Tanada vs Tuvera (136 SCRA 27)
therewith”.
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in
compelling respondent public officials to
publish and/ or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letter of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus
is that it “would be granted to a private
individual only in those cases where he has
some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds
with the public at large," and "it is for the
public officers exclusively to apply for the writ
when public rights are to be subserved”.
The legal capacity of a private citizen was
recognized by court to make the said petition
for the reason that the right sought to be
enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental
law of the land.
ISSUE: Whether publication in the Official
Gazette is still required considering the clause
in Article 2 “unless otherwise provided”.
HELD:
“Unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the
date of effectivity and not with the publication
requirement which cannot be omitted as public
needs to be notified for the law to become
effective. The necessity for the publication in
the Official Gazette of all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general
application, was affirmed by the court on April
24, 1985. This is necessary to provide the
general public adequate notice of the various
laws which regulate actions and conduct as
citizens. Without this, there would be no basis
for Art 3 of the Civil Code “Ignorance of the
law excuses no one from compliance
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders
respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force
and effect.
Acaac v. Azcuna, G.R. No. 187378
A petition for review on Certiorari assailing the
ruling of the Court of Appeals. The case lasted
11 years.
SUMMARY. The petitioners filed an action
praying for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, injunction, and damages
against the respondents, alleging that they
have prior vested rights to occupy and utilize
Capayas Island, while also assailing the
validity of the subject ordinance adopted by
the respondents that prohibits entry and
building of structures in the disputed property.
The case was about the validity of the subject
ordinance as questioned by the petitioners,
based on grounds of adoption without public
consultation, publication, and approval by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
MAIN DOCTRINE. In accordance with the
presumption of validity in favor of an
ordinance, their constitutionality or legality
should be upheld in the absence of evidence
showing that the procedure prescribed by law
was not observed in their enactment. We also
have a right to assume that officials have done
that which the law requires them to do, in the
absence of positive proof to the contrary.
FACTS
 The petitioner, Ramonito O. Acaac, was the
founder of the NGO called PETAL. PETAL
 built cottages on Capayas Island, which it
rented out to the public and became the
source of livelihood of its beneficiaries.
 On April 11 and May 20, 2002, respondents
Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. and
Building Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued
separate Notices of Illegal Construction
against PETAL, ordering it to stop all illegal
activities on the island due to the absence of
a building permit. There was a third and final
notice sent on July 8, 2002 but the same
remained unheeded.
 On the same date, the Sangguniang Bayan
of Lopez Jaena adopted a subject ordinance,
which prohibited the entry of any entity and
the construction of any structures in the area
of Capayas Island which Mayor Azcuna, Jr,
adopted on July 12, 2002. On August 23,
2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was
served upon PETAL directing it to remove the
structures it built since it was a violation of
the subject ordinance.
 On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an
action against the respondents before the
RTC alleging that they have prior vested
rights to occupy and utilize Capayas Island,
while also assailing the validity of the subject
ordinance on the grounds that it was
adopted without public consultation, it was
not published in a newspaper of general
circulation, and it was not approved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
 On November 26, 2004, the RTC declared
the subject ordinance as invalid/void on the
same grounds that the petitioners laid down.
 On the contrary, according to the CA, the
subject ordinance was deemed approved1
upon failure of the SP to declare the same
invalid within 30 days. It also gave credence
to the respondent that the subject ordinance
was posted and published and that public
consultations were conducted before the
subject ordinance was passed.
 The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration on March 9, 2009. Thus, the
instant petition.
ISSUES
1
Section 56 of the Local Government Code
1. Whether or not the subject
ordinance is valid and enforceable
against petitioners
HELD
Yes. Section 56 of the LGC (d) provides that,
“if no action has been taken by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan within 30 days
after submission of such an ordinance or
resolution, the same shall be presumed
consistent with law and therefore valid.” In
this case, petitioners maintain the subject
ordinance cannot be deemed approved
through the mere passage of time. It,
however, bears to note that more than 30 days
have already elapsed from the time the subject
ordinance was submitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for review by the Sangguniang
Bayan. Hence, it should be deemed approved
and valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) of the
Local Government Code. While Sec. 59 of
Republic Act No. 7160 or “The Local
Government Code” required the main features
of ordinances duly enacted or adopted be
published in a newspaper of general
circulation, Petitioners failed to present any
evidence to show that no publication of the
subject ordinance was made. In accordance
with the presumption of validity in favor of an
ordinance, their constitutionality or legality
should be upheld in the absence of evidence
showing that the procedure prescribed by law
was not observed in their enactment. Likewise,
petitioners had the burden of proving their
own allegation, which they, however, failed to
do. All told, the Court finds on reversible error
committed by the CA in upholding the validity
of the subject ordinance.
NOTES
 SB forwards the approved ordinance to
SP within 3 days after approval
 July 8, 2002 – SB adopted ordinance;
July12, 2002 – Azcuna, Jr. adopted
ordinance; August 23, 2002 –
respondents sent Notice of Voluntary
Demolition to petitioners (more than 30
 days after the adoption of ordinance, no
action from SP).
 RTC added that the authority and
control over Capayas Island belong to
the DENR, but the appellate Court ruled
that the Municipality of Lopez Jaena
was vested with sufficient power and
authority to pass and adopt the subject
ordinance (Sec 447 in relation to Sec.
16 of the LGC).
 All the courts ruled that PETAL have no
proprietary rights over the Capayas
island due to absence of building permit
and title.
 Petitioners had the burden of proving
their own allegations.
 We have a right to assume that officials
have done that which the law requires
them to do, in the absence of positive
proof to the contrary.
NMSMI v. Military Shrine, G.R. No.
187587, June 5, 2013
FACTS:
IN 1957, President Carlos Garcia issued
Proclamation No. 423, reserving parcels of
land in Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Rizal, and
Pasay City as a military reservation, more
commonly known as Fort Bonifacio.
In 1967, President Ferdinand Marcos amended
Proclamation No. 423 and reserved a portion
of Fort Bonifacio for a national shrine. Today,
this area is known as Libingan ng mga Bayani.
In 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No.
423 by excluding certain barangays in Lower
Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from
forming part of the military reservation. At the
bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President
Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which
read: “P.S.—This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos.” That same year,
Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the
Official Gazette without the addendum.
In 1999, members of Nagkakaisang Maralita
ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a
petition with the Commission on Settlement of
Land Problems (COSLAP) to convert the areas
they were occupying in Western Bicutan from
public land to alienable land pursuant to
Proclamation No. 2476. COSLAP granted the
request, ruling that despite the lack of
publication of the addendum, the “intention of
President Marcos could not be defeated by the
negligence or inadvertence of others.”
The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
decision of COSLAP. On appeal, the Supreme
Court (SC) sustained the CA. It ruled that the
“Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that
was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as
published. Without publication, the note never
had any legal force and effect.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the hand written note has
effect of law because of its non publication.
RULING: It was undisputed that the
handwritten addendum was not included when
Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the
Official Gazette. The SC, however, noted that
the issue of whether President Marcos
intended to include Western Bicutan in
Proclamation No. 2476 was not only “irrelevant
but speculative.” Courts cannot speculate on
the probable intent of the legislature apart
from the words appearing in the law.
Citing Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, the SC also
reiterated that requirement of publication is
indispensable in order to give effect to the law,
unless the law itself has otherwise provided.
The phrase “unless otherwise provided” refers
to a different effectivity date other than after
fifteen days following the completion of the
law’s publication in the Official Gazette.
Nevertheless, this does not imply that the
requirement of publication may be dispensed
with.

Commr. v Primetown, GR 162155,
August 28, 2007
Facts:
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, the Vice
President of Primetown (respondent), applied
for refund of the income tax which they have
paid on 1997. According to Yap, the company
accrued losses amounting to P/ 71,879,228.
These losses enabled them to be exempt from
paying income tax, which respondent paid
diligently. Respondent was therefore claiming
a refund. Respondents submitted
requirements but the petitioners ignored their
claim. On April 14, 2000, respondents filed a
review in the Court of Tax Appeals. The said
Court, however, denied the petition stating
that the petition was filed beyond the 2-year
prescriptive period for filing judicial claim for
tax refund.
According to Sec 229 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, “no suit or proceedings shall
be filed after the expiration of 2-yearsfrom the
date of the payment of the tax regardless of
any supervening cause that may arise after
payment. Respondents paid the last income
tax return on April 14, 1998. Article 13 of the
New Civil Code states that a year is considered
365 days; months 30 days; days 24-hours;
and night from sunset to sunrise. Therefore,
according to CTA, the date of filing a petition
fell on the 731st day, which is beyond the
prescriptive period.
Issues:
Whether the two-year/730-day prescriptive
period ends on April 13, 2000 or April 14, 2000
considering that the last payment of tax was
on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a
leap year.
Whether or not Article 13 of the New Civil Code
be repealed by EO 292 Sec 31 Chap 8 Book 1
of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that when a subsequent law
impliedly repeals a prior law, the new law shall
apply. In the case at bar, Art 13 of the New
Civil Code, which states that a year shall
compose 365 days, shall be repealed by EO
292 Sec 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987,
which states that a year shall be composed of
12 months regardless of the number of days
in a month. Therefore, the two-year
prescriptive period ends on April 14, 2000.
Respondents filed petition on April 14, 2000
(which is the last day prescribed to file a
petition.
Montajes v People, G.R. No.
183449, March 12, 2012
Facts: The original period for filing the
petition for review with the CA was on May 19,
2007, a Saturday. On May 21, 2007, a Monday
(the next working day which followed the last
day for filing which fell on a Saturday),
petitioner filed a motion for extension of time
to file a petition for review wherein he prayed
that he be granted 15 days from May 21, 2007
or up to June 5, 2007 within which to file his
petition. He then filed his petition for review
on June 5, 2007. Was the petition for review
filed on time?
Held: The petition for review was filed out of
time based on our clarification in A.M. No. 00-
2-14-SC that the 15-day extension period
prayed for should be tacked to the original
period and commences immediately after the
expiration of such period. Thus, counting 15
days from the expiration of the period which
was on May 19, 2007, the petition filed on
June 5, 2007 was already two days late.
However, we find the circumstances obtaining
in this case to merit the liberal application of
the rule in the interest of justice and fair play.
Notably, the petition for review was already
filed on June 5, 2007, which was long before
the CA issued its Resolution dated September
21, 2007 dismissing the petition for review for
being filed out of time. There was no showing
that respondent suffered any material injury or
his cause was prejudiced by reason of such
delay. Moreover, the RTC decision which was
sought to be reversed in the petition for review
filed in the CA had affirmed the MTC judgment
convicting petitioner of direct assault, hence,
the petition involved no less than petitioners
liberty. We do not find anything on record that
shows petitioner's deliberate intent to delay
the final disposition of the case as he had filed
the petition for review within the extended
period sought, although erroneously
computed. These circumstances should have
been taken into consideration for the CA not
to dismiss the petition outright.
We have ruled that being a few days late in
the filing of the petition for review does not
automatically warrant the dismissal thereof.
And even assuming that a petition for review
is filed a few days late, where strong
considerations of substantial justice are
manifest in the petition, we may relax the
stringent application of technical rules in the
exercise of our equity jurisdiction.
Courts should not be so strict about procedural
lapses that do not really impair the proper
administration of justice. After all, the higher
objective of procedural rule is to insure that
the substantive rights of the parties are
protected. Litigations should, as much as
possible, be decided on the merits and not on
technicalities. Every party-litigant must be
afforded ample opportunity for the proper and
just determination of his case, free from the
unacceptable plea of technicalities.
Cheng v. Sy, 592 SCRA 155
FACTS:
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2)
estafa cases before the RTC Manila
against respondent spouses William and
Tessie Sy for issuing checks drawn against a
closed account. Said case was dismissed for
failure of the prosecution to prove the
elements of the crime. The Order contained no
declaration as to the civil liability of Tessie Sy.
Petitioner also filed against respondents two
(2) cases for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) Manila,
which was also dismissedon account of
the failure of petitioner to identify the
accused respondents in open court. The
Order also did not make any
pronouncement as to the civil liability of
accused respondents. The petitioner then
lodged against respondents before the RTC,
Branch 18,Manila, a complaint for collection
of a sum of money with damages
previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg.
22 cases. The case was dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil
action to collect the amount ofP600,000.00
with damages was already impliedly
instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light
of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111
of the Revised Rules of Court. Amotion for
reconsideration, assailing the dismissal was
denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing and prosecution
of criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are
applicable to the present case where the
nature of the order dismissing the cases for
bouncing checks against the respondents was
based on the failure of the prosecution to
identify both the respondents herein?
RULING:
The rule is that upon the filing of the
estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases against
respondents, where the petitioner has not
made any waiver, express reservation to
litigate separately, or has
not instituted the corresponding civil action to
collect the amount ofP600,000.00 and
damages prior to the criminal action, the civil
action is deemed instituted with the criminal
cases. The dismissal of the estafa cases for
failure of the prosecution to prove the
elements of the crime beyond reasonable
doubt there was no pronouncement as regards
the civil liability of the accused and where the
trial court declared that the liability of the
accused was only civil in nature—produced
the legal effect of a reservation by the
petitioner of her right to litigate separately
the civil action impliedly instituted with the
estafa cases, following Article 29 of the Civil
Code. However, although this civil action could
have been litigated separately on account of
the dismissal of the estafa cases on
reasonable doubt, the petitioner was
deemed to have also elected that such civil
action be prosecuted together with the BP
Blg. 22 cases in light of the Rodriguez v.
Ponferrada ruling. With the dismissal of the
BP Blg. 22 cases for failure to establish
the identity of the accused, the question that
arises is whether such dismissal would have
the same legal effect as the dismissed estafa
cases. Put differently, may petitioner’s action
to recover respondents’ civil liability be also
allowed to prosper separately after the BP Blg.
22 cases were dismissed? Where the civil
action has been filed separately and
trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
may be consolidated with the criminal
action upon application with the court trying
the latter case. If the application is granted,
the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and
criminal action. However, in applying the
procedure discussed above, it appears that
petitioner would be left without a remedy to
recover from respondents theP600,000.00
allegedly loaned from her. This could
prejudice even the petitioner’s Notice of Claim
involving the same amount filed in Special
Proceedings No. 98-88390 (Petition for
Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin Enterprises,
William Sy and Tessie Sy), which case was
reportedly archived for failure to prosecute
the petition for an unreasonable length of
time. Expectedly, respondents would raise
the same defense that petitioner had already
elected to litigate the civil action to recover the
amount of the checks along with the BP Blg.
22 cases. For reasons of substantial justice
and equity, as the complement of the legal
jurisdiction that seeks to dispense justice
where courts of law, through the
inflexibility of their rules and want of power
to adapt their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do
so, we thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of
petitioner.
Famanila v. Court of Appeals 500
SCRA 76
Facts:
NFD hired Roberto Famanila as messman for
Hansa Riga a vessel registered and owned by
its principal and co-respondent, Barbership
Management Limited. Famanila complained of
headache; while assisting in the loading
operations while Hansa Riga was decked at the
port of Eureka, CA, USA experienced dizziness
and subsequently collapsed. He was
diagnosed cerebral HA from receptive
Aneurysm; thereafter he underwent a brain
surgery. Petitioner was repatriated to the
Philippines due to his condition and thereafter
examined by Dr. Patricia Abesamis declared
that he cannot go back to sea duty and has
been observed for 120 days, declared
permanently, totally disabled. Authorized
representatives; convinced him to settle his
claim by accepting the amount of US $13,,200.
Petitioner accepted as evidence by his
signature in the receipt Feb. 20,1991 release-
wife Gloria and Richard acted as witness in the
signing June 1997 – petitioner filed a
complaint praying for an award of disability
benefits.
.NCRC DISMISSED PRESCRIPTION CA
DISMISSED LACK OF MERIT
Petitioners Claim: He did not sign the receipt
and release voluntarily a freely because he
was permanently disabled and in financial
constraints; thus the same vitiates the
consent.
Issue:
Whether or not the contract is void and
unenforceable as what the petitioners.
Held:
NO.
There is no proof on record that his consent
was vitiated in account of his disabilities.
Contracts: A vitiated consent does not make a
contract void and unenforceable - A vitiated
consent only gives rise to a voidable
agreement
Under the civil code, the vices of consent are
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influences or fraud. If consent is given through
any of the aforementioned vices of consent,
the contract is voidable.
Disability; disability is not among the factors
that may vitiate consent.
Petitioner contends that his permanent and
total disability vitiated his consent to the
receipt and release thereby rendering it void
and unenforceable. However, disability is not
among the factor that may vitiate consent.
Besides same petitioners self-serving
allegation there is no proof on record that his
consent was vitiated an account of his
disability. In the absence of such proof of
vitiated consent, the validations of the receipt
and release must be upheld.
Contract void and unenforceable a vitiated
consent only gives rise to a voidable
agreement.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Herrera v. Borromeo
• Vito Borromeo, a widower, died on
March 13, 1952, at the age of 88 years,
without forced heirs but leaving extensive
properties in the province of Cebu. All his
brothers and sisters predeceased him.
• On April 19, 1952, JOSE JUNQUERA
filed a petition for the probate of a one page
document as the last will and testament,
devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato
and Amelia (all surnamed Borromeo), in equal
and undivided shares and designating
Junquera as executor.
• Oppositions to the probate of the will
were filed. On May 28, 1960, the probate court
held that the document presented as the will
of the deceased was a forgery. The decision
was affirmed upon appeal.
• The testate proceedings was converted
into an intestate proceedings. Several parties
came before the court filing claims or petitions
alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate
estate of Vito Borromeo.
• On April 10, 1969, the trial court issued
an order declaring the following, to the
exclusion of all others, as the INTESTATE
HEIRS OF THE DECEASED VITO BORROMEO:
Jose Cuenco Borromeo, Judge Crispin
Borromeo, Vitaliana Borromeo, Patrocinio
Borromeo Herrera, Salud Borromeom
Asuncion Borromeo, Marcial Borromeom
Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and, The heirs been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the
of Canuto Borromeo. heirs intend to transfer. Pursuant to Article
1043 of the Civil Code, to make acceptance or
- The court also ordered that the assets
repudiation of inheritance valid, the person
of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall
must be certain of the death of the one from
be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and
whom he is to inherit and of his right to the
distributed in equal and equitable shares
inheritance. Since the petitioner and her co-
among the 9 declared intestate heirs.
heirs were not certain of their right to the
• On August 25, 1972, respondent inheritance until they were declared heirs,
FORTUNATO BORROMEO filed a motion to be their rights were, therefore, uncertain.
declared as one of the heirs of the deceased,
• RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Under
alleging that he is an illegitimate son and that
Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is no need
he was omitted in the declaration of heirs.
for a person to be first declared as heir before
- As an acknowledged illegitimate child, he can accept or repudiate an inheritance.
he stated that he was entitled to a legitime What is required is that he must first be certain
equal in every case to four-fifths of the of the death of the person from whom he is to
legitime of an acknowledged natural child. inherit and that he must be certain of his right
to the inheritance. He points out that at the
- Finding that the motion of Fortunato
time of the signing of the waiver document on
Borromeo was already barred by the order of
July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver
the court dated April 10, 1969, the court
document were certain that Vito Borromeo
dismissed the motion.
was already dead as well as of their rights to
• Fortunato filed a motion for the inheritance as shown in the waiver
reconsideration. In the memorandum he document itself.
submitted, Fortunato changed the basis for his
• On December 24, 1974, the trial court
claim to a portion of the estate. He asserted
concluding that the five declared heirs who
and incorporated a WAIVER OF HEREDITARY
signed the waiver agreement assigning their
RIGHTS (7/31/1967). In the waiver, five of
hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had
the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato their
lost the same rights, declared the latter as
shares in the disputed estate.
entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo.
• PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: The trial
ISSUE: Whether or not the Waiver of
court, acting as a probate court, had no
Hereditary Rights executed in 7/31/1967 is
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim;
valid as to entitle Fortunato to the estate of
Fortunato is estopped from asserting the
Vito?
waiver agreement; that the waiver agreement
is void as it was executed before the
declaration of heirs; that the same is void
RULING:
having been executed before the distribution
of the estate and before the acceptance of the
inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and
• The heirs could waive their hereditary
inexistent for lack of subject matter.
rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the
- The "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" has estate was issued only in 1969.
been cancelled and revoked on June 29, 1968,
- In Osorio v. Osorio and Ynchausti
by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo
Steamship Co., the Court held: The properties
and Amelia Borromeo, is without force and
included in an existing inheritance cannot be
effect because there can be no effective
considered as belonging to third persons with
waiver of hereditary rights before there has
respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law
continue the personality of the former. Nor do would not be any reason for Fortunato,
such properties have the character of future Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the
property, because the heirs acquire a right to heirs in the offer to settle the case amicably,
succession from the moment of the death of and offer to concede to them parts of the
the deceased (Article 657 and applied by estate of the deceased
Article 661), the heirs succeed the deceased
- (2) On April 21 and 30, 1969, the
by the mere fact of death. More or less, time
majority of the declared heirs executed an
may elapse from the moment of the death of
Agreement on how the estate they inherited
the deceased until the heirs enter into
shall be distributed. The Agreement of
possession of the hereditary property, but the
Partition was approved by the trial court on
acceptance in any event retroacts to the
August 15, 1969.
moment of the death (Article 989). The right
is vested, although conditioned upon the - (3) On June 29, 1968, the petitioner
adjudication of the corresponding hereditary signed a document entitled Deed of
portion. Assignment purporting to transfer and assign
in favor of the respondent and Tomas and
• However, the purported "Waiver of
Amelia Borromeo all her (Patrocinio B.
Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be
Herrera's) rights, interests, and participation
effective.
as an intestate heir in the estate of the
- For a waiver to exist, three elements deceased Vito Borromeo.
are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2)
- (4) On June 29, 1968, the respondent
the knowledge of the existence thereof; and
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in
(3) an intention to relinquish such right.
the deed of assignment) in turn executed a
- The intention to waive a right or Deed of Reconveyance in favor of the heirs-
advantage must be shown clearly and assignors named in the same deed of
convincingly, and when the only proof of assignment. The stated consideration was
intention rests in what a party does, his act P50,000.00;
should be so manifestly consistent with, and
- (5) A Cancellation of Deed of
indicative of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish
Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was
the particular right or advantage that no other
signed by Tomas Borromeo and Amelia
reasonable explanation of his conduct is
Borromeo on October 15, 1968, while
possible.
Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on
• The circumstances of this case that the March 24, 1969.
signatories to the waiver document did not
have the clear and convincing intention to
relinquish their rights, Thus: • ISSUE OF JURISDICTION: The trial
court had jurisdiction to pass upon the validity
- (1) On October 27, 1967, Fortunato,
of the waiver agreement. In Special
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading
Proceedings No. 916-R the lower court
entitled "Compliance" wherein they submitted
disallowed the probate of the will and declared
a proposal for the amicable settlement of the
it as fake. Upon appeal, the Court affirmed the
case. In this document, the respondent
decision of the lower court. Subsequently,
recognizes and concedes that the petitioner is
several parties came before the lower court
an heir of the deceased Vito Borromeo,
filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as
entitled to share in the estate. This shows that
heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo.
the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was never
There is no impediment to the trial court in
meant to be what the respondent purports it
exercising jurisdiction and trying the said
to be. Had the intent been otherwise, there
claims or petitions. Moreover, the jurisdiction
of the trial court extends to matters incidental
and collateral to the exercise of its recognized
powers in handling the settlement of the
estate.
• [COMMENT: Bwisit ‘tong case na ‘to.
Ang haba…tapos konti lang ung kailangan.
Pero to summarize the cases that were
consolidated: (1) G.R. No. 41171; (2) G.R. No.
55000: Issues are similar to the issues raised
in G.R. No. 41171; the supposed waiver of
hereditary rights cannot be validated. The
essential elements of a waiver, especially the
clear and convincing intention to relinquish
hereditary rights, are not found in this case;
(3) G.R. No. 62895: For the termination and
closure of Special Proceedings No. 916-R;
pending motions to compel petition as co-
administrator to submit an inventory; (4) G.R.
No. 65995: Matter of attorney's fees; (5) G.R.
No. 63818: Respondents Jose Cuenco
Borromeo and Petra O. Borromeo filed a
motion for inhibition in the CFI of Cebu,
presided over by Judge Francisco P. Burgos to
inhibit the judge from further acting in Special
Proceedings No. 916-R; (6) G.R. No. 65995:
The petitioners seek to restrain the
respondents from further acting on any and all
incidents in Special Proceedings No. 916-R
during the pendency of this petition and No.
63818.]
Rayray vs. Chae Kyung Lee, G.R. No.
18176, October 26,
1966
ARTICLE XIV OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
LAZARO RAYRAY, plaintiff-appellant, versus
CHAE KYUNG LEE, defendant-appellee
G.R. NO. 18176, October 26, 1966
“A court has jurisdiction over the res, in an
action for annulment of marriage, provided, at
least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a
national of, the forum.”
PONENTE: CONCEPCION, C.J.
FACTS:
Lazaro Rayray married Chae Kyung Lee in
1952 in Pusan, Korea. Before the marriage,
Lee was able to secure a marriage license
which is a requirement in Korea prior to
marrying. They lived together until 1955.
Rayray however later found out that Lee had
previously lived with 2 Americans and a
Korean. Lee answered by saying that it is not
unusual in Korea for a woman to have more
than one partner and that it is legally
permissive for them to do so and that there is
no legal impediment to her marriage with
Rayray. Eventually they pursued their
separate way.
Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of
his marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee.
Inasmuch as, the latter's whereabouts is
unknown; summons was served by
publication, as provided in the Rules of Court.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved that defendant be
declared in default, she not having filed an
answer, and that a date be set for the
reception of his evidence.
In due course, thereafter, the lower court
decision was rendered dismissing plaintiff's
complaint, without costs, upon the ground: (1)
that the court could not nullify a marriage
contracted abroad; and (2) that the facts
proven do not warrant the relief prayed for. A
reconsideration of this decision having been
denied, plaintiff appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which certified the case to the
Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the lower
court being in issue in the appeal.
The court a quo found that it had no
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of
plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, it having
been solemnized in Seoul, Korea. Said
conclusion is erroneous. In order that a given
case could be validly decided by a court of
justice, it must have jurisdiction over (1) the
subject-matter of the litigation; (2) the person
of the parties therein; and (3) in actions in rem
or quasi-in-rem, the res.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject was subject to the
jurisdiction before Philippine trial courts?
HELD:
The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court
has jurisdiction over the res, in an action for
annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one
of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of,
the forum. Since plaintiff is a Filipino,
domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the
lower court had jurisdiction over the res, in
addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-
matter and the parties. In other words, it could
validly inquire into the legality of the marriage
between the parties herein.
The lower court is correct in ruling that
Rayray’s evidence is not sufficient to render his
marriage with Lee null and void. Rayray said
that the police clearance secured by Lee is
meant to allow her to marry after her
subsequent cohabitation/s with the other men
– which are considered bigamous in Philippine
law. The SC ruled that the police clearance is
wanting for it lacks the signature of the person
who prepared it and there is no competent
document to establish the identity of the
same. Also, through Rayray himself, Lee
averred that it is ok in Korea for a person who
cohabited with other men before to marry
another man. This is an indication that Lee
herself is aware that if it were a previous
marriage that is concerned then that could be
a legal impediment to any subsequent
marriage. Rayray cannot be given credence in
claiming that his consent could have been
otherwise altered had he known all these facts
prior to the marriage because he would lie to
every opportunity given him by the Court so as
to suit his case.
Thus, petition is DENIED with the cost against
the plaintiff-appellant.
ATCI Overseas Corp vs. Echin, G.R.
No. 178551, Oct. 11,
2010
ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G.
IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-
KUWAIT Petitioners, vs. MA. JOSEFA ECHIN,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 178551
October 11, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent Echin was hired by petitioner
ATCI in behalf of its principal co-petitioner,
Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, for the
position of medical technologist under a two-
year contract with a monthly salary of
US$1,200.00.Within a year, Respondent was
terminated for not passing the probationary
period which was under the Memorandum of
Agreement.
Ministry denied respondent‘s request and she
returned to the Philippines shouldering her
own fair. Respondent filed with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a
complaint against ATCI for illegal dismissal.
Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of
respondent and ordered ATCI to pay her
$3,600.00, her salary for the three months
unexpired portion of the contract.
ATCI appealed Labor Arbiter‘s decision,
however, NLRC affirmed the latter‘s decision
and denied petitioner ATCI‘s motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner appealed to the
Court Appeals contending that their principal
being a foreign government agency is immune
from suit, and as such, immunity extended to
them.
Appellate Court affirmed NLRC‘s decision. It
noted that under the law, a private
employment agency shall assume all
responsibilities for the implementation of the
contract of employment of an overseas
worker; hence, it can be sued jointly and
severally with the foreign principal for any
violation of the recruitment agreement or
contract of employment.
Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration was
denied; hence, this present petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners be held liable
considering that the contract specifically
stipulates that respondent‘s employment shall
be governed by the Civil Service Law and
Regulations of Kuwait.
Ruling:
Court denied the petition. According to RA
8042: “The obligations covenanted in the
recruitment agreement entered into by and
between the local agent and its foreign
principal are not coterminous with the term of
such agreement so that if either or both of the
parties decide to end the agreement, the
responsibilities of such parties towards the
contracted employees under the agreement
do not at all end, but the same extends up to
and until the expiration of the employment
contracts of the employees recruited and
employed pursuant to the said recruitment
agreement. In international law, the party who
wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law. Where a foreign law is not pleaded
or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as
ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in
determining the issues presented before us.
Tuna Processing v Phi. Kingford,
GR 185582, February 29,
2012
FACTS: Kanemitsu Yamaoka (licensor) was a
co-patentee of U.S. Patent No. 5,484,619,
Philippine Letters Patent No. 31138, and
Indonesian Patent No. ID0003911 (Yamaoka
Patent), and 5 Philippine tuna processors:
Angel Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish Co.,
Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa
Cruz Seafoods, Inc., and respondent Kingford
(sponsor/licensees).
They entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) on 14 January 2003 which
provides for the enforcing of said patents,
granting licenses under it and collecting
royalties, and for the establishment of
petitioner Tuna Processing, Inc. (TPI). The
parties likewise executed a Supplemental
Memorandum of Agreement and an
Agreement to Amend Memorandum of
Agreement.
Due to a series of events, the licensees
including respondent withdrew from petitioner
and reneged on their obligations. Petitioner
submitted the dispute for arbitration before
the International Centre for Dispute Resolution
in the State of California, United States and
won the case against respondent. To enforce
the award, petitioner filed a Petition for
Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of
Makati City which was raffled to Branch 150
presided by Judge Elmo M. Alameda.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss but was
denied so it sought for the inhibition of Judge
Alameda and Judge Cedrick O. Ruiz of Branch
61, to which the case was re-raffled, in turn,
granted respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration and dismissed the petition on
the ground that the petitioner lacked legal
capacity to sue in the Philippines.
Petitioner filed a petition for review, that
although a foreign corporation established in
the State of California, not licensed to do
business in the Philippines, but which collects
royalties from entities in the Philippines, can
enforce a foreign arbitral award.
ISSUE: whether or not TPI can sue in the
Philippines?
RULING: It is in the best interest of justice that
in the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award,
SC deny availment by the losing party of the
rule that bars foreign corporations not licensed
to do business in the Philippines from
maintaining a suit in our courts. When a party
enters into a contract containing a foreign
arbitration clause and, as in this case, in fact
submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound
by the contract, by the arbitration and by the
result of arbitration, conceding thereby the
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;
capacity of the other party to enter into the
contract, participate in the arbitration and b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at
cause the implementation of the result. P40,000 each;
Consider the wisdom of then Associate Justice
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving
Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her Dissenting
children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal
Opinion in Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of
shares.
Appeals, to wit: Arbitration, as an alternative
mode of settlement, is gaining adherents in
legal and judicial circles here and abroad. If its
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of
tested mechanism can simply be ignored by an
San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted
aggrieved party, one who, it must be stressed,
to probate in the Philippines. The People’s
voluntarily and actively participated in the
Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the
arbitration proceedings from the very
will, paid the entire bequest therein.
beginning, it will destroy the very essence of
mutuality inherent in consensual contracts.
Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a
Preparatory to closing its administration, the
foreign arbitral award should be respected not
executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s
because it is favored over domestic laws and
Final Account, Report of Administration and
procedures, but because Republic Act No.
Project of Partition” where it reported, inter
9285 has certainly erased any conflict of law
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary
question.
Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to
$240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of
DOCTRINE: When a party enters into a
the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of
contract whether containing a foreign
P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the
arbitration clause or not, shall submit itself to
project partition, the executor divided the
arbitration and be bound by the contract.
residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate
children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.
Bellis vs Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678 June
6, 1967

Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina

FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the
State of Texas and of the United States. He
had 5 legitimate children with his wife, Mary
Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate
children with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and
finally, 3 illegitimate children.
and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
opposition to the project partition on the
ground that they were deprived of their
legitimates as illegitimate children.
The lower court denied their respective
motions for reconsideration.

Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will ISSUE:

in the Philippines in which his distributable
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must
estate should be divided in trust in the
apply.
following order and manner:
RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both
a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at
the time of his death. So that even assuming
Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that
the same would not result in a reference back
(renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer
to Texas Law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule
adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling
for the application of the law of the place
where the properties are situated, renvoi
would arise, since the properties here involved
are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule
of Texas, it should not be presumed different
from our appellants, position is therefore not
rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos
Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA
and that under the Laws of Texas, there are
no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly,
since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights
has to be determined under Texas Law, the
Philippine Law on legitimates can not be
applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.
Tayag v Benguet Consolidated, GR L-
23145, Nov. 29,
1968 NCC 17
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Situs of
Shares of Stock: domicile of the corporation
SUCCESSION: Ancillary Administration: The
ancillary administration is proper, whenever a
person dies, leaving in a country other than
that of his last domicile, property to be
administered in the nature of assets of the
deceased liable for his individual debts or to be
distributed among his heirs.
SUCCESSION: Probate: Probate court has
authority to issue the order enforcing the
ancillary administrator’s right to the stock
certificates when the actual situs of the shares
of stocks is in the Philippines.
FACTS:
Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who
died in New York City, left among others, two
stock certificates issued by Benguet
Consolidated, a corporation domiciled in the
Philippines. As ancillary administrator of
Perkins’ estate in the Philippines, Tayag now
wants to take possession of these stock
certificates but County Trust Company of New
York, the domiciliary administrator, refused to
part with them. Thus, the probate court of the
Philippines was forced to issue an order
declaring the stock certificates as lost and
ordering Benguet Consolidated to issue new
stock certificates representing Perkins’ shares.
Benguet Consolidated appealed the order,
arguing that the stock certificates are not lost
as they are in existence and currently in the
possession of County Trust Company of New
York.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the lower
court is proper.
HELD:
The appeal lacks merit.
Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the
power to gain control and possession of all
assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction
of the Philippines
It is to be noted that the scope of the power
of the ancillary administrator was, in an earlier
case, set forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is
often necessary to have more than one
administration of an estate. When a person
dies intestate owning property in the country
of his domicile as well as in a foreign country,
administration is had in both countries. That
which is granted in the jurisdiction of
decedent's last domicile is termed the principal
administration, while any other administration
is termed the ancillary administration. The
reason for the latter is because a grant of
administration does not ex proprio vigore have
any effect beyond the limits of the country in
which it is granted. Hence, an administrator
appointed in a foreign state has no authority
in the [Philippines]. The ancillary
administration is proper, whenever a person
dies, leaving in a country other than that of his
last domicile, property to be administered in
the nature of assets of the deceased liable for
his individual debts or to be distributed among
his heirs."
Probate court has authority to issue the order
enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to
the stock certificates when the actual situs of
the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.
It would follow then that the authority of the
probate court to require that ancillary
administrator's right to "the stock certificates
covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her
name in the books of [appellant] Benguet
Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally
beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine
corporation owing full allegiance and subject
to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts.
Its shares of stock cannot therefore be
considered in any wise as immune from lawful
court orders.
Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v.
Collector of Internal Revenue finds application.
"In the instant case, the actual situs of the
shares of stock is in the Philippines, the
corporation being domiciled [here]." To the
force of the above undeniable proposition, not
even appellant is insensible. It does not
dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even
if it were so minded.
Kazuhiro Hasegawa vs. Kitamura, G.R.
No. 149177, November 23, 2007
FACTS:
Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a
Japanese consultancy firm providing technical
and management support in the infrastructure
projects national permanently residing in the
Philippines. The agreement provides that
Kitamaru was to extend professional services
to Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned
Kitamaru to work as the project manager of
the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR)
project. When the STAR project was near
completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy
services of Nippon, this time for the detailed
engineering & construction supervision of the
Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI)
Project. Kitamaru was named as the project
manger in the contract.
Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its
International Division, informed Kitamaru that
the company had no more intention of
automatically renewing his ICA. His services
would be engaged by the company only up to
the substantial completion of the STAR
Project.
Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the
BBRI project. Nippon insisted that Kitamaru’s
contract was for a fixed term that had expired.
Kitamaru then filed for specific performance &
damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed
a MTD.
Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been
perfected in Japan & executed by & between
Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City
has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-
termination of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be
heard & ventilated in the proper courts of
Japan following the principles of lex loci
celebrationis & lex contractus.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA
ruled hat the principle of lex loci celebrationis
was not applicable to the case, because
nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of
the written agreement put in issue. It held that
the RTC was correct in applying the principle
of lex loci solutionis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a
of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific judicial proceeding is conferred by the
performance & damages involving contracts sovereign authority w/c establishes and
executed outside the country by foreign organizes the court. It is given only by law and
nationals may be assailed on the principles of in the manner prescribed by law. It is further
lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, “the state determined by the allegations of the complaint
of the most significant relationship rule,” or irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled
forum non conveniens. to all or some of the claims asserted therein.
To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of
an action for lack of jurisdiction over the
HELD: subject matter of the claim, the movant must
show that the court or tribunal cannot act on
NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts
the matter submitted to it because no law
problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved:
grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.
jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and
enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction &
choice of law are 2 distinct concepts.
In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to
not claim that the RTC is not properly vested
cause a defendant to travel to this state;
by law w/ jurisdiction to hear the subject
choice of law asks the further question
controversy for a civil case for specific
whether the application of a substantive law
performance & damages is one not capable of
w/c will determine the merits of the case is fair
pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable
to both parties. The power to exercise
by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raise
jurisdiction does not automatically give a state
as grounds to question subject matter
constitutional authority to apply forum law.
jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the “state
will often coincide, the “minimum contacts” for
of the most significant relationship rule.” The
one do not always provide the necessary
Court finds the invocation of these grounds
“significant contacts” for the other. The
unsound.
question of whether the law of a state can be
applied to a transaction is different from the
question of whether the courts of that state
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the
have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
place of the ceremony” or the law of the place
where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex
contractus or lex loci contractus means the
In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue—
“law of the place where a contract is executed
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various
or to be performed.” It controls the nature,
aspects. For a court to validly exercise its
construction, and validity of the contract and
power to adjudicate a controversy, it must
it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed
have jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner,
upon by the parties or the law intended by
over the defendant/respondent, over the
them either expressly or implicitly. Under the
subject matter, over the issues of the case
“state of the most significant relationship rule,”
and, in cases involving property, over the res
to ascertain what state law to apply to a
or the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation.
dispute, the court should determine which
In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein,
state has the most substantial connection to
Nippon is actually referring to subject matter
the occurrence and the parties. In a case
jurisdiction.
involving a contract, the court should consider
where the contract was made, was negotiated,
was to be performed, and the domicile, place
of business, or place of incorporation of the
parties. This rule takes into account several
contacts and evaluates them according to their
relative importance with respect to the
particular issue to be resolved.
Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws
make reference to the law applicable to a
dispute, they are rules proper for the 2nd
phase, the choice of law. They determine
which state's law is to be applied in resolving
the substantive issues of a conflicts problem.
Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is
that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not
only inapplicable but also not yet called for.
Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of
choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that
they have not yet pointed out any conflict
between the laws of Japan and ours. Before
determining which law should apply, 1st there
should exist a conflict of laws situation
requiring the application of the conflict of laws
rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country
is invoked to provide the proper rules for the
solution of a case, the existence of such law
must be pleaded and proved.
It should be noted that when a conflicts case,
one involving a foreign element, is brought
before a court or administrative agency, there
are 3 alternatives open to the latter in
disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either
because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to
assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume
jurisdiction over the case and apply the
internal law of the forum; or (3) assume
jurisdiction over the case and take into
account or apply the law of some other State
or States. The court’s power to hear cases and
controversies is derived from the Constitution
and the laws. While it may choose to recognize
laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited
by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or
other formal agreements, even in matters
regarding rights provided by foreign
sovereigns.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum
non conveniens, be used to deprive the RTC of
its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for
a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court does not include it as a
ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be
entertained or dismissed on the basis of the
said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of
the particular case and is addressed to the
sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the
RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the
propriety of dismissing a case based on this
principle requires a factual determination;
hence, this conflicts principle is more properly
considered a matter of defense.
Raytheon v Rouzie, GR 162894,
February 26, 2008
FACTS:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine
Services, Inc., a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the State of
Connecticut, United States of America, and
respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an
American citizen, entered into a contract
whereby BMSI hired respondent as its
representative to negotiate the sale of services
in several government projects in the
Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10%
of the gross receipts. On 11 March 1992,
respondent secured a service contract with the
Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI
for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed
before the Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission, a suit against
BMSI and Rust International, Inc., Rodney C.
Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged
nonpayment of commissions, illegal
termination and breach of employment
contract.
 On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a
resident of La Union, instituted an action for
damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Bauang, La Union. The Complaint named as
defendants herein petitioner Raytheon
International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST,
the two corporations impleaded in the earlier
labor case.
Petitioner also referred to the NLRC
decision which disclosed that per the written
agreement between respondent and BMSI and
RUST, denominated as “Special Sales
Representative Agreement,” the rights and
obligations of the parties shall be governed by
the laws of the State of Connecticut. Petitioner
sought the dismissal of the complaint on
grounds of failure to state a cause of action
and forum non conveniens and prayed for
damages by way of compulsory counterclaim.
Petitioner asserts that the written
contract between respondent and BMSI
included a valid choice of law clause, that is,
that the contract shall be governed by the laws
of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions
the presence of foreign elements in the
dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses
involved are American corporations and
citizens and the evidence to be presented is
located outside the Philippines – that renders
our local courts inconvenient forums.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT BE
DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON
CONVENIENS?
RULING:
On the matter of jurisdiction over a
conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is
filed in a Philippine court and where the court
has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
parties and the res, it may or can proceed to
try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws
or the convenience of the parties point to a
foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign
prerogative of the country where the case is
filed.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties,
the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein
respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing
of the complaint. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as
party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary
appearance in court.
That the subject contract included a
stipulation that the same shall be governed by
the laws of the State of Connecticut does not
suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other
foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded
from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and
choice of law are two distinct concepts.
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to
cause a defendant to travel to this state;
choice of law asks the further question
whether the application of a substantive law
which will determine the merits of the case is
fair to both parties.The choice of law
stipulation will become relevant only when the
substantive issues of the instant case develop,
that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds
before the trial court.
Tamano v Ortiz, G.R. No. 126603,
June 29, 1998
Under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases,
may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction
where it is not the most “convenient” or
available forum and the parties are not
precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements
in the instant case are not sufficient to oust
the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a
case based on the principle of forum non
conveniens requires a factual determination;
hence, it is more properly considered as a
matter of defense. While it is within the
discretion of the trial court to abstain from
assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should
do so only after vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances
require the court’s desistance.
KEY TAKE-AWAY OR DOCTRINE TO
REMEMBER
Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction
over all actions involving the contract of
marriage and marital relations.
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.—Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: x x x (6) In all cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions x x x x
RECIT-READY / SUMMARY
Senator Tamano married his second wife,
petitioner Estrellita Tamano on May 18, 1994
in civil rights in Lanao del Sur. Soon after his
death, his first wife Zorayda Tamano and his
son, Adib Tamano filed a Complain for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Sen. and
Estrellita Tamano. The case was brought to
the Court of Appeals. Subsequently, Estrellita
filed a motion to dismiss at the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. Then, the petitioner
filed a case to the Court questioning the RTC’s
jurisdiction over the case, as the parties were
Muslims, and therefore, must be tried in a
shari’a court. The court ruled that RTC has
jurisdiction over the case, sustaining the CA
decision wherein the case can be tried in the
RTC can handle the case as there in no shari’a
court in Quezon City. The Court also stated
that the RTC has the general jurisdiction as
Sen. and Estrellita were married in civil and
Muslim laws.
FACTS
1. Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano
married Haja Putri Zorayda Tamano on May
31, 1958. On May 18, 1994, Senator Tamano
also married Estrellita J. Tamano in civil rights
in Lanao del Sur.
2. On November 23, 1994, Zorayda
Tamano and his son, Adib Tamano filed a
Complain for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
of Sen. Tamano and Estrellita Tamano on the
ground that it is bigamous, and the details in
their marriage contract are false and
fraudulent.
3. Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss at the
RTC of Quezon City alleging that the RTC
doesn’t have jurisdiction over the issue, and
the shari’a court should try the case.
Moreover, the deceased Sen. Tamano can file
annulment. The RTC denied the motion to
dismiss.
4. On Court of Appeals ruled on December
13, 1995 to resolve the Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage ahead of the
other consolidated cases. And that the CA
ruled that the case can be filed before the RTC
although the case would fall under the
jurisdiction of shari’a, there is no shari’a court
in Quezon City. Therefore, the RTC can try the
case.
5. Hence, this case. The petitioner is
reiterating her earlier argument that it is the
shari’a court and not the RTC has jurisdiction
over this case.
ISSUES / RATIO
WON the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction
over this instant case
HELD:
Petition was denied. Tamano were married in
accordance with the Civil Code. Hence,
contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil
Code is applicable in the instant case.
Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano
were likewise married under Muslim laws, the
same would still fall under the general original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
 Zamoranos v People, G.R. No. contracted a second marriage. The prosecutor
193902, June 1, 2011 found prima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos
liable for Bigamy but the same was thereafter
dismissed upon a motion for reconsideration
filed by Zamboranos.
Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before the
Facts:
Office of the Secretary of Justice assailing the
dismissal of the complaint for bigamy. The
These are three (3) consolidated petitions for
DOJ Secretary granted the petition and
review on certiorari under Rule 45, assailing
reversed the dismissal. Zamoranos
the Decision dated July 30, 2010 of the Court
immediately filed an Omnibus Motion and
of Appeals (CA), dismissing the petition for
Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion:
certiorari filed by petitioner Atty. Marietta D.
(1) for Reconsideration; (2) to Hold in
Zamoranos (Zamoranos), thus, affirming the
Abeyance Filing of the Instant Case; and (3) to
Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Lanao
Hold in Abeyance or Quash Warrant of Arrest
del Norte for Bigamy filed by petitioner
before the Secretary of Justice. Unfortunately
Samson R. Pacasum, Sr.
for Zamoranos, her twin motions were denied
On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de
by the Secretary of Justice in a resolution.
Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites.
Zamoranos’ second motion for
Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman
reconsideration, as with her previous motions,
Catholic who had converted to Islam on April
was likewise denied.
28, 1982. Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the
On the other civil litigation front on the
two wed again, this time, in civil rites before
Declaration of a Void Marriage, the lower court
Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC,
rendered a decision in favor of Zamoranos,
Quezon City.
dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of
A little after a year, on December 18, 1983,
jurisdiction. The court found that Zamoranos
Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce
and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such
by talaq. The court held that after evaluating
at the time of their marriage, whose marital
the testimonies of the parties, it is fully
relationship was governed by Presidential
convinced that both the complainant and the
Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as
respondent have been duly converted to the
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
faith of Islam prior to their Muslim wedding
Philippines, which provides that the Shari’a
and finding that there is no more possibility of
Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original
reconciliation by and between them, hereby
jurisdiction over the same. And any divorce
issues this decree of divorce. Consequently,
proceeding undertaken before the Shari’[a]
the marriage between Marietta (Mariam) D.
Court is valid, recognized, binding and
Zamoranos de Guzman and Jesus (Mohamad)
sufficient divorce proceedings.
de Guzman was dissolved by the Shari’a Circuit
The court held that the affirmative defenses
District Court in Isabela, Basilan.
which are in the nature of motion to dismiss is
Zamoranos married anew on December 20,
hereby granted. The CA and the SC affirmed
1989. As she had previously done in her first
the dismissal and the same became final and
nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed
executory and was recorded in the Book of
Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her
Entries of Judgments.
subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where
The RTC of Iligan, upon motion of Pacasum,
she worked, under Islamic rites and in order to
issued an Order reinstating criminal case for
strengthen the ties of their marriage,
Bigamy against Zamoranos.
Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their
Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the
marriage vows in a civil ceremony.
Information, arguing that the RTC had no
Zamoranos and Pacasum were then de facto
jurisdiction over her person and over the
separated. Pacasum filed cases for the
offense charged. Zamoranos asseverated, in
annulment of their marriage, criminal case for
the main, that the decision of the RTC
bigamy and an administrative case for
categorically declared her and Pacasum as
disbarment against Zamoranos. Pacasum
Muslims, resulting in the mootness and the
inapplicability of the RPC provision on Bigamy
to her marriage to Pacasum and prayed for the
dismissal of the case.
The motion to quash and motion for
reconsideration filed by Zamoranos was
denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari
for the nullification and reversal of the order of
the RTC. The CA dismissed Zamoranos’
petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a
petition for certiorari to assail the denial of a
Motion to Quash the Information. She now
comes to the SC in a petition for certiorari
alleging grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:
Whether or not an appeal is a legally
permissible remedy in an order denying a
motion to quash.
Held:
No. The Court granted the petition for
certiorari and granted the motion to quash
filed by Zamoranos. The denial of a motion to
quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable.
It is an interlocutory order which cannot be the
subject of an appeal.
Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper
remedy to assail the denial of a motion to
quash an information. The established rule is
that, when such an adverse interlocutory order
is rendered, the remedy is not to resort
forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to
continue with the case in due course and,
when an unfavorable verdict is handed down,
to take an appeal in the manner authorized by
law.
However, on a number of occasions, we have
recognized that in certain situations, certiorari
is considered an appropriate remedy to assail
an interlocutory order, specifically the denial of
a motion to quash. We have recognized the
propriety of the following exceptions: (a) when
the court issued the order without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is
patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious
relief; (c) in the interest of a "more
enlightened and substantial justice"; (d) to
promote public welfare and public policy; and
(e) when the cases "have attracted nationwide
attention, making it essential to proceed with
dispatch in the consideration thereof." The
first four of the foregoing exceptions occur in
this instance.
Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the
RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, committed an error
of jurisdiction, not simply an error of
judgment, in denying Zamoranos’ motion to
quash.
As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal,
board, or officer exercises judicial or quasi-
judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or
officer has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior
court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to
prevent it from committing such a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary
acts of courts—acts which courts have no
power or authority in law to perform.
True, the Shari’a Circuit Court is not vested
with jurisdiction over offenses penalized under
the RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan
City, is correct when it declared that:
The Regional Trial Courts are vested the
exclusive and original jurisdiction in all criminal
cases not within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body.
[Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg. 129] The Code of Muslim
Personal Laws (PD 1083) created the Sharia
District Courts and Sharia Circuit Courts with
limited jurisdiction. Neither court was vested
jurisdiction over criminal prosecution of
violations of the Revised Penal Code. There is
nothing in PD 1083 that divested the Regional
Trial Courts of its jurisdiction to try and decide
cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court has
jurisdiction over this case.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even
in criminal cases, the trial court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy
hinges on Pacasum’s claim that Zamoranos is
not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman
was governed by civil law. This is obviously far
from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos’
Muslim status should have been apparent to
both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan
City, and the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy
dwells on the accused contracting a second
marriage while a prior valid one still subsists
and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least,
the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have
suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had
litigated the validity of Zamoranos and De
Guzman’s marriage before the Shari’a Circuit
Court and had successfully shown that it had
not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq
entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.
Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for
certiorari before the CA when her liberty was
already in jeopardy with the continuation of
the criminal proceedings against her.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists
in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to
"promote the advancement and effective
participation of the National Cultural
Communities x x x, [and] the State shall
consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and
interests in the formulation and
implementation of its policies."
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because
the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction
over the offense defeats the purpose for the
enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by
the State on Muslim Filipinos.
If both parties are Muslims, there is a
presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim
law is complied with. If together with it or in
addition to it, the marriage is likewise
solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code
of the Philippines, in a so-called combined
Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever comes
first is the validating rite and the second rite is
merely ceremonial one. But, in this case, as
long as both parties are Muslims, this Muslim
Code will apply. In effect, two situations will
arise, in the application of this Muslim Code or
Muslim law, that is, when both parties are
Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim
and the marriage is solemnized in accordance
with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third
situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of the
Philippines will govern the marriage and
divorce of the parties, if the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with the Civil Code.
One of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well
as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance
of matrimonial bond, entitling one to remarry.
It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos’
divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an
Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari’a Circuit
Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was
valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry
Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to
try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.
Wassmer v. Velez 12 SCRA 648
Facts:
Franciso Velez and Beatriz Wassmer decided
to get married on September 4, 1954. Two
days before the wedding, Francisco left a note
for his bride-to-be:Will have to postpone
wedding-My mother opposes it. Am leaving on
the Convair today. The next day, he sent her
the ff. telegram: NOTHING CHANGED REST
ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON
APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE PAKING. Velez
filed for damages, and judgment was rendered
ordering defendant to pay actual, moral and
exemplary damages. Defendant now asserts
that his failure to marry plaintiff was due to
fortuitous event and circumstances beyond his
control and the judgment against him is
contrary to law, given that there is no
provision in the Civil Code authorizing an
action for breach of promise to marry.
Issue: WON breach of promise to marry is
actionable.
Held: No it is not, but this case is not a mere
breach of promise to marry. He must be held
answerable for the damages in accordance
with Art. 21.The SC maintained that though
breach of promise to marry is not actionable,
but the defendant’s act is still punishable
under Article 21 of the Civil Code which states
that “any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.” In this
case, plaintiff already arranged everything for
the wedding, like the wedding gowns,
invitations, matrimonial bed, etc. The SC held
that this is not a case of mere breach of
promise to marry - A wedding has been
formally set and all the preparations have been
made, only for the groom to walk out 2 days
before. This is contrary to good customs, since
defendant acted in a reckless and oppressive
manner.
Baksh v. CA, 219 SCRA 115
C. Agreements prior to Marriage
2. Breach of promise to marry
FACTS:
About December 1997, Apolonio courted
Arceli both of adult age. That Apolonio
expressed his undying love affection to Araceli
also in due time reciprocated the tender
feelings, in consideration of Apolonio promise
of marriage Araceli consented and acceded to
Apolonio’s pleas for carnal knowledge. Until
December 1959, through his protestations of
love and promises of marriage, defendant
succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff,
as a result of which the latter conceived a
child. Araceli informed Aplolonio and pleaded
with him to make good his promises of
marriage but instead of honoring his promises
and righting his wrong, Apolonio stopped and
refrained from seeing Araceli since about July
1959 has not visited her and to all intents and
purposes has broken their engagement and
his promises.
ISSUE:
WON man seduced the woman entitling her to
the rewards set forth in Art 21.
HELD:
No. Plainly there is voluntariness and mutual
passion. The facts stand out that for one whole
year, from 1958 to 1959, Araceli, a woman of
adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations
with Apolonio, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with
the idea of seduction.
Hence, the courts conclude that no case is
made under Art. 21 of the Civil Code and no
other cause of action being alleged, no error
was committed by the CFI in dismissing the
complaint. The decision of CA is reversed and
that of CFI is affirmed.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Breach of
promise to Marry – Article 21 of the Civil Code
In August 1986, while working as a waitress in
Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales,
then 21 years old, met Gashem Shookat
Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from
Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan.
The two got really close and intimate. On
Marilou’s account, she said that Gashem later
offered to marry her at the end of the
semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to
her parents where they expressed their
intention to get married. Marilou’s parents
then started inviting sponsors and relatives to
the wedding. They even started looking for
animals to slaughter for the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem
in his apartment where they had sexual
intercourse. But in no time, their relationship
went sour as Gashem began maltreating
Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his
promise of marrying Marilou and he told her
that he is already married to someone in
Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later
sued Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and
awarded her P20k in moral damages. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never
proposed marriage to Marilou and that he
cannot be adjudged to have violated Filipino
customs and traditions since he, being an
Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs
and traditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals
is correct.
HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for
damages in favor of Marilou not really because
of his breach of promise to marry her but
based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the
deceit and fraud employed by Gashem that
constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil
Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a
deceitful scheme to lure her into sexual
congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou
was not a woman of loose morals. She was a
virgin before she met Gashem. She would not
have surrendered herself to Gashem had
Gashem not promised to marry her. Gashem’s
blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on
marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is
contrary to morals, good customs, and public
policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the
hospitality of our country and even taking
advantage of the opportunity to study here he
is expected to respect our traditions. Any act
contrary will render him liable under Article 21
of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article
21 was meant to expand the concepts of torts
and quasi delict. It is meant to cover situations
such as this case where the breach complained
of is not strictly covered by existing laws. It
was meant as a legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible
for human foresight to specifically enumerate
and punish in the statute books – such as the
absence of a law penalizing a the breach of
promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal
luminaries that if the promise to marry was
made and there was carnal knowledge
because of it, then moral damages may be
recovered (presence of moral or criminal
seduction), Except if there was mutual lust; or
if expenses were made because of the promise
(expenses for the wedding), then actual
damages may be recovered.
Abanag v Mabute, AM P-11-2922, April
4, 2011
Facts: Abanag filed a complaint against
Mabute for Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct
with the OCA, alleging that the latter courted
her and professed his undying love for her.
Relying on his promise that he would marry
her, she agreed to live with him. She got
pregnant, and Mabute tried to have her get an
abortion. When Abanag did not agree, Mabute
grew cold and eventually left her. Her
depression resulted in a miscarriage.
Mabute filed his answer to the complaint,
denying the allegations and claimed that the
charges were baseless, false, and fabricated.
He insisted that the complaint was filed by
Norma Tordesillas in order to harass him
because Mabute would chastise her for her
arrogant behavior and undesirable work
attitude. Abanag averred that she wrote the
complaint herself.
The letter-complaint was referred to RTC in
Samar for investigation, report and
recommendation. Mabute sought for the
inhibition of the judge originally assigned to
the case for his biased relationship with
Abanag. It was then reshuffled to another
judge.
Complainant testified that she met Mabute
while she was a member of SFC. They started
dating and eventually lived together. Mabute
avers that he did force her to get an abortion,
and that he even proposed marriage, but
Abanag’s mother did not like him. They parted
ways since then, but he pledged his undying
love for her.
RTC ruling: It recommended the dismissal of
the complaint, reporting that the personal
affairs of a court employee has nothing to do
with his public employment. Abanag was not
forced to live with Mabute. She freely acceded
to cohabit with him. The situation thus, does
not give rise to administrative sanction.
Issue: W/N Mabute can be administratively
sanctioned on the grounds of breach of
promise to marry?
Held: NO. Petition is dismissed for lack of
merit.
Ratio: immoral conduct is defined as conduct
that is willful, flagrant, and shameless, and
that shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of the good and respectable members of the
community. To justify suspension or
disbarment, the act complained of must not
only be immoral, but grossly immoral. This is
an act so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or an act so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.
Mabute’s acts complained of cannot be
considered as disgraceful or grossly immoral
conduct. SC finds that the sexual relations
between the parties were consensual. Mere
sexual relations between two unmarried and
consenting adults are not enough to warrant
administrative sanction for illicit behavior.
Voluntary intimacy between a man and a
women who are not marred, where both are
not under any impediment to marry, and
where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor
an unprincipled act that would warrant
disbarment or disciplinary action.
It is not within the SC’s authority to decide on
matters touching on employee’s personal lives.
CCI v. Quiñones, G.R. No. 175822,
October 13, 2013
A. Legal Facts
Respondent, Shirley G. Quiñones, a
ticketing agent of Cebu Pacific Air, bought a
pair of black jeans worth P2,098.00 from
Guess USA Boutique. While she was on her
way to Mercury Drug Store, a Guess employee
approached her and said that she failed to pay
for the black jeans. Nevertheless, she
presented an official receipt and suggested
that they should talk about the matter in the
Cebu Pacific Office located within the mall.
While they were in the office, the Guess
employees allegedly humiliated her in front of
the clients of Cebu Pacific, repeatedly
demanded payment and even searched the
respondent’s wallet to check how much money
she had. Another argument ensued and after
that, respondent went home. The Guess
employees submitted two letters to the
Director of Cebu Pacific narrating the incident
but the said letters were not received.
Respondent filed a complaint for
damages against the petitioners, California
Clothing, Inc., Excelsis Villagonzalo, Imelda
Hawayon and Michelle S. Ybañez, alleging that
due to the incident, she suffered physical
anxiety, sleepless nights, mental anguish,
fright, serious apprehension, besmirched
reputation, moral shock and humiliation. She
demanded payment for moral, nominal, and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses.
Petitioners stated that they approached
the respondent to clarify whether or not
payment was made and that they approached
and talked to the respondent in a gentle and
polite manner. They sought payment for moral
and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses as counterclaim.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed both
the complaint and counterclaim stating that
the petitioners acted in good faith and the
respondent was the one who put herself in
that situation by inviting the Guess employees
to the Cebu Pacific Office to discuss about the
issue of payment. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the Regional
Trial Court decision stating that there was
preponderance of evidence showing the
petitioners acted in bad faith but, Hawayon
and Villagonzalo were absolved from liability
due to good faith. Since petitioners acted in
bad faith, respondent was entitled to damages
and attorney’s fees.
The principle of abuse of rights under Article
19 of the Civil Code is present in the case.
Respondent complained when petitioners
embarrassed her and insisted that she did not
pay for the black jeans despite the issuance of
an official receipt in her favor.
The court cited the case of Carpio vs.
Valmonte in which the elements of abuse of
rights were enumerated. “The elements of
abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a
legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in
bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing
or injuring another.” The elements stated are
complete in the present case. First, petitioners
continued to insist that there was no payment
made when respondent already presented the
black jeans with the original receipt. Second,
they accused the respondent that not only did
she fail to pay for the black jeans but she
intentionally stole it and quickly left the shop.
Third, the letters sent to the respondent’s
employer was not only intended to ask for
assistance in collection of the payment but
also to ruin the respondent’s reputation.
The exercise of rights is subject to
limitations. Thus, it must be in accordance
with the purpose of its establishment and not
abused.
Respondent was awarded P50,000.00
as moral damages and P20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.
BDO v. GOMEZ, G.R. No. 199601,
November 23, 2015

B. Legal Issue

Whether or not petitioners acted in bad

faith which resulted to the Court of Appeals
awarding moral damages and attorney’s fees
to respondent, Shirley G. Quiñones. Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr., G.R.
No. 179736, June 26, 2013

C. Ruling

Yes, petitioners acted in bad faith and

the award for moral damages and attorney’s
FACTS
fees to respondent was proper. The Supreme
Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision.
Sometime in April 2005, Aldo Development &
Resources, Inc. (owned by Choachuy’s) filed a
case for Injunction and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction or Temporary
Restraining Order against the Hing’s. The
latter claimed that the Hing’s constructed a
fence without a valid permit and that it would
destroy the walls of their building. The court
denied the application for lack of evidence. So
in order to get evidences for the case, on June
2005, Choachuy illegally set-up two video
surveillance cameras facing the Hing’s
property. Their employees even took pictures
of the said construction of the fence. The
Hing’s then filed a case against the Choachuy’s
for violating their right to privacy. On October
2005, the RTC issued a order granting the
application of the Hing’s for TRO and directed
the Choachuy’s to remove the two video
surveillance cameras they installed. The
Choachuy’s appealed the case to the Court of
Appeals and the RTC’s decision was annulled
and set aside. The Hing’s then raised the case
to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of two
video surveillance cameras of Choachuy’s
violated the Hing’s right to privacy.
HELD:
Such act of the Choachuy’s violated the right
of privacy of the Hing’s under Article 26(1)
prohibiting the “prying into the privacy of
another’s residence.” Although it is a business
office and not a residence, the owner has the
right to exclude the public or deny them
access.
Catalan vs Basa
Facts:
On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was
discharged from active military service. The
Board of Medical Officers of the Department of
Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to
render military service due to his mental
disorder (schizophrenia). On September 28,
1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. On
June 16, 1951, Feliciano allegedly donated to
his sister Mercedes one-half of the real
property through the execution of
a document, titled, “Absolute deed of
Donation”. On December 11,
1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed
Special Proceedings to
declare Feliciano incompetent. On December
22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order
of Adjudication of Incompetency for
Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing
Allowance of Feliciano. Thus, Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI), which is formerly the
People’s Bank and Trust Company, was
appointed to be his guardian by the trial court.
On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the
property donated by Felicianoto her in issue in
her children Delia and Jesus Basa. On April 1,
1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian filed
a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents,
Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as
well as damages against herein respondents.
BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute
Donation of Mercedes was void ab initio, as
Feliciano never donated the property to
Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even
if Feliciano had truly intended to give the
property to her, the donation would still be
void, as he was not of sound mind and was
therefore incapable of giving valid consent. On
August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. Both
the lower court and Court of
Appeals dismissed the case because
of insufficient evidence presented by the
complainants to overcome the presumption
that Feliciano was sane and competent at the
time he executed the deed of donation in favor
of Mercedes Catalan.
Issue:
Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to
execute the donation
Whether or not the property donated to
Mercedes and later on sold to her children
is legally in possession of the latter
Are laches and prescription should be
considered in the case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of
the lower court and the Court of
Appeals and denied the petition. A donation is
an act of liberality whereby a person disposes
gratuitously a thing or right in favor of
another, who accepts it. Like any other
contract, an agreement of the parties is
essential. Consent in contracts presupposes
the following requisites: (1) it should be
intelligent or with an exact notion of the
matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free;
and (3) it should be spontaneous. The parties’
intention must be clear and the attendance of
a vice of consent, like any contract, renders
the donation voidable. A person suffering from
schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his
competence to intelligently dispose his
property. By merely alleging the existing of
schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show
substantial proof that at the date of the
donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan
had lost total control of his mental facilities.
Thus, the lower court correctly held
that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time
and this condition continued to exist until proof
to the contrary was adduced. Since the
donation was valid. Mercedes has the right to
sell the property to whomever she chose. Not
a shred of evidence has been presented to
prove the claim that Mercedes’ sale of property
to her children was tainted with fraud or
falsehood. Thus, the property in question
belongs to Deliaand Jesus Basa. The Supreme
Court notes the issue of prescription and
laches for the first time on appeal before the
court. It is sufficient for the Supreme Court to
note that even if it prospered, the deed of
donation was still a voidable, not a void,
contract. As such, it remained binding as it was
not annulled in a proper action in court within
Mercado v. Espiritu 37 Phil 215
four years.
FACTS:
The case was about the contract made by Luis
Espiritu (father of Jose Espiritu, the defendant)
and the heirs of his sister Margarita Mercado;
Domingo and Josepha Mercado, who
pretended to be of legal age to give their
consent into the contract of sale of the land
they inherited from their deceased mother
Margarita Mercado (sister of Luis Mercado).
The siblings Domingo et. al., sought for the
annulment of contract asserting that Domingo
and Josepha were minors during the
perfection of contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when
the minors presented themselves that they
were of legal age.
HELD:
The court declared that the contract of sale
was VALID, even if it were made and entered
into by minors, who pretended to be of legal
age. The court stated that they will not be
permitted to excuse themselves from the
fulfillment of the obligations contracted by
them, or to have them annulled.
The ruling was in accordance with the
provisions on law on estoppel and Rule 123,
Section 6 paragraph A which states that
“whenever a party has, by its own declaration,
act or omission, intentionally and deliberately
led
Atizado vs People, GR No. 173822,
October 13, 2010
another party to believe a particular thing to
be true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, cannot be permitted to falsify it.

FACTS: Petitioners Atixado and Monreal are
accused of killing and murdering one Rogelio
Llona on April 1994. It was said that both
petitioners barged in on the house of one
Desder, where the victim was a guest and
suddenly shot at Llona with their guns. After
the shooting, they fled. For their defense, the
petitioners interposed that they were at their
family residence and drinking gin.The RTC
convicted Atizado and Monreal for the crime of
murder and sentenced them with reclusion
perpetua. On appeal to the CA, the court
affirmed the conviction in 2005.It is important
to note that Salvador Monreal was a minor at
the time of the commission of the crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in
finding the petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for murder. What is the
penalty to be imposed on Monreal, a minor
during the time of the commission?
HELD/RATIO:
Yes, conviction affirmed. However, the
penalty imposed on Monreal is suspended. The
witness positive identification of the
petitioners as the killers, and her declarations
on what each of the petitioners did when they
mounted their sudden deadly assault against
Llona left no doubt whatsoever that they had
conspired to kill and had done so with
treachery. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the
penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. There being no modifying
circumstances, the CA correctly imposed the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on
Atizado. But reclusion perpetua was not the
correct penalty for Monreal due to his being a
minor over15 but under 18 years of age. The
RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreal’s
minority at the time of the commission of the
murder probably because his birth certificate
was not presented at the trial. Yet, it cannot
be doubted that Monreal was a minor below
18 years of age when the crime was
committed on April 18, 1994.His counter-
affidavit, the police blotter and trial records
show that Monreal was a minor at the time of
the commission. Monreal’s minority was legally
sufficient, for it conformed with the norms
subsequently set under Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 9344:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in
conflict with the law shall enjoy the
presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all
the rights of a child in conflict with the law until
he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old
or older. In all proceedings, law enforcement
officers, prosecutors, judges and other
government officials concerned shall exert all
efforts at determining the age of the child in
conflict with the law. Monreal has been
Hernandez vs Santos, G.R. No.
169217, August 7, 2009
detained for over 16 years, that is, from the
time of his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the
present. Given that the entire period of
Monreal’s detention should be credited in the
service of his sentence, pursuant to Section 41
of Republic Act No. 9344, the revision of the
penalty warranted his immediate release from
the penitentiary.
Facts:
Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu)
was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses
Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan
Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due
to complications during childbirth. After
Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her
maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.
On December 16, 1951, Felix married
Natividad Cruz. The union produced three
children, petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma.
Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C.
Hernandez-Villa Abrille.
Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the
sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited
valuable real properties from the San Juan
family (conservatively estimated at P50 million
in 1997).
Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her
father and his new family. She was then 10
years old and studying at La Consolacion
College. However, due to her violent
personality, Lulu stopped schooling when she
reached Grade 5.
In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority,
Lulu was given full control of her estate.
Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish
her elementary education, Felix continued to
exercise actual administration of Lulus
properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993,
petitioners took over the task of administering
Lulu's properties.
Medical specialists testified to explain the
results of Lulus examinations which revealed
the alarming state of her health. Not only was
Lulu severely afflicted with diabetes mellitus
and suffering from its complications, she also
had an existing artheroselorotic cardiovascular
disease (which was aggravated by her
obesity). Furthermore, they unanimously
opined that in view of Lulus intelligence level
(which was below average) and fragile mental
state, she would not be able to care for herself
and self-administer her medications.
Issues:
Is Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself
and inherit a parcel of land at Marilou
Subdivision formerly belong to San Juan
Family? And who was her legal guardian?
Held:
No, because of her illnesses and low
educational attainment, needed assistance in
taking care of herself and managing her affairs
considering the extent of her estate. With
regard to the respondents appointment as the
legal guardian, the CA found that,
People v Bulagao, GR 184757, Oct. 5,
2011
since Lulu did not trust petitioners, none of
them was qualified to be her legal guardian.
According to article 38 of the civil code of the
Philippines that minority, insanity or imbecility,
the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and
civil interdiction are mere restrictions on
capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations,
as when the latter arise from his acts or from
property relations, such as easements.
Facts:
Aniceto Bulagao was charged with two counts
of rape, who willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of [AAA] 14 years
old, against the latter’s will and consent. AAA was living
with the family of the accused as she was adopted by
the latter’s parents. On redirect examination, AAA
testified that accused-appellant did not force himself
upon her. She affirmed that accused-appellant had a
little defect in his mind. Another witness for the defense
was Yolanda Palma, a clinical psychologist. She
conducted a mental examination on accused-appellant
on September 12, 2002, and found that accused-
appellant was suffering from mental retardation as he
had an IQ of below 50. RTC rendered decision convicting
the accused. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON Bulagao is exempted from his criminal
liability?
HELD:
No. Accused-appellant, in his appeal, did not
insist on the allegation in the trial court that he was
suffering from mental retardation. Nevertheless, the
court agree with the finding of the trial court that there
was no proof that the mental condition accused-
appellant allegedly exhibited when he was examined by
Yolanda Palma was already present at the time of the
rape incidents. Anyone who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it
with clear and convincing evidence.[32] Besides, this
Court observes that neither the acts of the accused-
appellant proven before the court, nor his answers in
his testimony, show a complete deprivation of
intelligence or free will. Insanity presupposes that the
accused was completely deprived of reason or
discernment and freedom of will at the time of the
commission of the crime.[33] Only when there is a
complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the
commission of the crime should the exempting
circumstance of insanity be considered.
Petitioner: Nilo Oropesa
Respondent: Cirilo Oropesa
Facts:
Petitioner claimed that the respondent has been
afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly
for over 10 years and was observed to have had
lapses in memory and judgement. Due to
respondent’s condition, he cannot manage his
property wisely without the help of others and has
become an easy prey for deceit from his girlfriend,
Luisa Agamata.
On January 23, 2004, the petitioner filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for him and
his companion to be appointed as guardians over
the respondent’s property. RTC dismissed the
petition due to lack of evidence, and later on the
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling.
Issue:
WON respondent is considered an incompetent
person and should be placed under guardianship.
Held:
NO. respondent is not incompetent and should not
be placed under guardianship and therefore the
petition was denied.
Ratio:
According to the respondent, petitioner did not
present any relevant documentary or testimonial
evidence. The Court noted the absence of any
testimony of a medical expert which states that
Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental,
emotional, and physical capacity to manage his
own affairs. On the contrary, Respondent pointed
Oropesa v Oropesa, GR 184528, April
25, 2012
out in the petitioner’s evidence which includes a
Neuropsychological Screening Report stating that
Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range
in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is
capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide
solutions to problem situations. The Report
concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact
cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired
abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is
the observation of the Court that oppositor is still
sharp, alert and able.
It is also long settled that "factual findings of the
trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
will not be disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such
findings by the lower courts are entitled to great
weight and respect, and are deemed final and
conclusive on this Court when supported by the
evidence on record." We therefore adopt the
factual findings of the lower court and the Court of
Appeals and rule that the grant of respondent’s
demurrer to evidence was proper under the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar.
There was no error on the part of the trial court
when it dismissed the petition for guardianship
without first requiring respondent to present his
evidence precisely because the effect of granting a
demurrer to evidence other than dismissing a
cause of action is, evidently, to preclude a
defendant from presenting his evidence since,
upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief.
Topics: Restriction on Civil Capacity- Restriction
on Capacity to Act- Insanity
Doctrines and Provisions:
Crewlink v Teringtering, GR 166803,
October 14, 2012
Article 38 of the Civil Code
Article 12 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
No. 6, Section C, Part II of the POEA "Standard
Employment Contract Governing the Employment
of All Filipino Seamen On-Board Ocean-Going
Vessels"
Doctrine: The issue of Insanity is a question of
fact; establishing the insanity of an accused
requires opinion testimony which may be given by
a witness who is intimately acquainted with the
person claimed to be insane, or who has rational
basis to conclude that a person was insane based
on the witness’ own perception of the person, or
who is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist
Facts:
 April 9, 2011, Jacinto Teringtering jumped
overboard at about 8:20pm but was
recovered.
 Jacinto jumped overboard again at about
10:30pm, his body was revived at
11:00pm
 April 18, 2001, a death certificate was
issued by the Ministry of Health of the
United Arab Emirates wherein it was
stated that Jacinto died on April 9, 2001
due to asphyxia of drowning.
 Editha Teringtering claimed payment for
death compensation; Crewlink refused
because Jacinto Teringtering committed
suicide.
 February 12, 2002- the Labor Arbiter
dismissed the case for lack of merit
because his death was directly attributable
to him
 February 20, 2003- Teringtering appealed
before the NLRC which affirmed in toto
the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.
 Teringtering filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals
and sought the nullification of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Resolution.
 July 8, 2004- The CA reversed and set
aside the assailed Resolution of the NLRC.
 Thus this petition
Issues and Holdings:
1. W/N the death of Jacinto is a result of a
willful act attributable to him and thus, not
compensable?
The death of Jacinto is not
compensable because it was a
deliberate act of killing himself by
jumping into the sea as
substantially proven by Crewlink.
Willful Act. Editha’s claim on
insanity as caused by
homesickness and/or family
problems may result to depression
does not necessarily equate to
mental disorder. The issue of
insanity is a question of fact. It
requires an opinion testimony
which may be given by a witness
who is intimately acquainted with
the person claimed to be insane,
or who has rational basis to
conclude that a person was insane
based on the witness’ own
perception the person, or who is
qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist. No such evidence was
presented to support respondent's
claim to Death Benefits of the
Employee
The issue for resolution
here is the obligation of the
employer to its employee based on
contract of employment and not
one of contract of carriage.
Indeed, in order to avail of death
benefits, the death of the
employee should occur during the
effectivity of the employment
contract. This rule, however, is not
absolute. The employer may be
exempt from liability if it can
successfully prove that the
seaman's death was directly
attributable to his deliberate or
willful act as stated in No. 6,
Section C, Part II of the POEA-SEC.
While it is true that labor
contracts are impressed with public
interest and the provisions of the
POEA-SEC must be construed
logically and liberally in favor of
Filipino seamen, still the rule is
that justice is in every case for the
deserving, to be dispensed with in
the light of established facts, the
applicable law, and existing
jurisprudence
Ruling:
The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the CA and its resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Resolutions of the NLRC are hereby
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Note:
VELASCO, JR., J Chairperson, ABAD,
MENDOZA, and PEREZ, JJ., concur.

Jalosjos v COMELEC, G.R. No. 193237,
October 9, 2012
Insanity, as a defense, must be shown by the
defense, through positive evidence, to have
been the cause of the offense.
Insanity is not the same as an inability to
control one’s temper or a lack of judgment.
FACTS:  Jalosjos and Cardino were
candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010
elections. Jalosjos was running for his third
term.
 Cardino filed a petition under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course
and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Jalosjos. It was alleged that Jalosjos made a
false material representation in his certificate
of candidacy when he declared under oath
that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor.
People v Boaquina, G.R. No. 188978,
June 13, 2012
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed
his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had
already been convicted by final judgment for
robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the
RTC Cebu and have not served his sentence.
 Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated
that he had already been granted probation.
Cardino countered that the RTC revoked
Jalosjos’ probation. Jalosjos refuted Cardino
and stated that the RTC issued an Order
declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with
the order of probation.
 Jalosjos further stated that during the 2004
elections the COMELEC denied a petition for
disqualification filed against him on the same
grounds.
 COMELEC First Division ruled in favor of
Cardino and found that Jalosjos’ certificate of
compliance of probation was fraudulently
issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet served his
sentence. Therefore, he is not eligible to run.
ISSUE: Did COMELEC commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it disqualified Jalosjos to run
as Mayor?
HELD: No.
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that a false statement in a certificate
of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run
for public office is a false material
representation is a ground for disqualification.
Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from
the start since he was not eligible to run for
any public office at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a
candidate at any time.
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically
carries with it, by operation of law, the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification, both would constitute
ineligibilities to be elected or hold public office.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Revised Penal Code
 Art. 31. Effect of the penalties of perpetual
or temporary special disqualification. — The
penalties of perpetual or temporal special
disqualification for public office, profession or
calling shall produce the following effects: 1.
The deprivation of the office, employment,
profession or calling affected; 2. The
disqualification for holding similar offices or
employments either perpetually or during the
term of the sentence according to the extent
of such disqualification.
 Art. 34. Civil interdiction. — Civil interdiction
shall deprive the offender during the time of
his sentence of the rights of parental authority,
or guardianship, either as to the person or
property of any ward, of marital authority, of
the
Geluz v. CA 2 SCRA 801
right
to
manage his property and of the right to
dispose of such property by any act or any
conveyance inter vivos.
 Art. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal; Their accessory penalties. — The
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the
sentence as the case may be, and that of
perpetual absolute disqualification which the
offender shall suffer even though pardoned as
to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
TOPIC: Natural Persons / Birth
FACTS:
 Respondent Oscar Lazo is the husband of Nita
Villanueva. Nita had a total of three abortions from
petitioner Antonio Geluz.
 Lazo was aware of, and even initiated, Nita’s first
two abortions: the first, before they got married;
and the second, when she was working for the
COMELEC.
 The third abortion was acquired without Lazo’s
knowledge when he was campaigning in Cagayan.
This gave rise to his demand for damages from
Geluz, based on Art. 2206 of the Civil Code.
 The CFI and the CA both ruled in favor of Lazo,
ordering Geluz to pay damages and attorney’s
fees.
ISSUE(S):
WON Lazo, who voluntarily procured an abortion
for Nita, may recover damages (on behalf of the
aborted fetus) from Geluz, who performed the
abortion.
HELD:
No, he may not. Decisions of the CFI and CA
reversed; copy furnished to DOJ and Board of
Medical Examiners for possible action against
Geluz.
 Art. 2206 of the Civil Code does not apply to the
unborn fetus, who is not endowed with personality.
o An action for pecuniary damages on account of
injury or death pertains to the one injured.
Because the fetus has no juridical personality
based on Arts. 40-41 of the Civil Code, it has no
cause of action, let alone one that may accrue to
its parents.
Continental Steel vs. Montano, GR
182836, October 13, 2009
 Because the aborted fetus is already dead when
it is separated from its mother’s womb, it doesn’t
even have provisional personality based on Art. 40,
because the requirement is that it be “born alive”.
 While the recourse of the parents could have
been moral damages (2217) or exemplary
damages (2230), their acts and demeanor served
as no basis for such because they themselves
caused and consented to the abortions.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
 A “person” with no juridical personality cannot
be the source of actions.
 A conceived child has personality, but only if it
is later born alive.
FACTS: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner
Continental Steel, filed a claim for Paternity
Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and
Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to recognizes the life of the unborn from
the CBA. The claim was for Hortillano’s unborn conception.
child who died. Hortillano’s wife had a
premature delivery while she was on her 38th
week of pregnancy. The female fetus died ISSUE: W/N a fetus can be considered as a
during the labor. The company granted dependent.
Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but
HELD: Yes. Even an unborn child is a
denied his claims for bereavement leave and
dependent of its parents. The fetus would
death benefits. Hortillano claimed that the
have not reached 38-39 weeks without
provision in CBS did not specifically state that
depending upon its mother.
the dependent should have first been born
alive or must have acquired juridical
personality. Petitioner argued that the said
provision of CBA did not contemplate death of
an unborn child or a fetus without legal
personality. They also claimed that there are
two elements for the entitlement of the
benefit: 1) death; and 2) status of legitimate Facts:
dependent. None which existed in Hortillano’s
case. They further contend that the only one
with civil personality could die, based on Art Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her
40-42 of Civil Code. Hence, according to parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought
petitioner, the unborn child never died. Labor an appeal from the orders of Zamboanga CFI,
Arbiter Montana argued that the fetus had the which dismissed her complaint for support and
right to be supported by the parents from the damages and request for amendment of
very moment he/she was conceived. Petitioner complaint.
appealed to CA but CA affirmed Labor Arbiter’s
decision. Hence, this petition.
Quimiguing averred that the then already
married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual
ISSUE: W/N only one with juridical personality relations with her through force and
can die. intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant
despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao and
HELD: No. The reliance of Continental Steel on
had to stop studying. She then claimed for
Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the
monthly support, damages and attorney’s
legal definition of death is misplaced. Article
fees.
40 provides that a conceived child acquires
personality only when it is born, and Article 41 The defendant-appellee, however, moved to
dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s failure to allege
Quimiging v Icao, 34 SCRA 134 the fact that a child had been born in her
complaint. The lower court dismissed the case
defines when a child is considered born. and subsequently denied further amendment
Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is to the complaint, ruling that no amendment
extinguished by death. The issue of civil was allowed for failure of the original
personality is irrelevant in this case. Arts 40- complaint to state a cause of action.
42 do not provide at all definition of death. Life
is not synonymous to civil personality. One
need not acquire civil personality first before Issue:
s/he could die. The Constitution in fact
W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for FACTS:
support and damages from defendant despite
failure to allege fact of birth in complaint
Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20
years of age was a cashier in a barber shop
Ruling: owned by the defendant’s brother in law
Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the
Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant
defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried
had right to support of the child she was
scion of a prominent family in Manila was
carrying and an independent cause of action
accustomed to have his haircut in the said
for damages.
barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonio
and had an amorous relationship. As a
consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40)
baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.
recognizes the provisional personality of the
unborn child, which includes its right to
support from its progenitors, even it is only “en
In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy,
ventre de sa mere.” Article 742 of the same
defendant was a constant visitor. On February
De Jesus v Syquia, 1933 1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev father
confirming that the child is his and he wanted
his name to be given to the child. Though he
Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it
was out of the country, he continuously wrote
may receive donations through persons that
letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time
legally represent it. Readings of Articles 40,
for her and “junior’s” sake. The defendant
854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the
ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the
Spanish Code also further strengthen the case
birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph
for reversal of order.
Hospital in Manila.

Additionally, “for a married man to force a

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and
woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx
his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila
constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his
where they lived together for about a year.
victim that entitles her to claim compensation
When Antonia showed signs of second
for damage caused” per Article 21 of the Civil
pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and
Code, a provision supported by Article 2219,
he was married with another woman at this
which provides moral damages for victims of
time.
seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious
acts.
It should be noted that during the christening
of the child, the defendant who was in charge
Judgment reversed, set aside and remanded
of the arrangement of the ceremony caused
for proceedings conformable to the decision;
the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead
with costs against Icao
of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the note to the padre in
connection with the other letters written by
defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy
proves acknowledgement of paternity.
2. Whether trial court erred in holding that
Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted
possession of the status of a natural child,
justified by the conduct of the father himself,
and that as a consequence, the defendant in
this case should be compelled to acknowledge
the said Ismael Loanco.
HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father
serves as admission of paternity and the other
letters are sufficient to connect the admission
with
Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio
Fragante 80 Phil 776
the
child
carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is
that the writing shall be indubitable.
“The law fixes no period during which a child
must be in the continuous possession of the
status of a natural child; and the period in this
case was long enough to reveal the father's
resolution to admit the status”.
Supreme Court held that they agree with the
trial court in refusing to provide damages to
Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of
promise to marry since action on this has no
standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no
proof upon which a judgment could be based
requiring the defendant to recognize the
second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found
no necessity to modify the judgment as to the
amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael
Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month.
They likewise pointed out that it is only the
trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the
order as to the amount of pension.
FACTS: Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the
time of his death, applied for a certificate of
public convenience to install and maintain an
ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. His intestate estate
is financially capable of maintaining the
proposed service. The Public Service
Commission issued a certificate of public
Dumlao v. Quality Plastics 70 SCRA
472
convenience to Intestate Estate of the
deceased through its special or judicial
administrator appointed by the proper court of
competent jurisdiction to maintain and operate
the said plant. Petitioner claims that the
granting of certificate applied to the estate is
a contravention of law.
ISSUE: W/N the estate of Fragante may be
extended an artificial judicial personality
HELD: Yes, because under the Civil Code,
“estate of a dead person could be considered
as artificial juridical person for the purpose of
settlement and distribution of his properties.”
Fragante has rights and fulfillment of
obligation which survived after his death. One
of those rights involved the pending
application for public convenience before the
PSC. The state or the mass of property, rights
left by the decedent, instead of heirs directly,
become vested and charged with his rights
and obligations. Under the present legal
system, rights and obligations which survived
after death have to be exercised and fulfilled
only by the estate of the deceased.
FACTS:

Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered
on February 28, 1962 ordering defendants
Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and
Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the
sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest
from November 1958 before its decision
became final or else Quality Plastics is hereby
authorized to foreclose the bond. Defendants
failed to pay the amount before the limit given.
Oria's land, which was covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area
of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied
upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction
on September 24, 1962 which he has given as
security under the bond.
Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long
before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not
aware on Oria’s death. The summons and
copies of complaint was personally served on
June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven
which the latter acknowledged and signed in
his own behalf and his co-defendants.
Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all
surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs
in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality
Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the
annulment of the judgment against Oria and
the execution against his land (T-873).
Dionisio also sued in his capacity as
administrator of Oria’s testate estate.
ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and
execution against his land be annulled on the
ground of lack in juridical capacity.
Eugenio v. Velez 185 SCRA 425
HELD:
Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons
on T-873 just learned that Oria was already
dead prior case T-662 was filed. The
Dumalaos’ agreed in their stipulation that
indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of Oria’s
death and that they acted in good faith in
joining Oria as a co-defendant.
However, no jurisdiction was acquired over
Oria, thus, the judgment against him is a
patent nullity. Lower court’s judgment against
Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over
his person as far as Oria was concerned. He
had no more civil personality and his juridical
capacity which is the fitness to be the subject
of legal relations was lost through death.
The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality
Plastics in order to annul the judgment against
Oria does not follow that they are entitiled to
claim attorney’s fees against the corporation.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is
reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil
Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared
void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale
of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is
also void.
Case Doctrine:
● Philippine Law does not recognize common
law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as
husband and wife, who represent themselves
to the public as husband and wife, and who
are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered
legally married in common law jurisdictions but
not in the Philippines
Facts:
Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters
unaware of the former’s death on August 28,
1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on
September 27, 1988 before the RTC of
Misamis Oriental alleging that she was forcible
taken from her residence sometime in 1987
and was confined by the herein petitioner,
Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in
Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.
The respondent court in an order dated
28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas
corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied.
Petitioner refused to surrender the body of
Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to
the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse
cannot be the subject of habeas corpus
proceedings; besides, according to petitioner,
he had already obtained a burial permit.
Petitioner claims that as her common law
husband, he has legal custody of her body.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can claim
custody of the deceased.
Held:
The custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was
correctly awarded to the surviving brothers
and sisters. Section 1103 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides:
“Persons charged with duty of burial - if the
Joaquin v. Navarro 93 Phil 257
deceased was an unmarried man or woman or
a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial
shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the
deceased.
Philippine Law does not recognize common
law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as
husband and wife, who represent themselves
to the public as husband and wife, and who
are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered
legally married in common law jurisdictions but
not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush
aside the fact that such relationships are
present in our society, and that they produce
a community of properties and interests which
is governed by law, authority exists in case law
to the effect that such form of co-ownership
requires that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be incapacitated
to contract marriage. In any case, herein
petitioner has a subsisting marriage with
another woman, a legal impediment which
disqualified him from even legally marrying
Vitaliana.(Eugenio vs Velez, G.R. No. 85140,
May 17, 1990).
FACTS: During the battle of liberation of
Manila on February 6, 1945, the following
sought refuge on the ground floor of German
Club building: Joaquin Navarro Sr (70); Angela
Joaquin (67); daughter Pilar (32-33); daughter
Concepcion (23-25); son Joaquin Natividad Jr
(30); and wife of Jr Adela Conde (--). The
building was set on fire and Japanese started
shooting the daughters who fell. Sr. decided to
leave the building. His wife didn’t want to leave
so he left with his son, Jr., and Jr.’s wife and
neighbor Francisco Lopez. As they came out,
Jr. was hit and fell on the ground and rest lay
flat on the ground to avoid bullets. German
Club collapsed trapping many people
presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr.,
Adela, and Francisco sought refuge in an air
aid shelter where they hid for 3 days. On
February 10, 1945, on their way to St. Theresa
Academy, they met Japanese patrols. Sr. and
Adela were hit and killed. The trial court ruled
that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while CA
ruled that son outlived his mother.
ISSUE:
W/N the son/mother died first before the
other.
[If the son died first, petitioner would reap the
benefits of succession. If mother died first,
respondent Antonio, son of Jr. by his first
marriage, would inherit]
HELD:
Based on the story of Francisco Lopez, Jr. died
before his mother did. This presumption was
based on speculations, not evidence. Gauged
by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence
on which civil cases are to be decided, this
inference should prevail. Evidence of
survivorship may be direct, indirect,
circumstantial or inferential.
(Where there are facts, known or knowable,
from w/c a rational conclusion can be made,
the presumption (in the Rules of Court) does
not step in, and the rules of preponderance of
evidence controls.
Are there particular circumstances on record
from w/c reasonable inference of survivorship
bet. AJ and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco
Lopez' (the sole witness) testimony competent
and sufficient for the purpose?
It is our opinion that the testimony contains
facts quite adequate to solve the problem of
survivorship bet. AJ and JN, Jr. and keep the
statutory presumption out of the case. It is
believed that in the light of the conditions
painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable
inference can be arrived at, namely: that JN,
Jr. died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died
before the son can not be ruled out, it must be
noted that this possibility is entirely
speculative and must yield to the more rational
deduction from proven facts that it was the
other way around. JN, Jr., was killed, while
running, in front of, and 15 meters from the
Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have
negotiated that distance in 5 seconds or less,
and so died w/in that interval from the time he
dashed out of the bldg. AJ could have perished
w/in those 5 or fewer seconds, but the
probabilities that she did seem very remote.
According to Lopez' testimony, the collapse of
the club occurred about 40 minutes after JN,
Jr. died, and it was the collapse that killed AJ.
The CA said that the interval bet. JN, Jr.'s
death and the breaking down of the edifice
was "minutes." Even so, it was much longer
than 5 seconds, long enough to warrant the
inference that AJ was still alive when her son
expired.
The CA mentioned several causes, besides the
bldg's collapse, by which AJ could have been
killed. All these causes are speculative. xxx Nor
was AJ likely to have been killed by falling
beams bec. the bldg. was made of concrete
and its collapse, more likely than not, was
sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause
instantaneous death; certainly, not w/in the
brief space of 5 seconds bet. her son's
departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in
inferences that are not conclusive. Sec. 69 (ii)
of R 123 does not require that the inference
necessary to exclude the presumption therein
provided be certain. It is the "particular
circumstances from w/c it (survivorship) can
be inferred" that are required to be certain as
tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of
inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt,
for "inference is never certainty, but it may be
plain enough to justify a finding of fact."
In conclusion, the presumption that AJ died
before her son is based purely on surmises,
speculations, or conjectures w/o any sure
foundation in evidence. The opposite theory is
deduced from established facts w/c, weighed
by common experience, engender the
inference as a very strong probability. Gauged
by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence
by w/c civil cases are decided, this inference
ought to prevail.)

FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's
birth because the document attached to the
Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father
(AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not
include the signature of the deceased father,
and “because he was born out of wedlock and
the father unfortunately died prior to his birth
and has no more capacity to acknowledge his
paternity to the child.”
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint
for injunction/registration of name against
Gracia. The trial court held that even if
Dominique, the father, was the author of the
unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the
same does not contain any express recognition
of paternity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten
instrument of the deceased father of minor
Christian can be considered as a recognition of
paternity.
RULING:
Yes.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by
RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use
the surname of his/her father if the latter had
previously recognized him/her as his offspring
through an admission made in a pubic of
private handwritten instrument.
Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly
state that there must be a signature by the
putative father in the private handwritten
instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement
of affixing the signature of the acknowledging
parent in any private handwritten instrument
wherein an admission of filiation of a
legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten
instrument is the lone piece of evidence
submitted to prove filiation, there should be
strict compliance with the requirement that the
same must be signed by the acknowledging
parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten
instrument is accompanied by other relevant
and
Dela Cruz v Gracia, G.R. No. 177728,
July 31, 2009
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim
of filiation therein be shown to have been
made and handwritten by the acknowledging
parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.
Facts: Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres Braza is
the wife of Pablo Sicad Braza Jr., the latter
died in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West
Java, Indonesia.
Braza v Registrar, G.R. No. 181174,
December 4, 2009
During the wake following the repatriation of
his (Pablo’s) remains in the Philippines,
Respondent Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick
Alvin Titutar showed up and introduced
themselves as the wife and son respectively,
of the deceased. Petitioner Cristina thereupon
made inquiries and in the course of which she
obtained Patrick Alvin’s birth certificate from
the Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental
which had states that:
Pablo S. Braza as the father of Patrick Alvin;
the latter was acknowledged by the father on
January 13, 1997;
Patrick Alvin was legitimated by virtue of the
subsequent marriage of his parents.
Therefore, his name is changed to Patrick Alvin
Titular Braza.
Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage
contract showing Pablo and Lucille were
married.
Cristina and her co-petitioner filed before the
RTC of Negros a petition to correct the entries
in the birth certificate record of Patrick in the
Local Civil Registry. They contended that
Patrick could not have been legitimated by the
supposed subsequent marriage between
Lucille and Pablo because said marriage is
bigamous on account of a valid and subsisting
marriage between her (Cristina) and Pablo.
Petitioner prayed for the:
Correction of the entries in Patrick’s birth
record with respect to his legitimation, the
name of the father and his acknowledgment
and the use of the last name “BRAZA”;
A directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all
surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor
Patrick, to submit Patrick to DNA testing to
determine his paternity and filiation;
The declaration of nullity of the legitimation of
Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for
this purpose, the declaration of the marriage
between Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction.
RTC: Trial Court dismissed the petition without
prejudice, holding that in a special proceeding
for correction of entry, the court, which is not
acting as a family court, has no jurisdiction
over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille
and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick,
and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA
test, hence, the controversy should be
ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
MR: denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over
the subject case?
Decision: Petition is dismissed. Petition to
correct the entries (Rule 108) is a wrong
remedy in this case because the trial court
herein has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages
and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
The allegations of the petition filed before the
TC clearly show that petitioners’ seek to nullify
the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the
ground that it is bigamous and impugn
Patrick’s filiation in connection with which they
ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected
to a DNA test.
It is well settled doctrine that validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation
can be questioned in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not
through a collateral attack such as the petition
filed before the court a quo.
RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT (vis a vis
Art. 412 of the Civil Code)
It charts the procedure by which an entry in
Baldos vs.CA, G.R. No. 170645, July 9,
2010
the civil registry may be cancelled or
corrected. The proceeding contemplated
therein may generally be used ONLY TO
CORRECT CLERICAL, SPELLING,
TYPOGRAPHICAL AND OTHER INNOCUOUS
ERRORS IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY.
CLERICAL ERROR/SUBSTANTIAL ERROR
A clerical error is one which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error
made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in
copying or writing; or a harmless change such
as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the
occupation of the parent.
Substantial or contentious alterations may be
allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in
which all interested parties are impleaded and
due process is properly observed.
Topic: Entries in the Civil Register
Facts:
1. October 30, 1948: Reynaldo Pillazar, alias
Reynaldo Baldos, was born.
2. However, his birth was not registered in
the office of the local civil registrar until
roughly 36 years later or on 11 February
1985.
3. His birth certificate indicated Nieves Baldos
as his mother and Bartolome Baldos as his
father.
4. Nieves Baldos also appeared as the
informant on birth certificate.
5. March 8, 1995: Nieves Baldos filed in the
RTC of Olongapo City a complaint, for
cancellation of the late registration of
Reynaldo's birth. She claimed that
Reynaldo was not really her son.
6. Petitioner's reason for disowning the
oppositor is obvious; he did not live up to
her expectation; his wife is ungrateful to
everything she did for her and the
oppositor. Bad blood runs in the veins of
the parties.
7. August 16 1999: the trial court dismissed
the petition for lack of merit.
8. August 8, 2005: the CA affirmed the trial
court's decision.
9. May 17 1999: Nieves Baldos died.
10. October 20, 2005: Her lawyer filed a
motion for substitution.
11. November 22, 2005: the CA granted the
motion for substitution.
12. From then on, Bartolome's brothers,
Francisco Baldos and Martin Baldos,
substituted for Nieves Baldos.
13. Petitioners insist that the late registration
of Reynaldo's birth is not authorized by
P.D. No. 651. They claim that P.D. No. 651
applies only to births within the period from
1 January 1974 up to the date when the
decree became effective.
14. Petitioners contend the late registration of
Reynaldo's birth amounts to simulation of
birth.
15. Respondent Reynaldo counters that P.D.
No. 651 does not proscribe the late
registration of births of persons born
before 1 January 1974.
16. He asserts that the birth certificate is a
public document covered by the
presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions.
Issue: Whether or not the late registration of
Reynaldo’s birth is valid.
Held: YES.
Since Reynaldo was born on October 30,
1948, the late registration of his birth is
outside of the coverage of P.D. No. 651,
as amended. The late registration of
Reynaldo's birth falls under Act No.
3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry
Law, which took effect on February 27, 1931.
As a general law, Act No. 3753 applies to the
registration of all births, not otherwise covered
by P.D. No. 651, as amended, occurring from
February 27, 1931 onwards. Considering that
the late registration of Reynaldo's birth took
place in 1985, National Census Statistics Office
(NCSO) Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
1983 governs the implementation of Act No.
3753 in this case.
Under NCSO A.O. No. 1-83, the birth of a child
shall be registered in the office of the local civil
registrar within 30 days from the time of birth.
Any report of birth made beyond the
reglementary period is considered delayed.
The local civil registrar, upon receiving an
application for delayed registration of birth, is
required to publicly post for at least ten days
a notice of the pending application for delayed
registration. If after ten days no one opposes
the registration and the local civil registrar is
convinced beyond doubt that the birth should
be registered, he should register the same.
Reynaldo's certificate of live birth, as a
duly registered public document, is
presumed to have gone through the
process prescribed by law for late
registration of birth. It was only on
March 8, 1995, after the lapse of ten long
years from the approval on February 11,
1985 of the application for delayed
registration of Reynaldo's birth, that
Nieves registered her opposition. She
should have done so within the ten-day
period prescribed by law. Records show
that no less than Nieves herself informed
the local civil registrar of the birth of
Reynaldo. At the time of her application
for delayed registration of birth, Nieves
claimed that Reynaldo was her son.
Between the facts stated in a duly registered
public document and the flip-flopping
statements of Nieves, we are more inclined to
stand by the former.
Applications for delayed registration of birth go
through a rigorous process. The books making
up the civil register are considered public
documents and are prima facie evidence of the
truth of the facts stated there. As a public
document, a registered birth certificate
enjoys the presumption of validity. It is
not for Reynaldo to prove the facts
stated in his birth certificate, but for
petitioners who are assailing the
certificate to prove its alleged falsity.
Petitioners miserably failed to do so. Thus, the
trial court and the CA correctly denied for lack
of merit the petition to cancel the late
registration of Reynaldo's birth.
Petition is DENIED. Resolution of the CA is
AFFIRMED.
Notes:
Presidential Decree No. 651, otherwise known
as An Act Requiring the Registration of Births
and Deaths in the Philippines which Occurred
from 1 January 1974 and thereafter, provides:
Sec. 1. Registration of births. — All babies
born in hospitals, maternity clinics, private
homes, or elsewhere within the period
starting from January 1, 1974 up to the
date when this decree becomes
effective, irrespective of the nationality, race,
Corpus v Sto. Tomas, GR 18671, Aug.
11, 2010
culture, religion or belief of their parents,
whether the mother is a permanent resident
or transient in the Philippines, and whose
births have not yet been registered must be
reported for registration in the office of the
local civil registrar of the place of birth by the
physician, nurse, midwife, hilot, or hospital or
clinic administrator who attended the birth or
in default thereof, by either parent or a
responsible member of the family or a relative,
or any person who has knowledge of the birth
of the individual child. The report referred to
above shall be accompanied with an affidavit
describing the circumstances surrounding the
delayed registration.
Sec. 2. Period of registration of births. — The
registration of the birth of babies
referred to in the preceding section must
be done within sixty (60) days from the
date of effectivity of this decree without
fine or fee of any kind. Babies born after the
effectivity of this decree must be registered in
the office of the local civil registrar of the place
of birth within thirty (30) days after birth, by
the attending physician, nurse, midwife, hilot
or hospitals or clinic administrator or, in
default of the same, by either parent or a
responsible member of the family or any
person who has knowledge of the birth.
The parents or the responsible member of the
family and the attendant at birth or the
hospital or clinic administrator referred to
above shall be jointly liable in case they fail to
register the new born child. If there was no
attendant at birth, or if the child was not born
in a hospital or maternity clinic, then the
parents or the responsible member of the
family alone shall be primarily liable in case of
failure to register the new born child.
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino
citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
married respondent Daisilyn Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina, in Pasig City. Gerbert left for Canada
soon after the wedding. When he returned to
the Philippines and discovered that his wife
was having an affair with another man, he filed
a petition for divorce before the Superior Court
of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada which
granted the petition for divorce.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert went to
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree.
Gerbert also filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved with the
RTC. Daisylyn did not file any responsive
pleading and offered no opposition to the
petition.
The RTC denied the petition. The RTC
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper
party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he
is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that
only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the
RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar
to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly
asks for a determination of his rights under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. Taking into account the rationale behind
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, he contends that the provision
applies as well to the benefit of the alien
spouse.
ISSUE:
Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
RULING:
The alien spouse can claim no right under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code as the substantive right it establishes is
in favor of the Filipino spouse.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was
included in the law “to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.”
The legislative intent is for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the
divorce decree. Essentially, the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive
right to have his or her marriage to the alien
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating
him or her to remarry.
Given the rationale and intent behind the
enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the
RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of
the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse
can claim no right under this provision.
Republic v Magpayo, GR 189476, Feb.
2, 2011
FACTS: Born in Makati on September 9, 1972,
Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo
(respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo
Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim
Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of
live birth shows, contracted marriage on March
26, 1972.
Claiming, however, that his parents were
never legally married, respondent filed on July
22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City a Petition to change his name to
Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim
Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP No.
Q-0863058, was entitled "IN RE PETITION
FOR CHANGE OF NAMEOF JULIAN EDWARD
EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN
EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM
COSETENG."
In support of his petition, respondent
submitted a certification from the National
Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna
Dominique "does not appear in [its] National
Indices of Marriage.” Respondent also
submitted his academic records from
elementary up to college showing that he
carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth
certificate of his child where "Coseteng"
appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001
and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was
elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd
District using the name "JULIAN M.L.
COSETENG."
On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC,
respondent amended his petition by alleging
therein compliance with the 3-year residency
requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of the
Rules of Court.
The notice setting the petition for hearing on
November 20, 2008 was published in the
newspaper Broadside in its issues of October
31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008,
and November 14-20, 2008. And a copy of the
notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG).
No opposition to the petition having been filed,
an order of general default was entered by the
trial court which then allowed respondent to
present evidence ex parte
By Decision of January 8, 2009, the trial court
granted respondent’s petition and directed the
Civil Registrar ofMakati City to:
1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item
24 for "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF
PARTIES" [in herein respondent’s Certificate of
live Birth];
2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space
for the Last Name of the [respondent] to
"COSETENG";
3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space
for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and
4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo,
Jr." in the space for FATHER of the
[respondent]… (emphasis and underscoring
supplied; capitalization in the original)
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed
a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009,
hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present
petition for review to the Court on pure The present petition must be differentiated
question of law. from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. In
Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner,
Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had
ISSUE: been known since childhood in order to avoid
confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy,
Whether or not the petition for change of
however. She merely sought to use the
name involving change of civil status should be
surname of her mother which she had been
made through appropriate adversarial
using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the
proceedings.
Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use
Whether or not the trial court exceeded its her mother’s surname, adding that the
jurisdiction when it directed the deletion of the avoidance of confusion was justification
name of respondent’s father from his birth enough to allow her to do so. In the present
certificate. case, however, respondent denies his
legitimacy.
HELD:

The change being sought in respondent’s

The petition is impressed with merit. (in favor
petition goes so far as to affect his legal status
of the Republic)
in relation to his parents. It seeks to change
his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103
then would not suffice to grant respondent’s
1. A person can effect a change of name under
supplication.
Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and
meritorious grounds including (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
that "changes which may affect the civil status
change results as a legal consequence such as
from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
substantial and controversial alterations which
confusion; (d) when one has continuously
can only be allowed after appropriate
used and been known since childhood by a
adversary proceedings . . ."
Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former
******** Since respondent’s desired change
alienage, all in good faith and without
affects his civil status from legitimate to
prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the
illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads:
surname causes embarrassment and there is
no showing that the desired change of name
was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any
change of name would prejudice public
person interested in any act, event, order or
interest.
decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register,
may file a verified petition for the cancellation
*** Respondent’s reason for changing his
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with
name cannot be considered as one of, or
the [RTC] of the province where the
analogous to, recognized grounds, however.
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the
filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of
the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof
to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order
to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics
and underscoring supplied)
2. Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which
concerns one’s civil status should be filed in
the civil registry in which the entry is sought to
be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in
the present case, and "all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby" should be made parties to the
proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of
respondent was filed not in Makati where his
birth certificate was registered but in Quezon
City. And as the above-mentioned title of the
petition filed by respondent before the RTC
shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor
his father and mother were made parties
thereto.
Rule 103 regarding change of name and in
Rule
Goitia vs Campos-Rueda, 35 Phils 108
252
concerning the cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry are separate and
distinct.
Aside from improper venue, he failed to
implead the civil registrar of Makati and all
affected parties as respondents in the case."A
petition for a substantial correction or change
of entries in the civil registry should have as
respondents the civil registrar, as well as all
other persons who have or claim to have any
interest that would be affected thereby."
Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices
to different "potential oppositors." The first
notice is that given to the "persons named in
the petition" and the second (which is through
publication) is that given to other persons who
are not named in the petition but nonetheless
may be considered interested or affected
parties, such as creditors. That two sets of
notices are mandated under the above-quoted
Section 4 is validated by the subsequent
Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides
for two periods (for the two types of "potential
oppositors") within which to file an opposition
(15 days from notice or from the last date of
publication).
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108
is to bind the whole world to the subsequent
judgment on the petition. The sweep of the
decision would cover even parties who should
have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule
108 but were inadvertently left out.
This is an action by the wife against her
husband for support outside of the conjugal
domicile.
Goitia vs Campos-Rueda, 35 Phils 252
FACTS:
Eloisa Goitia De La Camara and Jose Campos
Rueda were legally married in the City of
Manila on Jan. 7, 1915. They established their
residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where
they lived together for about a month, when
the plaintiff returned to the home of her
parents. It was alleged that respondent
demanded her to perform unchaste and
lascivious acts on his genital organs. The
plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the
defendant and refused to perform any act
other than legal and valid cohabitation. Since
Goitia kept on refusing, defendant maltreated
her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon
her lips, face and different parts of her body;
and that, as Goitia was unable by any means
to induce her husband to desist from his
repugnant desires and cease from maltreating
her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal
abode and take refuge in the home of her
parents.
Goitia filed a complaint against defendant for
support outside the conjugal home. The CFI
ruled in favor of defendant Rueda and held
that the defendant cannot be compelled to
support the plaintiff, except in his own house,
unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree
granting her a divorce or separation from the
defendant. The plaintiff appealed.
ISSUE: Whether Goitia can compel her
husband to support her outside the conjugal
home.
HELD: YES. The obligation on the part of the
husband to support his wife is created merely
in the act of marriage. Article 149 of the Civil
Code provides that the person obliged to give
support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by
paying the pension that may be fixed or by
receiving and maintaining in his own home the
person having the right to the same. However,
this option granted by law is not absolute. The
law does not permit the husband to evade or
terminate his obligation to support his wife if
the wife is driven away from the conjugal
home because of his wrongful acts.
In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave
the conjugal home abode because of the lewd
designs and physical assault of the husband.
Therefore, it is only but right, to claim support
from the husband for separate maintenance
albeit outside the conjugal home.
Silverio vs Republic, October 22, 2007
Facts: Petitioner was born and registered as
male. He admitted that he is a male
transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but
feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that
he had always identified himself with girls
since childhood. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment, breast
augmentation and sex reassignment surgery.
From then on, petitioner lived as female and
was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his
sex from male to female. The trial court
rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner.
Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG filed
a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
CA rendered a decision in favor of the
Republic.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to
change his name and sex in his birth
certificate.
Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides
that no person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority which was
amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law
which does not sanction a change of first name
on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a
person can legally change his given name, he
must present proper or reasonable cause or
any compelling reason justifying such change.
In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a
result of using his true and official name.
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no
entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order. The birth
certificate of petitioner contained no error. All
entries therein, including those corresponding
to his first name and sex, were all correct.
Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413
of the Civil Code provides that all other matters
pertaining to the registration of civil status
shall be governed by special laws. However,
there is no such special law in the Philippines
governing sex reassignment and its effects.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate
is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a
person is determined at birth, visually done by
the birth attendant (the physician or midwife)
by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’s sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error is immutable
For these reasons, while petitioner may have
succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery,
no law authorizes the change of entry as to
sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus,
there is no legal basis for his petition for the
correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be
addressed solely by the legislature, not by the
courts. Hence, petition is denied.
People v De La Cruz, G.R.
No.187683, February 11, 2010
FACTS: That on or about the 18th day of
August, 2002, in the municipality of Malolos,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill his
wife Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, with whom
he was united in lawful wedlock, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, use personal violence and stab
the said Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, hitting
the latter on her trunk and on the different
parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her
serious physical injuries which directly caused
her death.
HELD: In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the
best proof of the relationship between the
accused and the deceased would be the
marriage certificate. In this case, the
testimony of the accused that he was married
to the victim, in itself, is ample proof of such
De Santis v Jalandoni, GR 178221,
December 1, 2010
relationship as the testimony can be taken as
an admission against penal interest. Clearly,
then, it was established that Victoriano and
Anna were husband and wife.
FACTS: Rodolfo Jalandoni died intestate. His
brother, Bernardino Jalandoni filed with RTC a
petition for issuance of letters of
administration. Anonuevo et al intervened and
claimed that their mother Sylvia De Santis was
daughter of Isabel and John. They alleged that
at the time of Rodolfo’s death, their
grandmother Isabel was the lawful wife of
Rodolfo based on a marriage certificate.
Rodolfo’s brother opposed asserting that the
birth certificate of Sylvia states that Isabel and
John were married, hence, Isabel and
Rodolfo’s marriage was null and void.
Petitioners argued that the entries in the birth
certificate of Sylvia could not be used as proof
that Isabel and John were indeed married.
 Espinosa went to see her and requested for
the notarization of the contract but she told
ISSUE: W/N the marriage of Isabel and
him that it was illegal. Omana alleged that
Rodolfo was valid
Espinosa returned the next day while she was
out of the office and managed to persuade her
part-time office staff to notarize the document.
HELD: No. The birth certificate of Sylvia which
Her office staff forged her signature and
indicates that Isabel and John were married is
notarized the contract.
sufficient proof that indeed they were married.
Therefore Isabel’s marriage to Rodolfo is void
because at that time, she was still married to
ISSUE: W/N Omaña violated the CPR in
John. Consequently, her descendants have no
notartizing the “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.”
share in the estate of Rodolfo. While a
W/N the Kasunduaan ng Paghihiwalay is valid.
marriage certificate is considered the primary
evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded
as the sole and exclusive evidence of
HELD: SC has ruled that the extrajudicial
marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact
dissolution of the conjugal partnership without
of marriage may be proven by relevant
judicial approval is void. The Court has also
evidence other than the marriage certificate.
ruled that a notary public should not facilitate
Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be
the disintegration of a marriage and the family
recognized as competent evidence of the
by encouraging the separation of the spouses
Espinosa v Omana, AC No. 9081, and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
October 12, 2011
Morigo v People, 422 SCRA (compare
marriage between his parents. Martinez v. Tan 12

partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did

in this case.

FACTS: On 17 November 1997, Rodolfo

Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal sought
Omana’s legal advice on whether they could
dissolve their marriage and live separately.
Omana prepared a document entitled
“Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.” Espinosa and
Marantal started implanting the conditions of
the said contract. However, Marantal took
custody of all their children and took
possession of most of the conjugal property.
Espinosa sought the advice of Glindo, his
fellow employee who is a law graduate, who
informed him that the contract executed by
Omana was not valid. They hired the services
of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omana
before the IBP-CBD. Omana denied that she
prepared the contract. She admitted that
FACTS:
 Aug. 30, 1990 – Lucio Morigo married Lucia
Barrete.
 Aug. 19, 1991 – Lucia was granted a divorce from
Lucio in Canada, to take effect on Feb. 17, 1992.
 Oct. 4, 1992 – Lucio married Maria Lumbago.
 Sept. 21, 1993 – Lucio sought a judicial
declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Lucia,
alleging that no marriage ceremony took place.
 Oct. 19, 1993 – the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran
charged Lucio with bigamy. Lucio moved for
suspension because his judicial nullification posed
a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. The
suspension was granted, then denied.
 Aug. 5, 1996 – the Bohol RTC convicted Lucio of
bigamy. The RTC cited Domingo v. CA and said
that lack of a valid marriage ceremony is not a
defense against a charge of bigamy. They also
cited Ramirez v. Gmur and said that a divorce
issued by the court in a country where neither
spouse is domiciled has no jurisdiction to
determine their marital status.
 Oct. 23, 1997 – while Lucio’s appeal to the CA
was pending, his marriage to Lucia was declared
void, and it became final and executory.
 Oct. 21, 1999 – the CA affirmed the RTC’s
conviction, claiming that Art. 349 of the RPC
punishes the act of contracting a second marriage
before the first one is dissolved; also claiming that
the divorce is against public policy, thus,
ineffectual. Lucio’s motion for reconsideration was
also denied.
ISSUE(S): WON Lucio Morigo committed bigamy If
so, WON his defense of good faith is valid
HELD: No, he did not commit bigamy. Petition
granted.
RATIO:
 A marriage declared void ab initio is deemed to
have never taken place at all, because such a
declaration retroacts to the date of the supposed
marriage. Lucio’s marriage to Lucia was declared
void because they merely signed a marriage
contract without the presence of a solemnizing
officer. Therefore, the first element of bigamy as
laid down in Bobis v. Bobis, that the offender has
been legally married, is absent.
 Unlike in Mercado v. Tan, where the first
marriage was solemnized twice, and the
declaration of nullity was obtained after the second
marriage was celebrated.
A marriage declared void ab initio is a valid defense
against a charge of bigamy.
FACTS: (chronological order)
 Martinez filed an action to cancel her marriage
contract with Tan insisting that there was no
ceremony that took place. That she thought that
the document she signed was a document
authorizing Tan to ask the consent of her parents
to the marriage.
 Tan contended that the marriage contract was
signed by both of them, in the presence of two
witnesses, and a solemnizing officer.
 With this evidence, CFI ruled in favor of Tan.
 Martinez appealed stating that both of them did
not declare in the supposed ceremony that “they
take each other as husband and wife”, which
violates General Orders, No. 68, Sec. 6 (couple
must declare they take each other as husband and
wife).
ISSUE(S):
WON the marriage ceremony is valid.
HELD: Yes. CFI decision affirmed.
RATIO:
 The contract signed by Martinez and Tan
contained a positive statement that they had
mutually agreed to be married and they asked the
justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage.
 The document signed by Martinez, Tan and the
solemnizing justice stated that they ratified under
oath, before the justice, the contents of the
contract and that witnesses of the marriage were
produced.
 Martinez’ testimony that her consent was
vitiated was contradicted by the letters she sent to
Tan,
Martinez v. Tan 12
Phil 731
evidencing that they secretly planned the wedding.
No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is
required.

Topic: Equality of employment opportunities
considering marriages
Provisions:
1. Art. 136 of the Labor Code of the Philippines
Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful
for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a
woman employee shall not get married, or to
stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting
married, a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of her
marriage.
2. Republic Act No. 9710 (Magna Carta of Women)
- protects women against discrimination in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations,
including the right to choose freely a spouse and
to enter into marriage only with their free and full
consent.
Facts:
• Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of Brent
Hospital and Colleges, Inc.
• Brent is an institution of the Episcopal Church in
the Philippines.
• She was suspended from employment in 2006 on
the grounds of Unprofessionalism and Unethical
Behavior resulting to Unwed Pregnancy.
• The suspension will be lifted upon her marriage
to her boyfriend.
• The Labor Tribunal ruled that there was just
cause
Christine Joy Capin-Cadiz v. Brent for
Hospital and Colleges, her
Inc., G.R. No. 187417, February
dismissal. She was not entitled to reinstatement
24, 2016
until the marriage, as well as to backwages and
vacation/sick leave pay. She could only receive her
13th month pay (April 12, 2007).
• Cadiz appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), which affirmed the LA
decision ( December 10, 2007).
• The Court of Appeals also dismissed her petition
due to technical defects in the petition (July 22,
2008).
Issues:
1. Whether Cadiz’s premarital relations with her
boyfriend and the resulting pregnancy out of
wedlock constitute immorality.
No. The foregoing circumstances do not readily
equate to disgraceful and immoral conduct. Brent’s
Policy Manual and Employee’s Manual of Policies
do not define what constitutes immorality. As laid
down in the case of Leus v. St. Scholastica’s
College Westgrove, a disgraceful conduct should
be detrimental to conditions upon which depend
the existence and progress of human society. The
fact that a particular act does not conform to the
traditional moral views of a certain sectarian
institution is not sufficient reason to qualify such
act as immoral unless it, likewise, does not
conform to public and secular standards. More
importantly, there must be substantial evidence to
establish that premarital sexual relations and
pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful
or immoral. The fact that Brent is a sectarian
institution does not automatically subject Cadiz to
its religious standard of morality.
2. Whether marriage can be a condition for
reinstatement.
No. It is true that the doctrine of management
prerogative gives an employer the right to
regulate, according to his own discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment. However,
there are statutory laws that protect labor and
promote equal opportunity in employment which
may contravene this prerogative. In consideration
of Art. 136 of the Labor Code and RA No. 9710,
Brent’s condition is coercive, oppressive, and
discriminatory. Brent failed to prove that the said
marriage is an employment qualification that is
reasonably related to the essential operation of the
job involved and that the absence of said condition
will result to Cadiz’ inability to properly perform the
duties of the job. The imposition of such condition
deprives her of her freedom to choose her status.
Notes (issue of backwage and separation pay
computation): -
Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an
option, separation pay should be awarded as an
alternative and as a form of financial assistance. In
the computation of separation pay, the Court
stresses that it should not go beyond the date an
employee was deemed to have been actually
separated from employment, or beyond the date
when reinstatement was rendered impossible. (P
36, 434.80)
- Cadiz is only entitled to limited backwages. It is
computed from the time of dismissal until the
finality of the decision ordering separation pay. 62
The Court notes that at the time of Cadiz's
indefinite suspension from employment, Leus was
yet to be decided by the Court. Moreover, Brent
was
Abbas v. Abbas, G.R. No. 18396,
January 30, 2013
acting in good faith and on its honest belief that
Cadiz's pregnancy out of wedlock constituted
immorality. Thus, fairness and equity dictate that
the award of backwages shall only be equivalent
to one (1) year or P109,304.40.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The Resolutions dated July 22, 2008 and February
24, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
02373-M1N are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a
NEW ONE ENTERED finding petitioner Christine
Joy Capin-Cadiz to have been dismissed without
just cause.
Facts: This is a case filed by Syed Azhar
Abbas, petitioner, for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Gloria Goo-Abbas on the
ground of absence of marriage license, as
provided for in Article 4 of the Family Code.
Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on
August 9, 1992. When they arrived in the
Philippines on December 1992, a ceremony
was conducted between them solemnized by
Rev. Mario Dauz and witnessed by Atty.
Lorenzo Sanchez and Mary Ann Ceriola.
Present also is Felicitas Goo, mother-in-law of
Syed. During the ceremony, he and Gloria
signed a document. Syed claim that he did
not know the nature of the ceremony until
Gloria told him that it was a marriage.
In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria,
it is stated that Marriage License No 9969967,
issued at Carmona, Cavite was proven by the
MCR being issued to other couple.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Syed
and Gloria is valid.
Ruling: No. As the marriage of Syed
and Gloria was solemnized on January 9,
1993, the Family Code is the applicable law,
particularly Articles 3, 4 and 35 (3).
Article 3 provides the formal requisites of
marriage. Article 4 provides the effects of the
absence of the essential and formal
requisites. And Article 35, Paragraph 3
provides that those marriages which are
solemnized without a license are void from
the beginning in exception to those covered
by the preceding chapter.
Gloria failed to present actual marriage
license or copy relied on the marriage
contract and testimonies to prove the
existence of the said license.
Thus, the marriage of Syed and Gloria is void
ab initio.