Topic: Non-detention by reason of political beliefs or aspirations/Involuntary Servitude1.

Aclaracion vs Gatmaitan
64 SCRA 131, 135 (May 26 1975)

Facts:
Petitioner was assigned as a temporary stenographer in the Gapan branch of the CFI Nueva Ecija. After said appointment,
he was employed in the Public Assistance and Claims Adjudication Division of the Insurance Commission. After he had
ceased to be a court stenographer, the CA required him to transcribe his stenographic notes in two cases decided by
Gapan Court which had been appealed. Because of his failure to comply with the resolutions of the CA, he was declared
in contempt of the court. Arrested and incarcerated until he could submit a complete transcript of his noted in the said
cases. Petitioner contends that to compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes after he ceased to be a court
stenographer would transgress the rule against involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted" (Sec. 14, Art. IV, Bill of Rights, 1972Constitution). He was averse
to being subjected "to involuntary servitude sans compensation". He desired to be released from the obligation of
transcribing his notes. (He filed his petition in forma pauperis).

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s contention is tenable?

Held:
No. Involuntary Servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another or the condition of one
who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment and against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not.
That situation does not obtain in this case. The traditional mode of exercising the court's coercive power is to hold the
recalcitrant or negligent stenographer in contempt of court if he does not comply with the order for the transcription of
his notes and imprison him until he obeys the order (Sec. 7, Rule 71, Rules of Court). Another sanction to compel the
transcription is to hold in abeyance the transfer, promotion, resignation or clearance of a stenographer until he completes
the transcription of his notes. This is provided for in Circular No. 63 of the Secretary of Justice. In the instant case,
Aclaracion transcribed his notes in the Muncal and Paderes cases while he was an employee of the Insurance Commission.
During the time that he made the transcription, he received his salary as such employee.

Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998

Per Curiam

Facts:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his
common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.

He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both motions.

In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to
lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD
OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS
AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.

The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the grounds that it
constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a violation of the Philippines'
obligations under international covenants, an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by
respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of
Justice to respondent Director.

In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.

The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law,
and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by
lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the
most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death
penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers the
power to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.
The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with the
attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae. They alleged similarly with Echegaray’s arguments.

The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to the petition.

Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for
violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.

Issue:
Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment?

Held:
No. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment considering
that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to
be administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing
rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution,
which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions"
or mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.

Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment
of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman
and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the
details involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes
not. For reasons discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the
competence and expertise of administrative officials.

Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the time and date of execution,
and the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which
designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused. The procedure is that the "judgment is
entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below
including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor
the time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction
with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "not earlier
than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became
final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times."
Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death
penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual
affairs.

Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible complications in the intravenous
injection that respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal
injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated.

First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the expertise only of
phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply
cites situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing
death for the convict, without any other evidence whatsoever.

Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all personnel involved in
the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such task. We must presume that the public
officials entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty and does
not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense,
anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict,
it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is
to go unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method
of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.

What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."
Lozano vs Martinez Digest

Facts:
Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law). They moved seasonably to
quash the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being
unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court
declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected thus appealed.

Issue:
Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt.

Held:
The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of
the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act
not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a
bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient
to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the
instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment
in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for
currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If
such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become
nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks
can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee
or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

PEOPLE vs OBSANIA

Facts:
The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. He pleaded
not guilty. His counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the info. Said motion was
granted. From this order of dismissal the prosecution appealed.

Issue:
Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double Jeopardy.

Held:
In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained in the original
prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was
acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The
“doctrine of double jeopardy” as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is dismissed with the express
consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action
in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby
prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.

In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of the accused but even
upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him is
revived by the fiscal.
MELO VS PEOPLE

FACTS:
Petitioner herein was charged with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo with a kitchen
knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different part of the body, requiring medical attendance for a
period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time.

During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty, but on the same day, during the night, the victim died from his
wounds. Evidence of death of the victim was available to the prosecution and the information was amended.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy, but was denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the amended information constitutes double jeopardy.

HELD:
Rule 106, section 13, 2nd paragraph provides:
If it appears at may time before the judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court may
dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the
defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give the bail for their
appearance at the trial.

“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense”. It meant that when a person is charged
with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent
of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense.

The protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense, the only exception being,
as stated in the same Constitution, that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. “SAME OFFENSE” under the general rule, has always been
construed to mean not only the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but
also that the two offenses are identical.

There is identity between two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to
warrant a conviction for the other. This is called SAME-EVIDENCE-TEST. In this connection, an offense may be said to
necessarily include another when some of the ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS of the former as alleged in the information
constitute the latter; vice versa.

This rule however does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for
the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for
an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the
injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.

Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which charges the character
of the offense and, together with the fact existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense.

CRUZ vs ENRILE

Facts:
Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced in the Supreme Court on 1 October 1986 to test the legality of the continued
detention of some 217 so-called "political detainees" arrested in the nine-year span of official martial rule and committed
to the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa. All had been made to stand trial for common crimes before various courts
martial; if any of these offenses had any political color, this had neither been pleaded nor proved. Of the 217 prisoners,
157 are civilians, and only 26 confirmed as military personnel. 115 accused had been condemned to die, 46 were
sentenced to life imprisonment, 9 others were meted prison terms of from 20 to 30 years; 41 were given prison terms of
10 to 20 years; and 3 were meted prison terms of less than 10 years. As of the date of filing of the petitions, the sentences
of 68 had become final upon their approval by the Office of the President, 75 cases were pending review in either that
Office or before the Board of Military Review, while the appeal or review of the remaining 73 cases either had been
expressly suspended pending the outcome of these petitions, or are simply not dealt with in the records. Presidential
amnesty was granted to Virgilio Alejandrino, yet to this date he remains a prisoner at the Penitentiary, as
do Domingo Reyes, Antonio Pumar, Teodoro Patano, Andres Parado and Daniel Campus, although they were acquitted of
the charges against them, and Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de los Santos, who appear to have fully served the
sentences imposed on them by the military commissions which convicted them. The petitioners urge the Court to declare
unconstitutional the establishment of all military tribunals as well as General Order 8 ordaining their creation, and the
nullity of all the proceedings had against them before these bodies as a result of which they had been illegally deprived of
their liberty.

Issue:
Whether the petitioners’ cases may be retried without subjecting said accused to double jeopardy.

Held:
No breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense would result from the retrial of the petitioners' cases, for the simple reason that the absence of jurisdiction of
the courts martial to try and convict the petitioners prevented the first jeopardy from attaching. Valid previous
proceedings are required in order that the defense of double jeopardy can be raised by the accused in the second
prosecution. In fine, the Court holds that the merits of the indictments against all these civilians are solely for the civil
courts to weigh and decide upon after due proceedings. Otherwise stated, they are entitled to the retrial they have
explicitly requested of their respective cases in the civil courts.

PEOPLE VS JUDGE VILLARAMA

Facts:
On 24 August 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, RA 6425, as amended. The penalty
prescribed in the said section is imprisonment ranging from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years and a fine ranging from P6,000
to P12,000. The information against him reads: "That on or about the 21st day of August, 1990, in the Municipality of
San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without the corresponding license or prescription did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control 0.08 grams of Methamphetamin Hydrocloride (Shabu) wrapped with an
aluminum foil, which is a regulated drug. Contrary to law." During the arraignment, Manuel entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial ensued. On 21 November 1990, the prosecution rested its case. On 9 January 1991, Manuel's counsel
verbally manifested in open court that Manuel was willing to change his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to
the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA 6425, as amended. The said section provides a penalty of imprisonment
ranging from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and a fine ranging from P600 to P4,000 shall be imposed upon any pharmacist,
physician, dentist, veterinarian, manufacturer, wholesaler who violates or fails to keep the records required under Section
25 of the Act; if the violation or failure involves a regulated drug.

That same day, Judge Martin S. Villarama Jr. issued an order directing Manuel to secure the consent of the prosecutor to
the change of plea, and set the promulgation of decision on 30 January 1991. On said date, the Judge postponed the
promulgation of the decision to 18 February 1991 to give Manuel another opportunity to secure the consent of the
prosecutor. Also, on the said date, Manuel filed his Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. On 18 February 1991,
the Judge issued another order postponing the promulgation of decision to 25 February 1991 to give Manuel
further opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. On 20 February 1991, the prosecutor filed his Opposition to
the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution already rested its case on 21
November 1990; (2) the possibility of conviction of Manuel of the crime originally charged was high because
of the strong evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which the court and the prosecutor had expended
would be put to waste. On 21 February 1991, Manuel filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to
a Lesser Offense, alleging therein, among other matters, that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period
within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Subsequently, on 25 February 1991, the Judge
rendered a decision granting Manuel's motion. Forthwith, the prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
decision but the same was denied in the order of 13 March 1991. The prosecutor filed the petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rule of Court applies to the
accused's change of plea in the present case.

Held:
Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or
to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver
charge. Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still
permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter, as provided by Rule 116 of the Rules of Court,
Section 2 thereof, which provides that "The accused, with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed
by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime
charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for
purposes of double jeopardy." However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under the rule is not
demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the
trial court. Herein, Manuel moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution had already rested
its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick
within which their discretion may be properly exercised. The trial court need not wait for a guideline from the Office of
the Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's motion to change plea. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment
whether for or against the said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's
evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end that the
interests of justice and of the public will be served. A reading of the disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose the
strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence in hand, the judge's
acceptance of Manuel's change of plea is improper and irregular. Further, the provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The
consent of both the Fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The
right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rule of Court applies in cases where both
the fiscal and the offended party consent to the accused's change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, Manuel
cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable provision is that found in Section 7 (c), Rule 117
which states that "the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily
includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances: xxx (c) the plea
of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of the offended party." Under the rule,
Manuel could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of
the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial court's
approval of his change of plea was irregular and improper.

ICASIANO VS SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:
Acting Municipal Trial Court Judge of Naic, Cavite, Aurelio G. Icasiano, Jr. issued 2 orders of detention dated 18 and 27
November 1986 against Romana Magbago for contempt of court because of her continued refusal to comply with a fifth
alias writ of execution. Magbago filed an administrative complaint dated 17 February 1987 with the Supreme Court
against Judge Icasiano. After evaluating the allegations of the complaint, Icasiano's comment thereon and the
Court Administrator's recommendation, the Supreme Court dismissed the administrative complaint for lack of merit in an
en banc resolution dated 2 February 1988. Meanwhile, on 17 March 1987, Magbago also filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman the same letter-complaint earlier filed with the Supreme Court; this time, she claimed violation by Judge
Icasiano, Jr. of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, sec. 3 par. [e]) in TBP-87-00924. After considering Judge
Icasiano's answer, in a resolution dated April 1988 Special Prosecutor Evelyn Almogela-Baliton recommended
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. The recommendation was approved by then Special Prosecutor/Tanodbayan
Raul M. Gonzales. It appears from the records of the Tanodbayan, which were forwarded to the Supreme Court, upon
order of the Court in connection with this case, that the resolution dismissing the complaint was released on 14 April 1988.
The office of the Tanodbayan received another complaint from the same Romana Magbago (TBP-87-01546). The exact
date of filing of the second complaint is not stated but the records of the case were allegedly among those transmitted to
the then newly created office of the Ombudsman; unfortunately, the transmitted records did not contain the earlier
resolution of dismissal in TBP-87-00924. Special Prosecutor Nicanor Cruz, Jr. who was assigned to investigate the case
(TBP-87-01546) appeared completely unaware of the earlier case, TBP-87-00924. The corresponding information
against Icasiano was thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case 14563). After said information was filed on
21 March 1990, Icasiano (as accused) filed a motion for reinvestigation. Icasiano's motion for reinvestigation was denied
in the 29 June 1990 resolution, of the Sandiganbayan. Icasiano then moved to quash the information on the grounds,
among others, that the accused shall be placed in double jeopardy in so far as the resolution of the Hon. Supreme Court
in Administrative Case RTJ-87-81. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. A motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. Icasiano filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the resolution of the administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court bars the subsequent filing of a criminal
case against the accused in the Sandiganbayan.

Held:
After a closer look at the records of the case, the Court is of the view that the distinction between administrative and
criminal proceedings must be upheld, and that a prosecution in one is not a bar to the other. It is, therefore, correct for
the Sandiganbayan to hold that double jeopardy does not apply in the present controversy because the Supreme Court
case (against Judge Icasiano) was administrative in character while the Sandiganbayan case also against Judge Icasiano is
criminal in nature. When the Supreme Court acts on complaints against judges or any of the personnel under its
supervision and control, it acts as personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court judging justiciable
controversies. Administrative procedure need not strictly adhere to technical rules. Substantial evidence is sufficient to
sustain conviction. Criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, on the other hand, while they may involve the same
acts subject of the administrative case, require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To avail of the protection against
double jeopardy, it is fundamental that the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution:

(a) a valid complaint or information;

(b) a competent court;

(c) a valid arraignment;

(d) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and

(e) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.

All these elements do not apply vis-a-vis the administrative case, which should take care of Judge Icasiano's contention
that said administrative case against him before the Supreme Court, which was dismissed, entitled him to raise the defense
of double jeopardy in the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan. The charge against Judge Icasiano before the
Sandiganbayan is for grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and incompetence in having issued 2 orders of detention
against complaining witness Magbago. Ordinarily, complainant's available remedy was to appeal said orders of detention
in accordance with the Rules. It is only when an appellate court reverses the lower court issuing the questioned orders
can abuse, partiality or incompetence be imputed to the judge. Here no appeal from the questioned orders of the issuing
judge (Icasiano) was taken: instead, administrative and criminal cases were filed against the judge for issuing the orders.
It is precisely for this reason, among other, that the administrative case against Judge Icasiano was dismissed by the
Supreme Court for lack of merit; and yet, it cannot be assumed at this point that Judge Icasiano is not criminally liable
under RA 3019, par. 3(e) for issuing the questioned orders of detention. In fact, the Ombudsman has found a prima facie
case which led to the filing of the information. In any case, the dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first complaint cannot
bar the present prosecution, since double jeopardy does not apply. As held in Cirilo Cinco, et al. vs.
Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, a preliminary investigation (assuming one had been
conducted in TBP-87-00924) is not a trial to which double jeopardy attaches.

MISOLAS VS PANGA

Facts:
After receiving information from an unidentified informant that members of the New People's Army (NPA) were resting
in a suspected "underground house" in Foster Village, Del Carmen, Pili, Camarines Sur, elements of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC) raided said house in the early morning of 8 August 1987. Three persons were inside the house, Arnel P.
Misolas and two women known by the aliases "Ka Donna" and "Ka Menchie" but the women were able to escape in the
confusion during the raid. The house was searched and the raiders found in a red bag under a pillow allegedly used by
Misolas a .20 gauge Remington shotgun and 4 live rounds of ammunition. Petitioner was arrested and brought to the PC
headquarters. On 4 September 1987, an information charging Misolas with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition
under Presidential Decree 1866 was filed by the provincial fiscal. The information alleged that the firearm and ammunition
were used in furtherance of subversion so as to qualify the offense under the third paragraph of Section 1 of PD 1866.
Upon arraignment, Misolas, with the assistance of counsel de oficio pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. However, a few
days later, the same counsel filed a motion to withdraw the plea on the ground that there was basis for the filing of a
motion to quash. Judge Benjamin V. Panga, as Judge of RTC Branch 33, Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur, gave Misolas time to
file a motion to quash. Misolas filed a motion to quash on the grounds (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense because the information does not charge the proper offense since from the allegations the offense that may be
charged is either subversion or rebellion; and (2) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
because of violations of his constitutional rights, i.e, his arrest and the seizure of the firearm and ammunition were illegal.
The judge denied the motion to quash for lack of merit in an order dated 7 January 1988. Misolas moved for
reconsideration, but such was denied on 15 February 1988. Misolas filed the petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether PD 1866 constitutes a bill of attainder.

Held:
Misolas objected to PD 1866 on the ground of substantive due process. Established rules of constitutional litigation
would, therefore, bar an inquiry based on the theory that PD 1866 constitutes a bill of attainder. Yet, even if a challenge
on the ground that PD 1866 is a bill of attainder could be appropriately considered, it will still be met with little success.
The Court, in People v. Ferrer, defined a bill of attainder as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or
members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals
or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. This last element,
the total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the
most essential. PD 1866 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without
a judicial trial. Nowhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a corresponding punishment. What
the decree does is to define the offense and provide for the penalty that may be imposed, specifying the qualifying
circumstances that would aggravate the offense. There is no encroachment on the power of the court to determine
after due hearing whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the offense of illegal possession of
firearms has been committed and that the qualifying circumstance attached to it has been established also beyond
reasonable doubt as the Constitution and judicial precedents require.

PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:
Two letter-complaints were filed on 28 October 1986 and 9 December 1986, with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio, a
political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of Congressman Democrito O. Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after the
Ceferino S. Paredes had replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial governor of Agusan del Sur in March 1986. Gelacio's
complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still the provincial attorney in 1976, of a free patent
title for Lot 3097-8, Pls. 67, with an area of 1,391 sq.m., more or less, in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur. On 23 February 1989, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the City Fiscal of Butuan City who
subpoenaed Governor Paredes. However, the subpoena was served on, and received by, the Station Commander of San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur, who did not serve it on Paredes. Despite the absence of notice to Paredes, Deputized
Tanodbayan/City Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy conducted a preliminary investigation ex parte. He recommended that an
information be filed in court. His recommendation was approved by the Tanodbayan who, on August 10, 1989, filed an
information in the Sandiganbayan (TBP Case 86-03368), alleging "That on or about January 21, 1976, or sometime prior
or subsequent thereto, in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, having been duly
appointed and qualified as such, taking advantage of his public position, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully
persuade, influence and induce the Land Inspector of the Bureau of Lands, by the name of Armando L. Luison to violate
an existing rule or regulation duly promulgated by competent authority by misrepresenting to the latter that the land
subject of an application filed by the accused with the Bureau of Lands is disposable by a free patent when the accused
well knew that the said land had already been reserved for a school site, thus by the accused's personal misrepresentation
in his capacity as Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur and applicant for a free patent, a report favorably recommending
the issuance of a free patent was given by the said Armando L. Luison, land inspector, thereby paving the way to the
release of a decree of title, by the Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur, an act committed by the accused, in outright
prejudice of the public interest." Paredes was arrested upon a warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan. Claiming that the
information and the warrant of arrest were null and void because he had been denied his right to a preliminary
investigation, Paredes refused to post bail. His wife filed a petition for habeas corpus praying this Court to order his release,
but the Supreme Court denied her petition because the proper remedy was for Paredes to file a bail bond of P20,000 fixed
by the Sandiganbayan for his provisional liberty, and move to quash the information before being arraigned. On 5 April
1991, Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan "An Urgent Motion to Quash Information and to Recall Warrant of Arrest." After
the parties had filed their written arguments, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution on 1 August 1991 granting the motion
to quash on the ground of prescription of the offense charged. The People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General,
filed the petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for his violation of RA 3019 in 1976.

Held:
Batas Pambansa 195 which was approved on 16 March 1982, amending Section 11 of RA 3019 by increasing from 10 to
15 years the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may
not be given retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it would be
prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him of the substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period
under Section 11, RA 3019 which was an essential element of the "crime" at the time he committed it. To apply BP 195 to
Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would alter his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally
liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed. Since an ex post facto
law is proscribed by our Constitution (Sec. 22, Article III, 1987 Constitution), the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible
error in ruling that Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of RA 3019 in 1976, 6 years before BP
195 was approved. The new prescriptive period under that law should apply only to those offenses which were committed
after the approval of BP 195.
WRIGHT VS COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
On 17 March 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs indorsed to the Department
of Justice Diplomatic Note 080/93 dated 19 February 1993 from the Government of Australia to the Department of Justice
through Attorney General Michael Duffy. Said Diplomatic Note was a formal request for the extradition of Paul Joseph
Wright who is wanted for the indictable crimes of: 1 count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1)
of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 (Wright and Herbert Lance Orr, obtaining $315,250 from Mulcahy, Mendelson and
Round Solicitors by falsely representing that all relevant documents relating to the mortgage had been signed by Rodney
and Janine Mitchell who control Ruven Nominee Pty. Ltd. Which owned the Bangholme, Victoria property); and 13 counts
of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 (Wright and John
Carson Cracker, obtaining 11.2 million commission including $367,044 in bonus commission via Amazon Bond
Pty. Ltd. by submitting 215 life insurance proposals and paying premiums thereon, but where life proposals were not in
existence and approximately 200 were allegedly false; attempting to obtain $2,870.68 commission in the name of Amazon
Bond by submitting one proposal for life insurance with AMP Society; signing and swearing before the Solicitor); one count
of attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 (Wright and
Carson attempting to cause the payment of $2,870.68 commission to a bank account in the name of Amazon Bond Pty.
Ltd. by submitting a proposal for Life Insurance to the AMP Society, the policy-holder of which does not exist); and one
count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 (Wright and Cracker signing and swearing before
a Solicitor holding a current practicing certificate pursuant to the Legal Profession Practice Act of 1958, a Statutory
Declaration attending to the validity of 29 of the most recent Life Insurance proposals of AMP Society and containing 3
false statements). Pursuant to Section 5 of PD 1069, in relation to the Extradition Treaty concluded between the Republic
of the Philippines and Australia on 10 September 1990, extradition proceedings were initiated on 6 April 1993 by the State
Counsels of the Department of Justice before the Regional Trial Court. In its Order dated 13 April 1993, the trial court
directed Wright to appear before it on 30 April 1993 and to file his answer within 10 days. In the same order, the Judge
(Jose de la Rama, Branch 139) ordered the NBI to serve summons and cause the arrest of Wright. The trial court received
return of the warrant of arrest and summons signed by NBI Senior Agent Manuel Almendras with the information that
Wright was arrested on 26 April 1993 at Taguig, Metro Manila and was subsequently detained at the NBI detention cell
where Wright continue to be held. The trial court, in its decision dated 14 June 1993, granted the petition for extradition
requested by the Government of Australia, concluding that the documents submitted by the Australian Government meet
the requirements of Article 7 of the Treaty of Extradition and that the offenses for which the petitioner were sought in his
country are extraditable offenses under Article 2 of the said Treaty. The trial court, moreover, held that under the
provisions of the same Article, extradition could be granted irrespective of when the offense — in relation to the
extradition — was committed, provided that the offense happened to be an offense in the requesting State at the time
the acts or omissions constituting the same were committed. Wright challenged the decision of the Regional Trial Court
before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the trial court's decision on 14 September 1993 and
denied Wright's Motion for Reconsideration on 16 December 1993. Hence, Wright filed the petition for review on
certiorari to set aside the order of deportation.

Issue:
Whether the Treaty's retroactive application violate the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

Held:
Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all laws of retrospective application, whether civil or
criminal. However, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone, The Federalist and other early U.S. state constitutions
in Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept was limited only to penal and criminal statutes. As conceived under our
Constitution, ex post facto laws are (1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense
when committed; (2) laws which, while not creating new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a crime; (3) statutes which
prescribe greater punishment for a crime already committed; or, (4) laws which alter the rules of evidence so as to make
it substantially easier to convict a defendant. "Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that the
prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused." This being so, there is
absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive
application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the
Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Here, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal
procedural statute. "It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime
which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified."
FREEDOM OF RELIGION-EXPOST FACTO