Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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Causal descriptivism

Frederick W. Kroon

To cite this article: Frederick W. Kroon (1987) Causal descriptivism, Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 65:1, 1-17, DOI: 10.1080/00048408712342731

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 Australasian Journal o f Philosophy
Vol. 65, No. 1; March 1987

CAUSAL DESCRIPTIVISM*

Frederick W. K r o o n

Classical descriptivism, with its a p p a r e n t stress o n f i r s t - c o m e - t o - m i n d

descriptions, n o w has few adherents. T h o s e who still t h i n k that descriptive
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fit determines reference have m o s t l y retreated to a kind o f causal

descriptivism, claiming that what names refer to is determined b y descriptions
couched in causal t e r m s ) Causal descriptivists thereby express large, perhaps
even complete, a g r e e m e n t with the semantic i n t u i t i o n s that causal theorists
of reference use to s u p p o r t causalism. T h e y agree with the evidence, b u t still
think that the best e x p l a n a t i o n for the evidence is a k i n d o f descriptivism,
and not causalism.
O t h e r s - c a l l t h e m causal n e u t r a l i s t s - w i l l argue that there is n o t h i n g i n
it. Causal descriptions are always available when a causal t h e o r y works, a n d
since there are causal theories which c a n explain the evidence, there are also
causal description theories which can explain the evidence. T w o such theories
really a m o u n t to equivalent descriptions o f the same p h e n o m e n o n . The battle
against classical descriptivism is w o n , o n this view, w h e n it is agreed that
causal n o t i o n s have to be i m p o r t e d to explain the evidence. P e r h a p s Saul
Kripke accepts a view o f this k i n d . 2
Causalists, o n the other h a n d , t h i n k that n o descriptivist a c c o u n t can
capture the mechanism o f name-reference. Presented with causal descriptivism
(the causal theory made 'self-conscious'), they are likely to c o m p l a i n that there

* Much of this paper was written while I was a Visiting Fellow at Princeton University's
Department of Philosophy. I would like to express my thanks to the Department for a very
happy and stimulating work environment. Thanks are also due to those who participated
in discussions of the paper at the University of Auckland, the University of Waikato, and
the 1984AAP Conference in Canberra (especiallyMichael Devitt, Mark Johnson and David
Lewis) and to an unnamed A.J.P. referee. I owe a special debt to Michael Devitt for very
helpful comments on an earlier draft.
i The term 'causal descriptivism' seems to be David Lewis's. See, for example, his 'Putnam's
Paradox', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1984), pp. 226, 227. I see no need in this
paper to say very much about the kind of causal descriptionsthat play a reference determining
role according to causal descriptivism. It is evident that causal descriptions of the form 'the
individual referred to by uses of the name N from which I acquired the use of N' will count,
but more than these should be assigned a role since (inter alia) (i) I may know of more than
one individual called N, and (ii) I may be the first to introduce the term N, say on the~basis
of perception (so that we should also tolerate causal-perceptual conditions). Among causal
descriptivists I count Brian Loar (see, e.g., his 'The Semanticsof SingularTerms', Philosophical
Studies 30 (1976), pp. 353-377) and Michael McKinsey 'Names and Intentionality',
Philosophical Review 87 (1978), pp. 171-200, and 'Causality and the Paradox of Names',
MidWest Studies in Philosophy ix (1984), pp. 491-515.Perhaps even Searle can now be classed
as a causal descriptivist, at least for a large class of names; see his 'Proper Names and
Intentionality' Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1982), pp. 205-225.
2 SaulKripke, Naming and Necessity (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1980), note 38.
 2 Causal Descriptivism

can be no independent way of ensuring that causal descriptions have

o v e r r i d i n g weight, a n d h e n c e d o m i n a t e , w h e n it c o m e s to d e c i d i n g w h i c h o f
t h e ' a s s o c i a t e d ' d e s c r i p t i o n s a r e t o p i c k o u t the i n t e n d e d referent o f the t e r m .
Since c a u s a l i s m d o e s n ' t n e e d t o rely in this k i n d o f w a y o n d o u b t f u l f e a t u r e s
o f c a u s a l beliefs c a u s a l i s m is t o b e p r e f e r r e d .
W h o is right? I t h i n k c a u s a l d e s c r i p t i v i s t s ) I t h i n k t h a t t h o s e w h o d e f e n d
c a u s a l theories, w h e t h e r as t h e o n l y right e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e evidence
(causatists) o r as one o f the right e x p l a n a t i o n s o f the evidence (causal
neutralists), are m i s t a k e n a b o u t t h e role c a u s a l d e s c r i p t i o n s m u s t p l a y in t h e
t h e o r y o f reference. But I h a v e d o u b t s a b o u t m o s t o f t h e a r g u m e n t s I h a v e
seen for this c o n c l u s i o n : Such a r g u m e n t s f r e q u e n t l y u n d e r e s t i m a t e t h e
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difficulty o f their t a s k . Recall t h a t it is n o t e n o u g h t o s h o w t h a t t h e r e a r e

c a u s a l d e s c r i p t i o n s w h i c h p i c k o u t t h e right referents o f n a m e s . C a u s a l
descriptivists m u s t s h o w t h a t c a u s a l beliefs, a n d n o t e x t e r n a l causal c h a i n s ,
determine w h a t the right referents are. This is n o easy t a s k . It d o e s n ' t help,
for example, to s h o w (1) t h a t s o m e given a c c o u n t o f the causal links involved
in reference fails to s p e c i f y the right r e f e r e n t o f a n a m e , while s o m e fairly
specific causal d e s c r i p t i o n does pick o u t the right referent; 5 a g o o d a r g u m e n t
for causal descriptivism s h o u l d a s s u m e as s o p h i s t i c a t e d a c c o u n t o f the causal
links as it is p o s s i b l e to h a v e , a n d s h o u l d t h e n s h o w t h a t even o n such a
s o p h i s t i c a t e d a c c o u n t c a u s a l d e s c r i p t i v i s m wins out.
N o r does it help m u c h to a r g u e (2) t h a t the descriptivist need o n l y
a c k n o w l e d g e d e s c r i p t i o n s which a n a m e - u s e r w o u l d c o n t i n u e to affirm ' o n
reflection', a n d t h a t o n l y c a u s a l d e s c r i p t i o n s satisfy this m o r e stringent sense
o f ' a s s o c i a t e d d e s c r i p t i o n ' : W h y s u p p o s e , firstly, t h a t such a m o v e s u p p o r t s
c a u s a l d e s c r i p t i v i s m r a t h e r t h a n causal n e u t r a l i s m ? S e c o n d l y , w h y s u p p o s e
t h a t only the right kind o f d e s c r i p t i o n s - causal o n e s - fall o u t o f such a ' w h a t
we w o u l d say o n reflection' w a y o f singling o u t r e f e r e n c e - d e t e r m i n g
d e s c r i p t i o n s ? W h a t we w o u l d say ' o n reflection' is liable to be affected b y
all kinds o f e x t r a n e o u s f a c t o r s , such as o u r level o f intelligence, b a c k g r o u n d

3 At least where ordinary names are concerned, names for which the causal approach was
expressly formulated. If we also consider names whose reference-fixing mechanism clearly
does not fit the causal approach, then I would accept a more broadly based descriptivism,
perhaps a descriptivism where the causal dimension is replaced by a broader epistemic
dimension. (On this broader epistemic dimension, see my 'Theoretical Terms and the Causal
View of Reference', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (1985), pp. 143-166, §6 and fn.18).
4 I am worried about different arguments for different reasons. Some strike me as plainly wrong,
e.g., the arguments I describe in this section. Some seem to me to rest on rather controversial
premises (e.g., McKinsey's argument in 'Names and Intentionality', responded to by Rod
Bertolet in 'McKinsey, Causes and Intentions', Philosophical Review 88 (1979), 619-632). One
argument I am broadly sympathetic to is David Lewis' argument in 'Putnam's Paradox',
pp. 226, 227, but that argument also has its shortcomings. See section 4 below.
5 This argument, like the next two, is comparatively familiar. And like the next two, it can
be found in Searle's recent attempt to defend descriptivism: see 'Proper Names and
Intenti0naiity', esp. p. 214 (where Searle talks of keeping the external causal chains fixed while
varying the Intentional content associated with a name).
6 A version of this argument can be extracted from Searle's 'Proper Names and Intentionality',
p. 215, where Searle talks of certain bits of Intentional content taking precedence over other
bits on the basis of how a speaker allows certain associated descriptions to be discarded in
response to the discovery that the associated descriptions do not all hold of one individual.
 Frederick W. Kroon 3

beliefs, semantic awareness, and so on. (Have we so soon f o r g o t t e n a b o u t

those die-hard descriptivists who, c o n f r o n t e d with Kripke's and Keith
Donnetlan's arguments, claimed that their intuitions went the other way?)
It also does n o t help m u c h to argue (3) that descriptions play a central
role in solving various Fregean puzzles (including Kripke's puzzle a b o u t
'doubting Pierre'). 7 Causalists m a y agree with this, b u t to suppose that they
are thereby committed to a kind o f descriptivism about reference is to suppose
that one and the same theoretical n o t i o n must play a role in explaining b o t h
how reference is determined and h o w Fregean puzzles are t o be solved~ Such
was Frege's view o f sense, but w h y suppose he was right a b o u t this?
Furthermore, this a r g u m e n t for causal descriptivism can only w o r k if the
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descriptions that (allegedly) play a role in solving Fegean puzzles are causal
descriptions. This is far f r o m obvious, however. Some, if n o t most, o f the
philosophers w h o believe that descriptions play such a role also hold that
the descriptions in question are best t h o u g h t o f as typically non-causal,
conceptual representations that m a y be held in c o m m o n by different speakers.
Causal descriptivists should not assume an apriori coincidence between the
purely semantic task o f explaining h o w reference is determined and the partly
epistemic task o f explaining Fregean p h e n o m e n a , s
My own a r g u m e n t for causal descriptivism will be quite different in kind.
To put it somewhat paradoxically, the a r g u m e n t I give attacks causalism b y
claiming that its perception o f the role o f causality in semantics has been,
if anything, t o o conservative: causality plays t o o large a role in semantics
for causalism to capture.

I
Consider the following scenario. With B listening, A tells a friend:
(1) D u m a s was the best friend I ever had.
As it turns out, A is speaking o f his French poodle, no longer alive, w h o m
he named after his favourite author, Alexandre D u m a s p~re.
B subsequently wonders;
(2) W h o was D u m a s ?
(Or perhaps: Fwas D u m a s a 4~?7 ' for some description 4~. This would allow
us to set aside the w o r r y - b a s e l e s s , in m y v i e w - t h a t (2) is m o r e a question
7 Searle, again, is an example (see 'Proper Names and Intentionatity', p. 221).
8 TylerBurge distinguishes some different notions of sense, corresponding to different tasks that
Frege'ssingle notion of sense was designed to fulfil, in his 'Belief De Re', Journalof Philosophy
74 (1977), pp. 338-362. One philosopher who deliberately allows something like conceptual
content to count when it comes to solving broadly Fregean puzzles but not when it comes
to specifying the mechanism of reference is Hartry Field. Field, in fact, is a causalist--not
even a causal descriptivist-when it comes to specifying how reference is determined. (See
his 'Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role', Journal of Philosophy 74 (1977), pp. 379-409,
and 'Mental Representation', Erkenntnis 13 (1978), 9-61.) Searle, on the other hand, wants
to be a descriptivist on both counts, but seems unaware of the tension in his views: he argues
for the relevanceof total Intentional content when it comes to solving broadly Fregean puzzles
('Proper Names and Intentionality', p. 221 and note 29), but allows only purified Intentional
content to count when it comes to specifying how reference is determined (i.e., what remains
of International content once account has been taken of what 'takes precedence';cf. fn. 6 above).
 4 Causal Descriptivism

about the name ' D u m a s ' than about Dumas. In any case, let us assume that
hearing A utter (1) is the first time B hears the name 'Dumas', and that (2)
contains the first use on B's part of the name 'Dumas'.)
Question: To w h o m does the name ' D u m a s ' as used by B in (2) refer? By
construction, B has not initiated a new use of the name, and this makes a
difference. The causalist view of reference is now likely to yield a quick
response to the question. On all versions of this view that I a m acquainted
with, the answer must be that the name as used in (2) refers to whatever,
or whomsoever, the name as used in (1) refers: i.e., to A's poodle. Causalists
will maintain that what makes A's poodle the referent of ' D u m a s ' on B's use
of the name in (2) is that B's use of the name in (2) is caused, in the relevant
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way, by A's use of the name in (1), and ultimately by events involving A's
poodle. The literature yields different descriptions of the relevant causal
connections in question. The Naming and Necessity view is that B, on hearing
A use the name, formed the intention to use it with the same reference as
the m a n [A] f r o m w h o m he heard it. The informant's use of 'Dumas' is then
to be analysed in terms o f similar decisions on the part of the others, until
we get to an episode of naming. In the present case, we rather swiftly reach
such an episode, namely A's naming his poodle ' D u m a s ' on the basis of his
perceptual acquaintance with the animal. Another view, that of Michael
Devitt's Designation, 9 is that underlying B's use of the name ' D u m a s ' there
is a causal network of designation-chains whose final link is a reference
borrowing, with B borrowing reference for his use of ' D u m a s ' f r o m A's use
of the name; this entire network, in turn, is rooted in events involving A's
poodle. Both views, note, explicitly attempt to make room for the observation
that (perceptual) access to tokens of a name results in one's ability to use
the name with the same reference as the person who originally produced these
tokens, with Kripke's account, but not Devitt's, invoking intentions of a
certain sort to f o r m a kind of necessary mental backdrop to the ability (or
perhaps to explain the ability). It is this c o m m o n observation which underlies
the predicted causalist response that B, in using the name ' D u m a s ' when
uttering (2), uses it with A's poodle as referent.
It is easy, however, to falsify this answer. Let us complete the scenario
by assuming that B knows, or even just correctly guesses, that A has a
penchant for recycling existing names of the famous as names for animals.
And suppose that B, in uttering (2), is using his knowledge, or guess, about
the causal history of A's use of the name 'Dumas' to inquire about the famous
person whose name he believes to have been recycled by A. (With the right
inflexion, it is perfectly simple to see this meaning of (2): 'Who was Dumas?',
B wonders, meaning: ' W h o was the original Dumas?') So the right answer
to our question about the use of 'Dumas' in (2) is not the answer which existing
versions of the causal approach will give. The right answer is that B uses
' D u m a s ' with Alexandre D u m a s pbre, and not A's poodle, as referent, even
though B acquires his ability to use 'Dumas' with this reference from hearing
the name used by A with A's poodle as referent.
9 Michael Devitt, Designation (Columbia University Press, New York, 1981).
 Frederick W. Kroon 5
II
I assume that our scenario shows that standard versions o f the causal view
of reference at least require reformulation. 1° But how? The following view
might seem attractive to the causalist. While the scenario described shows
that standard versions o f the causal view are inadequate as they stand, all
that is required to solve the present problem is a reformulation, or (better)
a generalisation of the idea o f reference borrowing. Let us describe this
generalisation in stages. Let us first say that in cases of direct reference
borrowing a speaker's use o f a name with a certain reference is explained
by his ordinary perceptual access to certain tokens o f that name with that
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reference. (Thus described, direct reference borrowing is not an essentially

causalist notion. Causalists simply have their own view of how such an
explanation is to proceed, namely in terms o f a postulated causal link o f the
direct reference borrowing kind between past and present tokens.) In cases
of indirect reference borrowing, on the other hand, a speaker exploits his
perceptual access to such tokens in a way that allows him to gain indirect
access to other tokens o f the name, with the consequence that his use o f the
name acquires the same reference as these indirectly accessible tokens or uses.
If we call the latter kind of process 'simple reference borrowing' f r o m the
tokens/uses involved, we can say that (in)direct reference borrowing proceeds
via simple reference borrowing f r o m (in)directly accessible tokens or uses
of a name. In the scenario described earlier, for example, B has indirect access
to certain past uses o f the name ' D u m a s ' (uses in books, articles, etc.) which
had Alexandre Dumas p~re as referent and whose occurrence resulted in A's
choosing the name ' D u m a s ' for his poodle. What gave B this indirect access
was A's use of ' D u m a s ' in (1), and in using the name in (2) he succeeds in
using the name with Alexandre Dumas pere as referent insofar as he 'borrows
reference simply' f r o m these indirectly accessible uses of the name.
The only thing now needed to complete his solution to the problem of B's
use of 'Dumas' in (2), so the causalist might claim, is the twin observation
that any instance of reference borrowing should be construed as a causal
process linking tokens of a name in a communication-situation, and that there
are two kinds of causal process o f the 'reference borrowing' kind, not just
one: the 'direct' and 'indirect' kinds. (In what follows, I shall continue to
use the phrases 'direct/indirect reference borrowing' in a way that is theory-
neutral; only when the causalist account o f reference borrowing is under
discussion will I attribute a causalist connotation to these phrases.)
On such a view, our scenario shows only that the causal theory of reference
requires a more general account of semantically significant causal connections
than existing statements o f the theory have so far provided. And this appraisal
seems to me wrong. Far f r o m showing that current versions of the causal
theory of reference are simply not general enough, the admission that there

10Such a scenario can be used, in addition, to throw doubt on certain movescausalists typically
make when attacking classical descriptivist accounts of historical proper names like 'Jonah'.
The argument is given in my 'The Problem of "Jonah": How not to Argue for the Causal
Theory of Reference', PhilosophicalStudies, 43 (1983), pp. 281-299.
 6 Causal Descriptivism
exists a species of indirect reference borrowing yields a powerful reason for
preferring the contrasting causal descriptivism to either causalism or causal
neutralism.
Consider again such sample versions of the causal view as the early
statement of Kripke in Naming and Necessity and Devitt's lengthier one in
Designation. What is striking about these is (among other things) the simplicity
of their analysis of semantically significant causal connections. Asked what
determines the fact that a speaker uses a name with a certain reference, Kripke
will speak of name-conferrals and intentions (formed upon acquiring a name)
to use a name with the same reference it had for one's informants. Asked
the same question, Devitt will appeal to a rather more diffuse, but still simple,
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set of connections. D(esignation)-chains the (semantically significant causal

chains in the overall causal network under-lying a name's use) are alleged
to have three kinds of link: groundings which link the chain to an object;
abilities to designate; and communication-situations in which abilities are
passed on or reinforced (reference borrowings). The simplicity is no accident.
On the causal approach, free-floating intentions are not allowed to determine
the reference of names one is using; only one's causal ties to the physical
world are supposed to be able to play that role. But which ones? Kripke's
and Devitt's statements of the causal approach can be regarded as two
attempts at a recursive specification of the relevant (semantically significant)
causal connections in terms o f a small number of causal links. This is not
to say that no further reduction is thought possible. And it is certainly not
to say that reference is thought to be (supervenient) on a unique, recursively
specifiable, physical relation between speakers and the world: even physicalists
should acknowledge that a recursively specified causal relation can have many
different physical realisations. But unless a recursive specification of the causal
connections is possible in terms of a small, or at any rate fixed, number of
simpler kinds of causal processes or causal links, the causalist can scarcely
claim to have a causal theory of reference, a picture of the kind of causal
relationship which underlies and determines reference. In particular, the
causalist should resist the view that there might be indefinitely many
irreducible kinds of causal process which make up the semantically significant
causal connections; this view will tend to undermine causalism in the same
way as the possibility of indefinitely many different physical ways of
instantiating some psychological predicate undermines the theory that the
psychological predicate stands for a particular kind of physical state.
Let us return to B and his utterance of (2). B refers by borrowing reference
indirectly, and hence causal theories that include only direct reference
borrowing as a semantically significant causal link do not succeed in
accounting for the crucial semantic properties of B's use of the name 'Dumas'.
Suppose, then, that we follow our earlier suggestion, and allow the causalist
to add indirect reference borrowing to his list of semantically significant causal
links. Such an augmented list, it might seem, is now able to cover B's situation
as well, without requiring the use of concepts that causalists would have
reason to quarrel with.
 Frederick W. Kroon 7

It is a futile ploy. The causalist, we are supposing, imagines that by means

of indirect reference borrowing a speaker is able to hook into a certain causal
network only indirectly accessible to him, namely the causal network causally
responsible for the existence o f the directly accessible causal network (the
way in which the use of 'Dumas' as an historical name was causally responsible
for the existence o f A's new way o f using the name). But indirect reference
borrowing should not be so narrowly construed. Direct reference borrowing
allows a speaker who has ordinary perceptual access to tokens of a name
to use that name with the reference it had for those who produced those
tokens: once it is known that the speaker is in a situation of direct reference
borrowing only a single kind of answer is possible to the question of the
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reference of that name. But given access to the same tokens, a speaker has
many more ways of borrowing reference indirectly, The fact that he is in
a situation of indirect reference borrowing does not determine a unique kind
of answer to the question o f the reference of a name he is using, and this,
I shall argue, makes it correspondingly harder to make sense of indirect
reference borrowing as a special kind o f causal link.
For consider. A devoted fan of the English pop-singer Engelbert
Humperdinck, C calls his child 'Engelbert Humperdinck'. After hearing C
use the name in the course of proudly cataloguing his son's achievements,
D remarks:
(3) What a curious name the child has! Who is, or was, Engelbert
Humperdinck?
As the context makes clear, underlying D's use o f the name 'Engelbert
Humperdinck' (EH) there is an episode of indirect reference borrowing. By
itself, however, such a piece of information is not enough if we are to
determine the reference of D's use o f EH. It rules out the response that E H
as used in D's utterance of (3) refers to C's child, but it doesn't leave us with
just a single contender. D's question could still concern a number of different
people, perhaps just two, but maybe more. Little ingenuity is required to
fill in the scenarios that would make sense of the options. If, for example,
D knows (or guesses) only that C must have recycled the name o f some well-
known popular entertainer (given C's rather suspect tastes), the reference of
EH on D's use is clearly Engelbert Humperdinck, the pop-singer. That
description would then also be the appropriate one to give in response to
D's query (3). But (3) could just as easily concern the German composer of
fairy-tale operas whose name the pop-singer adopted when beginning his
musical career. D might realise, for example, that there must be a popular
entertainer called E H (given C's suspect tastes), but he might also believe
that the strangeness o f the name suggests that this entertainer recycled the
name of someone historically more remote, probably another artist. D's query
(3) could easily rest on such specific beliefs, and so could easily concern the
composer rather than the pop-singer. And the possible options don't end
there. Perhaps the name E H had an even more varied career. In that case,
someone who entertained the appropriate kind o f causal-historical beliefs
 8 Causal Descriptivism

would be able to use E H with yet another individual as referent. Perhaps,

for example, D guesses that an unusual name like E H must have been recycled
a number of different times before it was picked up, and recycled anew, by
C; and perhaps D, in uttering (3), is asking about the original holder of the
name, 'What a funny name to give a child', thinks D. 'It is the kind of name
that you might give a person if you knew of someone else who had the name:
someone you particularly admire. But at some stage in the past there must
have been an original Engelbert Humperdinck who was given that name in
the usual kind o f way. I wonder who he was?' Assuming a possible state of
affairs in which the composer assumed the name of a benefactor, given the
name because the Humperdincks sr. liked the sound o f 'Engelbert', it is hard
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to resist the conclusion that D's query concerns the composer's benefactor,
and not the composer or the pop-singer. Thus used, that is, the name E H
in (3) refers neither to C's son, nor to the well-known pop-singer, nor to the
German composer; all, it seems, because D entertained the appropriate causal
beliefs in uttering (3). (To see this reading o f (3), it helps to imagine D's
rehearsing his beliefs about the history of the name E H sotto voice between
his saying 'What an unusual name the child has!' and ' W h o . . . was Engelbert
Humperdinck?')
I shall not bother with other scenarios, since the lessons of this kind of
example should by now be tolerably clear. There appears to be no interesting
upper limit to the various ways in which we can borrow reference indirectly:
only one's ingenuity in thinking up largely true causal beliefs fixes the range
of referential options one has. This spells trouble for the causalist. Had there
been a rigid limit to the range of options, the causalist might have succeeded
in downplaying the significance of indirect reference borrowing. In such a
case, he might have been able to argue that the holding o f correct causal
beliefs can be at most an epiphenomenon of a more crucial underlying causal
relationship (involving, perhaps, some new causal links o f the 'indirect
reference borrowing' kind) on the grounds that there are many causal beliefs
of the same broad type that inexplicably do not have associated referential
options. But matters are not like that. Since possible referential options can
be generated quite smoothly by generating appropriate true causal beliefs
concerning accessible name-tokens, it is difficult to resist the view that it is
because some such causal belief is (approximately) true that one secures a
certain reference for a name one is using in a situation of indirect reference
borrowing.
Can the causalist respond to this objection by postulating indefinitely many
different kinds o f causal links o f the 'indirect reference borrowing' kind? We
have already seen why causalists should resist accepting indefinitely many
irreducible causal links. As far as the present suggestion is concerned, we
can say more: what is going to distinguish two alleged links o f the indirect
reference borrowing kind, making the first hook into one set of name-tokens
(e.g., those referring to Engelbert H. the pop-singer) and the second into
another (e.g., those referring to the composer), is the fact that speakers have
some largely true causal beliefs that they are able to exploit in order to
 Frederick W. Kroon 9

discriminate between these two sets of tokens. Similarly, the response that
there is really only one kind of causal link of the reference borrowing kind
(viz., simple reference borrowing), but indefinitely many past uses or tokens
of a name from which reference for a current use of the name can be
borrowed, leaves the causalist open to the objection that it is precisely the
ability to pigk and choose among these past uses that causalism has no good
way of explaining.
It should, perhaps, be stressed that this is not a purely negative statement
of the problem, able to cast doubt on the completeness o f a causal theory
that is committed to causal links of the reference borrowing kind, but quite
unable to disprove causal theories that operate with alternative ways of
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describing semantically significant causal chains. Our formulation o f the

problem has been more widely focused, for it has suggested that any causal
theory must face the fact that speakers in situations conventionally described
as of the indirect reference borrowing kind generate and exploit particular
causal beliefs in order to secure a reference for their terms. It is this
exploitative and creative element in reference that seems so much at variance
with the main thrust of causalism.
The following description of this creative element might help to heighten
the sense of contrast. On the present view, a person sometimes develops fairly
detailed beliefs about the causal history o f name-tokens he has direct
perceptual access to. By exploiting these causal beliefs, he is able to distinguish
among a potentially vast number o f ways of using the name that each could
have been semantically relevant to his own use (had he entertained the right
causal beliefs), selecting just one of these as the way he wishes to be party
to in his own current use of the name. But what goes for indirect reference
borrowing must also go for direct reference borrowing: there is no reason
whatsoever to postulate an asymmetry. It is through deciding to borrow
reference simply from certain directly accessible tokens, exploiting his belief
that these tokens were produced by other language-users to refer to some
object, that a person succeeds in using the name with the same reference.
Hence it is the way in which a person exploits his causal beliefs about certain
tokens that determines the reference for his own use of the name in all
situations of reference borrowing. Having the right kind of causal beliefs
about certain directly accessible name-tokens, he acquires potentially
numerous referential abilities on gaining access to these tokens. By exploiting
these beliefs on particular occasions he achieves determinate reference with
his use of the name on those occasions, sometimes using what I have termed
direct reference borrowing, and at other times using what I have termed
indirect reference borrowing.
There is thus more to reference than 'underlying causal networks' (Devitt).
There is above all the way in which referrers exploit their causal beliefs.
Because this kind o f exploitation depends on the overall descriptive correctness
of the beliefs, we now have our conclusion: far from showing that causal
theories need to be made even more complex, appealing to a greater variety
of causal connections than causalists have so far come up with, the possibility
 10 Causal Descriptivism

o f indirect reference borrowing argues strongly for causal descriptivism and

against the competing cansalist and causal neutralist approaches which do
not positively require an appeal to descriptively adequate causal beliefs in
their accounts of the mechanism of name-reference.

III
Call this the Argument from Reference Borrowing. Its essential structure is
as follows:
Premise I: The referential mechanism o f the use o f names on the basis o f
indirect reference borrowing is correctly described by causal descriptivism.
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(Premise I is itself the conclusion of an argument occupying most of section

II).
Premise II: The use of names on the basis of direct reference borrowing is
no different in kind from, and is to be explained in the same way as, the
use of names on the basis o f indirect reference borrowing.
Conclusion: The referential mechanism of the use o f names on the basis of
reference borrowing, whether direct or indirect, is correctly described by
causal descriptivism.
Note what this argument can, and cannot, do. In the first place, nothing
in what has been said implies that the causal descriptivism in question works
with p u r e (causal) descriptions, free'of any contextual elements. Names need
not be 'thoroughly descriptional' in this sense, to use Nathan Salmon's useful
classification. 11 Indeed, how can they be on the present account? If I have
a Twin-Earth doppelganger who, like me, uses a name N, I would not be
referring to what my doppelganger is referring to, but only to some individual
causally responsible for certain tokens of N that I am acquainted with, not
the individual causally responsible for other qualitatively identical tokens of
N that he is acquainted with. What determines the reference of a name
according to causal descriptivism can therefore be expected to depend on
the contextual feature o f name-user or speaker, but not on the irreducible
contextual feature of a speaker's locus in 'causal space'.
A second point is this. The causal descriptivism argued for does not purport
to give the meaning o f names, only the way in which their reference is
determined. It is entirely consistent with this kind of causal descriptivism
to suppose that names have no conventional meaning at all. Indeed, I think
that this conclusion is just about inescapable, for all the usual anti-descriptivist
reasons.12 Causal descriptivists should accept that only some of the purposes

n NathanU. Salmon,Reference andEssence (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1981),p. 17.

12 The only such theory that looks at all plausible is the so-called nominal description theory
of Brian Loar and Kent Bach (Loar, op. cit., and Bach 'What's in a Name', Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 59 (1981), pp. 371-386), but even that theory faces problems. Since
on the nominal description theory a name N just means 'the bearer of N', it follows that
even a very slight change in a name will result in a change of meaning, whether that change
is the result of corruptions within a chain of transmission, a change in language (e.g., to
facilitate the writing of certain word-forms), or translation (consider the practice of
transliteration). This seems totally counterintuitive. In any case, such a descriptivist theory
of meaning is independent of the descriptivist theory of reference advocated in this paper.
 Frederick W. Kroon 11

for which classical descriptivists invoked descriptions can be realised using

descriptions, and that providing an account of the meaning o f proper names
is not likely to be one of these purposes.
A final point. The argument focuses on the use o f the names on the basis
of reference-borrowing; nothing has been said about the 'first uses' of a name
by those party to the name-introduction (or about mixed uses that combine
elements of both 'first' and 'borrowed' uses). This requires comment. (i) I
agree that, strictly speaking the truth of causal descriptivism for 'borrowed'
uses is not sufficient (or even necessary) for the truth of some kind of
descriptivism for 'first' or mixed uses. Pending further argument, one could
perhaps be a causal descriptivist about one and a causalist about the other,
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although it is worth pointing out that, to the extent that most uses of names
are 'borrowed' uses, causal descriptivism about 'borrowed' uses places
significant limits on the area where causalism can play a role in the theory
of reference. (ii) A mixed causalist/causal descriptivist view would not only
be lopsided, however. It would also be inherently implausible. One argument
against such a view is the following 'generalising strategy'. Suppose that only
causal descriptivism works for one kind of use of names, and that an appeal
to causal descriptions provides at least one way of understanding the
referential mechanism o f the other uses o f names (whether or not an appeal
to causal chains provides an additional way of understanding their referential
mechanism). Then the most general overall theory o f reference will be causal
descriptivist, and not causalist or even causal neutralist. Applying this
generalising strategy, we thus have reason to accept a causal descriptivist
account for all uses of names if an appeal to causal descriptions provides
at least one way of understanding the referential mechanism o f 'first' uses
of names. Kripke, I think, accepts this latter claim, and so Kripke ought not
to be a causal neutralist but a causal descriptivist.
The generalising strategy is somewhat similar to an argument which David
Lewis uses in 'Putnam's Paradox', loc. cit. Lewis argues that since some terms
can only be understood in a descriptivist way, and since all terms which can
be understood in a causal-theoretic way can also be understood in a
descriptivist way (viz. a causal descriptivist way), the most general theory
of reference requires that all terms be understood in a descriptivist way. Thus,
in particular, all ordinary names should be understood in a causal descriptivist
way.
Lewis's argument deliberately focuses on the reference-fixing clement in
theories of reference, and this weakens its impact somewhat. It does nothing
to establish (causal) descriptivism concerning the use o f terms on the basis
of reference-borrowing-unless the argument is applied twice over,
generalising the second time from reference-fixing to reference-borrowing just
as under (2) we generalised from reference-borrowing to reference-fixing. But
such a move would simply compound a weakness in the original argument.
The causalist could well try to respond to that argument by claiming that
the terms for which causal theories were first devised form a natural referential
kind (e.g., they are all designators in virtue o f the way their referential
 12 Causal Descriptivism

mechanism involves causality), and that in so far as Lewis's argument is a

kind of argument from analogy this weakens it considerably. Such a retort
still leaves the causalist with the task of rebutting causal neutralism, but at
least it gives causal theories some breathing space.
Perhaps the generalising strategy described under (ii) is susceptible to similar
attacks. Not so, it seems, the Argument from Reference Borrowing itself.
That argument draws the noose around causalism and causal neutralism
tighter by arguing that some c o m m o n 'borrowed' uses of ordinary names
cannot be treated in a causalist or causal neutralist manner despite the fact
that to all appearances causality plays the same structural role here as it plays
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in more familiar 'borrowed' uses. As an argument from analogy, therefore,

the Argument from Reference Borrowing seems much stronger than the
argument used by Lewis or the generalising strategy described under (ii).
(iii) My own view is that the appeal to causal descriptions provides not
just one way, but the best way of understanding the referential mechanism
of 'first' uses of names, quite independently of the generalising strategy
described under 00.13 To the extent that this is true, we obtain a much better
argument for a causal descriptivist account of name use in general.

IV
So much for clarification. Let us now consider some of the main objections
to the Argument from Reference Borrowing. The first one is this. Why,
causalists might object, should they be afraid of Premise I? No causalist,
after all, is committed to the claim that the descriptivist view of reference
is wrong for all names. Devitt, for example, allows a category of attributive
names to be contrasted with the designational names whose semantic
functioning is explained by a causal theory. Why not reject Premise II instead,
and insist that cases of indirect reference borrowing are not cases of real
reference borrowing at all but are instead cases of the use of newly introduced
names that are syntactically, but not semantically, identical to certain
designational names? 14 On this view the name 'Dumas' as used by B in (2)
is an attributive name whose reference is determined in a causal descriptivist
way, while the name 'Dumas' as used by A in (1) is a proper name of the
ordinary non-descriptivist kind.
The first point to be noticed is that this answer surely offends the spirit
of the causalist's program for proper names. There now turn out to be many
more proper names that are (in Devitt's sense) attributive than there originally
appeared to be. Not only do we have attributive names like 'Jack the Ripper'
(Designation, p. 40) but ordinary names like 'Dumas' and 'Engelbert
Humperdinck' also turn out to have their attributive counterparts. And not
only names that have been recycled. Indirect reference borrowing need not
always proceed via access to occasions of the use of a name or even tokens

13 See my 'Theoretical Terms and the Causal View of Reference'op. cit. The argument of that
paper was not expresslyformulatedin terms of the debate betweendescriptivismand causalism,
but its conclusionmust certainly be seen as requiring some kind of (causal) descriptivism.
14 I owe this suggestion to Devitt (private communication).
 Frederick W. Kroon 13

o f a n a m e . It m a y b e a c c o m p l i s h e d via access t o s o m e o n e ' s m e n t i o n i n g a

name: (4) " T h e n a m e ' S o c r a t e s ' has b e c o m e a r a t h e r p o p u l a r n a m e f o r b o y s
since the T V p r o g r a m o n t h e G r e e k s " ; (5) ' W h o was S o c r a t e s ? ' O r it m a y
be a c c o m p l i s h e d via access to s o m e o n e ' s using o r m e n t i o n i n g a n a m e (or a n y
other p a r t o f speech) o f w h i c h the n a m e whose reference is b e i n g i n d i r e c t l y
b o r r o w e d is o n l y a p a r t : (6) ' T h e N a p o l e o n i c C o d e is still in f o r c e in p a r t s
of E u r o p e ' ; (7) ' w h o was N a p o l e o n ? ' Devitt m u s t also c o u n t the use o f
'Socrates' a n d ' N a p o l e o n ' in (5) a n d (7) as a t t r i b u t i v e , is
W o r s e still, t h e t e n d e n c y t o use such n a m e s a t t r i b u t i v e l y will n o t be
displayed o n l y locally, n a m e l y w h e n the n a m e s are used b y s p e a k e r s like B
and D o n t h e basis o f t h e i r o w n acts o f i n d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e - b o r r o w i n g . O n
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the c o n t r a r y , the t e n d e n c y to use such n a m e s a t t r i b u t i v e l y will s p r e a d

t h r o u g h o u t a p o p u l a t i o n o f l a n g u a g e - u s e r s , f o r t h o s e w h o use a n a m e like
' D u m a s ' o n the basis o f h e a r i n g it f r o m B will still be using t h e a t t r i b u t i v e
name rather t h a n its o r d i n a r y d e s i g n a t i o n a l c o u n t e r p a r t . (Designation, p. 41)
No d o u b t t h o s e w h o use t h e a t t r i b u t i v e v e r s i o n will also c o m m u n i c a t e with
those using t h e d e s i g n a t i o n a l version, b u t f o r Devitt this will s i m p l y result
in names t h a t are p a r t l y d e s i g n a t i o n a l a n d p a r t l y a t t r i b u t i v e (like t h e n a m e
'Ibn Khan'; see Designation, p. 160).
Hence the view t h a t the use o f ' D u m a s ' b y B is a special descriptivist o r
attributive use o f t h e n a m e has s o m e c u r i o u s consequences, at least when
e m b e d d e d in Devitt's f a i r l y well d e v e l o p e d a c c o u n t o f such issues. I n fact,
the situation is even w o r s e t h a n I h a v e so far d e s c r i b e d it. I n view o f the
argument a b o v e , the c l a i m t h a t n a m e s used o n t h e basis o f indirect reference
borrowing are a t t r i b u t i v e in k i n d implies t h a t for m a n y o f the n a m e s we
ordinarily use we s i m p l y d o n o t k n o w w h e t h e r t h e y a r e d e s i g n a t i o n a l (i.e.,
names for which a c a u s a l t h e o r y is right), a t t r i b u t i v e ( n a m e s for which a
descriptivist t h e o r y is right), o r a m i x t u r e o f t h e t w o . I n fact, it is p r o b a b l y
a safe bet to say t h a t o n Devitt's view this m u s t b e true f o r m o s t n a m e s
discussed in the large l i t e r a t u r e o n reference. T h o s e n a m e s t e n d to be n a m e s
of the f a m o u s ( ' N a p o l e o n ' , 'G6del', 'Aristotle', etc.), a n d such n a m e s are often
learned on the basis o f their a p p e a r i n g either within q u o t a t i o n s (where t h e y
are m e n t i o n e d , n o t used) o r as s t r u c t u r a l p a r t s o f c o m p o u n d s w h e r e t h e y
are again n o t used: e.g., 'the N a p o l e o n i c c o d e ' , ' a G S d e l i a n view o f
m a t h e m a t i c a l e p i s t e m o l o g y ' , ' A r i s t o t e l i a n logic', etc.
All this m a k e s for a p a r t i c u l a r l y messy t h e o r y . Messy theories m a y be true,
is There are many other kinds of examples. One familiar kind involves the use of quasi-descriptive
cues for purposes of disambiguation. Thus in response to talk to Pliny the Younger, someone
might ask: 'Who was Pliny the Elder?' And in response to talk to Louis XIV, someone who
has never heard the name 'Louis' might exploit his knowledge of the rules of royal nomenclature
to ask: 'what was Louis XIII like?' Another kind involves the thought that a certain name
one encounters is a fictional or mythical name whose origins can nonetheless be traced to
the use of a non-fictional name. This is arguably the case with a name like 'Jonah' (see my
'The Problem of "Jonah" '), and it is rather more clearly the case with a name like 'Santa
Claus'. Intrigued by the story of Santa Claus, I say: '(The real) Santa Claus must have been
a real do-gooder'. I say this fully believing that as used in the story the name 'Santa Claus'
doesn't stand for an historical person at all. My own use of the name stands for a certain
historical person only because I am borrowing, reference indirectly. (I owe the example to
David Lewis.)
 14 Causal Descriptivism

of course, but I don't think this one is. Perhaps the chief problem with the
present proposal is that it postulates distinctions where none seem to exist.
First, it must claim that the following exchange is semantically suspect since
it involves two names that are semantically distinct (one is attributive, the
other designational):
(2) Who was Dumas? (asked by B)
(2') Dumas was a famous French novelist o f the 19th century, author o f
such works as The Three Musketeers (uttered, let us suppose, by A,
whose use of 'Dumas' we stipulate to be designational).
Secondly, there is no basis in the psychology or phenomenology of reference
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for an important distinction between direct and indirect reference borrowing.

The difference between direct and indirect reference borrowing is that in
indirect reference borrowing one is interested in the reference of earlier tokens
to which one has only indirect access. This difference is best viewed as
epistemic rather than semantic, however. Even in the case o f direct reference
borrowing, the directness o f access to tokens from which one borrows
reference comes in degrees. Thus consider (a) hearing a token o f N and
immediately using another token of N, and (b) hearing a token o f N and,
a long time later, using another token of N on the basis of one's recollection
that one must have been exposed to tokens of N, whether through hearing
or seeing such tokens used. This example also shows that we cannot rely on
what some might take to be the unreflective 'unthinking' character of direct
reference borrowing to draw a significant psychological contrast between
direct and indirect reference borrowing. It is not inevitably the case that direct
reference borrowing proceeds in an unreflective manner, as example (b) shows.
And it is not inevitably the case that indirect reference borrowing proceeds
in a much more reflective manner, by means of a much more conscious
exploitation of causal beliefs. Thus suppose that one's first contact with the
occurrence of certain names is via a long and detailed quotation from a book.
Recognizing it as a quotation one subsequently uses the embedded names
with the same reference as their reference in the book, all on the basis of
indirect reference borrowing. Clearly, this far from unusual way of borrowing
reference may intuitively be less reflective, less a matter of a continuous and
conscious articulation o f causal beliefs, than many acts of direct reference
borrowing (again cf. example (b) above).
A second objection to the Argument from Reference Borrowing is one we
briefly anticipated in the introduction. It confronts the conclusion o f the
argument head-on, and does not simply challenge one or both premises. How,
so the objection runs, can the causal descriptivist ensure that causal
descriptions have overriding weight in the set o f all associated descriptions?
The only way to do this is to rule out ordinary associated descriptions from
that set; otherwise their combined weight is bound to be at least potentially
overriding. But this can only be done by letting the set o f reference-
determining descriptions be decided on grounds which have little to do with
 Frederick W. Kroon 15

the associated mental state o f the referrer and everything to do with the
existence of certain underlying causal chains. Hence, to the extent that causal
descriptivism works, it is not a true version o f descriptivism at all but, at
best, a kind of cumbersome metalinguistic version o f causalism (it says: token
t refers to e iff e satisfies 'xRt', where causalism says: t refers to e iff eRt).
Such a view doesn't even support causal neutralism, for while causal
descriptivism and causalism no doubt become extensionally equivalent on
such an interpretation, they are certainly not explanatorily equivalent: what
explains the fact that e satisfies 'xRt' is the fact that eRt (plus other facts
about the referential connection between expressions and objective items);
the fact t.hat eRt is not in turn explained by the fact that e satisfies
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'xRt'.
This rejection of causal descriptivism still leaves the causalist with the
problem of indirect reference borrowing. But perhaps his objection constrains
us to treat names used on the basis of indirect reference borrowing as
attributive after all, in line with the suggestion canvassed above (and rejected).
Perhaps this crucial argument provides the missing independent support for
the asymmetry the causalist sees between direct and indirect reference
borrowing.
I doubt it. First, note that a classical 'associationist' descriptivism is
wrong even in the case of names used on the basis of indirect reference
borrowing. In every case o f indirect reference borrowing, a person might
associate with a name fairly specific and vivid descriptions that are
nonetheless quite inaccurate. Thus in the 'Dumas' case, B might be convinced
that:
(4) Dumas must have been a leading light in the early days of the
Reformation in France, no doubt an ally of John Calvin; etc.
He might believe this simply because he (wrongly) believes that A only recycles
names o f famous reformation leaders. (A's other pets are called 'Calvin',
'Luther', 'Knox', etc.) Even if B's belief (4) is very firmly held, B still succeeds
in using 'Dumas' to refer to Alexandre Dumas pbre: the argument for this
is just the argument usually given by causal theorists like Kripke against
classical descriptivist views o f proper names. Hence if only a species o f
descriptivism can adequately explain the reference of 'Dumas in B's utterance
of (2), the descriptivism in question cannot be o f the classical kind.
What is wrong with the second objection is its view that descriptivism must
be formulated in terms of the psychological idea of association, whether we
give that idea a behaviourist, 'centralist', or some other natural interpretation.
The use o f this idea must inevitably lead to the inclusion o f semantically
irrelevant descriptions in the set o f reference-determining descriptions, and
it was this consequence that was so effectively criticised by Donnellan and
Kripke. But if not 'associated' descriptions, what then? There are in fact two
distinct questions that one can raise here:
(or) What determines the semantic relevance o f certain descriptions? The
only answer I can think of is: the content o f one's referential intentions, where
 16 Causal Descriptivism

referential intentions playing this role have to be posited to explain how

reference is determined. 16
(/3) W h a t explains the overriding importance of causal descriptions o f a
certain kind in the (descriptivist) way reference is determined, and hence (if
the answer to (o0 is accepted) in the way speakers intend to refer? One m a y
lack a good answer to this question, and still be reasonably confident that
some kind of descriptivism is true. One may have this confidence on the basis
of abstract arguments concerning the theoretical indispensability of referential
intentions whose contents determine reference, or perhaps on the basis of
the less abstract considerations sketched in the present paper. Nonetheless,
I agree that a good answer to (/3) is desirable, if only to lay to rest possible
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sceptical worries about referential intentions. Possibly we should look for

an explanation o f the role o f the relevant causal beliefs in our own
pragmatically explicable interest in co-ordinating our referential activities with
respect to a name with the referential activities of other users of that name,
perhaps remote ones, and the fact that our reliance on certain kinds of causal
beliefs gives us a way of satisfying that interest. This can only be part of
the explanation, but nonetheless I have good hopes that some such account
will work 17.
A final objection, this time against Premise I. The causalist might argue
that nothing said so far disproves causalism, since causalists are free to admit
that certain causal beliefs play a reference-determining role without thereby
admitting that it is the descriptive adequacy of these beliefs that grounds
reference. W h y not say, our causalist might urge, that it is the fact that a
speaker's beliefs and intentions involving a name are causally g r o u n d e d in
a certain individual that makes the individual the referent of that name when
used with these beliefs and intentions? 18 Such a view could be regarded as
tolerating classical descriptivism's emphasis on all associated descriptions and
beliefs (thus obviating the need for an answer to question (/3) above), while
avoiding the Donnellan-Kripke objections to descriptivism by giving a causal
construal of the reference-determining role of descriptions. Rather than work
with a classical relation of best fit between descriptions and objects, therefore,
a view of this kind will employ the relation of an associated description's
being o f a certain individual, or having it source in a certain individual
(similarly for referential intentions whose content is specified in terms of such
descriptions).
Perhaps it is indeed fair to say that events involving the pop-singer
Engelbert H. caused D's believing 'Engelbert Humperdinck is the popular
~6 Much more ought to be said, of course, about the form these intentions take, especiallyin
the light of the speaker's reference/semantic reference distinction. One account is found in
McKinsey's papers, op. cit., another in my Reference and Reduction (PhD dissertation,
Princeton, 1980).
17 For a fuller account, see 'The Problem of "Jonah" ' and 'Theoretical Terms and the Causal
View of Reference'.
~8 Such a view concerning referential intentions is suggested by Rod Bertolet, op. cit. Gareth
Evans in his 'The Causal Theory of Names' (Aristotelian Society Proceedings, July 1973)
first pointed out the advantages of incorporating associated beliefs into a causal theory of
reference for names. The strategy is also adopted, implicitly, by Devitt in Designation.
 Frederick W. Kroon 17

entertainer whose name C ,ecycled in calling his child EH' when using the
name in (3) to refer to Engelbert H. Had the latter never assumed the name
EH, for example, C would not have given her child the name, and D would
never have entertained that belief. Hence on a counter-factual account of
causality, events involving the pop-singer caused D's belief. But since this
can also be said about the solar system, or the pop-singer's parents, we have
so far said nothing very distinctive. The causalist must believe that there is
a special semantically significant kind of causal connection between Engelbert
H. and D's belief, a kind of connection that does not hold between the solar
system (the pop-singer's mother, etc.) and D's belief. Describing this kind
of connection, however, presents the causalist with exactly the same problems
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as the ones we have already considered. Perhaps he can rule out the solar
system and the pop-singer's parents (once again relying on such things as
groundings and communication-chains), but without relying on a criterion
of descriptive fit he seems unable to rule out an indefinite number of other
possible contenders: C's child, the composer, the baron whose name the
composer assumed, etc.

University o f A u c k l a n d Received July 1985