I.

Po, et al. vs. Dampal

SC:
In its disquisition, the DARAB held that absence of written notice to the tenant of the sale, as well as to the DAR, is
indispensable, particularly in view of Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, which
mandates that the 180-day period must be reckoned from the notice in writing upon registration of the sale.

Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389,
otherwise known as the Code of Agrarian Reform of the Philippines, provides:

Sec. 12.Lessee's right of redemption. — In case the landholding is sold to a third person
without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem
the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That where there are two or more
agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area
actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within
one hundred eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by the vendee on all
lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the sale,
and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption. The redemption price shall be
the reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale. (emphasis supplied)

The admitted lack of written notice on Dampal and the DAR thus tolled the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioners'
contention that Dampal must be considered to have had constructive knowledge thereof fails in light of
the express requirement for notice to be in writing.

II.
Grounds for Ejectment (TOP-FNS)

1. Failure to comply with terms and conditions of agreement

2. Planting of crops or the use of land for other purpose than that agreed upon
3. Failure to adopt proven farm practices to conserve land
4. Fault or negligence resulting in substantial damage
5. Non-payment of rental when due
6. Employed a sub-lessee

III.
Agricultural Activity [Sec.3(b) RA6657]
- Means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish including
the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with
such farming operations done by person whether natural or juridical.

In Luz Farms v. Sec. of DAR

Sec.3 (b) was declared unconstitutional with regards to the “raising of livestock, poultry and swine” since the use of land
is incidental and not the principal factor.

RA 7881 (effective May 1995)

- amended Sec.3(b) and removed “the raising of livestock, poultry or fish”

IV.
Number of Years for Transferability [Sec.27 RA 6657]
SECTION 27.Transferability of Awarded Lands. — Lands acquired by beneficiaries under this Act may not be sold,
transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the government, or to the LBP, or to other qualified
beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years: Provided, however, That the children or the spouse of the transferor shall
have a right to repurchase the land from the government or LBP within a period of two (2) years. Due notice of the
availability of the land shall be given by the LBP to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of the barangay
where the land is situated. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM) as herein provided, shall,
in turn, be given due notice thereof by the BARC.

If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the rights to the land may be transferred or conveyed, with
prior approval of the DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as a condition for such transfer
or conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself. Failing compliance herewith, the land shall be transferred to the LBP which
shall give due notice of the availability of the land in the manner specified in the immediately preceding paragraph.

In the event of such transfer to the LBP, the latter shall compensate the beneficiary in one lump sum for the amounts the
latter has already paid, together with the value of improvements he has made on the land.

V.
Central Mindanao Case [Sec.10(c) RA 6657]
Sec. 10.Exemptions and Exclusions. —
xxx xxx xxx
c)Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and
campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and
seedling research and pilot production center, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic
centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked
by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope
and over, except those already developed, shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.

CENTRAL MINDANAO v. DARAB

 The subject lands are exempted because they are actually, directly & exclusively used and found necessary for
school site and campus, including experimental farm stations for educational purposes and for establishing seed
and seeding research

 The construction of DARAB in Section 10 restricting the land area of CMU to its present needs overlooked the
significant factor it growth of a university in years to come. By the nature of CMU, which is a school established
to promote agriculture & industry, the need for vast tract of agriculture land for future programs of expansion is
obvious.

 While portion of CMU land was leased by Phil. Packing Corp.(now Del Monte), the agreement was prior to CARL &
was directly connected to the purpose & objectives of CMU as educational institution

 As to determination of when and what lands are found to be necessary for use of CMU, school is in best position
to resolve & answer the question. DARAB & CA have no right to substitute unless it is manifest that CMU has no
real need for land.

VI.

CONFED vs. DAR

SC:
Despite the revolutionary or non-traditional character of RA 6657, however, the chief limitations on the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, namely: (1) public use; and (2) payment of just compensation, are embodied therein as well
as in the Constitution.

With respect to "public use," the Court in Association of Small Landowners declared that the requirement of public use
had already been settled by the Constitution itself as it "calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why private
agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits. The purposes
specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and RA No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the
State adopt the necessary measures 'to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable
farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till.' That public use, as pronounced by the
fundamental law itself, must be binding on us."
 SECTION 57.Special Jurisdiction. — The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts,
unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30)
days from submission of the case for decision.

On the other hand, judicial determination of just compensation is expressly prescribed in Section 57 of RA 6657, quoted
above, as it vests on the Special Agrarian Courts original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination
of just compensation to landowners. It bears stressing that the determination of just compensation during the compulsory
acquisition proceedings of Section 16 of RA 6657 is preliminary only.

Section 57 of RA 6657 authorizes not only direct resort to the Special Agrarian Courts in cases involving petitions for the
determination of just compensation, it likewise mandates that the "Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the
Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act. " Hence, contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the Rules of
Court, including Rule 67 thereof, is not completely disregarded in the implementation of RA 6657 since the Special
Agrarian Courts, in resolving petitions for the determination of just compensation, are enjoined to apply the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court. Moreover, Section 58 of RA 6657, like Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, provides for the
appointment of commissioners by the Special Agrarian Courts: cAaETS

SECTION 58.Appointment of Commissioners. — The Special Agrarian Courts, upon their own initiative
or at the instance of any of the parties, may appoint one or more commissioners to examine,
investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute, including the valuation of properties, and to file
a written report thereof to the court.

The petitioners' contention that RA 6657 contradicts the dictum in EPZA by eliminating the appointment by the court of
commissioners to appraise the valuation of the land is, therefore, erroneous.

VII.
Agrarian Dispute [Sec.3(d) RA 6657]

SECTION 3.Definitions. — For the purpose of this Act, unless the context indicates otherwise:
xxx xxx xxx
(d)Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers'
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.

It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner
and tenant, or lessor and lessee.

ESSENTIAL REQUISITIES IN AGRARIAN DISPUTE (PSC-PPS)

1. Parties (landowner & tenants)
2. Subject matter is agricultural land
3. Consent of parties
4. Purpose is agricultural production
5. Personal cultivation by tenant
6. Sharing of harvest between parties

Isidro v. CA
- Private respondent is owner of land. Sister of private respondent allowed Isidro to occupy swampy portion subject to
condition to vacate upon demand. Failure to vacate, unlawful detainer was filed against Isidro. RTC dismissed because
land is agricultural and so agrarian.
SC:
Jurisdiction over subject matter determined from allegations of complaint. Court does not lose jurisdiction by defense of
tenancy relationship and only after hearing that, if tenancy is shown, the court should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Case
involving agri land does not automatically make such case agrarian. Six requisites were not present. There was no
contract to cultivate & petitioner failed to substantiate claim that he was paying rent for use of land.

SUPLICO v. CA
Suplico is a lessee of rice land. Private respondent was allowed by Suplico to till the land while Suplico will provide the
farm implements and thereafter Suplico was to receive cavans from the palay by way of rental. Years later, Suplico
threatened to eject priv. resp. from the property, so private respondent filed an action for damages against Suplico in
CAR. Resp. Owner intervened in case and alleged the absence of contractual relationship. Trial court declared private
respondent as agricultural lessee and confirmed by CA.

SC:
- SC found no reasons to disturb findings
1. Private respondent was in actual possession of land with family in a farmhouse just like what a farm tenant normally
would.
2. Private resp. and wife were personally plowing, planting, weeding and harvesting.
3. Management was left entirely to private respondent
4. Private respondent shared the harvest with Suplico.

MONSANTO v. ZERNA: tenancy relationship may be established verbally or writing

Sps. Zerna were charged with qualified theft for the taking of coconuts owned by petitioner. They were acquitted but
required Zerna to return P1,100 to Monsanto on the ground that Monsanto did not consent to harvest of coconut. Who is
entitled to P1,100 proceeds of copra sale. This falls under DARAB

There is Agrarian dispute:

1. Subject of dispute was taking of coconuts
2. Private respondents were overseers at the time of taking by virtue of Agreement .

tenancy relationship may be established verbally or writing, expressly or impliedly

- here there was agreement which contradicts petitioner’s contention that private respondents are mere overseers. Being
overseers does not foreclose their being tenants. Petitioner allowed respondent to plant coconut, etc. Harvests: receipts
of remittance by respondent. Petitioner is claiming the amount of P1,100 as balance from proceeds of copra sale. Private
respondents contend that this P1,100 is their compensation pursuant to tenurial arrangements. Since this amount is
intertwined with the resolution of agra dispute, CA correctly ruled that DARAB has jurisdiction. RTC has only jurisdiction
over criminal and it acted beyond when it ruled that agri tenancy between parties. This belongs to DARAB.

BEJASA v. CA
FACTS:
Candelaria owned two parcels of land, which she leased to Malabanan. Malabanan hired the Bejasas to plant on the land
and clear it, with all the expenses shouldered by Malabanan. Bejasas continued to stay on the land and did not give any
consideration for its use, be it in the form of rent or a shared harvest

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship in favor of the Bejasas

SC:
Court found that there was no tenancy relationship between the parties. There was no proof that Malabanan and the
Bejasa’s shared the harvests. Candelaria never gave her consent to the Bejasas’ stay on the land . There was no proof
that the Dinglasans gave authority to the Bejasas to be the tenant of the land in question. Not all the elements of tenancy
were met in this case. There was no proof of sharing in harvest. While Bejasa testified, SC said only Bejasa’s word was
presented to prove this. Besides testimony was suspicious because of inconsistency Bejasa testified that he agreed to
deliver 1/5 of harvest as owner’s share, yet at one time, he also mentioned that 25% was for Malabanan and 50% for
owner. Moreover, landowners never gave consent, citing Chico vs. CA , 284 534 – “self-serving statement are inadequate,
proof must be adhered”. Even assuming that landowner agreed to lease it for P20,000per year, such agreement did not
prove tenancy. Consideration should be harvest sharing.
VALENCIA v. CA
FACTS:
- Valencia is the owner of land, she leased the property for five (5)years to Fr. Andres Flores under a civil law lease
concept; lease with prohibition against subleasing or encumbering the land without Valencia’s written consent. During the
period of his lease, private respondents were instituted to cultivate without consent of Valencia. After lease, Valencia
demanded vacate but refused; Private respondents were later awarded with CLTs after they filed application with DAR;
CLTs were upheld by Exec Sec and CA.

ALMUETE v. ANDRES (Issue on Ownership)

Facts:
Almuete was in exclusive possession of subject land. Unknown to Almuete, Andres was awarded homestead patent due to
investigation report that Almuete was unknown and waived his rights; Andres also represented that Almuete sold the
property to Masiglat for radiophone set and that Masiglat sold to him for a carabao and P600. Almuete filed an action for
recovery of possession and reconveyance before trial court.

Issue is who between 2 awardees of lot has better right to property.

SC:
This is controversy relating to ownership of farmland so, beyond the ambit of agrarian dispute. No juridical tie of
landowner and tenant was alleged between petitioners and respondent. RTC was competent to try the case.

PASONG BAYABAS v. CA : “no evidence”

Development of land: converted from agricultural to residential as approved by DAR. Petitioners, claimed they are actual
tillers of land, they filed a complaint for damages alleging surreptitious conversion; priv resp denied cultivation & waiver
of rights was executed by some.

SC : no tenancy
no allegation in complaint that petitioners members are tenants; waiver of rights constitutes abandonment. No
substantial evidence that private respondent is landlord. Possession/entry is w/o knowledge of owner.
Cultivation/possession is not proven. As to the remaining twenty and more other complainants, it is unfortunate that they
have not shown that their cultivation, possession and enjoyment of the lands they claim to till have been by authority of a
valid contract of agricultural tenancy. On the contrary, as admitted in their complaint a number of them have simply
occupied the premises in suit without any specific area of tillage being primarily
mere farm helpers of their relatives

ESCARIZ v. REVILLEZA : “tenancy is not presumed”

Involving fruit on land owned by private respondent. Petitioner is claiming tenancy. DARAB considered petitioner a
tenant; CA reversed

SC: Tenancy is not presumed. There was no evidence to prove consent of parties and sharing of harvest. SC agreed with
CA that there is no evidence on record to prove the existence of the following elements: (a) the consent of the parties
and (b) the sharing of harvests.

HEIRS OF JUGALBOT V. CA
FACTS:
Jugalbot was issued EP; EP was challenged by Heirs of priv resp before DARAB and seek cancellation of title and recovery
possession; on appeal, DARAB upheld but CA reversed.

SC: Absence of tenancy relationship. The taking of property violated due process (CA was correct in pointing out that
Virginia A. Roa was denied due process because the DAR failed to send notice of the impending land reform coverage to
the proper party); no ocular inspection or any on-site fact-finding investigation and report to verify the truth of the
allegations of Nicolas Jugalbot that he was a tenant of the property. By analogy, Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals
applies to the case at bar since there was likewise a violation of due process. No concrete evidence of cultivation; No
proof was presented except for their self-serving statements. Independent evidence, aside from self-serving statements,
is needed. Plus CA findings- Jugalbot was soldier of US Army and migrated to US and returned only in 1998, wife and
daughter were residents of California. Land involved is residential and not agricultural because of zoning ordinance.
Coverage Section 4: All alienable and disposable public lands. All private lands devoted to or suitable to agriculture
Schedule of implementation – Sec. 5 “The distribution xxx shall be implemented immediately and completed within ten
years from effectivity hereof.” Sec. 63: “The initial amount needed to implement this Act for the period of ten years upon
approval hereof shall be funded from the Agrarian Reform Fund created under Sections 20 and 21 of Executive Order No.
299. xxx.”. RA 8542: amended Sec. 63 as follows: “The amount needed to implement this Act until 2008 shall be funded
from the Agrarian Reform Fund.” RA 9700, Sec. 21: “The amount needed to further implement the CARP as provided in
this Act, until June 30, 2014, upon expiration of funding under Republic Act No. 8532 and other pertinent laws, shall be
funded from the Agrarian Reform Fund and other funding sources in the amount of at least One hundred fifty billion
pesos (P150,000,000,000.00)”

SPOUSES JESUS FAJARDO and EMER FAJARDO, vs. ANITA R. FLORES

Facts:
Leopoldo delos Reyes owned a parcel of land located in Barangay Sumandig in Hacienda Buenavista, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan. In 1963, he allowed petitioner Jesus Fajardo to cultivate said land. The net harvests were divided equally
between the two until 1975 when the relationship was converted to leasehold tenancy. Per Order 2 from the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Regional Office, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, rent was provisionally fixed at 27.42
cavans per year, which Jesus Fajardo religiously complied with. From the time petitioner cultivated the land, he was
allowed by Leopoldo delos Reyes to erect a house for his family on the stony part of the land, which is the subject of
controversy. On January 26, 1988, Leopoldo delos Reyes died. His daughter and sole heir, herein respondent Anita Flores,
inherited the property. On June 28, 1991, Anita Flores and Jesus Fajardo executed an agreement, denominated as
"KASUNDUAN NG PAGHAHATI NG LUPA AT PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA MAGKABILANG PANIG." 3 This was
followed by another agreement, "KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA LUPA," executed on July 10, 1991, wherein the parties
agreed to deduct from Lot No. 2351 an area of 10,923 sq m, allotting the same to petitioner. Apparently, there was a
conflict of claims in the interpretation of the Kasunduan between Anita Flores and Jesus Fajardo, which was referred to
the DAR, Provincial Agrarian Reform Office, Baliuag, Bulacan. 4 In the Report and Recommendation dated May 3, 2000,
the Legal Officer advised the parties to ventilate their claims and counterclaims with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), Malolos, Bulacan. On December 22, 2000, a complaint for ejectment was filed by herein
respondent Anita Flores, assisted by her husband Bienvenido Flores, against petitioners with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), San Ildefonso, Bulacan. In the complaint, she alleged that, as the sole heir of the late Leopoldo delos Reyes, she
inherited a parcel of land consisting of stony land, not devoted to agriculture, and land suitable and devoted to agriculture
located in Barangay Sumandig, San Ildefonso, Bulacan; that, sometime in the 1960s, during the lifetime of Leopoldo delos
Reyes, Jesus Fajardo requested the former to allow him to work and cultivate that portion of land devoted to agriculture;
that Jesus Fajardo was then allowed to erect a house on the stony part of the land, and that the use and occupation of
the stony part of the land was by mere tolerance only; and that the land, which was divided equally between the two
parties, excluded the stony portion. In February 1999, respondent approached petitioners and verbally informed them of
her intention to repossess the stony portion, but
petitioners refused to heed the request.

Issue:
Whether or not MTC or the DARAB which has jurisdiction over the case.

Held:
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship,
or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries,
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor
and lessee. It relates to any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. Undeniably, the
instant case involves a controversy regarding tenurial arrangements. The contention that the Kasunduans, which allegedly
terminated the tenancy relationship between the parties and, therefore, removed the case from the ambit
of R.A. No. 6657, is untenable. There still exists an agrarian dispute because the controversy involves the home lot of
petitioners, an incident arising from the landlord-tenant relationship. "Indeed, section 21 of the Republic Act No. 1199,
provides that 'all cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by a third party and/or the settlement
and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of landlord and tenant . . . shall be under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.' This jurisdiction does not require the continuance of the
relationship of landlord and tenant — at the time of the dispute. The same may have arisen, and often times arises,
precisely from the previous termination of such relationship. If the same existed immediately, or
shortly, before the controversy and the subject-matter thereof is whether or not said relationship has been lawfully
terminated, or if the dispute springs or originates from the relationship of landlord and tenant, the litigation is (then)
cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations . . ."
In the case at bar, petitioners' claim that the tenancy relationship has been terminated by the Kasulatan is of no moment.
As long as the subject matter of the dispute is the legality of the termination of the relationship, or if the dispute
originates from such relationship, the case is cognizable by the DAR, through the DARAB. The severance of the tenurial
arrangement will not render the action beyond the ambit of an agrarian dispute.

VICENTE ADRIANO vs. ALICE TANCO

Facts:
On December 18, 1975, respondent Alice Tanco (Alice) purchased a parcel of land consisting of 28.4692 hectares located
in Norzagaray, Bulacan. The land was devoted to mango plantation. Later on, it was partitioned among the respondents.
Controversy arose when Alice sent to Vicente a letter 6 dated January 16, 1995 informing him that subject landholding is
not covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). She asked him to vacate the property as soon as
possible. Seeing the letter of Alice as a threat to his peaceful possession of subject farmland which might impair his
security of tenure as a tenant, Vicente filed before the regional office of DARAB in Region III a Complaint for Maintenance
of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He averred
that in 1970, Arsenio Tanco (Arsenio), the husband of Alice, instituted him as tenant-caretaker of the entire mango
plantation. Since then, he has been performing all phases of farm works, such as clearing, pruning, smudging, and
spraying of the mango trees. The fruits were then divided equally between them. He also alleged that he was allowed to
improve and establish his home at the old building left by Ang Tibay Shoes located at the middle of the plantation.
Presently, he is in actual possession of and continues to cultivate the land.

In their Answer, respondents denied having instituted any tenant on their property. They stressed that Vicente never
worked and has no employer-employee relationship with Geraldine, Ronald, and Patrick. Insofar as Alice is concerned,
respondents asserted that Vicente is not a tenant but a mere regular farm worker.

Issue:
WHETHER or not VICENTE IS A BONA FIDE tenant.

Held:
Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once they agree, expressly or
impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner, as a result of which relationship the
tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land. The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot
be presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. For tenancy
relationship to exist, the following essential requisites must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the
parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (6) there is sharing
of the harvests between the parties. 25 All the requisites must concur in order to establish the existence of tenancy
relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites is fatal.

After a thorough evaluation of the records of this case, we affirm the findings of the CA that the essential requisites of
consent and sharing are lacking.

The essential element of consent is sorely missing because there is no proof that the landowners recognized Vicente, or
that they hired him, as their legitimate tenant. And, although Vicente claims that he is a tenant of respondents'
agricultural lot in Norzagaray, Bulacan, and that he has continuously cultivated and openly occupied it, no evidence was
presented to establish the presence of consent other than his self-serving statements. These cannot suffice because
independent and concrete evidence is needed to prove consent of the landowner.

Likewise, the essential requisite of sharing of harvests is lacking. Independent evidence, such as receipts, must be
presented to show that there was sharing of the harvest between the landowner and the tenant. 28 Self-serving
statements are not sufficient. Here, there was no evidence presented to show sharing of harvest in the context of a
tenancy relationship between Vicente and the respondents. The only evidence submitted to establish the purported
sharing of harvests were the allegations of Vicente which, as discussed above, were self-serving and have no evidentiary
value. Moreover, petitioner's allegations of continued possession and cultivation do not support his cause. It is settled that
mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not automatically convert a tiller or farm worker into an
agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws. 30 It is essential that, together with the other requisites of tenancy
relationship, the agricultural tenant must prove that he transmitted the landowner's share of the harvest.

Neither can we agree with the DARAB's theory of implied tenancy because the landowner never acquiesced to Vicente's
cultivating the land. Besides, for implied tenancy to arise it is necessary that all the essential requisites of tenancy must
be
present.

ESTATE OF PASTOR M. SAMSON vs. MERCEDES R. SUSANO

Facts:
Pastor M. Samson (Pastor) owned a 1.0138-hectare parcel of land known as Lot 1108 of the Tala Estate Subdivision
located
in Bagumbong, Caloocan City. Pastor was approached by his friend Macario Susano (Macario) who asked for permission
to occupy a portion of Lot 1108 to build a house for his family. Since Pastor was godfather to one of Macario's children,
Pastor acceded to Macario's
request. Macario and his family occupied 620 square meters of Lot 1108 and devoted the rest of the land to palay
cultivation. Herein respondents, Macario's wife Mercedes R. Susano and their son Norberto R. Susano, insist that while no
agricultural leasehold contract was executed by Pastor and Macario, Macario religiously paid 15 cavans of palay per
agricultural year to Pastor, which rent was reduced by Pastor in 1986 to 8 cavans of palay per agricultural year. Pastor
subdivided Lot 1108 into three portions of which he sold portions of it without Macario's knowledge. Pastor sold 2,552
square meters of Lot 1108-A to spouses Felix Pacheco and Juanita Clamor, allegedly also without Macario's knowledge
and consent.

According to respondents, no written notice was sent by Pastor to Macario prior to the sale to Chan of Lot 1108-C
comprising an area of 6,696 square meters. They aver that Macario came to know of the transaction only after Chan
visited the property sometime in October 1990 accompanied by an employee from the city government.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a tenancy relation between Pastor Samson and Macario Susano and in binding herein
petitioner.

Held:
We find in favor of petitioners. Applying our pronouncement in Levardo v. Yatco, we rule that the subject land cannot be
subject to the OLT program of P.D. No. 27 for two reasons: first, the subject land is less than seven hectares; and
second, respondents failed to show that Pastor owned other agricultural lands in excess of seven hectares or urban land
from which he derived adequate income, as required by Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474. Moreover, the DAR
Memorandum on the "Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners" dated July 10, 1975 is explicit:

Tenanted rice and/or corn lands seven (7) hectares or less shall not be covered by Operation Land Transfer. The relation
of the land owner and tenant-farmers in these areas shall be leasehold . . .

However, while the disputed landholding which had an original aggregate area of only 1.0138 hectares is not covered by
the OLT program, the same may still be covered by P.D. No. 27, albeit under its Operation Land Leasehold (OLL)
program. The OLL program placed landowners and tenants of agricultural land devoted to rice and corn into a leasehold
relationship as of October 21, 1972. 54 But the fact that Macario, respondents' predecessor-in-interest, was a de jure
tenant must be established.

In the case at bar, while the RARAD, DARAB and the CA are unanimous in their conclusion that an implied tenancy
relationship existed between Pastor Samson and Macario Susano, no specific evidence was cited to support such
conclusion other than their observation that Pastor failed to protest Macario's possession and cultivation over the subject
land for more than 30 years. Contrary to what is required by law, however, no independent and concrete evidence were
adduced by respondents to prove that there was indeed consent and sharing of harvests between Pastor and Macario.

It has been repeatedly held that occupancy and cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make one a de jure
tenant. Independent and concrete evidence is necessary to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvest, or consent of
the landowner. Substantial evidence necessary to establish the fact of sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere scintilla of
evidence; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate to prove the element of sharing. To prove sharing of
harvests, a receipt or any other credible evidence must be presented, because self-serving statements are inadequate.
Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed; the elements for its existence are explicit in law and cannot be done away
with by conjectures. Leasehold relationship is not brought about by the mere congruence of facts but, being a legal
relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be primordial. For implied tenancy to arise it is
necessary that all the essential requisites of tenancy must be present.
The affidavits executed by three of respondents' neighbors are insufficient to establish a finding of tenancy relationship
between Pastor and Macario.

JUAN GALOPE vs. CRESENCIA BUGARIN

Facts:
Respondent owns a parcel of land. Petitioner farms the land.

In Barangay Case No. 99-6, respondent complained that she lent the land to petitioner in 1992 without an agreement,
that what she receives in return from petitioner is insignificant, and that she wants to recover the land to farm it on her
own. Petitioner countered that respondent cannot recover the land yet for he had been farming it for a long time and that
he pays rent ranging from P4,000 to P6,000 or 15 cavans of palay per harvest. The case was not settled. Represented by
Celso Rabang, respondent filed a petition for recovery of possession, ejectment and payment of rentals before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), docketed as DARAB Case No. 9378. Rabang claimed that
respondent lent the land to petitioner in 1991 and that the latter gave nothing in return as a sign of gratitude or
monetary consideration for the use of the land. Rabang also claimed that petitioner mortgaged the land to Jose Allingag
who allegedly possesses the land.

Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the petition and ruled that petitioner is a tenant entitled to security of tenure. The
Adjudicator said substantial evidence prove the tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondent. The Adjudicator
noted the certification of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) that petitioner is the registered farmer of the land;
that Barangay Tanods said that petitioner is the tenant of the land; that Jose Allingag affirmed petitioner's possession and
cultivation of the land; that Allingag also stated that petitioner hired him only as farm helper; and that respondent's own
witness, Cesar Andres, said that petitioner is a farmer of the land.

The DARAB found no tenancy relationship between the parties and stressed that the elements of consent and sharing are
not present. The DARAB noted petitioner's failure to prove his payment of rentals by appropriate receipts, and said that
the affidavits of Allingag, Rolando Alejo and Angelito dela Cruz are self-serving and are not concrete proof to rebut the
allegation of nonpayment of rentals. The DARAB added that respondent's intention to lend her land to petitioner cannot
be taken as implied tenancy for such lending was without consideration.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship

Held:
The matter of rental receipts is not an issue given respondent's admission that she receives rentals from petitioner. To
recall, respondent's complaint in Barangay Case No. 99-6 was that the rental or the amount she receives from petitioner
is not much. 14 This fact is evident on the record 15 of said case which is signed by respondent and was even attached
as Annex "D" of her DARAB petition. Consequently, we are thus unable to agree with DARAB's ruling that the affidavits of
witnesses that petitioner pays 15 cavans of palay or the equivalent thereof in pesos as rent are not concrete proof to
rebut the allegation of nonpayment of rentals. Indeed, respondent's admission confirms their statement that rentals are in
fact being paid. Such admission belies the claim of respondent's representative, Celso Rabang, that petitioner paid
nothing for the use of the land.

Respondent's act of allowing the petitioner to cultivate her land and receiving rentals therefor indubitably show her
consent to an unwritten tenancy agreement. An agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by the explicit provisions
of a written contract alone. Section 5 18 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist upon an oral agreement.

Thus, all the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are present. Respondent is the landowner; petitioner is her
tenant. The subject matter of their relationship is agricultural land, a farm land. 19 They mutually agreed to the
cultivation of the land by petitioner and share in the harvest. The purpose of their relationship is clearly to bring about
agricultural production. After the harvest, petitioner pays rental consisting of palay or its equivalent in cash. Respondent's
motion to supervise harvesting and threshing, processes in palay farming, further confirms the purpose of their
agreement. Lastly, petitioner's personal cultivation of the land 21 is conceded by respondent who likewise never denied
the fact that they share in the harvest.

VIII.
Agricultural Land Sec.3(c) RA 6657
SECTION 3.Definitions. — For the purpose of this Act, unless the context indicates otherwise:
xxx xxx xxx
(c)Agricultural Land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified
as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.

Alangilan v. Office of President

SC: It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was classified as agricultural, reserved for residential in
1982, and was reclassified as residential-1 in 1994. However, contrary to petitioner's assertion, the term reserved
for residential does not change the nature of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural. As aptly explained by
the DAR Secretary, the term reserved for residential simply reflects the intended land use. It does not denote that
the property has already been reclassified as residential, because the phrase reserved for residential is not a land
classification category. Indubitably, at the time of the effectivity of the CARL in 1988, the subject landholding was
still agricultural. This was bolstered by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had to pass an Ordinance in
1994, reclassifying the landholding as residential-1. If, indeed, the landholding had already been earmarked for
residential use in 1982, as petitioner claims, then there would have been no necessity for the passage of the
1994 Ordinance.

IX.
Justification of Extraordinary Expropriation

Assoc. of Small Landowners vs. Sec. of Agrarian Reform

We do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation
where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific
and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. The expropriation before us
affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum
retention limits allowed their owners. Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be
tremendous.

The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because
payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value
equivalent to the amount of just compensation.

Therefore, payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money.

X.
Land Acquisition [Sec.16 RA6657]
SECTION 16.Procedure for Acquisition and Distribution of Private Lands. — For purposes of acquisition of private lands,
the following procedures shall be followed:

(a)After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to
acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the same in a
conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is
located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding value in accordance with
the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent provisions hereof.

(b)Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered
mail, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or
rejection of the offer.

(c)If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) shall pay the
landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed
of transfer in favor of the Government and surrenders the Certificate of Title and other monuments of
title.
 (d)In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to
determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested
parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the
receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for
decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.

(e)Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response
from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the
redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.

(f)Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for
final determination of just compensation.

Heirs of Deleste vs LBP

HELD:
On the violation of petitioners' right to due process of law Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is
subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of
law was violated.

We agree with petitioners. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform
program cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod with the essential requirements of
administrative due process of law.

It was incumbent upon the DAR to notify Deleste, being the landowner of the subject property. It should be noted that
the deed of sale executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste was registered on March 2, 1954, and such registration serves as
a constructive notice to the whole world that the subject property was already owned by Deleste by virtue of the said
deed of sale. In Naval v. CA, this Court held:

Applying the law, we held in Bautista v. Fule that the registration of an instrument involving unregistered land in the
Registry of Deeds creates constructive notice and binds third person who may subsequently deal with the same property.
It bears stressing that the principal purpose of registration is "to notify other persons not parties to a contract that a
transaction involving the property has been entered into." 64 There was, therefore, no reason for DAR to feign ignorance
of the transfer of ownership over the subject property.

Moreover, that DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to the Nanamans, is bolstered by the fact that the
tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was already canceled and a new one issued in the name of Deleste. Although tax
declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are nonetheless "good
indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is
not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession."

Petitioners' right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the
subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program.

LBP vs Trinidad
Facts:
Private respondent is the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land situated in Sampao, Kapalong, Davao del Norte
with an approximate area of 37.1010 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-49200, 14.999 hectares of
which was covered by RA No. 6657 through the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) scheme of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP).

Private respondent offered to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) the price of P2,000,000.00 per hectare for said
portion of the land covered by CARP.

Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued and offered as just compensation for said 14.999 hectares the
amount of P1,145,806.06 or P76,387.57 per hectare. The offer was rejected by private respondent.
In accordance with Section 16 of RA No. 6657, petitioner LBP deposited for the account of private respondent
P1,145,806.06 in cash and in bonds as provisional compensation for the acquisition of the property. Thereafter, the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB), through the Regional Adjudicator (RARAD) for Region XI conducted summary administrative
proceedings under DARAB Case No. LV-XI-0330-DN-2002 to fix the just compensation. On June 26, 2002, the DARAB
rendered a decision fixing the compensation of the property at P10,294,721.00 or P686,319.36 per hectare.

Petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision but the same was denied on September 4, 2002.
Petitioner LBP filed a petition against private respondent for judicial determination of just compensation before the Special
Agrarian Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, docketed as DAR Case No. 78-2002, which is the subject of
this petition.

Private respondent, on the other hand, filed a similar petition against DAR before the same Special Agrarian Court
docketed as DAR Case No. 79-2002, to which petitioner LBP filed its answer and moved for the dismissal of the petition
for being filed out of time.

Private respondent filed a Motion for Delivery of the Initial Valuation praying that petitioner LBP be ordered to deposit the
DARAB determined amount of P10,294,721.00 in accordance with the Supreme Court ruling in "Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, Pedro L. Yap, Et Al., G.R. No. 118712, October 6, 1995".

Petitioner LBP filed a Manifestation praying that the amount of the deposit should only be the initial valuation of the
DAR/LBP in the amount of P1,145,806.06 and not P10,294,721.00 as determined by the DARAB.

On December 12, 2002, public respondent rendered the assailed resolution ordering petitioner LBP to deposit for release
to the private respondent the DARAB determined just compensation of P10,294,721.00.

On December 13, 2002, petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order to deposit.

On December 17, 2002, private respondent filed a motion to cite Romeo Fernando Y. Cabanal and Atty. Isagani
Cembrano, manager of petitioner LBP's Agrarian Operations Office in Region XI and its handling lawyer, respectively, for
contempt for failure to comply with the order to deposit.

After the filing of private respondent's comment to the motion for reconsideration and petitioner LBP's explanation and
memorandum to the motion for reconsideration, public respondent rendered the assailed resolution dated February 17,
2003, denying petitioner LBP's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner LBP filed a motion to admit a second motion for reconsideration which still remains unacted upon by public
respondent.

ISSUE:
The lone issue in this controversy is the correct amount of provisional compensation which the LBP is required to deposit
in the name of the landowner if the latter rejects the DAR/LBP's offer. Petitioner maintains it should be its initial valuation
of the land subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) while respondent claims it pertains to the sum awarded by the
PARAD/RARAD/DARAB in a summary administrative proceeding pending final determination by the courts.

HELD:
Section 16 of R.A. No. 6657 reads:

(d)In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the
just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above
period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is
submitted for decision.

(e)Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds
in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of
Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall
thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
We find the foregoing as a strained interpretation of a simple and clear enough provision on the procedure governing
acquisition of lands under CARP, whether under the compulsory acquisition or VOS scheme. Indeed, it would make no
sense to mention anything about the provisional deposit in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) — the landowner is sent a notice
of valuation to which he should reply within a specified time, and in sub-paragraph (c) — when the landowner accepts
the offer of the DAR/LBP as compensation for his land. Sub-paragraph (d) provides for the consequence of the
landowner's rejection of the initial valuation of his land, that is, the conduct of a summary administrative proceeding for a
preliminary determination by the DARAB through the PARAD or RARAD, during which the LBP, landowner and other
interested parties are required to submit evidence to aid the DARAB/RARAD/PARAD in the valuation of the subject land.
Sub-paragraph (e), on the other hand, states the precondition for the State's taking of possession of the landowner's
property and the cancellation of the landowner's title, thus paving the way for the eventual redistribution of the land to
qualified beneficiaries: payment of the compensation (if the landowner already accepts the offer of the DAR/LBP) or
deposit of the
provisional compensation (if the landowner rejects or fails to respond to the offer of the DAR/LBP). Indeed, the CARP Law
conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.

LBP vs Pagayatan
Facts:
On October 21, 1972, the 3,682.0286-hectare Suntay Estate, consisting of irrigated/unirrigated rice and corn lands
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31(1326) located in the Barangays of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, Sta. Lucia, and
San Nicolas in Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, was subjected to the operation of Presidential Decree No. 27, under its
Operation Land Transfer (OLT), with the farmer-beneficiaries declared as owners of the property. However, a 300-hectare
portion of the land was subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) instead of the OLT. Thus,
Certificates of Landownership Award were issued to the farmer-beneficiaries in possession of the land. 5 Such application
of the CARP to the 300-hectare land was later the subject of a case before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudicatory Board (DARAB), which ruled that the subject land should have been the subject of OLT instead of CARP. The
landowner admitted before the PARAD that said case was pending with this Court and docketed as G.R. No. 108920,
entitled Federico Suntay v. Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, the owner of the land remained unpaid for the property. Thus, Josefina S. Lubrica, in her capacity as assignee
of the owner of the property, Federico Suntay, filed a Petition for Summary Determination of Just Compensation with the
PARAD, docketed as Case No. DCN-0405-0022-2002. Thereafter, the PARAD issued its Decision dated March 21, 2003,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1.Fixing the preliminary just compensation for 431.1407 hectare property at P166,150.00 per hectare or a total of
P71,634,027.30.
2.Directing the Land Bank of the Philippines to immediately pay the aforestated amount to the Petitioner.
3.Directing the DAR to immediately comply with all applicable requirements so that the subject property may be formally
distributed and turned over to the farmer beneficiaries thereof, in accordance with the Decision of the DARAB Central in
DARAB Case No. 2846.

The LBP then filed a Petition dated March 4, 2004 with the RTC docketed as Agrarian Case No. 1390, appealing the
PARAD Decision. In the Petition, the LBP argued that because G.R. No. 108920 was pending with this Court in relation to
the 300- hectare land subject of the instant case, the Petition for Summary Determination of Just Compensation filed
before the PARAD was premature. The LBP argued further that the PARAD could only make an award of up to PhP5
million only. The PARAD, therefore, could not award an amount of PhP71,634,027.30. The LBP also contended that it
could not satisfy the demand for payment of Lubrica, considering that the documents necessary for it to undertake a
preliminary valuation of the property were still with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).

ISSUE:
What is the proper amount to be deposited under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657? Is it the PARAD/DARAB
determined valuation or the preliminary valuation as determined by the DAR/LBP?

HELD:
The LBP posits that under Sec. 16 (e) of RA 6657, and as espoused in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, it
is the purchase price offered by the DAR in its notice of acquisition of the land that must be deposited in an accessible
bank in the name of the landowner before taking possession of the land, not the valuation of the PARAD. The Court
agrees with the LBP.

Conspicuously, there is no mention of the PARAD in the foregoing Sec. 16 (e) when it speaks of "the deposit with an
accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds in accordance with this Act." Moreover,
it is only after the DAR has made its final determination of the initial valuation of the land that the landowner may resort
to the judicial determination of the just compensation for the land. Clearly, therefore, it is the initial valuation made by
the DAR and LBP that is contained in the letter-offer to the landowner under Sec. 16 (a), said valuation of which must be
deposited and released to the landowner prior to taking possession of the property.

It is clear from Sec. 16 of RA 6657 that it is the initial valuation made by the DAR and the LBP that must be released to
the landowner in order for DAR to take possession of the property. Otherwise stated, Sec. 16 of RA 6657 does not
authorize the release of the PARAD's determination of just compensation for the land which has not yet become final and
executory.

XI.
RA 6657 Applies Instead of PD 27 for Determining Just Compensation

LBP v. Dumlao
Facts:
Respondents are owners of agri lands covered under PD 27; Determination of just compensation remained
pending with DAR, so they filed complaint with RTC for determination.

SC:
If just compensation was not settled prior to the passage of RA No. 6657, it should be computed in accordance
with said law, although property was acquired under PD No. 27; the determination made by the trial court, which relied
solely on the formula prescribed by PD No. 27 and EO No. 228, is grossly erroneous. The amount of P6,912.50 per
hectare, which is based on the DAR valuation of the properties "at the time of their taking in the 1970s", does not come
close to a full and fair equivalent of the property taken from respondents; CA's act of setting just compensation in the
amount of P109,000.00 would have been a valid exercise of this judicial function, had it followed the mandatory formula
prescribed by RA No. 6657. However, the appellate court merely chose the lower of two (2) values specified by the
commissioner as basis for determining just compensation, namely: (a) P109,000.00 per hectare as the market value of
first class unirrigated rice land in the Municipality of Villaverde; and (b) P60.00 per square meter as the zonal value of the
land in other barangays in Villaverde. This is likewise erroneous because it does not adhere to the formula provided by RA
No. 6657.

It cannot be overemphasized that the just compensation to be given to the owner cannot be assumed and must be
determined with certainty.

Section 17 was converted into a formula by the DAR through AO No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by AO No. 11, Series
of 1994:

Basic formula (Voluntary Offer to Sell) or [Compulsory Acquisition] regardless of the date of offer or coverage of the
claim:

LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)

Where:
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and applicable.

Note:
1. PD 27: uses average crop harvest as a consideration;
RA 6657: factors for consideration in determining just compensation.
2. RA 6657 for lands covered by PD 27 and just compensation has not been determined at the time of passage of RA
6657 applies because PD 27 and EO 228 have only suppletory effect.

Take into account the nature of land (i.e., irrigated), market value, assessed value at the time of the taking, location (i.e.,
along highway) and the volume and value of its produce, like:
(a) prevailing market value of in the area and adjacent areas;
(b) presence and availability of an irrigation system to augment and increase agricultural production;
(c) available comparable sales in the area;
(d) average harvests per hectare.

The date of taking of the subject land for purposes of computing just compensation should be reckoned from the
issuance dates of the emancipation patents.

 Why? EP constitutes the conclusive authority for the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the
grantee. It is from the issuance of an emancipation patent that the grantee can acquire the vested right of
ownership in the landholding, subject to the payment of just compensation to the landowner.

However, their issuance dates are not shown. As such, the trial court should determine the date of issuance of these
emancipation patents in order to ascertain the date of taking and proceed to compute the just compensation due to
respondents.

Petitioner’s argument that respondents should not be paid yet pending determination by DAR is specious.

To wait for the DAR valuation despite its unreasonable neglect and delay in processing is to violate the elementary rule
that payment of just compensation must be within a reasonable period from the taking of property; Citing Cosculluela v.
CA, just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but
also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land
while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss

XII.
Ways of Distributing Land
1. Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) (Sec.20)
2. Compulsory Acquisition (Sec.16)
3. Non-Land Transfer Scheme
a. Leasehold (Sec.12)
b. Stock Distribution Option (SDO)
c. Production & Profit Sharing (Sec.13)

DAR Adm. Order No. 2-06 (The Institutionalization of Leasehold System)

RA 6389 automatically converted share tenancy throughout the country into agricultural leasehold relationship
1. abolition of share tenancy now covers all agricultural landholdings without exceptions
2. the conversion of share tenancy into leasehold is mandated by law.
3. All share-crop tenants were automatically converted into agricultural lessees as of june 15, 1988 whether or not a
leasehold agreement has been executed
4. Leaseholders security of tenure shall be respected and guaranteed.

 Share tenancy has been abolished and the leasehold system has been institutionalized.

XIII.
Homestead Grantees [Sec.6 RA6657]
SECTION 6.Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or
indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable
family-size farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1)
that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm:
Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the
areas originally retained by them thereunder: Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or their direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas
as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner:
Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the
option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or
comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and
shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural
land, he loses his right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option
within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.

In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farmworkers on the land prior to the approval of this Act shall be
respected.

Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management, contract or transfer of possession of private
lands executed by the original landowner in violation of this Act shall be null and void: Provided, however, That those
executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3)
months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Registers of Deeds shall inform the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) within thirty (30) days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares.