Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards

Liang v. People- GR 125865, March 26, 2001

MAINPOINT: The immunity granted is not absolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official
capacity. It cannot cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name
of official duty.

FACTS: This case has its origin in two criminal Information for grave oral defamation filed
against petitioner a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian
Development Bank allegedly uttered defamatory words to Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical
staff of ADB. The Trial Court pursuant to an advice of DFA that petitioner enjoys immunity from
legal processes, dismissed the criminal Information’s against him.

ISSUE: Should the petitioner enjoy immunity against the alleged crime?

RULING: The immunity granted is not absolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official
capacity. It cannot cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name
of official duty. Immunity from legal process is only limited to with respect to acts performed by
them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.

It should be made clear that nowhere in the assailed Decision is diplomatic immunity denied, even
remotely. The issue in this case, rather, boils down to whether or not the statements allegedly made
by petitioner were uttered while in the performance of his official functions, in order for this case
to fall squarely under the provisions of Section 45 (a) of the Agreement Between the Asian
Development Bank and the Government

Effect of Unconstitutionality; Par. 2(a); Operative Fact Doctrine

Article 7, New Civil Code

De Agbayani v. PNB- 38 SCRA 429 [1971]

MAINPOINT: Counter to the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act that is suffering from
that infirmity cannot be the source of any legal right or duties, OPERATIVE FACT states that
prior to the declaration of a law as unconstitutional, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with.

FACTS: Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944,
secured by real estate mortgage. On July 13 1959 or 15 years after maturity of the loan, defendant
instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of the balance of the loan
remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against both alleging that the mortgage sought
to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity. PNB
on the other hand claims that the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from
March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent
legislative act 2 extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted
from the computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the
loan. The lower court did not find such contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of
plaintiff.

ISSUE: W/N the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act extending the Moratorium Law
before the same were declared invalid tolled the period of prescription (Effect of the declaration
of Unconstitutionality of a law)

RULING: YES. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects.

The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being
adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. Precisely because of
the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental response to the plight of the
debtors who were war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a series of cases impressive
in their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and
Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run.

The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff’s suit is thus manifest. From July 19, 1944,
when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started
by appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive period
was tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18,
1953, when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two months
and eight days. Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the
mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.

Philippine Coconut v. Republic, supra.

MAINPOINT:

FACTS: This is about consolidated petitions for review assailed and seek to annul certain issuances
of the Sandiganbayan that issued Partial Summary Judgments in its Civil Cases about a suit for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth commenced by the PCGG against Marcos and several individuals
occupied, at one time or another, as directorial or top management positions in either the Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) or the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), or
both. In rendering the assailed Partial Summary Judgments, among other issues, was that the
Sandiganbayan committed gross and irreversible error, gravely abused its judicial discretion and
flagrantly exceeded its jurisdiction as it effectively sanctioned the taking of COCOFED, et al’s
property by the respondent Republic without due process of law and through retroactive
application of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the coconut levy laws, an act that is not only
illegal and violative of the settled Operative Fact Doctrine but, more importantly, inequitable to
the coconut farmers whose only possible mistake, offense or misfortune was to follow the law.

ISSUE: Was there a violation of the settled Operative Fact Doctrine?

RULING: Yes. The Sandiganbayan gravely erred if not grossly abused its discretion when it
repeatedly disregarded, and out rightly refused to recognize, the operative facts that existed as well
as the rights that vested from the time the coconut levy laws were enacted until their declaration
of unconstitutionality in the assailed PSJs. As a result, the assailed PSJs constitute a proscribed or
forbidden retroactive application of the declaration of unconstitutionality, a taking of private
property, and an impairment of vested rights of ownership, all without due process of law.
Otherwise stated, the assailed PSJs and the assailed Resolutions effectively penalized the coconut
farmers whose only possible mistake, offense or misfortune was to follow the laws that were then
legal, valid and constitutional.

Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, GR 171101, Nov. 22, 2011
(Operative Fact Doctrine applies to unconstitutional executive act)
CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, GR 187485, Oct 8, 2013 (Operative Fact Doctrine does not
apply to a mere administrative practice; there must be a law or executive issuance)

Automatic Review; Paragraph 2 (d)

Garcia, et al. v. People- 318 SCRA 434
Facts: The Provincial Fiscal of Guimaras filed with the RTC an information charging petitioners
with murder for the killing of one Jose Estrella. After due trial, the trial court promulgated its
decision convicting petitioners of the crime charged and sentencing each of them to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. The trial court
denied the motion. Petitioners did not interpose an appeal from the decision by the filing of a notice
of appeal. Thus, the decision became final.

Issue: Whether or not the SC must automatically review a trial court’s decision convicting an
accused of a capital offense and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua

Held: It is only in cases where the penalty actually imposed is death that the trial court must
forward the records of the case to the SC for automatic review of the conviction.

As the petitioners did not file a notice of appeal or otherwise indicate their desire to appeal from
the decision convicting them of murder and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua, the
decision became final and unappealable.

Pearson v. IAC, GR 74454, Sept. 3, 1998

MAINPOINT: This Court observed that the trend has been to make the adjudication of mining
cases a purely administrative matter. Decisions of the Supreme Court on mining disputes have
recognized a distinction between (1) the primary powers granted by pertinent provisions of law
to the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (and the bureau directors) of an
executive or administrative nature, such as granting of license, permits, lease and contracts, or
approving, rejecting, reinstating or canceling applications, or deciding conflicting applications,
and (2) controversies or disagreements of civil or contractual nature between litigants which are
questions of a judicial nature that may be adjudicated only by the courts of justice. This
distinction is carried on even in Rep. Act No. 7942.

People v. Mateo- 433 SCRA 640

FACTS: The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10
counts of rape and to indemnify the complainant for actual and moral damages. Mateo appealed
to the CA. Solicitor General assailed the factual findings of the TC and recommends an acquittal
of appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue
of express provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or death.

RULING: Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or
lower but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence
that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution –
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
“(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
“x x x x x x x x x
“(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.”

It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and
it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an
intermediate appeal or review in favour of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked
absence of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are
convinced that the evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the
recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the
determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to
face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the
direct mandate to review factual issues.

People v. Duavis, GR 190681, 07 December 2011

CANNOT FIND THIS CASE

Question of Law; Paragraph 2(e)

Cebu Woman’s Club v. De la Victoria- GR 120060 [March 9, 2000]
FACTS: In a bidding held on January 7, 1994, the construction of the building was awarded by
petitioner to respondent CAMSAC represented by its President/General Manager, architect
Catalino M. Salazar. The corresponding construction contract was executed between the parties
on January 26, 1994 with a stipulation on retention fee of ten (10%) percent to be deducted by
petitioner from all progress payments to the contractor, herein respondent CAMSAC.
 On February 4, 1994, respondent CAMSAC entered into a "Sub-Contract Agreement" with
respondent Seoron to undertake the construction of the subject building. After one year,
respondent Seoron filed a complaint for "sum of money with application for a writ of preliminary
injunction" against petitioner and respondent CAMSAC anchored on the "Sub-Contract
Agreement" he entered with the latter. Respondent Seoron sought to prevent petitioner from
paying or releasing any amount to respondent CAMSAC relative to the construction of the subject
building in the event that petitioner heeds CAMSACs request for the release of the retention fee.
In the meantime, petitioner allegedly received demand-letters from the suppliers-
creditors as well as from respondent CAMSAC for the release of the 10% retention fee, hence, on
February 22, 1995, it filed before the trial court a complaint for interpleader and damages against
respondents in order for them to interplead with one another to determine their respective
rights and claims on the retention fee.
On February 23, 1995, respondent CAMSAC filed an action for sum of money and damages
against petitioner for failure of the latter to release the 10% retention fee. On March 9, 1995, the
trial court issued an Order dismissing the complaint for interpleader to prevent multiplicity of
suits, as there are pending cases before the respondent court filed by respondent Seoron for sum
of money against petitioner and respondent CAMSAC which also involved the ten (10%) retention
fee.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, petitioners
immediate resort to this Court by a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner’s direct resort to the Supreme Court is correct.

HELD: No, petitioners direct resort to this Court is erroneous. Under the Rules of Court, a party
may directly appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision of the trial court only on pure questions
of law. The case at bench does not involve pure questions of law as to entitle petitioner to seek
immediate redress from this court. A question of law arises when the doubt or difference arises
as to what the law is on a certain set of facts as distinguished from a question of fact which occurs
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. The
resolution of the interpleader case necessitates a determination of whether the other pending
cases relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the former case involves the same matters
covered by the latter cases. There is a need to determine whether the pending civil cases arise
out of the same facts and circumstances as those involved in the interpleader case.

Change of Venue; Paragraph 4

People v. Gutierrez- 36 SCRA 172 [1970]
FACTS: In 1970, a group of armed persons set fire to various inhabited houses in Ora Centro and
Ora Este, both in Bantay, Ilocos Sur. The prosecutors charged 17 men, together with 82 other
unidentified persons, with the crime of arson, at the Court of First Instance of Vigan, Ilocos Sur.
The Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing Judge Gutierrez to
transfer the criminal cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, “in the interest of justice and pursuant to
RA 5179, as implemented by AO 258 and 274.” The prosecution invoked the Administrative
Orders, since the witnesses refused to testify in the court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where they
felt their lives would be endangered:
• about 82 of the armed men are still unidentified and at large
• one of the accused, Vincent Crisologo, belongs to an influential family in the province, son of
the Congressman for the First District of Ilocos Sur and of the lady Governor
• the promotion and confirmation of Judge Gutierrez from Clerk of Court to Judge of the Court of
First Instance was actively supported by Congressman and Governor Crisologo, parents of accused
Vincent Crisologo
The accused vigorously opposed such transfer. The respondent judge declined the transfer sought,
on the ground that Administrative Order No. 226 merely authorized the court below, but did not
require or command it, to transfer the cases in question, and denied that the circumstances justified
any such transfer. The prosecution resorted to the Supreme Court for writs of certiorari and
mandamus, so the cases may be tried either at La Union or Baguio City.
ISSUES::
1. Whether the Secretary of Justice has the power to determine what court should hear specific
cases
2. Whether the Supreme Court could transfer the trial to another place
3. Whether the circumstances warrant a transfer of the trial to another place

RULING: Judge Gutierrez was correct in regarding the Administrative Orders as merely directory
rather than mandatory, but he erred in denying that the circumstances justified the transfer.
1. The Secretary of Justice has no power to determine what court should hear specific cases. Any
such power trenches upon the time-honored separation of the Executive and the Judiciary; it would
endanger the rights and immunities of the accused or civil party. It could be a means of
predetermining the outcome of individual cases, so as to produce a result in harmony with the
Administration’s preferences.
2. Judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an
effective administration of justice. The courts “can by appropriate means do all things necessary
to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of
government.” One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial
of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of
securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands. Hence,
the Supreme Court possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to transfer the trial and disposition
of a case from one court to another. [Note: this case occurred before the 1987 Constitution]
3. In this case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer of the hearing of the criminal
cases to another place in the interest of truth and justice. The fear expressed by the witnesses cannot
be considered fanciful and unfounded when account is taken of the circumstances. Such refusal
necessitates transferring the place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the State is to be given
a fair chance to present its side of the case
The requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied by the filing of the criminal case in
question with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in which province the offenses charged
were committed. The holding of the trial in a particular place is more a matter of venue, rather than
jurisdiction.

Power to Promulgate Rules; Paragraph 5

Enforcement of Constitutional Rights, Pleading, Practice, and Procedure in All Courts
First Lepanto v. CA- 231 SCRA 30 [1994]
FACTS: Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular,
1-91 issued by the Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases
decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of Investments (BOI). BOI granted petitioner
First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing
the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa
filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics,
Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for
reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA.

CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own
terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary
injunction. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA
does not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme
Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.

Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91,
"Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision
of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal
to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82
of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly
with the Supreme Court. While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have
been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already
been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27,
1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as
the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.
Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly
with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
Clearly evident in the aforequoted provision of B.P. 129 is the laudable objective of providing a
uniform procedure of appeal from decisions of all quasi-judicial agencies for the benefit of the
bench and the bar. Equally laudable is the twin objective of B.P. 129 of unclogging the docket of
this Court to enable it to attend to more important tasks, which in the words of Dean Vicente G.
Sinco, as quoted in our decision in Conde v. Intermediate Appellate Court is "less concerned with
the decisions of cases that begin and end with the transient rights and obligations of particular
individuals but is more intertwined with the direction of national policies, momentous economic
and social problems, the delimitation of governmental authority and its impact upon fundamental
rights. However, it cannot be denied that the lawmaking system of the country is far from perfect.
During the transitional period after the country emerged from the Marcos regime, the lawmaking
power was lodged on the Executive Department. The obvious lack of deliberation in the drafting
of our laws could perhaps explain the deviation of some of our laws from the goal of uniform
procedure which B.P. 129 sought to promote.
Noteworthy is the fact that presently, the Supreme Court entertains ordinary appeals only from
decisions of the Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher. Judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court only
by petition for review on certiorari within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, this being the clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that "(a)ppeals to
the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court." Thus, the right of appeal provided in E.O. 226 within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the order or decision is clearly not in consonance with the present procedure before this
Court. Only decisions, orders or rulings of a Constitutional Commission (Civil Service
Commission, Commission on Elections or Commission on Audit), may be brought to the Supreme
Court on original petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 by the aggrieved party within thirty (30)
days from receipt of a copy thereof.
Under this contextual backdrop, this Court, pursuant to its Constitutional power under Section
5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation of B.P. 129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing
the rules governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of
Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing
rules of procedure. Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a circular is not strictly a statute
or law, it has, however, the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. In Inciong
v. de Guia, a circular of this Court was treated as law. In adopting the recommendation of the
Investigating Judge to impose a sanction on a judge who violated Circular No. 7 of this Court dated
September 23, 1974, as amended by Circular No. 3 dated April 24, 1975 and Circular No. 20 dated
October 4, 1979, requiring raffling of cases, this Court quoted the ratiocination of the Investigating
Judge, brushing aside the contention of respondent judge that assigning cases instead of raffling is
a common practice and holding that respondent could not go against the circular of this Court until
it is repealed or otherwise modified, as "Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the contrary."
The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the
former grants a substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or
increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely defensible as it
seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from
decisions or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what
manner such appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with procedural aspects
which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers.
Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the BOI should be
brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the substantive right to appeal
granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI
under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue
of appeals from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different
period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive
right to appeal. Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226
insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are
concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed
directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
Lina v. Purisima- 82 SCRA 344 [1978]
FACTS: Lualhati Lina was a bookkeeper at PVB. Petitioner files for mandamus to compel
Cabanos (President of Phil. Veterans Bank) to restore Lina to her position. Lina claims she was
removed from office by Cabanos who acted in gadalej. It appeared from the annexes of the
amended petition that Lina was dismissed by Cabanos pursuant to LOI # 13 / LOI # 19 for being
notoriously undesirable. The RTC dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the removal of Lina was pursuant to LOI issued by the President pursuant
to Proclamation 1081, the validity or legality of said act is beyond the power of the courts to
review, much less modify, or reverse. This is one of the express limitations upon the power of the
Courts in GENERAL ORDER # 3 by President Marcos.

HELD: The petitionerâs right to redress is beyond dispute. When the RTC invoked General Order
#3, it was nothing short of an unwarranted abdication of judicial authority. The judge was
apparently unaware that the Court has always deemed General Order # 3 as practically inoperative
even in the light of Proclamation 1081. There is unanimity among Us in the view that it is for the
Court rather than the Executive to determine whether or not We make take cognizance of any
given case involving the validity of the acts of the Executive purportedly under the authority of
martial law proclamations.

Santero v. CFI- Cavite- 153 SCRA 728 [1965]

FACTS: Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and Simona Santero, had three children
with Felixberta Pacursa namely, Princesita, Federico and Willie (herein petitioners). He also had
four children with Anselma Diaz namely, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel (herein private
respondents). These children are all natural children since neither of their mothers was married to
their father. In 1973, Pablo Santero died.
During the pendency of the administration proceedings with the CFI-Cavite involving the estate
of the late Pablo Santero, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court
questioning the decision of CFI-Cavite granting allowance (allegedly without hearing) in the
amount of Php 2,000.00, to private respondents which includes tuition fees, clothing materials and
subsistence out of any available funds in the hands of the administrator. The petitioners opposed
said decision on the ground that private respondents were no longer studying, that they have
attained the age of majority, that all of them except for Miguel are gainfully employed, and the
administrator did not have sufficient funds to cover the said expenses.
Before the Supreme Court could act on saod petition, the private respondents filed another motion
for allowance with the CFI-Cavite which included Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito, all surnamed
Santero, as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz, praying that a sum of Php
6,000.00 be given to each of the seven children as their allowance from the estate of their father.
This was granted by the CFI-Cavite.
Later on, the CFI-Cavite issued an amended order directing Anselma Diaz, mother of private
respondents, to submit a clarification or explanation as to the additional three children included in
the said motion. She said in her clarification that in her previous motions, only the last four minor
children were included for support and the three children were then of age should have been
included since all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of their
shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing the
administrator to get back the allowance of the three additional children based on the opposition of
the petitioners.
ISSUE:
1. Are the private respondents entitled to allowance?
2. Was it proper for the court a quo to grant the motion for allowance without hearing?

RULING: Yes, they are entitled. Being of age, gainfully employed, or married should not be
regarded as the determining factor to their right to allowance under Articles 290 and 188 of the
New Civil Code.

Records show that a hearing was made. Moreover, what the said court did was just to follow the
precedent of the court which granted previous allowance and that the petitioners and private
respondents only received Php 1,500.00 each depending on the availability of funds.

Damasco v. Laqui- 166 SCRA 214 [1988]

FACTS: petitioner Atty. Eugenio S. Damasco was charged with the crime of grave threats
committed for willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threaten one Rafael K. Sumadohat with the
infliction upon his person of a wrong amounting to a crime, that is, by then and there uttering the
following remarks, to wit:
BAKIT MO AKO GINAGANITO? MAGBABAYAD KA ... PAPATAYIN KITA ... MAYROON
AKONG BARIL, BABARILIN KITA, TAGADIYAN LANG AKO.

After trial, respondent judge found that the evidence presented did not establish the crime of grave
threats but only of light threats. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Rectify and Set Aside
the dispositive part of contending that he cannot be convicted of light threats, necessarily included
in grave threats charged in the information, as the lighter offense had already prescribed when the
information was filed. He contended that the crime of light threats, which is a light offense,
prescribes in two (2) months 2 which means sixty (60) days but the information was filed after the
lapse of 71 days.

ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for respondent Judge to still convict petitioner after finding
him guilty of the lesser offense of light threats but which has already prescribed

Held: Where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the
graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it has already prescribed.
To hold otherwise, according to the Court, would be to sanction a circumvention of the law on
prescription by the simple expedient of accussing the defendant of the graver offense.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision is SET ASIDE.

Carpio v. Sulu Resources- GR 148267, August 8, 2002

FACTS: The case originated from a petition filed by Sulu Resources Development Corporation
for Mines Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), covering certain areas in Antipolo, Rizal.
Petitioner Carpio filed an opposition/adverse claim thereto, alleging that his landholdings in
Cupang and Antipolo, Rizal will be covered by respondent’s claim, thus he enjoys a preferential
right to explore and extract the quarry resources on his properties.
After due proceedings were held, the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau
of the DENR rendered a Resolution dated September 26, 1996, upholding Carpio’s
position/adverse claim. The properties of Carpio are ordered excluded from the area of MPSA of
SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.
SULU appealed the foregoing Resolution to the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). Meanwhile,
Carpio filed a motion to dismiss appeal on the ground of respondent’s failure to comply with the
requirements of he New Mining Act’s Implementing Rules and Regulations. On June 1997, the
MAB rendered the assailed Order dismissing petitioner’s opposition/adverse claim.
The CA ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review the Decision of the Mines Adjudication
Board (MAB). The adjudication of conflicting mining claims is completely administrative in
nature; Under RA 7942, the "settlement of disputes involving rights to mining areas, mineral
agreements, and surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires shall pertain
exclusively to a Panel of Arbitrators in the regional office of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, whose decisions are appealable to the Mines Adjudication Board." Under
Section 79 of RA 7942, "the findings of fact by the MAB as well as its decision or order shall be
final and executory.

ISSUE: Whether appeals from the Decision or Final Orders of the MAB should be made directly
to the Supreme Court as contended by the SULU and the Court of Appeals, or such appeals be first
made to the Court of Appeals as contended by Carpio.

RULING: In the present case, it is claimed that a petition for review is improper because
petitioner’s challenge is purely factual, bearing only on the MAB ruling that there was no overlap
or conflict between the litigants’ claims. We clarify. Factual controversies are usually involved in
administrative actions; and the CA is prepared to handle such issues because, unlike this Court, it
is mandated to rule on questions of fact.
Second, when the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, transfers to the CA
pending cases involving a review of a quasi-judicial body’s decisions, such transfer relates only to
procedure; hence, it does not impair the substantive and vested rights of the parties. The aggrieved
party’s right to appeal is preserved; what is changed is only the procedure by which the appeal is
to be made or decided.
Third, the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies.21 Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and final orders are
now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review.
Fourth, the Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 12925 as amended by RA No.
7902,26 factual controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-judicial bodies; and the
CA, which is likewise tasked to resolve questions of fact.
Fifth, the judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct resort from
administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

Baguio Market Vendors v. Hon. Cortes- GR 165922, February 26, 2010

FACTS: Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative filed a petition with RTC Baguio to
foreclose a mortgage under act 3135. This type of petition is subject to legal fees based on value
of claim. Seeking an exemption for payment of these fees, petitioner then invoked Art 62 (6) of
RA 6938 (Cooperative Code of the PH) which exempts cooperatives: from the payment of all court
and sheriff's fees payable to the Philippine Government for and in connection with all actions
brought under this Code, or where such action is brought by the Cooperative Development
Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of the
cooperative.

Respondent Judge Cortes denied request for exemption citing Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court, as amended, exempting from the Rule’s coverage only the "Republic of the Philippines,
its agencies and instrumentalities" and certain suits of local government units. She said they were
liable to pay for foreclosure fees. Reconsideration filed by petitioner denied

ISSUES: WN petitioner’s application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal fees under
Article 62(6) of RA 6938.

HELD: No. Court: Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim exemption
from the payment of legal fees in this proceeding because first, the fees imposable on petitioner
do not pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage under Act 3135. Second, petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority which
can claim exemption only in actions to enforce payments of obligations on behalf of cooperatives.
Congress cannot repeal SC rules

Additionally, the rule making power of the Court was expanded in the 1987 consti. The 1987
constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.

Also, In the En Banc ruling in Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government
Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees, the Court described its exclusive power to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure as "one of the safeguards of this Court’s
institutional independence

In re Petition for Recognition- 612 SCRA 193 [2010]

FACTS: In a Petition dated 24 October 2011, Perpetual Help Community Cooperative (PHCCI),
through counsel, requests for the issuance of a court order to clarify and implement the exemption
of cooperatives from the payment of court and sheriffs fees pursuant to Republic Act No. 6938, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9520, otherwise known as the Philippine Cooperative Act of 2008.
PHCCI contends that as a cooperative it enjoys the exemption provided for under Section 6, Article
61 of Republic Act No. 9520, which states:
(6) Cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all court and sheriffs fees payable
to the Philippine Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or
where such actions is brought by the Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of
obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.

It avers that despite the exemptions granted by the aforesaid laws and issuances, PHCCI had been
continuously assessed and required to pay legal and other fees whenever it files cases in court.
PHCCI reports that it filed with the Office of the Executive Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, a Motion to implement the exemption of
cooperatives from the payment of court and sheriffs fees in cases filed before the courts in his
jurisdiction, but the Executive Judge ruled that the matter is of national concern and should be
brought to the attention of the Supreme Court for it to come up with a straight policy and uniform
system of collection. In the meantime, the MTCC has continued the assessment of filing fees
against cooperatives.

ISSUE: Whether cooperatives are exempt from the payment of court and sheriffs fees.

RULING: Court citing Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, stressed that the 1987 Constitution
molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary; took away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure; and held that the
power to promulgate these Rules is no longer shared by the Court with Congress, more so, with
the Executive, thus:
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified
by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain. That
power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive.
xxxx
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected
an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they
enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of
exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of R.A. 8291 necessarily fails.

With the foregoing categorical pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it is evident that the
exemption of cooperatives from payment of court and sheriffs fees no longer stands. Cooperatives
can no longer invoke Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by Republic Act No. 9520, as basis for
exemption from the payment of legal fees.

In re Exemption of NPC- 615 SCRA 1 [2010]

The National Power Corporation (NPC) seeks clarification from the Court on whether or not it is
exempt from the payment of filing fees, appeal bonds and supersedeas bonds.
The Court Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, to
DECLARE that the National Power Corporation (NPC) is still exempt from the payment of filing
fees, appeals bond, and supersedeas bonds.

On October 27, 2009, however, the Court issued A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC stating that:

The Court Resolved, upon recommendation of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of
Court, to DENY the request of the National Power Corporation (NPC) for exemption from the
payment of filing fees pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended by Section
13 of Presidential Decree No. 938. The request appears to run counter to Section 5(5), Article VIII
of the Constitution, in the rule-making power of the Supreme Court over the rules on pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, which includes the sole power to fix the filing fees of cases in
courts.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Hence, the subject letter of NPC for clarification as to its exemption from the payment of filing
fees and court fees.

Section 22 of Rule 141 reads:

Sec. 22. Government exempt. The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this rule. Local government units and
government-owned or controlled corporations with or without independent charters are not exempt
from paying such fees. (emphasis supplied)

Section 70 of Republic Act No. 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001), on
privatization of NPC assets, expressly states that the NPC "shall remain as a national government-
owned and controlled corporation.cra|aw"

Thus, NPC is not exempt from payment of filing fees.

The non-exemption of NPC is further fortified by the promulgation on February 11, 2010 of A.M.
No. 08-2-01-0, In re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees. In said case, the Court, citing Echegaray
v. Secretary of Justice,1cЃa stressed that the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress
to repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure; and that the
power to promulgate these rules is no longer shared by the Court with Congress and the Executive,
thus:

Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified
by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain. That
power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less the

Speaking for the Court, then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the
history of the rule-making power of this Court and highlighted its evolution and development in
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice:

Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it
was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article
VIII provides:

Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The
existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared
Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The
Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

In re: in the matter of clarification of Exemption from payment of all Court Sheriff’s Fees
of Cooperatives, A.M. 12-2-03-0,13 March 2012-668 SCRA 1 [2012]
In a Petition[1] dated 24 October 2011, Perpetual Help Community Cooperative (PHCCI), through
counsel, requests for the issuance of a court order to clarify and implement the exemption of
cooperatives from the payment of court and sheriffs fees pursuant to Republic Act No. 6938, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9520, otherwise known as the Philippine Cooperative Act of 2008.

PHCCI contends that as a cooperative it enjoys the exemption provided for under Section 6,
Article 61 of Republic Act No. 9520, which states:

(6) Cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all court and sheriffs fees payable
to the Philippine Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or
where such actions is brought by the Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of
obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.

It claims that this was a reiteration of Section 62, paragraph 6 of Republic Act No. 6938, An Act
to Ordain a Cooperative Code of the Philippines,[2] and was made basis for the Courts Resolution
in A.M. No. 03-4-01-0, as well as of Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 44-
2007.[3]

It avers that despite the exemptions granted by the aforesaid laws and issuances, PHCCI had been
continuously assessed and required to pay legal and other fees whenever it files cases in court.

PHCCI reports that it filed with the Office of the Executive Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, a Motion to implement the exemption of
cooperatives from the payment of court and sheriffs fees in cases filed before the courts in his
jurisdiction, but the Executive Judge ruled that the matter is of national concern and should be
brought to the attention of the Supreme Court for it to come up with a straight policy and uniform
system of collection. In the meantime, the MTCC has continued the assessment of filing fees
against cooperatives.

Records reveal that on 21 September 2011, Executive Judge Antonio Estoconing (Executive Judge
Estoconing), MTCC, Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, issued an Order treating the motion filed
by PHCCI as a mere consulta considering that no main action was filed in his court. Executive
Judge Estoconing submits that he had second thoughts in considering the exemption in view of the
guidelines laid down in the Rules. He reported that many cases filed by PHCCI are small claims
cases and under Section 8 of the Rule on Small Claims, the plaintiff is required to pay docket fees
and other related costs unless he is allowed to litigate the case as an indigent.
Hence, this Petition.
Before this Court is the issue on whether cooperatives are exempt from the payment of court and
sheriffs fees. The fees referred to are those provided for under Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules
of Court.

The term all court fees under Section 6, Article 61 of Republic Act No. 9520 refers to the totality
of legal fees imposed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as an incident of instituting an action
in court. These fees include filing or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of provisional
remedies, mediation fees, sheriffs fees, stenographers fees and commissioners fees.

With regard to the term sheriffs fees, this Court, in an extended minute Resolution dated 1
September 2009, held that the exemptions granted to cooperatives under Section 2, paragraph 6 of
Republic Act No. 6938; Section 6, Article 61 of Republic Act No. 9520; and OCA Circular No.
44-2007 clearly do not cover the amount required to defray the actual travel expenses of the sheriff,
process server or other court-authorized person in the service of summons, subpoena and other
court processes issued relative to the trial of the case,[6] which are neither considered as court and
sheriffs fees nor are amounts payable to the Philippine Government.

In fine, the 1 September 2009 Resolution exempted the cooperatives from court fees but not from
sheriffs fees/expenses.

On 11 February 2010, however, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution in A.M. No. 08-
2-01-0, which denied the petition of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for
recognition of its exemption from payment of legal fees imposed under Section 22 of Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court. In the GSIS case, the Court citing Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, stressed
that the 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary; took away
the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure; and held that the power to promulgate these Rules is no longer shared by the Court with
Congress, more so, with the Executive,[10] thus:

Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified
by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain. That
power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive.

xxxx

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they
enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of
exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of R.A. 8291 necessarily fails.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees
without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Courts independence
- fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess
and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic
components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary
Fund (SAJF).[14] The laws which established the JDF and SAJF[15] expressly declare the
identical purpose of these funds to guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the
Constitution and public policy.[16] Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the
Courts financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the Courts fiscal
independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to government-
owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and
the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Courts
guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.

In a decision dated 26 February 2010 in Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative

(BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes, this Court reiterated its ruling in the GSIS case when it
denied the petition of the cooperative to be exempted from the payment of legal fees under Section
7(c) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court relative to fees in petitions for extra-judicial foreclosure.

On 10 March 2010, relying again on the GSIS ruling, the Court En Banc issued a resolution
clarifying that the National Power Corporation is not exempt from the payment of legal fees.[19]

With the foregoing categorical pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it is evident that the
exemption of cooperatives from payment of court and sheriffs fees no longer stands. Cooperatives
can no longer invoke Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by Republic Act No. 9520, as basis for
exemption from the payment of legal fees.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the petition of PHCCI requesting for this
Court to issue an order clarifying and implementing the exemption of cooperatives from the
payment of court and sheriffs fees is hereby DENIED.

The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to issue a circular clarifying that
cooperatives are not exempt from the payment of the legal fees provided for under Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court.

Sto. Tomas v. Paneda- 685 SCRA 245 [2012]

Admission to the Practice of Law, the Integrated Bar, Disciplinary Powers, and Legal Assistance
to the Underprivileged
In re Cunanan- 94 PHIL. 534 [953-1954]
Javellana v. DILG 212 SCRA 475 [1992]
Velez v. De Vera- A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006
In re letter of UP Law Faculty- 644 SCRA 543 [2011]