BEYOND TOTALITARIANISM ?

Totalitarianism theory in Soviet Union

historiography since the end of the Cold War

Maaike Hensing

Thesis RMA History: ‘Cities, States and Citizenship’

Supervisor: Dr Jacco Pekelder
Utrecht, 26-08-2009
31.615 words
Studentno: 0344958
Address: Jutfaseweg 161, 3522 HM Utrecht
E-mail: maaikehensing@hotmail.com
Preface

With this thesis I conclude the Research Master’s programme in History: ‘Cities,
States and Citizenship’ at Utrecht University. I thank my supervisor Jacco
Pekelder for his kind and enthusiastic guidance, which turned a somewhat
daunting assignment into a manageable and overall enjoyable task.
I also owe gratitude to Arch Getty for kindly taking the time to comment on my
research proposal, offering a valuable firsthand account of the debate on
totalitarianism from the ‘revisionist’ perspective.
My friends deserve thanks for their encouragement and patience (and William for
accompanying me on those vital coffee breaks).
And finally I want to thank Niek, Ien & Dick for their unconditional support,
which has been absolutely essential throughout all the ups and downs of my life as
a student.
Contents

1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................................................3
1.1 A revival of totalitarianism theory?...............................................................................................................3
1.2 Short history of the academic discussion of totalitarianism ...................................4
1.3 Motivation and relevance of research........................................................................................................8
1.4 Research question and method..........................................................................................................................10

2 Defining totalitarianism theory ..................................................................................................13

2.1 Multiplicity of ‘theories’........................................................................................................................................13
2.2 Choice of theories: the classics and ‘post-totalitarianism’..............................14
2.3 Content of the theories............................................................................................................................................16
Unique and unprecedented - Comparative perspective
Ideology - Terror - A modern phenomenon? - Origins
Dynamism - Intention and achievement
2.4 ‘Checklist’ for the relevance of totalitarianism theory.........................................36

3 Review of Soviet Union historiography, 1990-2009 ................43

3.1 Remarks on selection and method......................................................................................................43
3.2 Review of publications.............................................................................................................................................45
3.3 Conclusion....................................................................................................................................................................................80

4 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................................................88

Bibliography
1 Introduction

‘Detachment adds nothing to understanding. Indeed, it detracts from it;

for how can one comprehend dispassionately events that have been
produced in the heat of passion?’ 1

1.1 A revival of totalitarianism theory?

Totalitarianism theory reached the status of a ‘paradigm’ in western academia
during the 1950s and was subsequently challenged by a new generation of scholars
in the 1960s and 1970s. According to some scholars, like Abbott Gleason and Paul
Luykx, totalitarianism theory never recovered from the criticism of these
‘revisionist’ scholars; it has been relegated to the margins of academic research and
has become more controversial than ever. 2 Others disagree with this conclusion
and argue that totalitarianism theory has recently witnessed a revival, which they
consider to be welcome and justified. 3 Achim Siegel for instance, editor of The
Totalitarian Paradigm after the End of Communism. Towards a Theoretical
Reassessment argues that the end of the Cold War both necessitates and enables a
reassessment of the totalitarian paradigm. Looking at the history of the debate,

1
Richard Pipes, A Concise History of the Russian Revolution (New York 1996) 403.
2
Paul Brooker, Non-democratic Regimes. Theory, Government and Politics (New York 2000) 20;
Abbott Gleason, Totalitarianism: the Inner History of the Cold War (New York 1995); Paul Luykx,
‘Een concept ondermijnd. Nieuwe literatuur over totalitarisme’, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 110
(1997) 500-529.
3
Klaus von Beyme, ‘The Concept of Totalitarianism – A Reassessment after the End of Communist
Rule’ in: Achim Siegel ed., The Totalitarian Paradigm after the End of Communism. Towards a
Theoretical Reassessment (Amsterdam 1998) 39-54; Peter Grieder, ‘In Defense of Totalitarianism
Theory as a Tool of Historical Scholarship’, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 8 (2007)
563-589; Eckhard Jesse ed., Totalitarismus im 20. Jahrhundert: eine Bilanz der internationalen
Forschung (Bonn 1996); Erik van Ree, ‘Zin en onzin van het totalitaire model’ in: André Gerrits ed.,
Een Bizar Experiment. De Lange Schaduw van de Sovjet-Unie, 1917-1991 (Amsterdam 2001) 61-74;
Achim Siegel, ‘Introduction: The Changing Fortunes of the Totalitarian Paradigm in Communist
Studies’ in: idem ed., The Totalitarian Paradigm after the End of Communism. Towards a
Theoretical Reassessment (Amsterdam 1998) 9-35.

3
Siegel argues that the popularity of totalitarianism theory has always depended on
its normative rather than its cognitive aspects; both proponents and opponents of
the theory have valued it for reasons that were (at least partially) political. He
argues that the cognitive merits and flaws of the theory now can and should be
studied in their own right, independent of its normative political connotations. 4
The recent developments in the debate on totalitarianism theory thus
revolve around the question whether or not the theory has witnessed a revival
after the end of the Cold War. Before I elaborate on my research question which
is based on this scholarly dissension, I will sketch the history of totalitarianism as
a subject of academic discussion, tracing the current state of the debate back to the
origins of the theory.

1.2 Short history of the academic discussion of totalitarianism 5

Totalitarianism theory was first developed in fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. After
Giovanni Amendola coined the term in 1923 in opposition to Mussolini, it
transformed from a negative label employed exclusively by its opponents into a
positive notion which was used simultaneously by its proponents. The first
theories of totalitarianism that were thus developed by fascists from 1925 onwards
were designed to both analyze and praise their own political system. Giovanni
Gentile emphasized the radically new character of Italian fascism, which existed
among other things in its abolition of the distinction between the public and the
private. He thus introduced the notion of the ‘totality of the state’ that would
remain the pivot of all subsequent theories of totalitarianism. In Germany, similar

4
Siegel, The Totalitarian Paradigm, 11-12.
5
My reconstruction of the academic debate is derived mainly from Gleason’s Totalitarianism. Other
overviews, more condensed but informative, are offered in Brooker, Non-democratic Regimes, 7-21;
John Claydon, ‘Changing Interpretations of Soviet Russia. The Redeemer Cometh’, History Review
44 (2002) 28-32; Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick ed., Beyond Totalitarianism. Stalinism and
Nazism Compared (Cambridge 2009) 1-37; David L. Hoffmann, Stalinism: The Essential Readings
(Malden 2003) 1-7; Alter Litvin and John Keep, Stalinism. Russian and Western Views at the Turn
of the Millennium (London & New York 2005) 89-100.

4
theories of German fascism were developed in the 1930s by Carl Schmitt, Ernst
Jünger and Ernst Forsthoff.
In the United States, theories of totalitarianism became known from 1933
onwards as a result of the arrival of German émigrés. Some of the most influential
contributors to the early development of totalitarianism theory in the United
States were the scholars who later became known as members of the neo-Marxist
Frankfurt School; in general, the academic discussion of totalitarianism during this
period was determined by the left. According to this view, there was a clear
distinction between the National Socialist state and the Soviet Union; the former
should be regarded as totalitarian, but the latter was not. Leftist thinkers argued
that the crisis of liberalism, which had culminated in the rise of National
Socialism, was in fact a crisis of capitalism. According to fellow travellers, the
Soviet Union was the true heir to the Enlightenment. They argued that the Nazi
regime was regressive and irrational, and therefore constituted the opposite of the
Soviet Union, which they saw as rational and progressive - and thus a source of
hope rather than fear.
Between 1934 and 1940 this idea of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany as
opposites disappeared in academia. Instead, the similarities between the two states
were emphasized. The German theologian Paul Tillich in 1934 first argued that
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were both totalitarian states. He argued that
under both regimes the individual lost all his rights in the face of the intrusive
state, whose rule was based on respectively the myth of nationalism and the myth
of social justice. Naturally, the left hesitated to accept the idea of Communism and
Nazism as evil twins. But ultimately, the Soviet-German Pact of 1939 sealed the
comparison of the two regimes as examples of the totalitarian state. At this point,
the idea that a new kind of state had emerged gained credibility in the academic
world; totalitarianism was becoming a generally accepted field of scientific
research.

5
 The use of the term in the United States remained mainly rhetorical until
the 1950s, when a more structural effort to theorize the notion of totalitarianism
developed and totalitarianism reached its paradigmatic status in the social
sciences. The coming into being of this paradigm was closely related to the
contemporary political situation. Cold War politics largely determined the
discussion of totalitarianism in the academia. Scholarly attention for the Soviet
Union increased in the 1950s; the socialist state was examined in newly founded
institutions with the use of the totalitarian model. Sovietologists were close to the
centre of the US administration, and received overt and covert funding for their
contribution to the policy of containment.
Thus during the 1950s, those who supported the use of ‘totalitarianism’ as
a political term looked to science to provide a theoretical foundation, both to
support the term’s credibility and to map the divided world more clearly. This was
considered necessary, since the concept had become a basis for policy but lacked a
clear definition. What is essential here is that the existence of totalitarianism was
apparently beyond doubt. Scientific research was not needed to test the credibility
of the concept in itself, but merely to fill in what it looked like exactly – and
hence what regime did or did not deserve the label. At this time, the term itself
was thus considered beyond contestation: the western world was facing an enemy
of unprecedented fierceness, only its face was somewhat unclear. This is why the
development of the totalitarianism paradigm is important: it became a set of
beliefs within which assumptions and theories could be validated or discredited.
The framework, namely the principal idea that totalitarianism was real and as
such a valid and important subject for research, remained intact until the next
generation broke it down. Central to the totalitarian paradigm were two theories
which are referred to today as the classics: Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of
Totalitarianism (1951) and Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski’s
Totalitarian Dictatorship and Authoritarian Control (1956). The content of their
theories will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. For now it suffices

6
to mention that according to these well-known accounts of totalitarianism, the
totalitarian society was characterized by the state’s total control over all spheres of
life, destroying individual agency and human pluralism.
In the 1960s, dissatisfaction with the totalitarian model as a tool for
studying the Soviet Union grew. On the one hand, criticism was aimed at its
methodology: since totalitarianism theory was based on Stalinism, it could not
explain the changes in the Soviet Union that followed Stalin’s death. On the other
hand, criticism of totalitarianism theory was part of a broader political and
cultural critique from a new generation of scholars. It centred on the idea that
Soviet studies were contaminated by Cold War prejudice and political interests.
The young researchers questioned the idea that the ‘civilized West’ was facing the
‘evil East’; they criticized both the assumption that the West was the epitome of
civilization and that Communism was its greatest threat. Their criticism was
obviously shaped by the socio-political context of the time: the Vietnam War, the
rise of the new left, the civil rights movement, the revival of Marxism among
western youth and US hypocrisy concerning right-wing dictatorships.
Furthermore, the thaw enabled western thinkers to take a look at the ‘real’ Soviet
Union, beyond rhetoric and theory. They found no utopia, but no ‘1984’ either.
This ‘reality check’ reinforced the new generation’s belief that the totalitarian
model was a mere tool for attacking the left at home and abroad. 6 Most
importantly, the idea that totalitarian regimes destroyed individual autonomy was
rejected. Revisionist theorists such as Sheila Fitzpatrick studied Stalinism using a
bottom-up approach, and concluded that interest groups did interact with, and
supported, the regime – which contrasted with the notion of an all-powerful
centralized state. Regarding the method of Soviet studies these scholars thus called
6
The ‘spirit of the times’ in which the revisionist critique was developed is illustrated by J. Arch
Getty’s comment on this period. Getty is (considered to be) a revisionist scholar, who’s work was
prominent in the critique on the totalitarian model. Asked whether his work was intended as a
revision of the totalitarian model, he denied this suggestion. Instead he recalled that he and his
fellow young academics turned away from ideology simply because they were wary of it; the socio-
political developments of the time had convinced them that it was a mere mask which covered
political interests and hypocrisy. Getty, J.A. Personal interview. 9 June 2009.

7
for a different approach than the conventional top-down analysis of ‘totalitarian’
regimes.

1.3 Motivation and relevance of research

Looking at its history, totalitarianism as an instrument of political rhetoric has a
tainted reputation with regards to the possibility of scientific objectivity.
According to Siegel, this is however merely an example – be it an extreme
example – of how politics and science are always interconnected. The appropriate
response to this problem, I agree with Siegel, is not to denounce a politically
charged theory for equally normative reasons. Rather, it should indeed be judged
on its cognitive merits or flaws. After all, as Mark Thompson argues, the notion of
totalitarianism should not be condemned merely because of its normative
connotations: ‘The use and abuse of the term totalitarianism by the political
activists and propagandists in the West does not discredit it as a social science
concept any more than does the manipulation and politicization of a term such as
“democracy”.’7
The post-1989 historiography of the Soviet Union could offer a valuable
addition to the theory and its evaluation before 1989. For until the end of the Cold
War, totalitarianism theory was developed mainly by political scientists, which
meant that totalitarianism theory was based on abstract models rather than
concrete evidence. Theories were formulated in terms of general laws rather than
unique events. The lack of a historical perspective on totalitarianism can be
explained as a result of the restricted access to archives and other sources in the
Soviet Union. The thaw enabled more research than before, but possibilities were
then still very limited. Today, archives and other sources are (becoming) available
to historians, who are thus able to evaluate the worth of totalitarianism theories
with reference to concrete and unique historical events. Post-1989 historiography

7
Mark R. Thompson, ‘Neither Totalitarian Nor Authoritarian: Post-totalitarianism in Eastern
Europe’, in: Siegel, The Totalitarian Paradigm, 303-328: 326.

8
could thus lead to the cognitive reassessment of totalitarianism theory that Siegel
considers to be necessary.
Whether this is indeed the case is unclear; the literature on the
totalitarianism debate lacks an account of how totalitarianism theory is evaluated
in recent historical research regarding the Soviet Union. Fitzpatrick, among
others, remarks that it remains unclear whether historians have rejected or
embraced the arguments and assumptions that informed interpretations of the
Soviet Union before its collapse. This means that the question, whether and how
totalitarianism theory has been evaluated with regard to its cognitive aspects
through concrete, historical research since 1989, has not yet been answered.
I believe this question deserves to be asked, because the answer will
enhance insight into recent developments of totalitarianism theory in relation to
Soviet and Communist studies; it provides information of both how totalitarianism
theory has developed, and of how Soviet and Communist studies have developed
with regard to the notion of totalitarianism, through a discussion of their relation.
As part of the history of totalitarianism, the historical research of the Soviet Union
provides information on how totalitarianism theory has developed as a result of
the new historiography since 1989. As part of Soviet and Communism studies, it
provides information about the implicit and/or explicit use and relevance of
totalitarianism theory to this field of (historical) research and thus helps to map
which road historiography has taken since the end of the Cold War.
Apart from these two academic domains, the answer to my research
question is also relevant to the more general problem of the interconnection of
politics and academia – of normative assertion and objective inquiry. It examines
an informative case of the way in which political or otherwise normative
arguments and ideas interact with and influence academic research, and vice
versa. As such it provides additional insights to the recent history of the praxis of
the humanities in western Europe and the United States.

9
1.4 Research question and method
I will attempt to answer the question how, in western Europe and the United
States, historians who have studied the political history of the Soviet Union
between 1989 and (July) 2009 have implicitly or explicitly evaluated
totalitarianism theory in their ‘research reports’. Below I expound on the meaning
of this question in order to clarify and justify the scope and aim of my research,
and to elucidate the research method used.
My research focuses on the history of academic research regarding
totalitarianism theory. I am thus not interested in studying ‘totalitarianism’ as a
term in a political debate, or actual regimes or states considered ‘totalitarian’. I
limit my research to totalitarianism as a notion in academic research and
discussion. The singular ‘totalitarianism theory’ that I mention in reality exists of a
number of theories and ideas. I will derive from these theories and ideas one core
of totalitarianism theory, which I will define explicitly in a ‘checklist’ which will
serve as the basis for my interpretation of post-1989 historiography.
My main research question is furthermore centred on the evaluation of
totalitarianism theory. By evaluation I mean the extent to which the theory has
been accepted or rejected as an instrument for academic research. I will try to map
this evaluation by looking at the attention it has or has not received in academic
research and debate. By ‘attention’ I mean whether scholars refer to the theory,
make use of its concepts or central notions, and whether their arguments are
based on presumptions or explanations that are derived from or part of
totalitarianism theory. I will take into consideration both implicit and explicit
attention for totalitarianism theory. After assessing the extent to which
totalitarianism theory is relevant in academic research, I will argue whether it
constitutes a positive or negative evaluation of totalitarianism theory.
I will thus derive the historians’ assessments of totalitarianism theory from
their ‘research reports’ (publications on the findings of their historical research).
My decision to study only publications which are available in the English, German

10
or Dutch language reflects the purely practical matter of my literacy being
restricted to those languages.
Further, I limit my research to the evaluation of totalitarianism theory by
historians (by which I mean scholars conducting historical research) because the
history of the debate on totalitarianism theory shows that the theory has
predominantly been assessed according to its normative/political connotations,
rather than its cognitive aspects. This, as I already mentioned, was in part caused
by the lack of objective and concrete information concerning ‘totalitarian’
regimes. This omission in turn was the result of the (near) impossibility of
historical research in totalitarian states. With the collapse of the Soviet Union,
possibilities for historical research have (slowly) opened up as archives and other
sources of information became (more) accessible. 8 Recent historical research
regarding totalitarian states can thus facilitate a reassessment of totalitarianism
theory based on its cognitive value rather than its political implications. This also
explains why I only include historians who have conducted their research from
1989 onwards.
I will only examine the work of historians from western Europe and the
United States, since this is where the debate originated and developed into its
current state. While totalitarianism theory is central to the historical debate in the
former Communist states as well, this discussion is very complex and could very
well serve as a research topic for a Master’s thesis in itself. Apart from its
complexity, this debate is also incompatible with my research for the practical
matter of the language barrier, since only a very small part of its publications are
available in English or German. Thus, since it is neither very relevant nor
attainable to take into account the full range of publications from eastern
European historians in my thesis, I have decided to restrict my research to
western historiography.

8
That the availability of the new sources necessitated a reconsideration of earlier interpretations was
expressed famously by the renowned Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis in We Now Know:
Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford/New York 1995).

11
 My choice for excluding all studies except those concerned with the
Soviet Union is not a random limitation; the debate on the validity of
totalitarianism theory has been renewed as a result of the end of the Cold War.
Not surprising considering its circumstances, this revival of the academic debate
focuses on the validity of the theory in relation to the Soviet Union (rather than
for instance Nazi-Germany, which is the other main subject of analysis in
totalitarianism theory). Thus, since the (presumed) ‘renaissance’ of totalitarianism
theory has taken place in Soviet and Communist studies, my research will focus
on historical studies concerned with the Soviet Union. Finally, since
totalitarianism theory comments on totalitarianism as a political phenomenon, I
will take into account only those historical studies concerned with the political
history of the Soviet Union – both from the top-down and the bottom-up
perspective; dealing both with the state and/or its relation with Soviet citizens.
While the abovementioned limitations provide clear boundaries and
directions for my research, my thesis will obviously not result in an exhaustive
study covering the entire field of Soviet historiography since 1989. I will explicate
the limitations that lead to the final selection of publications, in the knowledge
that a different or broader selection might yield different results.

In this chapter I have presented my research question and method, and its
theoretical underpinnings. In chapter two, I will define what I mean by
‘totalitarianism theory’, which results in a checklist by which to assess the recent
historiography of the Soviet Union. In chapter three I present the result of my
examination of the selection of publications. Finally, I conclude from these
findings what is the answer to my research question.

12
2 D e fi n i n g t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m t h e o r y

2.1 Multiplicity of ‘theories’

In my research question I speak of ‘totalitarianism theory’ in the singular, which
suggests that there is one comprehensive theory of totalitarianism which is clearly
defined and generally accepted. In reality, this is not the case. There is a wide
variety of theories, accounts and analyses concerning totalitarianism. The scholars
who have discussed it are equally varied; together they cover a wide range of
academic disciplines, approaches, nationalities, generations and political
affiliations. Their comments or theories have focused on totalitarianism as a
movement, as a principle of rule, as a process, as a social phenomenon and a
political phenomenon. The theories were constructed in different times;
originating in the 1920s, they have been further developed and adjusted since.
Another thing that needs to be defined is ‘theory’ in itself, for it is by no
means beyond debate what constitutes a theory in general; Luykx argues that in
many cases, the term totalitarianism theory is flawed because it refers not to a
theory, but a concept. For a theory, according to Luykx, offers an explanation for
the phenomenon it describes. I disagree with this definition of theory for two
reasons. First, I believe it is too rigid, especially for the humanities. Indeed,
scientific theory is and should be aimed at providing explanations to improve our
understanding of reality. But it can be argued that the definition of ‘theory’ does
not hinge on the actual achievement of this ultimate, or ideal, goal. A glance at a
variety of dictionaries suggests that instead, what constitutes a theory is a
systematic, rational inquiry by which one attempts to explain and predict the
empirical world.9 I believe it is more adequate to describe ‘theory’ in the following

9
In A Dictionary of Sociology for example, theory is defined as ‘a set of interrelated definitions and
relationships that organizes our concepts of and understanding of the empirical world in a systematic
way’. John Scott and Gordon Marshall, ‘Theory’, A Dictionary of Sociology (Oxford 2009) Oxford
Reference Online. Oxford University Press. Utrecht University Library. 29 May 2009.
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t88.e2349

13
ways: ‘In science, a way of looking at a field that is intended to have explanatory
and predictive implications’; ‘a coherent explanation or description, reasoned from
known facts.’10 The latter one leaves room for theories of totalitarianism that are
descriptive rather than explanatory – as Friedrich for instance did very
consciously and explicitly.
Second, it is unclear what can be considered an ‘explanation’. The origins
of the totalitarian system might not be revealed in a theory; but its functioning for
instance can still be explained in a comprehensive description. The fact that a
theory does not provide a causal explanation for the coming into being of its
subject, does not necessarily implicate that it lacks explanatory power completely.
But nonetheless, Luykx touches on a point that is very central to the debate of
totalitarianism. For it is characteristic of the discussion, both inside and outside
academia, that totalitarianism is used as a mere term without reference to, or
apparent knowledge of, the theories behind it. It is important to distinguish
between this general use of ‘totalitarianism’ as a term, and the more systematic
description and/or explanation that constitutes the totalitarian theory or model.

2.2 Choice of theories: the classics and ‘post-totalitarianism’

Before assessing the relevance of totalitarianism theory in recent historiography I
must thus define what I understand by ‘totalitarianism theory’. My selection of
theories is of course based on their relevance for my research, which is
determined by the context of my question – namely the rejection of
totalitarianism theory by revisionists and the subsequent criticism that this
rejection was based on normative rather than cognitive grounds. Thus my
research is concerned with the theories that were rejected in the politically
charged academic debates during the Cold War, and have possibly experienced a
revival in historiography since 1989. This means that I will take into consideration
10
Simon Blackburn, ‘Theory’, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford 2008) Oxford Reference
Online. Oxford University Press. Utrecht University Library. 29 May 2009.
2009 http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t98.e3085;

14
the theories that constituted the paradigm that was dominant during the 1950s
and 1960s, which was challenged and replaced by revisionism. These are, as I
mentioned before, the ‘classic’ totalitarian theories of Hannah Arendt and Carl
Friedrich & Zbigniew Brzezinski; they are generally considered to have been the
most influential and their paradigmatic status is widely acknowledged.
Besides these classics of the rejected paradigm I will also take into account
the theory of post-totalitarianism, which has been elaborated most systematically
by Juan J. Linz en Alfred Stepan. This theory is relevant to my definition of
totalitarianism theory because it is essentially an extension of the classic theory.
Its development was inspired by the need to complement the original accounts of
Friedrich and Arendt with an explanation for the changes which appeared in the
Soviet Union after Stalin’s death. For the revisionism of the totalitarian
explanation was fueled by these changes; criticism focused on the theory’s
inability to explain the Khrushchev Thaw. The debate concerning the validity of
the totalitarian paradigm in the 1960s and 1970s was thus initiated by its inability
to integrate the changing Soviet reality into its model. It was revived for the same
reasons after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Post-totalitarianism theory is
intended to provide an explanation for the ‘post-totalitarian’ situation, which
necessarily means that it departs from the assumption that the situation before
was indeed ‘totalitarian’. In this sense it is a continuation of totalitarianism theory
and a central point in the recent discussion of its cognitive value. If totalitarianism
theory is still or again important in recent interpretations of Soviet history, it can
be expected that post-totalitarian theory is employed to extend the explanatory
power of the original totalitarian model. 11
Friedrich himself was arguably the first contributor to post-totalitarianism
theory; from the mid-1960s onwards he adjusted his theory in order to integrate
the developments in the Soviet Union. In this revised account, terror was no

11
My discussion of Linz and Stepan’s theory of post-totalitarianism is based mainly on Mark R.
Thompson’s essay ‘Neither Totalitarian Nor Authoritarian’, in: Siegel, The Totalitarian Paradigm,
303-328.

15
longer a basic characteristic but merely a possible side effect. This invoked the
revisionist allegation that Friedrich was simply stretching his definition to fit all
communist regimes – and to denote them as such on normative grounds. 12 His
partner Brzezinski no longer thought the term ‘totalitarian’ fit for the Soviet
Union, and did not cooperate on the second edition of their original book,
Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy.13

2.3 Content of the theories

It is important to remark that the totalitarian paradigm in the academic debate has
been defined by its implicit and explicit critics; the revisionist approach appears to
present a reverse image of the classics of Arendt and Friedrich. The
abovementioned Sheila Fitzpatrick, one of the most influential revisionist scholars,
states that according to revisionists, totalitarianism theory was ‘a mirror image of
Soviet self-representation’, presenting the Soviet Union as a top-down monolith,
driven by ideology, in which total control over all spheres of society was achieved
through terror. Society in this view was a mere object of the state; all pluralism
was effectively destroyed to the point where individual autonomy was no longer
possible.14
I aim to establish whether or not totalitarianism theory has witnessed a
revival since it was rejected in favor of revisionism, and therefore it seems obvious
that my definition of totalitarianism theory should focus on those aspects which
were at the core of the debate surrounding this paradigm shift. Yet it is
characteristic of the debate on totalitarianism (and presumably of every heated
discussion) that the nuances are lost; accounts of the theories on the subject are
presented in an over-simplified or distorted manner - whether by intention or
mistake. Thus in discussions of totalitarianism, it is striking that participants in the
12
Siegel, ‘Carl Joachim Friedrich’s Concept of Totalitarian Dictatorship: A Reinterpretation’ in:
Siegel, The Totalitarian Paradigm, 277-278.
13
For this reason, and to improve readability, I will from this point onwards mention only
Friedrich’s name in discussing Friedrich and Brzezinski’s theory of totalitarianism.
14
Sheila Fitzpatrick, ‘Revisionism in Soviet History’, History and Theory 46 (2007) 77-91, 80.

16
debate hardly refer to the actual content of its theories adequately, or even appear
to be unfamiliar with it.15 It is therefore important to return to the original
theories. On the one hand, to do them justice, and on the other, to provide a more
balanced basis for the analysis of post-1989 historical research on the Soviet
Union.
What follows is an account of the classic totalitarianism theories of Arendt
and Friedrich as well as the post-totalitarianism theory of Linz and Stepan,
structured around what I believe are its central arguments and notions. I have
made use of the 1973 paperback edition of Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism.16
With regard to Friedrich, I have taken into account only his original theory which
he presented together with Brzezinski in 1956; I have used the second, 1965
edition of Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy as a reference.17 My motive for
limiting the discussion of Friedrich’s theory to his early work is twofold; on the
one hand, his ‘revisionism’ of the late 1960s lacks clarity of argument. It is unclear
whether he actually meant to replace his original theory and the alternative
analysis he presents lacks coherence. 18 On the other hand, it was the original
theory which became (part of) the ‘Cold War paradigm’, which I want to examine.

15
Luykx, ‘Een Concept Ondermijnd’.
16
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York 1973).
17
Carl J. Friedrich & Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Revised ed.,
Cambridge 1965).
18
Siegel, ‘Carl Joachim Friedrich’s Concept of Totalitarian Dictatorship’.

17
Unique and unprecedented
Central to totalitarianism theory is the premise that the dictatorships it refers to
are unprecedented, and that this needs to be acknowledged in order to adequately
describe and analyze them. According to the theory of totalitarianism, the regimes
concerned should be recognized as examples of a new and distinct phenomenon
for which existing methods of enquiry do not suffice. ‘Totalitarianism’ is a
definitive category which sets these regimes apart from other, familiar forms of
rule, and justifies grouping them together in a comparative analysis.
Theorists of totalitarianism thus argue for the uniqueness of totalitarianism
by contrasting it to other forms of non-constitutional government. They argue
that there is an essential difference between known forms of autocracy and
totalitarianism, which lies in its aim to remake society in its entirety. In older
forms of despotism only political freedom was curtailed; the totalitarian state on
the other hand aspires after total control over all spheres of life. Hence it seeks to
destroy not only political, but also cultural, economic, and social pluralism. 19
Post-totalitarianism theory is supplementary to totalitarianism theory, in
the sense that it is an attempt to explain the changes in the post-Stalinist Soviet
Union without abandoning the totalitarian model. The central argument of the
theory is that in post-totalitarian societies the ruler still seeks ‘total control’, but
since the power of the state has weakened, limited pluralism has a chance to arise.
As an extension of totalitarianism theory, post-totalitarianism theory too insists on
the uniqueness of the post-Stalinist communist regimes. It suggests that
‘totalitarianism’ is limited to Stalinism, and that the Soviet Union after his death
entered a different phase in its development. This change of direction is however
not considered a transformation to normalcy. Like their totalitarian predecessors,
and for the same reasons, these regimes are contrasted with ‘normal’ autocracies. 20

19
Friedrich, Totalitarian Dictatorship, 4, 15. Arendt, Origins, Part Three: ‘Totalitarianism’, 305-479.
20
Thompson, op. cit.

18
 In the revised edition of Totalitarian dictatorship and autocracy (1965),
Friedrich added a chapter on autocracy and the totalitarian state, in which he
emphasized that totalitarianism is a form of autocracy – but totalitarianism is sui
generis as a novel, unprecedented form of autocracy. Apart from the fact that
older autocracies did not aim to, nor could, control man in totality, they were
characterized by the self-interest of the leader as the driving force and logic
behind the rule.21 In the totalitarian system this kind of utility no longer serves as
a principle of rule. Instead, Friedrich argues that the logic and driving force
behind totalitarian rule lies in the achievement of a total remake of society; hence
it is determined not by personal gain or arbitrariness but an all-encompassing
utopian vision of the perfect society. The distinctive feature or ‘historical
innovation’ of totalitarian dictatorships according to Friedrich lies in ‘its
organization and methods developed and employed with the aid of modern
technical devices in an effort to resuscitate such total control in the service of an
ideologically motivated movement, dedicated to the total destruction and
reconstruction of a mass society.’22
Arendt’s account of totalitarianism corresponds to this general argument,
but her analysis differs from Friedrich’s in several respects. Arendt too regards the
totalitarian system to be distinct from other forms of autocracy because of its aim
to totally control society and because it is driven by this greater goal and therefore
transcends the personal interests of the ruler. Yet she has a fundamentally
different idea of what the total control of society entails; and as a consequence,
her assertion that the rule is ‘beyond utility’ has a different meaning as well. 23
According to Arendt, the ‘total control of all spheres of life’ does not equal a
utopian remake of society in order to enhance human well-being. Instead, it is the
negation and, ultimately, destruction of humanity in favor of ‘supra-human laws’
which are considered to hold the key to the past, present and future. The notion

21
Friedrich, op. cit., 4.
22
Ibid., 17.
23
Arendt, op. cit., 411-419.

19
of ‘laws’ helps to clarify what Arendt considers to be the unique character of
totalitarianism. For totalitarianism does not consist of lawless, arbitrary rule, like
older forms of non-constitutional government. On the contrary, totalitarian rule is
very much subject to law. The essential difference is that it is not committed to
man-made laws, which set boundaries to protect and enable individual agency;
instead it is determined by the inevitable ‘Laws of Nature and History’ which
render the human capacity to act and choose superfluous.24
Totalitarian rule thus moves beyond not only the personal interest of the
ruler, but is disconnected from utility entirely. If Friedrich’s account is grim, the
picture Arendt paints is pitch-black: in her view, the very future of mankind is at
stake. Friedrich rejects this ‘anthropological interpretation’ of the aims of
totalitarian control. While ‘totalitarians’ indeed aim to curtail and even destroy
individual autonomy, this is not an end in itself but merely a means to achieve the
ultimate goal of the perfect society – and this objective is valued for its collective
utility.25

Comparative perspective
A central feature of the classical totalitarianism theory is its comparative
perspective: fascist and Communist regimes are compared as two cases of
totalitarianism. Totalitarianism is thus the common denominator by which these
regime types are defined, grouped together and compared. The comparative aspect
is a distinct characteristic of totalitarianism theory and was the main cause of the
theory’s controversy. In the eyes of its proponents, the comparison offered the
right framework for understanding these regimes; to its opponents, it was a
politically inspired device by which the Soviet Union was equated with the
‘ultimate evil’ of the recent past. While critics rejected the comparative
perspective as an attempt to demonize trough definition, theorists of
24
Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought (Cambridge
1992) 88; Arendt, op. cit., 341-364, 460-479.
25
Arendt, op. cit., 437-459.

20
totalitarianism insisted that it was both justified and necessary to recognize that
both types of regimes were examples of an unprecedented threat to ‘the free
world’.
Post-totalitarianism is different form classical totalitarianism theory in
that it departs from its comparative perspective. Nazi Germany was ended before
it reached the post-totalitarian phase, it is argued, and hence there is no fascist
equivalent to the post-totalitarian communist regimes. Yet this deviation from the
comparative perspective need not be regarded as a decisive break with ‘the
totalitarian paradigm’, for post-totalitarianism theory consists of an attempt to
extend the validity of totalitarianism as an explanatory model. It claims the
validity of the common denominator of ‘totalitarianism’, without rejecting or
revising the comparison of fascism and Communism which was central to this
original definition.26
The regimes that are included in the comparison in classical theories vary.
Friedrich includes fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, based on the
idea that all three are ideology-driven regimes in which a dictator rules by means
of terror. Arendt limits the comparison to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.
She argues that Italian fascism is not a case of totalitarianism because of its
nationalist nature. Nationalist regimes are by definition not totalitarian, Arendt
states, for totalitarianism entails universal aspiration for world domination and
hence never-ending expansionism. 27
In arguing that ‘fascist and Communist totalitarian dictatorships are
‘basically alike’, Friedrich emphasizes that they were not ‘wholly alike’, as ‘Cold
Warriors’ contended.28 He argues that fascist and Communist dictatorships share
six ‘basic traits’ which justified a comparative analysis of these regimes as
totalitarian dictatorships:

26
Thompson, op. cit., 311.
27
Friedrich, op. cit., 15; Arendt, op. cit., 389-92.
28
Friedrich, op. cit., 15-19.

21
1. An official ideology, to which all citizens are supposed to adhere (at least
passively), which influences all spheres of life, focused on the perfection of
man and society in the future (a ‘chiliastic claim’);
2. A single mass party led by one man, consisting of a small part of the total
population – an elite which sincerely adheres to the official ideology;
3. A system of terror, aimed at both the party (except for the leader) and real,
‘potential’ and ‘objective’ enemies of the regime - using modern techniques,
especially ‘scientific psychology’;
4. A (near) complete monopoly of the means of mass communication;
5. A (near) complete monopoly of (the use of) weapons of armed combat;
6. A centrally controlled economy, through bureaucratic coordination of
corporations and other independent social associations. 29

Arendt’s Origins of totalitarianism seems to be concerned almost

exclusively with Nazism. It has been criticized for its lack of attention for
Bolshevism – there is for instance no discussion of Marxist ideology in her
analysis. But as Margaret Canovan observes, The Origins of Totalitarianism is not
as imbalanced as it may seem; for Arendt insists that totalitarianism is essentially a
world-wide phenomenon. It is the result of a combination of ‘elements’ such as
imperialism and the mass society, which are not limited to the content of a
specific ideology but, on the contrary, universal features of the modern world. 30

Ideology
While both Friedrich and Arendt argue that the specific content of totalitarian
ideology is not essential to this form of rule, ideology is one of its central features.
In totalitarianism theory, ideology is generally considered to be the driving force
behind the totalitarian movements. Ideology is of course a very broad term, and it

29
Ibid., 23-24.
30
Canovan, op. cit., 19-20.

22
is important to note that Arendt and Friedrich use it in a narrow sense. When
they speak of ‘ideology’ they refer to the regime’s official perspective on reality: a
set of ideas that is considered to hold the key to the past, the present and the
future. It is a concrete program which serves as the blueprint for the total remake
of society. It is thus a ‘top-down’, official and necessarily collective set of ideas,
rather than an individual form of Weltanschauung or any other set of ideas that is
not utilized by the state. While Friedrich and Arendt thus both regard ideology as
official, collective and instrumental, their accounts of totalitarian ideology diverge
in other respects.
Ideology according to Friedrich is a trait, but not the essence of totalitarian
dictatorships. For him the essence of totalitarian rule lies in its organizational
structure and functioning, and from this perspective he argues that the content of
the ideology is relatively unimportant; it is the function of ideology that matters.
Thus fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union are comparable despite the
dissimilar content of their respective ideologies. The function of ideology
according to Friedrich is that of an ‘instrument’ or a ‘weapon’, and this function
makes it central to the totalitarian dictatorship. Friedrich explicitly argues against
the idea that since ideology is ‘only a weapon’, it is therefore not very important.
Instead, he argues that it is an essential part of totalitarian dictatorships.
What does Friedrich mean when he says that ideology functions as a
‘weapon’? Totalitarian ideology is ‘pseudo-religious’: it can be considered a return
to the convergence of state and church which was abolished with the birth of the
modern state in the sixteenth century, when the separation of the worldly powers
and religious institutions established a constraint on the power of the rulers. 31
While Friedrich does not elaborate on this comparison, it does help to understand
what he means by ‘ideology as a weapon’: totalitarian ideology legitimizes the
dictator’s unlimited power in the same way as the ‘divine right of kings’
legitimized theirs. In both cases, unconstitutional rule is justified in the name of a

31
Friedrich, op. cit., 6.

23
transcendent power; respectively the Law of History or Nature, or God. 32 But
ideology serves not only as legitimation for the for the regime’s boundless power;
it also justifies the use of every means necessary to achieve the ultimate goal it
describes.
While ideology is thus a weapon in the regime’s struggle for legitimacy, its
function is not merely instrumental. Friedrich argues that the the leader and the
party elite sincerely believe in the totalitarian ideology; society is either genuinely
convinced or coerced to adhere to it. Yet the totalitarian’s faith in the undeniable
truth of his ideology is restricted to its core; only the overarching goal or basic
principle is beyond dispute. ‘Details’ are subject to unremitting debate and strife;
these discussions are mainly fueled by questions regarding the right path towards
the final goal. And it is only with regard to these margins of their ideology that
regimes do use ideology merely as an instrument, Friedrich argues. Leaders are
thus only cynical towards ideological ‘truths’ insofar as it does not contradict its
basic principle. Within these boundaries they employ ideological fiction for their
or the state’s convenience, cynically misguiding or coercing society into adhering
to a ‘truth’ in which they themselves do not believe.
Like Friedrich, Arendt too argues that the specific content of the ideology
is relatively unimportant; it is its form which makes ideology central to
totalitarian rule. The unavoidability and infallibility of the ‘Law of Nature’ (in the
case of Nazism) or the ‘Law of History’ (in the case of Bolshevism) is the driving
force behind the totalitarian regime. It determines reality and thereby renders
autonomous human action superfluous. Both the agency of the people and the
leaders becomes superfluous, for the latter are subjected to the unavoidable laws of
history and nature, too. Arendt emphasizes that ideology thus gives impetus to a
society that is directed towards a certain, fixed future. It determines the direction
of the movement and necessitates its totality; for anything that diverts from this

32
Ibid., 88-89.

24
fixed path contradicts the very existence of the totalitarian state and can therefore
not be sustained.33
The totality of the state is thus closely connected to the unity of the
official ideology. In this unambiguous unity lies the totalitarian ideology’s
attraction: after society has been wrecked by political upheaval, the uprooted
masses find a ‘home’ in the fictitious world of totalitarian propaganda. Arendt
argues that it does not matter if it is constructed from outrageous lies, as long as it
offers a consistent and comprehensible image of reality, in a time when reality
itself has become too bewildering to grasp. It does not matter whether or not
ideology is true; it only needs to make sense in itself, providing an incontestable
logic independent of common sense and experience. Like Friedrich, Arendt states
that ideology is both sincerely believed and also cynically employed by
totalitarian leaders. It is a remarkable ‘mixture of gullibility and cynicism’ which
characterizes their attitude towards the official doctrine. 34 It is at the heart of the
popular view on totalitarian reality as well; the widespread idea that ‘everything is
possible and nothing is true’ is a central feature of the totalitarian system. (This
paradox is explained further below, under the header ‘A modern phenomenon’.)
Arendt’s account also focuses on the form and function of ideology instead
of its content. It is not the particular set of ideas that makes ideology essential to
totalitarianism, but the idea that it is a compulsive ‘natural’ law to which humans
have to succumb. While Friedrich argues that ideologies are not in principle
totalitarian, Arendt contends that ideology is always loaded with ‘totalitarian
potential’. This potential lies in the fact that ideology separates thought from
experience; it is a system of ideas with a logical connection with reference only to
itself, arrived at through logical deductions. Totalitarian ideology is not anchored
in the empirical world and even incompatible with reality. It therefore bears the

33
Arendt, op. cit., 460-479.
34
Ibid., 382.

25
seeds of the totalitarian society, in which reality becomes superfluous as the
movement replaces it with ideological fiction.35
The function and form of ideology are also central to the theory of
post-totalitarianism. As part of its general argument that the post-totalitarian state
is weakened compared to its full-blown totalitarian predecessor, the theory holds
that while ideology is still central to the system, it is no longer sincerely adhered
to. Disbelief occurs in all layers of society: among the leaders as well as the general
public. Both are equally cynical towards the ideological fiction; rulers now use it
only as a means to legitimize their power. For the population, following the
ideological logic has a mere instrumental function as well; they adapt to it because
it is the only way in which they can live their everyday, ‘ordinary’ lives. Ideology
thus becomes a ritual: a constructed reality which is not openly contested, but
recognized for what it is: a mere myth. Because of this recognition, the
post-totalitarian state is far from an indestructible monolith; instead it is more like
a house of cards. Dissidents or opponents who refuse to ‘live in the lie’, as Vaclav
Havel famously phrased it, have the power to make the entire system collapse by
refusing to act according to the totalitarian ritual. 36 The likeliness of opposition to
appear and shatter the fragile post-totalitarian uniformity increases not only as a
result of growing cynicism. The decrease of terror is an essential precondition for
opposition to arise and succeed – for an effective system of all-pervasive terror is
the backbone of totalitarian society, according to its theorists.

Terror
According to Friedrich’s theory, terror is ‘the vital nerve of the totalitarian
system’.37 It develops in cycles, and hence its scope and intensity vary; from this
assumption, Friedrich argued that the Soviet thaw was not a deviation from the
totalitarian model, but in accordance with the general ‘evolution’ of totalitarian
35
Ibid., 468-474.
36
Thompson, op. cit., 315-316.
37
Friedrich, op. cit., 163.

26
dictatorships.38 The stages of terror are not, however, necessary and unavoidable,
but merely potential. In this respect Friedrich criticizes Arendt for presenting the
increase of terror as a ‘universal law’ instead of a mere possibility. 39 But whatever
its scope or intensity, terror is never absent in totalitarian societies, for it is the
instrument by which the movement seeks to create unanimity in all spheres of
life. ‘The passion for unanimity’ which totalitarian movements display is the
necessary result of their ideological foundation, which does not allow for
deviation from its ‘universal truth’.40 Any kind of dissent is a denial of this dogma
and must hence be eliminated. Terror paralyzes society to ensure the prevention
and elimination of real or potential opposition. Friedrich remarks that while terror
is not limited to totalitarian regimes, it is the combination with ideology as its
driving force and modern technology as its means which makes it unprecedented
and unique.
In the first stage of totalitarian dictatorship its political enemies consist of
real opposition, meaning those people who pose a threat to the movement because
of their (conscious) actions. After this phase, when the regime’s power becomes
more consolidated, ‘enemies of the people’ are identified by the regime regardless
of their behaviour. The violence then becomes preventive rather then reactive, as
the regime points out or ‘invents’ adversaries. These imagined enemies of the
movement and (hence) society are considered to be subversive not because of
their actual, but their potential action – or even through their mere existence.
Terror is thus the instrument by which real and ‘objective’ enemies of the state
and society are eliminated and prevented from arising. Friedrich in this respect
speaks of the pervasiveness of fear in the totalitarian society. The ‘all pervading
tentacles of the terror’ control people in all spheres of society, destroying the
possibility of popular resistance.41

38
Ibid., 11.
39
Ibid., 169.
40
Ibid., 101.
41
Ibid., 179.

27
 Overall, terror, in the form of purges, camps and forced confessions,
together with propaganda is aimed at securing the total uniformity which lies at
the heart of the totalitarian society. All these instruments of control and
domination are aimed at confirming the official ideology, the infallibility and
legitimacy of the ruler and to denounce and liquidate actual and potential
resistance. According to Friedrich, the desire for unanimity can be explained from
the fact that all governments, including totalitarian regimes, need consensus to
secure their existence - albeit a manipulated or coerced one.42
Friedrich thus argues that terror is an instrument by which totalitarian
regimes seek to create consensus to legitimize their rule. Here again, the
differences between Friedrich’s and Arendt’s accounts can be seen as a
consequence of their divergent views on the ultimate aim of the regimes.
Friedrich considers terror as a means to an end: it legitimizes totalitarian rule and
is a necessary step towards the achievement of the ultimate, utilitarian goal of the
perfect society. He speaks of terror not only in terms of ‘elimination’; according to
him it is also genuinely aimed at the ‘re-education’ and ‘redemption’ of those who
deviate from the ideological ‘Truth’. This suggests a true concern for popular
well-being - however far removed this obviously is from a humanistic notion of
well-being.
As I mentioned before, Arendt argues that the totalitarian movement goes
beyond notions of utility. Terror is not meant to promote the legitimacy of the
ideology and the dictator, nor is it part of an attempt to secure popular well-being
by creating a utopian society. Since it is central to the totalitarian system that
human agency is superfluous, totalitarian terror needs to foster neither individual
consent nor collective well-being. Instead, Arendt sees terror as a part of the
ultimate end of totalitarian rule, for it entails total domination over human beings
by which the human capacity for agency is destroyed. The total control means

42
Ibid., 201.

28
that human beings are reduced to ‘a specimen of the animal-species man’, 43
without individuality, spontaneity or morality – and that is the ultimate aim of the
totalitarian movement: the subjection of human pluralism to a closed future
dictated by a supra-human law.44
To a certain extent Arendt’s account of terror corresponds to Friedrich’s;
she too emphasizes the need for absolute unanimity as a consequence of
totalitarian ideology. She too argues that since any kind of alternative or
contradiction to the official ideology denies its universality and therefore its
validity, it can not exist in totalitarian society. She also describes how this leads to
the creation and persecution of ‘objective enemies’, who are judged on the basis of
what they are rather than what they do. But whereas Friedrich still sees this
practice of imagining adversaries as limited by the utilitarian goal and a struggle
for political power, Arendt draws a more radical and gloomy conclusion.
Following the totalitarian ‘logic’, she infers that ultimately, humanity itself is the
totalitarian movement’s objective enemy. For humans are capable of envisaging
alternative futures, of acting not in accordance with, but against everything that is
natural or given. Therefore they must be destroyed to the point where they no
longer possess the capacity for unpredictability, and can only respond to their
environment in a reactive, mechanical manner. They must be submerged in the
irresistible course of history or nature; their agency, being their distinctive human
trait, made entirely superfluous.45
In post-totalitarian society terror is still important, but as with ideology,
its hold on society is weakened. It occurs more in terms of secret police control,
rather than open (physical) violence and suppression. While the consequences of
opposition are still severe, they no longer amount to internment or death and
hence resistance is more likely to appear than in the strong totalitarian state. 46

43
Arendt, op. cit., 457.
44
Ibid., 437-457.
45
Canovan, op. cit., 58-60; Arendt, op. cit., 437-460.
46
Thompson, op. cit., 314.

29
A modern phenomenon?
Both Arendt and Friedrich see totalitarianism as a distinctively modern
phenomenon. Again, they do so for different reasons, related to their different
ideas on the ultimate goal and nature of totalitarianism. According to Friedrich,
totalitarianism is autocracy based on modern technology and mass legitimation. In
accordance with his contention that the essence of totalitarianism lies in its
organization and functioning, he stresses the importance of modern technology as
a necessary condition for the emergence and existence of totalitarian
dictatorships.47
Modern technology enables rulers to completely monitor and control their
subjects. In this sense, ‘totalitarian societies appear to be … logical exaggerations
… of the technological state of modern society.’ 48 Apart from this, totalitarianism
is a modern phenomenon in the sense that it is a perversion of the modern
constitutional democracy. It is a form of ‘autocratic democracy’ in which
unchecked power is concentrated in one party, legitimized by referring to the
democratic ideal of popular sovereignty. Rousseau’s volonté générale as the
epitome of democracy is reflected in the totalitarian ‘passion for unanimity’ that is
discussed above. What makes totalitarian ideology totalitarian (and hence
different from other heirs to earlier western thought, such as democratic
socialism) is the will to force reality into the utopian scheme, or to make reality fit
the theory, through violent revolution. In constitutional democracies, parties
campaign with programs in which they present a (simplified) ideal arrangement of
society, but once in power they adjust them to the complexity of reality.
Totalitarian dictatorships on the other hand adjust reality to their programs; either
by actually recreating reality (through the elimination of ‘dying classes’ for

47
Friedrich, op. cit., 4.
48
Ibid., 24.

30
instance) or at least by cultivating ideological fiction which replaces former
conceptions of reality (by forging history, for instance). 49
Totalitarian regimes according to Friedrich can thus be considered to be
‘perverted heirs’ to modernity and the Enlightenment, for their ideological roots
lie in the ideal of modern constitutional democracy and they are made possible by
modern technology. But Friedrich stresses that while totalitarian ideologies have
roots in modern western thought and science, the employment and glorification of
violence in service of ideological goals distorts this heritage – and sets them apart
from other heirs to this tradition.50
Arendt argues that totalitarianism is the answer to ‘the problem of
modernity’. It provides a solution for the existentialist despair of man, being
‘thrown into’ a meaningless world without any direction or goal. Totalitarianism
is an answer to this problem because it provides the ultimate, man-made goal
while at the same time removing the bothersome responsibility that comes with
human agency. The danger of modernity is thus that man, faced with this
awe-inspiring task to provide his world with meaning, submits himself to
supra-human laws to evade his responsibility. This according to Arendt is the
‘fundamental sin of totalitarianism’, but it is also a characteristic trait of modernity
in general. Because modern men are characterized by the apparent contradictory
inclination to subject their capacity for action to inevitable natural forces, while at
the same time they seek to actively accelerate and direct these forces - the paradox
mentioned above.51
This paradox can be explained from the idea that totalitarianism is formed
by a combination of two aspects of the modern world. One is ‘modern hubris’: the
belief that humans need no longer accept anything that is given as a standard; the
insistence on man as the lawmaker in his own universe. The other is the refusal to
face up to the responsibility that comes with this power. In this way, the modern

49
Ibid., 25, 90-91, 101.
50
Ibid., 106.
51
Canovan, op. cit., 11-13, 61-62.

31
human condition gives rise to totalitarianism, in which ‘human beings try to
purchase omnipotence at the price of siding with inhuman forces’. 52

Origins
During the 1950s and 1960s, Friedrich believed that it was not (yet) possible to
offer a valid explanation for the rise of totalitarianism. One of the flawed answers
to this question according to him is the idea that the rise of the totalitarian
movement is inherent in the regime’s respective ideology. Thus the idea that
Stalinism is the logical outcome of Marxism is merely a ‘distortion of historical
facts’.53 He argued that Arendt’s account too was unconvincing in this respect, and
explicitly stated that his own attempt to theorize totalitarianism would be
restricted to a description of its characteristics. He stressed the need to examine
and map the factual characteristics and functioning of the totalitarian state first,
before attempting to answer the question ‘why’.54
Luykx remarks that Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism does offer an
explanation for the creation of the totalitarian system; it is to be found in the
second part of the book, in which she reflects on imperialism as the root of the
Bolshevists’ and the National Socialists’ destructive expansionism. Unfortunately
this part has received little attention in academic discussion - instead, scholars
have focused on the third part, which describes the elements and functioning of
the totalitarian state. (Luykx is right in asserting that the German title of the book,
Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft, is far more adequate than the
American/English The Origins of Totalitarianism.)55 In a similar vein, Canovan
argues that in general the focus has been too much on the third part of The
Origins and its complex argument has therefore not been fully acknowledged.56

52
Ibid., 14, 55-57, 89; Arendt op. cit., 341-351.
53
Friedrich, op. cit., 18.
54
Ibid., 13-14.
55
Luykx, op. cit., 524-525.
56
Canovan, op.cit., 12.

32
 Central in Arendt’s complex explanation of the origins of totalitarianism is
her account of capitalist expansionism. In the nineteenth century, its meaning
shifted from economics to politics as it became the basic principle of imperialism.
Imperialism paved the way for totalitarianism in two ways: on the one hand it
fostered the idea that the expansion of power was an end in itself. The imperialist
preoccupation with expansion for expansion’s sake separated political power from
the goals of the nation state, which were by definition limited to a fixed territory.
On the other hand, imperialism introduced rule by decree, in which the
unaccountable ‘imperial bureaucrat’ governs secretively and arbitrarily.
Imperialism thus destroyed the stable political structures of the nation state era,
paving the way for a political movement to replace the political party. The
movement is not based on fixed interests or a steady policy; instead it seeks to
destroy stability and replace it with dynamism. According to Arendt, the pan-
German Nazi movement and the pan-Slavic Bolshevist movement should be
considered to be continental substitutes for overseas imperialism.57

Dynamism
Arendt’s account of expansionism as the root of totalitarianism is closely related to
another distinctive feature on which she an Friedrich agree, namely its dynamic
nature. Arendt argues that all authoritarian states are different from
totalitarianism in the sense that latter is a movement, not a stable structure; its
development is one of radicalization, as opposed to consolidation or stagnation.
Friedrich regards the perpetual dynamic of the totalitarian dictatorship as the
institutionalization of the revolution or war which brought it into being. Arendt
views the complexities and apparent disorder of Hitler’s and Stalin’s regimes as the
result of the continuous motion inherent in totalitarianism; these regimes never
settle down, but remain shapeless and in turmoil. The dynamic consists of the

57
Ibid., 30-36; Arendt, op. cit., Part Two: ‘Imperialism’, 123-302.

33
debates of and changes in ideology, institutional structures, and the ongoing
‘construction’ and persecution of successive enemies.58
Thus both authors stress the dynamic nature of totalitarianism. In a
slightly different manner, dynamism became the focal point for critique on
classical totalitarianism theory. As mentioned before, the paradigm was
considered inadequate because it could not account for totalitarian regime’s
change towards more constitutional, democratic forms of government. With
regard to the totalitarian state’s future development, Arendt asserted that the
dynamism of the totalitarian movement would result in a world-wide destruction
of humanity. While Friedrich believed that change or overthrow of the regime
from within was unlikely to occur let alone succeed, he rejected Arendt’s
prediction – emphasizing that its future development was too uncertain to
comment on.59 As discussed earlier, post-totalitarianism theory was developed as a
kind of counter-argument against the critical observation that totalitarianism
theory was incapable of explaining (let alone predict) the changes and eventual
collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet while post-totalitarianism theory accounts for
the post-totalitarian state in a descriptive way, it does not seem to solve the
problem of change – for it does not explain how or why exactly totalitarianism
evolves into post-totalitarianism,

Intention and achievement

As I have remarked earlier, I believe that the differences in Arendt’s and
Friedrich’s interpretation of totalitarianism spring from their disagreement on the
ultimate objective of totalitarian rule. Insofar as their opinions diverge on the
different aspects of totalitarianism, I believe these can be traced back to this
essential difference in their understanding of the totalitarian system. But while

58
Canovan, op. cit., 58; Arendt, op. cit, 389-419.
59
Friedrich, op. cit., 375.

34
they differed in their opinion as to what was the ultimate goal of totalitarianism,
Arendt and Friedrich agreed that it was not, or only very partly, achieved.
According to Arendt, the total elimination of human individuality and
capacity for spontaneous action was achieved only in the concentration camps –
but on this relatively small scale it thus proved to be possible. Friedrich is sceptical
of the possibility of the kind of total domination with which Arendt is concerned.
He argues against the idea that the essence of totalitarianism consists of the will to
control and remake human beings. He argues that while this is indeed the
regime’s intention, it is never actually accomplished: ‘Totalitarian dictatorship as it
actually developed was not intended by those who created it’. 60 Focusing on the
intention of the regime is not an adequate approach to discover its essential
characteristics, according to Friedrich; since it does not inform us about the
reality of existing totalitarian societies. Moreover, he argues, this intention is not
even the exclusive domain of totalitarian dictatorships. 61 His insistence on the
need to describe totalitarianism ‘as it actually developed’ is reminiscent of the
view of revisionist historians like Getty, who sees no point in discussing what
totalitarianism would have looked like if it had materialized, when in fact it did
not.62
I believe that this point of view is based on the entanglement of two
aspects that should be considered separately. On the one hand, there is the
question of whether the analysis of totalitarianism is adequate – in terms of
referring to a reality. On the other there is the question of whether the regime’s
intentions were realized. Whether historians adequately recover totalitarian
intentions from the past does not depend on whether or not these indeed
materialized into achievements. Friedrich and Getty’s remarks suggest that
intentions can not be part of serious and relevant research unless they were
actually achieved. Being a student of the history of ideas, I of course disagree with

60
Ibid., 15.
61
Ibid., 16-17.
62
Getty, J.A. Personal interview. 9 June 2009.

35
this assumption. Knowledge of intentions and ideas in general obviously increases
our capacity to interpret concrete actions and events more adequately. But it is
important to distinguish between intention and achievement, and I think the
failure to do so is part of the cause of the controversy surrounding totalitarianism
theory. For regimes were labeled according to their alleged intentions; they were
the ‘ultimate evil’ because of their ‘evil’ intentions. Friedrich and Getty’s
insistence to limit research to empirical evidence is aimed at the distinction
between intention and achievement, but it is essentially a concern for what was
actual or true as opposed to what was potential or imaginary. This concern is
understandable and partly justified, especially considering the history of
totalitarianism theory. But it should not lead to the conviction that researching
intentions is by definition pointless or unscientific. This is recognized by Luykx,
who (in accordance with the majority of the authors under review in his article)
argues that while the totalitarian model can no longer be considered valid due to
its inadequate description of ‘achieved’ or ‘actual’ totalitarianism, it is still valuable
as a tool for the analysis of the movement’s intentions. 63

2.4 ‘Checklist’ for the relevance of totalitarianism theory

Now that I have defined what I mean by totalitarianism theory, I need to
elaborate how this leads to an answer to the question whether or not
totalitarianism theory is relevant in post-1989 historiography. Below I discuss how
the theory’s arguments, assumptions and perspectives could be recognized in the
selected publications, presenting a kind of checklist – albeit an extensive one –
which serves as the basic framework of my analysis of the selected publications.
Before proceeding, a short comment on the selected publications is in
place. The subject of totalitarianism theory is the Soviet Union as a political-social
phenomenon; its comments on the Soviet state and society, and their interaction. I
have therefore based my selection of research reports on this feature, leaving out

63
Luykx, op. cit., 528.

36
for instance works on different or more specific subjects such as economics,
particular geographical regions, science and the arts. The works discussed thus
necessarily analyze the general political-social history of the Soviet Union; that is
the intention of my selection and thus beyond doubt.

‘Checklist’
1. In totalitarianism theory, the Soviet Union is considered to be unique and
unprecedented, which means that it is seen to belong to a distinct category,
different from other forms of (authoritarian) rule. The author could of course
explicitly argue for or against this assertion. Or he might confirm or reject this
presumption more implicitly, by using or avoiding the term ‘totalitarian’ to define
the Soviet state as opposed to ‘non-totalitarian’ states or, on the contrary, to stress
its similarity with other forms of non-constitutional rule. Usage of the term
‘totalitarian’ can obviously be recognized easily. But the researcher’s argument for
or against the Soviet Union’s uniqueness may be less overt; it might be seen in the
method of research used. This might be distinct from methods which are used to
examine other states and forms of government, shaped for instance by the
conviction that original Soviet sources are corrupted and therefore useless for
reconstructing reality. Or, on the contrary, the researcher might rely on an
overarching approach based on the assumption that Soviet history is not a singular
phenomenon but part of a general trend, such as modernization theory.
2. According to totalitarianism theory, the Soviet Union’s uniqueness justifies the
comparative perspective. In post-1989 publications, authors might endorse or
reject the idea that the Soviet Union can be compared to Nazism or Italian fascism,
or both. Or they might instead use a comparative perspective to suggest the Soviet
Union’s normalcy, grouping it together with other examples of
(non-constitutional) government. If the comparative perspective is relevant, this is
presumably always to some degree explicit, since the other regimes or states are
mentioned by name and the comparison is elaborated upon. But there might be

37
less obvious references as well; the historian could for instance implicitly use
theoretical presumptions and arguments that were originally developed in
researching Nazism, to interpret Stalinism.
3. According to totalitarianism theory, the uniqueness of the totalitarian
dictatorship is closely related to its goal, which is the total control by the state
over all spheres of society. Authors might deny or confirm that this was indeed
the intention of the Soviet state, and might similarly agree or disagree that it was
also its actual achievement. This aspect could be explicitly or implicitly argued for
or against both from a top-down and a bottom-up perspective; either from the
perspective of the state or the view from society. Comments on the (intended)
destruction of all forms of pluralism (or its restoration in its ‘post-totalitarian
phase’) are central here, as are remarks on the closely connected (aim for a) lack of
agency and hence resistance. The author might argue against or for the idea of the
prostrate civil society controlled by an effective, strong state. Implicit or explicit
arguments for or against the non-utility of the state’s intentions and achievements
are also informative; e.g. comments on leaders who act against their own
advantage for the utopian cause, or making seeming irrational decisions which can
only be explained with reference to this ultimate goal.
4. The (intended) goal as described in totalitarianism theory is closely connected
its other main element, ideology. In recent historiography, it could be considered
of either vital or little importance to the functioning of state and society.
a. If totalitarianism theory is relevant to these publications, ideology would
be conceived of as an official, top-down program for understanding the
past and present, and for constructing the future. If on the other hand, for
instance, post-modern perspectives on subjectivity inform the researcher’s
frame of reference, ideology might be of great importance but on a
different level; it will presumable be considered as individual
Weltanschauung rather than a collective plan for the remake of society.

38
b. If authors would endorse the arguments of totalitarianism theory,
adherence to ideology by the movement’s officials would be portrayed as
sincere, or in terms of Arendt’s ‘mixture of gullibility and cynicism’ – but
not as mere cynicism. They would accordingly also regard the leader’s
decisions and actions to be ideologically motivated. The contrary
argument that they acted out of pure pragmatism consequently signifies a
negation of the central arguments of totalitarianism theory. In line with
post-totalitarianism theory however, it might be argued that after Stalin’s
death the sincere and/or coerced adherence to official ideology is replaced
with cynicism, both among officials and the population.
c. Adherence to ideology on the level of society might be sincere or coerced,
or both, according to totalitarianism theory. While Friedrich and Arendt
regard sincere adherence possible and even essential for the movement’s
consolidation of power, this is only temporarily and/or restricted to a very
small portion of the population. In general, their suggestion that total
control is exercised over a passive, powerless society carries much more
weight. This is confirmed by the fact that one of the main arguments
employed in revisionist historiography is that the Soviet state on the
contrary relied on mass voluntary support from below – this was indeed
one of the controversial suggestions which was at the pivot of the
totalitarianism debate. Hence it can be argued that in recent
historiography, if the emphasis is on voluntary adherence to the state and
its official ideology, the author argues against totalitarianism theory.
d. Following totalitarianism theory, the importance of ideology should be
seen in its unity and infallibility, and in its form or function rather than its
specific content. Thus an analysis insisting on the uniqueness of the Soviet
Union because of the specific Bolshevist ideology can not be regarded to
be a continuation of totalitarianism theory in that respect.

39
5. The attention for terror as an important or even pivotal aspect of the Soviet
Union signals traces of totalitarianism theory; revisionism on the other hand is
characterized by, and criticized for, its lack of attention for it. The conviction that
terror is important to the Soviet state might be recognized in the author’s implicit
or explicit argument that this was the constructive element of society; or was at
least intended to be. Terror can either be presented as the means to an end
(Friedrich) or an end in itself (Arendt). Terror in the totalitarian phase will be
discussed in terms of purges, camps, physical elimination, brainwashing etc; in the
post-totalitarian phase, the focus would be on secret police activities; covert and
less severe, if still considerable.
6. Following totalitarianism theory, authors might comment on the Soviet Union
as being a distinctly modern phenomenon; but without connecting it to a general
modernization process (as in modernization theory). The suggestion that it is
modern can be signified by comments on its utopian nature, its mass character, its
reliance on technology and its ‘perversion’ of constitutional democracy - or
Arendt’s combination of modern hubris and a typically modern lack of
responsibility. Yet the aspect of modernity should be combined with other aspects
to confirm that the work shows traces of totalitarianism theory; for it is obviously
not a distinctive feature of totalitarianism theory to consider the Soviet Union a
modern phenomenon.
7. The question of modernity is related to the question of its origins. If
totalitarianism theory is indeed relevant to post-1989 research, the Soviet Union
will be considered to constitute a break rather than a continuation in Russian
history. This requirement obviously springs from the insistence on the Soviet
Union being unprecedented, which is central to totalitarianism theory. This does
however not mean that long term explanations are necessarily a rejection of
totalitarianism theory; Arendt herself argued that its origins were to be traced
back to the nineteenth century. The same goes here as for comments on its

40
modern nature: unless its unique character is emphasized, it need not signal the
relevance of totalitarianism theory.
8. Further, and also connected with its uniqueness, is the emphasis on the
dynamism of the state. Authors implicitly or explicitly endorsing totalitarianism
theory would likely comment on the eternal movement of the state; shifts of
power positions and sub goals, discussion and dissension, administrative
multiplicity or (seeming) chaos, etc. Historical accounts that stress the Soviet
Union’s transformation towards consolidation and normalcy on the other hand
would of course deny this presumption.
9. Finally, agency and autonomy are central notions in totalitarianism theory. If
the theory is still or again relevant, agency, in terms of conscious and even
carefully planned action, will presumably play a large role. A contrary emphasis
on contingencies or structural causes of history would imply its irrelevance. The
author would see the state as the agent in history, as opposed to society which
lacks autonomy (nearly) entirely. It might be argued that this was the actual
situation, or merely the intention of the state. From this assumption follows that it
is most rewarding to look at the Soviet Union from a top-down perspective; for if
the state is the agent in history, one must of course investigate the state in order to
understand Soviet history. Accordingly, revisionists made use of the
bottom-up perspective instead. Yet this division of approaches should not be used
as a rigid scheme for the interpretation of post-1989 historiography. For it is
possible that the central arguments of totalitarianism theory are defended, or
argued against, from either perspective. 64 Post-totalitarianism theory for instance
leaves room for both approaches; authors might comment on the growing
autonomy of society, and for this the bottom-up perspective is obviously very
informative. In classic totalitarianism theory however, society is merely reactive
whereas the state is active. Hence historians who endorse this classic view would
likely view society as a collective whole, rather than focus on separate individuals

64
Van Ree, ‘Zin en onzin van het totalitaire model’.

41
– except for important state officials. Society would thus be viewed from an
objective point of view, from outside, rather than from within, focusing on
individual subjectivity. Authors might on the other hand regard Soviet history
from a post-modern approach with great emphasis on subjectivity, and from this
perspective regard the bottom-up approach as the most fruitful one.

42
3 Review of Soviet Union historiography, 1990-2009

3.1 Remarks on selection and method

In this chapter I present the findings of my review of the historiography regarding
the Soviet Union since its collapse. It is obviously not an exhaustive account
encompassing all relevant publications since 1989; before turning to my discussion
of the examined works I will offer a short explanation of my selection of
publications.
I decided to review monographs rather than e.g. articles or essays, because
in history I believe books are (still) the primary medium by which to
communicate one’s research findings. Apart from that, in scope and volume I
expected them to provide a rich and relevant source from which to assess the
various points on the checklist. 65 As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the
selection was also in part determined, in advance, by the relevance of the subjects
researched – including only monographs concerned with the socio-political
history of the Soviet Union in general; certain aspects of Soviet history are
therefore omitted from this review.
Apart from this conscious decision, the selection of publications was
further determined mainly by the temporal and financial boundaries of my
research; the availability of a publication as well as the possibility to explore it in a
limited amount of time were among the decisive factors. Due to the limited
amount of publications available, as well as the limited amount of time I had to
review them, my initial selection of something over 70 monographs was reduced
to approximately 50 publications. From these 50 works I examined, I have
ultimately included 35 publications in the review below; these proved to be
relevant and informative in my attempt to map the significance of totalitarianism

65
I have however included collections of essays which contained a substantial comment from its
editors, outlining the general approach and/or conclusions of the contributions.

43
theory in post-1989 Soviet historiography. The publications span a period of
nearly two decades; the first dates from 1990, the last was published this year. 66
It is thus clear that the following makes no claim to be exhaustive; neither
does it provide an overview of historiography in its usual form. Since it is my
intention to check whether or not totalitarianism theory is still or again relevant,
the publications discussed are examined according to their individual content: the
arguments, perspectives and assumptions employed. The review does not focus
attention on the academic context of the publications or their relation to each
66
The publications that I intended to review but had to omit due to practical limitations are the
following: Archie Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism (London 2009); Alexander Dallin and
Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, The Soviet System: from Crisis to Collapse (Boulder 1995); R. W. Davies
e.a., Soviet History, 1917-53: Essays in Honour of R.W. Davies (New York 1995); André Gerrits, Een
Bizar Experiment: de Lange Schaduw van de Sovjet-Unie, 1917-1991 (Amsterdam 2001); Geoffrey A.
Hosking and Robert Service, Reinterpreting Russia (London/New York 1999); Geoffrey A. Hosking,
The First Socialist Society: A History of the Soviet Union from Within (Cambridge 1993); Stephen
Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley 1995); Roy D. Laird, The Soviet
Legacy (Westport 1993); David MacKenzie and Michael W. Curran, A History of Russia, the Soviet
Union, and Beyond (Belmont 2002); David R. Marples, Motherland: Russia in the 20th Century
(London/New York 2002); Martin McCauley, Stalin and Stalinism (New York 2008); Kevin
McDermott, Stalin: Revolutionary in an Era of War (New York 2006); Tony Parker, Russian Voices
(New York 1992); Robert Service, A History of Modern Russia from Nicholas II to Vladimir Putin
(Cambridge 2003); Harold Shukman, Redefining Stalinism (London 2003); Peter Waldron, The
Soviet Union (Aldershot/Burlington 2007); Stephen White, Communism and its Collapse (New York
2001).
The books I excluded after I studied them are the following: Stefan Creuzberger and Rainer
Lindner, Russische Archive Und Geschichtswissenschaft: Rechtsgrundlagen, Arbeitsbedingungen,
Forschungsperspektiven (Frankfurt 2003); Alexander Dallin and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, Dimitrov
and Stalin, 1934-1943: Letters From the Soviet Archives (New Haven 2000); Gregory L. Freeze,
Russia: A History (Oxford 2002); François Furet, The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism
in the Twentieth Century (Chicago 1999); David L. Hoffmann, Stalinism: The Essential Readings
(Malden 2003); David Holloway and Alexander Dallin, Reexamining the Soviet Experience: Essays
in Honor of Alexander Dallin (Boulder 1996); Robert T. Huber and Donald R. Kelley, Perestroika-
era Politics: The New Soviet Legislature and Gorbachev's Political Reforms (Armonk 1991); Galina
Michajlovna Ivanova and Donald J. Raleigh, Labor Camp Socialism: The Gulag in the Soviet
Totalitarian System (Armonk 2000); Henry Kozicki, Western and Russian Historiography: Recent
Views (New York 1993); Leonid Luks and Donal O'Sullivan, Rußland und Deutschland im 19. und
20. Jahrhundert: zwei "Sonderwege" im Vergleich (Cologne 2001); Martin E. Malia, Russia under
Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum (Cambridge 1999); Mary
McAuley, Soviet Politics, 1917-1991 (Oxford/New York 1992); Martin McCauley, The Rise and Fall
of the Soviet Union (New York 2008); Simon Sebag Montefiore, Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar
(New York 2004); Stefan Plaggenborg, Experiment Moderne: Der Sowjetische Weg (Frankfurt/New
York 2006); Donald J. Raleigh, Soviet Historians and Perestroika: The First Phase (Armonk, 1989);
Henry Rousso and Richard Joseph Golsan, Stalinism and Nazism: History and Memory Compared
(London 2004); Richard Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective (London/New York 1998); Ofira
Seliktar, Politics, Paradigms, and Intelligence Failures: Why So Few Predicted the Collapse of the
Soviet Union (Armonk 2004); Alan Wood, Stalin and Stalinism (London/New York 1990).

44
other, and thus does not (intentionally) comment on e.g. certain developments or
‘schools’ in historiography; the same goes for the specific content of the research
questions and academic disputes over the possible answers. In short, the context
and conclusions of the monographs discussed are in a sense of marginal
importance to my research. Readers will thus find that familiar categories and
important issues in Soviet historiography are largely omitted from the following
discussion; they are replaced with the categories and issues as described in the
checklist.

3.2 Review of publications

Robert Conquest, currently a research fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover
Institution, has been a prominent proponent of the totalitarian model in the
totalitarianism debate. The two publications reviewed here show that he has not
changed his point of view since. While ‘the archival revolution’ only began to gain
momentum in 1990, in his 1990 edition of The Great Terror 67
Conquest already
states confidently that his conclusions from the original 1968 edition have been
confirmed by the new sources. The author does not cite any of them however; this
edition is based largely on secondary sources published between 1950 and 1980.
Conquest thus offers his reader’s nothing to counter or even balance the
revisionist critique, that he has not taken into account the new primary material
that could really lead to a reassessment; instead he merely repeats his earlier
thesis, in accordance with the totalitarian paradigm.
In Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928 – 1941 68
Robert
Tucker examines the Stalinist collectivization and Terror of the 1930s. Professor
emeritus Tucker founded the Russian Studies Program at Princeton University
and is renowned for his biographies of Stalin. Since the book was finished only
when the new material first started to become available, it is no surprise that
67
Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (London 1990).
68
Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928 – 1941 (London/New York
1992).

45
Tucker did not base his research on the new sources. Yet he too argues confidently
that he knows the new sources and that they confirm his central thesis. 69 Which is
that this ‘second revolution’ was counterrevolutionary; a return to state-building
processes that occurred in Russia’s early history. Stalin’s policy was inspired not
by Bolshevist-revolutionary zeal, but on the contrary by ‘the distant Russian past’,
which led to a mixture of socialism with Great Russian nationalism. Tucker thus
does not regard Stalinism to be a unique and unprecedented phenomenon, but
instead emphasizes its long-term roots in Russian history. He accordingly does not
refer to Stalinism as an example of totalitarianism, but of autocracy. Tucker’s
approach is explicitly top-down: the author views the state, and specifically Stalin,
as the force that determined history: economic, social, cultural and political
change were all state-initiated and enforced; there was no support from below.
With regard to the goal of the Soviet state, Tucker does not confirm the
totalitarian model; he argues that its primary aim was to build a strong military-
industrial power, for the sake of defense and expansionism. 70 He argues that
ultimately, Stalin was after ‘fame and glory’ 71. In general, the author primarily
attempts to understand the dictator as a person, and employs a psychological
approach for this purpose. His analysis is abound with psycho-analytic terms;
Tucker interprets Stalin’s actions in terms of ‘neurotic anxiety’, caused by his
‘wretched childhood’, his ‘system of inner defense’, ‘self-hate’, and ‘repression’. 72
Tucker thus offers a good example of a top-down subjective approach (as opposed
to the bottom-up subjective approach I suggested in the checklist): a psychological
account of Stalin’s subjective experience as the agent that determined Soviet
history.
Professor emeritus of history at the University of Vermont Robert V.
Daniels in The End of the Communist Revolution 73
interprets the history of the
69
Ibid., xv.
70
Ibid., xiv-xv.
71
Ibid., 3.
72
Ibid., 4-6.
73
Robert V. Daniels, The End of the Communist Revolution (London/New York 1993).

46
Soviet Union in light of its revolutionary roots. He argues that the post-
revolutionary dictatorship was a ‘reactionary despotism’ and that Gorbachev’s
reforms meant not a sudden failure, but a gradual return to its original
revolutionary incentive; ‘a return to the missed opportunities of 1917’. 74 This work
is not based on new archival material or other primary sources, which could be
explained as the result of the time of its publication. Yet it could also indicate that
Daniels did not consider the new material to be of importance for his research;
this appears to be a more accurate conclusion given that in his 2007 publication
The Rise and Fall of Communism in Russia he still makes no use of these sources. 75
Daniels endorses a top-down perspective; he regards the members of the Soviet
elite (revolutionaries, leaders, and reformers) as the agents in history. While his
passing remark that the Soviet Union was ‘totalitarian’ suggests to the reader that
he considers the term self-evident, he does explicitly argue that all historical
interpretations, including the notion of totalitarianism, are in need of a
reassessment in light of the Soviet Union’s collapse. 76 His revaluation then results
in a validation of the totalitarian perspective. Daniels argues that revisionists have
underestimated the truth in the totalitarian model, and confirms the comparative
perspective by stating that ‘Stalinist totalitarianism … was more nearly total that
the Nazi variety’.77 The author also confirms the totalitarian model with regard to
the goal of the Soviet state; as far as the post-revolutionary period is concerned
(lasting until 1985) its leaders aimed at exercising total control over all spheres of
society. Ideology was top-down and personal, according to Daniels: ‘The system
that passed for ‘Communism’ became the creature of one Joseph Stalin’. 78 Ideology
was not the driving force behind the Soviet state, however; he argues against the
idea that the Soviet Union was above all a ‘utopian experiment’. Ideology was only
sincerely adhered to in the early years of the Soviet Union; under Stalin it came to
74
Ibid., 3
75
The Rise and Fall of Communism in Russia is reviewed on page 73.
76
Daniels, op. cit., 2.
77
Ibid., 77.
78
Ibid., 2.

47
be a mere instrument that could be altered at will. Ideology then was a mere
mask, ‘to the confusion to friend and foe alike’; in reality, the history of the Soviet
Union was the result of a mere struggle for power.79
In The Gulag at War: Stalin’s Forced Labour System in the Light of the
Archives 80 Edwin Bacon, Reader in Comparative Politics at Birkbeck College, the
University of London, presents a history of forced labor under Stalin’s rule, based
on the original administration of the Gulag authorities. Its temporal focus is on the
years of the Second World War. This study is based mainly on archival material
which had at the time of publication only recently become accessible (if still
restricted) to western scholars. Bacon argues that access to the official
administration of the forced labor system will help to decide long-lived feuds over
mortality rates and other disputed facts. While he values the official statistics for
their objective reliability, he insists that there is a different history to be told
which can not be derived from these sources: the personal, subjective accounts of
what it meant to live in the Gulag. Bacon thus employs the top-down approach for
reasons of objective validity, while at the same time suggesting that the bottom-up
approach is valid and necessary to answer other, different questions regarding this
history. Bacon states that forced labor in itself was not unique or unprecedented;
it was also common during tsarism. With regard to the comparative perspective,
Bacon remarks that while the term ‘concentration camp’ evokes the image of the
extermination camps in Nazi Germany, it should be understood that these can not
be compared.81 Regarding the goal of the Soviet state or in this case, the forced
labor system, Bacon argues that the Gulag camps and colonies were initially the
result of an ideological motivation, to prevent and remove actual and possible
resistance through this means of ‘re-education’. Yet from the 1930s onwards its
main reason for existence became economic. 82 While Bacon views the Gulag from
79
Ibid., 2, 82, 106.
80
Edwin Bacon, The Gulag at War: Stalin’s Forced Labour System in the Light of the Archives
(London 1994).
81
Ibid., 43.
82
Ibid., 160.

48
the perspective of the state, he does not support the totalitarian thesis that its
inmates were subdued to total control: he argues that the Gulag functioned
effectively as a tightly controlled central administration, yet he also pays attention
to the autonomous action from below - through uprisings, revolts and (attempted)
escapes.
Professor emeritus at Georgetown University Walter Laqueur in The
Dream That Failed: Reflections on the Soviet Union 83
reassesses Soviet history in
the light of its collapse, arguing that it was totalitarian; for if it had been a ‘regular’
authoritarian state, the transition towards democracy would have been easier and
it would not have collapsed. 84 The references in the book point only to secondary
sources, and the author does not comment on the availability of the new primary
material. Laqueur explicitly endorses totalitarianism theory; he argues that it was
dismissed too early, for even if it was flawed, it still offered a valid explanation,
whereas revisionism failed to do so.
In The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991, 85
professor emeritus at Berkeley Martin Malia (1924-2004) argues that although the
totalitarian model has its flaws, revisionism ‘in correcting one error fell into a
worse one’.86 Malia, a prominent defender of the totalitarian model, remarks that
revisionists were wrong in attacking the thesis that Soviet society was totalitarian,
when this was in fact a mere caricature of the totalitarian model. According to the
totalitarian model, not society, but the state was totalitarian. In other words, Malia
argues that the validity of the totalitarian model lies in its explanation of the
intention of the totalitarian movement, rather than its actual achievement. The
author is very explicit in his appreciation of the totalitarian model for
understanding the Soviet Union. He endorses the totalitarian thesis that the Soviet
Union is a unique and unprecedented phenomenon, which requires a distinct
83
Walter Laqueur, The Dream That Failed: Reflections on the Soviet Union (New York/Oxford
1994).
84
Ibid., 187.
85
Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York 1994).
86
Ibid., 13.

49
interpretive framework: ‘The uniqueness of this phenomenon [Soviet
Communism] cries out for a separate and distinct designation, and the rude
experience of the twentieth century has given us such a term. It is
totalitarianism.’87 In accordance with totalitarianism theory, too, Malia insists that
ideology is the key to understanding Soviet history; asserting that the motive
behind The Soviet Tragedy is ‘to reassert the primacy of ideology and politics’. 88
John L. H. Keep, professor emeritus at the University of Toronto in Last of
the Empires: A History of the Soviet Union, 1945 – 1991 89
comments on the
importance and possibilities of the new sources, but also remarks that it is too
premature to draw conclusions. His own account is based on secondary literature;
an attempt to ‘sum up what is now generally known’. 90 His approach is both
top-down and bottom-up, for he regards the revisionist attention for the
bottom-up approach valuable addition to the top-down approach of the
totalitarian paradigm. Keep comments on the controversies surrounding the
totalitarianism debate, and while he states without further explanation that the
Soviet Union in retrospect can indeed be ‘properly characterized as ‘totalitarian’, 91
he argues that historians should not pour their research subject into a rigid
theoretical mold and promises his reader to steer clear from such abstractions
himself. The author endorses the totalitarianism thesis by arguing that Stalin
effectively crushed civil society’s capacity for agency. 92 Keep is not a proponent of
the totalitarian comparison, arguing that there are more dissimilarities than
similarities. The main similarity between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union lies
in its origins, he argues: the socio-political upheavals caused by World War I and
the ‘demagogic mass-politics’ that followed. 93 Ideology according to Keep was the

87
Ibid., 14.
88
Ibid., 16.
89
John L. H. Keep, Last of the Empires: A History of the Soviet Union, 1945 – 1991 (Oxford/New
York 1995).
90
Ibid., 1.
91
Ibid., 4.
92
Ibid., 413.
93
Ibid., 419.

50
driving force behind state policy and is central to understanding the nature and
history of the Soviet Union. He argues that Soviet leaders were often cynical; their
‘adherence’ to ideology was merely staged for public display. The collapse of the
Soviet Union is also to be understood in terms of ideology. In line with post-
totalitarianism theory, Keep argues that from the 1960s onwards ‘ideology ceased
to be credible – and ultimately self-destructed’; this loss of faith was felt in state
and society, and both were agents in the determination of its collapse. 94
Richard Pipes’ A Concise History of the Russian Revolution 95
comprises
two earlier volumes: Russian Revolution (1990) and Russia under the Bolshevik
Regime (1994) – the latter was partly based on new primary sources. Pipes,
professor emeritus at Harvard University, employs a top-down approach, arguing
that the revolutionary vanguard was the main actor which shaped Soviet history.96
Noting with apparent regret that term has ‘fallen out of favor’, Pipes insists that
the Soviet Union was totalitarian. 97 A chapter titled ‘Communism, Fascism,
National-Socialism’ (omitted from this publication for practical reasons) indicates
that Pipes endorses the comparative perspective. With regard to the goal of the
Soviet state, Pipes too confirms the totalitarian assertion that it lies in the total
remake of society.98 Yet with regard to the totalitarian state’s unicity and
unprecedentedness, Pipes rejects the idea that the Soviet period constitutes a
radical break in the history of Russia; for ‘even someone entirely ignorant of
Russia should find it inconceivable that on a single day, October 25, 1917 … the
course of the thousand-year-old history … could undergo complete
transformation.’99 With regard to the role of ideology, too, Pipes’ interpretation
deviates from the totalitarian model. He argues that Marxist ideology was not the
main driving force behind Soviet history. It was determined more by the character
94
Ibid., 418.
95
Richard Pipes, A Concise History of the Russian Revolution (New York, 1995; I refer to the
paperback edition of 1996).
96
Ibid., xiii-xvii.
97
Ibid., 150, 392.
98
Ibid., xiii-xvii.
99
Ibid., 396.

51
of Lenin and the longer Russian tradition of authoritarianism. Ideology according
to Pipes was as mere instrument for securing and legitimizing power and personal
interests.100 Where agency is concerned, Pipes explicitly argues against the
structural explanation for Russia’s history: ‘events follow with inexorable force
from the mentality and character of the protagonists … economic or social forces
… are an abstraction; they do not act.’ 101 Yet Pipes does not argue for the
intentionalist view of the totalitarian model either, stating that there was no such
thing as a central plan: ‘Russia’s new rulers improvised their political system as
they went along’.102
For the fourth edition of The Soviet Colossus: History and Aftermath 103

Michael Kort, professor of social science at Boston University, did not consult the
newly available material; he argues that the new sources do not necessitate a
different approach to Soviet history, not do they provide clarity. Quoting Winston
Churchill’s famous phrase, Kort maintains that Russia is still ‘a riddle wrapped in a
mystery inside an enigma’.104 He explicitly argues that the Soviet Union (under
Stalin) was totalitarian, and not only in intent. While the state’s control was not
perfect, its effect was a near total repression of all spheres of Soviet life: ‘all Soviet
citizens [were] powerless vis-à-vis the totalitarian state.’ 105 The collapse of the
Soviet Union and its aftermath have established beyond doubt that totalitarianism
theory is correct, according to Kort; pointing out as main evidence the theory’s
renaissance among former Soviet citizens. The collapse itself proved that the
Soviet system was held together by the Party, and was not supported by ‘interest
groups’ as revisionist had argued – it was thus after all a monolith constructed and
maintained from above, which was incapable of change.

100
Ibid., 395.
101
Ibid., xiii-xvii.
102
Ibid., 151.
103
Michael Kort, The Soviet Colossus: History and Aftermath (London/New York, 4th ed. 1996; 1st
ed. 1984).
104
Ibid., xi-xii.
105
Ibid., 197.

52
 Michael Parrish, associate professor at Indiana University in The Lesser
Terror: Soviet State Security, 1939 – 1953 106
examines the ‘lesser terror’ of
1939-1953, which he argues was less visible, but no less pervasive in Soviet society
than the Great Terror had been. In his own words, he presents the reader with ‘a
history of the massive crimes committed by the Soviet state during 1939-1953,
usually initiated by Stalin and always carried out with his approval and consent.’ 107
From a top-down perspective, Parrish makes use of new archival material to
reconstruct state security policy. With regard to the goal of the Soviet state, he
concludes that ‘Stalin’s real interest was security and not revolution, territory, or
ideology.’108 Parrish focuses on terror, from the assumption that Stalin ruled as an
‘omnipotent master’, at least among his fellow state officials. Apart from the use of
terror, he strengthened and secured his power by creating factions among the
Soviet’s leading elite; Parrish’ argument here is reminiscent of Kershaw’s concept
of ‘working towards the Fuehrer’; he does not comment on this similarity
however.109 Parrish thus views agency as being top-down and limited to the
person of Stalin, describing ‘his henchmen’ as ‘nonentities who were nothing
more than the extension of his will’.110
In From Tsar to Soviets: The Russian People and Their Revolution, 1917 –
1921,111 Christopher Read, professor at the University of Warwick, describes the
Russian Revolution through the eyes of ‘ordinary Russians’, meaning workers,
peasants, and soldiers - but Read stresses that it is a difficult definition because it is
a matter of self-perspective.112 The author’s approach is thus explicitly bottom-up;
he intends to trace and stress the revolution’s popular roots, to move away from
the traditional top-down approach in which everything except ‘high-politics’

106
Michael Parrish, The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security, 1939 – 1953 (Westport/London 1996).
107
Ibid., xviii.
108
Ibid., xv.
109
Ibid., xvii.
110
Ibid., xvi.
111
Christopher Read, From Tsar to Soviets: The Russian People and Their Revolution, 1917 – 1921
(London 1996).
112
Ibid., vi.

53
disappeared from history. He remarks that after the change from the traditional
approach to revisionism he now sees ‘the contours of an emerging
“post-revisionist” and “post-Communist” interpretation’ that combines or
reconciles the two opposing approaches to do justice to the complex nature of
(this) history.113 While the author comments on the importance of the availability
of the new primary sources, the book contains little reference to them. Read
stresses the need to recognize the complexity and nuance of agency; he argues that
the revolution was neither enforced on a paralyzed, terrorized passive mass by the
Bolshevik elite, nor was it brought about by overwhelming popular support.
Instead, Read discerns two revolutions: a popular one and a Bolshevik one – and
argues that the first was crushed by the latter. He argues for the strong agency of
the ordinary citizen or ‘masses’ in modern society, stating that the failure of the
Revolution was due to popular resistance or lack of support: ‘The “awakening” of
the masses in modern society complicates the task of any potential ideologue or
dictator.’114
Terroristische Diktaturen im 20. Jahrhundert, 115 a collection of conference
essays edited by Matthias Vetter, presents a comparative perspective of the Nazi
dictatorship and Soviet history. More specifically, it discusses historical research of
the Soviet Union from 1917 until 1953 which is intertwined with historical
research concerning Nazi Germany. Among the various contributions, there is a
mixture of top-down and bottom-up approaches. There are few references that
indicate the use of new primary sources. Vetter explicitly discusses the
problematic political history of totalitarianism theory, and rejects the idea that ‘to
compare’ means ‘to equate’. He uses the term ‘totalitär-terroristische Herrschaft’
to elaborate on Arendt’s analysis of the totalitarian society, which according to
Vetter centers on the idea that the aim and essence of these dictatorships lies in

113
Ibid., 7.
114
Ibid., 294.
115
Matthias Vetter ed., Terroristische Diktaturen im 20. Jahrhundert (Opladen 1996)

54
their will and capacity to terrorize human beings from within. 116 The editor
explicitly argues that there is indeed a revival of totalitarianism theory; a
development which he values and aims to contribute to by means of this
publication. Arguing that there is too little empirical evidence to support a
revaluation of the theory, the book serves to resolve this omission by providing
examples of the revival of totalitarianism theory in historical research of the
Soviet Union.
Senior lecturer at Durham University Sarah Davies in Popular Opinion in
Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda, and Dissent, 1934-1941 117
reassesses popular
opinion under Stalin’s rule. She aims to leave behind the totalitarian-revisionist
dichotomy bordered by the extremes of ‘powerless passivity’ vs. ‘active support’
and look at the shades of grey in between. Based on archival material, Davies
offers the ‘provisional conclusion’ - arguing that more research is needed - that
official ideology was not effectively imposed on a passive society. Instead,
alternative ‘discourses’ existed, in the form of unofficial communication, rumors,
jokes, and also older discourses, such as religion and Leninism. Davies places
emphasis on popular resistance to official ideology, but she also remarks that
ideology is not only produced and imposed but also consumed, and transformed in
the process. Davies thus not only seeks to find the nuances in the interaction
between state and society, she also endorses the idea that the distinction between
the two can and needs to be transcended.118
Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison, 119 a collection of
conference essays edited by Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin, is intended to offer a
comparative analysis of the two dictatorships. Lewin, professor emeritus at the
University of Pennsylvania, is renowned for books like Russian Peasants and

116
Ibid., 12.
117
Sarah Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda, and Dissent, 1934-1941
(Cambridge, 1997).
118
Ibid., 183-187.
119
Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin ed., Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison
(Cambridge, 1997).

55
Soviet Power and Lenin's Last Struggle (both first published in 1968). In his own
essay ‘Stalin in the mirror of the other’ Lewin aims to hold ‘the German mirror to
Russia’s face’ in order to gain more knowledge about the relatively unknown
Soviet past, with help of the well-known German past. 120 The use of material
varies for the different essays; some are based on new primary sources, others are
derived from older secondary material. Both regimes are considered to be
unprecedented, in the sense that they entailed a new form of politics, based on
‘leadership cult’.121 The editors remark that the conference that resulted in this
publication was something new, distinct from the Cold War-comparison of the
two regimes as totalitarian. It was different, they argue, in the sense that it had a
broader scope, covering a longer era and rejecting the ‘assumption that
comparison assumed similarity’.122 The editors denounce the ‘ideological’ use of
totalitarianism concept as a ‘Cold War weapon’ - but like Siegel and Thompson
they stress that it is not necessary to denounce the comparative perspective
entirely.123 Kershaw and Lewin remark that in order to serve a wide and non-
specialized reading audience, they chose to limit the publication to include only
the comparison of the two dictatorships – which unfortunately brings it back to
the narrow scope of the totalitarianism debate they wished to transcend. Thus it
becomes unclear just what the major difference is that separates this comparison
from the totalitarian model. The editors argue that their comparative perspective
is different from the totalitarian model in that they do not assume, or look for,
similarities or ‘sameness’, but recognize the uniqueness of each regime through
comparing them.124 This however still means that their basic frame of reference
depends on the idea that there is an essential ‘sameness’ which justifies the
comparison in the first place. They offer two different reasons why the
comparison would be justified, both equally unconvincing: ‘because Stalinism and
120
Ibid., 107.
121
Ibid., 9.
122
Ibid., xi.
123
Ibid., 4.
124
Ibid.

56
Nazi Germany have been compared in the past’, and ‘because the process of
Vergangenheitsbewältigung is similar in both cases’. Their comment that ‘in some
senses, all historical inquiry is comparative’ sounds like a rather far-fetched and
noncommittal attempt to convince their readers of the validity of their
approach.125
Ronald Grigor Suny’s The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the
Successor States 126
according to Eugene Huskey is a history not ‘from above or
below but history from all over.’ 127 With regard to agency, Suny (professor at the
University of Michigan) indeed occupies a position in the middle of the traditional
and the revisionist approach; arguing for the importance of ideology but
emphasizing the influence of circumstances and ‘particular personalities’ at the
same time. ‘Ideology served as a source of ideas, a prism through which the world
128
was viewed, a rationalization … and a mobilizing force.’ But Suny stresses that
Marxism did not effectively function as fixed blueprint for the course of history;
instead the development of the Soviet Union was determined by contingent
historical events. The author does not offer bibliographical references and his
reader is thus not able to tell whether he made use of new (primary) sources;
according to Huskey’s review however his account was based in part on the new
historiography that resulted from the ‘archival revolution’. 129 When he comments
on the concept of totalitarianism, Suny’s perspective on agency in the Soviet
Union is remarkable: ‘[W]hat the West would call a “totalitarian state” … was in
actuality a disorganized, inefficient, and unresponsive leviathan. Rather than
orders from the top being obeyed without contradiction, fear and lethargy,
conformity and unwillingness to take responsibility eliminated most initiative or
originality.’130 Suny thus argues against the assertion that totalitarianism was
125
Ibid., 2.
126
Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States (New
York/Oxford 1998).
127
Eugene Huskey, Review [untitled], The American Political Science Review 4 (1998) 967-968.
128
Suny, op. cit., 57.
129
Ibid., 968.
130
Ibid., 268.

57
effectively ‘total’ - which, as I discussed earlier, was not actually argued in
totalitarianism theory, as proponents of the totalitarian model also repeatedly
point out. This point aside, it is more important that Suny argues that ‘fear and
lethargy, conformity and unwillingness to take responsibility’ stifled autonomous
agency; for this actually confirms the totalitarian thesis.
In The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-destruction of the Bolsheviks,
1932 – 1939 131
J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov examine the Soviet terror of
the 1930s from a top-down perspective. As mentioned before, Getty (professor at
UCLA) is a prominent ‘revisionist’ scholar in the debate on totalitarianism. The
authors remark that their focus on high politics does not necessarily reflect
historical reality however; it is instead ‘a bias of the source base’. From official
party documents they reconstruct the attitudes and actions of the Soviet party, in
an attempt to answer the question why ‘the party, which could have stopped the
terror, actively cooperated in its own destruction’. 132 The authors thus ascribe
great power to the party, and explicitly reject the idea that Stalin was the
omnipotent actor in history and that society is merely ‘a passive recipient’; instead
they argue that ‘the terror was a series of group efforts’. 133 The scope and range of
the terror can only be explained by mapping the party’s involvement in it, Getty
and Naumov argue. They are convinced that the terror was the product of an
interaction between state and society, which were both characterized by
complexity and contingency, rather than uniformity and master plan.
Paul Hollander’s Political Will and Personal Disbelief: The Decline and
Fall of Soviet Communism 134
is an account of the collapse of the Soviet Union
from the perspective of (post) totalitarianism theory. It is partly based on primary
sources: interviews with party officials as well as ‘dissidents’. Hollander, professor
131
J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-destruction of the
Bolsheviks, 1932 – 1939 (New Haven/London 1999). Another publication by Getty and Naumov:
Yezhov: The Rise of Stalin’s “Iron Fist” (2008) is discussed on p. 77.
132
Getty and Naumov, op. cit., 8.
133
Ibid., xiv, 9.
134
Paul Hollander, Political Will and Personal Disbelief: The Decline and Fall of Soviet Communism
(New Haven/London 1999).

58
emeritus at University of Massachusetts Amherst argues that the collapse of the
Soviet Union was the result of its leaders’ loss of faith, caused by the ever
increasing discrepancy between the theory and practice of the Soviet experiment.
The author employs a top-down approach, assuming that Soviet leaders were the
responsible actors in the history of the Soviet collapse. He explicitly rejects the
idea that the collapse was due to ‘massive popular discontent’. 135 Hollander
explicitly argues that the Soviet Union was totalitarian; it was different from
authoritarian states in its dissolution of the private-public distinction - the total
control over all spheres of life. 136 In line with the totalitarian model, he explicitly
endorses the comparative perspective as well, regarding Nazi Germany as the
‘other major totalitarian system of the twentieth century’. 137 The author quotes
Hannah Arendt, agreeing with her that Soviet leaders held reality in contempt;
they were convinced that they could remake society according to their ideology. 138
When Soviet leaders lost this conviction, the system collapsed; Hollander thus
argues for the importance of ideology as a driving force in Soviet history.
Hollander’s argument that genuine belief transformed into ‘routinized
commitment’ corresponds the interpretative framework of post-totalitarianism
theory.139
Peter Kenez, professor at UC Santa Cruz, in A History of the Soviet Union
from the Beginning to the End 140
endorses the totalitarian interpretation of the
Stalinist state. He agrees on the validity of the comparative perspective, arguing
that Nazism and Stalinism can indeed be grouped together as ‘totalitarian’. 141 He
rejects the revisionist’s understanding of totalitarianism, namely the effective total
control of society. The author considers totalitarianism to entail the intention to
exercise total control, not its actual achievement; and in this respect, the Soviet
135
Ibid., 278.
136
Ibid., 294.
137
Ibid., 289.
138
Ibid., 296.
139
Ibid., 279.
140
Peter Kenez, A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End (Cambridge 1999).
141
Ibid., 308.

59
Union from 1929-1953 should be considered totalitarian indeed. 142 Like the
theorists of totalitarianism, he thus argues that totalitarianism is a kind of ideal
type: ‘It is a mistake to think that totalitarianism implies efficiency … In fact, the
world has never known an efficient totalitarian regime.’ 143 Accordingly, the
collapse of the Soviet Union did not prove that it was not totalitarian; the idea that
reform from within was impossible rested on the misunderstanding that
totalitarianism actually succeeded in destroying the autonomous society, when in
fact it did not. Further, Kenez follows the line of argument from post-
totalitarianism theory, quoting Vaclav Havel on the possibility and importance of
dissent in the post-totalitarian Soviet state.144 Also in line with totalitarianism
theory, Kenez argues for the unicity of the Soviet state based on its normative
dimensions; being ‘one of the most criminal regimes that ever existed on the face
of the earth,’ it is unprecedented and unparalleled. 145 It appears that Kenez based
his research largely on secondary literature, yet his method remains rather elusive
since he offers his readers a very limited amount of references. The author’s
opinion on the use of the new primary sources is far more explicit, however.
Kenez argues that access to the archives and other primary sources will be of little
use in explaining the terror of Stalin’s rule, for while ‘Hitler was an actor, Stalin
was a puppeteer’, whose choices and ideas remain inscrutable since the dictator
operated from behind the scenes. 146 This quote also informs the reader about
Kenez’ view on agency; Stalin’s choices and ideas provide the key to
understanding Soviet history. Using a top-down approach, Kenez thus views Stalin
as the agent in Soviet history; he explicitly rejects the revisionist suggestion that
agency ‘from below’ (also) shaped Soviet history during Stalin’s rule. 147 By focusing
on Stalin’s individual agency, Kenez suggests that the causes in Soviet history were

142
Ibid., 121, 126, 308.
143
Ibid., 110.
144
Ibid., 223-4.
145
Ibid., 108.
146
Ibid., 103-4.
147
Ibid., 307.

60
personal and (thus) unique. Accordingly, in Kenez’ account ideology too was an
expression of Stalin’s private, autonomous ideas rather than a pre-fixed set of
dogmas which could be collectively adhered to or discussed. And since it was
personal, Stalinist rule was not predictable but ‘haphazardly’, dependent on the
whims of the leader.
In Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times, Soviet
Russia in the 1930s, 148 Sheila Fitzpatrick describes urban life in Soviet Russia in
the 1930s from a bottom-up perspective, focusing on the experience of ordinary
citizens, especially on their interaction with the state. As mentioned before,
Fitzpatrick (professor at the University of Chicago) was one of the most prominent
scholars of the revisionist school. With regard to agency, Fitzpatrick sketches a
nuanced picture: while Soviet citizens acted in a passive way and often felt like
they were powerless this was not entirely true. For acting passive was one of their
many tactics to avoid conflict with the state. They were ‘generally passive’, but
this was thus part of a mere outward conformity and obedience; underneath there
was skepticism and resistance to the state and its utopian project. Fitzpatrick’s
findings do confirm the idea that the public-private distinction was abolished: in
their diaries and memories citizens describe public issues rather than personal
ones; e.g. the milestones in their lives were not private events like childbirth, but
rather political developments and public upheaval. But on the other hand people
were not effectively mobilized or brainwashed; they did not truly identify with
the state and its project but always saw a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (state
officials, people in power). While there was active popular support in certain parts
of society, mainly form the young and the privileged, it did not extend to the
urban society at large.149

148
Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times, Soviet Russia in the
1930s (Oxford 2000).
149
Ibid., 219-224.

61
 Lewis Siegelbaum and Andrei Solokov in Stalinism as a Way of Life: A
Narrative in Documents 150
present an account of Soviet life in the 1930s, as
narrated in the documents of those who experienced it: a cross-section of ordinary
Soviet citizens and officials. The book consists mainly of these original documents;
commentary from the authors is only added to elucidate their context and to point
out what the authors consider to be important aspects. The documents are made
up mostly of letters from citizens to authorities (newspapers, state institutions and
functionaries), but also included is correspondence between officials, and state
(NKVD) reports. Siegelbaum, professor of Russian history at Michigan State
University, explicitly argues that the totalitarian model, a ‘mirror image of official
propaganda’, was inadequate for understanding Soviet life. He argues against the
idea that state and society are two separate realms. Instead he assumes that the
self-image or identity of ordinary Soviet citizens was a result of interaction
between the two. The political was personal and vice versa: ‘[W]hat is normally
thought of as political – a system or ideology – was something more, a lived reality
or way of life. The way Soviet citizens lived … both shaped and [was] shaped by
what Stalinism was.’151 Siegelbaum recalls how Stephen Kotkin’s Magnetic
Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization 152
opened up the way for abandoning the
totalitarian model’s distinction between state and society; Kotkin revealed that
Stalinism enabled, rather than restricted, agency from below. But the author
rejects Kotkin’s implicit assumption that citizens’ identities were shaped in
advance of the confrontation with Stalinism. Instead he argues that abandoning
the state-society distinction should entail the recognition of their interaction in
shaping each other.

150
Lewis Siegelbaum and Andrei Solokov, Stalinism as a Way of Life: A Narrative in Documents
(New Haven/London 2000).
151
Ibid., 26-27.
152
Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley 1995).

62
 Erik van Ree’s The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin: A study in
Twentieth-Century Revolutionary Patriotism 153 was inspired by the notes Stalin
scribbled in the margins of the books in his private library. Van Ree (assistant
professor at the University of Amsterdam) reconstructs his political thought, based
on newly available archival material. From a top-down perspective, he traces the
dictator’s thoughts and its effect on Soviet policy. He argues that it is necessary to
be familiar with Stalin’s ‘totalitarian thinking’ in order to understand Soviet
history.154 The comparative perspective is not endorsed as a matter of research
method, but Van Ree does remark that Hitler’s thoughts are comparable to
Stalin’s, in the sense that they were decisive in the development in the history of
Nazi Germany respectively Stalinist Russia. 155 Stalin was thus the major agent in
Soviet history, according to Van Ree, and his ideas defined its course. With regard
to his goal and intentions, the author argues that Stalin sincerely believed in his
utopian project; he was convinced that the Soviet Union was democratic - he just
had a very personal, non-liberal idea of what democracy meant. And this non-
liberal form of ‘democracy’ (dictatorship of the proletariat), he achieved. Stalinism
was the fulfillment of the Enlightenment ideal of the malleable society, but
disconnected from the western liberal tradition and hence its respect for
individual liberty – leading to a catastrophe in terms of humanity. 156 Van Ree
explicitly rejects the assumption that ideology was mere propaganda or a
masquerade; that Stalin was a mere liar, opportunist, or cynic. Instead, his main
argument is that Stalin did have ideas, sincerely believed in them and that these
mattered: they informed his decisions and thus determined Soviet history.
Ideology in Van Ree’s account is closely connected to the person of Stalin; it
consists of his individual beliefs and thoughts. Yet this does not mean that
ideology, and hence the course of Soviet policy, was arbitrary or instable. A
153
Erik van Ree, The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin: A study in Twentieth-Century
Revolutionary Patriotism (London/New York 2002).
154
Ibid., 5.
155
Ibid., 7.
156
Ibid., 287.

63
change of mind or opportunism only appeared in relation to short-term or
marginal policy. Stalin’s thought was flexible, but it always remained within the
general framework of his constant overarching beliefs.
In New Myth, New World: From Nietzsche to Stalinism 157 Bernice Glatzer
Rosenthal, professor at Fordham University (New York) presents a top-down
history of ideas, which focuses on the intellectual elite: political leaders, artists
and scientists. While she refers to Russian publications from post-1989, her thesis
does not seem to depend primarily on the availability of the new sources.
Rosenthal argues that ‘Nietzschean ideas’ - directly or more indirectly derived
from his original philosophy – were of profound influence in shaping Bolshevik
ideas and ideology. She explicitly states that it was not of greater importance than
Marxism, but rather suggests that Soviet intellectual history should be understood
as a mixture of Niezschean, Marxist and traditional Russian thought. She thus
emphasizes the importance of ideas and ideology as determinants in history – if
only by writing Soviet history from this perspective. (It should be remarked
however that Rosenthal does not suggest that hers is a general history of the
Soviet Union; it is only an intellectual history to which the Stalinist years can be
traced back.) Rosenthal thus suggests a comparison of Nazism and Stalinism based
on the connection of their ideologies: ‘if Adolf Hitler’s Germany explicitly exalted
aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, it was in fact the Soviet Union, which officially
rejected him, that actually realized the most brutal of his ideas, while hiding
“behind a veil of socialist-humanist rhetoric”’, as reviewer Catherine Evtuhov
observes.158 Rosenthal’s thesis is remarkable, for the totalitarian comparison has
often been rejected based on the argument that the National Socialist and
Bolshevik ideology were too dissimilar to justify the assertion that the two regimes
were ‘basically alike’. Rosenthal’s account suggests that in this respect they had
more in common than is generally acknowledged, providing a history which
157
Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, New Myth, New World: From Nietzsche to Stalinism (University
park, PA 2002).
158
Catherine Evtuhov, Review [untitled], American Historical Review 2 (2004) 647-648, 647.

64
proponents of the totalitarian comparison might consider to be a confirmation of
its validity.
Anne Applebaum’s Gulag: A History of the Soviet Camps 159
is based on
(mainly) new archival material and other primary sources. Applebaum, who won
a Pulitzer Prize for Gulag in 2004, is currently a columnist for the Washington
Post. She employs a bottom-up approach, in which the subjective experience of
the Gulag prisoners is reconstructed through their private or published memoirs,
and interviews. Applebaum also makes use of the official Gulag administration
files to establish the objective facts of the forced labor camps. Applebaum argues
that the history of the Gulag in itself is a unique one in one respect, but on the
other it is a history that is part of in the long term history of Russia and broader
developments in history. With regard to its origins, she argues that it is
intertwined with the history of (western) Europe in general. Applebaum traces
the origins of concentration camps back to imperialist violence in German South-
West Africa – her argument here is reminiscent of Arendt’s reflections on the
origins of totalitarianism. 160 She uses the term ‘totalitarian’ in referring to Nazism
and Soviet Communism and argues that the totalitarian comparative perspective is
justified. Her opinion on this subject is the mirror image of the revisionist’s
critique on the normative comparison of Nazism and Stalinism as ‘evil twins’: she
argues for a stronger connection of condemnation between the two. Applebaum
points out that there is an imbalance in the way Nazism is considered as the
ultimate evil, beyond doubt, while (Soviet) Communism is still sympathized with,
‘laughed at’ or stereotyped in media. While the horrors caused by the national
Socialist state have been the subject of countless books and movies, the experience
of the victims of Soviet terror has not nearly received the same kind of attention –
which is necessary to do justice to those who suffered it, according to Applebaum.
The disparity also extends to academia: the author remarks that some of her

159
Anne Applebaum, Gulag: A History of the Soviet Camps (London, 2003).
160
Ibid., 18-20.

65
articles were rejected for being too ‘anti-Soviet’ – and asks rhetorically whether
anyone could imagine an article being rejected for being too anti-National
Socialist.161 In short, Applebaum argues that the normative perspective is lacking
in Soviet historiography, and suggests that a comparison with Nazism would be
adequate in terms of a moral assessment. In arguing that Nazism and Soviet
Communism can and should be compared, she refers to Arendt’s ‘objective
enemy’: both regimes established and persecuted categorical enemies who were
targeted for what they were, not what they did. Further, she also confirms
Arendt’s description of the process by which the state dehumanizes and ultimately
destroys its victims.162
In Der rote Terror. Die Geschichte des Stalinismus,163 Jörg Baberowski
(professor at the Humboldt University of Berlin) examines the origins and effects
of the Terror, which he considers to be synonymous with Stalinism. 164 This study
is partly based on new primary material, and Baberowski expects that the archives
will provide the truth about Stalinism. Which is that there was no Stalinism from
below, nor a weak state; the author states that the sources prove that the Stalinist
state was in firm control. 165 Several passing remarks indicate that Baberowski
endorses the comparative perspective of Nazism and Stalinism as totalitarian; for
instance when he argues that ‘Stalin was as central to Stalinism as Hitler was to
Nazism’.166 Baberowski endorses the validity of totalitarianism theory from an
intentionalist perspective. He argues that the totale Ansprüche of the regime were
real, even if the desired totaler Herrschaft was not achieved. He states that since
this intention led to the destruction and remake of the private sphere, it is
essential for a good understanding of the Stalinist terror. Like Friedrich and
Arendt, he argues that the Terror was motivated by the need for unanimity, the

161
Ibid., 5-9.
162
Ibid., 20-1.
163
Jörg Baberowski, Der rote Terror: Die Geschichte des Stalinismus (München 2003).
164
Ibid., 7.
165
Ibid., 11.
166
Ibid., 16.

66
need to level society in accordance with the Law of History. Soviet policy was
motivated by the ultimate aim of establishing utopia; it was driven by genuine
belief in the official ideology. Baberowski insists that Soviet leaders were not mere
cynics who discussed matters differently behind closed doors than towards to
outside world. With regard to agency and autonomy, Baberowski’s interpretation
also confirms totalitarianism theory. He ascribes very limited autonomy to Stalin’s
citizens; agency from below was virtually non-existent; all initiative and control
resided in the state.167
David L. Hoffmann, professor at Ohio State University, in Stalinist Values:
The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917 – 1941 168
discusses the values
promoted by the Soviet state, especially under Stalin. He states that the archival
sources prove that the Stalinist leaders sincerely adhered to socialist ideology and
through their policy sought to recreate man and society accordingly. 169 Hoffmann
uses the newly available material in an approach that is mainly top-down: he
understands ‘culture’ as an official set of norms and values, collectively imposed on
society from above. The spread of values was centrally controlled and thus not
pluralistic, but on the other hand individuals had to interpret the central
directives, causing at least some contribution from below. While Soviet citizens
had ‘no direct voice in the Soviet system’, their confirmation or rejection of values
imposed from above did influence the success or failure of the state-centered
remake of society.170 Hoffmann concludes that the state achieved only a very
superficial transformation of its citizens; some internalized the values, but most
rejected them and adhered to them only outwardly. Violent coercion from above
did not destroy individual autonomy; it only fostered overt or covert resistance. 171
Central to Hoffmann’s argument is the idea that the Soviet Union under Stalin

167
Ibid., 10.
168
David L. Hoffmann, Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917 – 1941
(Ithaca/London 2003).
169
Ibid., 3.
170
Ibid., 4-7.
171
Ibid., 187-188.

67
was a modern state; policy was inspired by the modern desire to remake society.
Like Friedrich and Arendt, Hoffmann interprets the aim of Stalinism to lie in the
remake ‘of human nature itself’, as part of the ‘general Enlightenment impulse to
remake and improve society’. 172 ‘The intentions of party leaders were not in
themselves bad. They did aspire to fashion a better, more just world’. 173 With
regard to the question of uniqueness and the comparative perspective, Hoffmann’s
findings do not confirm the totalitarian model. His interpretation instead centers
on the notion of modernization: ‘[The] Soviet system is best understood as one
particular response to the ambitions and challenges of the modern era’. 174 As such,
the Soviet Union can be compared to other modern (European) states - both
constitutional and unconstitutional. It was unique, but not in its aim to remake
society entirely; this according to Hoffmann is a shared trait of modern states.
What made the Soviet Union unique was its collective and coercive nature, which
was a result of the socialist ideology. Ideology, as an official, top-down, collective
set of norms and values, is thus considered to be the driving force behind the
Soviet system, which inevitably led to the terror due to its content.
Richard Overy’s The Dictators: Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia 175
is
informed by both the top-down and the bottom-up approach. The author
emphasizes that history is made not by dictators alone: both the personal and
individual agency of the leaders and the response of society mattered. Further,
ideology and planned action do not shape history alone either; contingency and
spontaneity also matter. Overy, professor at the University of Exeter, explicitly
argues for a nuanced approach to capture the complex and nuanced forces that
shape history. He stresses the importance of new archival material for
reinterpretation of Soviet history; his own research is based on published archival
and other primary sources as well as secondary sources (among them are also

172
Ibid., 3-4.
173
Ibid., 187.
174
Ibid., 186.
175
Richard Overy, The Dictators: Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia (London 2004).

68
publications based on the new material). The author discusses the
historiographical debate on totalitarianism and positions his own work in it. Being
‘brought up under the old totalitarian school’, 176 today he argues for a different
approach: a comparative perspective with attention for differences, regarding the
two regimes as unique in one sense but a integrated in general history as well,
seeing agency both in from below and from above, with attention for plans,
intentions and ideology as well as contingencies and circumstances. Overy argues
against the normative aspect of the comparison and instead offers a comparative
history based on the similarities and differences of the actual functioning of these
dictatorships. In short, he wishes to offer ‘a direct historical, rather than polemical
comparison.’177 From Overy’s functional analysis of both regimes, ideology appears
to have been its driving force – ideology understood as the official and collective
set of values and norms. Like Friedrich and Arendt, Overy argues that while the
content of both ideologies was in many ways diametrically opposed, it fulfilled the
same function in both systems. Further, Overy rejects the suggestion that ideology
was merely an instrument in the eyes of the dictators and that their public
expression only served as a mask for the truth. He argues that Hitler and Stalin
were not merely cynical; the expressions of their thought need to be taken
seriously, for their actions were informed by their ideas and sincere beliefs. 178
Living Through the Soviet system, 179 edited by Daniel Bertaux (director of
research at the French National Center for Scientific Research), Paul Thompson
(director of the National Life Story Collection and research professor at the
University of Essex) and Anna Rotkirch (researcher at the Academy of Finland) is
the result of several research projects based largely on interviews. This
reconstruction of the everyday life of ordinary citizens in Soviet Russia is in one
sense bottom-up, as it considers the experiences of ordinary individuals. In
176
Ibid., xxvii.
177
Ibid., xxxiii.
178
Ibid., xxxv.
179
Daniel Bertaux, Paul Thompson and Anna Rotkirch ed., Living Through the Soviet System (New
Brunswick 2005).

69
another sense, it shows a top-down perspective in terms of agency, for the subjects
of research are considered to have been powerlessly subjected to Soviet
propaganda and coercion. The editors argue that Stalinism was internalized by
ordinary Russians, to the point were they lost their capacity for autonomous
thought and action. Stalin’s ‘victims were simply bewildered, unable to imagine
the source of their destructive fate. Ordinary Russians were more likely to pray to
Stalin than to imagine him as the source of their sufferings’. 180 The author’s
remark that while western researchers think of their informants as ‘actors’, this is
a mistake in the case of Russia: Russians see themselves as passive victims and in
this case have reason to do so. Yet while the authors thus seem to endorse the
classical totalitarian thesis of the victimized society, they simultaneously insist
that there was also inventiveness, spontaneity and resistance, especially among
those who suffered most. 181 The editor’s statement, that subjects tried to ‘find
spaces for self-expression’182 suggests that they consider state and society as two
distinct and opposed realms, which is in accordance with the totalitarian model.
Jochen Hellbeck, associate professor at Rutgers University (New Jersey) in
Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin 183 reconstructs Soviet
history from a bottom-up approach based on new primary sources. With reference
to diaries, memoirs and interviews, he argues that ordinary Soviet citizens under
Stalin’s rule internalized the revolutionary goals of the Soviet regime. This was in
part caused by the fact that the revolutionary incentive was not new to them,
Hellbeck argues, for it already existed in the earlier, pre-Soviet tradition.
Hellbeck’s main argument is that Soviet citizens thus supported the aims of their
government and shared its values and ideals. Diaries prove that the distinction
between the private and the public was in a sense abolished; Soviet citizens did
not seek refuge in their diaries to write down secret, sincere thoughts that were

180
Ibid., 4.
181
Ibid., 11.
182
Ibid., 7.
183
Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin (Cambridge 2006).

70
diametrically opposed to a feigned, outward conformity to state ideology. Instead,
they were truly and genuinely convinced of the need to ‘remake themselves’ after
revolutionary ideals. The Revolution of 1917 had ‘promoted a new thinking about
the self as a political project’, which resulted in a ‘concern with self-
transformation’ that shows in these diaries. 184 But Hellbeck asserts that this does
not mean a return to or triumph of totalitarianism theory, in which official
ideology was forcefully imposed on a passive society. Instead, his argument
appears to reconcile the traditional and the revisionist interpretation: emphasizing
the importance of ideology, without disregarding the agency of the ordinary
Soviet citizen. That Hellbeck is able to transcend the totalitarianism-revisionism
dichotomy is due to his perspective on agency. For him, it has a different meaning
than it had in the traditional historiographical debate. Agency according to
Hellbeck can not be considered as something that is entirely autonomous, in the
sense that it does not exist in itself; in the case of Soviet history, in isolation from
or opposition to ideology. Instead, agency interacts with ideology and is
simultaneously produced and consumed by it: ‘Rather than a fixed, given and
monologic textual corpus … ideology may be better understood as a ferment
working in individuals and producing a great deal of variation as it interacts with
the subjective life of a private person.’185
Christina Kiaer (professor at Northwestern University) and Eric Naiman
(professor at Berkeley University) in Everyday Life in Early Soviet Russia: Taking
the Revolution Inside 186
present a collection of essays which comment on the
experience of Soviet life by ordinary citizens in the 1920s and 1930s, all based on
(new) archival material. The overall approach is bottom-up, examining the
subjective experience and more particularly the internalization of Soviet ideology.
The editors explicitly state that the publication is intended as an addition to this

184
Ibid., 5.
185
Ibid., 12.
186
Christina Kiaer and Eric Naiman, Everyday Life in Early Soviet Russia: Taking the Revolution
Inside (Bloomington 2006).

71
(post-modern) approach, which focuses on the ‘interiority’ of history: the home
and the individual - in short, the private realm. They aim to establish the meaning
of the Revolution for ordinary citizens, and base their inquiry on the idea that
meaning can only be found in everyday ‘lived experience’. 187 With regard to the
term ‘totalitarianism’, Kiaer and Naiman emphasize that Soviet history according
to them is part of ‘modernity’, and explicitly reject the totalitarian idea of its
‘radical otherness’ which would justify and necessitate a distinct research
approach.188 The assumption that Soviet history is part of the history of modernity
leads the editors to compare ‘the East’ to ‘the West’ as two instances of modernity
– thus connecting western constitutional states with the Soviet Union rather than
presenting them as absolute opposites. The shared trait, modernity, is understood
as a context in which the subject is shaped (or: ‘produced’) by ideology; Marxism-
Leninism in this sense is comparable to mass media and advertising in the West,
the author’s argue - both are instances of ‘propaganda’. 189 With regard to the
totalitarian thesis that the distinction between the public and the private sphere is
destroyed, the author’s remark that while this was the case, it was not due to the
Bolsheviks - it had not existed prior to the Revolution either. When private life
was ‘mobilized’ for the public good under Soviet rule it was thus not something
alien or unprecedented for Russian society, they argue, since it had already been a
typically Russian, ‘pre-modern’ characteristic of society. Ideology is central to this
account, but beyond its narrow confines as a set of ideas imposed on society. It is a
frame of reference which serves as guide for behavior and perspective; it is a
conscious discourse. The West also has its discourse, Kiaer and Naiman argue, but
this is so embedded in everyday life that it can only be transcended by conscious
thought or action; it serves to naturalize or legitimize the given or existing
situation. While the consciousness of the Soviet ideology co-existed with older
Russian and general Enlightenment discourse (and conflicted with it), it became

187
Ibid., 2.
188
Ibid., 2-3.
189
Ibid., 3.

72
something the Soviet citizen had to master: subjects had a ‘compulsion to self-
criticize … in an attempt to become the ideal product always before him’. 190 From
this perspective, the idea of an ‘ideological mask’ which conceals cynicism is
unthinkable, for there is no reality outside the discourse of ideology. With regard
to agency, the assumption that the individual’s identity is produced in relation to a
public discourse has clear implications too. Like Kotkin, Davies and Hellbeck,
these authors transcend the distinction between the top-down and bottom-up
approach, interpreting history as the result of encounters between individual
subjects and state power.
Robert V. Daniels in The Rise and Fall of Communism in Russia 191
proves
to be a proponent of the concept of totalitarianism still. ‘Whatever reservations
may be raised as to how “total” Russian totalitarianism was,’ he states, ‘in its time
it represented more nearly total political control over society than any other case
192
of the phenomenon, Nazi, Fascist, or whatever.’ Ideology according to Daniels
was a mere masquerade in this totalitarian rule, an instrument by which to close
the inevitable gap between theory and practice. His analysis is very similar to the
one he presented in the The End of the Communist Revolution of 1993, discussed
above. That is no surprise however, since this book, published fourteen years after
the onset of ‘the archival revolution’ is essentially a collection of essays and
articles that were nearly all published before – mainly in the 1990s and 1980s,
with some of them dating back as far as the 1960s. The author’s neglect of the new
developments in his field of research indicates that he is apparently not interested
in a reassessment of his earlier assumptions and conclusions. He seems to value the
preservation of his original position over a thorough empirical foundation for his
thesis.

190
Ibid., 8.
191
Robert V. Daniels, The Rise and Fall of Communism in Russia (New Haven 2007).
192
Ibid., 8.

73
 In The Whisperers: Private life in Stalin’s Russia 193
Orlando Figes
describes the memories of Soviet families who lived under Stalin’s rule, based on
family archives and interviews. Figes is professor of history at Birkbeck College,
University of London. His endorsement of the totalitarian thesis is suggested by
his use of the term ‘totalitarian’ to group together the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany
and Communist China.194 But more importantly, he asserts that Stalinism
effectively transformed society and dissolved the private sphere; he argues that
Soviet citizens were unable to resist the imposed values and beliefs and
internalized them.195 Figes remarks that the idea that resistance to totalitarianism
was possible was too general a conclusion, informed by the those (mainly of the
intelligentsia) who were able to resist its internalizing and reported this to the
West: the ‘dissidents’. Figes explicitly comments on this distinction between elite
and ordinary people and its effect on (revisionist) history. He states that after the
collapse, the memoirs of the dissenting elite inspired historians to place more
emphasis on popular resistance, in addition to celebrating the collapse as a ‘liberal
victory’. But Figes argues that this is not justified by the memoirs of the ordinary
Soviet citizen. ‘Millions of ordinary people … did not share this inner freedom or
feeling of dissent, but, on the contrary, silently accepted and internalized the
system’s basic values’.196 The author’s assertion that ‘a silent and conforming
population is one lasting consequence of Stalin’s reign’ is reflected in the title of
the book.197 Ideology in Figes account is thus official and collective, imposed from
above, yet viewed here from the experience of individual citizens. Ideology then
becomes not so much a set of ideas or values, but rather an all-encompassing
reality to which there was no alternative: ‘Immersion in the Soviet system was a
means of survival for most people … a necessary way of silencing their doubts and

193
Orlando Figes, The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin’s Russia (New York 2007).
194
Ibid., xxxvi.
195
Ibid., xxxii-xxxvii.
196
Ibid., xxxiii.
197
Ibid., xxxi.

74
fears, which, if voiced, could make their lives impossible.’ 198 The impossibility of
escape from this state-enforced reality suggests that agency from below was
impossible in the Stalinist state. Figes’ approach might be categorized as bottom-
up in the sense that he focuses on society rather than the state, but it is top-down
in the sense that it regards the state as the only agent in history. He records the
Soviet citizen’s experience because it is a story that deserves to be told; not
because these individuals and families determined that history.
In Stalinism and the Politics of Mobilization: Ideas, Power and Terror in
Inter-War Russia 199
David Priestland, professor at Oxford University, examines
the ideological context of Russian political decision-making in the inter-war
period, based on primary sources - archival as well as published. The author’s
approach is a top-down one, with emphasis on the collective and the context,
instead of the individual and the personal. David Hoffmann praises Priestland’s
approach, stating that he ‘escapes the trap of over-emphasizing Stalin’s personality
and instead provides a rich ideological and political context for understanding
Stalinism.’200 Priestland argues that ideology matters, but rejects the suggestion
that it constituted a coherent blueprint for utopia. Instead he views ideology as a
discourse which limited and enabled what could be said and done. Ideology was
thus flexible and it did not autonomously determine the Soviet leader’s decisions,
but it was of great importance since it functioned as a restrictive framework for
political action. And while ideology was not the only framework, it was the most
important discourse because it functioned as a legitimation of Bolshevist rule. 201
With regard to agency, Priestland distances himself from the intentionalism-
structuralism debate and instead reconciles both perspectives by arguing that both
ideology and forces outside political decision-making influenced history. The

198
Ibid., xxxv.
199
David Priestland, Stalinism and the Politics of Mobilization: Ideas, Power and Terror in Inter-
War Russia (Oxford/New York 2007).
200
David L. Hoffmann, Review article ‘The Causes and Consequences of Stalinism’, Journal of
Contemporary History 44 (2009) 129-137, 32.
201
Priestland, op. cit., 16-17.

75
question of the leader’s adherence to the official ideology becomes irrelevant in
Priestland’s perspective of ‘ideology as discourse’. For it does not matter whether
or not leaders sincerely believed it or were merely cynical; either way they were
bound by the constraints of ideology as discourse. In short, Priestland concludes
that ‘ideology, interacting with other forces, structured and limited the strategies
available to the leadership.’202
In The Unknown Gulag: the Lost World of Stalin’s Special Settlements 203

Lynne Viola, professor at the University of Toronto describes the history of the
‘kulaks who were exiled in ‘special settlements’ in the far north as ‘class enemies’,
in the party’s attempt to colonize the high north and to initiate the overnight
modernization of backward Russia. This account is the result of Viola’s own
archival work in official archives as well as family- and social archives; it is based
mainly on letters, memoirs and interviews with the settlers and their families. The
use of both official and private sources reflects the author’s conviction that both
agency from below and from above created Soviet history. Viola argues that the
Soviet Union was totalitarian in design, but not in effect. While the intention was
the total control and remake of society, ‘the all-mighty and omnipresent
blueprints that characterized every detail of Soviet life’ did not materialize. 204 She
argues that the state was weak in rural areas, and that authority there was often
reactive - ad hoc repression or even neglect characterized these areas, not a
detailed plan. This was representative for Stalin’s Soviet Union in general: ‘the
reactive, ad hoc nature of special resettlement policy was characteristic of
Stalinism. The Stalinist state was hardly the monolith of the cold war legend.’ 205
Yet there is no doubt that ‘Stalin’s will was decisive’; Viola remarks that archival
resources have made this clear.206 Policy was initiated from above, but its

202
Ibid., 54.
203
Lynne Viola, The Unknown Gulag: the Lost World of Stalin’s Special Settlements (Oxford/New
York 2007).
204
Ibid., 190.
205
Ibid., 9.
206
Ibid.,

76
consequences took shape in relation to agency from below: local officials and the
settlers themselves. Straight-lined, abstract state planning clashed with a far more
complex reality, with disastrous results. But the author also nuances the image of
this rigid state planning, arguing that Soviet administration was characterized by
perpetual crisis, which revealed the weakness of the central state beyond its very
centre. With regard to ideology, Viola argues that Soviet leaders were cynical, but
did act within the confines of the official ideology; as such ideology was driving
force behind kulak policy. It was employed also in reaction to the unsuccessful
results of the settlements; it served to fill the gap between plan and reality. Policy
then became an ‘attempt to paper over reality and to “ideologize” existing
practice’.207 Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism comes to mind when Viola
compares the dekulakization to the brutality with which European states once
build their overseas empires. Class replaced race, and socialist utopianism replaced
the Christian zeal; both ‘civilizing missions’ were carried out under rule by
arbitrary decree and large-scale repression.208
In Yezhov: The Rise of Stalin’s “Iron Fist” 209
Getty and Naumov examine
the rise to power of Nikolai Yezhov, ‘the most powerful man in the USSR after
Stalin’, head of the NKVD from 1936 to 1938. The authors aim to offer more than
a biography; they argue that the particular, personal story of Yezhov can help to
improve our understanding of the Soviet state and society in general. Their top-
down research is based largely on the personal archive of Yezhov. With regard to
the goal of the Soviet state and its leader’s adherence to ideology, the authors
show that Yezhov truly believed that he was involved in the construction of a
perfect society. In line with Friedrich’s account, they argue that Yezhov was
concerned with protecting ‘a uniform commitment to truth’ and fighting
dissenting views that threatened the socialist utopia.210 Yezhov was thus no cynic,
207
Ibid., 190.
208
Ibid., 186-8.
209
J. Arch Getty and Oleg v. Naumov, Yezhov: The Rise of Stalin’s “Iron Fist” (New Haven/London
2008).
210
Ibid., 224.

77
Getty and Naumov insist; he read Lenin in his spare time and ‘believed what he
said and believed in what he did.’211 This sincerity extends to Soviet officials in
general: ‘The Stalinists said the same things to each other behind closed doors that
they said to the public.’ 212 With regard to the Terror, the authors state that the
suggestion that it was centrally planned is contradicted by the archival sources,
thus rejecting the intentionalist view. With regard to agency, further, they
explicitly argue against the idea that Stalin was the one and only responsible agent
in the Soviet system. Yezhov was not a passive robot but instead acted very
autonomously; he even lied to Stalin to secure his own interests. 213 While the
authors certainly do not wish to exonerate Stalin from blame, they note that
‘responsibility is a concept with limited analytical value’; 214 it is more useful as a
moral than an explanatory category. Thus while Stalin was certainly ‘responsible’
for the terror, they stress that we need to examine the functioning of the entire
system ‘beneath him’ to arrive at an adequate analysis of the Soviet state.
As editors of Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared 215

Michael Geyer (professor at the University of Chicago) and Fitzpatrick remark

that with regard to Soviet history the ‘research oriented, scholarly community
remains … in a posttheoretical and posttotalitarian mode.’ 216 Which means that in
rejecting the totalitarian model, historians have moved away from theory and
interpretation entirely. Focusing on empirical research, they have provided a great
amount of factual information, but they have refrained from offering a ‘grand
narrative’ of the twentieth century – for they are wary of abstract, general
interpretations. The authors believe that historical research in the archives has
proven that Nazism and Stalinism do have something in common; they are the
phenomena of ‘shock and awe’ that determined the twentieth century. And thus,
211
Ibid., xxi, 220-223.
212
Ibid., 223.
213
Ibid., xix, 212.
214
Ibid., 207.
215
Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick ed., Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism
Compared (Cambridge 2009).
216
Ibid., 8.

78
Geyer and Fitzpatrick argue, if we want to understand the meaning of this era, we
need to examine them in their relation to each other. 217 Without endorsing the
totalitarian idea that they were ‘basically alike’ – on the contrary, the authors
argue that they were antagonists – Geyer and Fitzpatrick thus argue that the
nature of the two regimes justifies and necessitates a comparative perspective.218
The editors thereby seem to take a step back from revisionism and towards a
reappraisal of totalitarianism theory. They do this more explicitly by stating that
‘empirical historians failed fully to appreciate the depth of thought invested in the
idea’ [of totalitarianism]; while Arendt ‘gets things wrong’ from an empirical
perspective, ‘historians have still a way to go to appreciate the complexity and
depth of thought in … The Origins of Totalitarianism.’219 The editors argue that
the original objections historians had against the comparative perspective of
totalitarianism theory have been lifted by the increased first-hand knowledge of
the Soviet Union through recent archival research:

‘During the heyday of totalitarianism theory, historians could

rightly claim that theory and ideology had been imposed upon them
and that they had not engaged in the first round of comparison since
they had not yet even begun seriously to study either of the societies
or regimes. But now they have done their work, and it is for them to
respond to the new challenges and to develop a scholarship of
integration – be it of the narrative, interpretative, or explanatory
variety.’ 220

Geyer and Fitzpatrick’s reappraisal of the totalitarian model does not extend to
the question of agency; they reject the perspective of society as a passive,
repressed subject and instead assume that state and society were interactive and

217
Ibid., 19.
218
Ibid., 8-9.
219
Ibid., 14.
220
Ibid., 13.

79
intertwined: ‘It seems evident … that social groups, rather than being merely a
site for regime action, are actors in their own right.’221

3.3 Conclusion
The great majority of the publications examined was informed by the newly
available material from public archives, private memoirs and other published and
unpublished sources. The use of these sources is spread out evenly over the entire
period, with the exception of 1990, 1992 and 1993. This is no surprise since ‘the
archival revolution’ only started to really open up possibilities for research from
about 1993 onwards. The amount of research that was apparently not or only very
marginally informed by the new sources is also considerable however; these were
all published, with one exception, in the 1990s.
While some authors offer their reader little insight into their method, in
most cases their use of the sources can be reconstructed. Overall scholars show
that they are aware that the assumptions and perspectives which underlie their
research are not self-evident and in need of explanation and justification. Perhaps
not surprisingly, due to the polemical history of their research subject, they often
comment on the preceding historiographical debate and consciously position their
own work within this context. In this discussion, the availability and possibilities
of the new material is in most cases commented on. Overall these comments show
a moderate optimism regarding the possibilities of the new information for further
research. Six authors express an explicit confidence that the new sources will
enable scholars to establish the objective truth about Soviet history, for once and
for all – among them are Baberowski and Geyer & Fitzpatrick; a couple of their
colleagues on the contrary are equally certain that they will not provide definitive
answers. What is remarkable is that the assessment of the new sources’ worth is
not necessarily related to their actual usage; Conquest and Tucker argue that the
new material establishes the truth beyond doubt while they do not at all refer to

221
Ibid., 35.

80
them in their work; while others, who have made extensive use of them, do not
consider their value without considerable reserve. Further, confidence and doubt
about the meaning of the ‘archival revolution’ is not limited to a certain period,
and only in two cases the availability of the new sources appears to have been
neglected entirely – as early as 1994 (Laqueur) and as late as 2007 (Daniels).
Almost half of the publications discussed are what could be labeled real
‘products of the archival revolution’, meaning that they would likely not have
been written if the new sources had not been available. They include research
projects that are based mainly or exclusively on the new primary sources. They
are products of the archival revolution in the sense that they offer new answers to
the questions that could not be answered adequately before glasnost. But they also
and perhaps more importantly, add new questions to the existing discussion; the
post-modern or cultural approach, with its emphasis on ideology as discourse or
identity is the most obvious example. In these publications, the new sources
function as an inspiration for a new framework; they broaden the existing
perspectives on (Soviet) history. These products of the archival revolution were
published from the late 1990s onward.
It appears that the term ‘totalitarian’ to refer to the Soviet Union is
generally accepted and used from the early 1990s until today. It is employed
consciously and intentionally as well as more casually, without further
elaboration. Various authors on the other hand employ different terms, such as
‘authoritarian’. This often entails an explicit rejection of the ‘totalitarian’ label.
Almost half of the authors discussed argue for the validity of the totalitarian
model as they understand it; explicit rejections are far less common. The positive
assessment of totalitarianism theory is spread out evenly over the two decades
under discussion. It is remarkable that the validity of the model is seen not only in
its explanation of the Soviet state’s intentions; it is also considered an adequate
description of its actual achievements. Recalling that the original debate on
totalitarianism suffered from a lack of adequate theoretical knowledge, it is worth

81
noting that five authors explicitly refer to, and even quote, theories of (post)
totalitarianism – and prove to be well informed about them.
While the explicit endorsement of the totalitarian model suggests that half
of the historians consider the Soviet Union to be ‘unique and unprecedented’, they
rarely comment upon this presumption – and it is not reflected in their research
method either. Several authors, like Pipes, explicitly reject the idea that the Soviet
Union constituted a radical break with the past; they point out long-term causes
and present various aspects of Soviet history as a continuance of older or broader
developments, rather than a radical and sudden change.
Regardless of whether the authors reject or confirm the totalitarian model,
it is clear that the question, whether or not the Soviet Union was totalitarian has
not lost its relevance. The majority of the publications are essentially a
contribution to the totalitarianism-revisionism debate, adding to, or repeating, the
assumptions and positions of the older discussion. These works revolve around the
question whether totalitarianism theory was right or wrong in the light of the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the newly available sources. The majority of
authors thus discusses Soviet history within the framework of the original
totalitarian model and the revisionist critique. Yet a substantial amount of
research is conducted in a different way; nine historians in this selection aim to
transcend the categories that are assumed in the totalitarianism-revisionism
debate. Notably, they leave behind the dichotomy of state and society as opposed
realms, arguing instead for its interconnectedness from a post-modern, subjectivist
perspective.
A considerable amount of publications endorse the comparative
perspective, in many cases explicitly, but often also implicitly. In many
publications, too, it is absent or irrelevant; explicit rejections are rare. The Soviet
Union is most commonly paralleled to Nazi Germany, but authors also mention its
likeness to Communist China and fascist Italy. Two authors who view Soviet
history from the perspective of modernization turn the original totalitarian

82
comparison on its head: arguing that the Soviet Union was not diametrically
opposed to modern western states, but similar to them. Very few authors elaborate
on the justification of the comparative perspective; they appear to regard it as self-
evident, or at least it is used in a casual way. The revisionist’s rejection of the
normative aspect of the comparison is remarkably absent from this selection; only
one author explicitly repudiates it. On the contrary, several authors explicitly
argue in favor of the normative comparison, arguing that it is unfortunately
lacking in Soviet historiography. Most surprising is ‘arch-revisionist’ Sheila
Fitzpatrick’s call on historians to group the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany
together in a comparative interpretation. Her assertion, that this is necessary in
order to come to terms with the twentieth century, is implicitly and explicitly
shared by other proponents of the totalitarian comparison.
With regard to the goal of the Soviet Union or the intention of the state,
less than half of the authors do not comment on it at all. The others, with very
few exceptions, all argue that it was the total remake of society; an attempt to
establish the perfect, socialist society. With Vetter as a single possible exception,
the concept of non-utility - total control as an end itself - is endorsed in none of
the publications; the generally accepted interpretation of the intention behind the
Soviet state appears to be its visions of utopia. Connected to this is the assessment
of terror, which is the focal point of a substantial part of the publications. Some
authors argue explicitly that terror is central to Soviet history but, again, with one
possible exception they do not consider terror to have been an end in itself.
Closely connected to this understanding of the Soviet goal is of course the
role of ideology. The attention for ideology is widespread throughout the entire
period; the majority of authors argues that ideology was the driving force behind
Soviet agency, and is thus the main key to Soviet history. Ideology is still mainly
understood as a top-down, official and collective set of ideas, but some historians
who consider it from a top-down perspective stress its particular and contingent
character; ideology as a product of Stalin as a person. With regard to the top-down

83
perspective on ideology, the question of sincerity divides the historians. While
some argue that the archives prove the true adherence of the Soviet leaders others
contend that they were merely cynical. Several scholars endorse post-
totalitarianism theory in arguing that the collapse of the Soviet Union was due to
its leader’s loss of faith in the utopian project. Within the bottom-up approach,
two different analyses of the role of ideology appear. There are those scholars who
discuss ideology in society from an objective point of view, meaning that they
consider society as a whole and from the outside perspective of the state. The
other bottom-up analysis is informed by the subjective approach, which considers
society in terms of the individual and his or her experiences. In most of the
publications published since 2004 ideology is understood from the objective
perspective, as a set of norms and values that was effectively imposed on society
by the state. In general, the reviewed works there show very little attention for
resistance to such a top-down enforcement of ideology. Instead, the question of
resistance and support which was central to the earlier debate seems to have lost
much of its relevance, as several historians abandon the idea of state and society as
separate realms. The abovementioned post-modern approach entails a subjective
view of society; and this leads to an evaluation of ideology as an all-encompassing
framework or discourse, a force that is constructive of identities and experiences
but that is also itself shaped in its interaction with society.
Apart from the insistence on the utopian goal of the Soviet Union and the
related ‘modern hubris’, there are few indications that scholars consider it a
modern phenomenon in the same sense as Friedrich and notably Arendt perceived
it. Some authors argue that it was in some senses an undesired consequence of
modern mass politics and the Enlightenment ideal of popular sovereignty; others,
as mentioned, consider it from the perspective of modernization. Yet there
appears to be no interpretation of the Soviet Union as the answer to ‘the problem
of modernity’, nor do authors comment on the importance of technology as a
precondition for the ‘total rule’ of the Soviet state.

84
 With regard to its origins, there is the abovementioned attention for
ideology as the driving force behind Soviet history which explains Soviet history
from the perspective of revolutionary change. On the other hand, there are those
authors who instead emphasize long-term causes. As I remarked in the
presentation of my checklist however, the question of ‘modernity’ and ‘origins’ do
not in themselves indicate an endorsement or rejection of the totalitarian model.
It is striking, however, that several scholars, e.g. Hollander, offer interpretations
of the origins of Soviet rule that are very reminiscent of Arendt’s description of
the 19th century-roots of totalitarianism.
The supposed dynamism of the state is hardly reflected in the publications
discussed. There is attention for the chaos, strife and flexibility within the state,
which counters the idea of the Soviet state as a monolith. But dynamism in the
sense of an ‘eternal movement towards total destruction’ appears to be absent from
these works. This can possibly be explained as a logical result of the post-1989
perspective: for the development and ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union proved
that Arendt’s gloomy prediction did not come true. Rather than radicalizing into a
violent, world-wide explosion, the Soviet Union stagnated, imploding rather
quietly.
With regard to agency and autonomy, the majority of the research regards
Soviet history from a top-down perspective, focusing on Soviet leaders or the elite
in general, as the agents that determine history. A substantial amount of research
is conducted from a bottom-up perspective as well, however; also common are
publications in which the two perspectives are combined in an attempt to
reconcile the traditional and the revisionist point of view. The bottom-up
perspective entails both subjective and objective accounts, regarding society from
within respectively from without. What is remarkable about the bottom-up
approach, is that it is not always informed by the assumption that agency resides
in society rather than the state. There are several authors, like Figes, who focus on
the experiences of Soviet citizens without regarding them as the agents in history.

85
While these historians consider the subjective perspective ‘from below’ important
as a source of information, their interpretation of agency is essentially ‘top-down’
in the sense that they consider society to be a distinct realm, devoid of the
autonomy to determine history. Overall, many authors endorse the traditional
dichotomy between state and society; these publications are spread evenly over
the two decades. Yet the perspective of state and society as intertwined and
interacting is also prevalent, especially since the late 1990s – these are the post-
modern publications discussed earlier.
The great majority of historians views Soviet history from an
‘intentionalist’ perspective, focusing on the intentions and human actors; there are
very few who argue for the importance of structural forces and contingencies as
determinants of history. With regard to the effectiveness of its agency, the state is
often considered to have been strong or even omnipotent. Just as often however,
the state’s weakness is emphasized. This diversity is logically also reflected in the
interpretations of society; it is explicitly argued in a number of publications that
society was passive, subdued to total control from above. As mentioned earlier, the
argument that there was support and/or resistance from below is not employed in
those accounts in which society is regarded from an objective point of view. There
is attention for support and resistance from below however; it is argued for by
those scholars who look at society from a subjective perspective and suggest that
state and society were interactive, interconnected realms.

86
4 Conclusion

‘So who is the biggest villain?’ the librarian asked me, as I collected several books
that compared the dictatorships of Hitler and Stalin. After admitting
that I was not sure yet, I realized that I had not even asked myself
that question; it seemed irrelevant to me. Yet after studying the
history and development of the debate on totalitarianism and Soviet
Union historiography, I remembered it; for it adequately summarizes
many of its central features.
In the foregoing, I have attempted to answer the question how, in western
Europe and the United States, historians who have studied the political history of
the Soviet Union between 1989 and (July) 2009 have implicitly or explicitly
evaluated totalitarianism theory. Since there exists no singular ‘totalitarianism
theory’ I have defined what I consider to be the central arguments and
assumptions in the theories Carl Friedrich & Zbigniew Brzezinski and Hannah
Arendt, as well as Juan J. Linz’ post-totalitarianism theory. I have translated this
essence of (post) totalitarianism theory into an overview, which I used as a
‘checklist’ in reviewing my selection of post-1989 historiography of the Soviet
Union.
From 1993 onwards the publications show the increased possibilities of the
growing accessibility of information; almost all of them make use of the newly
available sources. In general, the judgment on the possibility to find answers in
the archives is one of moderate optimism. The impact of the new sources is easily
recognizable; many publications from the late 1990s onwards are real ‘products of
the archival revolution’, using the new information to answer old questions as
well as providing new questions.

87
 Although historians are not known for their inclination to reflect on their
methods, the scholars discussed generally express that they are aware of the
controversies of the debate in which they take part, and they consequently often
explicitly justify and explain their methods and arguments. The recognition that
their approach is in need of justification does not extend to the use of the term
‘totalitarianism’ however; it is apparently not considered to be controversial, since
it is widely used and often in a casual way. With regard to the explicit evaluation
of the totalitarian model, it is remarkable that it is valued positively in many
instances and during the entire period, while explicit rejections are few. What is
even more remarkable is that totalitarianism theory is often considered to offer an
adequate explanation of the actual situation, rather than as an ‘ideal type’ which
informs us merely of intentions that never fully materialized. This assessment is
actually ‘more totalitarian’ than the original theories; for Friedrich and Arendt
argued that the totalitarian society was never actually achieved.
More significant however than the answers to the question whether or not
the Soviet Union was totalitarian - in intent or achievement - is the fact that this
question is apparently still central to the debate. In this sense, the historiography
of the Soviet Union is still determined by the totalitarian paradigm and the
subsequent revisionist critique; its framework still determines which questions are
asked. The newly available sources are accordingly employed mainly to answer
these ‘old’ questions; the opening of the archives is thus integrated into the
existing discussion whether totalitarianism theory is ‘right or wrong’.
The most convincing indication that totalitarianism theory has indeed
witnessed a revival is the widespread use of the normative comparative
perspective. To be sure, it differs from the ‘Cold War weapon’ it once was; its
political use became obsolete with the collapse of the Soviet Union. 222 Yet it is also
very similar to the original comparison, for its proponents argue that it is justified

222
Although its polemic power is still deployed to denounce Communism, as was done (in)famously
by Stéphane Courtois and Mark Kramer in The Black Book of Communism (Cambridge 1999);
published in France as Le Livre Noir du Communisme in 1997.

88
for reasons of ‘coming to terms with the past’; they argue that the regimes are
comparable in terms of gruesomeness. The urge to denounce a contemporary state
has thus been replaced with the need for Vergangenheitsbewältigung. In both
cases, interpreting reality is subjected to a cause to which empirical evidence and
objective inquiry is essentially secondary.
Concerning the goal of the Soviet state, it is generally accepted that it
entailed the total remake of society, as Friedrich and Arendt argued.
Consequentially, terror and more notably ideology are central to the majority of
interpretations. Ideology has definitely returned from its revisionist exile: it is
generally considered to have been the driving force behind Soviet history.
Consistent with totalitarianism theory, it is mainly understood as top-down,
official and collective. It is interesting that it is argued from both the top-down
and the bottom-up perspective that it successfully ‘totalized’ society – that it was
effectively imposed on the prostrated Soviet citizens.
Related to this conclusion is the fact that in general, agency in Soviet
history is mainly understood from a top-down perspective; Soviet leaders are
considered to have determined the course of its history. Closely connected to this
is the insistence on the primacy of conscious action and plans instead of
circumstances, structures and contingencies. Scholars that employ a bottom-up
perspective, in the sense that they focus on society in their reconstruction of the
past, overall do not ascribe agency to Soviet citizens either, but instead consider
the state to be the autonomous actor in history. This seeming contradiction can be
understood with reference to the predominance of the traditional framework I
mentioned earlier: it appears that the totalitarian model is endorsed both from a
top-down and a bottom-up perspective (a possibility I considered in my
‘checklist’). While they focus on the state and society respectively as the most
important realm for historical inquiry, both approaches consider state and society
to be separate realms, in opposition to each other. This is essentially a

89
continuation of the totalitarian model and its revisionist critique; both regarded
state and society to be distinct and conflicting spheres.
Revisionists argued against the totalitarian idea that society was passive
and powerless, and instead argued that there was on the contrary agency ‘from
below’. This perspective on the society as agent in history is not recognized by
those who view society from an objective point of view. However, the agency of
the Soviet citizen is central to the subjective bottom-up approach. This post-
modern perspective appears as a distinctive trend among the reviewed works; it
differs from the approaches discussed above in that it transcends the division of
state and society. While it focuses on ideology as the driving force behind Soviet
history too, it signals not a revival of totalitarianism theory, but a step beyond the
framework of the traditional debate. In considering state and society to be
intertwined, and regarding ideology in terms of an interactive discourse, these
scholars necessarily consider agency as coming from above as well as from below.
In moving beyond the traditional dichotomy of state vs. society, the historians
that employ the post-modern approach are concerned not primarily with
resolving the disputes of the totalitarian-revisionist debate, but instead seek new
perspectives in history.
Thus, it appears that two distinctive approaches can be discerned in the
post-1989 historiography of the Soviet Union: one that has as its basic frame of
reference the debate which took shape before glasnost and one that is inspired by
the cultural turn and the newly available material. This divide reminds me of
Pablo Picasso’s remark that ‘computers are useless, for they can only gives us
answers’. While the new sources are undoubtedly of much greater use to the
historian than the computer is to the artist, the archives can be compared to the
computer in the sense that they do not, in themselves, offer new interpretations
and perspectives. They can provide answers, but the increase of knowledge is
primarily dependent on the questions asked. Both proponents of the totalitarian
model and revisionists maintain that their conclusions are valid, based on the new

90
facts; I am in no position to decide whether these claims are justified, but this is
besides the point. Which is that the fact that academic disputes are not resolved
by the mere availability of new sources illustrates that objectivity in historical
inquiry is as complex as the reality it attempts to describe. Yet recognizing the
complexity of objectivity does not amount to relativism. Historical research is
primarily meant to reconstruct the past as adequately as possible; the post-modern
conviction that there is no such thing as ‘Truth’ does not render inquiry after
‘truths’ meaningless. It is apparently from this conviction that scholars employing
the subjective approach seek to reconstruct the many ‘histories’ of the Soviet
Union.
Diametrically opposed to this point of view is the other remarkable
development in post-1989 historiography; the return to the normative
comparative perspective. This implies that historical research matters primarily as
a means to come to terms with the past, and suggests that the task of the historian
is to decide upon the meaning of history. This task of making sense of the past is
inextricably bound up with passing judgment; and it is indeed striking how many
scholars value the normative aspect of historical research – either implicitly or
explicitly. The idea that history needs to be judged in order to reveal its meaning
suggests that the past can be judged objectively and definitely.
I believe that historiography is valuable as a provider of meaning and need
not, and can not be, entirely devoid of engagement. But this aspect or
consequence of historical research should not be confused with its primary goal,
which is to reconstruct the past as objectively as possible. In this respect I agree
with Arch Getty, who criticizes the idea that ‘once one decides who is guilty,
there are no more questions to ask, and the research becomes the further
enumeration of foul deeds by the evil prince.’ 223 Unlike Richard Pipes,224 I am
convinced that detachment does add to understanding; for it seriously narrows the

223
Getty, The Road to Terror, 10.
224
See quote on p. 3.

91
scope of possible questions - and thus answers – to discuss a subject merely in
terms of its immorality.
Returning to the question, whether or not totalitarianism theory has
witnessed a revival since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it could be argued that
it has: considering the attention for ideology as the driving force behind Soviet
history, the predominance of the top-down perspective, the widespread
assumption that agency from below was stifled and, notably, the use of the
normative comparison with the National Socialist state. Yet it should also be noted
that even within this limited selection of publications, a range of approaches and
presumptions can be discerned. The post-1989 historiography of the Soviet Union
appears too fragmented to argue for a definitive revival of totalitarianism theory.
This is not great surprise however, since a ‘paradigm’ in the humanities is never
the clear-cut ‘Gestalt Switch’ that Thomas Kuhn described regarding the sciences;
instead it is a perspective which exists simultaneously with other (older)
perspectives. The predominance of a paradigm in history is thus far from obvious
and definite, and it is hence not easily verified. Following this argument, the idea
that the totalitarian perspective was once entirely replaced by revisionism is of
course equally questionable.
This does however not lead to the general conclusion that questions
concerning perspectives in historiography are fruitless; multifaceted subjects
simply require a balanced approach and consequently lead to nuanced answers.
Apart from that, ironically, my research is informative because its central question
appears to be irrelevant in the light of new perspectives on Soviet history. The
subjective, post-modern approach is characterized by its transcendence of the
debate between totalitarianism and revisionism; and my research question in its
narrow sense exists within the confines of this discussion. The post-modern
approach moves ‘beyond totalitarianism’ in the sense that it does not seek to
answer such questions. Scholars who regard Soviet history from this perspective
transcend the division of state and society that was at the core of the debate on

92
totalitarianism. By interpreting ideology and agency as results of the
interwovenness of both realms, they offer new interpretations which contain
promising suggestions for further research.

93
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