megaproject management research. In that respect this issue was
guided by a set of intentions we wanted to achieve.
First, our intention was to advance the theoretical dis-
course on megaproject management, beyond simply pre-
senting empirical accounts and statistics of megaproject
performance. Instead we thought it would be important to
drive the discussion around explicit theoretical debates on
how to understand the nature and dynamics of these projects.
We were interested in inviting scholars from a broad range of
disciplines—including management and organization stud-
ies, but also history, anthropology, sociology, urban studies,
engineering, and economic geography—to cover the vibrancy
of current research on megaprojects. The intention with the
special issue is thus to make the management of these projects
also a concern for scholars outside the narrower field of project
management (see, for example, Geraldi & Söderlund, 2017).
The second intention was to advance the use of empirical
approaches by revisiting history. We know that history is replete
with fascinating examples of megaprojects and that these proj-
ects are still open for empirical research. Much information about
many of these projects is still available in books, reports, and so
forth; however, they have yet to receive attention from a schol-
arly point of view by trying to untangle the challenges associated
with their management. In that respect, we were inspired by the
special issue edited by Söderlund and Lenfle (2013) on project
history; although we wanted to move beyond that, by focusing
explicitly on the project level, the identification of projects that
have shaped the future, and explicitly address megaprojects.
Third, we were interested in their management, not just
the decision-making processes preceding these projects, but
specifically: How can we understand the ways in which these
projects are managed? In this respect, we were interested
in the inner functioning and processes of megaprojects—
how they are managed, led, and organized. By emphasizing
the importance of what goes on in projects, we are moving
beyond the conventional approaches to what goes on before
megaprojects are launched or after they are completed.
Accordingly, we were interested in transcending the tradi-
tional scope of research on megaprojects by including more
8  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
on what happens when they emerge, when they are imple-
mented, and when the dreams meet reality.
Initially, we also thought we would relate and build on
the idea of various sublimes in megaproject management and
the effects that these sublimes have on the management of
these projects. The original idea of sublimes in megaprojects
stemmed from Flyvbjerg’s article published in Project Man-
agement Journal (Flyvbjerg, 2014), and the article has since
received much attention from project scholars and other
management and organization scholars. We thus thought it
was timely and the appropriate scholarly context from which
to advance some of these ideas further. Several authors in this
special issue have referred to these sublimes in their articles
and have tried to address the effects that these sublimes have
on the management and leadership of projects.
From history we know that megaprojects have played a
significant role in creating the society in which we live. The
large-scale and pre-industrial canal projects constitute some
of the most profound mechanisms for shaping technological
progress in large parts of the world. Many of the pre-industrial
megaprojects educated project managers, which in subse-
quent projects were instrumental in keeping the large-scale
projects on track. This in turn led to the advancement of
capabilities to run even larger projects, which was epitomized
in the development and construction of the railway systems in
the Western world during the mid-19th century, and moving
further with a range of infrastructure and other construction
projects, which paved the way for the industrial revolution in
many countries around the globe. People did not talk about
megaprojects back then but they certainly worked on them;
many of these historic projects were in relative terms larger
than the megaprojects we see taking form in society today.
That said, encouraging the historical exploration into mega-
projects seems important—to see what we can learn from
history, to see what in-depth stories of how these projects
came into fruition and how they emerged seems to be an
important task for management and organization scholars
(Scranton, 2014). Clearly, this means that we need to recreate
these megaproject stories by visiting the books and reports
written about them, the stories told by the people who popu-
lated these projects. We do not know what is in these data and
stories and what they might lead to in terms of theoretical
insights, but it is worth collecting and analyzing them with
a project organizing mindset (Söderlund & Lenfle, 2013;
Sankaran, 2018)—by looking at these projects not as objects,
not as outputs, but as processes of organizing, as emerging
organizational entities, and action localities for the intermin-
gling of politics and power (Clegg & Kreiner, 2013).
We also know that scholars from a wide range of disci-
plines have taken interest in megaprojects—initially primarily in
domains such as urban planning and engineering, but increas-
ingly so in areas such as sociology and business administration.
It is also interesting to see the progress being made in research
into megaprojects at some of the leading universities and busi-
ness schools in the world, including Saïd Business School at
Oxford University, BI Norwegian Business School, the University
of Technology Sydney, the University of Québec at Montreal,
University College London, the University of Pennsylvania,
and the University of Manchester—all schools engaged in the
development of centers of excellence to drive research on
megaprojects further. In this respect, it is interesting because as
organizational phenomena megaprojects have emerged as fer-
tile cross-disciplinary grounds for the exchange of ideas across
a wide range of domains, ranging from engineering, science, to
social science. This is a path recently created and a path that
hopefully will continue to guide scholars in the decades to come.
The Future of Megaproject Research
There are at least four pressing and critical issues in mega-
project management research. First, their existence and
prevalence; second, their management and organization;
third, their success and performance, or under-performance;
and a fourth issue, which has become increasingly important
at academic conferences and in public debate over the last
few years, relates to the future of megaprojects and how they
address major societal challenges.
First, as mentioned earlier, we need to have many more
detailed discussions about why megaprojects exist—not why
people want to do certain things (improve, change, etc.) but
why they choose to do things through the mechanism of
projects, and why they want to group these initiatives and
actions into large-scale projects, oftentimes even megaproj-
ects, and beyond. This requires more theoretical scrutiny and
discussions—not only empirical stories, which are desper-
ately needed, but also awareness of the larger social science
literature in economics and organization theory (Söderlund,
2011a). These inquiries might relate to economics-based
explanations pertaining to transaction cost theory; they might
relate to the mustering of capabilities, the handling of inter-
faces, and complexity; they might obviously also relate to
power issues. Engaging more in the theory of megaprojects is
an important feat for management and organizational schol-
arship. Using extant theories of organizations and ‘firms’ and
exploring in what sense they might inform our understanding
of megaprojects is obviously one important path for research.
However, developing new approaches and unique theories of
megaprojects is just as important in order to be able to dem-
onstrate in what respect megaproject research might con-
tribute to wider management and organization theory, and
to social science at large. For these reasons, we need bolder
attempts to develop better theories of megaprojects. These
efforts are just beginning to take shape in the organization
studies and project management literatures. In recent years,
scholars writing about megaprojects have been relying to an
increasing extent on institutional theories (Biesenthal, Clegg,
Mahalingam, & Sankaran, 2017; Dille & Söderlund, 2011;
Levitt & Scott, 2017; Chi, Chen, & Shi, 2014; Mahalingam &
Levitt, 2007) to better understand and explain the coopera-
tion and coordination problems in megaprojects (Söderlund,
2011b). Focusing particularly on the cooperation problems
and conflicts among stakeholders, scholars have suggested
applying social conflict theory to address the challenges
observed in megaprojects (Jia, Yang, Wang, Hong, & You,
2011). Recently, scholars have also developed frameworks
and theories to address innovation in megaprojects as a par-
ticular context for innovation studies (e.g., Davies, Dodgson,
Gann, & MacAulay, 2017). These examples demonstrate that
megaprojects are more than merely empirical phenomena,
they also constitute interesting and distinct phenomena upon
which scholars can try out existing theories and develop new
ones, analytically pondering their salient features.
Second, we need to know more about what goes on in
megaprojects—how they are managed and organized, from
within, by the managers who are tasked with bringing them to
fruition. In that respect, we need to understand how manag-
ers implementing large-scale projects deal with the sublimes
often associated with them, of over-optimism and of realizing
the project from dreams through to reality. These are trouble-
laden journeys in which managers rarely have positive news
to tell to the people involved or to the stakeholders observing
the progress of the project. How do managers deal with such
a situation of “managing in head-wind,” constantly facing
bad news and negative deviations? How do they establish
cooperation and coordination in such contexts? How do they
drive innovation in such management situations? Answering
these questions, certainly requires an in-depth understand-
ing of the actuality of megaprojects. Getting more into the
actual occurrences, the nested processes of managing and
organizing in megaprojects are critical concerns for manage-
ment and organization studies (Davies et al., 2017). Thus
far, too much research has been focused on looking at them
from an outside-in perspective, of looking at the black box of
megaproject management. Too little attention has been paid
to what happens inside this black box of megaprojects, how
managers work to establish functioning regimes for coop-
eration, the relevant mechanisms for coordination, and the
ongoing practice of managers coping with the challenges of
getting the megaprojects in place. This needs to change.
Third, how do megaprojects perform? We often hear
consultants and scholars complaining about the underper-
formance of megaprojects. This is expected. It is their job
and a simple way of telling the world that their services are
needed and important. However, is it true and how would we
know? Why are we so much worse at managing megaprojects
than other kinds of organizational ventures? Because they
are more complex and difficult? Because we fail to learn from
experience? Or because the proper instruments for evaluating
their performance are lacking? Oftentimes we hear the story
about ‘on time and on budget’ as being the most important
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  9
 The Past and Present of Megaprojects
parameters of measuring success. We rarely use the same
parameters when evaluating and discussing the performance
of other ventures and organizations. Why? Why are these
parameters the most relevant in the context of megaprojects?
Consider the case of Norway (see for instance, Volden &
­Samset, 2017). We know that their strategic and operational
success have improved considerably over the last few years—
if, that is, we look at how they performed in relation to the
projected numbers. However, we rarely compare megaprojects
with each other. How much is a relevant sum for developing
and building a new bridge in one country compared with
the total cost for a similar bridge in another country? Which
country is best when it comes to the performance of their
megaprojects? Is it then only relevant to compare if they reach
the stated objectives? Is this a measure we would consider to
be relevant when comparing other kinds of organizations and
ventures, such as corporations? Of course not. Nonetheless,
they are frequently the ones we use in the context of megaproj-
ects, because we have not worked hard enough to find mea-
sures that are relevant and instrumental. This needs to change.
Fourth, and perhaps the most important issue for research
on megaprojects, is in what respect megaprojects contribute
to solving the major problems in society. These projects cost
a lot of money; they consume enormous amounts of resources
and attention; hence we should expect them to deliver value
to society and the organizations and individuals involved in
them. In some cases, one might wonder whether this really
Authors Title
Rego, Irigaray, and Symbolic Megaprojects: Historical Evidence of a
Chaves Forgotten Dimension
van Marrewijk The Multivocality of Symbols: A Longitudinal
Study on the Symbolic Dimensions of the High-
Speed Train Megaproject (1995–2015)
Shenhar and Holzmann The Three Secrets of Megaproject Success:
Clear Strategic Vision, Total Alignment, and
Adapting to Complexity
Harris Competitive Precinct Projects: The Five
Consistent Criticisms of ‘Global’ Mixed-Use
Megaprojects
Steen, Ford, and Symbols, Sublimes, Solutions, and Problems:
Verreynne A Garbage Can Model of Megaprojects
Eskerod and Ang Stakeholder Value Constructs in Megaprojects:
A Long-Term Assessment Case Study
Gillett and Tennent Dynamic Sublimes, Changing Plans, and the
Legacy of the 1966 Soccer World Cup
Söderlund A Reflection of the State-of-the-Art in Megaproject Conceptual/review
Research: The Oxford Handbook of Megaproject
Management, Edited by Bent Flyvbjerg
Table 2: Overview of the articles.
10  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
is the case. Do megaprojects really solve the mega-problems
of society? Are megaprojects the right solution? And if they
are, do we have the right projects to solve the most critical
problems in our society? This obviously makes it even more
important to create projects that will address the United
Nation’s primary goals concerning poverty, climate change,
economic inequity, and terrorism. Which problems are best
solved by megaprojects? Which problems are best handled
by programs? Which problems are best handled by a portfolio
of smaller projects? And which problems are best handled
without the aid of projects? These are all essential questions,
which brings us back to the start of this discussion: Why do
projects exist? This should then hopefully help us understand
not only why megaprojects exist, but also in what sense they
differ, how they behave, the value of the management of these
projects, and what factors determine their success or failure
(see Söderlund, 2004). All these questions are essential for
developing better theories of megaprojects.
Advancing Megaproject Research
This special issue contains seven interesting articles, which
in various ways contribute to the literature on megaprojects.
After a thorough review process and much help from
reviewers, we were able to accept seven articles written by
scholars from around the world (see Table 2).
Rego, Irigaray, and Chaves investigate how symbolic
megaprojects were conceived, implemented, and delivered
Theoretical Angle Primary Empirical Material
Combination of Content analysis of archival data of three
historical analysis and landmark projects in the development of
organization theory Rio de Janeiro
Power and politics Ethnographic study of a high-speed train project
theory in the Netherlands
Contingency theory Multiple case study of successful megaprojects
Urban planning theory Review of 42 mixed-use megaprojects
Decision-making Australian oil and gas megaprojects
theory
Value and stakeholder Historical study of the Astoria-Megler Bridge
theory
Institutional theory Historical study of the 1966 FIFA World Cup
Book chapters in The Oxford Handbook of
Megaproject Management
in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil over two centuries, culminating
in the Rio Olympics in 2016. They use a historical analysis
approach to addressing symbolic projects shaping urban
renewal in the 1950s to clean up the city, improve its sani-
tary conditions, and create a Parisian atmosphere. Then
followed the construction of the Flamengo Embankment, a
public park and the Perimetral in 1960s in conjunction with
a major event—the International Eucharistic Congress. The
next notable symbolic project was the Porto Maravilha, which
was completed at the start of this century as a program to
build a major port and much-needed infrastructure to create
a modern image of Rio de Janeiro as a great city of the world in
preparation for hosting two major international mega-events:
the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016. These
large projects had, according to the authors, all the hallmarks
of the four sublimes—political, economic, technological, and
aesthetic—mentioned by Flyvbjerg (2014). Rego, Irigaray, and
Chaves also portray the materialization of Rio’s megaprojects
as a phenotype evolving from the project’s genotype charac-
terized by culture, attributes, people, environment, and tech-
nology (Joslin & Müller, 2013). The authors demonstrate the
interaction among the sublimes and how they influence the
emergence of megaprojects.
Alfons Van Marrewijk analyzes a high-speed train (HST)
megaproject in the Netherlands, demonstrating how power
and politics can have an adverse effect on its progress (Clegg,
Sankaran, Biesenthal, & Pollack, 2017). The article’s focus
is on exegetical meanings that have significant impacts on
social, cultural, and political situations and processes. Using
an anthropological approach, the author captures the mean-
ing of failures that occurred in the HST megaproject scenario
as multi-vocal, which changed over time and represented
strategic power struggles among key stakeholders. The meth-
odology used is a decade-long longitudinal ethnographic
study to arrive at a ‘verstehen’ of the social reality of the
megaproject as it was constructed by its stakeholders.
The failures of the megaproject occurred in its three goals,
which were derived as meanings attributed from an analysis
of the data collected: HST as a radical, innovative contract
introducing public–private partnerships in the rail sector;
as an intervention in the Dutch rail sector to break down its
monopolistic position; and as a lynchpin of the rail trans-
port business for the Netherlands in the European transport
sector. All four sublimes proposed by Flyvbjerg (2014)—the
technological, political, economic, and aesthetic acted as
drivers for the four public organizations that participated in
the project.
The article shows how the exegetical meanings acted
to legitimize the arenas for power struggles often found in
megaprojects (Clegg & Kreiner, 2013). The symbolic ambi-
tions of the HST project turned out to be unrealistic due to
failed liberalization, incapability to meet the challenges,
exhibiting civil resistance to change, and causing both time
delays and cost overruns. The article demonstrates how proj-
ect management scholars can conduct a historical analysis
of megaprojects that can contribute to project management
studies (Söderlund & Lenfle, 2013).
Rather than investigating why megaprojects fail, Shenhar
and Holzmann (2017) study why some megaprojects suc-
ceed; specifically, they attempt to identify ingredients of and
commonalities among successful megaprojects. To do so, the
authors review the ambiguous literature on project success
that proposes a multitude of perspectives on what project
success is and how we can evaluate it. Following the multiple
perspectives, the article determines four dimensions, based
on which they analyze the success of megaprojects. The four
dimensions are: efficiency, impact on customer, business/
financial success, and impact on society.
The article uses a multiple case-study approach to quali-
tatively explore commonalities among successful projects.
The study includes multiple data collection methods to iden-
tify relevant case studies, such as content analysis, interviews,
and expert judgment. Following a step-wise analysis, the
authors produce a list of 14 case studies, which were deemed
successful in at least some of the aforementioned dimensions
of success. After finalizing the list, the authors’ objective was
to identify the vital factors responsible for the achievements
of the most successful megaprojects. In order to do so, they
reviewed the literature to come up with a list of 37 success
factors that could help to explain megaproject success. Then,
the authors performed an iterative cluster analysis to reduce
the number of factors until no further reduction was feasible.
Ultimately, the authors identify three distinct and unre-
lated elements that can explain the success of megaprojects,
namely having a clear strategic vision, total alignment of all
relevant stakeholders, and the ability to adapt to complexity.
Based on their findings, the authors suggest that success-
ful megaprojects are able to integrate all three elements; that
is, a clear vision is set and communicated to all those who
are involved or may be impacted by the project. Relevant
stakeholders embrace that vision and are totally aligned with
it, which includes knowing the roles and responsibilities
required to achieve that vision. Last, complex challenges are
identified and addressed appropriately. According to Shenhar
and Holzmann, these three elements are what successful
megaprojects have in common.
Harris’ article on competitive precinct projects offers a
systematic review of empirical studies of the key issues cre-
ated by the rapid growth of mixed-use megaprojects in cities
(that tend to be large enough to be called a ‘precinct’), which
do not seem to be good examples of urban planning. He
argues that these megaprojects are motivated by city-based
international competition; mobility and growth of knowledge
economies, creating pressures on urban space; redirection of
investment from physical to human capital; and the dominat-
ing role of politics, driving a market-rule ideology.
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  11
 The Past and Present of Megaprojects
His review of the empirical research, focusing on 42 mixed-
use megaprojects, reveals five consistent issues: introverted
project-led governance that circumvent local planning frame-
works; international marketing for talent tending to obscure
local issues; spatial and social disconnection due to follow-
ing the money and creating barriers between the new and
the old; generic urbanity through imitation irrespective of
the context in which they are being built; and lack of public
benefit caused by the rhetoric of delivery. He attributes this to
the emergence of neoliberal-oriented development practices.
Harris argues that these competitive precinct megaproj-
ects are a missed opportunity in good urban planning as they
fail to provide housing and employment opportunities in
areas of cities that are already associated with neglect; miss-
ing an opportunity to increase value through rezoning indus-
trial or residential land; and achieving synergy through lack of
coordination with other major government assets or projects.
Harris also contributes to the urban planning literature
by suggesting alternative directions for building competitive
precinct projects by developing principles-based project
frameworks that can overcome the five criticisms addressed
in the article and establishing monitoring practices and
adequate accountability to ensure they are being followed
and using a more contextual evaluation of such projects. The
contribution this article makes to the project management
literature is by addressing the dangers of projectification in
urban planning (Book, Eskilsson, & Khan, 2010), and thus
criticizing the underlying rationale for organizing develop-
ment through large-scale projects.
Steen, Verreynne, and Ford’s (2017) article aims to model
the decision-making and problem-solving process in a more
dynamic and realistic way, which overcomes the idea of ratio-
nality in organizations. According to the authors, rational
choice models of planning and decision making are domi-
nant in the megaproject literature, but have limited utility
in explaining the problems of complex megaprojects. To
overcome those rational models, the article draws on Cohen,
March, and Olsen’s (1972) garbage can model (GCM). Spe-
cifically, the authors use this model as a way of explaining
the differences in problems identified by businesses that are
attributed to megaproject delays and cost overruns in the
Australian oil and gas industry.
Steen et al. (2017) use quantitative methods and compare
media reports from business and industry associations with
survey data. The results are produced from the mean rank
exercise and indicate that, although megaproject execu-
tives focus their attention on solutions that involve external
parties, such as government and labor unions, the prob-
lems within the projects that are prioritized by managers
of firms within the supply chain network are actually quite
different and relate more closely to the performance of the
project. According to the authors, this finding is inexpli-
cable from a rational choice perspective without concluding
12  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
decision-making failure; from a GCM perspective, however,
the results can be explained through the lens of conflicting
agendas and solutions to a stream of multiple problems.
In summary, Steen and his co-authors identify differences
between members of the supply chain in the Australian oil and
gas industry in terms of what they perceive as major barriers
to meeting business objectives. Their study is therefore a valu-
able snapshot of the perceptions of those firms that make up
the industry supply chain, ranging from owner/operators of
the project through to construction firms and other businesses.
Eskerod and Ang, in their article on stakeholder value
constructs, explain how to understand, classify and express
megaproject stakeholder values using the example of the
Astoria-Megler Bridge connecting states of Washington and
Oregon, which had its 50th anniversary in 2016. They use the
four sublimes proposed by Flyvbjerg (2014) and value con-
structs derived from research conducted by Ang to analyze
the case study of a symbolic bridge (Ang & Killen, 2016). They
try to provide an answer to the often asked question: ‘How do
you measure the success of a megaproject?’ by extending its
evaluation beyond the conventional project close-out stage
into its impact stage (Turner & Zolin, 2014).
The article uses a single case study of a rich and pow-
erful case with multiple sources of evidence using online
videos, websites, and photographs in addition to interviews
and observations. Data analysis using the four sublimes
showed that the bridge provided evidence of a technological
sublime by having the longest continuous truss span in the
world; the political sublime was used as a means of political
promise during an election by the then Governor of Oregon;
the growth in the tourism industry contributed to the eco-
nomic sublime; and the delight of the local stakeholders and
tourists served as the aesthetic sublime. The two value con-
structs that were prominent during the analysis were that the
bridge provided ‘generative value’ for local communities by
unlocking development opportunities in the longer term and
‘retrospective-reflective-future oriented value’ evident from
the passionate speeches made during the celebration of the
50th anniversary of the bridge.
This article contributes a ‘value language’ to project man-
agement researchers and practitioners to gain a better under-
standing of the value that a megaproject can provide while
engaging with its stakeholders. It can further help in evaluat-
ing the success of a megaproject from a ‘value perspective,’
which extends beyond the traditional measures of project
success often discussed in the context of megaprojects.
Gillett and Tennent use the 1966 FIFA World Cup to
investigate megaprojects and demonstrate how sports mega-
events can achieve multiple tangible and intangible benefits,
even beyond the original vision. Since the actual realized
benefits, the outputs and outcomes from sports mega-events
can differ from what was proposed, the authors use multiple
theoretical lenses to capture the multiplicity of benefits that
can occur. In particular, they use Flyvbjerg’s (2014) four
sublimes model and Geraldi and Morris’ (2011) framework
of project management levels to identify a wide range of
potential drivers of megaprojects, which provide a basis for
evaluating project success.
The 1966 FIFA World Cup, which was held in England, is
an interesting and relevant case, which provides them with
a temporal perspective that allows the researchers to inves-
tigate the longitudinal scope and effects of a project while
avoiding certain political and ethical concerns of researching
contemporary megaprojects. Gillett and Tennent utilize an
inductively based archival research approach and draw upon
project documents, along with periodicals and secondary
sources, such as autobiographies. In the first step, the authors
performed an archival analysis of the main three project
phases; then, the authors examined the original propos-
als, the revised plan, and what actually happened; in the
third step, they researched the project network to determine
contextual factors (e.g., institutional) in which the project
took place.
Based on the results of their research, the article argues
that a broader view of the factors need to be taken into
account when evaluating megaprojects as successes or fail-
ures over time, including their symbolic impact on national
identity and status or international relations. In addition,
the authors find that the temporal nature of implementing
megaprojects is quite dynamic, which means the strategic
and institutional context changes (or can change) over the
course of the project. Hence, the article argues for a dynamic
understanding of the nature of megaproject management and
its performance evaluation.
Concluding this special issue is a short article by
Söderlund. Söderlund delivers a reflection of the state-of-
the-art in megaproject management based on the recently
published The Oxford Handbook of Megaproject Manage-
ment edited by Bent Flyvbjerg. The editor-in-chief of Project
Management Journal, Hans Georg Gemünden, asked Jonas
Söderlund to provide such a reflective piece in the context of
this special issue in order to link the contributions of this spe-
cial issue with the recently published handbook. As we men-
tioned earlier, this special issue was inspired by the sublimes
developed by Bent Flyvbjerg, and these sublimes have also
influenced several chapters in the new handbook. The inten-
tion was to integrate both pieces of work and to disseminate
the work of the authors and the editor of the new handbook.
The intention was also to encourage a discussion about the
book’s implications for future research.
In sum, a critical analysis of all articles in this special issue
shows some interesting insights about megaprojects and
megaproject research. The overarching theme of most articles
is performance, and this special issue highlights the complex
and multifaceted nature of performance, not only in terms of
drivers, but also in ways in which performance is assessed.
Despite the fact that some of the articles focus on project fail-
ure (e.g., van Marrewijk) and others on project success (e.g.,
Shenhar & Holzmann) there are clear commonalities across
the articles concerning the importance of the so-called soft
aspects of performance. In particular, the articles reveal that
there are different ‘soft’ drivers of megaproject success (i.e.,
success factors). For example, van Marrewijk identifies power
struggles, resistance to change, and institutional differences
as the main reasons why the project described in this article
failed. Steen and co-authors show that conflicting agendas
across the supply chain in megaprojects lead to problems and
poor performance. Shenhar and Holzmann argue that stra-
tegic vision, total alignment of all relevant stakeholders, and
the ability to adapt to complexity drive project success. While
the factors identified by Shenhar and Holzmann are both
inwardly and outwardly focused, van Marrewijk’s and Steen
et al.’s articles are more inwardly focused, all are primarily
concerned with soft performance aspects. We find the same
pattern when it comes to success criteria. While several of the
underperforming megaprojects described in the studies are
classified as such due to time and cost overruns, the articles
in our special issue show that a broader perspective of project
success is necessary when evaluating megaprojects. Such a
broader perspective goes beyond the standard triple con-
straints and incorporates aspects such as value and benefits.
More precisely, Eskerod and Ang introduce the two value
constructs of ‘generative value’ and ‘retrospective-reflective-
future oriented value’ to better evaluate megaproject per-
formance. In the same vein, Gillett and Tennent show that
a broader view of the factors needs to be taken into account
when evaluating megaprojects. The authors specifically use
the notion of tangible and intangible benefits. In addition,
both articles promote the idea that performance evaluation
needs to (also) be done after the close-out stage of the proj-
ect. More specifically, Eskerod and Ang call for performance
measurement in the impact stage, whereas Gillett and Ten-
nent promote that success or failure needs to be considered
over time in general. In short, not only are the measures of
performance slightly different, the timing also needs to be
reconsidered for megaprojects.
In terms of methodology, we find that a wide range
of mostly qualitative methods were used, such as ethnog-
raphies, single and multiple case studies, interviews, and
inductive archival analysis. Only one article (Steen et al.) uses
quantitative methods when comparing media reports from
business and industry associations with survey data. The
focus on qualitative methods seems natural, observing the
constraints of gathering sufficient quantitative data in a field
where access is difficult due to political reasons, the sheer
number of megaprojects that occur in a particular geographic
area is limited, and project-specific data that can be used
for quantitative work are highly confidential. The increas-
ing use of a mixture of research methods is another positive
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  13
 The Past and Present of Megaprojects
theme that can be observed in this issue. For example, due
to the long-term impact of megaprojects, multiple studies
used research methods that allowed them to investigate the
nature of megaprojects and their impact over time, including
Eskerod and Ang who evaluated a megaproject over a 50-year
period from the time it was delivered; van Marrewijk who did
a longitudinal ethnographic study; and Gillett and Tennent
who use archival data to investigate the longitudinal effect
of a megaproject. The variety of methods used in the differ-
ent articles suggests that megaprojects need to be viewed
from different perspectives, using different angles in order
to increase our understanding of megaprojects as a cultural
ecosystem by studying the interconnected organizational ele-
ments of megaprojects in their wider institutional contexts as
suggested by Kusuma (2014).
Emerging Insights
In summary, the main insights gleaned from this special issue
are as follows. First, while the notion of multiple success
factors and success criteria is not new to the field of project
management and, in fact, constitutes one of the most widely
discussed topics in the area, it seems more important than
ever. The magnitude of megaprojects with regard to their
duration and impact beyond the close-out stage is much
greater than what we have seen in the past. It is therefore
becoming increasingly important to assess projects and their
impacts at different times and based on different criteria to
be able to fully evaluate their performance. At this stage, it is
necessary to link the discussion back to the four critical points
we highlighted earlier and, in particular, the aspect of future.
If megaprojects are indeed a way to solve societal issues and
change the world in which we live, we cannot expect changes
to take place immediately. These changes will take place over
longer periods of time and will, hopefully, fulfill what they are
set out to do, but that cannot be assessed immediately after
the project has been completed. When it comes to improv-
ing the overall quality of life and well-being of the people
and planet, it might be hard to measure success based on a
monetary value. While this is certainly not what businesses
strive for, most megaprojects are either driven or subsidized
by political stakeholders, which means that success or failure
is not solely to be covered by organizations.
Second, the articles in our special issue demonstrate that
success is often driven by political and/or power-related fac-
tors. This relates particularly to the topic of how megaprojects
are managed. Seeing the highly political nature of stakehold-
ers across the supply chain with different underlying objec-
tives, the hard success factors do not seem to be enough
anymore. This unique setup calls for innovative governance
solutions that align stakeholder interests in a complex envi-
ronment with a large number of key players. Flyvbjerg’s
(2014) four sublimes is a relevant, but not exhaustive, frame-
work and starting point for such investigations of the different
14  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
drivers of megaprojects, which can help us understand the
ways in which we should manage them. We need to better
understand how managers shape, implement, and manage
large-scale projects in accordance with the sublimes. When
it comes to the soft factors, some of the main problems are
over-optimistic assumptions about realizing the project from
the dream stage through to reality, especially when factors
close to our personal belief system or agenda drive projects.
In these cases, objective assessments of how things should
be done, how long it takes, or how much it might cost, might
pave the way for the subjective assessments of such aspects.
If this is the case, megaprojects need to be managed and
assessed differently. In addition, if political or subjectivity
plays such a major role in megaprojects, appropriate research
methods need to be chosen to investigate such issues.
Third, we believe our studies indicate the importance of
using relevant empirical methods when doing research in
the field of megaprojects. We are quite optimistic about the
following possibilities of doing empirical research on mega-
projects, as we foresee two trajectories. One trajectory relates
to the ongoing need to explore megaprojects in-depth—from
various angles using various types of data. Anthropological
research is certainly one alternative here, as seen in the work
by van Marrewijk and colleagues (van Marrewijk, 2015). This
research may benefit from a historical approach as this allows
for insights and ways to zoom in on the actions and interac-
tions observed. We believe that more qualitative studies,
such as in-depth case studies or ethnographies are necessary
to unveil the political and power relations in megaprojects,
which seemingly drive many megaprojects. The main chal-
lenge is that these aspects need to be observed over time
because such research projects take three to four years. This
presents a major practical obstacle for many researchers. The
articles in this special issue demonstrate how longitudinal
research can occur despite those constraints.
The second trajectory is the building of larger data sets
and analyzing them by using qualitative and quantitative
methods. One way to go about this is to develop unique
databases about megaprojects that cover different aspects
of megaprojects, including financial and demographic data
as well as behavioral data, based on theoretical concepts. In
addition, more research could use existing databases that
provide relevant quantitative and qualitative information that
could be used to assess the performance of the project. Gillett
and Tennent provide a useful example in this special issue of
how this could be done. Generally, there seems to be a major
lack of quantitative studies in the field of project management,
which provides a major opportunity to further test the theo-
retical assumptions generated by qualitative research.
Finally, and as outlined above, we believe focusing on the
future of megaprojects is one of the most crucial issues. One
of the main themes in relation to the future are the challenges
of sustainability and how megaprojects will cope with external
industrial influences such as digitization and automation.
Megaprojects are not only temporary organizations but also
temporary structures, which is especially visible in cases when
stadiums are built for certain sports events, such as the FIFA
World Cup or the Olympics. In these cases, it is vital to address
the future of the project beyond its actual use, which is nor-
mally very short-lived. For example, pictures of the modern
‘ruins’ of the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, Greece, tell a
powerful story. Calls for building sustainable megaprojects
that stand the test of time are more than valid. How can we
build megastructures for a specific purpose that can also be
used for other purposes, transformed into something different,
or deconstructed quite easily? One of the most recent success
stories is the London Olympics, which had a strong strategic
agenda around the issues of sustainability and was able to
utilize the results of the respective projects (i.e., venues) long
after the fanfare of the event itself had passed. In particular,
the city utilized partly existing venues, built venues with its
short-term legacy in mind, or found future users for new ven-
ues in the early stages of the project. These, however, are just
some examples of which sustainable aspects were used and
incorporated in that particular megaproject at a holistic level.
Being able to sustainably transform a large area and produc-
ing new jobs for a relatively long period of time could be one
of the strongest selling points for megaprojects, which clearly
underscores the relevance of the future of megaprojects.
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PAPERS Symbolic Megaprojects: Historical
Evidence of a Forgotten Dimension
Marcos Lopez Rego, Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration—FGV, Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil
Helio Arthur Reis Irigaray, Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration—FGV, Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil
Renato Lago P. Chaves, Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration—FGV, Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil
ABSTRACT ■
By combining an historical analysis of three
megaprojects and an organizational theory
approach based on the notion of symbolism-
intensive organizations, this research attempts
to shed light on how symbols are constructed,
communicated, translated, and captured in
megaprojects. We conclude that, when it
comes to symbolic projects, a number of proj-
ect features may not be mirrored in the out-
come’s observable traits. We propose a novel
analysis dimension: the symbolism-intensive
project; in other words, projects that are car-
ried out aimed at delivering long-awaited
needs, a supreme mission, annihilation of
the past, or even the reification of heroes, or
success.
KEYWORDS: megaprojects; symbolic
projects; project sublimes; symbolism-
intensive projects
Project Management Journal, Vol. 48, No. 6, 17–28
© 2017 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
INTRODUCTION
M
egaprojects have become a subject of growing interest in project
management research, not only in terms of theoretical advances
but also due to the number of megaprojects from different sectors
and applications currently executed around the world. According
to Flyvbjerg (2014), a conservative estimate of the world’s expenditures
on megaprojects over the past ten years ranges from US$6 to US$9 trillion
dollars per year, or about 8% of the global gross domestic product (GDP).
Megaprojects include urban mobility, airports, healthcare systems, nuclear
and hydropower plants, offshore oil and gas platforms, and major events such
as the Olympic Games, among others.
Megaproject management deals with structures and processes of higher
complexity compared with the management of smaller projects, which refer
to stakeholder, risk, and technology management, project governance, as well
as general systems and temporary organization theories. The seminal work of
Flyvbjerg (2014) identifies four main elements or sublimes: political, techno-
logical, economic, and aesthetic. We propose a new construct so as to better
understand megaprojects: the symbolism-intensive project. This article is
based on the descriptions and analyses of three radical urban interventions,
which occurred in downtown Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, each taking place approx-
imately 50 years apart. Drawing on the definition of symbolism-intensive
organizations (Wood Jr., 2000; Alvesson & Spicer, 2012), the symbolism-
intensive project is presented as a novel analytic lens for the interpretation of
the real beliefs and motivations surrounding megaprojects.
According to Wood Jr. (2000), the symbolism-intensive organization is an
ideal type of organization, where the symbolic leadership becomes a manage-
rial form and constitutes a phenomenon linked with theatricalization of the
human experience and consolidation of the society as a spectacle.
Since its foundation in 1565, Rio de Janeiro’s city center has suffered four
major public interventions—in 1808, 1904–1908, 1959–1965, and 2012–2016,
respectively. The first intervention started with the relocation of central Rio
de Janeiro’s residents in order to accommodate the Portuguese royal family
and their court—numbering approximately 15,000 people—when they fled
from Napoleon and the French troops’ imminent invasion. As a result, in 1808
the prince-regent transferred the capital of the Kingdom of Portugal from
Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro (Azevedo, 2010).
A century later, from 1904 to 1908, former mayor Pereira Passos sponsored
a megaproject, which would mark the transformation of a dark, violent, and
unhealthy Rio de Janeiro. The intervention, planned to create a “Parisian
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  17
 Symbolic Megaprojects: Historical Evidence of a Forgotten Dimension
PAPERS
air” to the tropical capital, included the
demolition of slums and the construc-
tion of large avenues and boulevards—
an urban renovation that had previously
occurred in European cities, including
Paris, France; Vienna, Austria; Florence,
Italy; and Berlin, Germany. The project’s
outcome also encompassed a mass
vaccination of the population against
smallpox (Del Brenna, 1985).
In 1960, the same region was cho-
sen again, when the Brazilian federal
government moved the country’s capi-
tal from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília. The
intervention, which was also planned
to celebrate the city’s 400th anniver-
sary in 1965, involved a huge embank-
ment of Guanabara Bay, where a new
public park would be built, as well as
an elevated highway, also known as
Perimetral, which would shadow about
five kilometers (approximately 3 miles)
of Rio de Janeiro’s harbor extension.
Recently, after hosting a number
of international events, including the
United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development, in 1992; the
2007 Pan American Games; and the 2014
World Cup (the latter along with other
Brazilian cities), Rio de Janeiro’s mayor
started a new megaproject completed in
2016, just in time for the Olympic Games.
Called Porto Maravilha (in English,
“Wonder Port”), the project comprised an
area of approximately five million square
meters. Perimetral, the elevated high-
way, was demolished and approximately
eight kilometers of underground tunnels
were built. The project also included the
renovation of more than 120 kilome-
ters of the drinking water network, the
construction of 84 kilometers of a sew-
erage network, 37 kilometers of a drain-
age network, and 26 kilometers of a gas
network. Furthermore, Porto Maravilha
promised new urban standards in an
area of approximately 70 kilometers,
encompassing 650,000 square meters of
sidewalks, 17 kilometers of bike paths,
and 28 kilometers of technologically
advanced light rail lines (Companhia
de Desenvolvimento Urbano do Rio de
Janeiro [CDURP], 2015).
18  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
In summary, for the past 200 years,
central Rio de Janeiro has been radi-
cally changed four times—three of them
as the results of megaprojects. In fact,
not only did these megaprojects help
transform some of the city’s observable
traits, but they also carried a number of
symbolic meanings, best described by
Flyvbjerg’s (2014) aforementioned four
sublimes that drive megaproject devel-
opment. Comparing the three megaproj-
ects described in this article—Central
Avenue, Flamengo Embankment, and
Porto Maravilha—will likely reveal con-
tinuities and similarities in the ways they
are conceived, implemented, and deliv-
ered. For instance, the same tension
between economic and aesthetic sub-
limes observed in the 1960s is still pres-
ent today, since Brazil still lacks making
huge investments in infrastructure
(e.g., transportation and public services).
In effect, the lighting solution in the
Flamengo Embankment project was as
controversial as the recent demolition of
an expensive elevated highway just for
aesthetic purposes, driven by the Olym-
pics. Furthermore, a thorough examina-
tion might disclose other similarities in
important project management–related
issues, for example, the ways they are
conceived, implemented, and delivered.
Additionally, in this study we attempt
to shed light on how symbols are con-
structed, communicated, translated,
and captured by symbolic megaproject
stakeholders.
Stumbling Upon Symbols
in Megaprojects
Megaprojects—large-scale, complex, trans­
formational ventures that not only take
many years to develop but also impact mil-
lions of people—“are increasingly used as
the preferred delivery model for goods and
services across a range of businesses and
sectors.” (Flyvbjerg, 2014, p. 6) Warrack
(1993) emphasizes the economic, social,
and symbolic roles of megaprojects in
modern society, which may explain why
they are so attractive to decision mak-
ers. Sanderson (2012) mentions the main
characteristics of a megaproject: it is a
high-budget project, delivers a substantial
piece of physical infrastructure; the client
is the government and, typically, there is
a private main contractor who sometimes
retains a stake in ownership after the proj-
ect has been completed.
In this regard, Flyvbjerg (2014) des­
cribes the four sublimes that drive mega-
project development, starting with the
technological sublime, which refers to
the state that engineers and technolo-
gists arrive at in pushing what is possi-
ble in first-of-anything types of projects,
using high-technology solutions, some
of which are not sufficiently matured or
developed in the beginning of the proj-
ect (Shenhar, 2001). The political sub-
lime drives the decision-making process
of megaproject execution, because poli-
ticians are attracted to the visionary
approach and visibility that are cre-
ated, which materializes symbols cher-
ished by society and explains what the
results will cause with the public and
the media. The economic sublime refers
to the frenzy of economic activities
that ensue from every new megapro-
ject, including contractors, workers in
construction and transportation, trade
unions, consultants, bankers, investors,
landowners, and lawyers, among other
stakeholders. Finally, the aesthetic sub-
lime, which may go hand in hand with
the political sublime, may be described
as the breakthrough in architecture and
design represented by the project out-
come, which is also iconic, beautiful,
and breathtaking, such as the projects
described in this article.
Projects may be understood as exam-
ples of temporary organizations (Morris,
2013), although not all temporary orga-
nizations are projects. Projects emerge
in all industry sectors for different pur-
poses and for the satisfaction of vari-
ous needs (Morgan, 2006) and therefore
allow researchers to study them from an
organizational theory perspective.
The studies on organizational sym-
bolism started to gain relevance after the
seminal work of Pondy, Frost, Morgan,
and Dandridge (1983), who viewed orga-
nizations as collections of individuals
engaged in metaphorical transforma-
tions of reality. Morgan’s (2006) work
is filled with organizational symbolism
metaphors. His framework allows for a
better understanding of different orga-
nizational views. Alvesson (1991) intro-
duces the discussion of organizational
symbolism as a research field as well as
its relation to an ideology of organiza-
tions. Stratti (1998, p. 1379) states that
the symbolic approach “. . . emerges as
a component of the vast organizational
literature that deals with symbolism and
culture in organization.” Hence, sym-
bolism can be either viewed as part
of the organizational culture or linked
to institutional theory, since organiza-
tional politics can be viewed as a legiti-
mate symbol (Stratti, 1998); however,
the research on symbolism as a manage-
rial action is still scarce. Fiss and Zajac
(2006) developed a symbolic manage-
ment perspective on strategic change
to predict and test the antecedents and
consequences of how firms frame stra-
tegic change.
The symbolism-intensive organiza-
tion (Wood Jr., 2000) is defined as a
new ideal type in organization studies.
According to Wood Jr. (2000), organiza­
tions become magical kingdoms, where
the symbolic space is filled with symbol
manipulation and rhetoric. Symbolism-
intensive organizations are characterized
by symbolic leadership as a predominant
managerial style, where leaders and fol-
lowers apply impression management
techniques. By definition, impression
management is a conscious or subcon-
scious process in which people attempt
to influence the perceptions of other
people about a person, object, or event.
They do so by regulating and controlling
information in social interaction.
Moreover, the managerial innova-
tion is treated as a dramaturgical event,
and symbolic analysts are prevalent
within the workforce. The emergence of
symbolism-intensive organizations can
be associated with the theatricalization
of the contemporary human experience
and consolidation of the society as a
spectacle.
Based upon the notion of symbolism-
intensive organizations, we propose the
description of the symbolism-intensive
project: it is a high-budget megapro-
ject that deeply impacts its surround-
ings, is highly controversial, has a limited
schedule, and proposes a radical change.
Symbolism-intensive projects create an
aura of redemption, in the sense that
it creates a missionary culture that res-
onates in managerial practices. Such
megaprojects make intensive use of ritu-
als, for example, to celebrate the project
itself as well as its outcome for stakehold-
ers and society as a whole. Symbolism is
particularly intensive during ceremonies,
such as contract signings, the achieve-
ment of certain milestones, collective
press interviews, and press releases,
among others.
Symbolism-intensive projects  also
attempt to reorganize the past as a defin-
itive solution, after which all problems
from the past suddenly disappear. The
account of successful similar enter-
prises is extensively used, both as risk
mitigation and an incentive against the
expected obstacles during project exe-
cution. Furthermore, these projects are
usually managed by someone who acts
as a super project manager, a hero who
is supposed to overcome enormous bar-
riers. Furthermore, the project manager
and his or her team use a number of pos-
itive assumptions to reduce the project’s
difficulties and risks. Intensive symbol-
ism is also based upon the populariza-
tion of project management and pop
management clichés and terms (e.g.,
stakeholders, deliverables, milestones,
project manager, megaproject, organi-
zational culture, baseline, and project
legacy). The pop management (a term
coined by Wood Jr., 2000) literature com-
prises books and “fast consumption”
magazines, produced by the business
media. Business media is part of the
management industry, along with con-
sulting firms, business gurus, and busi-
ness schools. Moreover, a discourse
encouraging stakeholder participation
in the project is constructed, including
those stakeholders who do not support
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  19
the project. This participation discourse,
however, usually does not translate into
reality during project execution, since
these parties propose very few changes.
Symbols have meanings beyond their
inherent essence (Dandridge, Mitroff,
& Joyce, 1980), thus symbolic actions
are representational and demand inter-
pretation (Hambrik & Lovelace, 2017).
Moreover, symbolic actions—and sym­
bolic projects for that matter—are usu-
ally depicted in beneficial terms (Gioia,
Thomas, Clark, & Chittipeddi, 1994). Pol-
iticians and project managers alike are
thrilled about the potential of symbolic
projects to put them in the limelight.
Nonetheless, some symbolic projects fall
short of their expected outcomes and
may even be counterproductive. In this
case, they may be greeted with derision
by society.
These symbolic projects can only be
fully understood from historical, politi-
cal, and sociological perspectives. The
key questions are: What was at stake?
And why were these projects so impor-
tant to governments? In order to answer
these questions, we must recall that sym-
bols engage and direct people’s cogni-
tions (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991); they
are clearly perceptible attention-getters
(Werner & Cornelissen, 2014); they are
devices for conveying the importance and
urgency of needed change (Snell, 2002);
and finally, symbols provide economic,
image-laden reinforcement for associated
strategic themes (Maitlis & Lawrence,
2007); in other words, they signal a stra-
tegic change (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991).
This study also draws on Üsdiken and
Kieser’s (2004) integrationist app­roach,
which “calls for a focus on the inter­sec­tion
and the conjoining of historical analysis
and the study of particular organizational
forms and processes” (Usdiken & Kieser,
2004, p. 322). Therefore, adopting the
integrationist approach means recogniz-
ing that past projects act in the present
and are useful for identifying and under-
standing current practices and behaviors.
Recognizing that current megaprojects
have been influenced by older projects,
we resort to historical analysis not as
 Symbolic Megaprojects: Historical Evidence of a Forgotten Dimension
PAPERS
a sort of existing organizational theory
substitute. Rather, we attempt to bet-
ter understand current megaprojects by
combining both historical and organiza-
tional theory approaches.
According to Hofstede (2001), orga-
nizational symbols include words, ges-
tures, pictures, and objects and are
typically embedded in complex mean-
ings, identified by those who share the
same culture. Megaprojects are usually
perceived as unchangeable with regard
to both measurable and more abstract
benefits, in accordance with the iron
law of megaprojects (Flyvbjerg, 2014),
in other words, cost overruns, benefit
shortfalls, and other major concerns.
Nonetheless, in line with Kieser (1994,
p. 61), by reconstructing their develop-
ment over time, we attempt to discover
which features are actually the results or
outcomes of older projects, which prob-
ably have been conducted differently. In
this case, the past itself becomes a vari-
able (Üsdiken & Kieser, 2004).
Furthermore, by combining an his-
torical analysis with a novel organiza-
tional theory perspective, we are able to
critically assess “ideas that are currently
promulgated” (Usdiken & Kieser, 2004,
p. 323), thus adding to prior project
management research.
Methodological Procedures
Rowlinson, Hassard, and Decker (2014)
discussed three epistemological dual-
isms derived from historical theory
to explain the relationship between
history and organizational theory. The
first dualism concerns explanation:
While historians focus on narrative
construction, organizational theorists
subordinate narrative to analysis. The
second dualism, or dualism of evidence,
regards the use of verifiable documen-
tary sources by historians, whereas
organizational theorists prefer con-
structed data. In the third and final
dualism, in other words, dualism of
temporality, historians construct their
own periodization, whereas organiza-
tional theorists treat time as constant
for chronology.
20  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
These dualisms underpin their ex­­
plication of four alternative research
strategies for organizational history,
namely: corporate history, analytically
structured history, serial history, and
ethnographic history. This article uses
the analytically structured history as
a research strategy to discuss histori-
cal subjects comprising many complex
elements. Analytically structured his-
tory uses analytic constructs—in this
study, project, outcome, and benefit—to
search archival sources, enabling the
construction of a narrative of structures
and events that may not have been per-
ceived as such by historical actors (Row-
linson, Hassard, & Decker, 2014). Also,
we resorted to content analysis (Krip-
pendorf, 2012) of the data collected, not
only from historical books and papers,
but also from newspaper accounts and
project files.
It should be noted that, “although
analytically structured history retains
narrative as the main form of explana-
tion, it is driven by concepts, events, and
causation. [. . .] Analytically structured
history may draw on secondary sources
and narrative texts, but that is not the
same as a reworking or an analysis of
the narratives already contained within
those sources” (Rowlinson, Hassard, &
Decker, 2014, p. 264).
Rojas (2010, p. 1268) discusses three
disadvantages of consulting organiza-
tional archives compared with collecting
data in real time, for example, in inter-
views: (1) “organizations vary in what is
saved and when it is saved”; (2) “archives
tend to be rich in documents from lead-
ers, but they have fewer materials about
other actors”; and (3) “actors can selec-
tively record what transpires in an orga-
nization. Meeting minutes, for example,
may address only major points and omit
important contextualizing discussions.”
The author also argues that such disad-
vantages should be offset by the addi-
tion of “newspaper accounts, interviews,
memoirs, and other materials.”
The same disadvantages regarding
organizational archives apply to proj-
ects’ archival sources; hence, data col-
lection comprised not only the projects’
official archival sources but also previous
academic research as well as newspaper
and television accounts. In fact, we agree
that documentary sources provide “an
excellent means to test the accuracy of
different images and perceptions of the
organization and to compare espoused
and actual values.” (Dellheim, 1986,
p. 20)
Central Avenue: Making the
Transition from Rural to
Urban Society
In 1808, fearing the imminent invasion
of Lisbon by Napoleon’s troops, the
Portuguese court was transferred to Rio
de Janeiro, making the colonial city the
heart of the Portuguese empire, whose
territoriality included colonies in Africa
and Asia. Without any urbanization proj-
ect, the city saw its population double
in a year—with no proper structure and
virtually no local production or skilled
labor—since, for nearly 240 years, it had
only been a colonial city based on natural
resources extraction and the distribution
of slaves coming from Africa (Azevedo,
2010; Benchimol, 1990). Although the
presence of the royal family in the city
was supposed to be temporary, the King
of Portugal and his entourage remained
in Rio de Janeiro for almost 14 years.
In 1822, Brazil declared its inde-
pendence and established a monarchy,
yet it was still an agrarian economy
heavily dependent on slave labor. The
new capital of the empire remained
disorderly and dirty, avoided by many
foreign ships fearing chronic diseases.
Yellow fever epidemics were
recurrent—notably in 1870, 1873, and
1876—and the population crowded
around the city center (Benchimol,
1990). At the time, European immigra-
tion had increased and foreign residents
were estimated to be about one-third of
the city’s population. This population
lived mostly in slums or multi-room
houses, dark and dirty places lacking
minimum sanitary conditions. Many of
these houses were old colonial homes,
whose descendants had moved to new
neighborhoods created along the water-
front toward the south side of the city.
Then began, according to Benchimol
(1990), the controversy surrounding the
feasibility and advisability of removing
a great proletarian mass from the center
to the poorer part of the city, the so-
called ‘north side.’
In late nineteenth-century Rio de
Janeiro, the successful transformation
of European cities was discussed and
exemplified as a positive project out-
come. In 1875, the Brazilian Emperor
opened an exhibition in Rio called
“Public Improvements,” following a set
of urban planning and infrastructure
ideas, concepts, and projects devel-
oped about one year earlier. Benchimol
(1990) and Rocha (1995) describe
and analyze the ideas and plans pro-
posed by the Engineering Club and
the City Improvements Committee
from 1873 to 1902, which included
widening of streets, sanitation, water
distribution, and energy conces-
sions. These plans were influenced
by the Medical Commission, estab-
lished by the federal government as a
response to the yellow fever devasta-
tion in 1876, which accounted for 3,500
deaths (Benchimol, 1990). As a result,
the Imperial Medical Academy encour-
aged a new mindset in the incipient
Brazilian medical community. The
Academy introduced the need for space
ordering and planning, based on social
medicine’s new practices and ideas. It
was the first disease prevention state
policy based on spatial organization
architecture, with a strong emphasis
on public and private space clean-
ing. This new generation of doctors
would develop these ideas, changing
the population’s habits and introduc-
ing mandatory vaccines at the turn of
the century, which was met with strong
objection from the general public.
The execution of the Central Avenue
project, started in 1903, was the result
of a combination of factors, which acted
as project facilitators. In addition to the
aforementioned elements, slavery abo-
lition brought to the city a huge con-
tingent of Africans, former slaves who
had left their farms in the countryside.
Furthermore, European migratory waves
followed, not only from Portugal, but
also from Spain, Italy, Switzerland, and
Germany. Finally, the imperial govern-
ment outsourced infrastructure services:
sanitation was delivered to a British
company in 1862; an American organi-
zation was in charge of installing the first
telephone in 1881; a Belgium company
provided public gas lighting and gas
delivery in 1886; and the Canadians were
responsible for electricity at the turn of
century. The sole exception was water
supply, which remained state-owned,
after having been the subject of a huge
expansion project completed in 1880
(Benchimol, 1990).
In this scenario, the renovation of
the city center, including its harbor
extension, constituted the first mega-
project to be carried out in Brazil, whose
main symbol was the opening of Central
Avenue, the postcard image that would
add Rio de Janeiro to the list of civilized
and modern cities. The republic was
proclaimed in 1889 and 13 years later,
in 1902, the president submitted a pro-
posal to the Parliament that allowed a
loan of 8.5 million British pounds (circa
US$41 million, which today is equiv-
alent to approximately US$1 billion)
owed to British bankers, an amount that
represented almost 50% of the 1903 fed-
eral budget (Rocha, 1995).
During the project’s first year, intense
effort was made to amend the legisla-
tion and therefore reduce the costs of
land expropriations. The project itself
was divided into three areas, each with
its own staff and equipment, which
would converge in the end. In 1906, the
demolition of 1,681 houses was con-
cluded, directly affecting 20,000 people
(Rocha, 1995). Completed on time, the
project fully remodeled the city center;
renovated and organized the city’s port;
and led to the construction of landmark
buildings, such as the Municipal Theater,
the National Museum of Fine Arts,
the National Library, and the Monroe
Palace, home of the Federal Senate. “Rio
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  21
civilizes itself” was the rallying motto at
the time (Vieira, 2015). Moreover, the
project regulated urban life, and the
authorities acted firmly against old hab-
its and archaic traditions. For example,
the everyday sales of milk and small
animals earned by small producers, who
simply drove their cows in procession
every morning toward the old city cen-
ter, was one of the first practices to be
prohibited in downtown Rio de Janeiro,
despite the resistance of sellers and the
population in general.
The project manager was former
mayor Pereira Passos, himself a civil
engineer who had previously worked
on some important railroad projects
throughout Brazil for decades. Mr. Passos
had also lived in Paris, France and
Zurich, Switzerland, where he observed
some railroad construction projects and
furthered his knowledge on the sub-
ject. When the Central Avenue project
started, he was 67 years old and would
live for 11 more years until his death
in 1914. At that age, he was closer to
retirement than the other project man-
agers mentioned herein; nonetheless,
he envisioned a civilization far beyond
that which a single urbanistic project
could produce. He advocated in favor of
education and his ideas were in line with
the dominant medical policy at the time,
which was based on mass vaccination
and radically changing the poorer popu-
lation’s sanitation habits (Del Brenna,
1985). Passos’ views were similar to those
of Henry Ford’s Ford Motor Company
employees, which occurred years later
in the United States, during the growth
and heyday of mass production in his
automotive business (Snow, 2013).
Flamengo Embankment:
Rio Remains the Synthesis
of Brazil
The genesis of this project dates back to
1952, when Santo Antonio Hill was torn
down to open an avenue in downtown
Rio de Janeiro. The resulting debris was
then deposited in an area adjacent to
what is now the Flamengo Embank-
ment. This first part of the embankment
 Symbolic Megaprojects: Historical Evidence of a Forgotten Dimension
PAPERS
would last until 1958 and did not resem-
ble any park that would later be built.
In fact, the project was designed so as to
build high-speed lanes to connect the
city’s downtown to its southern neigh-
borhoods (Jornal O Globo, 2013).
Nonetheless, in 1956, former Bra-
zilian president Juscelino Kubitchek
decided to move the country’s capi-
tal from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília, a
city specifically designed for this pur-
pose. As a result, in 1960, Rio de Janeiro
became a city–state, the sole represen-
tative of the state of Guanabara, a sta-
tus that would last until 1975. Carlos
Lacerda, launching his campaign to run
for the state’s first governor, stated: “We
are not a decaying city, but a released
city [. . .] a region without regional-
ism. They thought that by abandon-
ing us they would move civilization
west, but here is where they left it.
Because we are the synthesis of Brazil,
because we are Brazil’s door to the
world, and we are the very image the
world makes of us” (Motta, 1997, p. 168).
Rio de Janeiro’s significant loss of status
had a major impact on the city’s politi-
cians as well as its people (Motta, 2000).
Following his election, Lacerda pre-
sented his plan for the next five years,
which included expanding the edu-
cational system, improving the water
supply network, and organizing Rio
de Janeiro’s urban space. The newly
formed city–state had peculiar financial
support: both state and city taxation,
federal debts with the state of Gua-
nabara, and external loans. Lacerda’s
anticommunist policy contributed to
his gaining access to loans granted
by international agencies—to a great
extent controlled by the United States—
after the communist revolution in Cuba
in 1959. The Flamengo Park was, in
fact, built in combination with an ele-
vated highway called Perimetral, which
would be integrated with the embank-
ment in order to connect the southern,
central, and northern neighborhoods.
Perimetral’s construction was based
on inner-city elevated expressways, a
common trend in several post-World
22  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
War II U.S. cities. Some decades later,
some of these American cities started
a movement to substitute viaducts with
tunnels, as illustrated by Boston’s Big
Dig project (Mohl, 2012; Tajima, 2003).
In addition, the idea of building a
tropical park (much like Central Park in
New York City) with 1.2 million square
meters, not only encompassing recre-
ational areas and over 11,000 trees of
nearly 200 different species, but also
presenting modern architectonic fea-
tures, was particularly appealing to the
governor. The project created the sym-
bol of modernity Lacerda wanted to
convey (Jornal O Globo, 2013; Instituto
Lotta, 2016).
In 1961, after agreeing to a transfor-
mation of the original parkway project,
Governor Lacerda created a work group
by decree, which was to be presided
by his friend Lotta Macedo Soares, to
manage the project. The work group’s
responsibilities were: (1) guiding and
projecting all architectonic, landscap-
ing, and creative work to be execu­
ted by the department of urbanization
and sanitation on the embankment;
(2) over­s eeing the urbanization and
landscaped composition on the water-
front; and (3) vali­dating any work of art
acquisition and location. Moreover, the
work group could request, if necessary,
Guanabara State’s public employees or
hire specialized services through for-
mal recommendation to the depart-
ment of urbanization and sanitation
(Instituto Lotta, 2016).
Lotta, who had a major influence
on the governor, envisioned a park in
an easily accessible place, to be visited
by people from different parts of the
city for outdoor recreational activities.
The project encompassed sports courts,
playgrounds, aeromodelling and naval
ship modeling areas, aquariums, arbo-
reta, public restrooms (the first in Rio
de Janeiro), as well as a public marina
for those who wished to visit the park
by sea. Furthermore, the project com-
prised an educational purpose, which
would be fulfilled by a specific orga-
nization in charge of promoting and
overseeing educational activities within
the park (Instituto Lotta, 2016).
In addition to innovation in gath-
ering a number of activities in a uni­
que scenario, the project resorted to
a highly advanced lighting solution,
which would allow for visitors attend-
ing nighttime park events to fully ap­­
preciate the beautiful setting. The
solution was controversial and deemed
an unnecessary luxury, even by mem-
bers of the work group, since the
45-meter (approximately 147 feet) high
light poles with six 1,000-watt mercury
lamps, weighing 17 tons each, required
technology unavailable in Brazil at the
time (Instituto Lotta, 2016).
The project was still in progress,
despite the park’s official opening in
October 1965. In fact, Lotta proposed the
creation of a public organization, which
would not only be responsible for pro-
moting and overseeing educational
activities within the park, but also for
integrating the project and making
sure it would eventually be completed
(Instituto Lotta, 2016).
In 1965, Lacerda ran again for gov-
ernor and lost, which made the creation
of the organization all the more impor-
tant for the continuation of the project.
Despite objection from the state parlia-
ment, Lacerda founded the organiza-
tion, Flamengo Park Foundation, which
would be dissolved the following year
by the new governor, Negrão de Lima.
Lotta would also be replaced as the
project manager (Motta, 2000; Instituto
Lotta, 2016).
In 1979, Marcos Tamoyo, Rio de
Janeiro’s mayor at the time, decided
the project was successfully completed
with the opening of a restaurant and
a marina (Jornal O Globo, 1979). The
original purpose of the marina, however,
had been changed from giving the
park’s visitors another transportation
option into a simple boathouse. In other
words, although integrated into the
same landscape, the park as a whole
and the marina no longer shared the
originally intended benefits (Jornal O
Globo, 2013).
 Furthermore, the concept of con-
tinuing education within the park was
never achieved, which may be credited
to the short-lived Flamengo Park Foun-
dation (Instituto Lotta, 2016). On the
other hand, the park was crossed by two
high-speed six-lane highways, which
led to the Perimetral elevated express-
way, thus connecting the northern and
southern parts of the city (Jornal O
Globo, 2015).
Porto Maravilha: Revitalizing
the Ultimate National Symbol
At the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury, Rio de Janeiro’s harbor extension
was at the pinnacle of its decadence.
With a huge abandoned area and closed
warehouses, the port of Rio de Janeiro
presented 70% of idle capacity. The re­­
gion’s main avenue, opened in 1907
as part of the projects undertaken by
Passos, had become a simple car route,
entirely shadowed by Perimetral, the
elevated highway built in Lacerda’s gov-
ernment. Furthermore, most buildings,
which used to be homes to grain silos
and flour companies, were vacant and
so were large state-owned areas. To
make matters worse, there had been no
residential real estate launch in the last
100 years, thus contributing to a sig-
nificant population decline. Barcelona’s
revitalization of the port area, motivated
by the 1992 Olympic Games (Ferreira,
2010), is frequently mentioned in works
by other authors.
Just like the Central Avenue project,
discussions on the revitalization of the
region and the search for resources for
its fulfillment took several years. In addi-
tion to Rio de Janeiro’s mayor’s high
political aspirations, the approval of Rio
de Janeiro as a 2014 FIFA World Cup
host city and as the 2016 Olympics host
city played a pivotal role in the deci-
sion of finally revitalizing the ultimate
national symbol. Thus, in 2009, the Porto
Maravilha project started with the foun-
dation of CDURP (Portuguese acronym
for Port of Rio de Janeiro Urban Devel-
opment Company), a public–private
partnership in charge of coordinating
public and private stakeholders. For
project implementation and public
service  operations and maintenance
within the established area of special
urbanistic interest, a concession was
granted to another new company, called
Porto Novo. CDURP was also responsible
for project conception and financing.
Although publicized as a single mega-
project, technically, Porto Maravilha was
actually a program, composed of a num-
ber of large projects. Its scope included
(1) demolishing Perimetral; (2) building
three underground tunnels to be used
as expressways; (3) building an entirely
new light rail network connecting the
city center, including the city’s largest
inter-state bus terminal offering trans-
portation to Santos Dumont domestic
airport, which relied on a new catenary-
less power system; (4) building a scenic
promenade; (5) rebuilding the region’s
infrastructure (e.g., sanitation and water
supply); (6) building the Museum of
Tomorrow on the pier; and (7) building
the Rio Museum of Art by retrofitting
two old unused buildings (Companhia
de Desenvolvimento Urbano do Rio de
Janeiro [CDURP], 2015).
Porto Maravilha was financed
through an innovative model for the
region’s urban requalification, based on
additional construction potential bonds
(these are government-issued bonds,
which allow its owners—real estate
companies—to build beyond legislation
limits). Municipality legislation defines
every type, size, and height of real estate;
in other words, it determines what is
called construction potential by area.
In order to recover degraded regions,
federal legislation allows the creation
of urban consortium operations in
which the municipality establishes spe-
cific rules for new buildings. In this
case, larger properties may be built in
exchange for financial compensation,
in other words, the purchase of Certifi-
cates of Additional Construction Poten-
tial (CEPACS, the Portuguese acronym).
Each certificate is equivalent to an area
to be built measured in square meters;
the resources must be used exclusively
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  23
to cover urban requalification expenses
within the established area of special
urbanistic interest. To stimulate hous-
ing construction in the port region,
one CEPAC permits the construction of
more square meters in residential than
in commercial enterprises (Companhia
de Desenvolvimento Urbano do Rio de
Janeiro [CDURP], 2016).
According to CDURP (2016), the port
region’s residents are the stakeholders
most directly affected by the Porto Mara-
vilha project. For example, the renova-
tion of drainage networks is expected
to put an end to historical floods in
a number of streets. During its execu-
tion, in the period spanning from 2013
to 2016, the project was responsible for
the greatest traffic jams in the history of
the city because of Perimetral’s demoli-
tion. Also, CEPAC certificates did not sell
as planned, thus leading the Brazilian
government to buying them all. In fact,
the Brazilian government expected a
high demand after the conclusion of
the project. Moreover, during execution,
the project was severely criticized by
the press, in light of its huge impact on
the region, elevated costs, tight sched-
ule, and potential risks.
A Megaproject Comparison
The cases described could be classified
as megaprojects, according to Flyvbjerg
(2014), Warrack (1993), and Sanderson
(2012). The three projects were strongly
motivated by a decolonizing view of
Brazil and Rio de Janeiro. Through the
materialization of symbols cherished by
the city’s society (e.g., its central role in
Brazil, modernity, urbanity, and civility),
the projects intended to provide Rio de
Janeiro with hallmarks of a great city,
which would allow it to be among such
major cities as Paris, Vienna, Florence,
Berlin, Barcelona, Boston, and New York.
Furthermore, the envisioned outcomes
would transcend merely observable
traits. In fact, when it comes to sym-
bolic projects, outcome analysis is not
only observable but eminently cul-
tural. Although the intended outcome
was not totally achieved in the cases
 Symbolic Megaprojects: Historical Evidence of a Forgotten Dimension
PAPERS

Sublimes Central Avenue Flamengo Embankment Porto Maravilha

Political •  First urban project in Brazil
•  Based on similar projects in major
European cities
•  Shows the maturity of the new
Brazilian republic government
•  High-visibility project of becoming
a South American postcard
Aesthetic •  European-oriented eclectic
architectonic style
•  Wide and clean streets
•  Landmark buildings
Economic •  The cost represented 50% of
Brazil’s 1903 budget
•  Foreign debt owed to the United
Kingdom
Technological •  Basic urban conditions, including
electricity, telephone, gas, water
and sewerage systems
•  Streets and squares built
adequately for public
transportation
Table 1: A megaproject comparison.
•  First project after the capital moved to
Brasília
•  High-visibility project
•  Materialization of symbols cherished by Rio
de Janeiro’s society, e.g., the city’s central
role, modernity, and civility
•  Modern architectonic, landscaping features, •  Substitution of elevated highway with
with artistic works in several locations
•  Seamless integration into the city’s natural •  Scenic promenade
beauty
•  Budget derived from federal compensation
for moving the capital to Brasília
•  Foreign debt owed to the United States
•  First active recreational park in Brazil
•  First public restrooms
•  High-tech lighting solution, with the highest
light poles in the country until then
•  Based on similar interventions in
other cities with degraded port areas,
e.g., Barcelona
•  High-visibility project with potential of
being internationally recognized due
to 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic
Games
tunnels
•  Extensive use of public–private solution
•  Unusual project financing, based on
bonds related to construction in the
area
•  Catenary-less tramway
•  N
 ew high-technology museums,
e.g., Museum of Tomorrow

studied, their symbolic, identitary,
and transformational roles lead one to
believe that they were indeed successful.
Table 1 summarizes the main aspects
of each project, according to the four
aspects proposed by Flyvbjerg (2014):
the political, aesthetical, economic, and
technological sublimes.
As far as the political sublime is con-
cerned, substantive similarities stand
out. Central Avenue was a symbol of a
nascent urban society and represented
the gentrification of the recently insti-
tuted Brazilian Republic Government.
Half a century later, the Flamengo
Embankment project and the con-
struction of Perimetral were parts of
the federal government’s response to
popular and political reactions against
the construction of the new Brazilian
capital, Brasília, and its most significant
consequence: the loss of the former
capital’s real and symbolic power. The
Brasília project was another megapro-
ject of the time—the city was erected in
four years. Finally, the Porto Maravilha
project started during the most favor-
able time of Lula’s presidency, when
good news abounded—skyrocketing oil
prices to go along with pre-salt reservoir
discoveries and Brazil’s election to host
the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016
Olympic Games. Despite the political
similarities, the project managers acted
differently. Pereira Passos, who was Rio
de Janeiro’s mayor, was both the proj-
ect sponsor and manager; moreover, he
did not have the same political aspira-
tions as his successors, illustrated by
the fact that he is currently referred
to as a mayor–engineer, more so than
as a politician (Del Brenna, 1985). On
the other hand, Carlos Lacerda dur-
ing the 1960s and Eduardo Paes dur-
ing the Porto Maravilha project both
clearly linked their political careers with
the projects’ outcomes. The political
symbolism of the three megaprojects
encompassed the strategic decision to
change the essence of downtown Rio
de Janeiro.
The aesthetic sublime is also present
in the symbolic nature of these cases,
due to the evident influence of major cit-
ies from more developed countries over
the projects’ aesthetic features. Paris’
wide boulevards were Central Avenue’s
benchmarks, whereas North American
cities inspired the construction of Perim-
etral. Porto Maravilha was influenced
by megaprojects from both Barcelona
and Boston. The projects attempted to
convey symbols of development and
civilization that would put Rio de Janeiro
among the best modern places to live.
Despite the influence of such cities over
the projects’ aesthetic traits, the evolv-
ing environment clearly had an effect
on them.
With regard to the technological sub-
lime, a similar change was noticed, rang-
ing from elementary urban conditions
to more aesthetically than technologi-
cally advanced features, and to a more
state-of-the-art and technology-driven
outcome, exemplified by a catenary-less
tramway integrating other pivotal means
of transport.
Finally, the most significant change
pertains to the economic sublime.
Both Central Avenue and the Flamengo
Embankment were heavily depen-
dent on public funds, whereas Porto
Maravilha differs in the way it was

24  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal

conceived, developed, and delivered,
as demonstrated by: (1) CDURP, a
public–private partnership responsible
for mediating public and private stake-
holders’ interests as well as for project
conception and financing; (2) unusual
project financing based on tradeable
bonds related to construction in the
area, thus alleviating the city’s budget;
and (3) Porto Novo, a concession owner
in charge of public service operations
and maintenance within the established
area of special urbanistic interest. Addi-
tionally, the three cases were paid for
with federal funds. The Central Avenue
initial budget was half the total 1904
national budget; the second project was
part of the federal compensation for
leaving the city; and the third project
was as a consequence of the Olympic
Games and political alignment.
Discussion
In addition to the four sublimes dis-
cussed in the previous section, we pro-
pose a new construct so as to better
understand symbolic megaprojects: the
symbolism-intensive project.
A symbolism-intensive project is
characterized by its five most distinctive
dimensions, described as follows. First,
it may be depicted as a redemptive proj-
ect, in the sense that it is intended to
fulfill a number of long-awaited needs,
thus deeply transforming the society
where it is executed. The three cases
discussed herein have been publicized
as redemption projects, whose legacy
would have a dramatic impact on the
everyday lives of Rio de Janeiro’s resi-
dents. “Rio Civilizes Itself,” “A Central
Park in Rio,” and “Rio, the Olympic
City” exemplify the vision these projects
encompassed. So, this is the first com-
mon feature among the three cases.
Bucci (2016) studied the redemptive
leadership and wrote about why one
should study redemption in manage-
ment. The redemption project is the
one that targets reconciliation with the
future, the one that will offer a second
or last chance to a complex or unattain-
able desire.
Second, it may be described as a
missionary project in the sense that
each stakeholder is expected to accom-
plish specific “missions” so as to earn
the project’s benefits. Volunteer work is
a paramount example. For instance, the
2016 Olympic Games organizing com-
mittee planned to recruit 70,000 volun-
teers for the event held in Rio de Janeiro.
Other stakeholders were also compelled
to participate, albeit indirectly, in the
project, as the majority of Rio de Janeiro’s
population were severely affected by the
demolition of Perimetral and its conse-
quences to the city’s traffic pattern for
more than three years. It could be said,
therefore, that these stakeholders were
invited to share their time—and occa-
sionally their money—for the project to
become a reality. The symbolic issue is
very strong in this case, because exter-
nal stakeholders are invited to take part
as active promoters and project fans,
so part of the project results could be
responsibilities of the population and
external stakeholders.
The third dimension of the symbolism-
intensive project refers to one of the proj-
ect’s main purposes, namely, to annihilate
the past and what it represents: an anni-
hilator project. The Central Avenue proj-
ect utterly demolished a 300-year-old city
center, and one century later the Porto
Maravilha project demolished the Perime-
tral elevated expressway, which connected
the city center to the northern part of the
city. Therefore, this dimension comprises
symbols that relate to the reconstruction
of spaces. The symbolism presented in
this dimension has been used in business
administration literature and practice for
decades, and is based on the idea that the
old managerial style should be replaced
with a more dynamic, professional, client-
oriented, and less costly approach.
The fourth dimension is about
the genius of people who distinctively
sponsor or manage the project. For
instance, such a heroic project is illus-
trated by the Olympic Games, since
former President Lula was responsible
for the idea of bringing the Games to
Brazil in 2009. The project manager may
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  25
also be perceived as a hero, not only
because of his or her idea, but also in
view of how the project was outstand-
ingly executed, despite all the conflicts
and pressures expected in a megapro-
ject. Adapting Werner and Cornelissen’s
(2014) findings on institutional change,
the project manager consciously plans
and executes verbal associations with
other ideas and cultural values, which
suggest how solutions in a particular
institutional field can be reconsidered
and rethought. In other words, the sym-
bolism-intensive megaproject manager
is able to establish connections with
other successful projects and translate
it into his or her own reality.
Fifth, and finally, a symbolism-
intensive project may be described as
an illusory project, because its results
and oft-publicized legacy, will fall short
of what was promised. As transformative
and influential as they may be, projects
alone do not improve social systems,
change cultural values and habits, and
enhance educational standards to the
extent they are believed. In short, sym-
bolism-intensive projects create an illu-
sion according to which it is possible to
simply import new conduct codes and
behaviors, just because they are common
in other environments, such as more
developed countries or cities. The gentri-
fication process clearly occurred in these
projects. No other project or effort was
carried out to deal with the vast number
of poor residents who had to leave their
homes; so, these megaprojects were not
the poverty reducers imagined by so
many stakeholders. Table 2 summarizes
our findings.
Conclusions
This research attempted to assess how
symbols are constructed, communi-
cated and translated, and captured in
megaprojects. To allow for new proj-
ect management–related insights, we
resorted to a combination of historical
analyses of three symbolic megaprojects
from Rio de Janeiro and an organizational
theory approach based on the notion of
symbolism-intensive organizations.
 Symbolic Megaprojects: Historical Evidence of a Forgotten Dimension
PAPERS

Dimension Central Avenue Flamengo Embankment Porto Maravilha

Redemptive In the beginning of the 20th century, it Again, the city needs to be aligned with The port area and the city are supposed to
intends to insert the city into the civilized the more developed countries, where rise as if from the ashes, as exemplified
world expressways and viaducts had solved traffic by the case of Barcelona. A huge, decrepit
issues caused by population increase and the part of the city is to be freed from an
automobile industry anachronistic viaduct
Missionary Not only were the residents obliged to The project is a big effort to keep the now Everybody needed to give their share
move from the city center, they were also former capital of Brazil as one of the First of sacrifice in order to be ready for the
urged to change their health and hygiene World major cities Olympic Games, as illustrated by long traffic
habits immediately jams caused by Perimetral’s demolition
Annihilator An enormous part of the city center was A big part of the downtown promenade, The demolition of Perimetral reinforced
almost entirely demolished in one year. renovated 50 years before, became the necessity of the project, since it
The population was forced to find new shadowed by the Perimetral viaduct. Also, created a nightmare in the city’s urban
homes, far from the city center the architectonic styles of the buildings were traffic. A high cost viaduct built only
considered anachronistic, most of which 50 years earlier was entirely demolished.
have been demolished since the 1940s
Heroic Pereira Passos, an elderly man near Lacerda, the first state governor and the Former president Lula and mayor Eduardo
retirement, was assigned the positions of project’s sponsor and primarily Lotta Macedo Paes always presented themselves as the
both city mayor and project manager Soares, the woman who acted as the real “fathers” of the project
project manager
Illusory As a result of building a beautiful new The project created an enormous abandoned Extremely tight schedule, insufficient
boulevard, the population’s habits were area near the port, traffic problems budget, and questionable debt solution
supposed to radically change, and the continued to grow, and years later the for financing the project budget. A strong
people removed from the city center expressway was not sufficient to handle the gentrification process in the former
would buy new houses in the city traffic. decrepit areas
Table 2: A symbolism-intensive megaproject analysis.

Organizations may use projects to
placate external stakeholders (Westphal
& Zajac, 1998) as do governments with
symbolic projects. We understand that
the use of the adjective ‘symbolic’ goes
beyond the concepts of words without
action: thus symbolic projects embody a
constructive imagery, as well as decep-
tion and guile. Indeed, the adjective
‘symbolic’ is meant as the materializa-
tion of constructive imagery. Symbolic
projects are representational and, there-
fore, require interpretation. In their
essence, symbols stand for aspirations,
ideals, or concepts; thus, they need to
be translated and apprehended by the
audience. The projects discussed herein,
sponsored by the Brazilian federal and
local governments, reflected the collec-
tive pictorial image of a country that was
being gentrified, developed, and, there-
fore, entering the crème de la crème of
First World nations.
Indeed, the aforementioned projects
confirm Gioia et al.’s (1994) assumption
about people’s cognition engage-
ment; Werner and Cornelissen’ (2014)
conception of attention-getters; the
expressed strategic change vision (Gioia
& Chittipeldi, 1991), and the urgency of
a needed change, as stated by Maitlis
and Lawrence (2007).
Given their culturally ingrained  fea-
tures, the examination of symbolic
projects must transcend an objective,
measurable, and observable outcome. As
previously stated, certain project features
may not be reflected in the outcome’s
merely observable traits. In fact, these
projects’ symbolic, identitary, and trans-
formational roles—which  a thorough
analysis should take into consideration—
may lead one to believe that they were
indeed successful, even when parts of
them were never accomplished or even
initiated.
In this article, the authors first pro-
pose a simple model summarizing the
main characteristic of a symbolism-
intensive project. Then, based on this
model, we outline a set of issues for
further research related to megapro-
ject management: How far it could be
applied to other project and environ-
mental dimensions, such as different
cultures, different project outcomes, spe-
cific industry sectors, nongovernmen-
tal megaprojects, and even applying the
framework to megaprojects carried out
in different countries.
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Marcos Lopez Rego, PMP, is an Electronic
Engineer, who earned his PhD and MSc degrees
in Management from Pontifical Catholic University
of Rio de Janeiro; he is Assistant Professor of
Project Management at the Brazilian School of
Public and Business Administration (EBAPE)—FGV,
Rio de Janeiro and visiting Professor at Alliance
Manchester Business School – Global MBA. His
recent research has focused on the organization
of project-based firms, historical projects, and
megaprojects. He has also worked as a project
manager for the Brazilian Navy Research Institute
(IPqM). He can be contacted at marcos.rego@fgv.br
Helio Arthur Reis Irigaray earned his PhD and
MSc degrees in Management from Fundação
Getulio Vargas—EAESP, São Paulo, Brazil and
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, respectively and a BA in Economics from the
University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, Iowa, USA.
He is Adjunct Professor at the Brazilian School of
Public and Business Administration (EBAPE)—FGV,
Rio de Janeiro and Adjunct Professor at Georgetown
University, Washington, DC, USA. Professor Irigaray
is Program Director of Alliance Manchester Business
School/FGV-EBAPE Global MBA Program, Editor of
Cadernos EBAPE.BR. He can be contacted at helio 
.irigaray@fgv.br
Renato Lago P. Chaves, earned his Master in
Business Administration from the Brazilian School of
Public and Business Administration (EBAPE)—FGV,
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. His main research interests
are in the fields of project management, strategy,
and organizational behavior. His managerial
experience includes research and development
programs and service contracting. He is currently
an Outsourcing Planning Coordinator at Petrobras'
shared services center. He can be contacted at
renatochaves.jazz@gmail.com
PAPERS The Three Secrets of Megaproject
Success: Clear Strategic Vision, Total
Alignment, and Adapting to Complexity
Aaron Shenhar, Rutgers Business School, Newark, New Jersey, USA
Vered Holzmann, Faculty of Management, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, Israel
ABSTRACT ■
Past studies have often voiced concern that
important megaprojects have repeatedly
failed due to extensive overruns, misunder-
standing of expectations, or both. In this
article, we contend that this pattern may not
be inevitable. In retrospect, despite pain-
ful delays, some megaprojects eventually
achieved their longer-term objectives. In this
study, rather than asking why megaproj-
ects fail, we asked whether these notable
(and rare) accomplishments have anything
in common. We found that successful mega-
projects are distinguished by three major
elements: clear strategic vision, total align-
ment, and adapting to complexity.
KEYWORDS: megaproject success;
complexity; vision; alignment; context
Project Management Journal, Vol. 48, No. 6, 29–46
© 2017 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
INTRODUCTION
M
egaprojects have been performed by humanity since the early
days of civilization. Almost all ancient societies have embarked on
ambitious goals of creating monumental structures on one hand
or useful infrastructures on the other. Megaprojects, in modern
times, have notably expanded beyond construction and have entered other
fields and industries. Furthermore, rapid developments in technology over
the last 60 years, have enabled us to do what could only have been a dream
years earlier. However, this progress has also presented enormous challenges
to the organizations and nations undertaking the creation of megaprojects.
Perhaps the most impressive example of a modern-day megaproject was
the Apollo Moon-Landing program, which successfully fulfilled society’s
century-old dream of “Man Going to the Moon,” and signaled the beginning of
a new era in the fulfillment of human potential. Consequently, today, mega-
projects are found in most areas of life—engineering, infrastructure, oil, avia-
tion, information technology, shipping, and of course space. Many of these
projects are initiated by government agencies or state and public organiza-
tions that usually have the resources, motivation, and time to run the highly
complicated processes required to undertake such huge commitments, along
with the endurance to bear the exorbitant costs involved.
As we already know, however, in retrospect, many famous megaprojects
were considered failures, due to extensive overruns or misunderstanding of
expectations, or both. Just recall the cases of the Concord—the supersonic
transporter built by the United Kingdom and France with a cost overrun of
1,100%; Boston’s Big Dig artery and tunnel project (a 220% cost overrun); or
Denver International Airport (with a 200% cost overrun). This ‘much too com-
mon’ pattern of megaprojects was recently dubbed by Flyvbjerg as “The Iron
Law” of “over time, over budget, over and over again” (2011). Although many
authors have studied the history of megaprojects, there is still no consensus
as to what the reasons are for this pattern.
But does it have to be that way? Is it inevitable that megaprojects will end
up in disappointment or unrealized expectations? Maybe it is time to learn
how to do it right! In fact, let’s not forget that despite this much-too-common
pattern, there are notable great successes after all. The immediate question
then is: What is their secret? What distinguishes between success and failure
in the megaproject arena?
In this article, we take a different approach to traditional studies. Rather
than asking what the reasons are for failure, we attempt to discover what makes
a megaproject successful. Furthermore, we question: What are the ingredients
of these superstar megaprojects? Do they have anything in common? Perhaps
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  29
 The Three Secrets of Megaproject Success
PAPERS
if we learn the critical elements that
lead to success, we will be able to avoid
some “expected” disappointments in the
future.
In this research, we use an inte-
grative strategic view to examine the
success of such megaprojects and the
value they have left behind. We consider
success or failure based on an exten-
sion to a combined multi-dimensional
and multi-stakeholder strategic concept
(Shenhar, Dvir, Levy, & Maltz, 2001;
Samset, 2010; Turner & Zolin, 2012;
Shao, Müller, & Turner, 2012). First, we
consider their long-term business and
value creation perspective—did they
really make money and/or contribute
to society at large? Second, obviously,
we cannot ignore the traditional view
of success as meeting time, budget, and
scope goals. By using the strategic and
retrospective thinking, however, we
contend that although many megaproj-
ects did not meet their time and cost
objectives, we should not ignore the
eventual value they delivered and the
long-term impact on different parts of
society. As history shows, sometimes,
what seems to be a failed project at the
moment of completion, may often turn
out to be an enduring success. Just think
of the beauty and attractiveness of the
Sydney Opera House. And, finally, we
will also distinguish between success
and failure from different stakeholders’
perspectives.
Another perspective we adopt here is
the fact that each megaproject is “one of
its kind.” With this perspective, we must
address the differences among megaproj-
ects and look at varying ways of managing
them. Thus, we engage different models
of distinction among megaprojects based
on innovation, complexity, constraints,
and so forth, and use them to examine
their selected managerial approaches.
Our ultimate goal, therefore, is to deci-
pher what makes a successful megapro-
ject and to detect the major factors that
contribute to its success. We will con-
clude with a few lessons for future enter-
prises embarking on future generations of
megaprojects.
30  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
Theoretical Perspectives and
the Literature
We will engage several organizational
theories in this study. The first one is
complexity theory, which has received
increased interest in recent years. Vari-
ous authors (e.g., Geraldi, Maylor, &
Williams, 2011; Pich, Loch, & De Meyer,
2002; Howell, Windahl, & Seidel, 2010;
Shenhar & Dvir, 2007) have suggested
ways to look at complexity in projects and
have offered methods for studying com-
plexity and its impact (a more detailed
discussion of theory is included later).
Another theory is structural contin-
gency (Pennings, 1992). Since “one size
does not fit all,” we intend to identify
differences among megaprojects using
different criteria and dimensions, and
suggest ways to successfully address
diverse kinds of megaprojects.
The third theory is transaction cost
economics (Williamson, 1981, 2008;
Douma & Schreuder, 2008; Luzzini,
­Caniato, Ronchi, & Spina, 2012), which
will be used to look at megaprojects as
transactions between capital investments
and benefits for society. Since we are
looking at projects as value creation pro-
cesses, this view will help us analyze the
net worth of benefits versus ­investments.
On Megaproject Research
One of the most well-known pioneers
in the literature of megaprojects is Bent
Flyvbjerg, who directed our attention to
the unique phenomenon of a megapro-
ject and its problematic challenges. In
a series of influential studies, Flyvbjerg
(2011, 2014, 2016) provided a framework
for the study of megaprojects. He defined
megaprojects as “large-scale, complex
ventures that typically cost US$1 billion
or more, take many years to develop and
build, involve multiple public and private
stakeholders, are transformational, and
impact millions of people” (Flyvbjerg,
2014, p.  6). Megaprojects are not just
magnified versions of smaller projects.
Megaprojects are completely different
from regular projects in terms of their
levels of aspiration, stakeholder involve-
ment, lead times, complexity, and impact.
Flyvbjerg (2014) also established
a specific jargon in the discussion of
megaprojects. In addition to the Iron
Law of “over budget over time, over and
over again,” he also identified the four
“sublimes” that drive megaproject devel-
opment: the political, technological,
economic, and aesthetic sublimes, and
he introduced the Break-Fix Model as an
explanation of the Iron Law of megaproj-
ects. All these ideas have sharpened our
understanding and defined the discus-
sion of modern megaprojects.
Finally, Flyvbjerg provided a histori-
cal and longitudinal view about the rate
of megaproject success. With a 90-year
perspective, he claimed that nine out
of ten megaprojects have cost overruns,
and that overruns of more than 50% are
not uncommon. Hence, delays are a
way of life for too many megaprojects,
as well as benefits not being realized.
According to Flyvbjerg, in this interest-
ing and very costly area of management,
best practice is an outlier and average
practice a disaster (2016).
However, Flyvbjerg himself admits:
“This is not to say projects do not exist
that were built on budget and time and
delivered the promised benefits. The
­Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, Spain,
is an example of such a rare breed.”
(Flyvbjerg, 2014, p. 11). That “ray of hope”
motivated our research.
Numerous researchers have provided
different perspectives for the typical
characteristics of megaprojects, refer-
ring, for example, to complexity (Hass,
2009), technical and social complexity
(de Bruijn & Leijten, 2008); and various
dimensions of complexity such as time,
cost, team composition, requirements,
contracts, communications, risk, and
technology (Kardes, Ozturk, Cavusgil,
& Cavusgil, 2013; Kipp, Riemer, &
Wiemann, 2008). Another common per-
spective in the investigation of mega-
projects is studying specific case studies
or arrays of cases in an industry. The
industries include the following:
• Construction—Brady and Davies (2014),
on two megaprojects in the United
 Kingdom; Brookes and Locatelli (2015),
on the construction of 12 power plants in
Europe; He, Luo, Hu, and Chan (2015),
on the Shanghai Expo construction proj-
ect in China
• Transportation—Chapman (2016) on a
rail megaproject in the United Kingdom;
Giezen (2012) on the Rotterdam metro
network
• Energy—Van de Graaf and Sovacool
(2014), on four energy megaprojects in
Europe and in Asia
• Aviation—Shenhar, Holzmann, Melamed,
and Zhao (2016), on the Boeing 787
• Information technology—Svejvig and
Nielsen (2014), on an information
technology project in a Danish bank;
Gauld (2007), on a large New Zealand
public hospital information system
development
Finally, another important point
of view used to analyze megaprojects
is focu­sed on management styles and
causes of the high rate of megaproject
failure (Chapman, 2016; Lenfle & Loch,
2016; Patanakul, Kwak, Zwikael, & Liu,
2016).
Contingency Theory in Highly
Complex Megaprojects
First emerging in the 1960s, structural
contingency theory suggests that, in
order to succeed, organizations should
be aligned with their environment
(Burns & Stalker, 1961; Drazin & Van de
Ven, 1985; Pennings, 1992; Thompson,
1967; Galbraith, 1982; Burgelman, 1983).
It was only a question of time before
researchers started realizing that proj-
ects could be viewed as “temporary
organizations within organizations”
(Lundin & Söderholm, 1995); hence,
one can apply contingency theory to
projects as well (Pich et al., 2002; Turner
& Cochrane, 1993; Shenhar, 2001). The
essence of these ideas is that “there is
no one best way,” and “one size does
not fit all” (Henderson & Clark, 1990;
Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Balachandra
& Friar, 1997; Souder & Song, 1997;
Shenhar & Dvir, 2007; Sauser, Reilly, &
Shenhar, 2009).
The correlations between structural
and environmental attributes have been
well studied when the organization is
the unit of analysis; however, they have
been less studied in the realm of project
management. The argument was that
projects may exhibit variations in struc-
ture based on context and environment
(Lundin & Söderholm, 1995; Payne &
Turner, 1999; Shenhar, 2001; Lenfle,
2008; O’Connor & Rice, 2013).
The evolution of project manage-
ment contingency theory was charac-
terized by the introduction of specific
context factors, which would distinguish
projects by different dimensions, lead-
ing to specific contingency management
decisions (Hanisch & Wald, 2012). For
example, Henderson and Clark (1990)
have used a 2 3 2 matrix to distinguish
between the components of a prod-
uct and the ways they are integrated.
Wheelwright and Clark (1992) have
classified projects based on product
and process types. Turner and Cochrane
(1993) have grouped projects based on
how well their goals and their means
are defined, and Pich et al. (2002) have
used a project’s information adequacy
(or level of uncertainty) to distinguish
between three strategies: instruction-
ism, learning, and selectionism.
From Contingency to
Complexity Theory
Contingency theory has been recently
combined with complexity theory in
studies of highly complex projects. But
what exactly is complexity? According
to Bar-Yam (2004), complexity is not
just a matter of size, duration, or the
number of parts that a specific system
has. Complex problems or systems are
the ones that do not have an imme-
diate resolution or understanding. In
other words, the resolution of complex
problems is not easily achieved. The
more human knowledge and technol-
ogy advance, the more existing systems
become complex. Organizations are
becoming more complex and are deal-
ing with increasingly complex environ-
ments. A decision by one individual
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  31
could impact an entire organization, or
one region may impact an entire coun-
try or the world. Another possible way to
define complexity is: How hard (or easy)
is it to describe the system and how
hard is it to understand its description?
However, complexity is also subjective,
that is, it also depends on the recipient’s
level of knowledge (Bar-Yam, 2004).
Edmonds (1999, p. 72) defines com-
plexity as the “property of a model which
makes it difficult to formulate its overall
behavior in a given language, even when
given reasonably complete information
about its atomic components and their
inter-relations.” Looking into the behav-
ior and inter-relations of the compo-
nents, Simon (1972) states that complex
systems are comprised of a great num-
ber of multiple-interacting components
in which it is difficult to understand the
behavior of each component or to pre-
dict the behavior of the entire system
once its starting conditions are known.
Complementing this view, Williams
(1999) considers complexity as a condi-
tion between numerous elements in a
system and the numerous forms they
can relate to each other.
The discussions on complexity have
broadened in recent years, encompass-
ing multiple dimensions. For exam-
ple, Geraldi et al. (2011) suggested  an
umbrella typology of five different
dimensions of complexity. Howell et al.
(2010) presented uncertainty as the most
common research theme in project con-
tingency theory (PCT), followed by com-
plexity, team empowerment, criticality,
and urgency; whereas, Bosch-Rekveldt,
Jongkind, Mooi, Bakker, and Verbraeck
(2011) demonstrated the elements that
contribute to project complexity by
introducing a technical, organizational,
and environmental (TOE) framework for
complexities.
It seems that numerous writers have
attempted to conceptualize and specify
levels of complexity; thus far, however,
there is no standard framework for the
assessment of a project’s complexity
(Shenhar et al., 2016). Based on the dis-
cussion above, however, in this article,
 The Three Secrets of Megaproject Success
PAPERS
we will adopt a wide interpretation of
the concept of complexity. Following
Simon’s (1972), Edmonds’ (1999), Bar-
Yam’s (2004), and Geraldi et al.’s (2011)
arguments about the difficulty associ-
ated with complex projects, we consider
complexity as any factor that may inhibit
a project from its timely completion.
Such factors may include size, number
of elements, and degree of interconnect-
edness; they may also include levels of
uncertainty, and degrees of constraints,
as well as risk. Uncertainty may involve
technology, market uncertainty, poli-
tics, economics, and the environment,
and constraints may involve time con-
straints, limited resources, restrictions,
regulations, and so forth (Geraldi et al.,
2011). Thus, by using such a wide inter-
pretation of complexity, we can include
everything that makes managing the
megaproject difficult or challenging.
We have seen that any megapro-
ject we have studied exhibits unique
characteristics in all or almost all of the
dimensions presented by Geraldi et al,
which are: structural complexity, uncer-
tainty, dynamics, pace, and sociopo-
litical complexity. We also suggest that
looking at the complexity of megaproj-
ects through these “lenses” may provide
a deeper framework for understanding
the nature of such projects and better
tools for analyzing their challenges.
Transaction Cost Theory
Transaction cost evolved as an economi-
cal theory related to the cost incurred
in making an economical exchange
between institutions. The term origi-
nated in the economical thinking of the
1930s by Commons (1931) and became
highly popular through the works of
Nobel Laureate, Oliver Williamson (1981,
1985, 1996), who coined the term Trans-
action Cost Economics (TCE). This
term is used today to explain a variety
of behaviors. It departs from traditional
neoclassical economics theory, which
assumes absolute rationality in any
transaction. Transaction cost econom-
ics involves considering transactions in
their wider sense, including emotional
32  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
interactions, informal exchanges, and
even political benefits. In creating such
transactions, buyers and sellers are
often changing their relationships from
a competitive environment to a bilat-
eral monopoly, which means that the
customer has a greater leverage over the
supplier and further collaboration mech-
anisms emerge, such as partial own-
ership, revenue sharing, and so forth.
Transaction Cost Economics involves
specific assumptions about mechanisms
of governance (Williamson, 1996), such
as behavioral assumptions, governance
structure, problematic property rights
and contracts, discrete structural analy-
sis, and remediability.
These characteristics may help in
explaining the difficulties and challen­
ges in megaprojects, on one hand and,
on the other hand, in creating a deeper
analysis of the benefits society derives
from embarking on megaprojects.
Megaproject Success Criteria
Despite a wide body of literature on the
issues of project success, there is still
no consensus as to what success really
means and no standard framework has
emerged. Early on, studies used the com-
mon triple constraints framework of time,
cost, and scope to assess the success of
a project. For decades this was accepted
as a standard way to measure a project’s
success and it was reinforced both by
researchers as well as practitioners; this
view, however, has gradually shifted in
the last 20 years based on two trends.
First, in the 1990s, Harvard’s Kaplan and
Norton introduced the idea that com-
panies should look at their success with
a broader perspective than just finan-
cial metrics. Their “Balanced Scorecard”
model became well known (Kaplan &
Norton, 1996), with its four dimensions
of success: financial, customer, inter-
nal processes, and learning; later they
updated their model to include a more
strategic perspective (Kaplan & Norton,
2006). The second trend emerged when
project management researchers started
realizing that measuring cost, time, and
quality for the assessment of project
success is insufficient (Atkinson, 1999;
Williams, 2005). Just as companies,
projects should be viewed as strategic
processes within a company and as a
means to executing the company’s strat-
egy. Project success measures started
to borrow from the enterprise success
literature with the introduction of the
multidimensional strategic concept for
assessing project success (Lipovetsky,
Tishler, Dvir, & Shenhar, 1997). These
studies have introduced new dimensions
for assessing a project. For example,
Shenhar et al.’s model (2001) includes
the dimensions of efficiency, impact
on the customer, impact on the team,
business success, and preparing for
the future; and Samset’s model (2010)
includes efficiency, effectiveness, rele-
vance, impact, and sustainability. Samset
and Christensen (2015) also introduced
the timing concept into the assess-
ment of project success, suggesting that
assessments should be made at the idea
phase, as an ex ante evaluation; at the
implementation phase, as an interim
evaluation; at project completion, as
final evaluation; and, later on, during
the operational phase, as an ex post
evaluation.
The introduction of programs as
extensions of projects and as a col-
lection of related projects signaled yet
another development in our under-
standing of project success. New studies
emerged dealing with program, rather
than project success. For example, Shao
and Müller (2011) introduced a sixth
dimension—social effects—to the pre-
vious ones. Recently, Shao, Müller, and
Turner (2012) introduced into their
seminal quantitative study on program
success, four dimensions of a program’s
capabilities: delivery, organizational,
marketing, and innovation; and Turner
and Zolin (2012) developed success
scales for multiple stakeholders over
multiple time frames.
This rich development in the study
of project success was highly useful
in our study. Megaprojects are clearly
expanding the scope of projects and
programs. While a megaproject can be
viewed as a single project, its influ-
ence, endurance, and expected value
are always beyond those of the immedi-
ate financial and functional results seen
in regular projects. Many megaprojects
will impact multiple stakeholders, future
generations, and the society at large for
centuries. Furthermore, using the argu-
ments of transaction cost theory, we can
clearly see that megaprojects are not
simple transactions between producers
and buyers—they create long-term rela-
tionships between contractors, spon-
sors, communities, government, and
the public at large. The value created
by a megaproject is often much more
significant and sustainable than that in
a simpler project contract. For example,
the Apollo Moon landing will always
be remembered as a historical land-
mark in human development history,
and the English Channel Tunnel has
forever reduced the geographical sepa-
ration between the British islands and
Europe, essentially making them one
continent.
Based on these multiple perspectives,
we will analyze the success of megaproj-
ects using the following four dimensions:
efficiency, customer, business/financial,
and society:
• Efficiency. To what extent did the
me­gaproject fulfill its cost, time, and
other productivity goals? Although typ-
ically researchers distinguish between
time, cost, and scope (the Iron Trian-
gle), we look at time and cost together,
since there is a strong correlation in
most megaprojects between the two.
In addition, we consider scope as part
of the issues that concern the customer,
as we show next. While megaproject
efficiency has played an important role
in many studies, we suggest seeing it as
only one part of the integrated picture
for assessing megaprojects. As history
has proven, many megaprojects that
initially did not meet time and cost
goals, turned out to be huge successes
in other dimensions, and, in retrospect,
are viewed later on as great success
stories.
• Impact on Customer/User. Every
megaproject is initiated with a cus-
tomer and user in mind. Consistent
with many studies (e.g., Shao et al.,
2012; Shenhar, Dvir, Levy, & Maltz,
2001; Atkinson, 1999), this dimension
assesses to what extent the results of
the project meet its scope and have an
impact on customers and users. Are
they satisfied with the end result? Are
they using the products and deliver-
ables of the megaproject? Did the proj-
ect improve the customers’ quality of
life, their effectiveness, efficiency, their
business, and so forth?
• Business/Financial Success. Financial
concerns are inseparable from mega-
projects (Flyvbjerg, 2014; Shenhar &
Dvir, 2007; Turner & Zolin, 2012). Such
projects require huge investments by
public or private sponsors and exten-
sive efforts by performing organiza-
tions and contractors. Investors always
expect getting their investment back,
along with significant profits. Similarly,
performing organizations need to
cover expenses and keep their busi-
nesses growing.
• Impact on Society. This dimension
is probably what distinguishes most
megaprojects from other “regular” proj-
ects. It reflects the long-term impact
that the project had on society, human-
ity, science, and the environment, as
well as the well-being of countries and
regions. Such an impact extends beyond
immediate delivery and users’ experi-
ence concerns (Samset & Christensen,
2015; Turner & Zolin, 2012; Shao et al.,
2012; Shenhar et al., 2001). As history
shows, some megaprojects are initi-
ated by prominent leaders for political
reasons, whereas others are driven by
environmental, aesthetic, or special
events interests. For example, Paris’
Arc de Triumph, Washington’s Lincoln
Memorial, or Rome’s Parthenon, are
historical evidence of humanity’s inge-
nuity, imagination, dominance, and
pride. This view suggests that consider-
ing a megaproject’s long-term impact
on society is legitimate, be it in terms of
­environment, quality of life, scientific
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  33
or artistic achievement, entertainment,
ecology, or symbolic impact on the his-
tory of humanity.
By using these dimensions in our
study, we acknowledge that megaproj-
ects may not achieve all these objec-
tives, and that possible tradeoffs need
to be considered. This choice will also
enable us to be less critical of a single
success dimension in one megaproject
or another. Instead, we look at mega-
projects as potentially benefiting one or
more groups of stakeholders (Turner &
Zolin, 2012). Specifically, if things are
not working in the short term, perhaps
a longer time perspective will compen-
sate our judgment of the projects we
studied (Samset & Christensen, 2015).
As we will see, the criteria in select-
ing megaprojects for our study required
that each project meet at least one of our
four dimensions of success. This selec-
tion enabled us to see the megaproject
phenomenon in its broader context,
which considered both its short- and
long-term aspects. Obviously, as we
describe later, of special interest are
those megaprojects that succeeded in
all four dimensions.
Research Method and Data
Description
The qualitative analysis method applied
was case study research, which, as
Flyvbjerg (2006) explained, is the most
appropriate approach to supporting a
detailed understanding of real-life situ-
ations. For the purpose of this study,
we used a multiple case study research
strategy (Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake, 2013),
which enables the analysis of poten-
tial constructs of theory. The initial
data were based on our data collection
of more than 500 project case studies
over the years. Each case was created
by a team of two to three researchers
who were trained in project manage-
ment research and were guided to write
their reports according to a common
protocol of data collection, interview-
ing, and case report structure. Each
case included information about the
 The Three Secrets of Megaproject Success
PAPERS

project’s objectives, management pro-
cesses, and outcomes. When interviews
were not possible, the data used for
analysis were based on open informa-
tion sources and academic and profes-
sional articles.
As candidates for this study, we
selected megaprojects only if they met
each one of the following criteria:
1. The project was a major undertaking
of strategic importance to the spon-
soring organization.
2. The project met the definition of
“megaproject” in terms of cost, vol-
ume, and complexity.
3. The project was highly innovative in
its concept, technology, design, or
operational point of view.
4. The project outcome was intended to
have a major impact for a long time on
its sponsors, users, and society at large.
The selection of final cases and their
analysis were performed in steps: We
first identified 42 candidate megaproj-
ects that met all four selection criteria,
according to our own judgment. This
list was then presented to a team of two
independent experts who were highly
experienced project managers and exec-
utives and had not participated in the
previous phases of the study or the data
collection. We asked them to assess, as
a team, the success of each one of the
cases and indicate their agreement with
each success criterion on a five-point
scale, ranging from “totally disagree” to
“totally agree.” The selected megaproj-
ects were those that received a mini-
mum score of 5 on at least one success
dimension. We then reduced the scale
to three levels: Success, Partial Suc-
cess, and Failure. “Success” was ranked
as level 5; “Partial Success” as level 3
or 4; and “Failure” as level 1 or 2. This
selection resulted in a final group of
14 megaprojects, presented in Table 1

Financial/
Project Customer/ Business Impact on
Name Product Industry Efficiency User Impact Success Society
 1 Los Angeles First 4.4 miles of the Los Angeles Metro, Construction Success Failure Partial Success Failure
Metro: between Downtown and North Hollywood
The Red Line
 2 Three Gorges World’s largest hydroelectric dam Energy Failure Success Partial Success Partial Success
Dam
 3 The English Rail tunnel of 50 km, linking the United Construction Failure Success Partial Success Success
Channel Tunnel Kingdom and France, beneath the English
Channel
 4 Sydney Opera Architectural wonder of performing arts Construction Failure Success Success Success
House center in Australia
 5 Boeing 787, A major aircraft, made largely of Aerospace Failure Success Success Success
Dreamliner composites
 6 Denver Airport International Airport to handle 52 million Construction Failure Success Success Success
passengers per year
 7 Hubble Space Space telescope orbiting above Earth’s Aerospace Failure Success Success Success
Telescope atmosphere
 8 London 2012 Olympic Park, Village and transport Construction Success Success Success Success
Olympic Park
 9 NOVA New Bank IT platform ICT Success Success Success Success
10 World Trade A large commercial complex in lower Construction Success Success Success Success
Center New York City
11 Mall of The largest retail mall and entertainment Construction Success Success Success Success
America complex in the United States
12 Kepler Space vehicle to discover planets, beyond Aerospace Success Success Success Success
the solar system, in search for potential life
13 Guggenheim A museum of modern and contemporary Construction Success Success Success Success
Museum Bilbao art, Spain
14 Apollo Complex mission for taking astronauts to Aerospace Success Success Success Success
the moon and returning them back to Earth
Table 1: Collection of research megaprojects, industries, and success assessment.

34  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal

along with their industries and degree
of success on each dimension.
In the final step of analysis, we per-
formed structured content analysis using
a pre-defined coding scheme based on
literature review for categorization of
success factors, and systematic accu-
mulation of qualitative descriptions
(Bullock & Tubbs, 1987; Eisenhardt, 1989;
Krippendorff, 2004). An initial list of cat-
egories revealed 37 factors that were
collected from previous literature and
confirmed during the structured con-
tent analysis. To reach a concise opera-
tional shortlist, however, we combined
similarly close factors by using a cluster
analysis method, which is the process of
grouping a set of objects or observations
in such a way that objects in the same
group are more similar to each other than
to those in other groups. Specifically,
we employed a manual density-based
clustering data-mining process similar
to the famous DBSCAN (Density-Based
Spatial Clustering of Applications with
Noise) algorithm (Ester, Kriegel, Sander,
& Xu, 1996). This process groups together
points that are closely packed by con-
necting points within certain distance
thresholds, and where each cluster con-
sists of all density-connected objects. The
process is relatively simple and required
no more than three clustering cycles.
Each cluster was named at the end of
each cycle, until no further clustering
was needed, based on our assessment.
A detailed discussion of the content and
results of this process is provided in the
analysis section of the article.
In the following sections, we briefly
describe each one of the research
megaprojects.
The Los Angeles Metro:
The Red Line
The Metro Red Line subway construc-
tion project was the first 4.4 miles of the
Los Angeles Metro, which was managed
by the Rail Construction Corporation
(RCC), a government-affiliated orga-
nization. In 1980, city voters approved
funding for an integrated railway sys-
tem. During execution, the project faced
several technical challenges, such as
hydrocarbon gases in the ground, aban-
doned oil wells, contaminated under-
ground water, and high seismic activity.
Despite all this, the project was com-
pleted and the line was opened to the
public eight months ahead of sched-
ule, with no budget overruns, in January
1993. Overall, the construction of the
Metro was very successful with regard
to the classical criteria of scope, qual-
ity, budget, and time. However, from the
financial and public perspectives, the
project failed to fulfill its expectations
(Stapleton, 1993; Stopher, 1993). While
expecting to see one million passengers
during the first year of operation, the
actual number was less than 60,000. As a
result, the remaining phases of the proj-
ect were dropped a few years later when
the city realized that the longer-term
mission of the system was not realized.
The Three Gorges Dam
The Three Gorges Dam (TGD) in Yiling
District, China, is the world’s largest
hydroelectric dam, managed by a gov-
ernment-owned company. The dam is
a concrete gravity type with a height of
607 feet and total water storage capac-
ity of 39.3 billion square meters. The
project was proposed in the early 1950s
and officially approved in 1958. It did
not start, however, until 1993, with con-
struction planned to take place between
1994 and 2009 (Ma, 2010). Several addi-
tional projects were needed later to
make the dam fully operational, thus
delaying completion to 2011 (Xu, Tan,
& Yang, (2013). The cost, which was
estimated at US$22.5 billion, reached
US$27.6 billion. The project involved
significant environmental, ecologi-
cal, and socio-economic implications,
because it posed possible geological
hazards to the surrounding area. The
main long-term challenge involving
the dam is mitigating its environmental
negative consequences and securing its
positive impacts, such as flood control,
energy production, increased navigabil-
ity of the Yangtze River, and access to
fresh water (Fu et al., 2010).
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  35
The English Channel Tunnel
Although the initial idea to connect
Britain with the European Continent
was raised as early as 1802, because of
political, technical, and financial rea-
sons, it was not officially launched until
the 1980s. This special project required
a treaty between Britain and France,
which was signed by the two coun-
tries in 1987. The tunnel was a build-
own-operate-transfer (BOOT) project
with a 65-year concession. The project’s
actual costs ran 80% over budget, and
its financing costs were 140% higher
than forecasted (Flyvbjerg, Buzelius, &
Rothengatter, 2003). In addition to the
engineering and technical complexities
of building a tunnel of this magnitude,
it required an extremely complex orga-
nization that had to deal with cultural
differences, political and financial com-
plications, conflicts of interest, lack of
leadership at the highest level, a poorly
written contract, and conflicting health
and safety concerns (Shenhar & Dvir,
2007). Its unique organizational struc-
ture and financing system, which had
to establish mutual adjustments and
coordination of stakeholders, was not
applied. As a result, the project did not
meet its original business objective
(Genus, 1997; Chang, 2013). In retro-
spect, however, from the public good’s
perspective, the Channel is clearly a
successful project. Not only does it con-
tinue to transport people and goods
across Europe, it continues to create
economic value to all involved European
nations.
The Sydney Opera House
The original project plan of the Sydney
Opera House, as envisioned by the New
South Wales government in the 1950s,
included a schedule of five years and an
estimated budget of about AU$7 million.
When its doors were eventually opened
only in 1973, it was 16 years later than
scheduled and with an actual cost of
AU$102 million. As a public construc-
tion project aimed to achieve long-term
or infrastructure goals, the project was
plagued by numerous stops and starts
 The Three Secrets of Megaproject Success
PAPERS
and endless political battles. From a tra-
ditional view of project success, how-
ever, the Sydney Opera House project
was a failed project. Yet, the project was
eventually perceived as a success story,
creating fame and a steady income to
the city of Sydney, and forever remains
one of the most fascinating buildings in
the world.
Boeing 787: The Dreamliner
The 787 Dreamliner project was devel-
oped by Boeing in the early 2000s with
the intent of responding to the growing
demand for next-generation, advanced,
and highly efficient airplanes. The proj-
ect was approved in 2004 with a schedule
of four years. However, the completion
of the project was delayed by almost
40 months and its cost, which is esti-
mated at about US$40 billion, was “well
more than twice the original estimate”
(Mecham, 2011). The reasons for such
extensive delay involved technologi-
cal and organizational challenges (Alt-
feld, 2010; Shenhar et al., 2016). From
the technology perspective, the chal-
lenge was to design an aircraft body
using lightweight composite materials
and to develop new avionics and com-
puting systems (Ye, Lu, Su, & Meng,
2005). Additionally, from the organiza-
tional perspective, Boeing outsourced
an unprecedented portion of the design,
engineering, manufacturing, and pro-
duction to a global network of 700 local
and foreign suppliers, which resulted
in more than 70% foreign development
and transformed the traditional sup-
ply chain into a development chain
(MacPherson & Pritchard, 2005; Tang,
Zimmerman, Nelson, & James, 2009).
The company was struggling with these
challenges for more than three years
until it finally went into service. Despite
the delay, it seems that the 787 Dream-
liner created a well-desired plane, which
will continue to produce extensive
financial business results in the future.
Denver International Airport
In 1989, Denver voters mandated the
con­
struction of a new airport, since
36  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
Denver’s Stapleton Airport had outgrown
its maximum capacity. The construction
work started in November of that year,
with a planned schedule of less than four
years. Although most of the construction
progressed as planned, the overall proj-
ect could not be completed due to the
innovative, state-of-the-art automated
baggage system that had to be integrated
into the new airport. The development
of this system, which was to be the larg-
est and most advanced in the world,
encountered numerous mechanical and
software problems (Szyliowicz & Goetz,
1995; Montealegre & Keil, 2000). Even-
tually, to avoid further delays, manage-
ment agreed to integrate a traditional
baggage system to enable the opening
of the airport. The challenge involved
in this relatively small subsystem was
underestimated when all components
in this projects were managed in the
same way.
The Hubble Space Telescope
The Hubble telescope project was con-
ceived by NASA in the 1960s, formally
funded in 1977, and prepared for launch
in 1986. In early 1990 it was put into
orbit, 370 miles above the Earth’s sur-
face, when it was noted that there was
a distinct spherical aberration in the
telescope’s primary mirror. In 1993,
the defect was repaired and upgraded
in several consecutive missions. Hub-
ble is operating and is planned for an
additional 15 to 20 years of service
(Harwood, 2013); it involved the incor-
poration of non-existent technologies
that needed to be developed during the
project’s effort, which thus classified it
as a super-high-tech project (Shenhar &
Dvir, 2007). On the managerial aspect,
the project enjoyed top management
support, in which Congress and several
NASA centers worked together in full
concert. Although originally perceived
otherwise, in the end, it appears that
NASA was competent at the techni-
cal, organizational, and personnel man-
agement challenges (Chaisson, 1998).
As the telescope went online, Hubble
continues to soar with continuous dis-
coveries, erasing the negative image
people still hold of it in their minds
(Zimmerman, 2010). For a long time,
the government, scientific community,
and society in general have perceived
Hubble as a failure; from a strategic and
retrospective point of view, however, it
can indeed, be considered a success.
London 2012 Olympic Park
In general, the Olympic Games are a uni­
que mega event, which involves a com-
plex construction megaproject, national
social and environmental initiatives,
and knowledge mobilization challenges
(Parent, MacDonald, & Goulet, 2014;
Grabher & Thiel, 2015). Its implementa-
tion started in July 2005 when London
was awarded the 2012 Olympic and
Paralympic Games. As a time-critical
project, with a deadline defined by the
opening date of the Games on 27 July
2012, the construction work, composed
of 70 projects, was completed one year
ahead of schedule; but the original
budget, which was almost US$4 billion
(£2.4 billion), was finally increased to
more than US$15 billion (£9.3 billion).
The Olympic management committee,
the municipality of London, the project
committee, and the executive managers
worked together as an integrated organi-
zation throughout the project life cycle
in order to plan, design, execute, and
deliver as specified by LOCOG (London
Organising Committee of the Olympic
Games). The management style that
enabled the completion of the complex
project was based on a layered struc-
ture of systems integration; it required
careful coordination of and communi-
cation with multiple internal and exter-
nal stakeholders with different interests
and priorities to manage the interfaces
between systems (Brady & Davies, 2014;
Davies & Mackenzie, 2014; Davies, 2016).
NOVA
Very large information and communi-
cation technology (ICT) projects, do
not typically fit the formal definitions
of megaprojects. Yet it is interesting to
review such an effort as an example of a
megaproject in this industry. Typically,
however, as Flyvbjerg noted (2011),
large ICT projects run over time and
over budget and fail to deliver many
of the requirements. The NOVA proj-
ect, however, demonstrates a successful
implementation of a highly complex
IT platform transition in the mid-sized
Danish Bank, Jyske Bank (Svejvig &
Nielsen, 2014). The project was imple-
mented between 2010 and 2012, through
147 sub projects. The project employed
900 workers who were inspired by the
Apollo project, as a leading “metaphor
for the NOVA’s journey” (p. 40). Based
on data collected through interviews
with various stakeholders, Svejvig and
Nielsen (2014) concluded that clear
vision, inspiring leadership, and highly
structured project communication and
documentation systems were keys to
its success.
The World Trade Center
Although the original World Trade Cen-
ter (WTC) complex was destroyed in the
September 11 attacks, it is still an exam-
ple of project management at its best.
The original World Trade Center was a
large complex of seven buildings in New
York City, which was built to revitalize
lower Manhattan and serve as the first
visible sign that the economy of New
York City was transforming from man-
ufacturing to service (Birch, 2006). In
1962, Yamasaki was selected as the lead
architect, and the actual construction
work began in 1968. At the time of their
completion, the “Twin Towers” were
the tallest buildings in the world. The
project involved technical challenges,
such as building to the Bathtub system,
which was aimed to resolve the problem
of reaching bedrock through the water
table of the Hudson River; the elevator
system, aimed to transport the 50,000
tenants working in the towers; and a
revolutionary exterior structural column
design. In addition, the project involved
many political and logistical issues
related to the selection of the site and
implications for displacing existing busi-
nesses and residents. The project was
well organized for its level of complexity
and stakeholder involvement. In ret-
rospect, throughout the entire project,
management demonstrated the right
approach with leadership, which created
high energy and motivated the team,
and a strategic, long-term perspective,
which was focused on the economic,
environmental, social, and political suc-
cesses (Gillespie, 2002).
The Mall of America
The Mall of America is the largest retail
mall and entertainment complex in the
United States and encompasses more
than 520 stores, dozens of restaurants,
nightclubs, theaters, a mini-golf court,
and an indoor theme park. The proj-
ect was initiated in 1988 when the city
of Bloomington, Minnesota, requested
proposals for development of the
78-acre site. Preliminary design began
in March 1989 and actual construction
started in June 1989. The project was
new with respect to size and design
challenges, including acoustical control,
extensive underground systems, water
attractions that created high humid-
ity, and skylights that required develop-
ing new software to support special 3D
computer models to predict heat gain.
The fast track construction method
applied in this project mandated a flex-
ible management style, which enabled
the Mall of America to open its doors
to the public on 11 August 1992, thus
completing the project on time albeit
with some budget overrun. Since then,
it receives more than 40 million visitors
annually, although it was originally tar-
geted to host only 3 million visitors per
year. “Joe Talentino, president of MSA
(Melvin Simon & Associates, the man-
aging partner and overall project man-
ager), attributes the earlier opening to
several factors, including close interac-
tion of building team members, absence
of strikes, and hands-on involvement by
the owner” (Wright, 1992).
Kepler
The Kepler project is a special purpose
space mission in the NASA Discovery
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  37
Program. Its goal is “to survey our region
of the Milky Way galaxy to discover
Earth-size or larger planets in or near
the habitable zone of solar-like stars
and determine how many of the billions
of stars in our galaxy have such planets”
(NASA, 2009, p. 11). The spacecraft was
launched on time, on 7 March 2009
to detect terrestrial planets, both rocky
and Earth-size, around other stars, in
search of possible life in the universe.
The project was managed well and fol-
lowed well-defined procedures and
plans (Shenhar et al., 2005). The project
was planned for 3.5 years of opera-
tion, with a budget of US$600 million.
It was extended to more than 7 years
in November 2012, when its primary
mission was about to end and an inde-
pendent panel of senior scientists rec-
ommended Kepler be kept alive through
2016 (Clark, 2012). The novelty of this
breakthrough project required careful
attention to the management of require-
ments, and the complexity of the system
called for intensive integration and for-
mal procedures for communicating and
coordinating among project teams.
Guggenheim Museum Bilbao
The museum of modern and contem-
porary art, located in Bilbao, Spain, was
designed and built by the well-known
architect Frank Gehry. It was initiated
in 1991 with the goal of increasing the
city’s sources of income. On 18 October
1997, the museum, which has special
curves on the exterior and a unique inte-
rior designed around a large light-filled
open-roofed entrance hall, opened. This
megaproject completed on time, on
budget, and it met the requirements. In
an interview with Bent Flyvbjerg (2005)
for Harvard Design Magazine, Gehry
explained the museum’s success: First,
he ensured that what he calls the “orga-
nization of the artist” prevailed during
construction, in order to prevent politi-
cal and business interests from interfer-
ing with the design. In addition, detailed
drawings and plans were prepared in
advance to enable realistic cost estima-
tions that could be controlled. Third,
 The Three Secrets of Megaproject Success
PAPERS
the project team used technology for
digital design models, which facilitated
precise quantification of the elements of
the building. The strategic success of the
Guggenheim Museum Bilbao is assessed
by the significant growth of tourism,
which has a positive impact on Bilbao
(Plaza, 2000), as well as the museum’s
effects on Bilbao’s image, tourism, and
the local economy (Plaza, 2006).
Apollo—Moon Landing
The Apollo program was initiated in
the early 1960s by the late President
John F. Kennedy with the vision of land-
ing the first American on the Moon
before the end of the decade. The pro-
gram included a three-part spacecraft to
take two astronauts to the Moon’s sur-
face, support them while on the Moon,
and return them to Earth. It was clear
that this program, which encompassed
17 missions, involved extremely innova-
tive developments, including response
to radiation, meteoroid hazards, and
threats presented by the unknown lunar
surface environment. Based on a risk-
aversion strategy, everything was tested
and retested, with numerous safety
mechanisms put in place to ensure
nothing could go wrong. The final con-
figuration and the design freeze had
to be significantly delayed until all
unknowns were resolved. The Apollo
program was part of NASA’s portfolio
activities at this time, with an increasing
share of budget—starting at 10% in 1962
and increasing to 70% in 1967 (Gisler
& Sornette, 2009). The Apollo program
was originally funded with US$3 bil-
lion, but later requested and received
US$20 billion. The actual plan, however,
was US$13 billion, with the remain-
der secured as reserved contingency.
That decision was appropriate, since
the actual final cost of the program was
US$19.4 billion (Stine, 2008). The suc-
cessful Moon landing of Apollo 11 in July
1969 symbolizes a victory for man, not
only on unknown space territories but
also on new and far-reaching technolo-
gies. Five subsequent Apollo missions
also landed astronauts on the Moon, the
38  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
last in December 1972. Although some
have argued that “the Apollo program
was a genuine bubble . . .” (Gisler &
Sornette, 2009, p. 67), it is considered
an exceptional triumph that laid the
scientific foundation for developments
in many areas of advanced technology,
including avionics, telecommunica-
tions, and computers.
Analysis and Findings
As shown in Table 1, each megaproject
selected for our sample was successful
in at least one dimension. Our objective
was to identify the pivotal factors that
were responsible for the achievements
of the most successful megaprojects.
As mentioned, we began with evidence
from the extensive body of literature on
project success factors. For example, in
their classical study, Pinto and Slevin
(1987) identified nine factors: clearly
defined goals, competent project man-
ager, top management support, compe-
tent project team members, sufficient
resources allocation, adequate commu-
nication channels, control mechanisms,
feedback capabilities, and responsive-
ness to clients. Pinto and Slevin (1988)
also analyzed the impact of a similar
list of ten factors: project mission, top
management support, project sched-
ule plan, client consultation, person-
nel, technical tasks, client acceptance,
monitoring and feedback, communica-
tion, and troubleshooting, at different
stages of the project life cycle. Belassi
and Tukel (1996) reviewed project man-
agement literature and classified suc-
cess factors into four groups: related
to the project, related to the project
manager and team members, related
to the organization, and related to the
external environment. After reviewing
60 relevant articles, Balachandra and
Friar (1997) presented a total number
of 72 factors related to market, tech-
nology, organization, and environment.
In his search for a comprehensive set
of factors, Cooke-Davies (2002) real-
ized that his list of 12 factors relates
to three perspectives: leading to proj-
ect management success, leading to
a successful project, and leading to
consistently successful projects. Dvir
and Shenhar (2011) summarized their
findings on successful projects in a list
of seven factors: exhorted focus on the
creation of competitive advantage and
value; a long period of project defini-
tion; unique project culture; a highly
qualified leader with unconditional
support; maximum use of existing tech-
nologies; flexible teams that adapted
quickly to technology and changes;
and strong partnership, ownership, and
pride. As also mentioned earlier, once
we compared the literature with the
outcomes of our sample project con-
tent analysis, we ended up with a list of
37 items, which were further processed
via cluster analysis.
The iterative cluster analysis pro-
cess reduced the number of factors
into smaller groups of similar nature,
until no further reduction was possi-
ble. For example, factors such as clearly
defined goals, project mission, and
exhorted focus on exceptional value
were eventually grouped together with
other factors into the first main factor
of “clear strategic vision.” Similarly, ade-
quate communication, control mech-
anisms, responsiveness to client, and
strong partnership, ownership, and pride
ended up as part of the second factor of
“total alignment.” Factors such as using
existing knowledge and collaboration,
flexible teams adapting quickly to tech-
nology and changes, and classical risk
management were parts of the factors
that made up the third main group of
“adapting to complexity.” Overall, mega-
project success was distinguished by
three different (and unrelated factors):
clear strategic vision, total alignment,
and adapting to complexity (Figure 1).
Clear Strategic Vision
From their early start until completion,
all successful megaprojects are guided
by a clear strategic vision. A vision is a
simple and exciting articulation of the
project’s outcome, which is defined in
words that everyone can understand
and imagine. It simply depicts the
Figure 1: The main ingredients of megaproject success.
state of the world after the project is
completed. The strategic part means
that the project had set a highly desir-
able and important long-term goal,
which is expected to have an enduring
impact beyond its immediate results.
There is also a clear idea on how to
achieve this vision. A vision is often
described in visual and emotional ways;
other times the vision describes how
people’s lives will change, improve, or
be simplified once the project is com-
pleted. For example, you will be able to
“travel from Paris to London in less than
two hours.”
We must emphasize that a vision
does not deal with profits or financial
performance, nor is it described in tech-
nical terms. The best visions are simple
and yet able to evoke emotional reac-
tions. For example, the Apollo program
had the simplest and most powerful
vision, defined by President Kennedy
in 1961: “Put a man on the Moon and
bring him back before the end of the
decade.” These simple words were clear
to every human being, and they created
waves of emotions and sympathy every-
where. Remember also that the vision
of Apollo 13, the rescue mission of the
three astronauts in a damaged vehicle
on their way to the moon, was: “Failure
is not an option.” The vision of the Mall
of America was: “Build the largest and
most fun mall in America.” The vision
of the World Trade Center was to build
a commercial and trade center that
would revitalize the economy in Lower
Manhattan. And the vision of Kepler
was: “Looking if there are others like us
out there.”
Visions serve all stakeholders and
many goals. They articulate in simple
terms what the project is all about—
customers know what to expect; spon-
sors and performing organizations have
a clear idea of what whey will create and
how to communicate and spread the
word about it; and employees compre-
hend what they are a part of, and clearly
understand how their work can contrib-
ute to the new creation. Finally, a strong
vision is strongly linked to exceptional
leadership. Great leaders understand the
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  39
power of exciting visions and know how
to articulate and communicate them in
an effective way to inspire and motivate
all people involved. And, surely, they
know how to combine vision with the
right strategy to implement it (Patanakul
& Shenhar, 2012).
Total Alignment
All successful megaprojects in our
study were characterized by full align-
ment of all parties with the goals, the
means, and the difficulties expected.
Such alignment is not easy to achieve.
The planning and implementation of a
megaproject necessitate coordination
of a large network of stakeholders with
different interests and agendas. In this
network one can often find the spon-
sor; the performing organization; con-
tractors; subcontractors; customers and
users; and numerous political, financial,
and societal organizations and agen-
cies. First and foremost, the sponsor
and the performing organizations must
have a clear and shared understanding
of the vision and how to achieve it.
 The Three Secrets of Megaproject Success
PAPERS
Similarly, customers and users should
be involved upfront and their voices
should be heard and considered; after
all, they will be impacted by the result
and they will become a major factor in
asserting success at the end. Finally, a
successful megaproject must be aligned
with the community and environment
in which it functions and it involves
cities, neighborhoods, political figures,
environmental groups, and advocates.
To achieve total alignment, megaproj-
ects must create clear rules, policies,
and guidelines about communication,
reporting, terminology, common tools,
and so forth, and make sure all parties
are following them. Lack of alignment is
quickly noticed, since it can cause con-
flict and huge delays. One cannot expect
to successfully put a huge creation in a
public environment or neighborhood
without the support and alignment of
all those who may be affected.
The most successful megaprojects
were aware of this need and worked very
hard to achieve such alignment. For
example, the London Olympic Village
planners and managers built a coordi-
nated network of contractors using a
set of common rules and risk-sharing
agreements that created a mutually
strong interest for all. Similarly, the
builders of the first World Trade Cen-
ter in Manhattan were managed by the
executives of the Port Authority, which
was also the sponsor of the project.
They were tightly aligned with New York
City’s government as well as many mer-
chant organizations, financial institu-
tions, restaurants, and other businesses.
In contrast, the Los Angeles Subway
project was defined and managed as an
engineering design-and-build project.
While it was created to serve millions
of passengers, there was no real con-
nection or alignment with the citizens
of the city during the project. No one
prepared potential travelers for the new
form of transportation, and no incen-
tives were offered for using it during the
first period. Although the project was
highly efficient and completed on time,
it was no wonder that very few people
40  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
actually used it. A better alignment with
end users could have made this engi-
neering achievement a highly desirable
and profitable service success.
Adapting to Complexity
Complexity is perhaps the most prob-
lematic area in understanding the mana-
gerial issues of megaprojects. Ironically,
it is also less discussed in the literature.
Yet, many failures in projects could be
attributed to insufficient understand-
ing of the essence of complexity and
failure to deal with it properly. Mega-
projects are highly complex creations of
humanity, built to serve nations, cities,
societies, and sometimes millions of
people. By nature, megaprojects involve
an enormous degree of complexity, but
few organizations know exactly how
to assess the degree of complexity in
their projects and to determine how to
manage them. Although some writers
have tried to conceptualize and specify
levels of complexity, thus far, no com-
mon framework has been established
for assessing a project’s complexity
(Shenhar et al., 2016).
As mentioned in the theory part, in
this article we have adopted the broad
view that complexity is any factor that
may inhibit a project from timely com-
pletion; in other words, anything that
makes managing the megaproject diffi-
cult or challenging. Thus, in the context
of a megaproject, one may view com-
plexity and challenge as synonyms. By
adapting a project to its complexity we
mean that management must under-
stand the unique challenges of each
project and select the appropriate man-
agement style, resources, organizations,
processes, skills, equipment, tools, and
technology to meet these challenges.
Obviously, different megaprojects
have varying degrees of complexity
and clearly, “one size does not fit all”
(Shenhar, 2001). Therefore, effective
management of a megaproject calls for
understanding the degree of complex-
ity and adapting its management to its
specific kind and degree of complex-
ity. Shenhar and Dvir (2007) offered a
framework (The Diamond Model) for
classifying a project according to four
dimensions (novelty, technology, com-
plexity, and pace) and adapt its man-
agement to its unique classification.
According to this classification, almost
all megaprojects will be considered
“arrays” on the Diamond’s dimension
of system complexity. However, using
the wider perspective of this article,
each megaproject should learn to adapt
itself to its unique complexities in all
dimensions to overcome its specific
challenges. Obviously, other challenges
should also be considered, such as Pich
et al.’s (2002) rate of change, or Geraldi
et al.’s (2011) socio-political complexity.
The best managed projects in our
study followed this concept and their
managers clearly adapted appropriate
ways of dealing with their complexities.
For example, in the Apollo project,
NASA understood that going to the
moon is extremely complex, risky, and
uncertain. The agency put in place
numerous mechanisms for testing and
examining everything. Nothing was left
to chance, and the mind set was: “it
is unsafe to fly, unless there is proof
that nothing can go wrong.” In con-
trast, Boeing 787 Dreamliner’s program
adopted a style that was used before
in its previous highly successful 777
program. The difference was that the
Dreamliner had used the new technol-
ogy of composite materials, which was
never used on such a large scale; it also
used a new business and profit-sharing
model as well as a new organization for
the development effort. These decisions
made the Dreamliner a high-tech array
project, whereas it was managed as a
medium-tech system project (Shenhar
et al., 2016). The Dreamliner’s extensive
delays were clearly a result of select-
ing the wrong style for the degree of
challenges involved.
Table 2 summarizes our findings
regarding the presence of these elements
in our research cases; it also shows the
number of dimensions rated as success
out of a total of four dimensions, as
listed in Table 1: efficiency, impact on
 quickly and cheaply; unfortunately,
Clear Success
Strategic Total Adapting to Score however, some of these subcontractors
Project Name Vision Alignment Complexity Out of 4 proved inadequate at doing the job.
They lacked the training and guidance
 1 Los Angeles Metro 2 2 1 1
from the main contractor on how to
 2 Three Gorges Dam 1 2 2 1 develop the components for this highly
 3 The Channel Project 1 2 2 2 complex and uncertain aircraft.
 4 Sydney Opera House 1 2 2 3 It is interesting to note that of the
remaining megaprojects in this study,
 5 Boeing 787: The Dreamliner 1 2 2 3
five have failed to achieve efficiency
 6 Denver Airport 1 1 2 3 goals and had extensive delays; however,
 7 Hubble Space Telescope 1 1 2 3 they were quite successful in the other,
 8 London 2012 Olympic Park 1 1 1 4 longer-term dimensions. This group
includes the Denver Airport, Channel
 9 NOVA 1 1 1 4
Tunnel, Sydney Opera House, Boeing
10 World Trade Center 1 1 1 4 787 Dreamliner, and Hubble Space Tele-
11 Mall of America 1 1 1 4 scope. It is notable that they all had a
12 Kepler 1 1 1 4 good strategic vision. What was miss-
ing in this group was either the total
13 Guggenheim Museum Bilbao 1 1 1 4
alignment and/or the ability to adapt
14 Apollo 1 1 1 4 to complexity. Not surprising, it seems
Table 2: Megaproject success factors. that vision is the most critical element
in the long-term success of a project.
No vision essentially guarantees fail-
customer/user, business/financial suc- the project’s vision, are committed to its ure; however, lack of alignment and/or
cess, and impact on society. success, and knew their role in making failure to address a project’s complex-
it work; and, finally, they knew how to ity, may often hurt on-time delivery,
Discussion identify the unique complexity and spe- and thus the financial performance of a
The megaprojects in our study were cific challenges involved in the project megaproject.
completed with varying degrees of suc- and to select the right approach to deal- To complete our study’s lessons on
cess. Perhaps not surprising, we found ing with this complexity. why megaprojects succeed or fail, we
a typical and consistent pattern in the As we have seen, not all megaproj- make two observations on past events:
most successful megaprojects. Seven ects in our study followed these three In the first observation, we note the
megaprojects have succeeded “across rules. For example, the Sydney Opera distinction between the beautiful build-
the board,” resulting in high efficiency, House had a clear vision set by the ings of Guggenheim and Sydney and
highly satisfied users and customers, architect from the outset. However, their stories. The Guggenheim Museum
good financial rewards to their perform- there was lack of alignment between in Bilbao, Spain, was designed and built
ing organizations and sponsors, and the city, the architect, and the political by the American architect Frank Gehry.
creating an enduring impact on society system around it, which led to extensive Gehry created his own project man-
and the public good. There is no doubt conflicts and unchecked spending, and agement organization, which included
that Apollo, Bilbao’s Guggenheim, the the project has failed to estimate the designers, planners, financial analysts,
Mall of America, London Olympic Park, levels of complexity involved in such marketing managers, and builders.
or Kepler belong to this category. Other a beautiful but complex structure. In Before accepting any job, Gehry insisted
projects succeeded in only one, two, or fact, only late into the project’s con- that his organization have complete
three dimensions. struction, did its builders learn how to control of the project and that he will
Our findings suggest that all highly produce the orange-shaped roof slices, make all artistic, as well as financial
successful megaprojects knew how to which made its structure so unique. and managerial decisions. Obviously,
integrate all three elements in their Boeing 787 failed to align all elements he set the vision, and at the same time,
management by setting a clear strategic and stakeholders into one coherent created a clear alignment of all parties.
vision, which is communicated to all development machine. When outsourc- Gehry was also aware of the expected
those involved or who may be impacted ing the design and development work difficulties, challenges, and complexi-
by the project; they also made sure that to its network of 700 subcontractors, ties, and he made sure nothing was
all stakeholders are fully aligned with they assumed the work would be done missed. No wonder all his buildings,

December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  41

 The Three Secrets of Megaproject Success
PAPERS
despite their uniqueness and complexi-
ties, were completed on time and within
cost. The contrast to the Sydney Opera
House is striking: although having a
similar unique vision and inspiring
beauty of design, the Sydney Opera has
miserably failed to meet the project’s
time and cost goals. It was significantly
lacking in the other two factors: lack of
stakeholder alignment and failure to
address all complexities upfront.
The second observation involves
NASA’s Space Shuttle program, which
was not included in our sample since it
failed on many fronts; however, its story
is relevant to our study. The Shuttle was
late on delivery; it carried a huge finan-
cial cost and did not fulfill the expected
cost saving in space flights; furthermore,
it failed to serve the United States’ long-
term human space flight capabilities.
Once the Shuttle’s was retired, America
was left for years without human space
flight capability and U.S. astronauts
had to get to space on Russian Soyuz
spacecraft. Finally, after four decades
of program development and operation
and two tragic shuttle accidents, which
claimed the lives of 14 astronauts, the
program’s impact on society is still ques-
tionable. Based on the findings of our
study, it is not surprising to learn that
the Shuttle had no clear strategic vision.
After the moon landing program, NASA
was looking for the next big program
and in 1969, planned to go to Mars by
building a three-component program:
a Shuttle, a Space Station, and a Mars
Landing module. The government at that
time, however, had lost interest in space
exploration and cancelled two of the sug-
gested components, keeping the shuttle
as the only program to be continued—
but without a clear vision of its mission.
In addition, there was no substantial
alignment between NASA, the govern-
ment, and the public; furthermore, the
program was badly underfunded. Finally,
NASA did not fully identify the program’s
complexities and uncertainties. In an
effort to secure the program’s funding,
NASA claimed that the vehicle could be
built of existing components taken from
42  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
previous programs; thus, NASA made a
commitment it could not meet. In real-
ity, the program suffered from exten-
sive delays and numerous breakdowns;
shortcutting the design and committing
to immature technologies resulted in
a suboptimal design and an extremely
hazardous vehicle. Lacking all three fac-
tors needed for megaproject success, its
lessons demonstrate how important it
is to take care of all critical elements:
vision, alignment, and adaptation.
Summary
Since megaprojects will continue to play
an important role in society, we should
learn to do them right. This study has
taught us an important and simple les-
son: the three necessary elements of suc-
cess should be established as a standard
and a “must have” in any project before
it starts. The formula for success is rela-
tively simple: Make sure you have the
right vision linked to strategy, and com-
municate it to all involved and impacted
parties; build a totally aligned network of
stakeholders, and adapt the megaproject
to its specific levels and types of com-
plexity and challenge. However, while
these elements are simple to understand
and recognize, in reality they are difficult
to implement. For a good strategic vision,
you need great leaders who understand
the power of vision and strategy and
know how to articulate them in an easy
way. Since there are many conflicting
interests in a megaproject, you need to
carefully build the necessary alignment
and commitment of all parties and you
must learn the secrets of complexity and
how to prepare a project according to
different types of complexities and chal-
lenges. In the end, failure is not inevita-
ble; with the right vision, alignment, and
adaptation, future megaprojects may be
better prepared for their challenges and
bring better value to society.
This study is not free of limitations.
First, our sample may not be represen-
tative; it was based on convenience
and availability of data. It may also not
cover the entire spectrum of megaproj-
ects around the world; as demonstrated,
many of our projects were in the con-
struction industry. This may not be
surprising since, historically, construc-
tion has been the origin of very large
projects. Other industries, however, may
play more important roles in the future
of megaprojects.
Finally, this study may open new
avenues for further research. For exam-
ple, we may need to study megaprojects
in specific industries or sponsors, as
well as transformation projects. How
are construction megaprojects differ-
ent from aerospace projects, and how
do government-funded megaprojects
compare with privately funded efforts?
Another area of interest is the further
study of megaproject complexity. As
perhaps the most complex undertaking
of society, what impact does complexity
play in understanding and managing
them? Yet another topic is the study of
technology in megaprojects. Perhaps we
need to develop specific and dedicated
management tools for megaprojects.
And still, another possibility is search-
ing for other parameters of success,
which were not detected in this study.
Future studies of megaprojects will take
endless routes, and surely, future gen-
erations of researchers may continue to
show us better ways of managing them.
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PAPERS The Multivocality of Symbols:
A Longitudinal Study of the Symbolic
Dimensions of the High-Speed Train
Megaproject (1995–2015)
Alfons van Marrewijk, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,The Netherlands
ABSTRACT ■
Megaprojects can be perceived as mod-
ern symbols, crucial for the encapsulation
of ideas, attitudes, and beliefs. This study
explores the exegetical meanings, or mean-
ings derived from local interpretation, that a
megaproject can encapsulate and how those
meanings shape the megaproject’s process.
A longitudinal study of the Dutch High-Speed
Train megaproject was executed. The find-
ings show three exegetical meanings of the
megaproject, which were used for strategic
goals, leading to power struggles, delays,
and cost overrun, and finally resulting in a
negative symbol of a failed megaproject.
This article contributes to the megaproject
literature with an anthropological perspec-
tive on symbolism.
KEYWORDS: megaprojects; symbols;
longitudinal; stakeholder
Project Management Journal, Vol. 48, No. 6, 47–59
© 2017 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
INTRODUCTION
M
egaprojects can be perceived as modern symbols of prestige,
progress, and political power (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003;
Diaz Orueta & Fainstein, 2008; Löfgren, 2015; Pitsis et al.,
2003; Schwartz, 1990). Löfgren (2015), for example, shows that
the Øresund Bridge and tunnel was a symbol of creating a transnational
region on the Danish–Swedish border. In another example, the Space
Shuttle megaproject served as a symbol of the American dream in which
manned space flights represented technological progress in the context of
the power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union after
World War II (Schwartz, 1990). In the same way, the Sydney Harbor Sewage
Tunnel megaproject was an important symbol of the Australian Olympic
dream, showing that “down under” could organize the 2000 Olympics
(Pitsis et al., 2003). In a final example, the Panama Canal is regarded in
engineering terms as one of the Seven Wonders of the World, with its
construction being symbolic of America’s power, its control of the region, and
the reach of its navy (Smits & Van Marrewijk, 2012).
Megaprojects are non-routine temporary endeavors, requiring special
authorization, funding, revenues, and regulatory actions (Davies & Mackenzie,
2014). Furthermore, they are typically controversial, proceeding slowly and
involving different electoral and business cycles for which public–private
cooperation is needed (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003). Such projects have com-
plex requirements in terms of the integration of activities and the management
of technology, resources, and equipment, and are characterized by a long time
frame and numerous interfaces among multiple contractors and third parties
(Van Marrewijk et al., 2016). Although traditional conceptions of megaprojects
still dominate much of contemporary project management literature (Cicmil &
Hodgson, 2006), the deviations, failures, and risks of many of these projects in
terms of scope, cost, and time (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 2003) have
diverted academic attention away from structural modes and toward issues
of social interaction, sense-making, and culture (Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006;
­Söderlund, 2004).
Megaprojects are here considered to be cultural phenomena (Kendra
& Taplin, 2004). Drawing from anthropological literature (Alvesson, 2002;
Smircich, 1983), project culture is perceived as a social construction that
results from people ascribing meaning to their situation (Cicmil & Gaggiottia,
2014). Consequently, megaproject organizations are understood not to have
a culture but as a culture (Van Marrewijk, 2015). Given the unique features
of megaprojects as temporary, ephemeral, or disposable organizations
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  47
 The Multivocality of Symbols
PAPERS
(Bakker, DeFillipi, & Sydow, 2016), mega-
projects make up a temporary cultural
framework, which is then reproduced
through processes of interaction dur-
ing the project phases (Van Marrewijk,
2007). Project cultures should be stud-
ied in terms of their history, develop-
ment, context, and environment (Cicmil
& Gaggiottia, 2014; Scranton, 2015;
Söderlund & Lenfle, 2013).
Symbols are present everywhere in
project cultures as they shape organi-
zational life (Alvesson & Berg, 1992;
Gagliardi, 1990; Nauta, 1991; Rafaeli
& Pratt, 2006). For example, corporate
flags, work clothing, office spaces, and
equipment can be vehicles for symbolic
meaning. Geertz (1973) uses the con-
cept of symbol to denote any object, act,
event, quality, or relationship that con-
tains a conception—namely, the sym-
bol’s meaning. He states that symbols
are “tangible formulations of notions,
abstractions from experience fixed in
perceptible forms, concrete embodi-
ments of ideas, attitudes, judgments,
longing, or beliefs” (Geertz, 1973, p. 91).
Following this line of thinking, and as
I have argued above, megaprojects can
be understood as modern symbols of
prestige, progress, and political power.
An important property of organi-
zational symbols is their capacity for
communicating meaning (Alvesson
& Berg, 1992; Firth, 1973). Even when
people share the same cultural context,
they can have various social interpre-
tations of a symbol, which makes the
receiver important (Firth, 1973). Firth
(1973) calls the distinct interpretation
of a complex profound representation
by receivers “multivocality.” Similarly,
Turner (1967, 1973) calls the meaning
derived from local interpretation “exe-
getical meaning.” A meaning can domi-
nate other meanings and by so doing
block different explanations, creating
discrepancies and contradictions in
meaning (Turner, 1967). This is the case
with the symbolic interpretation of a red
flag for “danger” or for “communism.”
Exegetical meaning is an important con-
cept in understanding the problematic
48  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
execution of megaprojects (Flyvbjerg,
2014). The multivocality of symbolic
interpretations by clients, agents, pub-
lic and private stakeholders, citizens,
and politicians can create serious chal-
lenges for a megaproject’s execution.
For example, in the Panama Canal
Expansion Project (PCEP), the Panama-
nian government understood the Canal
Zone to be symbol of national inde-
pendency, whereas the United States–
based contractor perceived the Canal
Zone as a symbol of former American
presence, which caused serious power
struggles (Van Marrewijk et  al., 2016).
Exegetical meanings can thus shape
social, cultural, and political situations
and processes. Insight into the nature
of exegetical meaning provides a bet-
ter understanding of the problematic
evolvement of megaprojects.
The goal of this article is to under-
stand which exegetical meanings
a megaproject can encapsulate for
involved stakeholders and how those
meanings shape the megaproject’s pro-
cess. The exegetical meanings of the
public organizations—the Ministry
of Infrastructure and Environment,
Rijkswaterstaat, ProRail, and Dutch
Railways—all involved in the Dutch
High-Speed Train (abbreviated as
HST) megaproject, will be discussed.
This €7.3 billion project was started
in 1995 to connect the Netherlands to
the European network of high-speed
trains. Although the rail infrastructure
was already completed in 2009, it never
came into operation; it never ran any
high-speed trains. The HST is a good
example of an infrastructure megapro-
ject that set out to provide a new type
of urban space, in the same way as
a new road (Harvey & Knox, 2015), a
canal (Smits & Van Marrewijk, 2012),
an airport (Dewey & Davis, 2013), a
bridge (Löfgren, 2015), a railway line
(Corvellec, 2001), or a subway infra-
structure (Van den Ende, Van Marrewijk,
& Boersma, 2015).
Central to this article are the two
research questions: (1) Which exe-
getical meanings do the four public
organizations attach to the HST, and
(2) how have these meanings shaped
the megaproject’s process? Data on this
case have been collected at three inter-
vals during a longitudinal study, which
was carried out under supervision of the
author between 2003 and 2015, using
participant observation, interviews, and
desk research, which allowed for an in-
depth contextual and historical analy-
sis. The findings show three exegetical
meanings of the HST megaproject: as a
radical innovative contract, as an inter-
vention in the Dutch rail sector, and as
a lynchpin of rail transport business.
These positive interpretations were used
by the public organizations for the legit-
imation of their own goals and interests;
they were not stable but changed over
time into a negative symbol of a failed
megaproject. This article contributes to
megaproject literature with an anthro-
pological perspective on symbolism.
Although symbolism plays an impor-
tant role in shaping organizational life
(Alvesson & Berg, 1992; Gagliardi, 1990;
Rafaeli & Pratt, 2006), it has not been
fully addressed in megaproject studies.
Therefore, this article engages organi-
zational and anthropological theory on
symbols to provide insight into the sym-
bolic understanding of megaprojects.
The structure of the article is as
follows. First, I discuss the theoretical
roots of symbols and examine how
they translate to organization and proj-
ect studies. Second, the methodology
section explicates how the data were
collected through a longitudinal quali-
tative study. Then, the findings section
shows the distinct exegetical meanings
of the HST and how these interpreta-
tions influenced the megaproject’s pro-
cess. The discussion section argues that
the involved public organizations used
the symbolic representations of the
HST megaproject for their own strategic
agenda. Finally, the article concludes
with the observation that organizational
theories on symbols are valuable for a
better understanding of the symbolic
meaning and interpretations of infra-
structure megaprojects.
Infrastructure Megaprojects
as Symbols
Academic studies on organizational
symbols draw heavily upon anthropo-
logical theories on culture and sym-
bolism (Alvesson & Berg, 1992; Firth,
1973; Rafaeli & Pratt, 2006; Turner,
1967, 1973). As early as the 1930s,
anthropologist Malinowski (1939) stud-
ied the formation of symbols in relation
to the origins and formation of cul-
ture. He traced the origins of the forma-
tion of symbols to the very beginning
of culture, rooted in the human need
to cope with the gap between superfi-
cial statements of action and underly-
ing meaning. Others (e.g., Firth, 1973;
Geertz, 1973; Nauta, 1991; Tennekens,
1982), too, understood symbolic repre-
sentation to be an essential function of
human consciousness and fundamen-
tal to coordinated action, standardize
techniques, and provide rules for our
understanding of religion, technology,
art, language, and science. An example
of symbolic representation is the John
Frum cargo cult movement just after
the end of World War II. John Frum
is often depicted as an American ser-
viceman who would bring wealth and
prosperity to inhabitants of the island
of Vanuatu if they followed him and
built fake airstrips and airplanes to sym-
bolically encourage American military
planes to land with their cargoes of sup-
plies (Worsley, 1957). The activities of
these cargo cult participants are no less
real to them than they are for us when
using our transport infrastructure. In
this way, meaning is captured or stored
in symbols and support the way one
ought to behave in a group (Geertz,
1973). For an excellent overview of the
long history of research on symbols, see
Firth (1973). Geertz (1973) states that
symbols can have the power to connect
facts, such as a cross and its representa-
tion of Christianity at a fundamental
level. Geertz (1973) calls this “synthesiz-
ing symbols” (p. 127). However, a basic
problem in the study of symbols is the
relationship between the symbol and its
representation, as this contains the risk
of cultural determination (Firth, 1973).
Cultural determinism is the belief that
a symbol determines our interpretation
of it. Therefore, Firth (1973) criticizes
Turner’s (1967) use of the concept of
“dominant” symbols, where one mean-
ing can dominate other meanings and
by so doing block different explana-
tions. Firth (1973) states that too great
a uniformity is assumed in the reaction
of people to symbols and therefore he
declines the idea of dominant symbols.
Without denying the existence of domi-
nant symbols, I would like to focus our
attention instead on the complexity and
context of the link between symbols and
their interpretations (Rafaeli & Pratt,
2006; Tennekens, 1982). For example, a
red flag that might be used to indicate
a hole in the road becomes a politi-
cal symbol of freedom when used on
Parisian barricades in the 1960s or a
symbol of totalitarianism when used in
a North Korean military parade. Sym-
bols, thus, allow for flexibility in indi-
vidual handling and interpretation.
An important characteristic of sym-
bols is that they are connected to their
referents in cultural systems (Firth,
1973). Turner (1967) calls this the posi-
tional meaning of symbols. Culture is
then seen as complex of symbols, which
have an intrinsic double aspect: They
are a model both of reality and for reality
(Geertz, 1973). First, when we use a sym-
bol as a model of reality, we are trying to
bring a symbolic structure close to real-
ity, such as the luxury car that symbolizes
the wealth of the owner. Second, using a
symbol as a model for reality helps us
to understand how relationships should
be organized, such as design plans for
a bridge or tunnel. Turner (1967, 1973)
calls this the positional meaning of a
symbol, understood from its relationship
to other symbols in a patterned totality.
The meaning of a symbol is not stable
but can change over time. For example,
Löfgren’s study (2015) of the symbolic
interpretation of the Øresund Bridge and
tunnel that connect Denmark to Sweden
shows that the bridge was first a symbol
of economic prosperity and growth and
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  49
then became a symbol of a price barrier,
bureaucratic barrier, and cultural bar-
rier that blocked regional development.
Finally, the bridge became a symbol of
economic opportunism for Danes and
Swedes who wanted to compare prices
in shopping malls. Löfgren (2015) con-
cludes that the meaning of the bridge
has changed continually during its short
history. In another example, the Pan-
ama Canal, once a symbol of America’s
power, regional control, and two-ocean
navy, has now become a symbol of eco-
nomic growth for Panama and of status
for the private firms involved (Smits &
Van Marrewijk, 2012).
Another characteristic of symbols is
their capacity for control; they can be
manipulated in order to justify social
order and power relations (Firth, 1973;
Turner, 1967). Consequently, symbols
can be used strategically in mega­
projects for decision-making processes
(Brown, 1994), for enacting transitions
during a project life cycle (Van den Ende
& Van Marrewijk, 2014), for the legiti-
mation of power (Brown, 1994), and
for power struggles among stakehold-
ers (Clegg & Kreiner, 2013), to name a
few examples. In this way, symbols can
become powerful.
In summary, this theoretical debate
helps us understand megaprojects as
symbols that capture meaning, which
can be multivocal, can change over time,
and can be strategic in power struggles.
This understanding focuses on mega-
projects as social and cultural networks
of people involved in the processes
of organizing and meaning-­ making
(Bresnen, Goussevskaia, & Swan, 2005).
Methodology
The data set used to answer the research
questions in this paper was collected
using longitudinal ethnographic field
research (Pettigrew, 1990). Such an
approach describes, interprets, and
explains behavior, meaning, and cul-
tural products through direct data col-
lected by researchers who are physically
present in the organization or other
setting of study over a long period
 The Multivocality of Symbols
PAPERS
Instruments Period I
Research period 2003–2005
Project HST
Role Research leader
Interviews 85
Participant observation 150 days
Sources used Reports, internal
documents, intranet
Table 1: Research instruments used in the three periods of study.
of time (Barley, 1990). The aim is to
provide an interpretative understand-
ing to come to a “verstehen” of the
constructed social reality (Yanow &
Schwartz-Shea, 2006). The term verste-
hen refers to understanding the mean-
ing of action from the actor’s point of
view (Czarniawska, 1992).
The research group in this study
consists of HST employees of four
public stakeholder organizations who
were stud­ied in three different periods
between 2003 and 2015 (see Table 1 for
an overview of the research periods).
Conducting longitudinal ethnographic
fieldwork is not an easy task. Academ­
ics often have limited time for research
and gaining the access necessary for
such research can be difficult. There-
fore, other stakeholders, such as poten-
tial users, local governments, and
construction firms, were not included in
the study. To partly overcome this limi-
tation, a document analysis of newspa-
per articles on the HST in two leading
Dutch newspapers (De Volkskrant and
NRC Handelsblad) has been included
in the study.
Data Collection
The most important period of data
collection was from 2003 to 2005 dur-
ing the construction of the HST line.
Data, methods, and researchers were
triangulated to improve the reliability
of the research (Yanow & Schwartz-
Shea, 2006). The methodological tri-
angulation used included biographical
interviews, observation, participant
observation, group interviews, and desk
50  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
Period II Period III
2007–2008 2014–2015
HST HST
Consultant/researcher Researcher
10 3 enquiries were studied. Important data
15 days —
HST intranet, internal Parliamentary enquiry
documents, newspapers report, newspapers
research. During this period, 85 inter-
views were held with employees of the
four public organizations involved: the
Ministry of Infrastructure and Envi-
ronment (abbreviated here as Ministry
of I&E); Rijkswaterstaat, which man-
ages road and water infrastructure;
ProRail, which is responsible for rail
infrastructure; and the passenger rail
operator Dutch Railways.
During that two-year period, a
team of four employees of the proj-
ect’s knowledge management depart-
ment, supervised by the author, asked
the interviewees questions on topics
regarding project goals, design, and
culture. All interviews were conducted
by two researchers—one taking notes
and the other doing the interview,
which is called researcher triangulation
(Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006). Inter-
views were held in Dutch and typically
lasted between one and a half and two
and a half hours. All interviews were
transcribed directly after they had taken
place. Participant observation was car-
ried out for 18 months during three days
a week at the project’s headquarters, the
regional offices, and the offices of the
stakeholders. Finally, data triangulation
was applied in terms of the sources con-
sulted, including interviews, biographi-
cal interviews, observations, websites,
public reports, management reports,
internal reports, and public hearings.
During the second period (2007–
2008), the author was involved as a
consultant in the transfer of the new
rail networks to the operator ProRail.
In this period, 10 interviews were held
with relevant stakeholders in the pub-
lic organizations involved. During the
third period (2014–2015), three inter-
views were held with former HST man-
agers, and reports and parliamentary
came from three parliamentary enqui-
ries related to the HST megaproject:
the enquiry of the HST tender process
( Su r ve y - Co m m i tte e - Co n st r u c t i o n ,
2002), of the decision-making pro-
cess used (Commission-Duijvensteijn,
2004), and of the tendering of the high-
speed trains called Fyra (Parliamentary
Commission, 2015).
Analyzing the Data
An initial exploration of the data set
resulted in a time table and in the find-
ing that the HST was initially a sym-
bol of European integration. Turner’s
(1967, 1973) exegetical meaning of a
symbol was then used for analysis of
the data set. The author went back to
the data and reread all the interviews,
reports, and newspaper articles in order
to address the different exegetical mean-
ings. From this reading, three exegeti-
cal meanings appeared: the HST as
(1) a radical innovative contract, (2) an
intervention in the Dutch rail sector,
and (3) a lynchpin in the rail transport
business. Then the analysis centered
on how employees of the four public
organizations used the megaproject’s
symbolic meaning for their own reasons,
also called “sublimes” (Flyvbjerg, 2014),
to participate in the megaproject. This
resulted in the understanding that the
HST was being interpreted symbolically
and used strategically for individual
and organizational goals. Finally, the
positional meaning (Turner, 1967) was
analyzed to understand how the HST is
related to the overall pattern of mega-
projects as symbols.
The HST Megaproject:
Four Sublimes
The HST megaproject was a symbol of
European integration in the 1990s to
be achieved by connecting Amsterdam
to the European capitals of Brussels,
Paris, Berlin, and London with high-
speed trains. The HST encompassed the
optimistic dream of integrating Europe
into one political-economic commu-
nity where people could travel freely in
high-speed trains without border con-
trols. The ambition of the Dutch gov-
ernment was to connect Amsterdam to
the European network of high-speed
trains with a southern line to Paris, an
eastern line to Berlin, and a northern
line to Hamburg. These last two lines
failed to obtain parliamentary approval
(see Table 2 for a short overview of
the HST megaproject history). Only the
construction of the 125-kilometer line to
the Belgium border, which was budgeted
in 1995 at €3.4 billion, was approved.
The goal of the HST megapro-
ject was to establish a line between
Amsterdam and Paris on which high-
speed trains could travel at a maximum
speed of 300 kilometers per hour to
shorten travel time and give people an
alternative to car and air traffic, while
also strengthening the economic posi-
tioning of the Netherlands (Dutch-
Auditing-Institute, 2014). The Ministry
of I&E initiated the megaproject and
controlled its budget. The company
Dutch Railways was privatized in 1995,
with the Dutch government being the
sole shareholder, while the infrastruc-
ture manager ProRail, as a department
of the Ministry of I&E was responsible
for the maintenance of the rail network.
In the HST megaproject, ProRail was
responsible for the initiation, decision-
making, and operating phases. Another
department of the Ministry of I&E,
Rijkswaterstaat—normally responsible
for the design, construction, manage-
ment, and maintenance of road and
water infrastructure—was now in
charge of realizing the HST.
The findings of the study show that
the HST megaproject was attractive to
the four abovementioned public organi-
zations for four reasons, corresponding
to what Flyvbjerg (2014) called the four
“sublimes.” First is the technological
sublime, as project engineers of ProRail
and Rijkswaterstaat love designing and
constructing complex ­ i nfrastructure

Events Date
Establishment of HST think tank 1973
Political discussions on connection to European HST network 1979
Agreement on HST network among the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Germany 1989
Termination of HST North project 1989
Preparations for HST East and South August 1991
Plan for the HST line made public in governmental decision 1994
Final decision on HST trace made by government 1998
Tender for infrastructure of HST South 1999
Start of construction phase May 1999
Termination of HST East project 2001
Dutch Railways win public tender for franchising the HST line 2001
Parliamentary enquiry on tendering of HST 2003
Dutch Railways sign contract with AnsaldoBreda for Fyra trains January 2004
Delivery of rail foundation, bridges, and tunnels 2005
Delivery of rail infrastructure, and problems with security system software 2006
Opening of tunnel June 2008
Final delivery of rail infrastructure five years later than initial projections January 2009
Start of operations December 2009
Ministry saves Dutch Railways with a reduction on concession costs August 2009
Parliamentary enquiry on construction of HST April 2010
Renegotiations between the government and Dutch Railways over cost of concession December 2011
Start of Fyra high-speed train, five years later than planned July 2012
Problematic startup of Fyra trains and breakdown of trains in winter weather January 2013
Definitive stop to Fyra production June 2013
Parliamentary enquiry on the HST March 2015
Table 2: Timeline of events in the HST megaproject.

December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  51

 The Multivocality of Symbols
PAPERS
works, which is central to their pro-
fessional identity (Florman, 1996).
The HST mega­project was one of the
largest infrastructure projects in the
­Netherlands. A great number of com-
plex technological problems, so typical
of megaprojects (Van Marrewijk, 2015),
had to be solved during this project. To
give a few examples, these problems
included digging tunnels in unstable
clay, building bridges over wide rivers
with changing sand banks, and tak-
ing the new rail line through densely
populated urban areas. The engineers
of ProRail and Rijkswaterstaat hoped
and expected that the HST rail would
stand as future testimony to techno-
logical achievements in the same way
that the transoceanic highway between
Peru and Brazil did for road engineers
(Harvey & Knox, 2015) and the Panama
Canal did for its constructors (Smits &
Van Marrewijk, 2012).
Second is the political sublime
(Flyvbjerg, 2014), in which the Ministry
of I&E manifests optimism in terms of
the ideal of European unification. They
want to connect the Netherlands to the
European network of high-speed trains
and wish to deregulate the Dutch rail
sector, in line with European regula-
tions. Another goal, not mentioned in
the project plans but stated by inter-
viewees, was to liberalize the Dutch rail
sector by opening up the Dutch rail net-
work to foreign competition. This anti-
monopolistic thinking dominated the
European political agenda in the 1990s
(Parliamentary-Commission, 2015).
Consequently, the Dutch government
wanted to use innovative contracting of
public–private partnership in the HST
construction. Rijkswaterstaat used this
to acquire more influence in the man-
agement of infrastructure megaprojects
in the Netherlands.
The third is the economic sublime
(Flyvbjerg, 2014), in which Dutch Rail-
ways perceived the HST line to be the
lynchpin in their strategic positioning
as an international high-speed opera-
tor. Here, the Ministry of I&E saw the
Netherlands as a country that wanted
52  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
to improve its transport infrastructure,
which the construction industry, with
its collusive practices during that period
(Van den Heuvel, 2005), was eager to
fulfill. The HST megaproject was the
first public–private partnership (PPP) in
the Dutch rail sector, and a project man-
agement organization was recruiting
consultants for design and supervision,
hiring contractors, and supervising and
initiating operations.
The HST megaproject was split into
three parts (Dutch-Auditing-Institute,
2014). The first part was the foundation
of the rail network, consisting of the
construction of tunnels, bridges, and
dikes. This work was divided into seven
contracts: five PPP contracts for the
foundation, tunnels, and bridges; one
for a seven-kilometer tunnel; and one
to connect the HST to the existing rail
network. Each contract was given to a
separate construction consortium. The
second part was the rail infrastructure,
consisting of the rails, communication
system, security system, and signaling
system. This was financed and con-
structed by a market consortium con-
sisting of investors, international banks,
and private companies. The govern-
ment pays the consortium a yearly fee
to maintain and keep the HST rail run-
ning with an availability rate of 99.46%
until 2031 (Parliamentary-Commission,
2015). The third part was the transport
franchise, which gave High-Speed Alli-
ance (HSA) the exclusive right to deliver
train services. Because Dutch Railways
own 95% of HSA, I have used the name
Dutch Railways in this article. This
splitting into three separate parts was
intended to speed up the realization of
the HST megaproject and to make pos-
sible the public tendering of the conces-
sion and the private financing of the rail
infrastructure.
The fourth sublime is the aesthetic
(Flyvbjerg, 2014), which is found in
the design of iconic landscape ele-
ments in the HST project, such as a
large bridge, a viaduct, and a tunnel.
The iconic new bridge of two kilome-
ters over the river Hollands Diep has
Y-shaped pillars, which strengthen the
image of the slim but strong bridge.
The aesthetics of the bridge are ampli-
fied by the illumination of the pillars
in the dark, with lights reflecting in the
water. Another iconic element is the
longest rail viaduct in Europe, which
runs for an impressive six kilometers
at a height of six meters. Finally, the
preservation of an iconic polder land-
scape was one of the aesthetic sublimes
of the m ­ egaproject. The project was
debated at length in the Dutch parlia-
ment and in the press, as the typical
polder landscape was directly affected
by the new rail line. After conducting
environmental impact, feasibility, and
safety studies, and identifying alterna-
tives, the Dutch parliament decided to
drill a seven-kilometer tunnel to protect
the polder landscape.
These four sublimes were the driv-
ers for the four public organizations
to participate in the HST megaproject.
I now focus upon how the various sub-
limes are dealt with by symbolic repre-
sentations from various stakeholders.
HST as Symbol: The
Multivocality of Meanings
From the findings, three local interpre-
tations of the HST were found: (1) HST
as a radical innovative contract, (2) HST
as an intervention in the Dutch rail
sector, and (3) HST as a lynchpin of the
rail transport business. These interpre-
tations were not fixed and stable, but
rather have changed over time, with
some symbols becoming more domi-
nant than others in certain periods.
Below the local interpretations will be
discussed.
HST as a Radical Innovative Contract
The first exegetical meaning of the HST
megaproject is that it is an opportunity
for introducing PPP as an innovative
form of contracting. In the 1990s, the
Ministry of I&E was heavily influenced
by the philosophy of new public man-
agement, which advocated reducing
the responsibilities of the public sector
on the basis that market organizations
could do such tasks cheaper and bet-
ter than public-sector organizations
(Gruening, 2001). Therefore, the Min-
istry of I&E tendered the HST megapro-
ject as an innovative PPP: “We decided
to prepare for a public tendering of
the concession and the construction
of the rail infrastructure” (Interview
with employee of the Ministry of I&E,
November 2003). Here, the HST as a rad-
ical, innovative PPP is seen as a model
for reality (Geertz, 1973), designed to
change the Dutch construction sector,
thereby contributing to the economic
and political sublime. The HST mega-
project symbolized something much
larger than “just” a megaproject; rather,
the Ministry of I&E understands the
HST as a revolutionary change in
project management practices: “With
this project, we will show how the con-
struction industry and the Ministry of
I&E will work within the next 10 years”
(Interview with former HST director,
November 2003).
With this in mind, Rijkswaterstaat
recruited enthusiastic, flexible, and
innovative pioneers for the project man-
agement organization—people with
alternative mind-sets, who could deal
with ambiguity and chaos and were
able to develop new ideas: “There was
a constant change, and everything was
overthrown. One has to be able to stand
that. I needed people who were flex-
ible” (Interview with former HST direc-
tor, January 2004). These employees,
who strongly identified themselves
with the HST as a radical, innovative
project, were known by interviewees
as “Gideon’s gang.” Gideon’s gang is a
biblical metaphor for a small group that
opposes a very large group, but knows
no fear and uses creative, innovative
methods to reach its goals.
Rijkswaterstaat used the symbolic
representation of the HST to show
the success of innovative contracting,
and especially how it could prevent
the visual pollution of a high-speed
rail line cutting through the protected
area of typical Dutch polder landscape
that encircles the cities of Amsterdam,
Leiden, and Utrecht. The solution pro-
posed was to tunnel under this land-
scape, at a projected cost of €380 million,
not to ruin the aesthetic beauty of the
region. Two tunnels were proposed in
the tender document, but one consor-
tium calculated, and later proved, that
one wide tunnel with two tubes would
be more cost-effective. This was widely
perceived to be a success:
“The tunnel is a good example of how an
innovative contract can result in major
savings. This, of course, depends on the
space a contract gives to realizing such
an innovative concept and to what extent
the contractor has an interest in innova-
tion. A contractor only innovates if he can
improve his market position.” (Interview
with HST manager, November 2003)
Notwithstanding this positive exam-
ple, over time the symbolic representa-
tion of HST as innovative contracting
changed, as the tender procedures of all
other contracts in the megaproject failed
and, when finally brought into execu-
tion, underperformed (Commission-­
Duijvensteijn, 2004). The failed tender
procedures in the megaproject triggered
a parliamentary enquiry on “Irregulari-
ties in the Dutch Construction Indus-
try” (Survey-Committee-­Construction,
2002), which uncovered what later
became known as the Dutch con-
struction fraud scandal (Commission-­
Duijvensteijn, 2004; Sminia, 2011;
Survey-Committee-­Construction, 2002).
The enquiry found many cases of ille-
gal practices involving collusion and
fraud. The report confirmed that the
“entire sector was involved in fraud and
other illegal practices” and that “man-
agement knew about it and authori-
ties helped to perpetuate the system”
(Van den ­Heuvel, 2005, p. 134). Many
Dutch construction firms were given
large fines, and managers were even
imprisoned. It took public and private
partners more than 10 years of rees-
tablishing boundaries and negotiating
competences in order to develop new
collaborative practices (Veenswijk,
Marrewijk, & Boersma, 2010).
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  53
Slowly, the HST turned into a symbol
of failed public–private contracting.
Some blamed the contractors for this:
“I think it is because the contractors
did not see how they could earn more
money with opportunities and optimiza-
tions. I had expected this to be totally
different. In hindsight, I think that our
expectations were colored by earlier expe-
riences in the Oosterschelde megaproject
[innovative construction of sea dike], but
that is water; people are more innova-
tive there.” (Interview with former HST
director, December 2003)
Others stated that there was little
room for the contractors to design their
solutions: “HST was a logistical process
to make rail production, with little room
for innovation,” said one HST employee.
Some interviewees also reflected upon
the complexity that had been intro-
duced by dividing the HST into three
parts, thereby creating organizational
boundaries that had to be spanned:
“Our model worsened the problems as
nobody really felt responsible for the
boundaries; all seemed to perceive the
project in terms of their own respon-
sibilities with little integral thinking.”
(Interview with HST manager, November
2003)
The failed contracting of the HST
stimulated the development of knowl-
edge of how to manage PPP megaproj-
ects in a Dutch context. According to
respondents, many megaprojects initi-
ated after 2005—for example, the Hanze
rail line, the Delft rail tunnel, and the
North–South metro line in ­Amsterdam—
have benefited and learned from the
knowledge developed in the HST mega-
project and the Betuwe route (a  freight
train line from ­Rotterdam to G
­ ermany).
One respondent talking about the
Hanze project indicated:
“We have cleverly chosen the contract
boundaries based upon the experiences
of the HST and Betuweroute.” (Interview
with project employee of the Hanze line,
2012).
 The Multivocality of Symbols
PAPERS
Others have learned to keep mega-
projects out of the political domain
because, in the case of the HST, national
politics heavily influenced the execu-
tion. One respondent said:
“It was important to keep the Hanze line
under the radar in order to prevent it from
becoming a political project. Therefore, it
remained a ‘normal’ megaproject in the
shadow of HST.” (Interview with Hanze
line employee, 2012)
Furthermore, the symbol of innova-
tive contracting stimulated the in­volved
public organizations to improve the
training of public managers. This
re­sulted in the creation of distinct
knowledge platforms. Here, project
managers working in the public domain
are trained in negotiation, management
skills, how to deal with ambiguity and
social complexity, and how to obtain
knowledge about innovative tendering
and contracting. Both project manag-
ers and the Dutch parliament realized,
after three parliamentary enquiries, that
their capacity to really understand and
critically question the decision making
and execution of megaprojects was too
limited. One of the key players from
the Ministry of I&E stated: “Innovative
contracting is gorgeous, but we first
should have learned to play the game on
a much smaller scale. Now it almost fell
apart.” (Interview with Rijkswaterstaat
manager, February 2004)
This resulted in extra research capac-
ity in the Dutch parliament to support
politicians in their decision-making
processes and, thus, in the functioning
of democracy. This was an unforeseen
outcome of the HST megaproject.
HST as an Intervention in the Dutch
Rail Sector
The second exegetical meaning found
is the HST as an intervention to change
the rail sector. Both the Ministry of I&E
and Rijkswaterstaat perceived the HST
to be an excellent opportunity to break
the monopolistic position of both Pro-
Rail and Dutch Railways in the Dutch
rail sector. Dutch Railways and ProRail,
54  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
which were one organization until 2004,
were very afraid that the line would
be operated by one of their powerful
competitors, such as the Deutsche Bahn
or the French SNCF. For ProRail, the
HST would be the largest rail construc-
tion project ever, while Dutch Railways
wanted to exploit the HST line to prevent
competition, particularly from interna-
tional operators. Therefore, in the early
stages of the project, Dutch Railways
tried to prevent the public tendering of
the HST rail line (Parliamentary-Com-
mission, 2015). In doing this, Dutch
Railways “searched for the borders of
the unseemly and even sometimes
crossed these” (Duursma & Verlaan,
2015, p. 4). Because Dutch Railways
was unable to stop the public tender-
ing from going ahead, it saw no option
other than to make an offer the govern-
ment could not refuse—twice as high as
the bids of the competitors. However, all
interviewees said that they immediately
knew that the offer and expected turn-
over were unrealistic.
Both Rijkswaterstaat and the Minis-
try of I&E used the symbolic representa-
tion of the HST to exclude ProRail from
the management of the project organiza-
tion because they thought ProRail could
not manage the innovative contracts and
was actually part of the problem:
“I had to remove ProRail from the project.
ProRail was too much connected to the
Dutch Railways, and that power had to be
broken because we wanted to bring the
concession to the market.” (Interview with
former project director, November 2003)
This quote emphasizes how the
HST was regarded as a means of break-
ing the power of Dutch Railways. The
power struggle was symbolized in a
cartoon depicting Rijkswaterstaat as
the national figure of Hansje Brinker,
who used his finger to stop a hole in
the dike to prevent the Netherlands
from being flooded, now stirring a large
pan of soup with his finger, indicat-
ing Rijkswaterstaat’s wish to influence
large rail infrastructure megaproj-
University magazine Ad Valvas,
ects (­
27 November 2003). Not surprisingly,
the cooperation agreement did not work
out well:
“There wasn’t a cooperative attitude
(­Interview with manager from the Min-
istry of I&E, September 2003); “There
was a strong identification of employ-
ees with the project. Consequently, they
[­
Rijkswaterstaat] were not open and
developed an attitude that put others off.
They went their own way.” (Interview with
ProRail manager, December 2003)
ProRail argued that it had 100 years
of experience in rail construction and
that it was formally responsible for the
construction and maintenance of rail
infrastructure in the Netherlands. Pro-
Rail preferred to opt for a matrix model
in which it would have greater author-
ity; it wanted to design infrastructure
and manage a part of the project itself:
“Our proposition was to give certain parts
of the project to the different partners, and
that these partners would be accountable
to the project management.” (Interview
with ProRail manager, January 2004)
Rijkwaterstaat and ProRail could not
agree on how the activities should be
organized, and ProRail was left with little
or no authority in the project organization:
“We were lonely wolves in the wilderness.
There was only one person with rail knowl-
edge, and that was me.” (Interview with
former ProRail manager, November 2003)
Conflicts over project control had
arisen earlier between ProRail and
Rijkswaterstaat, which is why detailed
protocols for responsibilities, roles,
and cooperation were designed for
joint projects. In the HST megaproject,
Rijkswaterstaat signed a cooperation
agreement with ProRail, as expertise on
constructing such a complex megapro-
ject was needed:
“Given the size of the project, the complex-
ity and the challenges for the organiza-
tion of construction work and innovative
technologies, it is necessary to use all the
available knowledge.” (Internal document;
cooperation agreement, 2000).
 This painful exclusion of ProRail
from the construction phase of the HST
project was risky for the Ministry of I&E
as ProRail would, after completion, be
responsible for maintenance of the HST.
There was a risk that ProRail would
blame Rijkswaterstaat for bad rail con-
struction. Indeed, in October 2015, the
findings of a technical study, commis-
sioned by ProRail, indicated that some of
the concrete used in the HST project was
of very poor quality. Respondents from
ProRail criticized the R ­ ijkswaterstaat
approach of the HST project:
“We were not constructing a rail line, but
dikes and tunnels. There was a domi-
nant focus on the environment with many
adaptations, and that is why [the rail]
seems to be a roller coaster. There is only
one good rail line and that is a straight line.
(Interview with former ProRail manager,
November 2003)
If no action is taken to improve or
replace the concrete, this will result in
the technical life span of the project
being reduced from 100 years to only
between 20 and 40 years (Gompel, 2015).
HST as a Lynchpin of the Rail
Transport Business
The third exegetical meaning is the HST
as an opportunity for strategic position-
ing. Dutch Railways interpreted the HST
to be a rail line that is a lynchpin of the
rail transport business. Dutch Railways
wanted to become an important player
in the European transportation sector
and the connection to the European
network of high-speed trains was some-
thing it had to have at all costs.
Dutch Railways used the symbolic
representation in its struggle against the
liberalization of the Dutch rail network.
It presented the HST as the most impor-
tant line in its rail network, and won the
tender process for the line concession
on the basis of an unrealistic business
case. Consequently, Dutch Railways
nearly went bankrupt at three different
points of time: 2003, 2008, and 2010
(The Parliamentary Commission, 2015,
p. 4). Each time, the Dutch government
went back to the contract and renegoti-
ated a much lower compensation for the
HST transport concession, sometimes
forgetting to explicitly inform the Dutch
parliament (Duursma & Verlaan, 2015).
Still, in 2007, Dutch Railways forecasted
that it would be transporting 22 mil-
lion passengers in 2010, around 16 mil-
lion of whom would be national and
6 million international (AD newspaper,
November 2007). Even in 2009, Dutch
Railways was still optimistic about com-
pleting the high-speed train connection:
“It is spring 2029. I’m with my grandson on
the Eurostar that is transporting us non-
stop from Amsterdam to London. That
is possible nowadays. Finally, he experi-
ences what it is like to travel at a speed of
300 km/h on the HST. (Director of the HST
program in HSL Highlights, no. 18, 2009)
By using the symbol of HST as a
lynchpin of the rail transport business,
Dutch Railways was able to continue
developing the new high-speed train.
Because it had an unprofitable business
model, Dutch Railways tendered for a
low-cost, high-speed train in a process
in which the Italian firm AnsaldoBreda
was the only one left to make a final
bid (Duursma & Verlaan, 2015). It took
AnsaldoBreda a long time to design
the train, and after five years of delay,
the first high-speed trains, named Fyra,
were delivered. The word Fyra is the
number four in Swedish and signifies
the connection of the four HST cit-
ies: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerp,
and Brussels (Dutch-Auditing-Institute,
2014). Furthermore, the term Fyra has
echoes of the Dutch word fier, which sig-
nifies self-confidence and pride. Unfor-
tunately, the trains had many technical
defects and proved to be unsuitable
for the Dutch winter weather, which
resulted in daily headlines in the Dutch
media criticizing the Fyra. After a fierce
struggle between AnsaldoBreda and
Dutch Railways, the trains were sent
back and the rest of the order was can-
celed, which meant there were then
no high-speed trains. The line is now
used only for regular trains with speeds
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  55
up to 140 kilometers per hour and the
French high-speed train. The Parlia-
mentary Commission investigating the
failure of the Fyra stated that it had
been a disaster for Dutch train travelers
(­Parliamentary Commission, 2015).
Over time, the symbol of the HST
as a lynchpin changed into the HST
as a failing megaproject. This has to
do directly with cost overruns and dis-
appointing incomes. The income for
the Dutch government declined as the
expected revenues from Dutch Railways
was first calculated to be €2 billion over
a period of 15 years, but was lowered to
€1.8 billion for a period of 18 years, and
this dropped, after negotiations in 2011,
to €1.1 billion (Duursma & Verlaan,
2015). Furthermore, Dutch Railways, in
which the state is sole shareholder, had
lost €772 million on the Fyra debacle by
June 2015 (Parliamentary Commission,
2015). Normally, the Dutch government
receives 35% of Dutch Railways’ profit
each year in the form of a dividend.
Since 2013, no dividend has been paid.
Finally, the three parliamentary enqui-
ries and the new problems with the rail
construction brought and will continue
to bring extra costs.
The failure to deliver a function-
ing high-speed train service can be
measured in terms of time delays (five
years) and budget overrun. The costs
of the HST increased from €3.4 billion
in 1995 to €7.3 billion in 2013 (Dutch-
Auditing-Institute, 2014). The projected
cost of maintaining and keeping the
line in use has risen from an initial
figure of €3.1 billion to €3.6 billion over
the period from 2009 to 2031 (Dutch-
Auditing-Institute, 2014). The failure
also triggered frustration among rail
passengers, and caused civil unrest over
the failure of megaprojects. The Parlia-
mentary Commission (2015) concluded
that the expectations created by the
HST megaproject in Dutch society were
too high:
“The initial expected transport on the HST
line has not been reached, because other
interests have repeatedly prevailed over
 The Multivocality of Symbols
PAPERS

provided managers of the four involved

Period Dominant Exegetical Meaning Organizations
public organizations with opportuni-
1973–1998 European integration Ministry ties to use these meanings for strate-
1999–2003 Radical, innovative form of contracting Ministry, RWS gic purposes. The exegetical meanings
Instrument to change the rail sector Ministry became strategic instruments for the
2003–2008 Instrument to change the rail sector Ministry legitimation of positions and as an
arena for power struggle, so typical in
Opportunity for strategic positioning Dutch Railways, ProRail
megaprojects (Clegg & Kreiner, 2013).
2008–2013 Instrument to change the rail sector Ministry The strategic use of symbols in organi-
Opportunity for strategic positioning Dutch Railways, ProRail zations has been noted in earlier orga-
2013–2015 Failed megaproject Ministry, ProRail nizational studies (Gagliardi, 1990), but
Table 3: Shifting exegetical meaning of the HST megaproject over time. hasn’t been mentioned in project man-
agement studies, with only a few excep-
tions (Löfgren, 2015; Van den Ende &
the implementation of transport for train more negative meanings. Using the con- Van Marrewijk, 2014). The Ministry of
travelers. For example, the Government cept of temporal bracketing (Langley, I&E and Rijkswaterstaat used the sym-
insisted upon the financial return, and 1999), Table 3 shows how this process bol as an intervention in the railway and
Dutch Railways were focused upon retain- took place over time. The recent change construction sectors, whereas Dutch
ing their strategic position over the Dutch
in the dominant exegetical meaning Rail­ways and ProRail used the symbol
rail system. Therefore, not only have the
of the HST as failure of railway lib- to try to strengthen their positions. In
interests of the train travelers been dam-
aged, but also the financial investment
eralization had political consequences this way, the three exegetical meanings
in the HST, made by taxpayers, remains with enquiries and the Dutch govern- influenced the megaproject’s process,
underutilized.” ment announced in 2016 the merger of causing, together with other factors,
Dutch Railways and ProRail to improve time delays, cost overruns, power strug-
Besides the three described exegeti- rail network operations. gles, and the failure to run high-speed
cal meanings, the HST as a failed project trains. This is in line with Harvey and
has become a dominant symbol in the Discussion Knox (2015), who emphasized that the
Netherlands. Since December 2016, an This article focused on the exegeti- construction of railways, bridges, and
intercity train (not a high-speed train) cal meanings of the HST megaproject tunnels is intrinsically political.
with a speed of 160 kilometers per hour by four public organizations and how In turn, the three exegetical mean-
(instead of 300 kilometers per hour) has these meanings have shaped the mega- ings were influenced by the inherently
been running 16 times daily to Brussels, project’s process. The findings demon- political megaproject process and by
and the promised travel time of 3 hours, strate that a megaproject—in this case, changes in the context. The HST as
16 minutes has not been met. Further- the HST—has the capacity to express radical intervention in the rail sector
more, the promised direct connection a political ambition. The HST initially changed into “failed liberalization” as
to London has never been realized. symbolized European (political) inte- a result of power struggles between the
Finally, the network remains sensitive gration and economic growth. These Ministry and the Dutch Railways. More-
for disruptions because of its complex- findings are in line with earlier stud- over, the positional meaning of the HST,
ity and software problems in the safety ies of megaprojects—for example, the the relation to other European integra-
systems (NRC Handelsblad, 20 Decem- Øresund Bridge (Löfgren, 2015), the tion projects on market liberalization,
ber 2016: E7). Perhaps if flying became Panama Canal (Smits & Van Marrewijk, rail deregulation, and new public man-
impossible for some reason, the HST 2012), and the Transatlantic Highway agement (Gruening, 2001) changed. In
might turn out to be a good investment (Harvey & Knox, 2015), all of which 10 years’ time, the HST as a synthesizing
after all. Some people have still not started as symbols of economic growth or iconic symbol of political integration
given up hope that the financial invest- and national and regional integration. and economic growth turned into an
ment made in the HST is only being This gives us ground to observe the iconic symbol of incapability, unrealis-
temporarily underutilized (Parliamen- potential capacity of infrastructure tic ambitions, cost overrun, time delay,
tary Commission, 2015). megaprojects to fulfill political dreams and civil resistance. These findings are
In sum, we have seen that the exeget- (Harvey & Knox, 2015). in contrast to general observations that
ical meanings of the HST megaproject The findings demonstrate that the organizational symbols are fixed in per-
were not fixed and stable; they became HST encapsulated three different exe- ceptible forms (Geertz, 1973) and have
obsolete, meaningless, or empty or were getical meanings. The complex and considerable staying power (Alvesson
even completely replaced by other, profound representation of the HST & Berg, 1992). This case revealed that

56  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal

the encapsulation of meaning to sym-
bols is subject to change over time,
which makes megaprojects so complex
to manage successfully.
The failure to realize the high-speed
train service seriously undermined the
authority of the Dutch government in
terms of its capacity to make decisions
and realize large infrastructure mega-
projects. Avoiding the pitfall of cultural
determination (Firth, 1973), it can be
concluded that infrastructure mega-
projects symbolize both a dream of
economic development and social
trans­formation, and a disappointment
of failed ambitions, incompetence,
and waste of public funding. At first
sight, these are opposite ends of a spec-
trum, but at the same time they are
interrelated: One can only be disap-
pointed if one’s expectations are too
high, and, as we know, high hopes and
expectations are deeply ingrained in
political d­ecision-making processes
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2003), so it is not sur-
prising that megaprojects have also
become symbols of failure.
Conclusions
This article explored the symbolic rep-
resentations of the HST megaproject,
which initially started as a symbol of
optimistic European integration, where
people could travel freely in high-speed
trains without border controls. Three
exegetical meanings have been found
of the HST as (1) radical innovative
contract, (2) intervention in the Dutch
rail sector, and (3) a lynchpin of the rail
transport business. The strategic use of
these meanings by the four public orga-
nizations studied caused power strug-
gles, serious delays, and cost overruns
in the megaproject’s process while, in
return, these meanings were changed
by the intrinsically political project
process.
This article contributes to the mega-
project literature with an anthropologi-
cal perspective on symbolism, based
upon the work of Firth (1973) and Turner
(1967, 1973). Such a perspective has
been well developed in organizational
studies (Alvesson & Berg, 1992; Gagliardi,
1990; Nauta, 1991; Rafaeli & Pratt, 2006)
and opens opportunities for studying
symbols in megaprojects. The organiza-
tional understanding of symbols in terms
of their capacity to encapsulate differ-
ent meanings for different groups allows
project management scholars to conduct
an historical analysis of megaprojects,
which is frequently asked for in project
management studies (e.g., Söderlund &
Lenfle, 2013).
Furthermore, the article contributes
the concept of exegetical meaning to
the growing debate on the problematic
evolvement of megaprojects (­ C icmil
& Hodgson, 2006; Flyvbjerg, 2014;
­Söderlund, 2004; Van Marrewijk, 2015).
Exegetical meanings have proven to
encapsulate the complexity of mega-
projects. The multivocality of symbolic
interpretations and their strategic use
by stakeholders hindered the HST
megaproject’s successful execution. The
strategic use of symbols hasn’t been
d iscussed yet in megaproject stud-
­ Magazine, 27 November 2003, p. 7.
ies, with the exception of a few studies
(Löfgren, 2015; Van den Ende & Van
­Marrewijk, 2014).
The limitations of this study stem
from the reinterpretation of the data
sets, which have been developed over
nearly 15 years with slightly different
research questions. This issue has been
ad­dressed by going back and forth
between the original data sets and the
analysis (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006).
Furthermore, limitations are found in
the focus of this study on the public orga-
nizations involved in the start, design,
construction, and maintenance of the
HST. Hence, exploring the symbolic
representation by potential users of the
high-speed train as well as the construc-
tion and engineering firms involved was
beyond the scope of this study. This
extension, however, would have unfolded
a more complete picture of the different
symbols attached to the HST project.
It is advisable for project managers
to have a comprehensive understanding
of how all the various stakeholders
may interpret megaprojects in symbolic
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  57
terms, as this may help them prevent
fragmentation of project goals or dis-
putes over which decisions (and direc-
tions) should be taken to reach the
objectives of the project (Clegg & Kreiner,
2013). The work practices of stakeholder
employees are rooted in different orga-
nizations and they convey distinct
understanding and interpretations of a
megaproject; this can cause issues in
collaboration and role-taking during the
execution of the project. Because the
connection between a megaproject as a
symbol and its interpretation is multivo-
cal and subject to change, regular the-
matic workshops and rituals are needed
to align the various stakeholders in a
megaproject. This will help ensure that
the right issues and topics are addressed
during the execution of a megaproject.
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a.h.van.marrewijk@vu.nl
 PAPERS Stakeholder Value Constructs in
Megaprojects: A Long-Term
Assessment Case Study
Pernille Eskerod, Webster Vienna Private University, Vienna, Austria
Karyne Ang, University of Technology, Sydney (UTS), Australia
ABSTRACT ■
By definition, megaprojects consume numer-
ous resources and impact numerous peo-
ple, even across generations; it is therefore
important that they bring considerable value
to their initiators and other stakeholders.
Based on stakeholder value construct frame-
works identified in the literature and a single
case study of the construction and operations
of an over 50-year-old American highway
bridge, we identify ways to understand, clas-
sify, and express megaproject stakeholder
value.The research links different stakeholder
types to types of value constructs. Knowing
which types of value constructs matter to
different stakeholder types could potentially
help project representatives communicate
more efficiently and effectively.
KEYWORDS: megaproject; stakeholder;
value constructs; value opportunities;
benefits
Project Management Journal, Vol. 48, No. 6, 60–75
© 2017 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
60  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
INTRODUCTION
M
egaprojects have been growing in scale and frequency globally
(Flyvbjerg, 2014; Gellert & Lynch, 2003); therefore it is important
to understand issues that accompany this particular project type.
Winch (2017) argues that “considerable effort needs to be put
into extending project stakeholder management theory for megaprojects
both empirically and theoretically” (p. 14) and he points to more gaps in the
literature, which, among these, include (1) the link between megaprojects and
society, in other words, society as an important stakeholder of megaprojects;
and (2) future generations as another important stakeholder due to the long-
term impact of most megaprojects.
Chang, Chih, Chew, and Pisarski (2013) state that the key to megaproject
success is found in the value created and captured during and post projects,
both for the funding organization as well as for the stakeholders. Project
success needs to be considered as an ongoing and long-term (emergent)
process of value creation in contrast to the traditional output measures of
cost, time, quality, or financial value returns. Shenhar and Dvir (2007) agree,
as they state that value created for end users and other stakeholders needs
to be addressed. Researchers (e.g., Ika, 2009; Fahri, Biesenthal, Pollack, &
Sankaran, 2015) emphasize that many project success criteria (e.g., satisfac-
tion of clients, end users, and other stakeholders, as well as the strategic
objectives of the client organization) can only be understood a long time after
the project has been finalized. Acknowledging that megaprojects can impact
a society years and decades after project completion, Sato and Chagas (2014)
suggest that the measurement of project success should incorporate “[1] the
time between the initial idea of the project and the time when success is
being assessed and [2] the stakeholders [should be allowed to] apply whatever
success criteria that are relevant for them in terms of utility at that moment
in time” (p. 633). The first part of their suggestion is in line with Fahri et al.
(2015) who state that research about measurements of the long-term impacts
and outcomes are scant, and they therefore suggest a project close-out phase
(i.e., the stage when project outputs have been delivered) is added when
assessing project impact (e.g., on the environment and the community). The
second part of the suggestion is in line with Oliomogbe and Smith’s (2012)
statement that research on project stakeholder value should reveal ‘[the]
understanding [of ] how stakeholders value different things’ (p. 617).
In order to address the gaps and suggestions identified above, we aim
to identify ways to understand, classify, and express megaproject stake-
holder value, while simultaneously acknowledging that different types of
stakeholders may relate to different kinds of values; in other words, they
may place emphasis on different kinds
of consequences of the megaproject at
hand. By allowing stakeholder value
constructs to be defined as positive con-
sequences of the megaproject perceived
and appreciated by stakeholders, our
research question (RQ) is the following:
Which stakeholder value constructs mat-
ter for different types of megaproject
stakeholders?
We answer the question by identify-
ing the theoretical frameworks on stake-
holder value offered in the literature,
and by conducting an empirical study
of stakeholders of an over 50-year-old
highway bridge in the United States—
the Astoria-Megler Bridge (hereafter
referred to as “Astoria Bridge”)—which
connects the U. S. states of Washington
and Oregon on the west coast. The
bridge was chosen for the study because
(1) it has generated substantially more
value to the stakeholders than stipu-
lated in the business case at the time
of project approval, and (2) abundant
material is available on use of the bridge
and the value perceptions of various
types of stakeholders due to the fact that
material had been collected and gener-
ated for the bridge’s 50th anniversary in
2016 and was made publicly available
on the internet.
This research is relevant for theory
and practice for two different reasons:
an instrumental reason and an ethical
one. Insights into the combination of
certain stakeholder types and types of
perceived value can help project repre-
sentatives communicate with the vari-
ous stakeholder types in more efficient
and effective ways, thereby enhanc-
ing the likelihood that they will con-
tinuously support the project as well
as deem the project successful. This
is the instrumental reason. By defini-
tion, megaprojects consume numer-
ous resources (often based on public
funding) and impact many people, even
across generations. As a consequence, it
is of ethical importance that they bring
considerable value to their initiators
and other stakeholders.
The limitations of this research are:
(1) The case study concerns only five
specific stakeholder types (i.e., project
owners, project members, local busi-
nesses and non-profit organizations,
local citizens, and the general public).
Other stakeholder types that might be
relevant (e.g., legal authorities or reg-
ulators, non-local, non-governmental
organizations [NGOs]—e.g., environ-
mentalist groups, and the press—are
not included in the empirical study);
and (2) the case study does not contain
quantitative analyses of economic value
generated or of environmental impact
to the bridge.
The article is structured as follows:
First, the theoretical framework is pre-
sented, followed by the research meth-
odology. Next, a section on findings is
presented and, finally, a conclusion and
suggestions for managerial implications.
Theoretical Framework
The Concept of Stakeholders and
Stakeholder Types
Since Cleland’s early work about ongo-
ing project evaluation (1985, 1986),
stakeholder management has been a
topic in the project management lit-
erature. (An overview of this subject can
be found in Eskerod, Huemann, and
Savage, 2015). Even though no consen-
sus exists on the definition of a project
stakeholder, most researchers build on
Freeman’s (1984) seminal work, which
also holds true for the definition chosen
for this article: “[Project stakeholders
are] the persons and entities that can
affect or be affected by the project”
(Eskerod & Jepsen, 2013, p. 1).
Freeman’s (1984) core message
was that managers should consider
more individuals and groups than their
company’s shareholders in order to
be successful when conducting stra-
tegic management. Freeman (1984)
pointed to the following generic stake-
holder types of a very large organi-
zation: “owners, financial community,
activist groups, customers, customer
advocate groups, unions, employees,
trade associates, competitors, suppliers,
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  61
government, political groups” (p. 55). In
other parts of his book, Freeman (1984)
mentions more stakeholder types (e.g.,
the media and special interest groups,
such as environmentalists). His mes-
sage is that no general list of relevant
stakeholder types can be created. Any
manager or organization must identify
specific stakeholder groups and decide
how to deal with them. A list of generic
stakeholder types should only be viewed
as a starting point for a dialog among the
parties involved in strategic manage-
ment. This line of reasoning has been
followed by other researchers, even
though many of them also list generic
stakeholders as a source of inspiration.
Dröge, Germain, and Halstead (1990),
for example, pointed to shareholders,
customers, voters, the general public,
financial community, lawmakers, com-
munities, the press, higher education,
employees and their families, labor
unions, company distributors, and other
companies, including competitors, as
sources of inspiration; and Turner and
Zolin (2012) who pointed to the investor
or owner, project executive or project
sponsor, consumers, operators/users,
project manager and project team,
senior supplier (design and/or manage-
ment), other suppliers (goods, materi-
als, or services), and the public. As can
be seen, some generic stakeholder types
are overlapping, whereas others are not.
For the purpose of this research, the
contribution from this part of the litera-
ture review is that stakeholder types will
differ across projects, and that relevant
stakeholder types should be identified
by management in each specific case.
Lists of the generic types, however, can
be referred to for inspiration.
The Concept of the Project Life Cycle
Because every project, per definition,
is temporary, its course can be viewed
as a life cycle (Lundin & Söderholm,
1995). The classical project life cycle
consists of four stages: (1) starting the
project; (2) organizing and preparing;
(3) carrying out the work; and (4) clos-
ing out the project (Project Management
 Stakeholder Value Constructs in Megaprojects: A Long-Term Assessment Case Study
PAPERS
Institute, 2013). A life cycle model spe-
cifically dealing with the management
of infrastructure megaprojects is offered
by Priemus (2010) and is comprised
of: (1) problem analysis; (2) compila-
tion of a functional program of require-
ments; (3) elaboration of the technical,
practical, and economic aspects and
preparation of the project until it is
ready for execution; (4) realization of
the project from start to finish; and
(5) operation of the infrastructure after
completion. An advantage of this model
is that it includes the time after comple-
tion, whereas the classical project life
cycle “fails to capture the longer term
effects that megaprojects usually pro-
duce.” (Sato & Chagas, 2014, p. 625). The
time after project completion is also in
focus, when Fahri et al. (2015) suggest
that a project close-out phase (i.e., the
stage when project outputs have been
delivered) should be included when
assessing project impact.
The Concept of Megaproject
Stakeholder Value
Acknowledging that any project goes
through a life cycle, Turner and Zolin
(2012) suggest in a conceptual article
that the consequences of a project can
be differentiated by three types: proj-
ect outputs, project outcomes, and
project impacts. Project outputs are
defined by Turner and Zolin (2012) as
“the new asset delivered by the proj-
ect, commissioned at the end of the
project” (p. 90); whereas project out-
comes are defined as “the new capa-
bilities that operation of the new asset
gives to the investing organization . . .
[and] its successful achievement can
be judged in the months after the proj-
ect” (p. 90); and project impacts are
defined as “the long-term performance
improvement that it is expected the
new capabilities will enable the par-
ent organization to achieve . . . [and]
it will be judged years after the end of
the project” (p. 90). Turner and Zolin
(2012) suggest that different stake-
holder types (eight different types are
mentioned) place different emphases
62  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
on the various consequence types. For
example, the owner or investor pay-
ing for the project, is focused on (1)
whether the project’s outputs are deliv-
ered on time, within budget, and with
appropriate features and levels of per-
formance; (2) whether the asset deliv-
ered (i.e., the project outputs) continues
to perform, makes a profit, enhances
a good reputation and customer loy-
alty and, in general, that the stipu-
lated project outcomes are achieved;
and finally (3) whether new technology,
competence, capability, a new class of
product or similar, as a result of the
asset, materialize. In other words, this
stakeholder type has a vested interest in
all of the three consequence types. The
end users may also be interested in all
three types, but for different reasons;
they may focus on the timely delivery
and quality of the project outputs in
order to be able to start using the asset,
for example, a bridge; the project out-
come for them may be that they spend
less time on transportation, whereas
the project impact may be that they will
have less stressful workdays and be able
to spend more time on the job and/or
with family. When it comes to the gen-
eral public, they may be concerned with
the environmental impact in the years
to come after project finalization, but
interested neither in the project outputs
nor the project outcomes.
In line with Turner and Zolin (2012),
Harrison and Wicks (2013) acknowledge
that various (types of ) stakeholders may
appreciate the different consequences
of strategic efforts and even refer to
one of the classical economic thinkers
Adam Smith (1776), who has claimed
that “individuals know—what is best for
them—that value is something that indi-
viduals should define for themselves
and not allow governments or others
to choose in their stead” (Harrison
& Wicks, 2013, p. 101). The authors
define value as “anything that has the
potential to be of worth to stakeholders”
(pp. 101–102) and point to utility as
another important concept related to
stakeholder value, when stating that
“utility [is understood as something]
to reflect value a stakeholder receives
that actually has merit in eyes of the
stakeholder and it is a function of the
stakeholder’s utility function, which
express the stakeholder’s preferences
for particular types of values” (p. 102).
The authors developed a four-factor
model of the types of value that stake-
holders seek from their relationships
with an organization: (1) stakeholder
utility associated with actual goods
and services; (2) stakeholder utility
associated with organizational justice;
(3) stakeholder utility from affilia-
tion; and (4) stakeholder utility associ-
ated with perceived opportunity costs
(Harrison & Wicks, 2013, p. 103).
As Harrison and Wicks (2013) point
to the perception of utility (e.g., related
to organizational justice), Chang et al.
(2013) state that perceived value of a
project will not only relate to something
functional or commercial but also to
some­thing experiential, whether cogni-
tively or emotionally.
Other researchers (e.g., Flyvbjerg,
2012, 2014; Ang & Killen, 2016; Ang,
Killen, & Sankaran, 2016; Davis, 2014,
2016) have offered conceptual frame-
works related to megaproject stake-
holder value perceptions (or sometimes
referred to as “project success dimen-
sions”). Many of the authors of con-
ceptual papers agree that various
stakeholder types focus on different
project success dimensions; in other
words, they value different elements
generated by the project and suggest
that this should be incorporated into
megaproject stakeholder manage-
ment. The researchers differ, however,
when it comes to suggestions on how
to deal with the multi-faceted value
perceptions. For example, Davis (2016)
proposes that dimensions should be
incorporated into a project success
measurement, thereby allowing all
stakeholder groups to share the same
perception of project success, whereas
Flyvbjerg (2012, 2014) and Ang and
colleagues (Ang & Killen, 2016; Ang
et al., 2016) point to the importance
of emphasizing different aspects when
dealing with different stakeholder types.
Flyvbjerg (2012, 2014) suggests that
megaproject proposals are perceived
as attractive by project initiators and
other stakeholders due to four so-called
sublimes (technological, political, eco-
nomic, and aesthetic dimensions of the
megaproject proposal), and that differ-
ent project stakeholder types can be
convinced to support the proposal by
different dimensions of the megapro-
ject. The technological sublime relates
to the excitement engineers and tech-
nology-oriented people derive from the
potential opportunity of being part of
something uniquely new in terms of
a ‘longest-tallest-fastest’ type of proj-
ect. The political sublime relates to the
excitement politicians derived from the
possibility of generating ‘legacies’ on
themselves and their efforts and receiv-
ing positive visibility in the media and
with the public, thereby enabling them
to be re-elected and/or honored in the
present and the future. The economic
sublime relates to the prospect of creat-
ing jobs and business opportunities in
the project phase as well as after project
termination. In addition to politicians,
stakeholder types that can relate posi-
tively to this sublime include business
people, trade unions, contractors, con-
struction and transportation workers,
consultants, bankers, investors, land-
owners, lawyers, and developers (Fly-
vbjerg, 2014). The fourth sublime—the
aesthetic sublime—‘talks’ to stakehold-
ers who appreciate artefacts and struc-
tures such as buildings and bridges,
which are considered iconic and beau-
tiful from a design point of view. This
group includes designers, artists, area
residents, and other interested parties.
Ang and Killen (2016) offer another
framework to discuss stakeholder value
constructs. In their research, they identi-
fied seven value perspectives employed
by stakeholders and an eighth perspective
was added in Ang et al. (2016) (see Table 1
for an overview of the eight perspectives).
Table 1 shows that project stakehold-
ers employ numerous ways of expressing
and demonstrating both the tangible and
intangible value contributions of projects.
Since publication of the Brundtland
Report by The World Commission on
Environment and Development (WCED)
in 1987, values related to sustainability
have also been on the research agenda
when it comes to stakeholders. In this
report, sustainable development is
defined as “development that meets the
needs of the present without compro-
mising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs.” (WCED, 1987,
p. 46). The definition especially empha-
sizes the long-term perspective of sus-
tainable development as well as values

Value Perspective Characteristics of the Perspectives for Value Identification

Singular/transactional value Relationship drawn between labor (provider) and output (recipient) (Smith, 1776).
Routine activities, simple, found mainly in task-oriented activities, or operational supervision.
Value or deliverables derived are usually planned (deliberate), expected, and articulated upfront.
Generative value Value that is generated through projects and activities is not static but flows on (ripple effect) to deliver value in
other areas, in the present and future to benefit different stakeholders.
Value derived could be planned (deliberate) or unplanned (emergent). Value is generated in the longer time horizon,
and generative value emerges as work unfolds.
Transformational value Ability to change circumstances, magnitude, or quality of project, portfolio, or organization. Adds value through
reputation, publicity, morale, and reinforcing the strategic purpose of the portfolio.
Likely to have a longer term time horizon.
Includes facilitating changes to stakeholder mental models or the way project management is practiced in the system.
A value spectrum (range) When value runs along a range, e.g., through time-based expressions (short to long term), cognition (rational to
emotional) viewpoints (individual to multi-perspectival or collective) and function (operational to strategic).
Retrospective-reflective-future Involves rolling hindsight in sensemaking (Weick, 1995). Value is not static, it shifts (Grönroos & Voima, 2012)
oriented value based on past experiences, present realizations, and future anticipations.
Value realized in the past may pave the way for present and future opportunities.
Value networks and relationships Includes relationships that are collaborative or cooperative (Agarwal & Selen, 2009).
Describes the ability of stakeholders to engage and add value through their own experiences and connections with others.
Preventative value Used in decision making under conditions of risk and uncertainty, where project investments are about prevention
or minimizing negative consequences to the portfolio or organization.
Business case is built around the endpoints to risk reduction, demonstrates the downside of not investing where
the resulting outcomes could be major and sufficiently devastating as opposed to the often invisible upside
(normality, maintaining the status quo of the investments).
Personal reward Emotional expressions such as pleasure, inspiration, satisfaction, and enhanced personal identity from a
stakeholder’s involvement in a project as a member or beneficiary.
Table 1: Value perspectives (based on Ang & Killen, 2016; Ang et al., 2016).

December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  63

 Stakeholder Value Constructs in Megaprojects: A Long-Term Assessment Case Study
PAPERS
such as solidarity and fairness across
generations. The first publications on
sustainable development focused on
issues related to protection of the envi-
ronment and natural resources (i.e.,
ecological issues), whereas recent lit-
erature emphasizes the need for inte-
grating ecological, economic, and social
dimensions (Eskerod & Huemann,
2013). Meadows, Meadows, Randers,
and Behrens (1972) state that the sus-
tainability dimensions are interrelated
and influence each other; however,
AlWaer, Sibley, and Lewis (2008) point
to the fact that various (types of ) stake-
holders may have different and sub-
jective perceptions when undertaking
sustainability assessment.
In addition to the mentioned con-
ceptual articles on frameworks for
stakeholder value, researchers have
also conducted empirical studies on
stakeholder value. In Table 2, we list
the articles containing empirical stud-
ies reviewed, which are relevant to our
study.
When reviewing Table 2 it can be
seen that, even though they are sources
of inspiration, none of the papers
answers the research question we have
set out to investigate. They do not relate
perceived stakeholder value to mega-
project stakeholder types as we have
aimed to do in our study. None of the
papers relates to the RQ as well as those
of Flyvbjerg’s (2012, 2014) and Ang
and colleagues’ (Ang & Killen, 2016;
Ang et al., 2016) frameworks. Flyvbjerg
(2012, 2014) directly relates name-given
stakeholder types to the various dimen-
sions of a megaproject, whereas Ang
and colleagues (Ang & Killen, 2016; Ang
et al., 2016) emphasize that perceived
value can be expressed in many dif-
ferent ways, incorporating more ways
than Flyvbjerg (2012, 2014). In addition,
these authors cover perceived value in
the whole project life cycle.
In our study it is relevant to clar-
ify whether Flyvbjerg’s (2012, 2014)
framework can be applied to the mega-
project’s close-out phase (Fahri et al.,
2015), not only the project proposal
64  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
phase, and to investigate whether Ang
and colleagues’ (Ang & Killen, 2016; Ang
et al., 2016) framework can be tied to
different stakeholder types.
Another interesting contribution
to the theory on stakeholder value is
the so-called project value opportunity
(Lechler, Edington, & Gao, 2012; Lechler,
Gao, & Edington, 2013); in other words,
“project opportunities that provide the
potential to exceed the predefined stake-
holder value of a project during that proj-
ect’s implementation [i.e., execution]”
(Lechler et al., 2013, p. 17), which we also
add in the project close-out phase. The
topic of encouraging exploitation of proj-
ect opportunities to maximize project
stakeholder value is, however, outside
the scope of this article, but is presented
in our other publications (Eskerod,
Ang, & Andersen, 2017; Eskerod, Ang, &
Andersen, forthcoming).
The conclusions of the literature
review are that (1) stakeholder value is a
multifaceted concept; (2) various types
of stakeholder value constructs exist;
(3) the perception of value or impor-
tance of value seems to be contingent on
the types of stakeholders; and (4) there
is a gap in the existing literature when it
comes to stakeholder value constructs
in the close-out phase of the megapro-
ject life cycle, as the existing literature
focuses on the pre-project phase, during
which a project proposal is developed,
and the project execution phase.
Research Methodology
As we position ourselves within the sci-
entific approach of social constructiv-
ism (Berger & Luckmann, 1966), our
contribution concerns the understand-
ing of megaproject stakeholder value
constructs; in other words, which mega-
project consequences they appreciate
and perceive as valuable.
Single Case Study
The research is based on a single case
study (Eisenhardt, 1989); in other words,
stakeholder value constructs related to
the proposal, construction, and opera-
tion of the Astoria Bridge on the west
coast of the United States, which is the
longest continuous truss span bridge in
North America (Great Columbia cross-
ing celebrates, 2006) (See Figure 1).
The case is selected because it is
rich and powerful (Siggelkow, 2007) for
the topic at hand. This single case study
addresses the statement by Flyvbjerg
(2006) that “a discipline without exem-
plars is an ineffective one” (p. 219) and it
also responds to Söderlund and Lenfle’s
(2013) call for investigation of historical
projects, due to the fact that the first
recorded proposal of the bridge was
in 1928 (Bridge Timeline, 2016) and in
2016 it celebrated its 50th anniversary.
Analyzing stakeholder value constructs
related to a megaproject whose outputs
have been in operation for over 50 years,
allows us to directly address one of
the literature gaps, which Winch (2017)
identifies: future generations as a stake-
holder. It is worth further mentioning
that the bridge was constructed within
budget, ahead of schedule, and with
unexpected benefits. Such projects are
few and far between and therefore need
to be studied carefully as especially
revealing cases for potentially useful
lessons (Flyvbjerg, 2014).
In 1953, 25 years after the project
proposal, a partnership was formed
between the Port of Astoria, Oregon
State Highway Department, the Wash-
ington Toll Bridge Authority, and Pacific
County, Washington, to assess the feasi-
bility of building a joint bridge (Bridge
Timeline, 2016). In 1961, the legislatures
of the states of Oregon and Washington
agreed to fund the project. In summary,
the project phases of the bridge were:
pre-project phase (1928–1961); construc-
tion (1962–1966); and operation, in other
words, close-out phase (1966–present).
The costs of construction (US$24 mil-
lion) would translate to half a billion U. S.
dollars in 2016 (according to Measuring-
Worth.com, accessed 27 January 2016).
The originally intended stakeholder
value was an infrastructural improvement
for people crossing the Columbia River.
This improvement was for locals traveling
from the state of Oregon to the state of
Studies (in
chronological
order) Context and Method
Olander (2007) •  Construction industry
•  Sweden
•  Qualitative method
•  Three longitudinal case
studies
Rowlinson and •  Real estate and
Cheung (2008) construction industry
•  Hong Kong and Australia
•  Triangulated approach
(qualitative and quantitative •  Longer term objectives cannot be achieved without
methods)—semi-structured
interviews, observation,
document examination, and
case studies
Li, Ng, and •  Major infrastructure and
Skitmore (2012) construction (MIC) project
•  Hong Kong
•  Diverse research method
(literature review
and content analysis,
questionnaire survey, face-
to-face interviews, mean
score ranking, and fuzzy
comprehensive evaluation)
Hartmann and •  A road maintenance
Hietbrink (2013) project (an arterial
highway ring road)
•  The Netherlands
•  Questionnaires
•  Stakeholder groups that
are directly affected by the
highway section: highway
users, people living close
to the highway, and
companies located along
the highway.
Key Gaps in Relation to the
Key Contributions Phenomena in Our Study
•  Suggests a method for project stakeholder analysis that •  The method does not examine
considers that different stakeholders may have different and evaluate application of
needs and expectations the method across different
•  Points to the usefulness of differentiation between stages and levels of project
proponents and opponents execution, which includes
•  Demonstrates how a wide variety of stakeholders can be both external and internal
included in analysis (e.g., the municipality, the country’s stakeholders.
administrative board, the national government, residents in
the vicinity, interest group for the preservation of the city’s
image, interest group for senior citizens, the media)
•  Point to different kind of stakeholders (upstream, •  The authors do not match the
downstream, external) stakeholder types explicitly to
•  Success in achieving project performance and client the longer term objectives.
satisfaction
additionally focusing on stakeholder management issues
•  Proposes a method of analyzing stakeholder concerns •  Even though concerns also
•  Results indicate a significant divergence of views among can be seen as related to our
stakeholder groups concept of stakeholder value,
•  Conflicts arise when there is a mismatch between the focus on concerns does
peoples’ different perceptions of the issues not fully cover our focus on
•  Policy and decision makers should strive to resolve the stakeholder value.
majority of conflicts arising throughout the project life
cycle to maximize chances of success
•  Allows a thorough assessment taking the views of all
concerned (i.e., the general public, government, pressure
groups, and people affected by the project) into account
•  Suggests that road agencies should redirect their •  The article is very closely
efforts from trying to determine and meet stakeholder related to our topic as it
expectations to allowing stakeholders to experience the investigates how expectations,
improvements of a maintenance project by providing experiences, and satisfaction
sufficient information before and during the project interrelate in a road
•  Helps to determine whether high but realistic expectations maintenance project. However,
about certain road impacts should be stated or overstated the focus on expectations does
about what can be expected from the maintenance in not fully correspond with our
order to gain satisfied stakeholders focus on stakeholder value.
•  Implies that maintenance projects should lead to •  In our data collection,
noticeably improved road infrastructure, since the value of we focus on the current
a road will emerge at the moment of its usage perception by each informant
•  Indicates that the duration of a project might be adjusted of value generated due
to experiences or stakeholders might be not able to recall to the megaproject. This
their expectations after project termination incorporates stakeholder
value (types), which were
not thought of at project
initiation. So it is not relevant
for our study whether our
informants can recall their
initial expectations or not.
(continued)
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  65
 Stakeholder Value Constructs in Megaprojects: A Long-Term Assessment Case Study
PAPERS

Studies (in
chronological Key Gaps in Relation to the
order) Context and Method Key Contributions Phenomena in Our Study
Panahi, Moezzi, •  Construction industry •  Contributes to the extant literature of organizational •  The articles are both very
Preece, and Wan •  Malaysia behavior in construction relevant as they deal with
Zakaria (2017); •  Quantitative method using •  Suggests that a personal–organizational value conflict is a value constructs as well as
Panahi, Preece, questionnaire survey better and stronger predictor of job satisfaction value conflicts in construction
and Wan Zakaria •  Shows the importance of value-based management companies. However, the
(2016) •  Suggests that project managers in the organizational focus on job satisfaction of
setting pay more attention to the construct of “values” the internal stakeholders
•  The expected result is a reduction in the conflicts in is too narrow for our topic,
projects and an increase in the job satisfaction of as it neither includes the
construction stakeholders stakeholder types we need
nor the life-cycle perspective,
in which project outcomes and
impact can first be measured
after project completion.
Mok, Shen, •  Major public engineering •  Diversities of stakeholder concerns and interdependencies •  This article contributes to
Yang, and Li projects (MEPs) between stakeholder concerns add complexities to major our work by pointing to the
(2017) •  China public engineering projects relevance of incorporating
•  Initiated and funded by the •  Illustrates how a network perspective can be used to multiple concerns (which
government analyze stakeholder concern interdependencies is an aspect of stakeholder
•  Four primary research value) and to address the
methods (case study, interdependencies between the
interviews, survey, and concerns, adding to complexity.
network-theory based All these concepts provided
analysis) inspiration for our study.
•  However, the importance
level of stakeholder concerns
and the identification of
major challenges faced by
stakeholders are not solely
related to the network
analysis result of concern
interdependencies.
•  In addition, the concept of
concern does not fully match
our concept of stakeholder
value, even though it can be
viewed as a sub-element.
Table 2: Relevant empirical literature on megaproject stakeholder value constructs.

Washington or vice versa, and for non-local
travelers on U. S. Route 101, as the bridge
was the completing segment of this high-
way, which links the state of Washington
to California, and hence also Canada to
Mexico (Astoria-Megler Bridge, n. d.).
Data Collection
To ensure the quality of the research, more
data collection methods were utilized
(Yin, 2014). The data consisted of inter-
views, online videos of speeches, news-
paper articles, books, website texts, and
photographs (see Table 3). In addition,
one of the authors made onsite observa-
tions during a six-day stay in a hotel in
Astoria, close to the bridge.
Twenty-one individuals provided
direct input to the case study; 14 were
interviewed (45–90 minutes), using
a semi-structured interview guide,
whereas the remaining seven delivered
their input through public speeches.
The 14 individuals were selected partly
through their formal roles mentioned
in our published material on websites,
for example, the public information
officer of the Oregon Department of
Transportation, and partly through
snowball sampling (Goodman, 1961),
in which interviewees recommended
additional participants. Some of the
interviewees were family related (i.e.,
parents and son, father and daughter),
thus accounting for subsequent genera-
tions being involved in construction of
the bridge.
The individuals were categorized into
the following stakeholder types (however,

66  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal


Figure 1: Astoria Bridge, 2009 (Photo courtesy of Ron Reiring, Creative Commons Attribution 2.0).
some of them belonged to more than one
type, for example, interviewee #6, who is
both a project owner and a citizen), as
this made sense for the stakeholders in
the actual project (applying Freeman’s
[1984] advice that the relevant stake-
holder groups should be defined in the
specific setting):
• Project owners (i.e., Oregon Depart-
ment of Transportation, Washington
Department of Transportation, a state
governor, Astoria’s mayor);
• Project members (involved in the bridge
construction, e.g., construction workers);
• Local businesses and NGOs (e.g., cham-
ber of commerce, an historical society);
• Local citizens (living and/or working in
Astoria); and
• The general public (e.g., non-locals from
other parts of Oregon or Washington, a
member of congress, and representa-
tives from the ‘sister city’ of Waldorf in
Germany)
All interviews and speeches were
recorded and transcribed.
Data Analysis
Recognizing that different research-
ers may produce findings that are not
identical and that have non-overlapping
components (Thomas, 2006), the data
were iteratively analyzed by both
authors who ultimately converged their
individual analyses. This study utilizes a
recursive deductive–inductive analysis
approach (Miles, Huberman, Saldaña,
2014). Deductively, a common analysis
framework guided by Flyvbjerg’s four
sublimes (2012, 2014) and the value
perspectives typology framework by
Ang and colleagues (Ang & Killen, 2016;
Ang et al., 2016) were used by both
researchers. The deductive analyses
were balanced by inductively explor-
ing new themes that emerged from the
data. Important concepts, categories,
and patterns were identified, coded,
built up, and revised as new and differ-
ent codes emerged. The collaborative
experience amounted to a dynamic dia-
log, as the researchers interrogated and
revisited the data iteratively, compared
new concepts with the frameworks and
data, and then built abstractions and
more ‘what ifs’ with any new pattern
that emerged (Stake, 1995). Further-
more, the thematic analysis of the data
was conducted using a combination
of manual and CAQDAS (QSR NVivo)
approaches (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013).
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  67
The use of CAQDAS enabled the codes
to be organized, revised, merged, and
reconstructed more flexibly and effi-
ciently (Miles et al., 2014).
The authenticity of our analysis is
demonstrated through the representa-
tion of a range of value perspectives
(multiple realities) by the different
stakeholders being studied. Triangula-
tion of different data sources added
strength to the data quality (Miles et al.,
2014). Consequently, our conclusions
are based on several different sources of
information following converging lines
of inquiry (Yin, 2014), where they all
triangulate on the same RQ.
Findings
An overview of the empirical findings;
in other words, the stakeholder value
constructs associated with the various
stakeholder types identified in the inter-
views and speeches, are presented in
Table 4. The levels ‘Nil, Low, Medium,
High, and Very High’ are based on the
frequency of coded mentions associated
with each sublime and stakeholder type.
Analysis Using the Four Sublimes
Framework
When constructed, the Astoria Bridge
was the longest continuous truss span
in the world (Astoria Bridge, n. d.), thus
reflecting the technological sublime for
at least two stakeholder groups—the
designers, namely architect William A.
Bugge; and the constructors DeLong
Corporation, American Bridge Com-
pany, and Pomeroy Gerwick (Astoria-
Megler Bridge, n.d.). The second sublime
was the political one. The stakehold-
ers in question were the political pro-
ponents of the bridge, who originated
from two U. S. states (Oregon and Wash-
ington), even though the building of
the bridge was mostly championed by
Oregon representatives (Associated
Press, 1978). The political sublime was
no doubt a factor, as can be seen in a
1966 campaign advertisement by the
Governor of Oregon at the time, Mark
Hatfield, who was running for state
senator and whose platform mentioned
 Stakeholder Value Constructs in Megaprojects: A Long-Term Assessment Case Study
PAPERS
Type of Document Sources
Semi-structured interviews Interviews with 14 key stakeholders
classified under project owners (public
services and politicians), project
members, local businesses and non-
profit organizations, local citizens, and
the general public
Eight interviewees lived in the area
for over 40 years, 5 had lived there for
under 40 years, and 1 was undisclosed
Newspaper articles Associated Press (1962); Inkster (1966);
Judge what he will do (1966); Sherman
(1967); Associated Press (1978);
Associated Press (1994); Hauser (2004);
Webber (2011)
Book Stark (2014)
Online videos (transcripts of Goicochea (2016): Speeches by governor, 50th anniversary celebration of
speeches and open letters mayor, public services officials,
presented in the speeches) non-profit organization historical
representatives, representatives from
German sister city; included open letters
(to be read out load at the event) from
members of congress and more
Web-based articles The Daily Astorian by DePledge (2015);
The Oregonian by Read (2015); Clatsop
County Historical Society by Daly (2016);
The Daily Astorian by Spurr (2016); The
Oregonian by Hale (2016)
Photographs Provided by interviewees and through
websites (1962–2016)
Reports Alternative Uses (2012),
Monday Study Club Report by
Isaacson (2015)
Table 3: Summary of data collected on Astoria Bridge.
68  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
Scope or Context
Locals and non-Astorians
From the states of Oregon or
Washington
Pre-during-post construction
accounts
Years lived in the area
Accounts recalled as a child,
teenager, or adult
Key incidences based on
the timeline of the bridge
construction, post construction
Chronological description of the Historical background of the area and
development of the area
the bridge
Astoria Bridge turns 50, bridge
timeline
Photo illustrations of events
and stakeholders
Bridge to Astoria—historical
account of the bridge outlined
as well as alternative uses
Content
Demographics and personal: Living in
Astoria or surrounding areas, recollection
of experiences with the bridge (pre-during
and post construction), significance of
bridge to the individual, perceived public
sentiments, earliest and best memories of
the bridge, anecdotes
Bridge construction: Memory about
construction and media, incidents,
Astoria Clowns, recollection about the
local sentiments
Bridge operations: Changes, positive or
negative impacts and effects (during and
post construction), concerns, desired
changes upon reflection (if you could go
back in time), tolls, perceived sentiments
of future generations
Bridge’s cause by Oregon representatives
(political debates between Astorian
leaders and the states), oppositions on
scale and budgets, completion of the
bridge, political sublimes evident during
the conceptualization and pre-construction
periods
stakeholders
Speeches by current government
representatives and open letters from
a congress member and more imply the
technological and political sublimes;
evidence for the ‘generative perspective’
of value; economic and symbolic
impacts of the bridge, and maintenance of
the bridge
Historical account for the purpose
of promoting the 50th anniversary
celebrations, a historical timeline since
the proposal in 1928
During and post-construction periods;
stakeholders, including the public,
politicians, and promoters
Highlights the historical accounts and
issues with the proposed project and
funding sources, stakeholder groups
involved
Points to alternative uses of the bridge
the ­completion of the bridge among his
achievements (“Judge what he will do,”
1966). The third sublime was the eco-
nomic sublime, which included growth
in tourism businesses; fourth was the
aesthetic sublime. The relevant stake-
holders included not just local groups
(e.g., home and business owners, archi-
tects, and so forth) but also tourists
(then and now), who believed the bridge
was reason enough to visit the area,
as well as future generations (i.e., the
current generation who is left with this
aesthetic legacy).
Table 4 demonstrates that the local
citizens and general public stakeholders
tend to express their views through the
aesthetic and economic expressions of
delight, whereas the business represen-
tatives tended to appreciate the politi-
cal and economic sublimes. Those who
worked on the bridge, as well as busi-
ness representatives, also appreciated
the bridge’s technological achievements.
Speeches presented by current gov-
ernment representatives at the recent
50th-year anniversary tended to describe
the bridge through technological and
political sublimes. Speech phrases asso-
ciated with the technological sublime
include: ‘marvel of human innovation
and engineering power’ (#10, Local busi-
ness and NGO), ‘man-made wonder’
(#6, Project owner), ‘engineering marvel;
built with the strength to support the more
than 6,000 daily crossings of today; resil-
ience to withstand every changing coastal
weather conditions; longest continuous
trans-bridge in the world’ (#5, Project
owner). Meanwhile political rapture is
manifested through how the bridge is a
living embodiment of state collabora-
tion, good government, and team work,
and a ‘landmark achievement.’ (#6, Proj-
ect owner). There were also praise for
and acknowledgment of the previous
government officials involved during
the time of construction, with phrases
such as: ‘This is one of his many contri-
butions to the state of Oregon.’ (#4, Proj-
ect owner); ‘a testament to the foresight
of an earlier generation that recognized
that a well-managed transportation sys-
tem is the backbone of a thriving regional
economy; visionary transportation advo-
cates.’ (#5, Project owner).
Analysis Using the Value Perspectives
Framework
Analyzing the data through the value
perspectives framework (Ang & Killen,
2016; Ang et al., 2016) (see the middle
part of Table 4) showed that ‘genera-
tive value’ is a value perspective that is
found to be strongly associated with all
stakeholder types, for example: ‘It helps
us to officially move goods from our
ports, from our fishing boats, from our
farms, fields, factories to national and
international markets. Make no mis-
take, a healthy tourism industry depends
on a healthy transportation system.’

Stakeholder Types
Local Businesses
Project Owners Project Members and NGOs Local Citizens General Public
Generative value Nil Med-High Very high High Very high
Personal reward Nil Medium Very high Very high Low
Ang and Killen’s Value

Preventative value Low Nil Low Medium Nil

Perspectives

Retrospective-future value Low Low Medium Low Low

Singular or transactional value Nil Low Low Low-Medium Low
Transformational value Nil Low Med-High Low Medium
Value networks and relationships Low Medium High-Very high High Low
Value spectrum Nil Nil Low Low Low

Aesthetic Low Low Low High Very high

Four Sublimes
Flyvbjerg’s

Economic Low Medium Medium High Very high

Political High Low-Medium High Low Nil
Technological Low Low-Medium Medium Low Low

Connecting places and people High Low High Very high Medium
Quality of Life —
Contribution

Symbolic value Medium Low Low High High

Functional or practical value, High Medium Very high High Low
e.g., time savings
Unexpected benefits Medium Low Med-High Med-High Low
Table 4: Empirical findings on the value frameworks associated with stakeholder types.

December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  69

 Stakeholder Value Constructs in Megaprojects: A Long-Term Assessment Case Study
PAPERS
(#6, Project owner); and ‘projects like the
Astoria-Megler Bridge bring significant
benefits to local communities and unlock
key economic development opportuni-
ties.’ (#5, Project owner).
The value perspective ‘networks
and relationships’ appears more highly
associated with business representatives
as well as the local citizens, compared
with the other stakeholders, whereas the
value perspective depicting ‘personal
reward’ is highly expressed by the local
citizens and business representatives.
The value of the bridge is weakly asso-
ciated with a transactional perspective
and is recognized more as a transforma-
tional value mainly by business repre-
sentatives. The business representatives
also appear more likely to reflect on the
value of the bridge retrospectively or
further consider future value from the
bridge. We also found evidence, how-
ever, of retrospective-reflective-future
value constructs in the speeches, specif-
ically in the expressions of acknowledg-
ment of the foresight and vision of their
predecessors, as well as what the future
might hold, through remarks such as:
‘inspire a renewed commitment to creat-
ing a shared vision for our future, one that
meets the needs of Oregon communities,
Washington communities and all their
people’ (#5, Project owner); and ‘as it was
50 years ago, as it is today, the Astoria-
Megler Bridge is a shining example of this
type of investment, and stands symbolic
of what one generation can do for the
next.’ (#6, Project owner).
Overall, although stakeholders tended
not to express project value in ‘preventive
terms,’ there were a few isolated expres-
sions from the local citizens who dis-
cussed safety and maintenance as part of
the preventive value construct, as well as
the value through avoiding exposure to
health risks, the prevention of delays, and
inconveniences.
Further Findings
At the bottom of Table 4 we present
coded mentions, which did not fit into
the deductive analyses with the two
selected frameworks.
70  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
In the longer term, the megapro-
ject contributed positive social value by
transforming the community’s quality
of life. Based on our analysis, we sug-
gest that ‘quality of life’ is a contributing
element outside the two frameworks.
This element describes the communi-
ty’s delight and the impact the bridge
has had on their lives, both for local and
non-local stakeholders.
The ‘Quality of life’ element is iden-
tified through the connectedness the
bridge provides to the two states, which
resulted in time savings for the commu-
nity, freedom, the added mobility and
connection with others, and access to
facilities in other geographical areas, as
expressed by the following stakeholder
comments:
“It’s just made us so much more a
part of the world . . . We can go and zip
out anywhere.” (#8, Project member).
“There’s a lot of people who go back
and forth . . . who work on one side and
live on the other side. There’s people who
can go back and forth to visit their fami-
lies, relatives, and there’s some really
fantastic places across the river for visit-
ing the beaches.” (#12, Local citizen).
“It’s an extremely important bridge
for the communities of Astoria and also
southwest Washington, because that really
connects those communities.” (#3, Project
owner).
“People weren’t going to come across,
sit in line for a ferry that took a half hour
to get here, half hour to get back. They’re
not going to do that to come over to shop
in a penny store or shop in a grocery
store, but with the bridge, it just turned
everything wide open both ways. Now,
our residents can go over to Long Beach
and Waco and shop there or recreate
there, so it’s been a win/win for both
sides of the river.” (#9, Local business
and NGO).
“One of the things . . . Pacific County
on the Washington side is a very large
retirement community. From the Wash-
ington side’s perspective, Astoria has the
larger hospitals, the more specialized
doctors, and is in the process of building
a cancer treatment building too. That
means a lot to those retirees on the
Washington side of the river. Because
otherwise they have to travel 50 miles to
Long View. Or 100 miles to Olympia. . . .
They have more access to more special-
ized care over here.” (#13, Local citizen).
“It meant that there were more possi-
bilities for things to do, travel over there
whenever we want.” (#12, Local citizen).
Quality of life as an element was
also well-founded in the speeches of
the state representatives, as reflected
in the following examples: ‘have really
contributed to the economic well-being
and quality of life of our community;
it improves the quality of life and the
land value, so for our residents over the
Long Beach Peninsula area.’ (#4, Proj-
ect owner); and ‘simply put, Oregon’s
bridges, highways, roads, and public
transportation systems contribute to vir-
tually everything of value in our econ-
omy and in our lives . . . Systems that
provide choices for us citizens, systems
that connect our transport to our services
and a system that connects our people
to work, school, recreation, and family.’
(#6, Project owner).
Phrases evident from the interview-
ees and speeches that demonstrate the
strong symbolic nature of the project
include: ‘symbolic of the coastal region’
(#18, General public), ‘always been an
icon’ (#9, Local business and NGO), and
‘collage of images I would associate with
my home state.’ (#18, General public).
In addition to being a physical icon,
the bridge is also symbolically associ-
ated with progress and achievement,
in other words, ‘it really made Asto-
ria’ (#8, Project member). Further such
evidence is expressed as: “The bridge
is a symbol of progress. It is not only a
means of transporting goods and people
between states, but stands as an illustra-
tion of determination and ingenuity.”
(#16, Local citizen), and “A lot of them
[future generations] aren’t going to pay
attention to the history of this bridge,
how it was really built by the little people
who stood up to the politicians and said,
"No, we want the bridge!" (#9, Local
business and NGO).
 Relating the above mentioned find-
ings to the two theoretical frameworks,
it becomes clear that the economic
delight that the business community
and trade unions derived from gen-
erating revenue and creating employ-
ment is highly associated with several
value perspectives: generative, trans-
formational, and value networks. This
can also be explained by its very high
association with the bridge as a con-
nector of people to places. The access
and connectivity generate opportunities
for economic growth and consequently
transform the surroundings. What this
means is that the bridge enabled and
enhanced the value networks and rela-
tionships between the two states and
this greatly resulted in an economic
‘boom’ or ‘boost’ in the regions, which
depicts both generative (progressive)
value as well as transformational value.
This has especially benefited the next
generation of stakeholders.
The expressions of political delight
in the bridge constructions were less
obvious from the interviews but are vis-
ible from newspaper articles published
before the construction (“Judge what he
will do,” 1966) and the speeches from
the 50th-anniversary celebration. In the
1950s (the conceptualization and pre-
construction period), there were strong
political debates between the Astorian
leaders and the states on whether such
an investment should proceed.
It appeared that the political stake-
holders needed to balance the needs
and expectations of public stakehold-
ers, because the project decisions made
at the time could have a long-term
impact on future generations and state
funding. The following comments dem-
onstrate the decisional conflict between
the need for having funds for mainte-
nance and living up to a public promise,
which could cause further problems in
the longer term. “We were very happy
not to have to pay a bridge toll. Most
people said we should have kept it on
for maintenance so that we could keep
it maintained properly. The reason that
we were told that the bridge toll was
discontinued was that we’d been prom-
ised that it would be discontinued when
the bridge was paid off. Then our repre-
sentative at the time said it is a good idea
to keep the bridge toll on but it’s unfair
to have a bridge crossing the Columbia
River with a toll on it if other bridges
that cross the Columbia don’t have a toll
on them. There are five bridges in the
Portland area that cross the Columbia
and Willamette, and nobody that was in
the political world at that time wanted
to broach tolls on those bridges and so
our toll came off.” (#11, Local citizen).
It was clear from the data that most
stakeholders observed that the bridge
has had a great impact on the com-
munity. For example, the local citizens
tended to comment that the bridge
positively impacted on their lives and
observed that business and the econ-
omy were affected positively. Locals
in the area benefitted primarily from
time savings and convenience. Simi-
larly, the general public that did not
live near the bridge acknowledged the
high impact that the bridge had on the
local businesses and economy, yet they
were more likely to comment from a
symbolic perspective. Those who were
involved in its construction perceived
that the bridge strongly impacted on
the lives of the locals and economy,
whereas business representatives were
able to recognize and relate to the high
impact the bridge has had on the lives
of locals and businesses, thus contrib-
uting to the economy. Project owners
focused on the impact the bridge had
in terms of the economy and what the
bridge represented (i.e., symbolism).
When asked about whether or not the
bridge impacted on the environment,
the informants generally stated they had
not observed any detrimental impacts.
This includes the current bridge main-
tenance projects in which great care was
being taken to protect the environment.
The comments related to quality
of life can be related to another con-
ceptual framework, namely the con-
cept of sustainable development, in
other words, the ecologic, economic,
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  71
and social dimensions (World Commis-
sion on Environment and Development
[WCED], 1987). According to AlWaer
et al. (2008), various stakeholder types
placed different emphases on the proj-
ect’s consequences on various dimen-
sions. The locals (businesses, NGOs,
and residents) pointed to the social and
economic dimensions when stating the
time savings as a value of very high
importance to them, whereas the gen-
eral public scored it low.
What was also revealed in the analy-
sis was that many of the stakeholder
values identified relate to the project
impact; in other words, the long-term
consequences, according to Turner and
Colin’s (2012) project life cycle–based
framework on project outputs, project
outcomes, and project impact.
Conclusion and Managerial
Implications
The research underlying this article set
out to investigate how stakeholders of
megaprojects construct value; as part of
that, the authors investigated whether
different value constructs matter differ-
ently to different types of stakeholders.
We identified ways to understand,
classify, and express megaproject stake-
holder value, and the research links
types of stakeholders to varying types
of value constructs. These findings are
summarized in Table 4 and can be used
strategically by project representatives.
Knowing the focus of the varying types of
value constructs by different stakeholder
types can help project representatives
communicate more efficiently and effec-
tively with stakeholders. The references
to value constructs with a High or Very
High score (as shown in Table 4) are
well-suited for communication with the
specific stakeholder type, whereas value
constructs with Nil and Low scores are
not suited. References and inquiries
made with respect to the stakeholder’s
personal value of the bridge is relevant,
for example, when communicating with
local businesses, NGOs, and citizens,
but not when communicating with indi-
viduals from the general public.
 Stakeholder Value Constructs in Megaprojects: A Long-Term Assessment Case Study
PAPERS
Our findings demonstrate that the
two most relevant frameworks identi-
fied in the literature—the four sub-
limes and the value perspectives—can
be used as guidelines for the value
constructs expected from megaproject
stakeholders. However, more value
constructs than those covered by the
two frameworks were also found in the
data. This led us to propose that an
additional element in the form of qual-
ity of life, which focuses on values that
are partly related to sustainable devel-
opment dimensions (i.e., ecological,
social, and economic dimensions), is
also relevant for the individual (types
of ) stakeholders as well as life-cycle
issues. The managerial implication of
this is that project representatives seek-
ing to promote value creation should
communicate with the stakeholders in
a way that is aligned with the particu-
lar stakeholder groups’ preferred value
constructs—not only in the pre-project
phase in which approval and initiation
of the project proposal is considered
success, but also in the post-project
phase, when project success is viewed.
This can be in terms of impact on the
customer, business success, and pre-
paring for the future; in other words,
the insights created can help inform
and enrich how one could position
and structure what we refer to as ‘the
language of value’ to various stake-
holders. Our findings demonstrate the
richness of the case and the multiple
perspectives of value occurring in the
megaproject.
In summary, we suggest two ways
our findings can assist organizations
responsible for managing multi-stake-
holder value in megaprojects: (1) an
appreciation for multiple stakeholder
value expressions and perspectives; and
(2) a ‘value-language’ to enhance stake-
holder engagement.
First, the frameworks allow for value
identification in both the short and
long term and consider value that goes
beyond tangible and financial value to
incorporate aspects of intangible social
value.
72  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
Second, using such frameworks
could improve the communication of
value in megaproject processes and
stakeholder engagement by provid-
ing a specific ‘value language’ for each
stakeholder group, specifically groups
with varying affections and needs.
Communication is an essential part of
megaproject activities. Through specific
stakeholder ‘value–language’ nuances,
value is expressed, reinforced, and
channeled into current and future deci-
sions, which, in turn, can help to further
identify opportunities to improve the
development, delivery, and capture of
relevant value propositions and deliver-
ables. The value perspectives typology
could aid in structuring the communi-
cation and language used with different
stakeholder groups in order to build and
leverage relationships, experience, and
expertise to seek out opportunities that
can benefit the various stakeholders in
a megaproject.
A limitation of this study is that we
only had a few interviewees within each
stakeholder type. However, by analyz-
ing a megaproject whose outcome (i.e.,
the bridge) has been in operation for
50 years and with more family-related
interviewees (e.g., parents and son,
father and daughter), presented us with
a unique opportunity to directly address
one of the gaps identified in the litera-
ture—accounting for future generations
as stakeholders, because the benefits
(and drawbacks) they have inherited
are already visible. In future research,
it would be interesting to conceptual-
ize how including this generation as
a stakeholder could have changed the
process of the project (e.g., deciding
to continue with the toll taxes even
after construction costs were repaid to
account for current and future mainte-
nance, which otherwise would become
a burden on the future generations of
taxpayers).
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the
interviewees in the case study. Further,
we would like to thank MBA students,
Ms. Petya Sabinova and Ms. Jovana
Djuric, and Webster Vienna Private
University, for their input on data col-
lection, literature reviews, and write-
ups. We would also like to thank the
reviewers and editor for the construc-
tive, valuable, and detailed input, which
have contributed to the improvement
of the text.
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Pernille Eskerod is a Full Professor of
Management and Organizational Behavior at
Webster Vienna Private University, Austria; she is
a faculty member at the WU Executive Academy
in Vienna, Austria; and holds a PhD in enterprise
management. Her research focuses on stakeholder
management, project opportunity management,
change management, temporary organizations, and
project benefit management. Pernille has authored
more than 100 journal articles, books, book chapters,
and conference papers. She was the principal guest
editor of a special issue of Project Management
Journal ® on project stakeholder management in
2015. Pernille is of Danish nationality and has been
employed at the University of Southern Denmark
for many years. She has been a visiting professor
at Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, New
Jersey, USA, and at WU Vienna University of
Economics and Business. Between 2016 and 2017,
she spent three months at Webster University’s
campus in Bangkok, Thailand, to pursue her recent
research interests in the hospitality industry. Since
2015, she has been a SIG board member of the
Project Organising SIG at the European Academy
of Management (EURAM). In 2017, she undertook
the role as SIG program manager at the EURAM
conference in Glasgow, Scotland. She can be
contacted at pernille.eskerod@webster.ac.at.
Karyne Ang is a project manager and part-time
academic at the University of Technology, Sydney
(UTS), Australia. Her core research areas are
project portfolio management, multi-stakeholder
engagement, value concepts, organizational
learning, collaborative practices, and decision
making in complex environments. Karyne engages
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  75
in both quantitative and qualitative research and
is a hands-on researcher who is comfortable
with multiple inquiry methods. She teaches and
conducts educational research projects across
multiple faculties, including engineering and
information technology, design, architecture and
building, science, and law. Through her former role
as account director for several consumer research
agencies in Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia,
Karyne developed and led multiple client-based
project portfolios encompassing new product
development (NPD), strategic brand management,
consumer behavior, and market segmentation
research project portfolios. Karyne holds a Master
of Education (Organization Learning) from UTS and
a Bachelor of Business Administration (Marketing)
from RMIT in Melbourne, Australia and is currently
completing her PhD at the University of Technology,
Sydney (UTS), Australia. She can be contacted at
Karyne.ang@uts.edu.au.
 PAPERS Competitive Precinct Projects:
The Five Consistent Criticisms of
“Global” Mixed-Use Megaprojects
Mike Harris, Faculty of the Built Environment, The University of New South Wales,
Sydney, Australia
ABSTRACT ■
Mixed-use megaprojects on state-owned land
have been increasingly occurring around the world
over the past few decades. This article reviews
the body of literature that has emerged on these
projects during this period and investigates a num-
ber of projects more deeply by reviewing original
planning documents and undertaking interviews
with government officials, consultants, and other
insiders. Project motives, delivery methods, and
built outcomes have been examined in order to
contextualize their emergence and proliferation,
leading to a typological understanding, defined in
this article as competitive precinct projects. A con-
tent analysis of 30 reviews covering 42 mixed-use
megaprojects in 20 countries reveals remarkable
global consistency in thematic criticisms. Framed
in this article as the “five consistent criticisms
of ‘global’ mixed-use megaprojects,” they pose
a significant barrier to addressing increasingly
complex urban challenges as well as to their suc-
cessful management from inception to delivery.
While the consistent criticisms represent patterns
that have endured within a globally active urban
development type for over three decades, this
research shows that rather than being a neoliberal
hegemony, there are mixed political and ideo-
logical aims and outcomes across projects and
sometimes within the same project. A typological
understanding allows patterns to be examined and
understood, variances and hybridity to be evalu-
ated, and more sophisticated future directions to
be mapped out in the pursuit of broader based and
city-scale project outcomes.
KEYWORDS: urban megaprojects; competitive
cities; neoliberal globalization; urban renewal;
urban planning
Project Management Journal, Vol. 48, No. 6, 76–92
© 2017 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
76  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
INTRODUCTION
S
ince the 1980s, competitively orientated, precinct-scale urban renewal
projects on state-owned land have been increasingly undertaken
around the world. Large-scale development projects are far from new;
however, the projects occurring in the past few decades have been
similarly driven by globally interlinked political and economic restructuring
processes occurring since the late 1970s (Del Cerro, 2013b; Lehrer & Laidley,
2008; Moulaert, Rodriguez, & Swyngedouw, 2003; Oakley & Rofe, 2005; Olds,
2001; Orueta & Fainstein, 2008).
The focus of this article is on mixed-use megaprojects that are explicitly
motivated by four global processes: (1) city-based international competition
(Florida, 2002; Moretti, 2013b; Porter, 1998); (2) the mobility and growth of
knowledge economies (Montgomery, 2007; Moretti, 2013a); (3) the redirec-
tion of global investment from physical to human capital (Sassen, 2001); and
(4) the dominance of market-rule ideology and politics (Brenner & Theodore,
2005). They vary in size from a few hectares to hundreds, as long as they
occupy at least enough blocks to be considered a city “precinct” or “quarter”
in their own right. They are multibillion-dollar comprehensive transforma-
tions of the urban space within their boundaries, commissioned by public
authorities and usually delivered in partnership with private enterprise
(Lehrer & Laidley, 2008; van Marrewijk, Clegg, Pitsis, & Veenswijk, 2008).
As such, these projects offer lucrative capital markets, often publicly funded
(Swyngedouw, Moulaert, & Rodriguez, 2002), despite p ­ ublic–private partner-
ships being driven by the desire to reduce public spending (Zimmermann &
Eber, 2014). This capital market is now an underlying driver of urban mega-
projects, with powerful urban growth coalitions advocating for and benefiting
from their production (Siemiatycki, 2013).
From a typological point of view, these mixed-use megaprojects can be
subcategorized as a globally active model of urban development, defined in this
article as competitive precinct projects (CPPs) (see Table 1 for examples of project
categorization).
The social, health, economic, and environmental benefits of a mixed-use
approach to urban design and planning have been increasingly understood and
implemented over the past 50 years, and in a general sense, such an approach
can now be considered standard practice (Dovey & Pafka, 2017). CPPs emerged
roughly 20 years after the disciplinary reengagement with mixed-use cities. The
political alignment with the above four global processes separates CPPs from the
conventional approach to increasing the diversity of use within an urban area. In
fact, as will be explained, CPPs can be seen to limit diversity within rigid formula-
tions of mixed-use development.
 Large-Scale Competitive
Development Construction Mixed-Use Precinct
Project Period Key Objectives Megaproject Project
Biljmermeer, 1968–1975 Response to housing shortage. Planned for working- and middle-class No No
Amsterdam families. Design based on modernist principles of strict separation of living,
500 ha working, recreation, and travel functions (Fainstein, 2010).
Canary Wharf, 1988–ongoing Anticipating demand for office space in a deregulated market. Compete Yes Yes
London with regional financial centers, particularly Frankfurt and Paris (Newman &
47 ha Thornley, 1996).
Hammarby 1995–ongoing Integrated environmental infrastructural systems precinct that exemplifies Yes No
Sjöstad, Stockholm’s commitment to environmental policy (Pandis Iveroth, Vernay,
Stockholm Mulder, & Brandt, 2013).
160 ha
Ørestad, 1997–ongoing Attract international companies and investment in competition with regional Yes Yes
Copenhagen centers, particularly in northern Germany and Scandinavia. Attract higher-
310 ha earning Danish residents to Copenhagen. Fund new metro lines with land
sales revenue (Danish Ministry of Finance, 1992).
Vauban, 1998–2010 Deliver an ecologically, socially, economically, and culturally sustainable city Yes No
Freiburg district in a cooperative, participatory process (City of Freiburg, 2015).
41 ha
Barangaroo, 2012–ongoing Attract international companies and investment in competition with centers Yes Yes
Sydney in the Asia Pacific (BDA, 2014).
22 ha
Hudson Yards, 2012–ongoing Expand the midtown central business district seeking global attention Yes Yes
New York (HYDC, 2014).
11 ha
West Kowloon 2013–ongoing Become Asia’s arts and cultural capital (WKCDA, 2016). Yes Yes
Cultural District,
Hong Kong
40 ha
Table 1: Large-scale development project categorization.

The rhetoric from CPP protagonists
will always embrace a globalization dis-
course in which international economic
competitiveness is paramount for the
prosperity of the city and the state. In both
times of genuine bust, as in ­Copenhagen
in the late 1980s, or times of obvious
boom, as in Sydney in the 2010s, this rhet-
oric dominates public discourse, frames
objectives, and guides decision-­ making
processes, despite rarely being operation-
alized into official project man­agement
processes.
In Flyvbjerg’s (2014) definition, the
intent of a megaproject is to change
the structure of society, rather than
work within existing structures. How-
ever, the structural change that these
projects are aiming to bring about, who
precisely stands to benefit, and more
importantly, what alternatives might
be available all remain shrouded in a
generic “glossy globalization” discourse
that glorifies potential investment and
growth while obscuring real urban dis-
placement and socio-spatial polariza-
tion (Marcuse, 1997).
This article argues that CPPs repre-
sent a globally embedded approach to
city making, spanning cultural and geo-
graphical contexts, with a management
process defined loosely by common aims
and narratives. Despite their size and
requirement to be strategically located,
these projects are increasingly occurring
in a great number of cities and, at times,
with numerous projects being deliv-
ered at the same time in a single city.
Sydney can claim Barangaroo, Darling
Harbour (the second wholesale redevel-
opment since the late 1980s), the Bays
Precinct, and the Central to Eveleigh
Corridor as examples of CPPs currently
under way, totaling 243 hectares, all
within four kilometers of the city center.
Copenhagen, a much smaller city, can
claim a massive 714 hectares across
three projects: Ørestad, Nordhavn, and
Sydhavn. All of these are within three
kilometers of the city center and are
being delivered by the same govern-
ment-owned delivery authority, By &
Havn (City & Port).
This article reviews the body of lit-
erature that has emerged on mixed-
use megaprojects occurring over the
past 30 years. Project motives, delivery

December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  77

 Competitive Precinct Projects
PAPERS
methods, and built outcomes have been
examined within the discourse of neo-
liberal globalization and the increasing
mobility of capital in order to contex-
tualize their emergence and prolifera-
tion. A thematic content analysis of this
literature was undertaken to determine
the most common evaluative themes,
followed by a more targeted, project-
based investigation, including a review
of planning documents, interviews with
government officials and consultants,
and onsite studies.
A conventional and summative
approach to analysis was undertaken
of subjective interpretation of content
through systematic identification pat-
terns (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) in which
themes were progressively grouped
and reduced. Five thematic criticisms
emerged as dominant evaluative themes
and are expanded on in this article as
the five consistent criticisms of global
mixed-use megaprojects. In summary,
these five are (1) introverted governance
that circumvents local planning frame-
works, (2) international positioning and
marketing prevailing over the concern
of local issues, (3) physical and social
disconnection, (4) generic urbanity, and
(5) lack of public benefit.
Among the literature’s heavy criti-
cism, threads of more inclusive plan-
ning mechanisms can be found. The
shortcoming of the literature is that
these mechanisms are under acknowl-
edged. When compiled, they begin to
offer alternate directions that disrupt the
exclusive business-as-usual approach
to delivering CPPs. The latter part of this
article is, in part, a response to calls for
more contextually grounded views of
practice to better evaluate megaprojects
(van Marrewijk et al., 2008) and shows
that, while the consistent criticisms
dominate project reviews, some proj-
ects demonstrate significant countering
qualities. This suggests that although
neoliberal-oriented development prac-
tices can appear hegemonic, there is
an undercurrent of alternative ideolo-
gies and practices. Acknowledging the
persistence of international city-based
78  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
economic competition, this article con-
cludes with the proposition that more
sophisticated future directions would
couple competitive city goals with local
planning goals to achieve broader-
based city-scale public benefit.
In view of this evaluation and the
tenacity of this model of urban renewal,
there is a need for more normative
research approaches in order to under-
stand the genesis, delivery, urban
implications, and future directions of
this type of project. It is evident that
far greater and more diverse city-scale
benefits are possible than are currently
being achieved.
Neoliberal Globalization
and CPPs
CPPs have arisen from a complex set
of geographic, economic and, above
all, political processes of restructuring
occurring throughout the world since
the late 1970s and early 1980s. This
period has seen the widespread ascen-
dency of globalization, neoliberalism,
and as an urban manifestation of these
processes, the CPP.
Globalization is not a new phe-
nomenon. The origins of a “world-
embracing market” have been placed as
far back as the 16th century (Marx, 1978,
p. 329). However, it was in the late 20th
century that globalization became the
central lens through which to under-
stand the world in both the popular
imagination (Dicken, 2007) and schol-
arly discourse (Featherstone, Lash, &
Robertson, 1995).
Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Per-
raton (1999) explain globalization as a
set of processes that underpin trans-
formations in the extensity, speed, and
impact of social and economic relations
that have vastly increased regional and
international flows of interactions and
power. A quarter of a century ago, Gid-
dens (1990) asserted the reach of this
interconnectedness: “whoever studies
cities today, in any part of the world,
is aware that what happens in a local
neighborhood is likely to be influenced
by many factors—such as world money
and commodity markets—­ o perating
at indefinite distance away from that
neighborhood itself ” (p. 64). This obser-
vation introduces volumes of literature
examining urban space under the pro-
cesses of globalization.
Any discussion of the urbanization
of globalization must include a reference
to neoliberalism, as the ascendency of
both are inextricably linked (Angelis,
2014; Harvey, 2005; Soja, 2000). Most
simply described, neoliberalism is the
belief that economic benefits are best
achieved by releasing entrepreneurial
potential through deregulation, open-
ing up markets, and expanding prop-
erty rights (Campbell, Tait, & Watkins,
2013). Global politics is dominated by
this language, with some arguing that
neoliberalism as a political ideology
holds a hegemonic influence on urban
governance (Brenner & Theodore, 2005;
Peck, 2001).
Neoliberal ideologies and ­ policies
were developed in the late 1970s and
early 1980s as both an enabler of and
in response to economic globaliza-
tion processes (Del Cerro, 2013b). This
period marks a global political and
economic shift resulting in fundamen-
tal changes in terms of financial capi-
tal becoming more fluid in a world of
increasing complexity, interconnected-
ness, mobility, and competitiveness.
This has been extensively documented
in the context of the United States and
the United Kingdom (Dicken, 1992;
Sassen, 2001), with a similar impact in
Australia (Stimson, 1995).
Megaprojects occurring over the
past three decades represent spatial
outcomes of these processes (Moulaert
et al., 2003; Olds, 2001; Taşan-Kok, 2010),
featuring prominently on policy agen-
das of ambitious metropolitan govern-
ments around the world (Altshuler &
Luberoff, 2003). The project of neolib-
eral globalization is simultaneously a
response and stimulus to increasingly
internationalized markets and prac-
tices (Peck, 2001). Similarly, CPPs are a
­product of and catalyst for urban, politi-
cal, and economic changes, accelerating
processes that are felt locally, nation-
ally, and internationally (­Swyngedouw
et al., 2002).
Despite its apparent hegemony, neo-
liberalism and its associated global-
izations are complex and more open
to subversion than common discourse
often suggests. Similarly, the narrowly
focused narratives of CPPs, particularly
in the early phases of project concep-
tualization, fail to provide an accurate
impression of the wide-ranging, city-
scale benefits that these projects might
offer. These narratives of exclusion dem-
onstrate Yeoh’s (1999) point that rather
than simply being a term describing
the way the world works, globalization
is “a discourse (or even a myth) drawn
upon to legitimize particular political
and economic agendas” (p. 607).
Narrative Versus Practice
Globalization is an incredibly loaded
concept, which can appear to act as a
prevailing term for contemporary exis-
tence. In common discourse, globaliza-
tion is a processional fact of life, used as
a “metaphor for practically everything
that has been happening everywhere
through the late 20th century” (Soja,
2000, p. 190). However, it is important
to acknowledge that globalization is a
multivalent concept, operating through
many actors and materializing in many
forms at many scales. Dicken (2007)
claims that today the concept of glo-
balization is commonly misused and
ill-considered as an “all-embracing,
inexorable, irreversible, homogenizing
force” (p. 29) and argues that this ten-
dency belies the complex and varied
nature of globalization. He stresses that
the concept needs to be conceived as
an underlying set of complex interre-
lated processes under way in the world.
Marshall (2003) highlights the danger
in the assertion that globalization is a
foundational concept for decision mak-
ing. He argues that once it is accepted
as pervasive and self-perpetuating, a
condition is set up in which its negative
aspects are clearly apparent but seem-
ingly unavoidable. In this context, city
decision makers become faced with an
ethical crisis in which neoliberal glo-
balization is both the problem and the
answer.
The degree and relationships of
influence wielded by state and private
entities are heavily debated (Wiener,
2001). Although generalities are com-
mon, as with the amorphous term glo-
balization, neoliberalism manifests in
many, sometimes contradictory, vari-
ances of governance, regulatory frame-
works, and urbanization (Brenner &
Theodore, 2005). Jessop (2013) provides
a detailed analysis of neoliberalism’s
unstable foundations and outcomes,
concluding that its diverse propo-
nents draw on its unevenly developing
“crisis-tendencies, contradiction and
resistances” (p. 73) to renew the broad
project under changing conditions,
resulting in immense variation in neo-
liberalism. In this manner, the project
of neoliberalism has proved highly resil-
ient in its tendency to “fail forward,” in
that its failures to deliver on promises
merely prompt further attempts of neo-
liberal invention (Peck, 2011).
According to Campbell et al. (2013),
like the welfare state model before it,
neoliberalism is a generalized term, and
both should be regarded as groupings
of ideas and policies rather than sin-
gle positions. Larner (2003) criticizes
the reductionist discourse surround-
ing neoliberalism as a hegemonic story
that has supplanted the similarly used
term globalization. She argues that not
enough attention is paid to the dif-
ferences, hybridity, and contradictory
aspects of neoliberalism—it is not an
either–or, and if we interrogate the
complexity and contradictions, we can
more carefully work through processes
of political power. Peck (2001) stresses
the need to recognize that processes
of restructuring under the neoliberal
banner are part of a sustained political
project striving for certain economic
conditions, rather than simply “the
way the world works.” Marcuse (1997)
presses this fact of agency: that global-
ization does not move of its own accord;
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  79
rather, it is the direct result of con-
sciously coordinated human actions.
Brenner and Theodore (2005) argue
that diverse social forces aggressively
contest these attempts by resisting
unfettered capital accumulation and
advocating the preservation of “social-
ized” forms of coordination. Campbell
et al. (2013), opposing the Thatcherite
mantra that “there is no alternative” to
neoliberal policies, raise two planning
models that have emerged in response
to rising inequality. The first is commu-
nicative, or collaborative, planning that
recognizes the diverse nature of con-
temporary societies and promotes more
inclusive forms of deliberation. The sec-
ond is the reemergence of substantive
forms of justice in planning, includ-
ing material redistribution, framed as a
concern for the “just city.”
Globalization is a continually evolv-
ing set of interrelated processes that are
subject to checks and guidance. Under-
standing globalization in this manner
suggests more agency is available than
is often assumed. Certain processes
can be modified, restrained, or encour-
aged. New or emerging processes can be
cultivated.
CPPs are a product of the politi-
cal and economic shifts rhetorically
driven by less government intervention.
However, as stated by Swyngedouw,
Moulaert, and Rodriquez (2002), these
projects are “decidedly and almost
without exception state-led and often
state-financed” (p. 551). This level of
government involvement is typical of
the tension between the ideology and
practice of neoliberalism and is revealed
starkly in CPPs. Peck (2003) argues that
it is simplistic to conceive “deregula-
tion” as a cornerstone of neoliberalism.
More than merely “liberating” mar-
ket forces, the neoliberal project has
constructed new institutional forms,
government practices, and regulatory
conventions to extend and maintain
certain market conditions. Keil (2002)
asserts that contrary to what its ideology
sustains, neoliberalism has always been
reliant on state intervention. Therefore,
 Competitive Precinct Projects
PAPERS
neoliberalism doesn’t necessarily rep-
resent a less interventionist state; the
interventions are just organized in dif-
ferent ways (Peck, 2001). In Brenner
and Theodore’s (2005) review of theo-
retical and empirical perspectives on
the neoliberalization of urban space,
they claim that by generating a complex
reorganization of state-economy rela-
tions, whereby the state actively enables
and promotes market-based regulatory
arrangements, neoliberalism and its
urbanization hinges upon the active
mobilization of state power. Moretti
(2013a) describes the urban economic
policies behind special economic zones
designed to attract foreign investment
to specific areas as effectively forms
of welfare—they just target locations
rather than individuals. Shifting capi-
tal in this manner should come as no
surprise, as cuts in social spending
alongside the development of corporate
welfare were central themes during the
first phase of neoliberal strategies in
the late 1970s and early 1980s (­Angelis,
2014). Therefore, according to Peck
(2003), these new forms that have dis-
placed the Keynesian or welfare model
are not liberalized markets per se but
rather new forms of statecraft.
Global Competition for Mobile
Capital and Urban Space
The mobility of financial and human
capital under globalization processes
has exerted profound pressures on
urban space. The massive economic
shift from manufacturing to service-
and knowledge-based industries over
the second half of the 20th century is the
central historical turn that transformed
the global geo-economic lands­ cape
(Castells, 1989; Dicken, 1992; Sassen,
2001).
Changes in foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) over this period demon-
strate the extent to which the global
mobility of capital has increased. Signif-
icant FDI increases in services occurred
during the 1960s and 1970s and then
increased massively through the 1980s
and 1990s. Global FDI in services has
80  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
continued to grow steadily, while falling
in primary products and raw materials.
Alongside the competition for inter-
nationally fluid financial capital, human
capital has shifted to a global market-
place:
“What the international firms say . . . is
that first they could recruit their work-
force nationally, but now the market is
such that they have to go out and recruit
internationally. . . . It’s therefore important
for them to locate where they can attract
international labor.” (Poul Madsen, direc-
tor, commercial development planning,
Roskilde County Copenhagen, 21 January
2000, quoted in Hansen, Andersen, Clark,
& Lund, 2001, p. 854)
Demonstrating how mobile the labor
market can be, Sassen (2001) lists prom-
inent law firms in New York, Chicago,
and London by their percentage of for-
eign employees. Topping the list is the
Chicago firm Baker & McKenzie, where
foreign citizens constitute almost 80%
of the lawyers. Half of the firms on the
list have a foreign-employed workforce
of over 30%. At the extreme end of
the spectrum, approximately 90% of the
entire urban population of both Abu
Dhabi and Dubai, collections of wildly
speculative megaprojects, are sourced
from around the world to make up a
truly foreign workforce (Ponzini, 2013).
The wealth of cities today, deter-
mined by productivity and high sal-
aries, derives more from deep pools
of knowledge markets than mass pro-
duction and natural resource endow-
ments. Financial and human capital is
more mobile today than ever before,
but both are increasingly clustering in
particular urban locations (Moretti,
2013b). Capturing a share of the world’s
mobile wealth is foundational to the
justification of CPPs being developed
on public land. Protagonists embrace a
narrative of international competitive-
ness, framing a project discourse that is
dominated by the rhetoric of economic
survival.
The response has been urban trans-
formations in which governments and
private-sector actors have been striv-
ing to position their cities and services
within a globally fluid sociopolitical
division of labor, production, and con-
sumption, and coordinate their local
networks with the perceived or real
requirements of an increasingly deregu-
lated and neoliberal international eco-
nomic system (Moulaert et al., 2003).
In recent decades, cities have increas-
ingly been framed as “growth engines”
of regional and national economies
(Jonas & Wilson, 1999). Increasing eco-
nomic prosperity is often equated with
growing cities. Batty (2011) claims
there is conclusive evidence that more
populous cities are more prosperous.
He argues that income per capita, the
number of innovations, cultural and
educational institutions, and creative
pursuits scale more than proportion-
ately with city size, by the simple fact
that face-to-face contacts increase more
than proportionately. It is the large cit-
ies, according to Batty, that are the suc-
cess stories of the global economy and
wealth generation.
Of course, it is not as simplistic
as “more is better,” at least not for
everyone. In the 1980s, a “world city
hypothesis” argued that the pursuit
of growth-oriented “world city status”
would inevitably lead to damaging
spatial and socioeconomic polariza-
tion, as the growing social investment
required for housing, education, health-
care, transportation, and welfare is
increasingly deferred against the needs
of transnational capital for economic
infrastructure and subsidies that ben-
efit the corresponding social classes
(Friedmann, 1986).
More recently, a list of the most
prosperous cities according to the
UN Habitats City Prosperity Index
shows an extremely varied relationship
between population size and prosper-
ity (Table 2). According to this index
(it is important to acknowledge that
there are many others), the most pros-
perous city in the world, Vienna, has
only 1.7 million inhabitants, whereas
the second most prosperous, New York,

Population
Ranking (millions)
  1.  Vienna, Austria 1.7
  2. New York, United States 19.4
  3.  Toronto, Canada 5.4
  4. London, United Kingdom 8.6
  5. Stockholm, Sweden 1.3
  6.  Helsinki, Finland 1.1
  7.  Dublin, Ireland 1.1
  8.  Oslo, Norway 0.9
  9.  Paris, France 10.5
10.  Tokyo, Japan 36.7
Table 2: The top 10 most prosperous
cities according to the UN Habitats City
Prosperity Index 2012/2013 (United Nations
Human Settlements Programme [UN
Habitat], 2012).
has almost 20 million. Five of the
top 10 most prosperous cities have fewer
than 2 million inhabitants, yet Tokyo,
at number 10, has almost 37 million
inhabitants.
The point is there are many vari-
ables: productivity, quality of life, infra-
structure development, cost of living,
conveniently located housing, recre-
ation, and services, to name a few. The
efficiencies of more populous cities are
reliant on a degree of accessibility. This
requires certain land-use and transport
patterns to be coordinated in order to
achieve broad benefits of scale. The
premises can be, in principle, correct,
but as will be discussed, the relation-
ship between city growth and prosperity
under urban policies guided by neolib-
eralism has been shown to favor certain
groups and places while disadvantag-
ing others, accruing benefits that are
geographically highly uneven.
From Planning to
“Competitive” Megaprojects
“There doesn’t seem to be any strate-
gic coordination. That’s something I’ve
been quite vocal about. It’s all state
land. But at the moment we’re all kids
competing for attention from our parent
who is the minister. You know, the min-
ister has given a project there, a project
there, a project there . . . and we’re com-
peting against each other. As I say, can-
nibalizing each other.”
(R. Mellan, development director at Places
Victoria, 25 September, 2015)
The political strategy of neoliberalism
has been linked to the cultivation of a
planning agenda that exhibits spatially
selective characteristics, favoring tar-
geted capital accumulation over strate-
gic planning and distributive policies.
According to Swyngedouw et al. (2002)
large-scale urban projects, presented
as project-focused and market-led ini-
tiatives, have replaced statutory plan-
ning as the primary means of city
development:
“Essentially fragmented, this form of inter-
vention goes hand in hand with an eclectic
planning style where attention to design,
detail, morphology, and aesthetics is para-
mount. The emblematic Project captures
a segment of the city and turns it into the
symbol of the new restructured/revitalized
metropolis cast with a powerful image of
innovation, creativity, and success.” (p. 562)
Brenner and Theodore’s (2005)
review of case studies on contemporary
urban restructuring demonstrates how
neoliberal policies have extremely varie-
gated geographical implications. Places
or systems are targeted in search of
some form of capital accumulation par-
ticular to the opportunities presented
by their conditions, and thus, each
intervention has its own specific set of
policy processes. Oakley (2014) explains
that the effect of neoliberal governance
skews development provision toward
large-scale, high-end residential proj-
ects where housing is primarily viewed
as a commodity for its speculative and
accumulative potential and that the
state is increasingly relying on private-
sector and market-led approaches to
deliver them.
In the Australian context, a report on
productive cities by the Grattan Institute
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  81
reveals a socio-spatial economic diver-
gence within large cities (Kelly & Mares,
2012). The report found that there is an
increasing polarization within Austra-
lian cities by income, health, education
level, and access to jobs. City centers are
increasingly concentrated with higher-
paid, knowledge-based professionals,
while workers with trade skills or low
skills are concentrating away from the
center. A recent study demonstrates that
20 years of neoliberal policies underpin
the geographic concentration of disad-
vantage in Australian cities, particularly
a marked locational shift of disadvan-
tage to suburban areas. The authors
conclude by acknowledging:
“It is hardly surprising that a greater reli-
ance on the market to allocate housing
opportunities will have led to greater spa-
tial polarization, because housing markets
have responded to these initiatives in the
only way the market knows—to ‘sift and
sort’ social classes into their respective
spatial locations reflecting ability to pay.”
(Randolph & Tice, 2014, p. 397)
Campbell et al. (2013) argue the
competitive discourse of neoliberalism
with its rhetoric of “delivery,” in which
visible signs of change are highly sym-
bolic, encourages development with
minimal scrutiny on overall benefits.
Under these conditions, Marshall (2003)
claims that large-scale urban projects
represent a new way of planning the
city that is centrally concerned with
marketing and the provision of compet-
itive infrastructure. The literature sug-
gests that much of today’s city making
is undertaken by delivering a list of big,
often disconnected projects with the
primary aim of attracting investment,
the benefits of which, according to
Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez
(2002), are almost always reaped by the
private sector.
CPPs are an exemplar of these pro-
cesses. They are charged with a narra-
tive of high symbolic importance as the
economic savior of the city, embodying
Flyvbjerg’s (2014) political, economic,
and aesthetic “sublimes.” They hold the
 Competitive Precinct Projects
PAPERS
promise of wealth generation, directly
for the protagonists and suggestively for
the public (Siemiatycki, 2013), yet the
benefits are often left to “trickle down”
without any mechanisms to ensure that
they do (Turok, 1992).
Competitive Precinct Projects
There is now a body of literature exam-
ining the genesis, governance, delivery,
and built outcomes of mixed-use mega-
projects around the world. This section
looks at how these projects have been
appraised as a particular type of urban
development.
A content analysis of 30 reviews
covering 42 mixed-use megaprojects in
20 countries (Table 3) demonstrates a
remarkable consistency in the projects’
motives, public narratives, governance
structures, delivery methods, and built
outcomes. In addition to their scale
and mixed-use nature, they share the
premise of elevating the competitive
position of their metropolitan econo-
mies into regional and global economic
networks—an intercity economic com-
petition using office and residential
buildings and the urban space they sit
within as the mechanism with which
to compete (Beauregard, 2005; Bunnell,
2013; Marshall, 2003; Swyngedouw et al.,
2002). For projects occurring in wide-
ranging geographical, political, and
social urban contexts, the similarities
in their aims and outcomes are striking,
exhibiting varying degrees of “copycat”
competitive urban entrepreneurialism
(Siemiatycki, 2013).
Under these conditions, CPPs invari-
ably consist of:
• High-end residential and A-grade office
space aiming to attract (often foreign)
investment and subsequent high-profit
companies and affluent residents;
• Leisure and consumption amenities
targeting affluent residents and visitors;
and
• Large and striking buildings to symbol-
ize new economic growth and provide
high marketing visibility regionally and
globally.
82  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
The Five Consistent Criticisms
The dominant evaluative themes from
the content analysis can be distilled into
five consistent criticisms, listed below
and subsequently expanded. They rep-
resent a global perspective from the
literature on internationally oriented
mixed-use megaprojects:
1. Introverted modes of governance that
circumvent local planning frame-
works, traditional democratic channels
of participation, and accountability.
2. Global economic positioning and
marketing toward a globally mobile
elite prevailing over the concern of
local issues.
3. Physically and socially self-con-
tained, isolated, and disconnected
from the context of the host city.
4. Similar urban form regardless of the
host city that encapsulates a narrow
definition of urban life and culture.
5. Minimal commitment to public ben-
efit or socially just policies arising
from a primary focus on profitability.
Consistent Criticism 1: Introverted
governance models that circumvent
local planning frameworks, traditional
channels of democratic participation,
and accountability.
“We got a new set of planning laws in the
1970s and 1980s that meant increased pub-
lic access to and engagement in planning.
It was troublesome and time-demanding.
Therefore, these corporations were con-
structed, which need not be subjected to
the same rules of public transparency, for
some of the big projects.”
(Kaj Lemberg, retired head of planning,
Copenhagen, 25 January 2000; quote from
Hansen et al., 2001, p. 586)
According to the literature, CPPs are
managed under introverted, business-
oriented, and flexible governance models
that circumvent traditional channels of
democratic participation and account-
ability (Desfor & Jørgensen, 2004; Fain-
stein, 2008; Malone, 1996; Oakley &
Rofe, 2005; Swyngedouw et al., 2002).
Despite the complexity of megaprojects,
objectives are rarely operationalized for
delivery. A lack of accountability mech-
anisms, such as reward-penalty systems,
often results in failure to achieve the
goals articulated at the beginning of the
project (Bruzelius, Flyvbjerg, & Rothen-
gatter, 2002). These fluid arrangements
align with recent tendencies for “flexi-
ble” urban governance in which a coali-
tion of actors within public and private
spheres manipulate and distort estab-
lished practices for ends that are often
poorly articulated publicly (Desfor &
Jørgensen, 2004).
It is argued these introverted, project-
tailored governance models tightly con-
trol access to decision making through
formal and informal channels, favor-
ing those who stand to gain the most
(Majoor, 2008a). This suggests that the
processes and outcomes of CPPs are
manipulated to represent the global
ambitions of local urban elites (Del
Cerro, 2013b).
CPP governance models operate
in very similar ways to the develop-
ment model formulated for large urban
projects by the government of the
United Kingdom in the New Towns Act
1946. Under this model, a government-
appointed Development Corporation
was established to plan and develop
each proposed town, independent of
local authorities (Heraud, 1966)—in
other words, transferring complete con-
trol to a single authority to plan, approve,
and deliver a large urban project.
In the case of Ørestad, ­Copenhagen’s
first CPP, the Ørestad Development
Corporation (ØDC) was formed with a
governance and development approach
explicitly adopted from the English New
Towns model (Ørestadsselskabet, 1994).
Although owned jointly by the state and
city governments, this was branded a
“nonpolitical” delivery corporation with
a mandate to operate under market
conditions. Full property rights for the
310-hectare government-owned site were
transferred to the corporation, which
effectively became the owner, planner,
Project City Sources
 1. Abandoibarra Bilbao (Del Cerro, 2013a; Swyngedouw et al., 2002)
 2. Adlershof Berlin (Backmann, 2007; Swyngedouw et al., 2002)
  3.  Al Reem Island Abu Dhabi (Ponzini, 2013)
  4.  Al Sowwah Island Abu Dhabi (Ponzini, 2013)
 5. Barangaroo Sydney (Johnston & Clegg, 2012; Stickells, 2010)
  6.  Birmingham CBD Birmingham (Swyngedouw et al., 2002)
  7.  Bundang and Ilsan Seoul (Min Joo, 2013)
  8.  Central Market Abu Dhabi (Ponzini, 2013)
  9.  Centro Direzionale Naples (Swyngedouw et al., 2002)
10. Clichy-Batignolles Paris (Lobo, 2013)
11.  Darling Harbour Sydney (Boydell & Searle, 2014; Daly & Malone, 1996)
12. Docklands Dublin (Malone, 1996; Swyngedouw et al., 2002)
13.  Docklands, Canary Wharf London (Barnes, Colenutt, & Malone, 1996; Fainstein, 2008; Hinsley & Malone, 1996)
14. Docklands Melbourne (Dovey, 2005; Dovey & Sandercock, 2002; Shaw, 2013)
15.  Donau City Vienna (Grubbauer, 2013; Swyngedouw et al., 2002)
16.  Espace Leopold Brussels (Swyngedouw et al., 2002)
17. Euralille Lille (Swyngedouw et al., 2002)
18.  Green Square Sydney (Ziller, 2004)
19. HafenCity Hamburg (Grubbauer, 2013)
20.  Het Eilandje Antwerp (Taşan-Kok, 2010)
21. Honeysuckle Newcastle, Australia (McGuirk, Winchester, & Dunn, 1998)
22.  Hudson Yards New York (Lobo, 2013)
23.  Kalvebod Brygge Copenhagen (Desfor & Jørgensen, 2004)
24.  Kop van Zuid Rotterdam (Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Taşan-Kok, 2010)
25.  Kuala Lumpur City Center Kuala Lumpur (Bunnell, 2013)
26.  La Confluence Lyon (Carpenter & Verhage, 2014)
27.  Lisbon Expo 1998 Lisbon (Swyngedouw et al., 2002)
28.  Athens Olympic Village Athens (Swyngedouw et al., 2002)
29.  Operacao Urbana Agua Branca Sao Paulo (Lobo, 2013)
30.  Port Adelaide Waterfront Adelaide (Oakley & Johnson, 2011; Oakley & Rofe, 2005)
31. Ørestad Copenhagen (Majoor, 2009; Swyngedouw et al., 2002)
32.  Pacific Park (formerly Atlantic Yards) New York (Fainstein, 2008)
33.  Rogoredo Santa Giulia Milan (Ponzini, 2013)
34.  Saadyiat Island Abu Dhabi (Ponzini, 2013)
35. Seestadt Vienna (Suitner, 2015)
36.  Stratford City London (Fainstein, 2008)
37. Southbank London (Swyngedouw et al., 2002)
38.  Tokyo Waterfront Subcenter Tokyo (Seguchi & Malone, 1996)
39.  Toronto Waterfront Toronto (Lehrer & Laidley, 2008)
40.  Universal Forum Barcelona (Majoor, 2009)
41.  Yas Island Abu Dhabi (Ponzini, 2013)
42. Zuidas Amsterdam (Fainstein, 2008; Majoor, 2009)
Table 3: Content analysis of literature on 42 mixed-use megaprojects in 20 countries.

December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  83

 Competitive Precinct Projects
PAPERS
approval authority, and project man-
ager, as well as the property marketer
and vendor for individual plots. The ØDC
was also responsible for delivering and
operating the entire 22-station metro sys-
tem. Vesting this amount of power in
one unelected body, and the process it
managed, has been widely criticized for
bypassing existing planning legislation,
as being elite-driven, exclusionary, and
reducing transparency and accountability
(Book, Eskilsson, & Khan, 2010; Gaard-
mand, 1991; Majoor, 2008b; Swyngedouw
et al., 2002).
Consistent Criticism 2: Global
economic positioning and marketing
toward a mobile elite prevailing over
the concern of local issues.
Zuidas is Amsterdam’s prime location,
an urban hub with international allure.
(Amsterdam Development Office, 2014)
Barangaroo is the future of Sydney. It
is being created as a landmark for our
economic future. (Barangaroo Delivery
Authority, 2014)
CPPs are explicitly initiated and deliv-
ered within a narrative of intense interna-
tional economic competition (Oakley &
Johnson, 2012; Orueta & Fainstein, 2008)
in which “competitive advantage” has
become the mantra of city governance
(Marshall, 2003). Governments eagerly
promote their CPPs as “world standard”
projects in their aspirations to connect
into global economic networks and
acquire a share of global wealth (Marshall,
2003; Min Joo, 2013; Olds, 2001). Urban
megaprojects feature prominently in
more than two decades of research on
government-sponsored place marketing
on a global scale (Bunnell, 2013).
Competing with the neoliberal pur-
suit of individualism, competitiveness,
and economic self-sufficiency are domes-
tic and increasingly common city-scale
challenges such as access to afford-
able housing and economic opportuni-
ties. Goals to address these challenges
are often articulated at the local, city,
and state levels; however, the literature
84  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
argues that CPPs conflict with these
goals and exacerbate social exclusion
and marginalization via the restructuring
that occurs through their land-use and
transport prioritization patterns. This
occurs under newly created powers that
supersede existing plans, outlined in the
previous consistent criticism, with the
justification of project “exceptionality”
(Grubbauer, 2013; Majoor, 2008a;
Moulaert et al., 2003).
Lehrer and Laidley (2008) track
Toronto’s repositioning to a “competitive
city” in the pursuit of global capital first
by narrative—­relabeling itself from “the
city that works” to “the city that aston-
ishes,” then regulatory—­ reconfiguring
planning and investment regulations
to become more globally attractive,
and finally project led—launching the
Toronto Waterfront CPP with the ambi-
tion to “generate economic activity early
and establish the international presence
of the city and its revitalization” (Lehrer
& Laidley, 2008, p. 789).
The design and supporting narrative
of CPPs enable this by being “made to
travel” as products in a global market
(Bunnell, 2013). A fundamental objec-
tive of CPPs is to attract national and
international investors, high-profit
commercial tenants, and affluent resi-
dents (Oakley & Rofe, 2005; Swynge-
douw et al., 2002; Taşan-Kok, 2010).
Imagery and narrative disseminated
globally is a key component of this
objective (King, 2004)
Consistent Criticism 3: Physically and
socially self-contained, isolated, and
disconnected from the context of the
host city.
The literature commonly criticizes CPPs
as being physically and socially self-
contained, isolated, and disconnected
from their context. Boundaries are
formed between the new “project” and
the surrounding communities. These
boundaries may not take the form of
gated communities, but access patterns,
transport infrastructure, exclusive land
uses, and public-domain design can
set up clear socio-spatial demarcations
(Marshall, 2003; Rofe, 2010). Public land
is privatized and the public is more
heavily scrutinized than in other parts
of the city by cameras and security
guards with the power to control and
remove members of the public (Boydell
& Searle, 2014).
CPPs are commonly described as
being physically unrelated to their sur-
roundings. The historic identity, local
qualities, and uniqueness of the loca-
tion are not meaningfully taken into
consideration in the design of these new
city quarters (Fainstein, 2008; Oakley &
Rofe, 2005). The prevailing condition
that CPPs visually and socially depart
from their surroundings is a logical and
intentional outcome when considering
their competitive objectives. A dramatic
difference in form is perceived as a
necessary component of CPPs in order
to secure their intended global status
and visibility, and to convey an image
of regeneration and economic growth
(Grubbauer, 2013; Ponzini, 2013; Sklair,
2013). This implies a distinctive form
as well as a clear demarcation of the
project in relation to the surrounding
urban fabric.
“Starchitects” are virtually guaran-
teed a place on the agenda of CPPs.
“World-renowned” architects are habit-
ually brought in to “put the city on the
map” with “iconic” buildings (Del Cerro,
2013b; Fainstein, 2008; Marshall, 2003;
Taşan-Kok, 2010). Olds (2001) describes
how governments accessorize their cit-
ies by actively seeking to acquire a tro-
phy case of buildings from a select group
of international architects. Parachuting
global architects and their buildings are
criticized as being detached from the
dynamics, networks, and forms of the
host city (Koolhaas, 1998; Lang, 2011).
Changes in demographics and
urban form and character under urban-
economic renewal have been thoroughly
debated in the discourse of gentrifica-
tion (Lees, Slater, & Wyly, 2010; Smith,
1996). Mixed-use megaprojects are fre-
quently cited as symbols of gentrifi-
cation, with links having been made
between CPPs and intended, or at least
accepted, social dislocation (Del Cerro,
2013a; Fainstein, 2008; Marshall, 2003;
Min Joo, 2013; Rofe, 2010; Shaw, 2014).
Consistent Criticism 4: Similar urban
form regardless of the host city that
encapsulates a narrow definition of
urban life and culture.
Interviewer: “Are Australian cities get-
ting this (sustainability of high density)
message?”
Richard Rogers: “I have to be careful
because I don’t know it (Sydney) well . . .”
Ivan Harbour: “We were very reluctant to
get involved in a big way simply because
we were at such a distance. . . . How do
we know what is right for this place?”
(Withnell, 2011, pp. 80–81)
Yet despite this distance and self-confessed
lack of local knowledge, Rogers Stirk Har-
bour is the master planner of Sydney’s
CPP Barangaroo and architects of its most
dominant collection of towers. This archi-
tectural fly-in, fly-out process has been
described as the continuation of a decon-
textualized and universal approach:
“In keeping with these modernist ap­­
proaches to planning and design . . .
architects such as Rogers, Perrault, Piano
and Foster will accept work in cities and
nations where they have little understand-
ing of the social, cultural, political and
economic context. They are firms that
offer ‘universal’ solutions to universal
problems—a pure modernist design ethos
underlying monumental self-referential
architecture.” (Olds, 2001, p. 150)
The literature consistently presents a
picture of generic urban form and activ-
ity, arguing that these large projects lack
idiosyncratic qualities, incidental activi-
ties, and pedestrian-scaled interaction.
It appears the realization of CPPs repre-
sents an uncritical local manifestation
of a global phenomenon that encap-
sulates a specific and narrow defini-
tion of urban life and culture (Marshall,
2003; Oakley & Rofe, 2005). The messi-
ness of the city, difficult to control and
market, is intentionally replaced by a
predictable “absent urbanism” that can
be readily packaged and reliably sold
to investors and incoming inhabitants
(Marshall, 2003). The manufacture and
presentation of a recognizable, interna-
tionalized image is perceived as crucial
for cities to gain competitive advantage
on the global stage (Zukin, 1992).
In Castells’ (1989) view of the Infor-
mation Age the ease of which infor-
mation can be disseminated has led
to a tendency where different societies
adopt the same ideas. The effective-
ness of “competitive city” urban policy
transfer has been questioned, particu-
larly the mostly generic responses to the
creative cities movement that has swept
through North America, Europe, and the
Asia-Pacific region (Hansen et al., 2001;
Peck, 2005). The results, according to
Fainstein (2010), are urban assemblages
that bear striking physical similarity
regardless of the host city.
Consistent Criticism 5: Minimal
commitment to public benefit or
socially just policies arising from a
primary focus on profitability.
CPPs are widely criticized for their poor
contributions to public benefit and
social outcomes. The literature consis-
tently reveals a primary focus on prof-
itability that inevitably conflicts with
socially just policies (Fainstein, 2008;
Majoor, 2009; Sklair, 2013; Swyngedouw
et al., 2002). CPPs are fundamentally
geared toward high-income groups or
potentially high-productivity-based eco-
nomic activities (Marshall, 2003; Swyn-
gedouw et al., 2002). In doing so, it is
argued, CPPs not only avoid addressing
social segmentation and exclusion, but
they actively accentuate the problem.
According to Oakley and Rofe (2005),
the growing importance placed on the
commodification and consumption of
these urban landscapes undermines the
potential for communities of diversity
and difference to establish.
Oakley and Rofe (2005) observe
that the governance transition from
managerialism to entrepreneurialism
has run parallel with governments’
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  85
push to repopulate inner-city areas.
Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez
(2002) describe this new competitive
urban policy as “re-centering” whereby
inner-city development is primarily
geared toward investors, developers,
businesspeople, and wealthy tourists
whom they group collectively as “out-
siders,” as opposed to established res-
idents and communities. The degree
to which cities pursue this strategy
through explicit policy is debatable, but
certainly for CPPs the literature is strik-
ingly united in suggesting that today’s
large urban projects are consumption
oriented in a quest to attract mobile
capital (Del Cerro, 2013b; Oakley &
Rofe, 2005; Siemiatycki, 2013).
The result is an inherent tension
between the desire to accumulate
capital and social justice (Fainstein,
2010). Nevertheless, the provision of
urban infrastructures and the ame-
nities required by service sectors are
seen by public agencies as a crucial
factor to enhance the competitiveness
of cities (Beauregard, 2005). Investment
is being funneled into developments
that are intended to enable and increase
consumption economies with a focus
on high-end residential, office, and
retail projects—those with the greater
anticipated financial return.
The Missed Opportunities
of CPPs
Large government-owned sites with
spatially high strategic relationships
present exceptional opportunities at the
city scale for at least three reasons:
(1) They offer significant housing and
employment opportunities in areas that
are already connected, or relatively eas-
ily connected, to existing transportation
networks, city functions, communities,
and amenities; (2) they create enor-
mous increases in land value through
rezoning, most often from heavy indus-
try to residential and commercial; and
(3) they offer opportunities for coordi-
nation with other major government
assets or strategic projects that can
achieve benefits greater than any one
 Competitive Precinct Projects
PAPERS
project can achieve in isolation. As the
land owner and approval authority, gov-
ernment can set, and clearly articulate,
the goals and the rules of these projects:
their composition, their intended ben-
efits, and their strategic relationships.
However, according to the literature,
they are commonly non transparently
guided by powerful actors, often outside
of government; have narrowly focused
outcomes; and demonstrate a signifi-
cant transfer of wealth from public to
private interests with unclear public or
strategic benefits at the city scale.
This review of mixed-use mega-
projects expands on Flyvbjerg’s (2005)
extensive study on infrastructural mega-
projects and risk in which hundreds
of projects in more than 20 countries
were reviewed. Flyvbjerg concluded
that it is not the most feasible projects
that get built, but rather “those projects
for which proponents best succeed in
conjuring a fantasy world of underes-
timated costs, overestimated revenues,
undervalued environmental impacts
and overvalued regional development
effects” (Flyvbjerg, 2005, p. 18).
Considering the strategic opportuni-
ties presented by these sites, this review
demonstrates an alarmingly poor track
record of projects realizing their city-scale
potential. The five consistent criticisms
demand a reevaluation of this model of
development, calling into question the
objectives, planning processes, and deliv-
ery methods of these projects.
Alternative Directions of CPPs
Accepting that mixed-use megaprojects,
and CPPs, will continue to occur, there
is a pressing need to identify alterna-
tive directions that can deliver broader-
based city-scale benefits. Two processes
respond to the call for a reevaluation of
CPPs. First is a framework for overcom-
ing the five consistent criticisms. This
would require contextual specificity,
both regulatory and spatial; however,
each project’s framework would need to
articulate principles aimed at overcom-
ing each consistent criticism. Critically,
monitoring and accountability practices
86  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
for each principle would need to be
established before project commence-
ment to ensure that they are pursued
diligently throughout the project’s
delivery period. Second, a finer and
more contextual evaluation of the vari-
ances and hybridity of existing CPPs
is required to demonstrate potential
directions. The remainder of this article
begins this process.
Much like practices of neoliberal
globalization, a more nuanced exami-
nation of CPPs reveals divergent ideolo-
gies, practices, and outcomes. Although
the literature favors criticism, there are
examples of CPPs where broader ben-
efits have been achieved, pairing inter-
national economic positioning with
wealth distribution strategies. These
show traces of a Keynesian state model,
aiming to “counter the cycles and dam-
aging effects of the market, to ensure
collective ‘well-fare’ and to reduce
inequalities” (Wacquant, 2001, p. 82).
Two areas offer perhaps the most
transferable opportunities, which will be
further expanded. They are (1) housing,
where significant portions of residential
floor space is dedicated to affordable
housing; and (2) transport, where the
site’s rezoned land value is leveraged to
finance public transport infrastructure
for other parts of the city, as well as for
the project itself.
It should also be acknowledged
that there are mixed-use megaprojects
that forgo global positioning altogether
and demonstrate a high degree of com-
munity participation, such as Vauban
in Freiburg (Schroepfer & Hee, 2006),
or that reflect a city’s commitment to
realizing long-term environmental sus-
tainability policies, such as Hammarby
Sjöstad in Stockholm (Pandis Iveroth
et al., 2013). These projects represent
a minority of examples among more
neoliberal-oriented development prac-
tices, but they still offer hybridization
opportunities for future CPPs.
Housing
As discussed, city growth and interna-
tionalized markets under neoliberalism
have resulted in growing socioeconomic
spatial polarization. Many mixed-use
megaprojects, including those that fit
neatly into the CPP definition, seek to
counter this polarization by committing
a significant amount of the residential
floor space of the project to affordable
housing. In fact, an affordable housing
provision appears to be the strongest
consistent public benefit of mixed-use
megaprojects by global standards. This
commitment counteracts consistent
criticism 2: Global economic positioning
and marketing toward a globally mobile
elite prevailing over the concern of local
issues, and consistent criticism 5: Mini-
mal commitment to public benefit or
socially just policies arising from a pri-
mary focus on profitability.
Table 4 shows a range of affordable
housing provisions in recent mixed-use
megaprojects, from 60% to 0%. Some
CPPs are meeting their goals, such as
Ørestad in Copenhagen and Zuidas in
Amsterdam. Others are experiencing
uncertainty in the design and construc-
tion phase. Some affordable hous-
ing goals are legally binding, such as
Pacific Park in New York with its Com-
munity Benefits Agreement (Atlantic
Yards Development Co. LLC, 2005).
Others rely on the will and ability of
the delivery authority to enforce. Some
CPPs remain uncommitted to housing
affordability, despite being developed
on government-owned land in cities
with acute housing affordability chal-
lenges, such as Barangaroo in Sydney or
Docklands in Melbourne.
Public Transport
An example of leveraging a CPP to
finance public transport infrastructure
for the city can be found in Ørestad,
Copenhagen. This 310-hectare CPP was
conceptualized in the late 1980s with
the dual objectives of financing a new,
two-line, 22-station metro from the sale
of serviced land on a plot-by-plot basis
and providing the City of Copenhagen
with a strategic location that would
attract international companies. The
metro was constructed first to increase
 Jørgensen, 1995). The governance meth-
Project City Affordable Housing Area (ha)
ods of this CPP have been criticized as
Hunters Point New York, United States 60% 17
circumventing planning frameworks and
Pacific Park New York, United States 50% 9 lacking transparency (Andersen, 2003)
La Confluence Lyon, France 48%1 150 and the public domain as severely lacking
Greenwich Peninsular London, United Kingdom 38% 19.4 activity (Majoor, 2008b). However, within
this new entrepreneurial approach, there
Stratford City London, United Kingdom 35% 73
remained core elements of redistribu-
HafenCity Hamburg, Germany 33%2 157 tive policies such as the metro financing
Zuidas Amsterdam, Netherlands 30%3 270 model and a 20% affordable housing
Kop van Zuid Rotterdam, Netherlands 30% 125 component, matching the nationwide
Mission Bay San Francisco, United States 28% 122 share. The metro was conceived as a
means to modernize the city and make
Hudson Yards New York, United States 25% 11
it—and particularly Ørestad—attractive
Nordhavn Copenhagen, Denmark 20% 360 for international companies; however,
Ørestad Copenhagen, Denmark 20% 310 most of its users reside outside of
Green Square Sydney, Australia 3% 278 Ørestad—the site that paid for its con-
Barangaroo Sydney, Australia 2.3% 22 struction. The strategic relationships
between major projects and the spread of
Docklands Melbourne, Australia 1.84%4 146
benefits demonstrate high-level city- and
Hammarby Sjöstad Stockholm, Sweden 0% 160 regional-scale land-use and transport
Wynyard Quarter Auckland, New Zealand 0% 37 coordination. This metro planning and
148% consists of 17% assisted family housing, 11% “medium”-level housing, and 20% social housing. financing strategy counteracts consistent
2HafenCity began in the late 1990s with no affordable housing provision under a conservative senate. criticism 2: Global economic positioning
When the Social Democrats came into power, they introduced a target of 33%, with construction and marketing toward a globally mobile
beginning on the first affordable dwellings in 2014 (Menzl, 2014). elite prevailing over the concern of local
3It has been noted that although it is considered high elsewhere, 30% is a low rate for Amsterdam
issues; consistent criticism 3: Physically
(Fainstein, 2008). and socially self-contained, isolated,
4Figure calculated from current affordable housing residents of 184 and current total population of
and disconnected from the context of
10,000. The final Docklands population will be 20,000. If no additional affordable housing is built by
the host city; and consistent criticism 5:
completion, the rate will be 0.92%.
Minimal commitment to public benefit
Table 4: Global comparison of committed affordable housing in mixed-use megaprojects.
or socially just policies arising from a
primary focus on profitability.

the land sale revenue with which to
repay the state loans for upfront con-
struction costs (Knowles, 2012).
Value capture mechanisms such
as this can be contextually targeted to
finance local infrastructural deficits. A
particular benefit of financing public
transport as part of the megaproject
above other options is the additional
increase in land value generated by the
site’s new connectivity. This additional
revenue can help repay loans faster or
extend the transport line farther, as was
the case with Ørestad, where revenue
was expected to be high enough that the
lines could extend six stations past the
city center into the neighboring munici-
pality of Frederiksberg (Danish Ministry
of Finance, 1992).
Ørestad and the metro were part
of a series of large, linked infrastruc-
tural investments aimed at steering the
city away from near bankruptcy toward
an internationally competitive city that
would act as the “growth locomotive” for
the nation (Andersen, 2003). In addition
to Ørestad and the metro, a road and rail
bridge/tunnel was constructed between
Copenhagen and the Swedish city of
Malmö, greatly increasing the catch-
ment of Copenhagen Airport, which was
expanded as one of the linked projects.
The period in Denmark during
which Ørestad was conceived is referred
to as marking a decisive shift from a
redistributive, welfare-oriented per-
spective to embracing outward-looking
entrepreneurial policies (Andersen &
Mutual Benefits of CPPs?
CPPs are primarily predicated on their
potential to attract companies and work-
ers of knowledge-based industries and
provide employment growth. They over-
whelmingly do so by offering specialized,
high-end, exclusive urban environments.
However, evidence suggests that the scale
of specialization of conventional CPPs
is less important in affecting employ-
ment growth than diversity in indus-
try type and size (Andersson, Quigley,
& Wilhelmsson, 2005; Glaeser, Kallal,
Scheinkman, & Shleifer, 1992; Porter,
1998). Additionally, empirical research
shows that the residential preferences
of those within knowledge industries
are weighted toward affordable housing
and efficient public transport (Lawton,

December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  87

 Competitive Precinct Projects
PAPERS
Murphy, & Redmond, 2013). More sim-
ply put, the same city-scale issues matter
to both “knowledge workers” and “non-­
knowledge workers” as well as long-term
residents and recent arrivals. There are
various urban qualities that increase the
attractiveness of a city, for living and
investment. However, the five consis-
tent criticisms demonstrate that CPPs
are commonly narrow in focus, both in
employment growth and social oppor-
tunities. Despite the rhetoric of innova-
tion, the similarities in these projects
indicate that they are far from innova-
tive urban responses to global economic
competitiveness.
Globalization and CPPs are both
part of continually evolving sets of
interrelated processes. Globalization
does not move of its own accord; it is the
direct result of consciously coordinated
human actions that navigate and mate-
rialize within particular locations. Simi-
larly, each CPP is planned and delivered
in a contextual milieu. Those CPPs that
deliver demonstrable public benefit
indicate that this development model
does not have to be bound to a par-
ticular outcome in which the socioeco-
nomic polarizing project of neoliberal
globalization is accepted and perpetu-
ated. Strategies that attempt to diversify
the social groups who live in, work in,
and visit these new city precincts indi-
cate that a more inclusive approach
to planning can occur within the type
while still being premised on attracting
investment and city competitiveness.
However, it needs to be repeated
that these examples represent a minor-
ity of cases. The typical outcomes that
have been consistently criticized repre-
sent patterns that have endured within
a globally active development model
for over three decades. The range of
city-scale opportunities these projects
present are exceptional and potentially
highly impactful, yet they are only being
realized as exceptions to the rule.
This article has set out to define
a megaproject type in order to better
understand the emergence and con-
tinuation of a particular method of
88  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
large-scale urban development. The five
consistent criticisms of these projects
reveal major systemic faults with their
delivery processes and built outcomes.
By extending the critical review with
identification and illustration of the
less acknowledged inclusive planning
mechanisms within some projects, this
article hopes to contribute to a shift
toward CPPs achieving broader-based
city-scale goals.
Acknowledging the global common-
alities and understanding these projects
as a type means admitting that they are
not as unique as the competitive city
narrative on which these projects are
often founded suggests. This acknowl-
edgment would be the first step in
working through how this major urban
development type would be most effec-
tively appropriated to unique conditions
in order to overcome the five consistent
criticisms.
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PAPERS Dynamic Sublimes, Changing Plans,
and the Legacy of a Megaproject:
The Case of the 1966 Soccer World Cup
Alex G. Gillett, The York Management School, University of York, United Kingdom
Kevin D. Tennent,The York Management School, University of York, United Kingdom

ABSTRACT ■ INTRODUCTION

L
arge-scale sport tournaments such as the Olympic Games and FIFA
Global sporting events such as the FIFA
(Fédération Internationale de Football Association) World Cups have
(Fédération Internationale de Football Asso-
been described as megaprojects (e.g., Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012; Grün,
ciation) World Cup have been described as
2004). The motives of decision makers for undertaking megaprojects are
megaprojects. The motives of decision mak-
summarized by Flyvbjerg’s (2012, 2014) “four sublimes,” which influence their
ers for undertaking megaprojects are sum-
objectives: technological, political, economic, and aesthetic. To mobilize sports
marized by Flyvbjerg’s (2012, 2014) “four
megaprojects requires the formation of a temporary project organization to plan
sublimes,” which lack a temporal dimension.
and execute a large-scale and complex fixed-duration event, and increasingly,
We utilize a case study of the 1966 FIFA
this also involves overseeing the “legacy” of the megaproject for a broad range of
World Cup in England, applying the three
stakeholders in the post-event period. These temporary organizations require the
levels of project management identified by
application of knowledge and capabilities from the past as well as anticipation
Morris and Geraldi (2011), refined through
of the future (Grabher & Thiel, 2015). Such temporary project organizations are,
Flyvbjerg’s four sublimes, to analyze the
therefore, complex to manage, but they can be conceptualized quite simply as
shifting nature of stakeholders’ motives.
comprising three levels: the technical, the strategic, and the wider institutional
We evidence that Flyvbjerg’s sublimes are
context within which the project occurs (Morris & Geraldi, 2011).
dynamic in response to change during the
The 1966 FIFA World Cup held in England provides an interesting case
project timeline, creating new insights into
study in contrast to existing megaproject literature because the project and its
project development and opportunities for
sublimes changed over the duration of the project. The sublimes were, there-
research into historic projects.
fore, dynamic—the motives and objectives of the stakeholders shifted as the
project progressed. The realized project and subsequent legacy were different
KEYWORDS: megaproject; dynamic
from the original conception. Because of changes in the project plan, existing
sublimes; project environment; mega-
stadiums were developed rather than new ones built, and the work to these
event; project management history
existing facilities appears to have been undertaken by locally based contrac-
tors. The 1966 FIFA World Cup did not involve a global construction project
and its tangible built legacy is less visible than is the case for some subsequent
World Cups, but its intangible and symbolic legacy is significant.
We apply the three levels of project management identified by Morris and
Geraldi (2011) together with Flyvbjerg’s (2012, 2014) four sublimes to analyze
stakeholders’ reasons for involvement in the 1966 World Cup project and
their decision making. We demonstrate that these frameworks are compat-
ible in the study of project management history, highlighting the particular
importance of Morris and Geraldi’s (2011) understanding of the institutional
level in this project, and develop Flyvbjerg’s sublimes by evidencing that
they are dynamic in response to changing opportunities during the project’s
duration.

Project Management Journal, Vol. 48, No. 6, 93–116 Project Management and Sports Mega-Events
© 2017 by the Project Management Institute We begin with a critical review of sports mega-event literature, demonstrating
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ that such events can be viewed as a form of megaproject. Next, we introduce

December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  93

 Dynamic Sublimes, Changing Plans, and the Legacy of a Megaproject
PAPERS
our theoretical lenses, the three levels
of project management identified by
Morris and Geraldi (2011) and Flyvbjerg’s
(2012, 2014) four sublimes.
Major sport events often include
significant stadium building and related
infrastructure developments. These
sports mega-events, such as the Olym-
pic Games and FIFA World Cups, have
been described as megaprojects within
the project management literature
(e.g., Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012; Grün,
2004), although with some exceptions
(e.g., Brady & Davies, 2014), the explicit
applicability of project management
theories to the organization of sports
mega-events is less studied.
Outside of project management
journals, research on major sports
events can be found in literature from
different disciplines and different theo-
retical lenses have been applied. The
project nature of sports mega-events is
also evident within sports economics,
leisure, tourism, and regional studies.
This diverse literature contains con-
trasting viewpoints—­ perhaps because
of the temporal and spatial nature of
mega-events and the extent to which
they can be compared, and perhaps
because of the differences in disciplines
and theoretical lenses. However, there
are similarities and we summarize how
the varying types of literature converge,
to explain:
• The reasons for hosting major sports
events, including their intended
outcomes;
• Planning and delivery of the events;
and
• Realized outcomes and legacies.
Reasons for Hosting Major
Sports Events
Mega-events are best understood as
“large-scale cultural (including com-
mercial and sporting) events, which
have a dramatic character, mass popular
appeal and international significance”
(Roche, 2000, p. 1). Sports mega-events
are scarce, so demand is often high
94  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
(Andranovich, Burbank, & Heying,
2001), although that is not always the
case because of the associated cost
and risk of hosting them (Dyreson &
Llewellyn, 2008). Motives for hosting
sports “megas” include perceived short-
and long-term economic and social
benefits, some of which can be viewed
as an end in themselves, whereas oth-
ers are a means to an end. The wider,
and increasingly global, broadcasting
of these events amplifies the symbolism
attached to them.
One attractive aspect of sports
mega-events is that they are understood
as social occasions and contribute to
community spirit and the feel-good fac-
tor (Madrigal, Bee, & LaBarge, 2005;
Molloy & Chetty, 2015; Preuss & Sol-
berg, 2006; Solberg & Ulvnes, 2016;
Wann, Melnick, Russel, & Pease, 2001).
It is therefore possible to understand
why local communities might be sup-
portive (­Andersson, Rustad, & Solberg,
2004; Atkinson, M ­ ourato, Szymanski &
Ozdemirogly, 2008; Preuss & Solberg,
2006), although that is not always the
case, as evidenced by news reports
highlighting residents’ reactions and
resistance to global sports events such
as the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil.
More tangibly, it is often claimed
that sports mega-events will lead to
financial and economic benefits for
the locality and investors, increasing
employment and alleviating poverty
(Andranovich et al., 2001; Dyreson &
Llewellyn, 2008; Grabher & Thiel, 2015;
Kaplanidou, Al Emadi, Sagas, Diop,
& Fritz, 2016; Kellett, Hede, & Chalip,
2008; Molloy & Chetty, 2015; Pillay &
Bass, 2008; Poynter, 2009; Preuss, 2007;
Kaplanidou & Karadakis, 2010). It is
hypothesized that investments in the
built environment and sporting infra-
structure will result in increased produc-
tivity and discretionary effort during the
lead-up to the event (Molloy & Chetty,
2015) and new or enhanced sports facil-
ities and participation in local areas
thereafter (Coalter, 2004; Hogan &
Norton, 2000; Kaplanidou et al., 2016;
Kellett et al., 2008; Preuss, 2007; Solberg
& Ulvnes, 2016; Veal, Toohey, & Frawley,
2012). Furthermore, advocates for host-
ing suggest that sports mega-events
might act as a catalyst for public sec-
tor investment in local economies and
improved national nonsporting infra-
structure, for example, transport, and
an opportunity to extend the returns
on investment by hosting more mega-
events in future, because of the long-
term life span of such developments
(Molloy & Chetty, 2015).
Furthermore, sports mega-events
can be seen as promotional opportuni-
ties for cities and countries, showcas-
ing their attractions to global audiences,
helping to attract tourism and outside
investment (Andranovich, et al., 2001;
Dyerson & Llewellyn, 2008; Horne, 2007;
Kaplanidou et al., 2016; Løwendahl,
1995; Molloy & Chetty, 2015). This relates
to a further dimension: the political.
Sport mega-events have been used
as propaganda—for example, to legiti-
mize ideologies, such as the fascism
of Italy and Germany in the 1930s
(Archetti, 2006; Gordon & London,
2006; Guttmann, 2006), or to showcase
and catalyze economic and societal
development (e.g., Molloy & Chetty,
2015; Zimbalist, 2015). Motives focus on
long- and short-term potential benefits
and legacies, which can be tangible/
measurable, or intangible/difficult to
measure (Preuss, 2007). Projected ben-
efits are not guaranteed to material-
ize, and as a result, sports mega-events
carry risks, yet they continue to receive
public subsidy. The literature points
to the rationale for continued invest-
ment as partly being the intangible
nature of legacy (i.e., that megaprojects
become in some way symbolic), as
well as the more tangible outcomes
from economic “boosterism” (Baade &
Matheson, 2004; Kuper & Syzmanski,
2012; Zimbalist, 2015). To illustrate,
the United Kingdom’s bid for hosting
the Olympics and Paralympics in 2012
focused on measurable economic and
built environment legacy as well as
intangible outcomes from volunteering
such as community spirit (HM Govern-
ment & Mayor of London, 2013).
Planning and Delivery of the
Events
Compared with literature about the
motives for hosting sports mega-events,
or the extent to which these motives
are realized (i.e., their legacies), there
is less published work focusing on the
actual planning and delivery of sports
mega-events. The sports history and
economics literature place particular
focus on considerations before and after
mega-events, although project manage-
ment literature does offer more insight
into the management and operational
aspects.
National governments often pay a
substantial proportion of infrastructure
investments (Solberg & Ulvnes, 2016). As
an important stakeholder, government is
often involved in the main stages of the
mega-event project life cycle (bidding,
organizing, and delivery) (Andranovich
et al., 2001). The FIFA World Cup requires
the host government to create an appro-
priate business climate and environ-
ment for the mega-event, and this might
involve working across national and
state boundaries, and making politi-
cal reforms through governance over-
hauls (Kaplanidou et al., 2016; Kellett
et al., 2008; Preuss, 2007). Although such
development could have positive effects,
there is a risk of collusion and corruption
(Molloy & Chetty, 2015). Sports mega-
event projects require “a tremendous
investment of human, financial and
physical resources from the communi-
ties that stage them” (Kidd, 1992, p. 154).
The risks to the public purse and to the
wider economy are significant, given that
these projects can involve multibillion-
dollar budgets (Andreff, 2012; Baade &
Matheson, 2004; Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, &
Rothengatter, 2003; Zimbalist, 2015).
Problems might arise in projects
because of project task uncertainty and
the extent to which project manage-
ment is embedded within a parent orga-
nization (Løwendahl, 1995). Because of
uncertainties, sports mega-events can
be ambiguous in their nature (Horne,
2007), although this can often be by
design. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) and De
Bruijn and Leijten (2007) point out that
promoters of megaprojects frequently
mislead stakeholders and funders in
order to have their projects approved,
and that this can be a particular fea-
ture of events that is also symbolic in
their nature. Project drift, such as the
over-engineering of stadiums, can occur
from the lure of “free money” and ten-
sions between national and local-level
organizers stemming from the different
priorities given to different drivers (e.g.,
should development efforts focus on
achieving national exposure via televi-
sion or on local infrastructure needs)
(Molloy & Chetty, 2015).
Realized Legacy
Mega-events deserve public debate,
accountability, and critical reflection
as to what they achieve beyond the
field of play (De Bruijn & Leijten, 2007).
Extant literature covers both multisport
events, such as the Olympics and Com-
monwealth Games, and single-sport
events, such as soccer and Rugby World
Cups. There is relatively little consensus
as to whether the proposed legacies
of mega-events are actually achieved,
and in many cases, the literature con-
cludes that it is very difficult to prove
causality for many of the outcomes
(Frawley, 2013; Preuss, 2007). Although
many studies have tended to be criti-
cal, it is important to note that others
have demonstrated positive outcomes
(e.g., Grabher & Thiel, 2014, 2015;
Løwendahl, 1995).
Part of the difficulty in assessing
how effectively mega-events achieve
their proposed objectives is the lack of
a single theory, definition, or law about
what constitutes “legacy,” “impacts,” and
so on, although legacy is a term used
broadly to encompass economic, social,
political, cultural, and sporting achieve-
ments inherited from one generation,
person, or organization to another.
Legacies can include additional activ-
ity generated after the event, such as
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  95
increased tourism in subsequent years
(Holt & Ruta, 2015).
Following Holt and Ruta (2015), we
interpret the term legacy broadly, to
include short-, medium-, and long-term
achievements, both economic and non-
economic, of varying degrees of impact,
tangible and intangible, “hard” and
“soft” (including “symbolic”), which we
consider formative to how the event
is perceived in the long run. Consis-
tent with the theme of this issue, our
interpretation of legacy emphasizes the
symbolic.
Preuss (2007) defines legacy very
broadly in terms of event structures,
encompassing “soft” and “hard” struc-
tures: Soft structures relate to knowledge
(organizational, security, technological),
networks (political, sport federations,
security), and cultural goods (cultural
identity, cultural ideas, common mem-
ory). Contrastingly, hard structures
refer to a tangible legacy and can be
divided into primary structures (sports
infrastructure and training sites), sec-
ondary structures (villages for athletes,
technical officials, and media), and ter-
tiary structures (security, power plants,
telecommunication networks, cultural
attractions). This analysis was expanded
by Kaplanidou et al. (2016), who view
business networks as important soft
structures.
Preuss (2007) and Kaplanidou et al.
(2016) show that the term legacy is not
just used in relation to the planned and
positive. This is consistent with stud-
ies such as that of Molloy and Chetty
(2015), whose research about the 2010
FIFA World Cup demonstrated wide
divergence among their interviewees as
to the expected and realized benefits.
The Economic Benefits and Costs
A common claim is that hosting a sports
mega-event leads to increased eco-
nomic activity (Feddersen & Maennig,
2013; Kasimati & Dawson, 2009; Lee
& Taylor, 2004; Maennig & du Plessis,
2009; Rose & Spiegel, 2011; Spilling,
2000; Stevens & Bevan, 1999; Tien, Lo, &
Lin, 2011). Holt and Ruta (2015) identify
 Dynamic Sublimes, Changing Plans, and the Legacy of a Megaproject
PAPERS
that some economists use the terminol-
ogy of “impacts” (the amount of money
that will flow in or out of a geographic
area exclusively through hosting an
event, either directly or via a multiplier
effect) and “legacy” (the additional eco-
nomic activity generated after the event,
such as increased tourism in subse-
quent years).
It is difficult to isolate the hosting of
a sports mega-event as the causal vari-
able behind an increase in economic
activity because other factors, includ-
ing those from the macro-environment,
might have an influence (as might the
methodology of the researchers, such
as their measure of economic activity,
sample size, and geography). Further-
more, results can depend upon when the
study was conducted (ex-post or ex-ante
studies). Nevertheless, it does seem that
there can be some direct economic ben-
efits even if these are somewhat short-
term. Economic benefit might occur as a
result of temporary injections of external
funding for new sporting facilities (Holt
& Ruta, 2015; Solberg & Ulvnes, 2016).
Multiplier effects might then occur, such
as from a temporary increase in employ-
ment to cope with demand before
and during an event, such as building
contractors (Brunet, 1995; Miguélez &
Carrasquer, 1995). The achievement of
any such economic benefits, however,
is subject to participation and season-
ality effects (Fourie & Santana-Galleo,
2011; Spilling, 2000; Teigland, 1999; Tien
et al., 2011). Benefits may also occur as
a result of knowledge development in
the human resources of the host country
(Kaplanidou et al., 2016; Kellett et al.,
2008; Preuss, 2007).
As well as evidence for the benefits
of sports “megas,” there is a substantial
body of literature highlighting the risks,
assessing their economic costs, under-
performance, and failures, particularly
for the host cities and countries (Alm,
2012; Andreff, 2012; Baade & Matheson,
2004; Baloyi & Becker, 2011; Baumann,
Engelhardt, & Matheson, 2011; De Bruijn
& Leijten, 2007; Gursoy & Lee, 2006;
Kim, Flyvbjerg, & Stewart, 2012; Kuper &
96  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
Szymanski, 2012; Molloy & Chetty, 2015;
Müller, 2014; Pillay & Bass, 2008; Preuss,
2004; Preuss, Solberg, & Alm, 2014; Senn,
1999; Zimbalist, 2015). For example, the
Olympic Games have frequently been
subject to cost overruns (e.g., Flyvbjerg
& Stewart, 2012; Zimbalist, 2015).
We have already mentioned that
mega-events are hosted in the belief
that they will attract tourism and inward
investment. There is some evidence to
suggest hosting a sport mega-event can
have a positive country-of-origin effect,
improving the image of the host in the
minds of visitors as prospective consum-
ers (Donaldson & Ferreira, 2009; Kim &
Morrsion, 2005; Sun & Paswan, 2012).
However, there is also literature to
demonstrate that regardless of image
boosting and changes to consumer
attitudes, hosting sport mega-events
might not necessarily result in economic
gains (Kang & Perdue, 1994; Pyo, Cook,
& Howell, 1988). Jakobsen, Solberg,
Halvorsen, and Jakobsen (2012) and
Flyvbjerg and Stewart (2012) suggest that
sport mega-events do not necessarily
achieve the Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) inflows governments sometimes
predict. Baade and Matheson (2004)
explain that visitors and residents may
decide not to shop locally because they
are concerned about congestion and
price gauging for the duration of the
tournament. Second, errors made in esti-
mating direct spending are compounded
when calculating multiplier analysis—the
indirect spending from the circulation of
tourists’ money in the local economy.
Leakages can be significant if the host
economy has high employment, because
the event will be staffed by people from
other localities, in which unemployment
or a labor surplus exists. A further point
not stated by Baade and Matheson (2004)
is that many of the staff could be working
on a purely voluntary basis.
The Noneconomic Benefits and Costs
There is much debate as to the wider
effects of sporting mega-events, beyond
those that can be classified as strictly/
directly “economic.” For example, there
is little consensus as to whether hosting
mega-events can lead to increased inter-
est and participation in sport (Frawley &
Cush, 2011; Pope, 2016; Brent Ritchie,
1984; Truño, 1995; Veal et al., 2012) or
not (or at least not to the extent that is
proposed when making the case to host
a mega-event) (Hogan & Norton, 2000;
Weed et al., 2009). Some writers sug-
gest that the global exposure of a city or
country can make the expense of host-
ing an event worthwhile (Oldenboom,
2006; Brent Ritchie & Smith, 1991; Varrel
& Kennedy, 2011), whereas others dis-
cern little or no impact on international
awareness and image improvement
(Chalip, Green, & Hill, 2003; Gripsrud,
Nes, & Olsson, 2010; Mossberg &
Hallberg, 1999; Rivenburgh, Louw, Loo,
& Mersham, 2003). For example, though
not an economic success in the short
term, the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South
Africa arguably helped elevate the
country’s image as a growing competi-
tive economy, and promoted national
unity and national identity (Varrel &
Kennedy, 2011). In England, the suc-
cess of the 1996 Union of European
Football Association’s (UEFA—soccer’s
governing body in Europe) European
Championship Finals reinforced an opti-
mistic attitude toward the idea of bid-
ding to host the 2012 Summer Olympiad
(Fairclough, 2000). However, as Grabher
and Thiel (2014) identify, mega-events
can result in risky “self-induced shocks”
(massive disruptions because of expec-
tations for stunning and overwhelming
spectacles). A further and related criti-
cism is that sports mega-events can lead
to protests and bad publicity resulting
from the displacement of local popula-
tions (Andranovich, Burbank & Heying,
2001; Beaty, 1999). Whether success-
ful or not, hosting mega-events can be
politically sensitive for host countries
(Solberg & Ulvnes, 2016); therefore,
there is an impact on reputation. To
help reduce the risk of mistakes being
repeated, the London 2012 Olympics
plan for legacy formally attempted to
capture managerial experience and
best practice by implementing an open
access internet platform accompanied
by several lecture and publication series
(Grabher & Thiel, 2015).
The symbolic legacy effects over the
long term are also important, but they
may be intangible and even impossible to
quantify—the implication being that the
legacy of sports mega-events must look
beyond the immediate cost-­benefit analy-
sis (De Bruijn & Leijten, 2007; Flyvbjerg
& Stewart, 2012; Horne, 2007). Cynics
may, however, argue that claims of non-
economic and intangible benefits are an
attempt to cover up for the aspects of
the Olympic Games that did not achieve
their proposed financial or tangible ben-
efits. Critics of sports mega-events and
boosterism, such as Zimbalist (2015),
argue that there are few positive spillover
effects associated with sports events and
the building of new sports venues, which
often constitute the built legacy.
Theoretical Lenses
We have shown that actual realized out-
puts and outcomes from hosting sports
mega-events may differ from those that
are proposed when prospective hosts
bid for the rights to hold a mega-event,
and also that there are contrasting find-
ings within academic studies.
Capturing the network of organiz-
ing and delivering the 1966 FIFA World
Cup event, Tennent and Gillett’s (2016)
swarm model (Figure 1) interprets the
scope of stakeholders, portraying them
as bees swarming to establish a new col-
ony or nest. In this analogy, following
Figure 1: The 1966 World Cup Swarm
(adapted from Tennent and Gillett, 2016).
Gloor (2006), the participant organi-
zations simultaneously cooperate to
organize, manage, and deliver the proj-
ect, apparently without a high degree
of deliberate central coordination. The
swarm analogy has limited explanatory
power, however, in that it is an empiri-
cal rather than a theoretical construct.
It is limited in its depth as to the locus
of decision making. Neither does it fully
contextualize the reasons for stakehold-
ers wanting to host the event, or explain
its legacy (Porter, 2016).
Tools exist that can address these
limitations. First, Flyvbjerg’s (2012, 2014)
“four sublimes” that drive megaproject
development explain what makes mega-
projects attractive to decision makers.
Flyvbjerg extends the “technological
sublime”—a term he attributes to Miller
(1965) and Marx (1967)—to explain “the
excitement engineers and technologists
get in pushing the envelope for what is
possible in ‘longest-tallest-fastest’ type
of projects” (Flyvbjerg, 2014, p. 8). Three
additional sublimes also make mega-
projects attractive to decision makers—
namely, the following:
• Political: “The rapture politicians get
from building monuments to them-
selves and for their causes, and from
the visibility this generates with the
public and media”
• Economic: “The delight business people
and trade unions get from making lots of
money and jobs off megaprojects”
• Aesthetic: “The pleasure designers and
people who love good design get from
building and using something very
large that is also iconic and beautiful”
Another useful project manage-
ment framework is Morris and Geraldi’s
(2011) identification of project manage-
ment levels in temporary organizations.
Similar to the conceptual disaggrega-
tion of strategy in the strategic manage-
ment literature between the operational,
business unit, and corporate levels
(­Johnson, Scholes, & Whittington, 2008),
Morris and Geraldi (2011) see project
organizations as being manageable at
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  97
three  levels: Level  1, the technical, con-
sisting of the operational and delivery
orientation; Level 2, the strategic, taking
a more holistic view of the project pro-
cess; and Level 3, the wider institutional
context within which the project occurs.
Level 2 is relevant to this study because
it emphasizes the project as an organi-
zational entity to be managed within
its business and social context (­Morris,
1994). This has congruence because,
although a sport mega-event is short in
duration, lasting a month at most, the
preparation process usually takes place
over the course of years, and may neces-
sitate the creation of special project
organizations within the host sporting
bodies. Level 3 is also particularly rel-
evant to sport mega-events because the
sporting bodies are usually not capable
of managing the project preparation pro-
cess on their own, because of the broad
nature of the events involving diverse
social and economic variables beyond
the playing of sports.
Succinctly described by Morris and
Geraldi (2011), Level 3 involves “the insti-
tutional context: management here is
concerned with ensuring the long-term
project management health of the organi-
zation. Work will be in the ‘parent’ orga-
nization and/or in the environment that
the project is operating” (p.  23). In prac-
tice, this concerns the interaction of the
sporting event megaproject with the wider
environment, comprising various levels of
government and other stakeholder orga-
nizations. This complex interface involves
a range of scenarios and requires further
research for increased explication, a point
raised by Morris and Geraldi (2011).
Research Approach
The Case
Megaprojects are expensive in terms
of time as well as finance and thus
carry considerable reputational as well
as economic risk. Time, political reputa-
tion, and international diplomacy were
prominent drivers in the case of the
1966 World Cup. Unlike contemporary
sports mega-events or the FIFA World
Cups of the 1930s, the 1966 FIFA World
 Dynamic Sublimes, Changing Plans, and the Legacy of a Megaproject
PAPERS
Cup was not initially conceived or engi-
neered as a symbolic megaproject, but
as we identify, it evolved into one.
We first became interested in study-
ing the 1966 FIFA World Cup because
of another project we were involved in,
concerning the use of public finance to
fund sports clubs and their built assets,
such as stadiums and sports halls. We
discovered that the 1966 FIFA World
Cup received an unprecedented sum of
public money in the UK context, with the
majority of this money directed toward
stadium improvements, although no
new stadiums were constructed. How-
ever, the legacy of these investments
in the built environment was largely
forgotten over the decades following the
tournament, as English soccer suffered
a decline in support (for a discussion on
the reasons for this decline, see Walvin,
1986). Stadiums were neglected until
reforms following several fatal disasters
spurred investment in new all-seater
stadiums, which ushered in or at least
corresponded with soccer’s revitaliza-
tion in England, and which, in turn, has
corresponded with the sport’s global
expansion and financialization (Conn,
2004; Taylor, 1990).
Thus, the 1966 edition represents a
pivotal moment in the history of soc-
cer’s World Cup—the 1966 event was at
the vanguard of the global expansion
of the soccer “industry” through subse-
quent World Cups, broadcast media, and
sponsorship. Despite the lack of tangible
built reminders to 1966 (even Wembley
Stadium, the venue that hosted the World
Cup final in 1966, has been demolished
and rebuilt, and was a megaproject in its
own right), tourism and economic oppor-
tunities have arisen since, as a result of
the symbolic nature of the project.
Methods
We used inductively based archival
research, drawing upon project docu-
ments alng with periodicals and sec-
ondary sources to triangulate and
compensate for the problems of archi-
val silence and selection (Decker, 2013;
Kipping, Wadhwani, & Bucheli, 2013).
98  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
We believed that returning to the docu-
ments generated in the 1960s by the
original stakeholders was the optimal
way of avoiding the danger of ahis-
toricism, enabling our understanding of
how the World Cup was contextualized
within the economic and social set-
tings of the 1960s, rather than applying
our present-day understanding of the
tournament to the past. This historical
survey of the topic allowed us to exam-
ine planning and organization, and the
extent to which phenomena such as
stadium boosterism existed in the 1960s
and how far the FIFA World Cup of
that period was captured by social and
economic concerns. We offer a manage-
ment and organizational history of a
global sporting event, focusing on the
institutional context and the organiza-
tions involved in delivering the event.
Within the project management his-
tory literature, Söderlund and Lenfle
(2013) offer five categories of project
history research:
1. History of project management
practice
2. Landmark projects and project
narratives
3. Corporate project history
4. History of project-based production
5. History of project managers
We position ourselves within the
framework in Type 2 (landmark proj-
ects and project narratives) and Type  3
(corporate project history), because we
are concerned with a single project,
within which we study the project orga-
nization at the “firm level,” analyzing
the P-form links between a number of
organizations that manifest themselves
in temporary form.
A wide sweep of archives was con-
sulted, including documents belonging
to the following stakeholders identified
from Tennent and Gillett’s (2016) World
Cup 1966 swarm model:
• English Football Association (FA,
soccer’s governing body in England):
minute books of the main organizing
committee, council minutes, the plans
for the 1966 tournament, and subse-
quent publications such as the Mayes
(1966) official World Cup report.
• Fédération Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA): Records of the orga-
nizing committee, the FIFA Bureau,
correspondence, and plans detailing
early planning and regulations that
divided responsibility between FIFA
and the FA.
• UK government and civil service: At
the national level, memos and cor-
respondence principally originating
from the Foreign Office and Ministry
of Education, as well as the prime min-
ister’s office and Ministry of Transport
were used to establish their roles in
planning the tournament. At the local
level, local authority minutes and
local newspaper accounts of the host-
ing arrangements were then added
by visiting archives and libraries, and
local organizing committee files were
accessed.
Using historical methods to study
project history was valuable because a
temporal perspective allowed us to see
the longitudinal scope of a project while
avoiding concerns about the presentism
of much project management research
(Biesenthal, Sankaran, Pitsis, & Clegg,
2015). Maylor, Brady, Cooke-Davies,
and Hodgson (2006) argue that where a
task stretches over many years, a project
is not a temporary organization. How-
ever, our project is, by definition, a tem-
porary organization, as there was a fixed
end in 1966 and a fixed maximum span
of six years for project delivery. A further
benefit of an historical study is that we
were able to observe long-term legacy,
such as 50th-anniversary celebrations
and how “1966” has become symbolic.
By focusing on a single case study, we
aimed to draw out the deep structure
of the case, drawing richer and more
detailed insights than possible from
multiple case studies (Dyer & Wilkins,
1991; Platt, 1988). We use these insights
to evaluate the case study, highlight-
ing the general in particular in order
to uncover the “dynamics of phenom-
ena” (Maclean, Harvey, & Clegg, 2016,
pp. 612–613). In doing this, we follow
the lead of Eisenhardt (1989) in high-
lighting the extent to which historical
specificity matters—in this case, creat-
ing opportunities for future researchers
to exploit the differences between this
and other global sporting events.
Following Yin’s (2003) matrix of rel-
evant situations for different situation
strategies, our study exists within the
overlap of archival analysis, history, and
case study. We were mainly concerned
with the “How?” and “Why?” of our
case in relation to motives and decision
making, and ultimately, to the legacy of
the event. We were mostly concerned
with the past, although we also had
an interest in contemporary manifes-
tations of “legacy,” such as events to
commemorate the 50th anniversary of
the 1966 World Cup tournament. With
reference to Yin’s (2003) taxonomy, it
was not necessary to control behav-
ioral events because most had already
occurred, while the ongoing legacy
could be observed.
Initially, we undertook a literature
review. This analysis revealed that dif-
ferent disciplines converge to suggest
reasons for hosting events, the ways in
which they are planned and executed,
and the resulting outputs and legacies.
The emergent and intangible nature
of projects was an interesting finding
because motives for hosting can become
subverted or forgotten. We found no
academic literature to satisfactorily
capture the dynamic, intangible, or
symbolic nature of the 1966 event. We
considered this a gap worthy of explo-
ration and an opportunity to develop
understanding of a significant historic
project.
Our archival analysis comprised
three main phases. Eisenhardt (1989)
refers to the usefulness of writing up
a narrative account of the case as a
suitable early step in the case study
process. First we produced a chrono-
logical narrative understanding of the
project from an initial reading of the
data to identify what compared and
contrasted with the existing literature
and what was novel. By evaluating key
points and identifying the dates when
important decisions about financing,
locations, and so on were made, and
by whom, we created a timeline to pro-
vide a snapshot of our case that helped
us keep things in chronological order.
We identified clues as to the reasons
for hosting the tournament, how it was
organized, and also some indication as
to legacy, although additional research
was required to address the question
“What happened next?” We visited com-
memorative events such as the National
Football Museum’s (the English soc-
cer museum) exhibition marking the
50th anniversary of the 1966 tourna-
ment. Identifying events and produc-
ing a chronology provided the building
blocks of our case, but to go beyond
descriptive case history to produce a
case study, we observed patterns within
the data (Pettigrew, 1997).
Second, to address the question
“Why were the stakeholders interested
in hosting the event?” we examined
the original proposals for the tourna-
ment, the “new” plan, and what actually
happened. We noticed that the motives
of different stakeholders changed over
time. We distilled our findings into two
main themes: (1) how the 1966 World
Cup was organized and delivered (this
included who was involved, when, and
why), and (2) what the project delivered
(including positive and negative, short-,
medium-, and long-term legacies).
We researched theory for an explana-
tory framework following Eisenhardt’s
(1989) recommendation to ask our-
selves: “What theory is this similar
to? What does it contradict and why?”
Eisenhardt claims that linking to exist-
ing theory in this way enhances the
internal validity, generalizability, and
general level of theory building from
case research. We identified two frame-
works from the project management lit-
erature as being the best fit for our data:
Flyvbjerg’s (2012, 2014) four sublimes
of megaprojects to determine what the
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  99
decision makers’ motivations/drivers
for the project were, and Morris and
Geraldi’s (2011) three levels of project
management, to show where and in
what way decision making occurred.
We were also able to assess the extent
to which this contemporary framework
might apply to a 50-year-old example.
Our third phase of data analysis
involved examining the project network
of the temporary organization, to deter-
mine the spaces within which decision
making took place, and by whom. We
found that the headings provided by the
frameworks of Flyvbjerg (2012, 2014)
and Morris and Geraldi (2011) were
suitable for coding and sorting our data,
although some expansion of definition
was required. We applied these frame-
works to the data to see what fit and
how, and what the frameworks don’t
explain. The latter were our unique
features. We discovered that a more
dynamic understanding of the existing
theory was necessary, which we will
explain later in this article.
Our theoretical choices were made
after data collection, and our research
approach was exploratory and induc-
tive. There is some comparison with
the work of Molloy and Chetty (2015),
whose study of the 2010 FIFA World Cup
used grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss,
1967). Their study of a contemporary
mega-event was based on interview
data, which was not possible for our
study because the organizers were dead,
although autobiographies were used to
triangulate some of the archival data
relating to Sir Stanley Rous (FA, FIFA)
and Denis Howell (UK sports minister).
Findings
The Original Plan and Intended
Benefits of Hosting
The 1966 World Cup involved no “new
build” stadiums, and the improvements
that were made to the existing stadiums
were procured and overseen by the soc-
cer clubs themselves. As a result, the
tournament is dissimilar to many other
FIFA World Cups, where the building
of new stadiums was an integral part of
 Dynamic Sublimes, Changing Plans, and the Legacy of a Megaproject
PAPERS

the plan (e.g., Molloy & Chetty, 2015).
To understand the reasons for hosting
the 1966 event, we must analyze the
intended benefits, which requires us
to look beyond the plan used in the
delivery of the project, to the English
Football Association’s (FA) original plan
document (FA, 1961). We now outline
our findings from this document using
Flyvbjerg’s “four sublimes” to evidence
the FA’s intentions for hosting. The FA,
as host, was contractually responsible
for the tournament’s delivery within
FIFA’s specifications; the FA essentially
represented a franchisee of FIFA. The
FA secretary (effectively a chief execu-
tive), Sir Stanley Rous, and the England
team manager, Walter Winterbottom,
wrote the first detailed plan for the
hosting of the tournament in 1961 (FA,
1961; Rous, 1978). This vision for the
tournament included details of the
financial plan, possible host grounds,
and speculation about the possible sta-
tus of broadcasting for the competition.
Potential hotels and training grounds
for visiting sides were also listed, and
even ideas regarding possible souvenir
products for both the public and visiting
teams were detailed.
With reference to Flyvbjerg’s four
sublimes, we found that these were less
evident at the time of the initial bid to
host the tournament in England, which
was driven by the FA without govern-
ment backing (Table 1). Contextually,
the FA would celebrate its centenary
in 1963, so perhaps this was a catalyst,
although our research did not reveal any
documentary evidence to prove it. It is
apparent from the plan that opportuni-
ties existed relating to technology and
economics that were certainly attrac-
tive, although it might be stretching
the data to claim much significance
for the “technological” or “economic”
sublimes when compared to some pre-
vious World Cups (for instance, 16 years
prior to our case, the 1950 World Cup
held in Brazil involved constructing the
largest stadium in the world, the Mara-
canã). An example that demonstrates
the interlinking nature of these oppor-
tunities was the noted possibility to film
all of the games and broadcast them
globally—the United States and Canada
are mentioned explicitly—although it
was stated that any deals for film rights
should not be made until 1966; because
of the pace of technology, the tech-
nological capabilities would be more
advanced by then (FA, 1961). The plan
identified economic opportunities or
ticket sales and merchandising such as
badges and scarves. The plan gives no
consideration to the potential for prod-
uct licensing, although this would be
the dominant approach when the tour-
nament actually happened (FA, 1961).
It is possible to infer that the “politi-
cal” sublime was present at the time
of the original 1961 plan, but more in
relation to the “politics” of soccer than
to party politics. Specifically, the fact
the report’s authors, Stanley Rous and
Walter Winterbottom, were senior fig-
ures in the English FA indicates that the
possibility of hosting the 1966 tourna-
ment was considered important and
prestigious, as well as an opportunity
to leverage income from souvenirs and

Type of Sublime Characteristic Degree of Applicability Explanation

Technological The excitement engineers and technologists
get in pushing the envelope for what is
possible in “longest-tallest-fastest” types of
projects
Political The rapture politicians get from building
monuments to themselves and for their
causes, and from the visibility this generates
with the public and media
Economic The delight businesspeople and trade unions
get from making lots of money and jobs off
megaprojects, including money made for
contractors, workers in construction and
transportation, consultants, bankers, investors,
landowners, lawyers, and developers
Aesthetic The pleasure designers and people who love
good design get from building and using
something very large that is also iconic and
beautiful, such as the Golden Gate Bridge
Table 1: Four sublimes of the 1966 FIFA World Cup (at the time of the FA’s original plan, 1961) (Source: Adapted from Flyvbjerg, 2014, p. 8).
Medium •  Emphasized use of existing stadiums with
one proposed “new build” (Sheffield)
although actually proposed by the club’s
owners, not by the FA
•  Stadium improvements required, including
hospitality, covered areas, and electronic
scoreboards comparable with European
stadiums
Low (UK government) •  Low: Not yet considered by national
High (English FA) government
•  High: Prestige for English FA as hosts
High •  FIFA to ensure organizational continuity
•  Government aim to attract foreign currency
•  Local economies from incoming tourism
•  Host football clubs from available funding
and gate receipts from match attendance
No evidence N/A

100  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal

ticket sales, and spread the sport into
new territories or leverage technologi-
cal advancements in film and television.
Broadcast media aside, other tech-
nological developments were clearly
important as to how the event would
be experienced and contributed to its
lasting legacy both in terms of the built
environment and symbolically. The
FA’s original plan provides a slightly
different narrative to the established
story of which grounds were selected—
for instance, that Ayresome Park was
only considered at the very last min-
ute, whereas the northeast group was
originally conceived to include three
stadiums.
Table 2 shows that the original vision
was for the tournament to be held at
14 grounds (FA, 1961). Assumptions of
likely gate receipt revenues were based
upon data from the 1958 FIFA World
Cup, which indicated attendance fig-
ures of 50,000. The plan also estimated
some of the operating costs of the World
Cup, but no capital expenditure plans
were outlined. The plan envisaged that
stadiums would have to be improved
Group Stadium
London Wembley Stadium
Highbury
White Hart Lane
Stamford Bridge
Birmingham Villa Park
St. Andrews
Wolverhampton Molineux
Liverpool Goodison Park
Manchester Maine Road
Old Trafford
Sheffield Proposed new stadium*
Sunderland Roker Park
Newcastle St. James Park
Middlesbrough Ayresome Park
Total
Source: Adapted from FA, 1961, p. 14
*Planned by the Sheffield Wednesday board, not specifically for the tournament.
Table 2: Original Rous and Winterbottom plan: Proposed stadium capacities.
with regard to the amount of covered
seating and standing accommodation
available, including some improve-
ments to the seating at Wembley, as
the English weather could not be relied
upon. It was also noted that restaurant,
bar, and toilet facilities at all stadiums
required a “100% increase” (Ibid, p. 14)
and that television facilities needed to
be installed, as well as facilities for up to
500 journalists with 100 telephone lines.
Support services would also have to
be improved, such as accommodations
for police, first-aid posts, catering ser-
vices, souvenir sellers, and information
kiosks.
Also envisaged was the introduc-
tion of electronic scoreboards, which
already existed in some European
grounds, as well as improved dressing
room facilities, and even places for pre-
match entertainers to change. Security
measures and access for teams and offi-
cials would also need to improve. A
feeling emerges that Rous and Win-
terbottom had a vision of what was
required to modernize England’s tra-
ditional soccer grounds, which had
Anticipated Capacity
97,165
67,000
62,000
71,000
70,500
55,000
53,500
72,000
75,200
65,600
58,500
60,800
59,500
55,500
923,265
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  101
been built with locally living standing
spectators in mind, and which had not
envisaged the use of the grounds in
internationally televised tournaments.
The plans were mostly an adaptation
of existing grounds—the one exception
being Sheffield Wednesday, where the
club’s board proposed a new ground.
Further, the projections were still largely
based on standing accommodations
being the norm. Wembley was the only
venue where additional seating was
proposed, including temporary form
benches to be placed on the greyhound-
racing track.
A New Plan
The death of FIFA President Arthur
Drewry led to the election of Sir Stanley
Rous in his place (FIFA, 1960; Rous,
1978), but with Rous unable to carry
on as FA secretary, this meant that he
moved from franchisee to franchisor.
As a result, the strategic thread was
lost, and Rous’s successor as FA secre-
tary, Denis Follows, started the process
again from scratch after a gap of around
a year, convening the first meeting of
the FA’s World Cup Organizing Com-
mittee (WCOC) in November 1962 (FA,
1962).
Our archival data show the deci-
sions and behaviors of the main stake-
holders involved in the planning and
delivery of the 1966 FIFA World Cup.
By relating our findings to the three
levels identified by Morris and Geraldi
(2011), we provide a more detailed and
effective understanding of the project
management of the tournament than
has previously been published. Table 3
summarizes our analysis.
Our findings indicated the particu-
lar significance of public sector involve-
ment in the project, which we will now
explain.
After the death of Drewry, Dennis
Follows was essentially left on his own
to replan the tournament, although
government support was not forthcom-
ing at this stage; Follows’ approach
to the Conservative government led
only to an assurance that police escorts
 Dynamic Sublimes, Changing Plans, and the Legacy of a Megaproject
PAPERS

Host Football
Clubs and
Focus of World Cup UK Public Sector Liaison
Level Management FIFA English FA Organization Institutions Committees
1. Technical Operational and Stipulate Travel for teams and Award Reduce usage of Construction work
delivery oriented stadiums’ officials within England licensing national symbols to improve stadiums
specifications agreements for Grant visas to visiting and facilities
and assessed use of brands teams Sell tickets and
delivery and logos programs at hosted
standards Travel agency
Print and execution fixtures
Appoint match sell tickets, Provide public
referees brochures, and Public transport
provision information
Travel to the programs literature and
tournament Provide policing hospitality
for teams and Provide utilities and Local PR and press
officials from post services
outside of
Provide university
England
accommodation and
press centres
2. Strategic Manage projects Negotiate Negotiate gate receipt Develop brands Persuade host
as holistic entities gate receipt apportionment with FIFA and logos football clubs to use
including front- apportionment Front-end development Design allocated public funds
end development with English FA and definition—the World tournament to improve hospitality
and definition; Cup Plan—including literature and media facilities
concern for value financial planning, proposed Travel agency
and effectiveness stadiums at each stage of planning
the tournament—speculate Public transport
about broadcasting, and planning
suggest hotels, training
grounds and possible Plan policing
souvenir products Plan utilities and post
Emphasis on developing services
existing stadiums—no Plan university
complete new builds— accommodation and
decide that clubs self-fund press centers
permanent improvements
3. Institutional Create the context Set the Set foreign and
and support format, timing, economic policy
for projects to qualification, outcomes
flourish and for and host Allocate public
their management Negotiate funds to stadium
to prosper broadcasting improvement and
rights hospitality
Table 3: Morris and Geraldi’s (2011) three levels of project management and the 1966 FIFA World Cup.

would be provided for visiting team
vehicles (FA, 1965). Follows was forced
to economize by narrowing the 18 pos-
sible hosting grounds down to eight.
Each of the four groups would now have
two constituent grounds; Everton and
Manchester United remained hosting
matches in the North West group,
Newcastle and Sunderland in the North
East group, while Sheffield Wednesday
was grouped with Aston Villa in the
Midland group, and London group
matches were to be held at Arsenal and
Wembley.
Crucially, the committee decided
that the hosting clubs themselves would
be responsible for funding any new
facilities or improvements deemed nec-
essary. Their reward for taking this risk
was to receive 15% of the gate receipts
(FA, 1962); the rest of the takings after

102  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal

expenses paid to teams and officials
would be paid to the qualifying nations,
the FA, and FIFA. Clubs were still
expected to stage matches simply for
the honor of doing so, with no consid-
eration of legacy. Indeed, in the first
draft of the World Cup Regulations, FIFA
only allowed 10% of the receipts for
“ground hire,” clearly stipulating that
all usual privileges, such as club sea-
son tickets and complimentary tickets,
were suspended for World Cup finals
matches (FIFA, 1963). In May 1963, after
negotiations with the FA, FIFA agreed
to allow the host clubs 15% of the gate
receipts, although FIFA would not
contribute toward the cost of ground
alterations (FA, 1963a). The FA com-
mittee started to plan the tournament
within the limited envelope allowed for
them by FIFA, although it would be as
late as 1965 before the definite final
host grounds, shown in Table 4, were
decided.
The Influence of Stakeholders
Our archival research has revealed
that the original 1961 plan by Walter
Winterbottom and Sir Stanley Rous
for the 1966 FIFA World Cup, which
focused on the tournament as being for
the benefit of soccer and the sport’s gov-
erning bodies, was gradually subverted
toward the benefit of national and
local government instead. The national
government sought to benefit from an
improved image for Britain in order
to improve foreign relations and boost
exports. The local governments sought
to boost local industry and improve
tourism. This led to considerable invest-
ment of public funds into the project,
and co-option of local industry into its
implementation. The influence of stake-
holders, power, and politics can also
be considered from the perspectives of
international diplomacy between gov-
ernments and sports governing bodies,
with each other and one another. Cold
War concerns, wider geopolitics, and
domestic industrial policy in a period
of national planning evolving around
the world (everywhere from the United
Kingdom to North Korea) also led the
politicians to desire a more permanent
legacy than was initially envisaged, as
we will now explain.
A New Government
The election of Harold Wilson’s Labour
government in the autumn of 1964
caused an abrupt change in the political
landscape. Important to our narrative is
the change of ethos toward centralized
planning, which was fundamental to
the Wilson view of the economy. In the
British context, Wilson’s National Plan
of 1965 meant stimulus and corrective
intervention in the economy through
control of public investment, nation-
alized industries, and encouragement
of technological change (Tomlinson,
2004), rather than the outright com-
mand and control approach favored by
Communist nations. An important ele-
ment of the Labour government’s policy
was to invest heavily in science and
education. Unlike today, where sport
and leisure have its own distinct gov-
ernment department, the Department
of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), in
the 1960s, sport was under the purview
of the Department of Education and
Science (DES). As we shall now explain,
the government’s role in funding the
World Cup was part of this expansion
of education and science funding, and
sport formed only part of a broader
portfolio in which education and sci-
ence were the main responsibilities
(Howell, 1990).
Denis Howell, the undersecretary
with responsibility for sport, and also

Anticipated Number Total Actual

Stadium Capacity of Games Capacity Crowds
City Stadium (per game) Hosted (all games) (all games) Utilization %
London Empire Stadium, Wembley 97,000 9 873,000 760,795 87.1
London White City Stadium 60,000 1 60,000 44,574 74.3
Middlesbrough Ayresome Park 46,000 3 138,000 54,307 39.4
Sunderland Roker Park 63,000 4 252,000 107,236 42.6
Manchester Old Trafford 64,000 3 192,000 101,876 53.1
Liverpool Goodison Park 66,000 5 330,000 263,065 79.7
Sheffield Hillsborough 65,000 4 260,000 130,836 50.3
Birmingham Villa Park 72,000 3 216,000 149,580 69.3
Totals 533,000* 32 2,321,000 1,612,269 69.5
Source: Adapted from FIFA, 1964, p. 14
*This number of seats was available for allocation on any given day to the tournament organizers. The capacity available depended on the allocation of
matches to grounds. This was a decision for the organizers, who were influenced by stadium capacity as well the desire to spread matches around the
country as equally as possible.
Table 4: Eventual host grounds, 1965.

December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  103

 Dynamic Sublimes, Changing Plans, and the Legacy of a Megaproject
PAPERS
a soccer referee, saw the potential of
the World Cup tournament for national
prestige. Wanting to generate a lasting
legacy, he approached Wilson for fund-
ing. Wilson agreed to set aside the sum
of £500,000, partly backed by the Board
of Trade, which saw the opportunity to
boost British exports (Howell, 1990; The
Times, 1965a). The government saw the
World Cup as an opportunity to create a
lasting legacy; it was symbolic of prog-
ress under the government’s national
plan. This was the first time the UK
government had funded a soccer event,
but it had previously supported the
1948 London Olympics, and this invited
comparisons with that event in the civil
service (HM Treasury, 1965).
The chosen stadiums were substan-
tially unimproved since around 1900—
attendance had been large, but the
gate receipts had mostly been spent on
transfer fees. Despite this, it would be
prohibitive to build new stadiums and
the treasury admitted: “We have to make
do with what we have” (HM Treasury,
1965). The issue of power and rivalry
between different parts of government
became important as Howell and his
team prepared their plans to enhance
the tournament in the spring of 1965.
In terms of creating a lasting legacy,
Howell persuaded the FA to go beyond
the original plan by installing new areas
of seating, together with improved
hospitality and media facilities, to make
the stadiums more welcoming to the
overseas media and visiting dignitar-
ies (HM Treasury, 1965). There were
concerns about how good an invest-
ment this would be for the public sec-
tor because of the prolificacy of soccer
clubs with increasing transfer fees and
player wages at a time when they were
unwilling to invest in the updating of
their stadiums, their main capital asset
(The Times, 1965b). There was also con-
cern in the treasury that investing in
the World Cup could be the thin end of
a very large wedge; there could poten-
tially be as many tournaments to spend
money on as there were types of sport
(HM Treasury, 1965).
104  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
There was further concern in the
Foreign Office about the inclusion of
the team representing the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK—
more colloquially referred to as ‘North
Korea’). It was feared that their pres-
ence in England and symbolic display
of national symbols such as flags and
national anthems would legitimize a
state considered nonexistent at best and
an enemy at worst, this being the height
of the Cold War and within recent
memory of the Korean War. It was also
feared that recognition of North Korea
would implicitly legitimize the German
Democratic Republic (GDR), which was
backed by the Soviet Union. Because
of a boycott by most African and Asian
states, the DPRK ended up being the
sole qualifier for the 1966 FIFA World
Cup from outside of Europe and the
Americas. The Foreign Office was ini-
tially unwilling to grant the DPRK team
a visa to visit the United Kingdom,
and this threatened the team’s abil-
ity to appear in the World Cup finals
at all. After considerable negotiations
between DES and the Foreign Office, a
compromise was reached in which the
DPRK team would agree to be known as
North Korea and the usual World Cup
customs of displaying flags and play-
ing national anthems before matches
would be suspended for most of the
tournament (Polley, 1998). This was an
example of a conflict between govern-
ment organizations, as well as between
countries, because DES had already
invested public money in flagpoles for
the host stadiums (HM Treasury, 1965).
Although part of the original plan,
the location of Middlesbrough in
North East England might not have
been included in the actual project
had it not been for local politics in
Newcastle-Upon-Tyne. An important
name associated with the National Plan
in the North East was that of ambi-
tious council leader T. Dan Smith,
who had grand designs for the city of
Newcastle-Upon-Tyne and was at log-
gerheads with the local soccer team,
Newcastle United Football Club, which
leased the St. James Park stadium from
the council. Smith wanted to upgrade the
stadium to a municipal multisport arena
that could be used seven days a week,
rather than allowing it to be the sole
domain of the club (Foote Wood, 2010;
Joannu, 2000). This dispute caused sig-
nificant delays when it came to starting
any of the required work for the World
Cup, and meant that the club, respon-
sible for the day-to-day operations at
the stadium, was unable to guarantee to
the FA that it would still be occupying
St. James Park by the time of the tourna-
ment. This presented such a significant
risk to the WCOC in terms of the FA
contract with FIFA that it was decided to
relocate the matches to Middlesbrough
(FA, 1964a, 1964b).
Intended and Achieved
Benefits of Hosting: Legacy
and Symbolism
A key finding of our study was that
as the 1966 FIFA World Cup project
evolved, the sublimes became more
significant as opportunities were iden-
tified and public money invested.
There is some evidence to suggest that
Flyvbjerg’s (2012, 2014) sublimes can
explain the motives for this evolution,
and the same typology can be used to
categorize the actual outputs and out-
comes of the project, which were tan-
gible as well as intangible. An important
finding was how the 1966 FIFA World
Cup has become increasingly symbolic
over time, in ways that were not envis-
aged by its organizers.
Table 5 summarizes our findings
in relation to Flyvbjerg’s four sublimes
(technological, political, economic, and
aesthetic). We found the political and
economic sublimes emerged as gov-
ernment and the public sector became
increasingly involved. Similar to the
findings of Molloy and Chetty (2015),
who studied the 2010 FIFA World Cup,
there is evidence to show how the tech-
nological sublime became more rel-
evant in the 1960s as public money
became available. Although there was
no major aesthetic built legacy, there is
 Type of Sublime Characteristic
Technological The excitement engineers and technologists get Medium
in pushing the envelope for what is possible in
“longest-tallest-fastest” types of projects
Political The rapture politicians get from building
monuments to themselves and for their causes,
and from the visibility this generates with the
public and media
Economic The delight business people and trade unions
get from making lots of money and jobs off
megaprojects, including money made for
contractors, workers in construction and
transportation, consultants, bankers, investors,
landowners, lawyers, and developers
Aesthetic The pleasure designers and people who love
good design get from building and using
something very large that is also iconic and
beautiful, such as the Golden Gate Bridge
Source: Adapted from Flyvbjerg, 2014, p. 8
Table 5: The four “sublimes” of the 1966 FIFA World Cup
Degree of Applicability Explanation
•  Wembley Ltd.—“Plexi” roof
•  Host football clubs—e.g., steel cantilever
stand at Sheffield
•  More emphasis on seating within stadiums
than in the original plan
•  Advances in broadcasting technology—
e.g., satellite, replays, etc.
•  However, World Cup driven by technology,
not technology driven by World Cup
High (UK Government) •  Seen by UK government as being
High (English FA) consistent with its national plan—World
Cup as shop window for England
•  Desire among UK government and civil
service for a lasting legacy (see also
“Economic”)
•  Prestige for English FA as hosts
High •  FIFA to ensure organizational continuity
•  Government aim to attract foreign currency
•  Local economies from incoming tourism
•  Host football clubs from government
funding and gate receipts from match
attendance
•  World Cup organizing committee from
licensed products
Low •  WCOC and English FA—symbolism and
branding of the tournament—e.g., the
World Cup Willie mascot
•  No major aesthetic build legacy

evidence to support the aesthetic sub-
lime, as the WCOC realized the poten-
tial for symbolism and branding.
Technological
There is evidence that clubs brought
forward investment plans to benefit
from the opportunity of public money.
Soccer clubs seized upon the expecta-
tion for the higher specification techni-
cal conditions encouraged by FIFA to
access grant funding so that they could
create stadiums that were technically
advanced and worthy of a never-before-
seen event. Even in the initial plan,
there were proposed technical improve-
ments to stadiums, though mostly of a
temporary nature (FA, 1961). In con-
trast, the subsequent plan proposed by
Denis Howell sought a longer-lasting
legacy, with the intention of improv-
ing English stadiums to be comparable
with those found overseas. Proposals
included installing new steel cantile-
ver stands (the latest technology), new
seating, permanent facilities for tele-
vision broadcasters for the first time,
and new hospitality facilities, includ-
ing women’s toilets for the first time at
many stadiums. Sheffield Wednesday
did not build a new stadium, but did
develop a gymnasium and a whole new
stand seating 5,000 at its existing Hills-
borough stadium (HM Treasury, 1965).
Middlesbrough FC, whose Ayresome
Park ground had the lowest capacity
of the host stadiums, made significant
improvements, proposing an additional
8,520 seats to replace dated terracing, as
well as improving its hospitality areas
and covering its terraces (HM Treasury,
1965; Middlesbrough FC 1965a, 1965b).
Everton FC demolished housing to
lengthen its pitch and increase stadium
capacity (Mayes, 1966), and Manches-
ter United widened a road bridge and
developed a “modern,” technologically
advanced cantilever stand (Financial
Times, 1966). By the end of the process,
all six provincial host grounds had at
least 18,000 seats installed, a high num-
ber for English soccer grounds at this
time (HM Treasury, 1965).
Political
There is a clear overlap between the polit-
ical and the technological sublimes—­the
UK government as well as FIFA inter-
vention was the driver for technologi-
cal improvement after the 1964 general

December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  105

 Dynamic Sublimes, Changing Plans, and the Legacy of a Megaproject
PAPERS
election, creating a world-class sporting
spectacle to showcase the country.
Despite satire (e.g., Private Eye, 1966),
the 1966 World Cup is remembered as
successful: The host nation’s team won,
people were happy, and  ­ diplomatic
embarrassments were avoided. How-
ever, British soft power was impacted
(Foreign Office, 1966a, 1966b). This
was partly the result of the poor per-
formance of South A ­ merican teams—
World Champion B ­ razil exited in the
group stages, followed by ­Argentina in
the quarter finals. There were claims the
English had used their influence within
FIFA to choose referees favorable to
themselves, which escalated into a dip-
lomatic row. British embassies in South
America expressed concern over the risk
to British exports and FDI links (Foreign
Office, 1966a, 1966b).
The World Cup seduced national
and local politicians who thought it
would create an opportunity to gener-
ate much-needed foreign currency and
drive the National Plan for industrial
renewal, itself a seductive megapro-
ject. This was consistent with the wider
failure of 1960s economic and social
planning. In a reflection of how a small
detail can upset a larger plan, the FA
appointed the travel agency Thomas
Cook, which mismanaged the allocation
of visiting supporter accommodations
(see below). With reference to orga-
nizational theory, this was a warning
from the 1960s (a decade characterized
in Anglo-Saxon economies by M-form
organizations) that the Druckerian pol-
icy of outsourcing could compromise
project delivery (Wilson & Thomson,
2006). The idea that the World Cup
would provide an opportunity to push
British industrial exports to soccer fans
might have been far-fetched: There is
no evidence to suggest that Brazilian
fans placed orders for Sheffield steel or
Sunderland glass as a direct result of
attending the World Cup! This practical
disconnect is evidence of the seduction
explicit in sporting mega-events.
More broadly, the tournament
improved British relations with DPRK,
106  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
on a local scale at least, which we explain
later in this article, in relation to the sym-
bolic legacy of the 1966 World Cup.
Economic
Economic factors had significance at
the time of the FA’s first plan for the
tournament and became more impor-
tant as the project progressed.
As hoped, the profile and image
of soccer benefited from global TV
exposure, which, in this tournament,
was the greatest yet. Advances in the
marketing and licensing of World Cup
branded products—for example, the
“World Cup Willie” range (Mayes, 1966,
p. 44) innovated the first-ever World
Cup mascot. Unlike in previous World
Cups, the English approach demon-
strated that hosting the tournament
did not require the construction of new
stadiums.
As the tournament grew closer,
there were hopes that it would encour-
age tourism and promote local industry.
However, the expected influx of tourists
did not materialize. Many overseas vis-
itors opted to stay and visit London
instead of going to Sunderland or Liv-
erpool. The provincial cities were rel-
atively unknown to overseas visitors,
yet these cities were also keen to put
themselves in the shop window, and
like the tournament overall, the regional
matches were exploited for local eco-
nomic purposes. Tours of factories and
workplaces were organized, includ-
ing the Vauxhall Motors factory near
Liverpool and the offices of the Little-
woods football (soccer) pools company
(Liverpool Echo, 1966). In Sunderland,
the local authority organized tours
of factories and shipyards (Northern
Echo, 1966a). In Middlesbrough, an
“Industrial Eisteddfod” event was held
on the Imperial Chemical Industries
(ICI) chemical company’s showgrounds,
planned separately from the World Cup
but tied into the tournament (Northern
Echo, 1966b).
The FA’s official travel agent, Thomas
Cook, sold the tournament to overseas
visitors in the form of three-week
“packages” on the assumption that a
fan would spend the whole tournament
around a 50-mile radius of a single
match center. There were ambitions
that floating hotels might be needed
to alleviate accommodation shortages
in provincial cities, but these proved
optimistic (British Railways Board,
1966; Evening Gazette, 1965; FA, 1964c,
1964d). This approach, which did not
match the pattern of matches played
and did not take account of the allure
London held for overseas visitors, was
flawed. Accommodation bookings were
not tied to overseas ticket sales, and
inevitably, with a range of attractions,
the London package proved the most
popular.
Aesthetic
We found little evidence of the aesthetic
sublime in Flyvbjerg’s (2012, 2014)
meaning of the term. Construction
was temporary or for technical compli-
ance and economic reasons, such as
future income. The built legacy of the
tournament was one of neglect. With
few exceptions, soccer clubs did not
renew their assets until forced to do so
by the Taylor Report of 1990, a direct
response to the Hillsborough disaster of
1989, in which many soccer fans were
killed or injured during a soccer game
at Sheffield’s Hillsborough stadium.
Fans also died at another World Cup
stadium, Ayresome Park; and elsewhere
in the country, a fire at Bradford in 1985
showed the dangers of England’s stadi-
ums, which were in need of improve-
ment (Conn, 2004). After Bradford, the
memory of the 1966 World Cup became
a symbol of hope when the 1966 World
Cup final was re-created in an exhibi-
tion match between the England and
West Germany teams, comprising 1966
alumni (Wray, 1985).
There was an aesthetic dimension
to the World Cup 1966 project in terms
of the World Cup Willie merchandising,
developed for economic purposes, but
this, as we explain next, has become
iconic and symbolic of the tournament,
demonstrating the power of sports
mega-event aesthetics. A better way to
explain this is in terms of the symbolic
legacy.
A Symbolic Legacy
The 1966 FIFA World Cup has taken on
symbolic meaning for several reasons,
including the culmination of sublimes
and other factors. It remains the only
time the tournament was both hosted
and won by England, and this victory
took place in the setting of the iconic
Wembley Stadium, which has since
been replaced. At the time of this
writing, there had been a fashion for
soccer nostalgia, and 2016 marked the
50th anniversary of these events.
The 1966 World Cup was a symbolic
project for unintended reasons—the
legacy of the tournament was almost
entirely intangible and social rather
than built and economic. This partly
supports Warrack’s (1993) proclama-
tion that megaprojects have “powerful
economic, social and symbolic roles
in the society” (p. 2). The final, in
which England won 4–2 against West
Germany, became iconic—the main
reason for this being the technologi-
cal advances made in the broadcast
media, which enabled viewers across
Europe, the United States, and Mexico
to watch live. This catalyzed the for-
mation of the North American Soccer
League (Cairns, 2016). England’s vic-
tory was a landmark moment in English
popular memory, compared by some to
the assassination of President Kennedy
in 1963 (in the where were you when
it happened sense, rather than in a
tragic way) (Critcher, 1994; Hughson,
2016; Porter, 2009; Wray, 1985).
Public appetite for televised soc-
cer in the United Kingdom increased
after the tournament, raising the pro-
file of the FA’s domestic cup competi-
tion. Match attendances also enjoyed a
short-term revival (European F ­ ootball
Statistics, 2016). To illustrate, BBC com-
mentator Kenneth Wolstenholme’s
comment at the final whistle, “Some
people are on the pitch, they think it’s
all over—it is now!” slipped into the
English language, inspiring the title of
the BBC’s panel game show They Think
It’s All Over 30 years later (Porter, 2009).
England’s subsequent failure to again
win the tournament inspired a popular
song “Three Lions,” which included lyr-
ics reflecting on England’s “thirty years
of hurt” since 1966 (Baddiel & Skinner,
1996). The tournament was also instru-
mental in broadening the appeal of soc-
cer among females as both supporters
(Pope, 2016) and players (Lopez, cited
by BBC, 2016).
There was a more successful cul-
tural and commercial legacy related to
another symbol of the tournament, the
mascot World Cup Willie, conceived
as a marketing device within England
only, but less commercially successful
in 1966 than the English FA had envis-
aged. Subsequent World Cups have had
their own mascots, and the Olympic
Games followed suit a few years later, as
well as the UEFA European Champion-
ship in 1980 (McGuiness, 2011). English
soccer clubs also introduced mascots
in the wake of 1966 (Football League,
1967). The legacy lives on: London 2012
was notable for two mascots, Wenlock
and Mandeville, although it remains
to be seen whether they will have the
longevity of World Cup Willie. Simulta-
neously, the British Olympic Commit-
tee launched Pride the Lion, a mascot
resembling World Cup Willie (Gibson,
2011)! Even today, World Cup Willie
memorabilia can be found for sale on
the collector market, both for original
items and as contemporary souvenirs.
An opportunity for this has been pro-
vided by the soccer nostalgia market,
symbolized by the National Football
Museum’s dual-site World Cup ’66 exhi-
bition in 2016–2017 in Manchester and
Wembley Stadium. Anniversary exhi-
bitions were also organized locally at
other 1966 host cities.
The 50th anniversary was commem-
orated by the media, with documen-
taries, dramatizations, and newspaper
articles. Book publishers also capital-
ized on the event with a plethora of new
titles. An academic symposium was
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  107
held in London during June 2016,
attended by the authors of this article,
along with other academic experts and
authors. Another way in which 1966
has been commemorated was with the
launch of the Sporting Memories Net-
work, a social research project to record
written and oral memories of the tour-
nament. This project was extended to
establish a network of sporting mem-
ories groups for people over age 50
and demonstrates how the unforeseen
legacy of a sporting event can be used
for social good decades later. It exists
“to reignite connections between gen-
erations and combat the effects of
dementia, depression and loneliness.”
(Sporting Memories, 2017) This is fitting
because some members of England’s
1966 team have been diagnosed with
Alzheimer’s disease.
At a local level, a symbolic rela-
tionship between Middlesbrough and
the DPRK has persisted. The Ayresome
Park stadium was demolished in 1997
to make way for a housing estate incor-
porating memorials to the club and
tournament, but a bronze sculpture
marks the location of an important
goal scored by North Korea (Wood &
Gabie, 2011). The North Korean play-
ers revisited Ayresome Park in 2002
(Middlesbrough Football Club, 2002)
and the Middlesbrough Ladies Team
visited North Korea in 2010 (Kelly,
2010).
The Temporary
Organization—A Missed
Opportunity?
We have outlined the outcomes and leg-
acies of the 1966 World Cup tournament
in relation to technological, political,
economic, aesthetic, and symbolic per-
spectives. Also important is the missed
opportunity to sustain the successful
relationships within the project orga-
nization. The delivery of the project
entailed a series of temporary organiza-
tions oriented around each city by the
Local Liaison Committees, stretching
the scope of the project far off the pitch
(FA, 1963b).
 Dynamic Sublimes, Changing Plans, and the Legacy of a Megaproject
PAPERS
These organizations brought soc-
cer’s institutions—including the FA and
the clubs—together with the media,
local authorities, police, and utility
companies such as the General Post
Office and British Rail. This enabled the
creation of an integrated communica-
tions system to manage the unusual
demands of the tournament. Press
centers were established at stadiums
and city centers, with new telephone
links to allow international media to
dispatch reports (Mayes, 1966). Special
rail services were arranged to corre-
spond with games, and British Rail also
set up a Transport Information Unit to
relay information to the BBC (British
Railways Board, 1966). Information
kiosks were provided for foreign visi-
tors (British Railways Board, 1966; HM
Treasury, 1965; Northern Echo, 1966a)
and a corps of language students from
universities recruited as translators (FA,
1965). Universities and colleges pro-
vided premises and team accommoda-
tions (FA, 1964d; Foreign Office 1966a;
Manchester Evening News, 1966). The
temporary organizations engendered
a great sense of camaraderie. Work-
ers in Manchester remarked that it was
a shame there wasn’t another project
after the tournament (Shiel, 2006). This
network evidences the existence of soft
structures, as discussed in our literature
review. However, we broaden Kaplani-
dou et al.’s (2016) concept of business
networks to place greater emphasis on
state-run organizations. In the case of
1966, this was a missed opportunity—
an example of interagency cooperation
to deliver a large-scale project, with no
further projects planned.
Discussion
Scranton (2014) raises the question: “Is
it possible projects serve as a useful cat-
egory for historical analysis?” (p. 354).
We examine this proposition by looking
at one such historical project, the 1966
FIFA World Cup in England. We analyzed
the 1966 World Cup as a megaproject
worthy of analysis informed by project
management and organizational theory,
108  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
in relation to the contexts of its time.
Doing so has allowed us to extend the
work of Flyvbjerg (2012, 2014) by demon-
strating that the four sublimes of mega-
projects can interact and change over the
course of a project. We also identify what
goes on in a sport mega-event project
and how this one was managed.
Our findings provide an alternative
view of the factors that need to be taken
into account when evaluating such events
as a success or failure over time, includ-
ing the symbolic impact on national
identity and status, international rela-
tions, and so on. We also explain the
temporal nature of project implemen-
tation, demonstrating that the strate-
gic and institutional context itself is
not static over the lifetime of a project,
and thus, the contribution of historical
analysis is to provide an opportunity
to evaluate how these challenges were
managed. We argue that this requires an
understanding of the dynamic nature of
megaproject management.
Megaprojects are expensive in terms
of time as well as finance, and thus, they
carry considerable reputational as well
as economic risk. Time, political reputa-
tion, and international diplomacy were
all prominent drivers in the case of
the 1966 World Cup. Unlike contem-
porary sports mega-events or the FIFA
World Cups of the 1930s, the 1966 FIFA
World Cup was not initially conceived
or engineered as a symbolic megapro-
ject. The tournament did not require
the construction of huge new stadiums.
The 1966 edition represents an inter-
esting pivot in the history of soccer’s
World Cup, which was subsequently
amplified; the 1966 event was at the
vanguard of the global expansion of the
soccer “industry.” Despite the lack of
tangible built reminders of 1966 (even
Wembley Stadium has been demolished
and rebuilt—a megaproject in its own
right), tourism and economic opportu-
nities have arisen since, because of the
symbolic nature of the project.
Therefore, we argue that the 1966
World Cup was a “vanguard project”
(Brady & Davies, 2004, p. 1607) and
should be viewed as the pivot point
between the “Stanley Rous era” of FIFA
and the approach taken to hosting
mega-events in Britain, and the com-
ing of Rous’s successor at FIFA, João
Havelange, who ushered in a new com-
mercial era of soccer.
We view this project as one that
emerged within a particular spatial
temporal context, with unique fea-
tures (Maylor, Brady, Cooke-Davies, &
Hodgson, 2006) that arose because of
the nature of the temporary organiza-
tion wrought around it, and one where
there was a great danger of knowledge
being forgotten (Foucault, 1971) as the
FIFA World Cup circus moved on else-
where. By viewing the World Cup proj-
ect in such a way, we also seek to show
that it is possible to answer Söderlund
and Lenfle’s (2013) call for more variety
to enhance our knowledge of projects
in countries such as England and away
from railway, canal, military, and space
projects. We add further methodological
sophistication by breaking away from
the quasi-Chandlerian norm (Söderlund
& Lenfle, 2013), not only challenging
the hegemony of corporate histories but
directly engaging with them while using
their archives to find traces—sometimes
merely transient and ephemeral on their
own—that when converged together
prove synergistic in the creation of the
narrative of a transient, multifaceted
organization.
The argument that sport is a rel-
evant topic for social science has been
made by Bourdieu (1991), who postu-
lated that sport is a form of production
intended to meet a social rather than
economic demand. Within the study of
sport, global mega-events such as World
Cups, which require associated infra-
structure work and off-the-pitch inter-
vention, are a type of megaproject. Their
size and significance are evidenced by
the fact that their organizer, FIFA, has
more members than the United Nations
and because their ubiquity and use of
large sums of money, including public
investment, make them worthy of criti-
cal analysis (De Bruijn & Leijten, 2007).
 The study of World Cups and their
legacy, therefore, requires researchers
to look not just at the tangible eco-
nomic legacy but also at the intan-
gible and non-economic legacy. The
1966 project is particularly interesting
because the tournament that took place
differed significantly from the original
conception. Developments were done
mainly to (1)  meet FIFA required stan-
dards, and (2)  improve hospitality and
press/media facilities. As a result, the
1966 World Cup became an important
event in the evolution of the tourna-
ment toward its contemporary scope
and scale, and also symbolic in English
national identity—partly because of an
injection of public money that contrib-
uted to its success.
The organization of the 1966 World
Cup was a project shaped by Morris and
Geraldi’s (2011) Level 3 environment,
but one in which the parent organiza-
tion, FIFA (Fédération Internationale
de Football Association), franchised out
the implementation to a wide range of
institutional actors such as the English
Football Association (FA), the UK gov-
ernment, local authorities, and national
utilities. These actors came together
to deliver the tournament with a finite
deadline, but the team was dissolved
and moved on to very different projects
despite the feeling that the project orga-
nization had developed real capacity.
This case emphasizes that poli-
tics in the megaproject sense is not
limited to relations with government
­ ate an entire implementation process,
but also to the wider “institutional”
context (­Morris & Geraldi, 2011, p. 20).
Therefore, ­Flyvbjerg’s (2014) definition
of the “political sublime” should be
expanded to include institutions as well
as governments. International non-­
governmental organizations (NGOs)
such as FIFA and the FA provide the
institutional ­framework for the opera-
tion of s­ porting megaprojects. Indeed,
FIFA’s entire e­ conomic survival at the
time was contingent on the World Cup,
and this remains true to a large extent
today, even though the main income
streams now come from sponsorship
and broadcasting rights rather than
ticket sales.
Conclusion and Suggestions
for Further Research
The central contribution of this article is
to illustrate the dynamic nature of Flyvb-
jerg’s (2012; 2014) sublimes framework.
With government intervention, the 1966
FIFA World Cup evolved from just a soc-
cer event into an increasingly important
political, social, and economic mega-
project. We have found that the main
benefits of the project were actually
unintended or perhaps accidental, and
that the intended benefits either did not
materialize or melted away. Govern-
ment intervention in megaprojects is
always a risky activity, but in this case,
the government’s involvement changed
the nature of the project, which had
already shifted from the original plan,
and served to increase the visibility of
the project, thus enhancing its cultural
significance. We have reached these
conclusions by analyzing what hap-
pened during the project and how it
was managed.
Our study has resonance for contem-
porary megaprojects, potentially beyond
sport, where the political sublime is an
important driver. As sports mega-events
become bigger in scale and scope, the
lead time expands. Therefore, the need
to understand the implementation phase
has increased. Historical sports mega-
events provide an opportunity to evalu-
including the change implicit within
this process.
We recommend that further re­search
be undertaken to evaluate the pressures
of continuity and change during the
lives of megaprojects. We have dem-
onstrated the usefulness of contempo-
rary project management theory (i.e.,
Flyvbjerg’s sublimes and Morris and
Geraldi’s three levels) in analyzing an
historic megaproject. In particular, we
have found that these frameworks were
useful for explaining continuity in a
project, but less so change. We have
also found that the main benefits of the
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  109
1966 World Cup project were actually
unintended or perhaps accidental. Gov-
ernment intervention in megaprojects
is always a risky activity but in this case
the government’s involvement changed
the nature of the project, which had
already shifted from the original plan,
and served to increase the visibility of
the project and thus ironically enhanced
its cultural significance. With govern-
ment intervention, the 1966 FIFA World
Cup was more than just a soccer event;
it was an important political, social, and
economic megaproject.
Further research should focus on
the dynamic nature of sublimes and
of decision making within the levels of
a project. Specifically, research should
aim to explain more recent and more
complex megaprojects where legacy
was planned and engineered into the
projects from the early phases. An obvi-
ous comparative study would be to
research another World Cup or Olym-
piad, but other case studies beyond
sports could be similarly rich, such as
transport or military, in instances where
the institutional and political contexts
have been particularly dynamic, such
as regime change. We will now explain
how further research could apply addi-
tional theory to develop and refine the
ideas presented in this article.
In our article, we have drawn mainly
upon Flyvbjerg’s (2012; 2014) sublimes
and Morris and Geraldi’s (2011) three
levels of project management. Used
together, these frameworks were most
suitable because (1) their scope is consis-
tent with the most significant stakehold-
ers identified from our data, and (2)  we
have been concerned with changes over
the lifetime of the project and its lon-
gitudinal legacy, including the way in
which the project has resulted in, or even
shaped, symbolic value. But there are
other perspectives—­for example, a cor-
pus of work on large-scale projects exists
that is underpinned by a sociological per-
spective of institutional theory (see, for
example, Ainamo et al., 2010; Javernick-
Will & Scott, 2010; Scott, Levitt, & Orr,
2011). Here, conception of institutional
 Dynamic Sublimes, Changing Plans, and the Legacy of a Megaproject
PAPERS
theory, which “attends to the deeper and
more resilient aspects of social struc-
ture” (Scott, 2005, p.  460), has adapted
Scott’s (1995) pillars framework, which
emphasizes three main elements of
institutions—­ they are regulative, nor-
mative, and cultural–­cognitive. Put sim-
ply, “institutions lead to regularized or
homogenous behaviour within a group”
(­Mahalingam & Levitt, 2007, p.  523) as
“a dominant institutional form will over-
come a weaker one” (Mahalingam &
Levitt, 2007, p. 526).
The institutional conception of an
organization’s context appears broader
than in the frameworks of Flyvbjerg and
Morris and Geraldi. Scott (2011) proposes
that institutional perspectives can help
inform and guide decision making by
important project stakeholders, includ-
ing “governments, oversight bodies, con-
sumers of services, community members,
and interest groups” (p.  8). This broader
sociological institutional perspective has
been applied to global projects concern-
ing engineering projects focusing on built
environment and infrastructure develop-
ment and does not appear to fully reflect
or explain the findings that emerged
from our data relating to the 1966 FIFA
World Cup. There is, however, potential
for applying institutional theory to other
historic cases, and also to recent sports
mega-events such as the London 2012
Olympics, or contemporary or future
FIFA World Cups, which from the bidding
stage onward explicitly place more
emphasis on legacy for a wider scope of
stakeholders than was evident from our
findings of the 1966 tournament. This leg-
acy has often involved investment in new
infrastructure and the built environment.
For instance, Germany, which hosted the
2006 World Cup, already had sufficient
stadiums to host the tournament, but
public funding was lavished upon infra-
structure, including a new central rail-
way station in Berlin. The 2010 World
Cup in South Africa and the 2014 edi-
tion in Brazil also involved considerable
investment in stadiums and public infra-
structure, and for the 2022  tournament,
host Qatar has promised 9 to 12 stadiums
110  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
with at least a US$65 million investment
in transport and hotel infrastructure
(Tennent & Gillett, 2016). Indeed, the
2022 FIFA World Cup project is suffi-
ciently globalized for the project to act as
an opportunity to import procurement
accreditations from overseas (Kaplanidou
et al., 2016). Specifically, we identify the
following future research directions:
• How do national or organizational cul-
tures affect sports governing bodies such
as FIFA and other global sporting bodies
(e.g., International Olympic Committee
(IOC)), continental confederations (e.g.,
UEFA), and national associations (e.g.,
English Football Association, United
States Soccer Federation)?
• How do national or organizational cul-
tures affect the way these bodies work
with one another and with external
stakeholders such as governments,
sponsors, construction firms, the media,
and other stakeholders?
• How does the institutional perspective
affect the project sublimes for hosting
sports megaprojects?
• How do the institutional factors affect
the perceived legacy of hosting sport-
ing events? Is legacy perceived differ-
ently by different stakeholder groups
depending upon their cultural atti-
tudes, beliefs, and so on?
Hofstede’s (1993) cultural beliefs
include the most deep-set and “slow
moving” of the institutional elements.
They connect to deeper “background”
assumptions taken for granted by their
adherents, including expectations of
power distance, uncertainly avoidance,
masculinity, and long-term orienta-
tion (Campbell, 2004). So, institutional
theory helps us understand how and
why things work the way they do. For
example, conflicting timing norms
can lead to temporal misfits on global
projects (Dille & Söderlund, 2011,
2013); institutional theory could help
us more easily coordinate norms within
sporting megaproject teams to fit the
requirements of the sporting calendar,
TV broadcasts, and so on. Orr, Scott,
Levitt, Artto, and Kujala (2011) identify
leadership, teamwork, and risk manage-
ment as areas for future research, but
perhaps most interesting in terms of the
symbolic legacy for sport megaprojects
might be trust and shared project cul-
ture. The creation of new group identi-
ties, symbols, and collective practices
specific to the project team in sports
mega-event projects raises certain
questions, such as the following:
• To what extent does a shared culture
develop within a project organization,
especially in relation to Morris and
Geraldi’s (2011) three levels of project
management?
• How long does this take to achieve
good performance and how can it be
accelerated?
• How can the quality of output be
optimized?
Project management and insti-
tutional theory has tended to take a
snapshot approach—this is where his-
toric studies are potentially useful;
whereas longitudinal studies require
the researcher to wait for something
to happen, historic studies such as the
case presented in this article allow us to
look at a temporal run of data to analyze
the evolution and legacy of a project
over the medium to long term—in our
case, over six decades. For example,
a process research approach could be
applied to chart events, activities, and
choices, and the involvement of indi-
viduals and organizations within the
project organization, to shed more light
on the sequence of events and dynamics
among the various actors as they inter-
pret and react to events in World Cup
projects (Langley, 1999).
This research agenda has the poten-
tial to help further integrate sport, his-
tory, and project management research
into mainstream international manage-
ment theory areas. Following Engwall’s
(2003) postulation that projects are
nested within their historical and orga-
nizational contexts, we propose further
research to identify the evolution and
linkages between global sporting mega-
event projects. Preuss’ (2007) Matrix of
Event Comparison case studies suggests
that there would be value in studying
other events in the United Kingdom,
such as the UEFA European Champi-
onships 1996 or any of the Olympic or
Commonwealth Games. Alternatively,
we could explore cases in geographies
other than the United Kingdom—
for example, World Cups or other
global sporting megaprojects, including
multisport events such as the Olympic
Games or world championships in a
single global sport.
To illustrate, an interesting compar-
ison to our study but beyond the con-
texts of the World Cup and the United
Kingdom could be the 2020 Olympic
Games, set to be hosted in Japan. Fol-
lowing IOC Agenda 2020 reforms,
which suggest using existing facilities if
it makes financial and practical sense,
and with costs escalating, the Japanese
government has tried to find savings
with new proposals to either move the
location of some venues farther away
from the main Tokyo hub or even to
make more use of some of its existing
facilities, including the built legacy of
the 1964 Olympics (The Guardian, 2016;
Zimbalist, 2015).
In summary, the study of sports
megaprojects using historic and con-
temporary data offers potential for rich
insight as to the ways in which plans and
motives change as megaprojects (and
sometimes also the network of orga-
nizations involved in and around the
temporary organization) become more
high-profile and more political. Apply-
ing dynamic sublimes, levels of decision
making in project organizations, and
institutional theory would surely help
develop and refine the conclusions pre-
sented in this article.
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Dr. Alex G. Gillett is Lecturer in Marketing at the
York Management School, University of York, United
Kingdom. His research interests are relatively broad,
but much of his work has focused on organizational
networks, relationships, and interaction. In addition
to studying contemporary contexts, Dr Gillett has
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founding committee member of the Management and
Business History Special Interest Group of the British
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Alex.gillett@york.ac.uk
Dr. Kevin D. Tennent is Lecturer in Management
at the York Management School, University of York,
United Kingdom. His research focuses on the themes
of governance and strategy in management history,
across the fields of sport, international business,
the music industry, and transport. He is founding
chair of the Management and Business History
Special Interest Group of the British Academy of
Management, and is active in the Management
History Division at the Academy of Management.
He can be contacted at Kevin.tennent@york.ac.uk
PAPERS Symbols, Sublimes, Solutions, and
Problems: A Garbage Can Model
of Megaprojects
John Steen, UQ Business School, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
Jerad A. Ford, CSIRO Futures, Brisbane, Australia
Martie-Louise Verreynne, UQ Business School, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
ABSTRACT ■
In this article, we deploy Cohen, March, and
Olsen’s (1972) garbage can model of decision
making to produce a different lens on the per-
formance of megaprojects. Using a sample
of firms involved in hydrocarbon megaproj-
ects, we show that the problems given the
most public attention by the industry are
different from those responsible for bud-
get overruns. Furthermore, the attribution of
reasons for exceeding project budget differs
between project owners and supply chain
firms. This is consistent with garbage can
model predictions around problem latency
when the multifaceted symbolism of these
projects drives divergent prioritization of
problems in project execution.
KEYWORDS: megaprojects; garbage can
model; problem solving; oil and gas
Project Management Journal, Vol. 48, No. 6, 117–131
© 2017 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
INTRODUCTION
M
egaprojects are an important vehicle for the development of
organizations, cities, and nations. Many of these projects are now
so large that they have been called ‘terraprojects’ (Flyvbjerg, 2014).
While the lure of these ventures is the potential transformation
they bring to businesses that benefit from the investments and governments in
terms of taxes, royalties, and economic development, there is also significant
risk. The poor track record of megaproject performance is well documented,
with Flyvbjerg (2014, p. 11) pointedly summarizing it as “over time, over budget,
over and over again.” The paradox is that even with this history, megaprojects
continue to be sanctioned and often with the same risk factors. This cycle
continues and the frequent failure to learn is an important phenomenon for
both academics and practitioners to investigate.
Clearly, rational choice models of planning and decision making have
limited utility in explaining the recurrent problems of complex megaprojects.
In challenging the rational planning model, Stinchcombe and Heimer (1985)
suggested that all large projects have elements of unforeseen problems and
opportunities and are more akin to innovations. Indeed, the view of ratio-
nal optimization in project management has been recently challenged by a
more emergent/adaptive view (Brady, Davies, & Nightingale, 2012; Davies,
2014; Lenfle & Loch, 2010), and Flyvbjerg has been central in explaining the
apparent irrationality of megaproject planning with concepts from behavioral
economics (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 2003).
A behavioral psychology lens can certainly challenge traditional ratio-
nal decision assumptions (e.g., Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Flyvbjerg, Garbuio, &
Lovallo, 2009; Kahneman, 2012). However, there is some difficulty in applying
theories of individual decision processes to megaprojects that are temporal
phenomena involving a vast number of decision makers within many orga-
nizations (Baum & Ingram, 2002; Davies, Dodgson, & Gann, 2016; Molloy &
Chetty, 2015; Steen & Kastelle, 2012).
Individuals are subject to optimism, availability, and search biases but
how can megaprojects have cognitive bias? Although the cognitive bias of
project managers exists, there is also a milieu of complex organizational
processes that are at work. It follows, therefore, that purely cognitive expla-
nations of actions in large, complex projects have limited explanatory power.
In their review of the strategic decision-making literature, Eisenhardt and
Zbaracki (1992) conclude that although decision makers are boundedly ratio-
nal, power wins battles of choice and chance matters. Agency is therefore a
distributed and emergent property that emerges from organizing processes
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  117
 Symbols, Sublimes, Solutions, and Problems: A Garbage Can Model of Megaprojects
PAPERS
rather than residing with actors (Law,
1992; Steen, Coopmans, & Whyte, 2006).
Not only is agency distributed within
megaprojects, the actors themselves
frequently change during the long
design and construction period, which
may last for several years (Brookes,
Sage, Dainty, Locatelli, & Whyte, 2017).
Project manager turnover in organiza-
tions is highest during project execu-
tion, and the senior managers at the
end of the project may be different
from those in the beginning (Parker &
Skitmore, 2005).
Understanding decisions at the level
of megaprojects means greater con-
sideration of political, institutional,
and psychosocial processes (Flyvbjerg,
2005; Pinto, 2000; Saint-Macary & Ika,
2015; Williams & Samset, 2010). The
socio-technically constructed dimen-
sion of organizational problems and
decisions is accentuated in megaproj-
ects because of their sheer size and the
involvement of multiple stakeholders
and technologies (Maylor, Turner, &
Murray-Webster, 2013; Molloy & Chetty,
2015). Within these projects, there will
be differences in dominant logics and
discourses, not only among the vari-
ous stakeholders, but also within the
organizations responsible for deliver-
ing the project (Saint-Macary & Ika,
2015; van Marrewijk, Ybema, Smits,
Clegg, & Pitsis, 2016). Flyvbjerg (2014),
following Frick (2008), alludes to the
bias that megaproject decision mak-
ers face due to the seductive power of
‘sublimes,’ such as the technological
sublime—”the rapture engineers and
technologists get from building large
and innovative projects” (Flyvbjerg,
2014, p. 8). Other forms of sublimes
include public visibility for politicians,
economic sublimes such as large mon-
etary deals for business people, and an
aesthetic sublime in the guise of beauty
for designers and architects (Flyvbjerg,
2012, 2014). Different agents may there-
fore view the megaproject as a symbol
of technical expertise, political power,
or economic strength, and conse-
quently they will see the problems and
118  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
solutions involved in the design and
delivery of the project from different
perspectives as well.
Literature Review
The Garbage Can Model of Decision
Making
One influential model of organizational
decision making that goes beyond indi-
vidual agents as the locus of decision
making is Cohen, March, and Olsen’s
garbage can model (GCM) (Cohen et al.,
1972; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). In
this model, an organization is “. . . a
collection of choices looking for prob-
lems, issues and feelings looking for
decision situations in which they might
be aired, solutions looking for issues
to which they might be the answer,
and decision-makers looking for work”
(Cohen et al., 1972, p. 2). The formal
articulation of the original GCM is rela-
tively simple with interrelations among
problems, solutions, participants, and
choice opportunities that occur over
time. Problems can be ambiguous with
goals often discovered through the
decision-making process. Solutions are
potential answers looking for prob-
lems. Causal relationships are unclear,
and the connection between means
and ends is not well defined because
the connection is unclear. Participants
in the decision-making process come
and go and their focus of attention is
unstable (Cohen et al., 1972; Levitt
& Nass, 1989; Magjuka, 1988). Prob-
lems attach themselves to choices and
the solutions absorb energy from the
actors, which affects the quantity of
problem-solving energy that is avail-
able in the system (Lomi & Harrison,
2012).
The garbage can metaphor in the
model originates from the idea that
choice opportunities are garbage cans
into which actors place problems and
solutions. The mix of garbage in a sin-
gle can depends on the availability of
alternative cans and the rate that the
‘garbage’ is being deposited and cleared
(Jann, 2015). Although based in the
Carnegie School of bounded rationality
(Cyert & March, 1963), the extension
that the GCM provides revolves around
dynamism, temporality, and ambigu-
ity. Fluid participation, multiple and
unpredictable decision points, and the
integration of these observations are
important features of the model (Jann,
2015; Sager & Rielle, 2013).
The GCM has been applied using var-
ious organizational research methods,
including simulations, case studies, and
field studies (Cohen, March, & Olsen,
2012; Jann, 2015; Lomi & Harrison,
2012; Magjuka, 1988; Masuch & LaPotin,
1989; Pinfield, 1986). An important crit-
icism of the original model is that it
lacks consideration of organizational
structure and control processes and
therefore is a very atypical represen-
tation of organizations (Perrow, 1977;
Sager & Rielle, 2013). However, Padgett
(1980) published a similar simulation to
the original GCM paper (Cohen et al.,
1972) but included management vari-
ables such as hierarchical differentia-
tion, standard operating procedures,
and centralized control and showed
that garbage can decision-making pro-
cesses could still operate under these
conditions.
Megaprojects as Garbage Cans
Applying the GCM to a megaproject
means to reorientate from a rational
decision-making process that posits a
particular order of events to one that con-
siders uncertainty, unexpected events,
and complex processes that connect
solutions to problems. This fits with
the activities within a megaproject, in
that outcomes are largely dependent
on those involved in the decision, and
those attendant to that particular deci-
sion vary greatly depending on the situ-
ation (Brookes et al., 2017; Cohen et al.,
2012).
This decision-making process is very
different from the simple linear model
in which a series of choices are consid-
ered, examined as to their consequences
and alignment with predetermined
objectives, which then leads to a deci-
sion (Cohen et al., 1972; Eisenhardt &
Zbaracki, 1992). As applied to megaproj-
ects, the tenets of GCM posit that deci-
sions are more likely to be the aftereffects
of accidental collisions between oppor-
tunities to make choices (extreme in
the megaproject case due to extensive
stakeholder and community interfaces);
solutions that are looking for problems
to solve (including technologies and ser-
vices); inconsistent participants (firms,
who throughout the project will have
varying influence and motivations to
engage in decision making); and prob-
lems, which may arise from nearly infi-
nite loci (e.g., conflict between firms,
stakeholder management, technologi-
cal interactions, and weather delays)
(Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Hellgren &
Stjernberg, 1995; Stinchcombe & Heimer,
1985).
The GCM model has the poten-
tial to explain the frequently observed
disconnect between problems and
solutions in megaprojects through an
organizational, rather than cognitive,
theory of decision making. Further-
more, while psychological biases have
been deployed to explain the front-
end design and sanction of (mostly
public sector) megaprojects, there has
been less attention paid to decision-
making processes and problem solv-
ing through construction to completion
(Brookes et al., 2017; Olaniran, Love,
Edwards, Olatunji, & Matthews, 2016).
As we shall argue, this is where GCM
has particular utility in providing expla-
nations for decision-making processes
and outcomes in the complex environ-
ment of megaprojects. The GCM has
been criticized for being more appli-
cable to situations in which technolo-
gies are ambiguous and the time frames
for the streams of decisions and solu-
tions to interact are long (Eisenhardt
& Zbaracki, 1992). However, this is a
good description of many megaproj-
ects, especially the development of very
large liquefied natural gas projects,
which we used as the setting for this
research (Olaniran et al., 2016).
In this article we use GCM as a
way of explaining the differences in
problems identified by businesses that
are attributed to megaproject delays
and cost overruns in the Australian oil
and gas industry. By comparing media
reports from business and industry
associations with survey data, we show
that the large operator companies who
own the megaproject focus their atten-
tion on external regulatory issues that
involve actors such as the government
and labor unions. However, the prob-
lems that are identified by managers of
service companies who are construct-
ing the project are actually quite dif-
ferent and relate more closely to the
performance of the project. From a
rational choice perspective this is hard
to understand, but from a GCM view-
point we can see this outcome as a
result of conflicting agendas and solu-
tions to a stream of multiple problems
over time.
This article now provides back-
ground on the research setting—in our
case, the Australian oil and gas indus-
try. We describe the context and pro-
vide a description of the method used
to capture the public narrative that
surrounded the problems facing the
industry at the time of our study. The
article then provides an overview of
the GCM and then shows how it can
be applied to a megaproject context
where the symbolism of these proj-
ects generates different motivations for
undertaking them. Based on the GCM,
we advance propositions of how prob-
lems arise, which reflect the underlying
agendas of the different agents who are
involved in the project. Furthermore,
the structuring of these complex proj-
ects predicts a high level of problem
latency during which problems may
linger within the project without being
resolved. This problem latency creates
cost and schedule overruns. We then
describe the research method used
to test these propositions and discuss
findings from our data analysis. The
article concludes with a discussion of
how the GCM can provide new ways of
conceptualizing performance problems
in megaprojects and generate broader
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  119
research opportunities for agent-based
simulation in megaproject research.
The Case of Australian
Liquefied Natural Gas
Megaprojects: Symbols,
Sublimes, Solutions, and
Problems
The Australian gas industry has long been
challenged by having vast reserves and a
small local market. As gas prices rose after
2005, liquefying this gas and shipping it
to international customers became eco-
nomically feasible. Large global oil com-
panies either acquired smaller Australian
companies or formed joint ventures with
other local and international companies
to access reserves and capital. Even for
the size of these companies, the cost of
these projects was significant at between
US$23 billion and US$60 billion (Ford,
Steen, & Verreynne, 2014).
For some of these companies, the
investment represented the business
sublime of a strategic transformation
and a new growth strategy and at the
same time, technical breakthroughs in
extracting gas from coal was symbolic
of the engineering expertise of these
companies. In the East Coast Australian
coalfields, three projects competed in
a race to be the first to ship liquefied
natural gas (LNG) cargo. By 2012, over
US$220 billion had been committed to
LNG megaprojects in Australia.
However, soon after these projects
commenced, delays and cost overruns
began to emerge (Chambers, 2013; Ford
et al., 2014). The oil and gas industry
had been critical of government regu-
lation and industrial relations and in
the media turned its attention to blam-
ing external factors, including the gov-
ernment and unions for many of the
problems (Ernst & Young, 2014). Sym-
bolically, these projects became ideo-
logical battlegrounds between business,
government, and environmentalists.
The three East Coast projects were
especially contentious, because the gas
delivered to the port for liquefaction
and export came from coal seams (also
called coal-bed methane). Not only did
 Symbols, Sublimes, Solutions, and Problems: A Garbage Can Model of Megaprojects
PAPERS
this use the process of hydraulic fractur-
ing (or ‘fracking’) to release the gas, it
also necessitated the drilling of thou-
sands of smaller wells across a very large
area, which included farmland (Ford
et al., 2014). With this large footprint and
public interest, these projects became
powerful symbols for environmental-
ists, the gas companies, and govern-
ment but with very divergent meanings
and prioritization of problems. The
environmental lobby was able to use
the coal seam gas projects as a rallying
point for other interest groups, includ-
ing many ‘green’ voters in the cities
and some sections of the agricultural
industry, which also forced regulatory
responses from the government (Aus-
tralian Broadcasting Corporation [ABC],
2013). The Queensland Labor govern-
ment used the projects to project an
image of prosperity, including an elec-
tion promise to return royalties from
the project to voters in the form of an
education scholarship worth US$1.6 bil-
lion over 10 years (Hurst, 2012). Simi-
larly, the projects became a contested
subject for the ongoing political debate
on industrial relations. In Western
Figure 1: Reasons cited for oil and gas project overruns in the print media (2010–2015).
120  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
Australia, the massive Gorgon gas proj-
ect, developed by Chevron, had started
with a construction budget of around
US$37 billion and was headed for a
budget of US$60 billion by 2017. While
the project was environmentally chal-
lenging due to the protected status of
the area it was operating in, as well as a
breakthrough CO2 capture and under-
ground sequestration plant that was
attached to the project, the attention of
the industry turned to the high wages
and unionization within the work-
force of 5,000 employees to explain the
cost blowout. Claims of average wages
for low-skill construction workers of
US$150,000 and an infamous example
of a chef being paid US$350,000 were
widely publicized (Ellem, 2014).
Much of the public debate on the
projects happened in the print media,
with the project owners keen on high-
lighting problems external to the project,
which were threatening to delay comple-
tion or increase costs. For this reason,
we conducted a systematic survey of
the business press, which showed the
attribution of problems by the industry
to external factors such as government
regulation and industrial relations.
Our data source was the Factiva database,
which comprises over 30,000 news and
information sources, including the Aus-
tralian Financial Review, The Guardian,
Reuters, The New York Times, The Wall
Street Journal, and Dow Jones Newswire,
covering more than 22 million public
and private companies. We searched the
Factiva database for new reports pub-
lished between 2010 and 2015 mention-
ing Australian oil and gas cost overruns
and blowouts and found 65 reports. We
scanned these reports, coded the com-
monly cited specific problem attribu-
tions, and categorized these into internal
and external factors (Figure 1). High
costs of doing business, a factor that
refers to the cost of doing business in
Australia more generally (Commission,
2014) were most frequently cited, with
labor costs and availability also receiving
attention. Consistent with the politicized
nature of these projects, the complaints
about labor availability were often linked
to work immigration visas, which were
mostly opposed by the unions due to the
perceived threat to Australian workers
(Ellem, 2014).
 From a GCM perspective, an exter-
nal problem focus from project owners
can be seen as part of the megaproject
garbage can in which there is a stream
of problems, solutions, participants, and
choice opportunities that are processed
through the garbage can over time. At the
outset these projects became decision-
making situations where long-standing
industry concerns about unionized labor
and government regulations could be
aired and framed as an obstruction to the
business sublime of creating a world–first
industry, However, what were the con-
sequences of this problem stream enter-
ing the megaproject garbage can at the
beginning of the project? Pinfield (1986)
argues that these circumstances, where
there are divergent agendas with prob-
lems being prioritized over others, are
more likely to trigger garbage can pro-
cesses. As described in the original Cohen
et al. (1972) model, there may be a stream
of potential solutions to these problems
but also a limited amount of energy that
participants can expend on the decision-
making process to make choices.
In a simulation of the garbage can
model under these assumptions, Cohen
and colleagues show that problems
are infrequently resolved and, as the
demands on the system increase in the
hierarchical decision-making structure
most descriptive of megaprojects, the
prospects for problem resolution fall
further. Furthermore, Cohen et al. (1972)
suggest a path dependency, where
decision makers work on active prob-
lems with active choices and therefore
‘. . . decision-makers and problems tend
to move together from choice to choice.
Thus, one would expect decision-makers
who have a feeling that they are working
on the same problems in somewhat dif-
ferent contexts, mostly without results’
(Cohen et al., 1972, p. 10). The garbage
can model indicates that problems can
persist without solutions, especially in
the megaproject context of hierarchical
decision making and increasing load
in the system with the emergence of
unforeseen complications and drive
for speed in delivery, which are typical
of these oil and gas projects (Floricel
& Miller, 2001; Merrow, 2012; Miller &
Hobbs, 2005; Olaniran et al., 2016).
In addition, in the megaproject envi-
ronment of many firms working in a net-
work of contractual relationships there
is a feature of segmented generation of
streams of solutions (Ford et al., 2014).
In all cases with the Australian oil and
gas megaprojects that are within our
sample, the project owners—being the
oil and gas companies—commenced
the project with a systems integrator
firm that would engineer, procure, and
construct (EPC) the project on behalf
of the owner (Olaniran, Love, Edwards,
Olatunji, & Matthews, 2015). While this
allows the owner to transfer risk to the
EPC firm to make the project less risky
for funding purposes, it also effectively
divides the project into segmented pack-
ages delivered by different firms. This
project delivery structure also reinforces
the hierarchical decision-making struc-
ture that slows the matching of problems
and solutions in the GCM.
In this study, we are particularly con-
cerned with the divergent attention of
megaproject owners and service com-
panies within the project to focus on dif-
ferent problems. The GCM predicts that
given the segmented organizing struc-
ture of oil and gas megaprojects there will
be an accumulation of unresolved prob-
lems disconnected from solutions. With
the locus of decisions existing primarily
with the project owners (operators), we
should be able to see differences in the
types of problems identified by them
compared with the service companies in
the supply chain who are more structur-
ally separated from these choices. This
leads us to the first research proposition:
Proposition 1 (P1): The rank order of prob-
lems identified by service companies within
megaprojects will be different from those of
the project owners.
Problem latency can result in delays
later in the project when these unre-
solved problems finally emerge to
disrupt the critical path of the project.
Merrow (2012), in his survey of oil and
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  121
gas megaprojects, finds that there is a
relationship between aggressive sched-
uling and cost overruns. While the stake-
holders in the investment community
exert pressure on boards and executives
to achieve faster project delivery, this
actually slows delivery due to disputes
and technical problems (Merrow, 2012).
This observation is also consistent with
GCM predictions, where increasing load
in the decision-making system can slow
the matching of problems and solu-
tions. Problem latency will be evident
through the relationship between prob-
lems identified by businesses and proj-
ect performance measures. Following
from Proposition 1, although there may
be high-profile attention given to some
problems that were dominant at the
beginning of the project by project own-
ers, there is a likelihood of the accumu-
lation of latent problems throughout the
project network, which have a bigger
impact on project performance. Thus,
Proposition 2 is stated as follows.
Proposition 2 (P2): Lower ranked inter-
nal project problems will be more closely
related to poor project performance than
the publicly visible external factors priori-
tized by project owners.
To test these propositions we con-
ducted a cross-sectional industry survey
of megaproject-involved firms in the
Australian oil and gas industry, which
we describe next.
Methods
Survey and Variables
A survey instrument originally devel-
oped by the Cambridge Centre for Busi-
ness Research (Cosh & Hughes, 2000,
2003; Cosh, Hughes, Bullock, & Milner,
2009; McCarthy, Oliver, & Verreynne,
2017) was adapted for use in the
Australian oil and gas industry setting
(Ford et al., 2014; Ford, Verreynne, &
Steen, 2017). This adaptation was done
through face-to-face interviews with
experienced oil and gas managers and
consultants to test for completeness and
validity. The survey instrument was then
piloted with a larger group of managers.
 Symbols, Sublimes, Solutions, and Problems: A Garbage Can Model of Megaprojects
PAPERS

The purpose of the survey was twofold,
namely (1) to understand the perceived
problems facing firms in the oil and gas
industry and (2) to understand the man-
agerial practices that they employ to
address these challenges. This approach
allowed us to gain a snapshot of the
perceptions of those firms that made
up the industry supply chain—from
owners/operators of the project through
to construction firms and other busi-
nesses that supply specific components
and expertise. Specifically, the survey
asked firms several questions regard-
ing their innovation activities, col-
laboration behaviors, and competitive
environment. It also asked questions
about factors that have caused firms
difficulty in meeting business objectives
in the past three years, such as “Given
your firm’s history in the last three
years, which of the following factors
have acted as a significant limitation
or barrier on your ability to meet your
business objectives?” Answers were col-
lected via a five-point Likert scale (rang-
ing from 1—insignificant limitation to
5—crucial limitation). The 24 items
and their shortened variable names are
shown in Table 1, pointing to a wide
range of internal and external factors
that affect projects. While some of these
variables, such as access to overseas
labor and high costs due to the strong
Australian dollar, are specific to the
research context, we note that these
barriers are broadly in line with other
studies of oil and gas projects (Merrow,
2012; Olaniran et al., 2015).
An additional dichotomous vari-
able regarding budget overrun was cre-
ated to support means testing and to
be used as the dependent variable in
logistic regression analyses. This variable
is called ‘budget exceeded,’ and it takes
the value of one if the firm answered that
“exceeding budget and/or schedule in
projects” is a significant or crucial limi-
tation with regard to meeting business
objectives (a 4 or a 5 on the Likert scale).
It takes the value of zero if not. We used
this variable as the measure of project
performance, because being able to stay
on budget is usually the main indicator of
project success in the oil and gas indus-
try where projects are commenced with
sales agreements in place. The financial
penalties for not having gas ready for
shipment are severe so the construction
budget tends to expand to avoid comple-
tion delays (Ford et al., 2014).
We conducted exploratory factor
analysis (EFA) on the list of barriers to
identify latent “barrier” constructs. Prin-
ciple components analysis with Varimax
rotation was used to validate the gen-
eral view in the literature that megapro-
ject constraints could be grouped into
external and internal factors. The Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Ade-
quacy achieved was 0.751, above the
0.7 suggested minimum (Field, 2009).
Six separate factors were identified, how-
ever, only the first two factors explain
enough variance to be considered in
subsequent analyses (Table 2). The first
factor contains nine items and accounts
for most of the variance. The items in
the factor include governmental regu-
lations, including red tape and envi-
ronmental compliance; social license to

Variable Description Variable (cont’d) Description (cont’d)

 1 Risk sharing
 2 Meet incentive
 3 Scope
 4 Contractual disputes
 5 High cost
 6 Poor productivity
 7 Skilled labor
 8 Management skills
 9 Marketing skills
10 Technological learning
11 Technology acquisition
12 New technology
*Shown in order of appearance in the survey instrument
Table 1: The 24 barriers to meeting business objectives.*
Inequitable risk sharing in contractual 13 Competition Increasing competition
relationships
Ability to meet incentive targets on 14 Red tape Government regulations and compliance
contracts (red tape)
Scope changes in projects 15 Lengthy approval Lengthy project approval processes
Contractual disputes 16 Green tape Environmental compliance (green-tape)
High cost of doing business in Australia 17 Regulatory uncertainty Environmental regulatory uncertainty
(strong A$)
Poor labor productivity 18 Current bottlenecks Current infrastructure bottlenecks
Skilled labor 19 Future bottlenecks Future infrastructure availability
uncertainty (ports, rails, etc.)
Management skills 20 Social license to Social license to operate (land access,
operate community relations)
Marketing and sales skills 21 Overseas labor Access to overseas labor
Learning about technology 22 Immigration processes Immigration processes
Acquisition of technology 23 Labor reporting Mandatory labor reporting and disclosure
Implementing and using new technology 24 Changes to allowances Changes to employee allowances and
concessions

122  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal

 Factor Name External Constraints
Variance explained
Cronbach’s alpha
Immigration processes
Overseas labor
Green tape
High cost
Regulatory uncertainty
Poor productivity
Red tape
Social license to operate
Labor reporting
Contractual disputes
New technology
Meet incentive
Risk sharing
Scope
Table 2: Exploratory factor analysis results.
operate; macroeconomic factors, such as
increased project costs due to the strong
Australian dollar; and labor-related
issues, such as immigration, productiv-
ity, and compliance reporting. These
factors can be considered ‘external con-
straints’ that megaproject firms face.
The second factor that emerged con-
tains all of the contract-related items in
the survey: contractual disputes, incen-
tives, risk sharing, and scope changes
and also includes troubles implement-
ing technology. We called this factor
‘internal constraints.’ No items had
loadings of below 0.49.
Sample
The data were obtained through tele
phone interviews with oil and gas execu-
tives from a range of firms operating
in the Australian oil and gas industry.
The Australian Petroleum Production
and Exploration Association (APPEA)
was the source of respondents. APPEA
is the peak industry body for the Austra-
lian oil and gas industry who supported
the survey by writing to its membership
about the survey. With this support we
were able to achieve a 30% response rate,
Internal Constraints
38.6% 12.6%
0.90 0.84
0.825
0.818
0.702
0.677
0.673
0.623
0.611
0.584
0.504
0.794
0.752
0.714
0.714
0.491
which reflects a relatively high response
rate when targeting executives (Baruch,
1999). The delineation is made between
oil and gas operators (e.g., Shell, Chevron)
and service (supply chain) firms (e.g.,
Schlumberger, Bechtel) in line with
industry parlance (Perrons & Donnelly,
2012). Not all APPEA firms are involved
in megaprojects, so we asked whether
firms were involved in any of the indus-
try oil and gas megaprojects and defined
these as having capital budgets exceed-
ing US$1 billion, giving several named
examples of well-known projects for ref-
erence. Using this question, we identified
a set of 54 megaproject-involved firms
(Table 3). This is the sample used in the
analyses contained in this article.
Data Analysis
To explore the nature of internal bar-
riers leading to potential cost overrun
outcomes, we undertook four analyses,
which are discussed next. Analysis was
conducted using SPSS version 22.
We first ranked the list of barriers
presented in Table 1 by calculating the
mean score for each of the 24 items.
The purpose of this exercise was to
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  123
Sample (n)
Operators 10
Service 44
Total 54
Table 3: Megaproject firms involved in the
sample.
understand where firms ranked internal
project constraints relative to a host of
other barriers, which ostensibly lead
to cost and overruns including govern-
ment regulations and low productivity
(Chambers & Kitney, 2011).
Logistic regression, using maximum
likelihood estimating techniques to
produce odds ratios that describe the
relationship between the independent
variables and the dichotomous out-
come variable, was employed to under-
stand the predictive power of various
constraints on the ‘budget exceeded’
performance variable. Odds ratios are
interpreted similar to ordinary least
squares regression: one unit increase
in the predictor results in an increased
or decreased likelihood that outcome
will be achieved, and that increase (or
decrease) is equal to the odds ratio.
Probabilities and odds have a simple
relationship. Odds (O) are the prob-
ability (P) of an event over the prob-
ability of non-event as summarized in
Equation 1.
p
o 5 _
​       ​  o    
​ and p 5 _ ​ (1)
(1 2 p) (1 1 o)
Robustness Testing
Several tests were used to ensure the
validity and reliability of our results. First,
we used the Mann–Whitney U test of
means, which is a non-parametric test for
comparing continuous or count variables
across two groups based on mean rank
scores (Field, 2009) to test for response
bias. While we did not consider it to
be a concern because the sample frame
included firms in the leading industry
trade group in Australia, which covers
most of the firms in the industry (APPEA,
2012), we did perform additional analy-
sis. We assumed that late responders
will resemble the characteristics of
 Symbols, Sublimes, Solutions, and Problems: A Garbage Can Model of Megaprojects
PAPERS

non-responders, following Armstrong
and Overton (1977). We split the sample
into early and late respondents demar-
cated by the halfway mark of the collec-
tion campaign (De Villiers & Van Staden,
2010) and tested differences using Mann–
Whitney and cross tabulation using Pear-
son exact test (for binary variables). Only
one variable, ‘skilled labor,’ showed any
bias (p , 0.05, two-tailed). Therefore, we
conclude that non-response bias was not
an issue in our analyses.
We also tested for common method
bias because our data came from single
respondent surveys. We undertook the
Harmon single factor test (Leiponen &
Helfat, 2010; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986)
for this purpose. This test uses EFA to
identify whether a single factor accounts
for the result. We applied this test to the
variables used in the logistic regression
analyses in particular. In Model 1, we
found that three factors emerged and
the first factor accounted for less than
48% of the variance. In Model 2, two
distinct factors emerged and the first
accounted for less than 47% of the vari-
ance. It is reassuring that at least two
factors emerged, particularly because
these models are parsimonious and
thus the test is overly conservative in
such cases (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).
To test for multicollinearity we took
the same variables used in the logistic
regression and subjected them to linear
regression and inspected the collinearity
diagnostics. This analysis revealed that
both Models 1 and 2 were free from mul-
ticollinearity. The value inflation factors
(VIF) were no greater than 3 and the aver-
age was 1.8 for both, indicating that multi-
collinearity is not a concern (Field, 2009).
Results
The mean rank order of the “barriers
to meeting business objectives” for
megaproject-involved firms is shown in
Figure 2. This figure demonstrates the

Figure 2: Mean rank of “barrier” Likert scores comparing operator ranking with service firm ranking.

124  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal

differences in the rank of the “barriers”
between the oil and gas operators and
the service companies delivering the
project. It reveals, for instance, that the
high costs associated with the strong
Australian dollar are the primary con-
cern of the whole sample as well as
for operators and service firms indi-
vidually. However, the divergences
between the solid line (operators) and
dashed line (service companies) are
noticeable in several places. Consistent
with the media coverage data shown
in Figure 1, operators rank promi-
nent government issues around regu-
lation and environmental compliance as
important barriers. Poor productivity is
another barrier that the operators rank
highly compared with the service firms
and this relates to union disputes over
workplace flexibility. In terms of inter-
nally related issues: scope changes rank
eighth and sixth, respectively, whereas
sharing of risk ranks 15th and 11th,
respectively, and meeting incentive tar-
gets ranks 20th and 24th, respectively.
This observed divergence in perception
of barriers to project performance is
supportive of the thesis behind the first
research proposition on the existence of
garbage can processes in the megapro-
ject environment.
Mann–Whitney test of means differ-
ence was also used to test if differences
for 24 of the “barriers” between the
group having significant or crucial chal-
lenges with budget and scope (‘bud-
get exceeded’ 5 1) and the group that
did not (‘budget exceeded’ 5 0). These
results are shown in Table 4 and indi-
cate that the only significant differences
(p , 0.10, 1-tail) between these groups
are scope changes and contractual dis-
putes. The estimated size is moderate,
with ‘scope’ at 0.30 and weaker with
contractual disputes at 0.19. The rest of
the items fail to meet standard levels of
significance.

Exact Sig. Effect Size

Median Mann–Whitney U Z (1-tailed) (r)
Risk sharing 2.00 8.00 20.89 0.23 0.12
Meet incentive 1.00 12.00 0.00 0.60 0.00
Scope* 3.00 2.00 22.22 0.02 0.30
Contractual disputes1 2.00 6.00 21.38 0.07 0.19
High cost 3.00 11.50 20.11 0.50 0.02
Poor productivity 1.50 8.50 20.78 0.26 0.11
Skilled labor 2.50 8.00 20.88 0.22 0.12
Management skills 2.00 7.50 21.02 0.23 0.14
Marketing skills 2.00 8.00 21.22 0.33 0.17
Technological learning 1.00 6.00 21.58 0.17 0.22
Technology acquisition 1.00 10.00 20.52 0.33 0.07
New technology 1.00 8.00 20.91 0.29 0.12
Competition 2.50 8.50 20.85 0.36 0.12
Red tape 3.00 7.50 21.00 0.20 0.14
Lengthy approval 3.00 7.00 21.09 0.20 0.15
Green tape 2.00 10.00 20.44 0.36 0.06
Regulatory uncertainty 2.00 7.50 21.01 0.14 0.14
Current bottlenecks 2.00 11.00 20.22 0.43 0.03
Future bottlenecks 1.00 12.00 0.00 0.52 0.00
Social license to operate 1.00 8.00 20.89 0.26 0.12
Overseas labor 2.00 10.00 20.46 0.46 0.06
Immigration processes 2.00 7.50 20.99 0.23 0.13
Labor reporting 1.00 9.00 20.71 0.40 0.10
Changes to allowances 2.00 12.00 0.00 0.60 0.00
1 P , 0.1, *P , 0.05
Table 4: Mann–Whitney test of mean differences of all barriers against ‘budget exceeded.’

December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  125

 Symbols, Sublimes, Solutions, and Problems: A Garbage Can Model of Megaprojects
PAPERS

To further investigate this relation-

Dependent Variable: ‘Budget Exceeded’
ship we undertook logistic regression
analysis. The intent of this analysis is Variables B S. E. sig Exp(B)
to go beyond the simple fact that inter- Risk sharing 0.93 0.63 1 0.40
nal project management and exceeding Meet incentive 0.10 0.65 1.10
budget are related. Rather we wanted Scope 1.26 0.59 * 3.52
to see if internal project constraints can
Contractual disputes 0.87 0.67 1 2.39
predict whether megaproject-involved
firms are exceeding budget compared New technology 0.81 0.60 1 2.25
with high-profile external problems. To High cost 0.34 0.42 1.40
do this, a dichotomous dependent vari- Log size 0.28 0.62 1.32
able called ‘budget exceeded’ was used
Constant 8.55 2.88 ** 0.00
as the dependent variable in the logis-
tic regression. This variable takes the Chi-square 25.97
value of 1 if the firm has “significant” or Sig. 0.00
“crucial” issues exceeding budget and/ 22 Log likelihood 31.24
or schedule. The remaining five items
Nagelkerke R Square 0.584
in the internal constraint factor are then
1(p , 0.1), *(p , 0.05), **(p , 0.01), ***(p , 0.001)
used as independent variables. As con-
trol variables, the raw variable ‘high Table 5: Model 1—Logistic regression controlling for ‘high cost’ and business size.
cost’ is used because it is the number
one complaint of the sample and is
‘budget exceeded’ will equal 1). ‘Meet alone, the model shown in Table 6 con-
an obvious potential driver of budget
incentive’ shows no significant relation- trols for the entire external constraint
overruns. In addition, log size (num-
ship. Importantly, nether of the control factor identified from the exploratory
ber of employees) is used as a control
variables (high cost or log size) are factor analysis. Here, the relationship
(Table 5).
significant in the model, implying that for scope increases to odds of 4.2 (a one
The logistic regression of internal
scope, contractual disputes, and imple- unit means approximately that an 80%
constraints reveals that scope, contrac-
menting new technology are more pow- probability that ‘budget exceeded’ will
tual disputes, and implementing new
erful predictors of ‘budget exceeded.’ be achieved). Contractual disputes do
technology significantly predicts hav-
Whereas the first model controlled not achieve significance. Risk sharing
ing difficulties with exceeding budget.
for ‘high cost’ (exchange rate effect) has a slightly lower albeit still negative
Strictly speaking, with a one increment
increase in scope toward becoming a
crucial barrier (toward 5 on the Likert
Dependent Variable: ‘Budget Exceeded’
scale), the odds of ‘budget exceeded’ are
increased by 3.5 (an approximate 77% Variables B S.E. sig Exp(B)
probability that ‘budget exceeded’ will Risk sharing 21.11 0.69 1 0.33
equal 1). In other words, with increased Meet incentives 0.03 0.65 1.03
scope challenges, there is a 77% chance Scope 1.43 0.64 * 4.17
that a firm will have “significant” or
Contractual disputes 0.75 0.66 2.12
“crucial” issues exceeding budget and/
or schedule. It is worth noting here, the New technology 0.82 0.58 1 2.26
relationship between odds and proba- External constraints 0.95 0.63 2.59
bilities is probability 5 odds/(11odds). Log size 0.30 0.63 1.35
Similarly, a one unit increase in ‘con-
Constant 29.60 3.13 ** 0.00
tractual disputes’ means the odds of
‘budget exceeded’ increase by 2.4 (an Chi-square 27.82
approximate 70% probability that ‘bud- Sig. 0.00
get exceeded’ will equal 1). Interestingly, 22 Log likelihood 29.39
RISK SHARING shows a negative rela- Nagelkerke R Square 0.616
tionship; that is, it increases by one unit,
1(p , 0.1), *(p , 0.05), **(p , 0.01)
the odds of ‘budget exceeded’ decrease
by 0.4 (only about a 29% probability that Table 6: Model 2—Logistic regression controlling for ‘external constraints.

126  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal

relationship to ‘budget exceeded.’
Implementing new technology is still
significant and positive at similar levels
to Model 1. Importantly, in this model
the ‘external constraints’ factor is not
associated with budget overrun. Com-
paring these results to the public debate
on project performance in the print
media (see Figure 1), we can see that,
although scope change is most signifi-
cantly related to budget overrun based
on the data analysis, it ranks tenth in
public media prominence and seventh
by operators in the survey ranking of
project performance barriers.
Discussion
We find differences between the posi-
tion in the supply chain and the attri-
bution of problems from the ranking
data. Compared with the service com-
pany subset, operators are more likely
to focus attention on high-profile exter-
nal problems such as environmental
regulation (so called ‘green tape’), poor
labor productivity, access to overseas
labor, and slow governmental pro-
cesses. Consistent with Proposition 1
and the survey of media articles shown
in Figure 1, these are external factors in
the public domain, where the project is a
contested symbol of economic progress
in the face of government regulation.
Tests for statistical significance between
differences in the rankings showed that
the internal factors of scope change and
contractual disputes were most differ-
ent between the operator and service
company subsets.
When these cited problems (bar-
riers to meeting business objectives)
were regressed against the budget
overrun dependent variable, we find
that only the internal factor ‘scope
changes’ is significant at the p ,0.05
level, whereas problems with new tech-
nology are significant at the p ,0.1
level. High-profile external factors are
not significantly related to project cost
overruns when these internal barrier
items are included in the model. The
latency of the internal constraint fac-
tor is important because it emerges
from the exploratory factor analysis
that reveals underlying relationships
between variables.
The results are congruent with the
thesis behind Proposition 2, where we
advanced the notion that less publicly
prominent problems, which turn out to
be internal project management issues,
would indeed be associated with poor
project performance. Scope change
usually becomes an issue when the proj-
ect needs to deviate from the original
plan (Petit & Hobbs, 2010). These are
responses to situations or unexpected
events that have materialized in the
course of the project and are reactive in
nature (Hällgren & Maaninen-Olsson,
2005; Söderholm, 2008).
Our findings are different from the
study by Merrow (1988) who was able
to attribute megaproject underperfor-
mance to external factors, such as labor
shortages and government regulation.
However, that study of 47 megaprojects
used public-domain information such
as press releases and company reports to
generate the data for analysis. Our study
casts doubt on these results, because this
information has a different purpose from
mere ‘reporting,’ and the political and
stakeholder maneuvering in these docu-
ments cannot be brushed aside (White &
Hanson, 2002). Any study based on this
public information is likely to accentu-
ate the more symbolic external factors
cited by project owners and major stake-
holders in meeting project performance
objectives.
While this study is not a robust test
of the garbage can model, these find-
ings are certainly consistent with what
the GCM would predict under condi-
tions that are a consequence of how
these oil and gas megaprojects in our
study are structured into segmented
work packages. These garbage can pro-
cesses are exacerbated by the symbolic
character of megaprojects, which leads
to divergent prioritization of problems
for the organizations that are associated
with the project from the outset. This
affects problem solving in response to
emergent situations and has material
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  127
consequences for project performance.
Energy and attention are diverted to
address external issues, allowing latent
problem accumulation within the inter-
nal management of the project.
The project management literature
contains many studies that survey an
industry or a location to discover suc-
cess factors or barriers for successful
project delivery. Although these stud-
ies may be valid for smaller projects,
the finding that different businesses
within the project have divergent pri-
oritization of problems casts doubt on
these studies when large projects are
involved. Surveying the project owner
will reveal a particular problem or suc-
cess factor set that may be different
from other businesses within the supply
chain. Similarly, megaproject studies
that use public information, such as
reports and media releases, are also
likely to miss latent problems hidden
within the megaproject ‘garbage can.’
This has practitioner implications for
performance reviews of megaprojects.
Owners of megaprojects routinely con-
duct ‘lessons learned,’ but our research
shows that these reviews must include
inputs from firms in the supply chain to
understand the complexity of problem
and solution streams in order to learn
how to better deal with them.
GCM processes can occur in mega-
projects and it is certainly the case that
megaprojects have a history of producing
a very wide variety of outcomes in
terms of budget and time to completion
(Flyvbjerg, 2005). Nonetheless, evidence
is emerging of alternative megaproject
delivery models, which are more capa-
ble of encouraging coherent problem
solving and producing more consistent
delivery outcomes. For example, Davies
and colleagues describe the role of the
T Five agreement, which provided an
overarching collaborative framework for
the governance of the Heathrow Termi-
nal Five project. This project was ground
breaking in terms of on-time delivery and
safety and was noteworthy for its rapid
response to emergent problems (Davies,
Gann, & Douglas, 2009). Merrow (2012,
 Symbols, Sublimes, Solutions, and Problems: A Garbage Can Model of Megaprojects
PAPERS
p. 42) also notes the rarity of functional
integration in oil and gas megaprojects
where “. . . reservoir functions, facilities
engineers, and drillers work in harmony
and mutual comprehension.” He also
suggests that integrative management
is more common in smaller projects
because “. . . each function and sub-
function has not (yet) evolved into an
organization with turf to defend and
walls to build.”
A possible insight into why these
megaproject integrating agreements
and collaborative organizing models
might work can be found in a study of
the publishing industry, where GCM
processes resulted in surprisingly uni-
form outputs due to strong institutional
forces around the decision environment
that placed a ‘lid on the garbage can’
(Levitt & Nass, 1989). In contrast to
Thompson’s (1967) model where orga-
nizations with uncertain technological
cores should buffer that core from the
environment, megaprojects should seek
to create collaborative institutions like
the T Five agreement to avoid prob-
lem latency (Levitt & Nass, 1989). This
progress in megaproject delivery mod-
els is consistent with Padgett’s (1980)
practical findings from garbage can
simulation studies where the most effi-
cient decision outcomes resulted from
structural organizational design and
appropriate personnel selection for
management roles rather than reactive
management to problems as they occur.
There are some limitations to this
study. The most obvious one is that gar-
bage can processes are an unobserved
variable due to the nature of the survey,
which doesn’t capture processes. As was
mentioned earlier, this article is not a
true test of the GCM in megaprojects.
While we develop propositions that are
grounded in the GCM and we find that
the results are supportive of these prop-
ositions, this is different from a true test
of the model (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki,
1992; Lomi & Harrison, 2012). Another
limitation is that our setting of the oil
and gas industry has an unusual level
of technological uncertainty due to the
128  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
world-first construction of unconven-
tional gas to LNG facilities. This would
accentuate GCM processes, which may
not be as dominant in projects with
lower levels of technological uncer-
tainty or shorter duration (Cohen et al.,
2012).
It has been over 40 years since
Cohen et al. (1972) first articulated the
GCM and the testing of the model in a
simple computer simulation in FOR-
TRAN. Since that time, the capacity for
researchers to simulate complex sys-
tems has increased exponentially and
agent-based modeling is now a well-
established research methodology that
is applied across a variety of disciplines,
including business and economics
(Bonabeau, 2002; Holland, 1995). While
it would be possible to experiment with
parameters in the older GCM to repli-
cate different forms of megaprojects,
agent-based modeling (ABM) offers a
vast literature in simulation methods
to study multi-agent processes, such as
the coordination and completion of a
megaproject and different conditions.
One of the challenges of megaproject
research is that studies are frequently
based on small samples or single case
studies. ABM creates an opportunity to
change starting conditions such as con-
tracting relationships, information flow,
decision flexibility, and compare these
with observed outcomes. This type of
study is not constrained by access to
data, which is a challenge in current
research (Jann, 2015; Lomi & Harrison,
2012). Cohen, March, and Olsen’s pio-
neering simulation work, using very
basic computers, offers a direction in
megaproject research that has thus far
been overlooked.
Conclusions
This article offers a different explana-
tion of megaproject performance based
on the garbage can theory of organiza-
tional decisions. In our case of oil and
gas megaprojects in Australia, public
discussion of symbolic external issues,
such as government regulation and
industrial relations, is also reflected
in our survey of the large oil and gas
companies who own the project, but
these issues are not the main perfor-
mance barriers for the service compa-
nies that are constructing the project.
Exploratory factor analysis reveals a
latent group of internal problems, espe-
cially scope changes and technology,
which are more influential in determin-
ing cost overruns. This latency is con-
sistent with the existence of garbage can
processes within megaprojects.
The GCM endeavors to model the
decision-making and problem-solving
processes of organizations in a way that
is more grounded in the dynamics of
organizations. Rather than assuming
simple and linear decision processes,
it adopts a more sociological view that
is sympathetic to the complex, pres-
sured, and contested decision-making
environment of megaprojects. Over the
course of several years of megaproject
research, we have conducted nearly
100 hours of interviews with executive
managers and, while they are highly
skilled professionals, they also make it
clear that they are operating in a com-
plex organizational context where the
best course of action is often only obvi-
ous in hindsight. We also saw instances
where problems emerged in the project
but these were left unsolved due to
other priorities. In the words of one
manager: “We kept kicking the can
down the road.” This reality is certainly
consistent with a GCM view of the orga-
nization. While our application of it to
a megaproject setting might seem con-
troversial when compared with the nor-
mative project management literature,
which focuses on an optimistic view of
front-end design and planning (Davies,
2014; Olaniran et al., 2016; Williams &
Samset, 2010), it does offer alternative
explanations for the recurrent problems
in megaproject performance and pro-
vides interesting prospects for future
research.
Acknowledgments
We gratefully acknowledge financial sup-
port from the PMI Sponsored Research
Program for this study. The article has
benefited from two anonymous Project
®
Management Journal reviewers.
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John Steen is an Associate Professor in Strategy and
Innovation at UQ Business School, the University of
Queensland. His research focus on innovation extends
to complex capital intensive businesses, such as
mining and oil and gas. He has published in a range
of peer-reviewed journals and collaborates in research
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  131
projects with a range of well-known companies. He
can be contacted at j.steen@business.uq.edu.au
Dr. Jerad A. Ford is an innovation manager and
strategist with nearly two decades of experience
across industry, academia, and government.
For a decade, Jerad has managed research and
development programs for clients in a range of
sectors, including oil and gas, renewable energy,
and defense. In the five years since, he has been
studying the links between innovation and business
performance in a range of contexts and settings,
from small businesses to industrial ‘megaprojects’ at
UQ Business School, the University of Queensland.
He can be contacted at Jerad.ford@csiro.au
Martie-Louise Verreynne is an Associate
Professor in Entrepreneurship and Innovation at
UQ Business School, University of Queensland,
Brisbane, Queensland, Australia. Her research in
small firm innovation and resilience focuses on how
these firms leverage capabilities and networks to
gain a competitive edge. Martie-Louise is a regular
contributor to leading entrepreneurship, strategy, and
interdisciplinary journals. She can be contacted at
m.verreynne@business.uq.edu.au.
 A Reflection of the State-of-the-Art in
PAPERS
Megaproject Research: The Oxford
Handbook of Megaproject Management
Jonas Söderlund, BI Norwegian Business School, Norway
T
he Oxford Handbook of Megaproject Manage­
ment edited by Bent Flyvbjerg is an important and
certainly timely book. The interest in megaproject
management has probably never been greater.
This is equally true for research on megaprojects and
megaproject management. The general impression is
that more and more people are entering the field of
megaproject management, more scholars are attending
a growing number of conferences, and workshops are
being organized to drive research and scholar–practitioner
interactions. The Project Management Institute is initiating
research-related activities targeting the management of
megaprojects. MIT Sloan Management Review recently
published a paper on innovation in megaprojects that,
to a great extent, demonstrates the interest from general
management, top managers, and key decision makers in
the challenges associated with megaprojects (Davies et al.,
2017). Harvard Business Review has published a number
of key papers addressing the difficulties associated with
decision making in large-scale projects. The Academy of
Management organizes workshops specifically targeting
the management and organization of megaprojects,
and a number of universities, business schools, and
engineering schools around the world are setting up
centers of excellence in research and training within the
area of megaproject management. To be sure, these are
indeed exciting times for anyone interested in large-scale
projects, and megaprojects are an important focal area of
project studies (Geraldi & Söderlund, 2017), as well as a
significant arena where project scholars can meet scholars
from a number of other disciplines, including strategy,
innovation, economic geography, urban planning, archi­
tecture, sociology, and engineering.
This rapid development clearly calls for a definition
of the field; an overview of what is currently taking place;
along with a discussion about the central areas of mega-
projects, the core topics, and the core contributors. This
Handbook does a wonderful job in doing just that—all
under the auspices of Professor Bent Flyvbjerg at the
University of Oxford. Professor Flyvbjerg is one of the cen-
tral players in this emerging field of research and he has
Project Management Journal, Vol. 48, No. 6, 132–137
© 2017 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
132  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
teamed up with world-leading contributors from a diverse
set of scholarly disciplines and backgrounds to offer a
contemporary view of megaproject management. It adds
considerable depth to mainstream project studies and
previous handbooks of project management (Morris et al.,
2011) by offering a broader and interdisciplinary scrutiny
of projects with an explicit focus on a particular kind of
projects. This f raming triggers new perspectives and the
identification of novel problems, as well as it fosters new
understandings of organizational processes, and thus new
possibilities for theorizing (Söderlund, 2011).
Without spending too much time on the definition—
whether it is about the number of people involved, the
money invested, or the time spent—we all know that mega-
projects are the large-scale projects that shape and change
society. Most of them are found in infrastructure (such as
city development, transportation systems, communication
systems), but they could also target the development of
completely new technologies, such as the Manhattan Proj-
ect, the Large Hadron Collider project in CERN, and many
other large-scale scientific and research-oriented projects
that develop future science and technologies. The term
“megaprojects” is rather recent, but major projects and
large-scale projects and programs are labels that people have
been using for ages for similar types of projects. The new and
primary idea of the megaproject concept is the focus on
infrastructure and the connections to economic geography,
architecture, and regional and urban planning. Less on
product and systems development in that sense, which are
certainly large, but that might not meet the same kinds of
challenges associated with politics, stakeholder complexity,
and environmental concerns. The book undoubtedly unveils
many of the challenges associated with these projects, about
their decision-making challenges, political intricacies, insti-
tutional requirements, and technological difficulties.
Following a short introductory chapter, which add­
resses the prevalence and problems of megaprojects by
the editor Bent Flyvbjerg, there are 24 chapters divided
into four parts: challenges, causes, cures, and cases. The
division makes a lot of sense, although it is sometimes dif-
ficult to follow whether or not each of the chapters actually
adheres to the theme into which it has been categorized,
and what each theme actually is targeting.
In Chapter 2, the first chapter in Part I of the book,
Lenfle and Loch discuss why megaprojects so often fail.
The authors underscore the essential role of poor manage-
ment in explaining the poor performance of megaprojects,
specifically that management fails to address uncertainty and
stakeholder complexity. According to the authors, the combi-
nations of these challenges were known already in the 1940s
but management has lost the capability to address them.
Going back to the root of the problem seems to be a good
idea, with a stronger emphasis on acknowledging inherent
uncertainties, stakeholder management, and flexible contract
management. The chapter contributes to an insightful and
intriguing treatise on the history of megaproject management.
In Chapter 3, Siemiatycki offers an interesting historical
and macro-perspective on the development of megaprojects.
The author introduces the idea of waves of megaproject devel-
opment. Siemiatycki demonstrates his idea with a number of
cases, which took place between 1890 and 2007. He demon-
strates that these cycles of megaproject development range
from brief punctuated fads to long-term trends. The cycles are
driven by a complex blend of technological innovation, eco-
nomics, social networks, ideologies, and interest groups that
spur the diffusion of certain new megaproject approaches.
Megaprojects are thus triggered by the political lure of achiev-
ing major tangible benefits, as well as the potential to convey
a powerful set of intangible symbolic messages that are often
associated with particular megaprojects. The chapter pro-
vides a broadened view on megaprojects, and the notion of
waves of megaprojects seems promising as a valid explana-
tion for the existence of megaprojects.
But, why do megaprojects have to be that big? Why
do they have to be megaprojects? Why not smaller-scale
projects? This is the focus of Chapter 4, written by Ansar,
Flyvbjerg, Budzier, and Lunn. The authors discuss why
­bigger always seems to be worse by centering the analysis on
investment fragility. The authors point out that big capital
investments break easily and that they may deliver negative
net present value to a great extent because of various sources
of ­uncertainty that impact a megaproject during its extended
time of development to fruition. The authors show, based
on the empirical research on mega-dams, that nearly half of
the projects suffered a cost overrun so large for the project
to be considered broken before it even began operations.
The authors point out that developing countries ought to
stay away from projects that are big relative to the national
economy. In that respect, the authors clearly demonstrate
that bigger is far from always better and provides a healthy
critical analysis of the existence of megaprojects.
Addressing the institutional challenges, particularly for
global megaprojects, is the focus of Levitt and Scott’s Chap­
ter 5. The authors discuss a key reason why megaprojects
tend to dissolve—traditional legal-contractual governance
mechanisms almost always break in projects crossing insti-
tutional and national divides. The authors point out the dif-
ficulties associated with mixing and matching governance
mechanisms in large-scale global projects. In particular,
Levitt and Scott zero in on the difficulties so common in these
projects and associated with cooperation and coordination
across institutional divides. This is a chapter that makes an
important linkage between projects and institutional theory,
which adds to our understanding of the current challenges
facing megaprojects and a theoretically interesting explana-
tion as to why they so often seem to fail.
Moving even further into the realms of the ethical and
political issues associated with megaprojects is the aim of
Chapter 6 by Van Wee and Priemus. The authors particularly
address the ethical aspects of the impacts of megaprojects on
society, the quality of the estimates of the cost-benefit-analysis
of megaprojects, and the democratic quality of the decision-
making process preceding megaprojects. The authors offer evi-
dence indicating that estimates are often biased: costs are more
frequently underestimated than overestimated and benefits
are typically more often overestimated than they are underes-
timated. In a condensed summary of normative frameworks of
how to deal with these problems, the authors offer a set of core
principles on how to improve the quality of cost estimates. This
chapter is important to anyone interested in what needs to be
done to fix the fragile foundation of many megaprojects.
Ending the section on the challenges is Chapter 7 by Xuefei
Ren. The author offers an in-depth description of the current
situation in China based upon which the author asks whether
the current megaproject wave is the biggest infrastructure
bubble ever seen in world history. The chapter centers on the
conditions that underlie the planning and implementation of
megaprojects, most specifically the regulatory reforms in the
land, housing, and financial sectors. The author locates many
of the underlying reasons driving the megaproject boom to be
found in regulatory changes in these sectors. In many ways,
the author offers a refreshing analysis of the contested nature
of megaproject development, and a sobering conclusion that
tightened regulations will probably put a stop to China’s mega-
project era. Again, this is a chapter that connects the existence
of megaprojects with regulatory changes. It is an important
contribution based upon research on one of the most fascinat-
ing domains of megaproject development.
Part II of the Handbook centers on the causes of mega-
projects or, perhaps more accurately, on the causes of the
challenges facing megaproject management. In Chapter 8,
Flyvbjerg leads the way for this part with a contribution on
Albert Hirschman’s work on the principle of the hiding hand—
basically indicating that poor initial estimates in the project
are accompanied by an underestimation of the ability to deal
with the problems faced during the project. This has consid-
erable creative effects, argued Hirschman. Flyvbjerg criticizes
the fundamental and general claim that Hirschman presented
in his book more than 50 years ago. He demonstrates that
Hirschman’s data collection was biased, that the dataset was
far too limited, that Hirschman misrepresented his findings,
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  133
 A Reflection of the State-of-the-Art in Megaproject Research
and that it is difficult to replicate Hirschman’s findings
through statistical tests. In many ways, this chapter offers an
important critique of Hirschman’s work on the so-called ‘hid-
ing hand,’ yet also demonstrates how we can move on and
learn from the work by Hirschman, centering on in what sense
and context that the hiding hand is a benevolent hand and
when it works in the complete opposite way—as the malevo-
lent hand. These are important matters for the future that very
well could lead the way for an integrated and balanced schol-
arly debate about the rationality and different rationalities
underlying the decision to implement a megaproject.
Helga Drummond continues the analysis of decision-
making problems in megaprojects in Chapter 9 by addressing
megaproject escalation of commitment. The topic is highly
relevant for a book on megaprojects as this topic is probably
one of the most influential areas of research linking mega-
projects with decision making ever since the publication of
the seminal work by Staw and Ross in the 1970s (e.g., Staw &
Ross, 1978). Drummond elegantly summarizes the core ideas
of this stream of research, addressing questions such as: Why
does escalation start, how does it start, and what drives deci-
sion makers to hold on to an economically weak megaproject?
The chapter is important as it provides a coherent summary
and analysis of extant research, yet simultaneously points out
several important avenues for research and practice on how
to encourage commitment to megaprojects and the dreams of
megaprojects, yet avoid the dangerous effects typically seen
in cases escalating commitment.
In Chapter 10, Miller, Lessard, and Sakhrani address the
issue of megaprojects as ‘games of innovation.’ In particular,
the authors point out the criticality of project shaping for
large-scale projects, including demand forecast, frame agree-
ment between sponsors, business model, regulatory decisions,
and partnership agreement. This is another important chapter,
especially the framework and discussion of project shaping,
the process of project shaping, value creation in project shap-
ing, and the management of project complexity, and less focus
on the games of innovation. In many ways, this chapter dem-
onstrates the importance of building a solid foundation for
megaprojects, of shaping the project in an accurate manner, of
ensuring that the environment is sufficiently stable to allow for
the implementation of the project. These are important tasks
that involve multiple stakeholders, including project owners,
sponsors, politicians, top managers, and project managers.
In Chapter 11, Clegg, Sankaran, Biesenthal, and Pollack
address the issue of power and sensemaking in megaproj-
ects. The authors examine current practices underlying the
management of megaprojects and show how the evolution of
these practices created a management discipline that became
ill equipped to deal with the current challenges facing con-
temporary megaprojects. In particular, the authors emphasize
the need to incorporate power relations into the analysis. The
authors present different ways in which project management
134  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
produces cues for common sensemaking—creating, adapting,
and using common frames of meaning that could character-
ize the megaproject organization and its members. Clegg
et al. demonstrate that, given the temporality and fluidity of
projects, projecting the past onto the future is particularly
problematic and important for project managers, as most
actors will have a variety of distinct experiences to draw on
when making sense of occurrences in projects. This is proba-
bly particularly true for projects spanning institutional fields.
Accordingly, the story that emerges around megaprojects can
be “expected to be fragmentary, discontinuous, and subject
to much subtle and sometimes not so subtle respecification”
(Clegg et al., 2017, p. 245). The chapter nicely captures the
integral features of power relations and sensemaking, that
power is a central concern for megaprojects, and that sense-
making is particularly difficult in a fragmented megaproject
context. Indeed, it demonstrates that politics is an integral
part of megaprojects and the analysis of these organizations
and that researchers should engage more closely in the emer-
gence of the narrative around and within a megaproject; how
meaning is created in the context of megaprojects to better
understand what actually goes on in these kinds of projects.
Such an understanding would definitely contribute to project
managers’ action repertoires needed to implement highly
fragmented megaprojects.
Chapter 12 by Nuno Gil offers a ‘collective’ action per-
spective’ on the planning of megaprojects. Based on an in-
depth, comparative study of four major infrastructure projects
in the United Kingdom, the authors show that to sustain a
highly fragile consensus-oriented development, management
needs to know when to resolve the make-or-break issues by
relaxing rules, building slack and flexibility, or conceding
problem-solving capacities to arbitrators. In many ways, the
chapter builds further on the politics argument presented
by Clegg et al. in the previous chapter. It focuses specifically
on what kinds of flexibilities are important in megaprojects
and what managers can do to maintain and make use of
them. It also addresses how a particular kind of safeguarding
mechanism should work in these kinds of complex and multi-
organizational undertakings.
In Chapter 13, on the drivers of mega-events in emerg-
ing economies, Baade and Matheson demonstrate why the
economic outcomes for mega-events in sports have fallen
short of expectations. The authors point out that unreasonable
expectations, poor management, and corruption are critical in
explaining the failure to achieve satisfying economic outcomes
in the domain of mega-events. These observations are also
valid for the analysis of megaproject performance on a more
general level. The chapter furthers the analysis of the politi-
cal issues of megaprojects and makes a strong point about the
combination of unreasonable expectations and poor man-
agement being at the core of the underperformance of many
megaprojects. It nicely identifies several common concerns
among megaprojects in general and the specific case of mega-
events and thereby identifies several important linkages among
these knowledge areas. This seems particularly important as
many megaprojects, such as stadiums and apartment build-
ings, are built adjacent to a mega-event, such as the Olympic
Games or World Championships (Davies & Mackenzie, 2014).
Part III of the book centers on the cures for failed mega-
project performance. This part begins with Chapter 14 by
Davies, Dodgson, and Gann on innovation and flexibility
in megaprojects. The authors present a new delivery model,
which relies to a much greater extent on innovation and
flexibility. Central to succeeding with developing such a
model are, according to the authors, five strategic processes:
search capabilities, adaptive problem-solving capabilities,
test and trial capabilities, strategic innovation capabilities,
and balancing capabilities. These processes are illustrated
by the use of examples from in-depth empirical research on
infrastructure projects in the United Kingdom. The chapter
is very nicely written, empirically solid, and also well in
line with the topic for the part itself—cures for megaproject
underperformance. It intellectually connects with the chapter
by Lenfle and Loch, which addressed the current problems
facing megaproject management. The chapter by Davies and
colleagues certainly paves the way for future research on
linking megaprojects with the field of innovation—an area of
research that will not only contribute to our understanding of
the problems facing megaprojects, but also how innovation
might better be integrated into contemporary megaprojects.
Graham Winch takes the linkages between stakehold-
ers and megaprojects further in Chapter 15 on megaproject
stakeholder management. The author provides a comprehen-
sive overview of current theorizing on stakeholder manage-
ment, tracing its roots and significance to project management.
Moreover, Winch discusses two relatively novel extensions
of stakeholder management by elaborating on the ways
that stakeholder management literature has benefitted from
analyses from actor-network-theory and institutional theory.
The chapter concludes with an outline of a contemporary per-
spective on megaproject stakeholder management—what the
author refers to as megaprojects and society, which addresses
the political, economic, and ethical issues surrounding mega-
projects. The chapter offers an important update of the
stakeholder management literature and a healthy view of the
big issues in stakeholder management. This chapter clearly
makes the case that researchers studying megaprojects should
be aware of the larger societal challenges and how megaproj-
ects might contribute to these problems, or how they could be
designed to better address society’s major problems. A better
understanding of stakeholder management is certainly an
important first step towards that end.
How might private finance solve the problems cur-
rently facing megaprojects? This is the overarching question
answered in Chapter 16 by Hodge and Greve. The authors
offer a succinct account of the current state of research on
the private funding of megaprojects, including a meta-level
analysis of reports that indicate favorable outcomes of such
initiatives, and reports indicating negative outcomes of such
initiatives. The chapter is topical, as private funding is critical
for megaprojects in general—it should play a key role in driv-
ing megaproject performance improvements and a broader
engagement from a diverse set of stakeholders in society’s
most important projects. In that respect, it builds further on
Winch’s chapter on stakeholder management by address-
ing to what degree the financial solution paves the way for
broader and better stakeholder engagement.
Compared to several other chapters, which address the
underperformance of megaprojects, in Chapter 17, Roger
Vickerman offers a slightly more positive view in his chapter
on the wider impacts of megaprojects. The author points out
that for most megaprojects in the transport sector there are
wider economic impacts not captured in traditional appraisal
methods. The chapter offers evidence that there is a sound and
theoretical, as well as an empirical basis, for justifying the inclu-
sion of wider economic impacts in the appraisal of megaprojects.
Vickerman emphasizes the need for an objective way of deter-
mining when the wider impacts should be included, and what
accepted method of their valuation to use. The chapter is impor-
tant to anyone interested in benefits realization and value cre-
ation in megaprojects as it demonstrates the plethora of factors
that need to be included in an accurate analysis of their effects.
This chapter also provides additional evidence to several of the
arguments presented in Winch’s chapter on stakeholder man-
agement of looking broadly at megaprojects and their effects.
In Chapter 18 by Volden and Samset, the quality assur-
ance in megaproject management is the center of attention.
The authors rely on a wealth of data from the quality assur-
ance regime implemented in Norway. The authors point
out that this regime has improved the operational success,
the tactical success, as well as the strategic success. The
authors claim that too often the analysis of performance of
megaprojects tends to focus on the operational success, but
that it needs to include the other two success parameters as
well. The aim of a quality assurance regime, such as the one
implemented in Norway, is to ensure political control, an
adequate basis for decisions, and a distinct set of milestones
and decision gates that applies to a broad range of sectors.
The chapter is important as it summarizes Norway’s experi-
ence from implementing a decision-gate regime that focuses
on the front-end in megaprojects. This constitutes an exem-
plar that several other countries are about to implement or
are currently being considered for implementation. With its
broader view on success, it also adds to Vickerman’s argu-
ment on the wider impacts of megaprojects as central for a
balanced view of megaproject performance.
In Chapter 19, Thayer Scudder presents a series of con-
vincing pieces of evidence that analysts should pay more
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  135
 A Reflection of the State-of-the-Art in Megaproject Research
attention to the environmental and social costs of mega-
projects. His chapter centers on the case of mega-dams. The
author shows why mega-dams are poor—even unacceptable
investments from a societal point of view. This chapter offers
a balanced view of the negative long-term costs—a wider
perspective on megaproject performance, which nicely bal-
ances the earlier mentioned chapter on the wider benefits of
megaprojects. Again, it provides a good argument for looking
broadly at the consequences of megaprojects.
The final five chapters are grouped under the heading
“Cases.” These chapters offer different empirical illustra-
tions of the decision-making and managerial aspects of
megaprojects. Chapter 20 by Holzmann, Shenhar, Zhao,
and Melamed focuses on cracking the code of megaproject
innovation through the example of Boeing’s 787 project.
The chapter demonstrates how Boeing underestimated the
managerial consequences of technological innovation and
underlines the importance of understanding the contingen-
cies facing a megaproject. The chapter illustrates the value of
the contingency approach to megaprojects by understanding
the project’s degree of novelty, technological uncertainty,
complexity, and pace. This chapter nicely summarizes several
of the core ideas with the contingency theory of megaproject
management that highlight the importance of uncertainty and
complexity for the design and management of these projects.
With an analysis of the London 2012 project, Andrew
Davies demonstrates in Chapter 21 the importance of sys-
tems integration to succeed with megaprojects. To a great
extent, the author focuses on the challenges associated with
project complexity and how organizational actors deal with
almost unsurmountable project complexity due to the num-
ber of systems, technologies, and actors involved. It addresses
more closely some of the factors highlighted in the chapter
by Holzmann and colleagues. In particular, Davies’ chapter
suggests that dealing with a system of systems project calls for
wider strategic capabilities and skills to manage the overall
program scope and the multiple stakeholders involved in the
project. Davies points out the role of systems integration not
only for internally dealing with the many interfaces involved
in a megaproject, but also externally—linking the project with
its external environment. Besides emphasizing the impor-
tance of certain contingency factors, Davies also underscores
the value of strategic capabilities to manage the most pressing
challenges.
In Chapter 22, Gerardo Del Serro Santamaría offers an
analysis of iconic megaprojects in light of the so-called Bilbao
effect—the perception that the Guggenheim Museum project
resulted in a Cinderella-like transformation of the entire city
of Bilbao in Spain. The chapter discusses this effect on a wider
level by examining a number of other iconic urban projects.
The notion of the Bilbao effect is interesting, and should pro-
vide considerable opportunities for future research. Del Serro
Santamaría remains critical toward this effect and illustrates
136  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
the problems of associating the effects to a particular project;
for instance, he points out that it is difficult to establish a con-
nection between the growth of the Basque tourist industry,
which gained momentum following the Guggenheim Bilbao
Museum, and the increase of the Basque GDP. The idea of
the Bilbao effect is certainly important in times when urban
policies are presented to increase global visibility and attract
visitors and investments to cities. As the author claims, cities
compete through grand-scale projects. In essence, the Bilbao
effect shows how an imaginatively designed megaproject can
help turn a city around. The author, however, emphasizes that
“a spectacular building alone. . . . is not usually capable of shift-
ing their fortunes in fundamental ways” (p. 515). This chapter
offers several ideas for future research, both in analyzing in fur-
ther depth the nature of the Bilbao effect, in cases where one
could establish real links between projects and growth, and the
actual consequences of this effect, looking more closely at the
complementary of effects from several initiatives and projects.
In Chapter 23, Demi Chung focuses on the case of Austra-
lia’s motorways—a context in which public–private partner-
ships have been used on a large scale. The author investigates
the performance of design, build, finance, and operate road
(DBFO) projects. The principle rationale underlying these
projects is that they facilitate the transfer of risk to the party
that has the greatest capacity to manage that risk. The chapter
presents several interesting case studies based upon which
the author draws a number of important and insightful con-
clusions. The first conclusion is that the private provision in
road infrastructure has progressively evolved into a more risk-
balanced approach; second, the erroneous traffic forecasts
have created fundamental problems for the business of these
projects; and, third, the current capabilities of governments
are insufficient to negotiate appropriate and equitable risk-
sharing arrangements with private partners. For that reason,
the author points out that a proactive risk management para-
digm adhering to risk allocation rather than a risk-shifting
approach is needed to create sustainable DBFO projects.
In Chapter 24, Janis Van der Westhuizen discusses
megaprojects as political symbols. The focus is on South
Africa’s Gautrain—a high-speed train connecting Pretoria,
Johannesburg, and OR Tambo International Airport. The
chapter focuses on the mythical discourses that typically
surround megaprojects, in other words, the ways in which
symbols, images, and metaphors are the products of symbolic
processes. In particular, the author demonstrates how these
dimensions play a central role in the discourse shaped by
proponents and opponents of megaprojects. The author
offers a succinct analysis of megaprojects as status symbols,
marketing tools, and aspirational mechanisms—to signal to
the world the progress of a particular community.
Chapter 25, the final chapter in the book, is written by
Ahlers, Zwarteveen, and Bakker. The empirical context is large
dam development—an interesting context for megaproject
analysis given the large number of mega-dams carried out
during a relatively recent period of time, the complexity and
technologies involved, and the interaction between private and
public sectors in shaping and implementing these projects. The
empirical context is also particularly interesting as mega-dams
have re-entered the agenda of world politics and are today
larger than ever and more problematic than ever, plagued by
principal–agent problems and opportunistic behavior among
the actors involved. The authors argue that the current growth
of mega-dams is occurring despite the lack of evidence show-
ing that these dams positively affect poverty, environments,
and livelihoods. To advance the analysis of megaprojects, the
authors suggest an analysis based on the Lefebvrian notion of
‘production of space’—defining dams not as objects in space
but as agents in spatial strategies and as sites of continued and
dynamic struggles. With the example of the Egyptian Aswan
High Dam, the authors show how mega-dams were legitimized
as carriers of economic development and political and ideo-
logical spatial strategies. According to Ahlers et al., mega-dams
are better described as a Pandora’s Box, revealing complex
and nested financial flows and networks of public and private
actors working toward diverse and conflicting objectives. The
authors use a parallel metaphor by arguing that mega-dams
can be likened to Trojan Horses, legitimated as mechanisms
of economic development while simultaneously operating as
purveyors of political and ideological spatial strategies.
This is indeed an important book. It covers a lot of ground
and certainly steers the emerging discipline of megaproject
organizing/managing/decision making in the right direction.
It sets an important marker with regard to what this area of
scholarly investigation is and what it should entail, the main
issues critical to practitioners, and the future challenges lying
ahead for scholars as well as practitioners. In particular, it
demonstrates the nested processes preceding and surrounding
megaprojects—political processes of over-optimism and stra-
tegic misrepresentation—shaping projects that become impos-
sible missions, which in turn creates a highly fragile ground
upon which to build and implement actual projects. Projects
lose their foothold in their attempt to achieve the impossible.
The book is not only a thorough investigation of all the prob-
lems and challenges associated with these kinds of projects. It
also offers a number of suggestions on how to fix the problems,
including a stronger focus on quality assurance, due diligence
in megaprojects, use of the external view, and better use of
contracting and partnership mechanisms. Throughout it dem-
onstrates the value of understanding the stakeholders, the rela-
tionships among stakeholders, and what one can do to ensure
stakeholder engagement throughout the life of the project.
In many ways, this is a thought-provoking and important
outlook for megaproject management—what it is and what it
should be. It is strong on the decision-making and front-end
issues, and it is extremely strong on empirical illustrations
and cases. Many of the chapters provide dense empirical data
supporting the arguments presented with examples from
diverse industries and regions. The book underscores the
need for more research on the inside and insights of mega-
projects—of what goes on in megaprojects, how they evolve
and how they change, and what participants and policy mak-
ers learn from them. The book also demonstrates the need for
better linking the front-end issues with the actual manage-
ment challenges inherent in megaprojects: that project shap-
ing and project stakeholder management are critical aspects
of the management of megaprojects and that they dynami-
cally unfold throughout the course of the project. Finally, the
book clearly points out the need for improving megaproject
performance evaluation beyond how they compare with their
estimates to better grasping their effectiveness in relation to
other perhaps more relevant performance measures.
I strongly recommend this book to anyone interested in
megaprojects—policy makers, practitioners, consultants, and
scholars. It is a must-read for master and doctoral students in
large-scale project management, and I am sure that it will be
a major milestone defining research on large-scale projects,
which project scholars and practitioners will reflect upon for
many years to come.
References
Clegg, S., Sankaran, S., Biesenthal, C., & Pollack, J. (2017).
Power and sensemaking in megaprojects. In B. Flyvbjerg (Ed.),
The Oxford handbook of megaproject management. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press.
Davies, A., Dodgson, M., & Gann, D. M. (2017). Innovation
and flexibility in megaprojects: A new delivery model. In
B. Flyvbjerg (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of megaproject
management. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Davies, A., Dodgson, M., Gann, D. M., & MacAulay, S. (2017).
Five rules for managing large, complex projects. MIT Sloan
Management Review (Forthcoming).
Davies, A., & Mackenzie, I. (2014). Project complexity and
systems integration: Constructing the London 2012 Olympics
and paralympics games. International Journal of Project
Management, 32(5), 773–790.
Geraldi, J., & Söderlund, J. (2017). Project studies: What it is,
where it is going. International Journal of Project Management.
(In press).
Morris, P., Pinto, J., & Söderlund, J. (Eds.) (2011). The
Oxford handbook of project management. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Söderlund, J. (2011). Theoretical foundations of project manage-
ment: Suggestions for a pluralistic understanding, in P. Morris,
J. Pinto & J. Söderlund (Eds.) (2011). The Oxford handbook of
project management. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Staw, B. M., & Ross, J. (1978). Commitment to a policy
decision: A multi-theoretical perspective. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 23(1), 40–64.
December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal  137
 Calendar of Events
Dec 2017/Jan 2018
SEPTEMBER
9–11 September 2018
PMI Chapters in Africa
2018 PMI Africa Conference
Port Louis, Mauritius. Hundreds of
visionaries who manage Africa’s proj-
ects will meet in September 2018 to
share ideas and build relationships
of how to harness the power of proj-
ect management in building projects
in one of the world’s most diverse,
resource-rich emerging markets—
Africa! pmiafricaconference.com.
Gulf Countries Conference
Coming soon: the very first PMI-run
conference in the Gulf countries of
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Board of Directors member Randy
Black, P.Eng., PMP and other project
management experts such as Michel
Thiry, PhD, PMI Fellow at the “Project
Leadership Through Excellence and
Innovation Conference.” Presenters
will share the latest topics, ranging
from project excellence, the strategic
PMO to business analysis, and many
more.
Whether you are a seasoned project
professional, starting your career, or
returning to the profession, there are
unique learning and networking oppor-
tunities that await you. The conference
spans three days and multiple locations:
Date Location
5 December Oman
6 December Bahrain
7 December Kuwait
Project Management Journal, Vol. 48, No. 6
© 2017 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
138  December 2017/January 2018  ■  Project Management Journal
Please visit www.pmimenaconfer-
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­register.
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Management.com community, you
can access webinars that p ­rovide
insight from the industry’s most
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evant and important topics today—
and earn PDUs.
14 December, 1:00 p.m. EST (UTC–5)
The Project Manager’s Guide to
Managing the “Difficult Sponsor,”
Part II
Project managers have to serve many
different stakeholders, and in so
doing, often get pulled in different
directions. Sponsors can help with
problem resolution, but what do you
do when your sponsor is the problem?
Whether your sponsor is missing in
action, has a big ego, or is a weakling,
this workshop provides techniques to
effectively manage the situation. Pre-
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21 December, 3:00 p.m. EST (UTC–5)
Project HEADWAY: Reframing Success
The role of projects in organizations
has evolved considerably, but our per-
ception of project success has barely
moved. Projects are complex activities
that shape the strategic direction of the
organization. They are far less linear,
defined, or certain than they appear
on paper. That means how we think
about them and how we evaluate their
success, need to change. Presented by
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Project Management Journal  ®
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 Give your students real job potential!

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 CALL FOR CASES
PROJECT MANAGEMENT JOURNAL® LAUNCHES A
NEW SECTION FOR CASES FOR THE CLASSROOM

Make your impact in the classroom

with cases from PMJ®
SECTION EDITOR:
Gina Vega, Organizational Ergonomics

The Project Management Journal® is an official publication of the Project Management Institute (PMI) and a leading international journal
focused on the management of projects through research, theory, and evidence-based practice. As part of an innovative publishing agenda,
PMJ® is responding to the needs of instructors by launching a new section that provides full-length cases and instructor’s manuals for
classroom or consulting use. Case submissions can address the full spectrum of Knowledge Modules in the PM Curriculum (see https://
pmiteach.org/teaching-pm/knowledge-module/ for a list of 30 distinct areas of learning).

With the rise of experiential learning, case studies have gained traction as a fundamental teaching tool in every subject area, and they have
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SUBMIT YOUR TEACHING CASES AND ASSOCIATED TEACHING NOTES

PMJ® invites submissions of cases designed for classroom use. The following elements are required for submission:

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■ Cases must be factual, and releases must be available where necessary. Cases need not be field-researched, although field research is
preferred.
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Cases and teaching notes undergo a double-blind developmental peer review process. The editor will work with authors to address the
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Cases and their associated instructor’s manual should be submitted via the journal submission site: http://www.pmi.org/learning/
publications/project-management-journal/guidelines. For further information or questions about publishing cases in PMJ®, please contact
the section editor at gina.vega978@gmail.com.

®2017 Project Management Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. PUB-006-2017 (05/17)
 CALL FOR PAPERS
PROJECT MANAGEMENT JOURNAL® SPECIAL ISSUE

Exploratory Projects
SPECIAL ISSUE EDITORS:
Sylvain Lenfle, Professor, Christophe Midler, Research Director, Markus Hällgren, Professor,
Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers Centre de Recherche en Gestion, CNRS/ Umeå School of Business & Economics,
& Centre de Recherche en Gestion, Ecole Ecole Polytechnique, France Sweden
Polytechnique, France

DEADLINE FOR PAPER SUBMISSIONS: FEBRUARY 2018

The strategic roles of innovation and exploration in today’s competitive environment have given birth to a research stream in the
management of exploration projects for which neither the goals nor the means to attaining them are clearly defined from the outset.
This work bridges the project, innovation, entrepreneurship, and discovery management literature and has led to a new approach
to projects as experimental learning processes for which new management principles, such as selectionism and sequential learning,
have been defined. From the same perspective, this literature underlines the need to differentiate between the management
processes for exploratory projects, since the traditional stage-gate approach generally leads to failure, and to design new evaluation
methods adapted to their “expansive” nature. We are only at the beginning of the research; thus, the goal of this special issue is to
continue to develop the research on exploratory projects. More precisely, we welcome contributions in the following areas:

1. Research that sheds new light on the actor’s practices in exploratory projects.
2. The validity of the management principles proposed in the literature.
3. The functions and roles of the actors in teams involved in exploratory projects.
4. The relationship between the project and its parent organization.
5. The role of exploratory projects in creation of the ecosystem.
6. The type of cognitive process used during these types of projects.

We welcome all research methods (contemporary case study, quantitative analysis, historical research, and so forth), along with
research coming from adjacent fields (entrepreneurship, management of extreme situations, and so forth).

SUBMISSIONS
Full papers must be submitted by 28 February 2018 via the journal submission site. Papers accepted for publication but not
included in the special issue will be published later in a regular issue of the journal. If you have any additional questions, please
consult any of the guest editors.

For further information please contact one of the guest editors of this special issue:
sylvain.lenfle@lecnam.net / christophe.midler@polytechnique.edu / markus.hallgren@umu.se

AUTHOR AND REVIEWER GUIDELINES

Special issues follow the same guidelines as those for regular articles. We expect the authors and reviewers to react promptly with
their revisions and reviews. A special issue is a project with a scheduled deadline. While some variance may arise, timeliness matters
more than that in a regular submission.

©2017 Project Management Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. PUB-009-2017 (06/17)