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Author(s): Karl Loewenstein
Source: The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Jun., 1938), pp. 566-608
Published by: University of Chicago Law Review
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THE BALANCE BE'WEEN LEGISLATIVE AND
EXECUTIVE POWER: A STUDY IN COM.
PARATIVE CONS'T'lIUTIONAL LAW*
KARL LOEWENSTEINt
I N REVOLUTIONARY therealpolitical
periods,
ly obscuredby the persistent
issuesarefrequent-
applicationof an obsoletescientific
terminology whichdenotesattitudesand patternsof behaviorno
longerin conformity withactualconditions.Particularlyinpoliticalthe-
orytheuse of traditional termsmaybe misleading and confusing.The
postulateof a balanceor equilibrium betweenlegislativeand executive
powers,revealsits ancestryfromthe customary divisionof
tri-partite
stateactivitiesintothelegislative,
executive,andjudicialfunctions tradi-
tionallyassociatedwithMontesquieu.Anyrealistic discussion,
therefore,
ofwhathasbecome,intheserecentyears,thecrucialissueofgovernment
andconstitutional lawneedsclarification
ofterms.In itsoriginalmeaning
thedoctrine oftheseparation ofpowerssignifies anddetermines, by con-
trastandjuxtaposition, thecomponent partsofstatepowerundertheas-
sumption of a staticsystemwhich,in thespiritof theage whenit was
formulated, organizestheactivitiesofthestateby wayofa divisionbe-
* Thisarticleis in substance
theenlarged
andannotated ofanaddress
version presented
by theauthorat theSecondInternational of Comparative
Congress Law at theHagueon
August5, I937; it coversdevelopmentsto May i, 1938.
t ProfessorofPoliticalScience,Amherst College.
IThe mostup-to-date bibliography on contemporary politicalorganization in general
andontheproblems concerning therelationshipbetween andexecutive
legislative inparticular
is to be foundin tomex oftheEncyclopedie Fransaise, l'Etat modeme(1935)(citedhere-
after, E.F.; thefigure quotedindicatesthe"fascicule," notthepage,according tothedivision
ofthevolume;thenameaddedis thatoftheindividual author;literatureis contained in the
appendix Io. B-i ff.);seeIO64.-4 (Gordon).Compare Barthelemy, Le roledupouvoir ex6cutif
dansles republiques modemes(I907); Dendias,Le renforcement des pouvoirsdu chefde
l'6tatdanslesdemocraties parlementaries(I932); Dendias,Le chefde l'etatrepublicain et le
rajustement de l'ex6cutif (au seuilde la dictature)(1937);Gordon, Les nouvelles constitu-
tionseurop6ennes et le roledu chefde l'6tat(1932); Mirkine-Guetzevich, Les nouvelles ten-
dancesdu droitconstitutionnel (2d ed. I936); Barthelemy-Duez, Traitedu droitconstitu-
tionnel(I933), 252 ff.,6o4ff.;Esmein-Nezard, Elements du droitconstituoionnel fran;aiset
compare457 if.(7thed. 1921); Finer,Theoryand PracticeofModernGovernment 949ff.
(I932).
Muchvaluablematerialis scattered
also in Friedrich,
Constitutional
Government and
Politics(1937);see,however,
thereservations
madeby Loewenstein,
3I Am.Pol. Sc. Rev.
953 if. (1937).
566
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 567
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568 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
I. A REALISTIC RE-EXAMINATION OF
MONTESQUIEU'S DOCTRINE
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER j69
institutions6in that in Englandof the eighteenth centurythe cabinet
systemwithits implications ofpoliticalpartiesand ministerial responsi-
bilitywas alreadyclearly in the making. It should be borne in mind,
however, thattheominousterm,separationofpowers,is nowherefound
expressisverbisin Montesquieu'sfamousChapter 6 of Book XI of
L'Espritdeslois; on thecontrary, it is stressedthatthepowersmustcol-
laborate:"Le pouvoirarretele pouvoir."What is evenmoreimportant
is thefactthatthedoctrine, whether itshistoricalderivationwas trueor
false,served hereafteras a ramrod againstroyal absolutism both in Eu-
ropeandbeyondtheseas. Thusa historical misunderstanding becamethe
foundation oftheconstitutions on theNorthAmericancontinent.7 Here
thedogmahas retaineditsspell to our own day. Some ofthe most impor-
tantpartsof theso-calledNew Deal of thepresentadministration have
beeninvalidatedrecently by arguments whichseemto be drawndirectly
fromMontesquieu'srigidpostulateof a strictconfinement of theexecu-
tiveandlegislative functions to theirproperspheres.8Undertheinfluence
of traditionalistconceptions whichare so surprisingly frequentin this
country,9theUnitedStatesstands todayout as theonlystatein whicha
clearbalancebetweenlegislativeand executivepowershas been main-
tainedconstitutionally.This dogmatictenacity, upheldevenin theface
offundamental and
changesin economicstructure socialthought, is per-
hapsone oftheexplanations whythiscountry, otherwise unusuallyfor-
tunatein its pragmaticconstitutionalism, experiences today whatsome
considerto be a majorconstitutional crisis.Thus thepostulateof func-
tionaldualism,implying theequilibrium betweenthepowers,is on trial
eveninthecountry whichexemplifies thedoctrine kath'exochen.
6 See Dedieu,
Montesquieuetla tradition anglaiseenFrance(190o9);Carcassonne,
politique
Montesquieu et le de
probleme la constitution
frangaiseau I7i*mesi&cle(1928); Klimovsky,
Die englische
Gewaltenteilungslehrebiszu Montesquieu(I927). Compare alsoMontesquieu's
ownobservations inBookX ch.6 oftheEspritdeslois.
7 On theinfluenceofMontesquieu on theAmerican constitutions(stateand federal)see
Nos.XLVII and XLVIII ("theoraclewhich
i Finer,op.cit.supranote5,at i62 if.;Federalist,
is alwaysconsulted andcitedon thissubject").Wright, A Sourcebook ofAmerican Political
Theory,282 ff.,343ff.(1929); Erlick,La separationdespouvoirsetla constitutionf6deralede
I787 (1936). Knust, Montesquieu und die der
Verfassungen Vereinigten Staatenvon Amerika
(I922).
Corporationv. UnitedStates,295 U.S. 495, 529 (I935);
8 A.L.A.SchechterPoultry Panama
RefiningCorporationv. Ryan, 295 U.S. 388, 414 (i935).
9For morerecentcriticism of theseparationand thechecksand balancesdoctrine see:
Fairlie,The Separation ofPowers,21 Mich. L. Rev. I (I923); Powell, Separation ofPowers,
ofPowers,28 Pol. Sc. Q. 34 ff.(I9I3).
27 Pol. Sc. Q. 193 ff.(1912); Powell,Separation
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570 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 57I
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572 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 573
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574 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 575
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576 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 577
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578 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
no timeinmodemhistoryhavethepsychological ofMontes-
ingredients
quieu'sdoctrinebeenmoreimperative.
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 579
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58o THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOLAWREVIEW
Ontheotherhand,ampleexperience
president.4s sincethewarhasdem-
onstratedbeyond doubtthatthepopularelection in-
ofthepresident,
tended totheinstability
as a counter-weight ofparliamentary
party gov-
ernment,gravely thefunctioning
endangers oftheparliamentary
system
as evidencedin republican
GermanyandSpain.Theplebiscitarychar-
acterofhisoffice,whenbasedonpopular mayeasilyopenthe
election,
waytoan authoritarianordictatorial
regime.
THE FOUR PERIODS
thehistorical
Seenretrospectively, developmentofconstitutional
gov-
ernmentinsofar
as therelation
betweenthelegislative
andtheexecutive
isconcerned, divided
seemsclearly intofourperiods.
oftheparliament.-When
Ascendancy royalabsolutism
succumbedto
as in EnglandafterI688, in FranceafterI789,thenat-
risingliberalism,
uralrecipientofliberal
aspirationswastheparliament. Rousseau's
seduc-
tivedoctrineoftheomnipotency ofthelegislativeas wellas thepent-up
resentment againstabsolutismwere responsible factthatthedemo-
forthe
craticideology behindmodern constitutionalismclaimedtheultimate
powerofpolitical decisionfortherepresentatives,sincetheyalonewere
believeddogmatically to reflect
what has been calledthewillofthepeo-
ple.46During the nineteenth the
century, attempt to democratizethe
representative hasobscured,
institutions toa largeextent, therealissues
ofpolitical
leadershipas involvedinthedistributionand location
ofpoliti-
calpower.Bytransfer ofpsychological the
emphasis parliamentcenter
as
ofpoliticalgravityacquired rightsandpowers offullsovereignty which
themonarchy andtheclassesaffiliated
withtheCrown wereforcedtosur-
render.Thelong-drawn processtooka different
tempo indifferent
coun-
triesas evidenced byFrancewhere progressionandretrogression alter-
natedalmostcyclically, whileintheso-calledconstitutionalmonarchies
oftheCentralEuropeantypethefinalascendancy ofparliament was
45ArticlesI2 to 14 of the constitutionof I937. On the Irishpresidencysee Keith, I9 Jour.
of Comp. Leg. 268 (x937). There is a good deal of disagreementabout the possibilitiesof a
strongpresidencyin Eire accordingto the new constitution.See Bromage,Constitutional
developmentsin the Saorstat Eireann and the Constitutionof Eire, II Internalaffairs,31
Pol. Sci. Rev. o1050,
I058 (1937). The electionof Mr. Hyde to the presidencyin April,I938,
seemsto indicatethatat least Mr. DeValera considersthefunctionsofthepresidentas merely
formal.But the constitutional documentmay lenditselfin timeto a moreliteralinterpreta-
tion,even againstMr. DeValera.
46On the supremacyofthe legislature(amountingto the dictatorshipofan assembly)dur-
ing the FrenchRevolutionsee Mirkine-Guetzevitch,Le gouvernement parlementaire sous la
Convention,in Cahiers de la Revolution Frangaise 47 ff. (I937); Mirkine-Guetzevitch,
Parlementarisme sous la ConventionNationale,Revue du Droit Public 67I ff.(I935).
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER
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582 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOLAWREVIEW
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 583
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584 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER
Chi. L. Rev. 537, 554 ff.(I937); Ermath, The New Germany48 if. (1936); Bonnard, Le
droit et l'tat dans la doctrinenational socialiste (1936); Stoffel,La dictaturedu fascisme
allemand (1936). The officialGermandoctrineof the relationbetweenexecutiveand legis-
lative poweris presentedby Hamel, Gleichgewicht zwischengesetzgebenderund vollziehender
Gewalt, in Deutsche Landesreferatezum i . Internationalen Congress fur Rechtsver-
gleichurgim Haag I937, 438 (I937). For Italy see Finer,Mussolini'sItaly 248 (1935); Steiner,
Governmentin Fascist Italy (1938).
63Loewenstein,op. cit.supra note 62, at 558 ff.
64 Finer,
op. cit.supra note 62, at 255 ff.;Schneider,The Fascist Governmentof Italy 5I if.
if.
(1936); Rosenstock-Franck,L'conomie corporativefascisteen doctrineet en fact 242
(I934); Steiner op. cit.supra note 62, at 69.
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586 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 587
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588 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAG LAW REVIEW
(1936); Loewenstein,op. cit. supra note 42, at 639 if.; Roucek, Constitutionalchangesin Es-
tonia, 30 Pol. Sci. Rev. 556 if. (I936); St. v. Csekey, Die Verfassungsentwicklung Estlands
I929-I934, 22 Jahrbuchdes 6ffentlichen Rechts 411 if. (I935); Tatarin-Tamheyden,Auto-
cratischeRegierungenin Lettland und Esthland und deren volkischePolitik, 26 Archivdes
6offentlichenRechts 257 if. (I935); E.F. I070.4 (Mirkine-Guetz6vitch).The text of the new
constitutionof September3, I937, is reprintedin Informationsconstitutionnelles et parle-
mentariesof NovemberI5, 1937,no. I5, 288 if. (I937).
On constitutionalevolutionin the Baltic States in generalsee: Graham,Stabilityin the
Baltic States, in Buell, New Governmentsin Europe 279 ff.(Estonia), 286 ff.(Latvia), 290 ff.
(Lithuania) (1934); Montfort,Le droit constitutionneldes nouveaux etats de la Baltique
orientale,in i Annales de l'Institut du droit public compare de l'Universitede Paris 41 ff.
(1934). The best information on the postwarsituationin the Baltic States is foundin Tibal,
Les problemespolitiques contemporainesde l'Europe orientale,CentreEuropeen de la Dota-
tion Carnegie (I929).
74On Latvia see Tartarin-Tarnheyden, op. cit.supranote 73,at 257if.;E.F. 1070.5 (Mirkine-
Guetzevitch). The projectof a new presidentialconstitution(submittedin 1934) whichlegal-
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 589
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590 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 59I
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592 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 593
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594 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 595
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596 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 597
Barthelemy,La constitution
Doumergue,Revuepolitiqueet parlementaire
I934,p. 245 ff.;
B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch,
Constitutional
reform 98 if.(I935);
in France,6 PoliticalQuarterly
Valeur,op. cit.,supra note 87, at 532 ff.;Braunias,op. cit.supra note 87, at o105ff.
On constitutional Valeurde la libert6
inFranceseeJoseph-Barthelemy,
reform et adapta-
tion & la republiquer78 ff.(1935); Haikal, op. cit. supra note 5, at 448 if.; Blum, La reforme
gouvernementale (I936); Tardieu,La reformede l'6tat (I933); Tardieu,L'heure de la decision
(I934); Bardoux,La Francede demain(I936); Ordinaire, La revisionde la constitution
(i934); Romain,Le plan du 9 juillet (I935); Melot, op. cit. supra note I7, at 226.
30 Am.Pol. Sci. Rev. 857
93Sharp,The PopularFrontin France:Preludeor Interlude,
ff.(1936); Haikal, op. cit. supra note 5, at 266 ff.
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598 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW
parliamentary
government, or,to be morehesitantin conclusions,
it may
inauguratea fundamental transformationof the relationshipbetween
executive
andlegislative
in statesoperatedbyparliamentarism.
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM AND THE TECHNIQUE OF
THE "PLEINS POUVOIRS"
The presentsituationin almostall countries faithful
to theprinciples
ofparliamentary government is characterizedby thefactthatno longer
is stabilization
ofthegovernment by thesupport ofstrongparliamentary
coalitionssought.The partiesbehindthegovernment wouldbe strong
enoughto carryout thepolidesofthecabinetagainstanypossiblecom-
binationoftheopposition.Nonetheless thestrong parliamentary major-
itvcommits thatactofself-abdicationoflegislativefunctionscalledpleins
pouvoirs94 or EnablingActby whichthegovernment assumesthepleni-
tudeoflegislative powersinsteadofand in theplace oftheparliament.
Moreover,suchdelegationof legislativeauthority is grantednot fora
specificpurposeand withinthelimitsof specified but it is
instructions,
conferred ingeneral,without anylimitations otherthanpurelyformal and
foranyobjectivewhatever unspecified at thetimeofgranting.Suchpow-
ers are by no meansa substitute forconstitutional emergency powers
customarily
(Notverordnungsrecht),95 accepted in timesof waror when par-
liamentis physically prevented fromassembling.At first forceduponre-
calcitrantparliaments as a stop-gapor makeshift of pragmaticnature
thedeviceoftheEnablingActseemsto emerge fromthecrisisas thenew
technicalbasis forexecutiveleadership which,whilepreserving theulti-
matepoliticalresponsibility of the freelyelectedrepresentatives of the
94On the pleinspouvoirsor EnablingActs whichformthe legal basis forthe dtcrets-lois
a
vastliterature
existsinalmostallcountries underparliamentary government. Oneofthebest
monographs is byTingsten,Les pleinspouvoirs (I934) (withextensive onp. 345ff.).
literature
Compareinaddition, Gouet,La questionconstitutionnelle despr6tendus d&crets-lois
(1932);
Haikal,op.cit.supranote5,at 68ff.,
422 if.;Bonnard, Lesd&rets-loisduministerePoincare en
I926, Revuedu droitpublic248 ff.(I927); Barthelemy-Duez, op. cit.supra note5,at I95 if.,
779 ff.(bibliographyon p 250, 781); Mirkine-Guetz6vitch,
op. cit. supra note I7, at 78 if.;
Jeze,L'ex&utif en tempsde guerre(1917); Carrede Malberg,op. cit.supra note 87, at 79 ff.;
Eisenmann, Die Theorievonderdelegation in derfranzosischen
legislative Rechtslehre,i
Zeitschriftfuroffentliches
Recht334ff.(I935). Foran excellent
studyofa morelimited sec-
tionoftheproblem see Jacoby,
Delegation ofPowersandJudicial Review,36 Col. L. Rev.
87I ff.(I936). Theeventual ofordinances
unconstitutionality onthebasisofthedelegation of
legislativepowers,becauseoflack ofpowersto delegate,or becauseofexcessiveapplicationof
delegatedpowers,is, of course,onlyone aspect amongmanyothersof the wholecomplexof
delegation.
95On emergencypowersprovidedforthe constitutionsee Friedrich,op. cit. supra note i,
at 208 ff.(withliteratureon p. 534); Barth6lemy-Duez,
op. cit.supra note 5, at 240 ff.;Gouet,
op. cit.supranote94, at I63 if.
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 599
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6oo THE N'IVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 601
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602 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOLAWREVIEW
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 603
In thisconnection
thepresentconstitutionalsituationin Switzerland'07
deservesspecialconsideration.Since i874, that well-balancedcountry
o16The decrets-lois,issued by the cabinet of Doumergueduring1934, were ratified,by a
close majority,as late as in February1935,whenhis successor,M. Flandin,insistedon a defi-
nite assumptionof responsibility by the chamber;see Haikal, op. cit., supra note 5, 433. On
theotherhand,theparliament,althoughthe decreesissuedby Poincar6in 1926 weredulysub-
mitted,delayed ratificationad calendasGraecas; see Barth&lemy-Duez, op. cit. supra note i,
at 781.
107 On recentconstitutional developmentsin Switzerlandsee Giacometti,Verfassungsrecht
und Verfassungspraxis, in Festgabe (Fleiner) 45 if. (1937); Spencer,op. cit. supra note 82, at
413 if.; Buell, Democratic Governments in Europe 557 ff.(I935); Tingsten,op. cit.supra note
94, at 58 if.; Battelli, Les institutionsde la democratiedirecteen droit Suisse et compare
moderne(I933); Ruck, SchweizerischesStaatsrecht(I933); Secretan,L'initiative populaire
cantonaleet la legislationde crise (I934).
See E.F. 1068.I4-I6 (d'Ernst).
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604 THE tNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 605
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6o6 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 607
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608 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW
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