RULE 10

(1-4 CASES)

SIASOCO V. CA
(Amended and Supplemental Complaints)
DOCTRINE
Notwithstanding the filing of a responsive pleading by one defendant, the complaint may still be amended once,
as a matter of right, by the plaintiff in respect to claims against the non-answering defendant(s)

FACTS
Petitioners were the registered owners of nine parcels of land located in Montalban, Rizal. They began to offer
the subject properties for sale. Subsequently, Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) negotiated with the petitioners, but the
parties failed to agree on the terms of the purchase. More than a year later, both parties revived their
discussions. In a letter, petitioners made a final offer to the INC. The latter’s counsel sent a reply received by
Petitioner Mario Siasoco stating that the offer was accepted, but that the INC was “not amenable to your
proposal to an undervaluation of the total consideration.” In their letter, petitioners claimed that the INC had not
really accepted the offer, adding that, prior to their receipt of the aforementioned reply they had already
“contracted” with Carissa Homes and Development & Properties, Inc. for the sale of the said properties “due to
the absence of any response to their offer from INC.

Maintaining that a sale had been consummated, INC demanded that the corresponding deed be executed in its
favor. Petitioners refused.

INC filed a civil suit for specific performance and damages against petitioners and Carissa Homes and
Development & Properties, Inc.

Petitioners filed therein a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue and lack of capacity to sue.

Carissa Homes filed its answer to the complaint.

Pending resolution of petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss,

INC negotiated with Carissa Homes which culminated in the purchase of the subject properties of Carissa
Homes by INC.

INC filed an Amended Complaint, dropping Carissa Homes as one of the defendants and changing the nature of
the case to a mere case for damages.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Strike Out Amended Complaint, contending that the complaint cannot be amended
without leave of court, since a responsive pleading has been filed

An order denying petitioners’ Motion to Strike Out Amended Complaint was

rendered by the trial court.

CA ruled that although private respondent could no longer amend its original Complaint as a matter of right, it
was not precluded from doing so with leave of court. Thus, the CA concluded that the RTC had not acted with
grave abuse of discretion in admitting INC’s Amended Complaint. The CA also held that the Amended Complaint did not
substantially alter private respondent’s cause of action, since petitioners were not being asked to answer a legal
obligation different from that stated the original Complaint.

SSUE
WON CA gravely erred in holding that the respondent Judge’s admission of INC’s
Amended Complaint was proper.
HELD
SC sustained the Court of Appeals.
 Where some but not all the defendants have answered, plaintiffs may amend their Complaint once, as a
matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering defendants, but not as to claims
asserted against the other defendants.— It is clear that plaintiff (herein private respondent) can amend its
complaint once, as a matter of right, before a responsive pleading is filed. Contrary to the petitioners’ contention,
the fact that Carissa had already filed its Answer did not bar private respondent from amending its original
Complaint once, as a matter of right, against herein petitioners

Indeed, where some but not all the defendants have answered, plaintiffs may amend their Complaint once, as a
matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering defendants, but not as to claims
asserted against the other defendants.

After a responsive pleading has been filed, an amendment may be rejected when the defense is substantially
altered since such amendment does not only prejudice the rights of the defendant but also delays the action;
Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice.— The
rationale for the aforementioned rule is in Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, which provides that after a
responsive pleading has been filed, an amendment may be rejected when the defense is substantially altered.
Such amendment does not only prejudice the rights of the defendant; it also delays the action. In the first place,
where a party has not yet filed a responsive pleading, there are no defenses that can be altered. Furthermore,
the Court has held that “[a]mendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in order
to speed the trial of cases.

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY

VS. WILLIAM GOTHONG AND ABOITIZ

FACTS:
Petitioner William Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc. (WG&A ), is a duly organized domestic corporation engaged in the shipping
industry. Respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA ), upon the other hand, is a government-owned and controlled
company created and existing by virtue of the provisions of P.D. No. 87 and mandated under its charter to operate and
administer the country's sea port and port facilities.
After the expiration of the lease contraCT, petitioner WG&A requested respondent PPA for it to be allowed to
lease and operate the said facility. The contract was eventually conformed to and signed by the petitioner
company, thereafter, in accordance with the stipulations made in the lease agreement. However, respondent
PPA subsequently sent a letter to petitioner directing the latter to vacate the contested premises and to turnover
the improvements made therein pursuant to the terms and conditions agreed upon in the contract. In response,
petitioner wrote PPA urging the latter to reconsider its decision to eject the former. Said request was denied by
the PPA. WG&A commenced an Injunction suit before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
Petitioner claims that the PPA unjustly, illegally and prematurely terminated the lease contract. It likewise prayed
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to arrest the evacuation. In its complaint, petitioner also sought
recovery of damages for breach of contract and attorney's fees.
WG&A amended its complaint for the first time reiterating that PPA is already estopped from denying that the
correct period of lease that should the petitioner be forced to vacate the said facility, it should be deemed as
entitled to be refunded of the value of the improvements it introduced in the leased property.
And there is a second amendment, the complaint met strong opposition from the respondent PPA. It postulated
that the reformation sought for by the petitioner constituted substantial amendment, which if granted, will
substantially alter the latter's cause of action and theory of the case. Then the CA granted respondent's petition,
thereby setting aside the RTC orders and directing the RTC to admit respondent's second amended complaint
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the
same was denied per Resolution.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
admission of the second amended complaint.
HELD: The Court finds the petition without merit.
The CA did not err in finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Order dated March 22, 2002
denying the admission of respondent's second amended complaint. The RTC applied the old Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules
of Court:

Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. after the case is set for hearing, substantial amendments may be made only upon
leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay the
action or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this
section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
instead of the provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amending Section 3, Rule 10, to wit:

SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments
may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was
made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in
court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
The Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of
Appeals,[3] thus:
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such manner
that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered" was stricken-off and not retained
in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the
amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense." This should only be true, however,
when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be
made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable
objective of the rules which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.[4]

CHING VS. CA
(Action in Rem and Action in Personam)

Facts: Alfredo Ching is the legitimate son of Ching Leng wherein the latter bought a property from Sps.
Nofuente and the former registered the property in her name on September 18, 1961, her postal address was in
Pasay City. Ching Leng died in Boston and his legitimate son was appointed as administrator of her estate.
Thirteen (13) years after the death of Ching Leng, a suit was commenced on December 27, 1978 by private
respondent Pedro Asedillo against Ching Leng for the reconveyance of said property. An amended complaint
was made by private respondent alleging “that on account of the fact that the defendant has been residing
abroad up to the present, and it is not known whether the defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be
served by summons and other processes only by publication.” Summons by publication was made through
“Economic Monitor”, newspaper of general circulation in Province of Rizal, Pasay City. Since no responsive
pleading was filed after the lapse of 60 days, judgment on the merits in favor of private respondents was made.
Consequently, the title of Ching Leng was cancelled and transferred to private respondent who sold the same to
Villa Esperanza Dev., Inc. Petitioner learned of the decision, and so he filed a petition to set it aside as null and
void for lack of jurisdiction;

Lower court decision:

RTC: At first, granted the verified petition to set aside as null and void the prior order of the RTC; however, on
motion by private respondent, the same was set aside. So, petitioner filed for reconsideration but was denied.
*the case was elevated directly to SC

Issue: WON reconveyance and cancellation of title is in personam which cannot give jurisdiction to the court by
service of summons by publication.
(Note: private respondents argue that they are quasi in rem)
Ruling: Yes, reconveyance and cancellation of title are acts in personam.

Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek
personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek
judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world.

An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular
individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.

Private respondent’s action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the judgment in
question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng. Verily,
the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter’s death.

According to Dumlao v. Quality plastic products, the decision of the lower court insofar as the deceased is
concerned is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been validly served
with summons. He had no more civil personality, that its fitness to be subject of legal relations was lost through
death.

Ching Leng is an innocent purchaser for value as shown by the evidence adduced in his behalf by petitioner
herein, tracking back the roots of his title since 1960, from the time the decree of registration was issued.

The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another’s name after one year from the date of the decree is not to set aside the decree but respecting it
and to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for damages if the property has
transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.

ONG PENG v CUSTODIO March 25, 1961 Amendment

FACTS: Ong Peng filed a complaint against Jose Custodio for a sum of money with interest for goods and materials
Custodio obtained from Peng and attorneyâs fees. Custodio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Pengâs cause of
action had already prescribed.. Peng answered the motion and attached an amended complaint with a promissory note
supporting his claim. Custodio did not file an answer to the amended complaint nor object to its admission. The court
admitted the amended complaint on the ground that Custodio did not object to it and denied his motion to dismiss. The
Court furnished Custodioâs counsel a copy of the order admitting the amended complaint and furnished Custodio a copy of
the order denying his motion to dismiss. Peng moved that Custodio be declared in default because he had not filed an
answer to the amended complaint. The court granted the motion and set the hearing for Pengâs presentation of evidence.
Before the hearing Custodio filed a motion to set aside the order of default to allow him to present evidence. Peng objected
to this motion. The court denied it during the hearing. After the presentation of Pengâs evidence, the court entered judgment
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P2,527.30, with legal interest, and costs. After receiving the judgment,
Custodio filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had strong and valid defense, that the promissory note was
spurious and that he was an intelligent and respectable member of the community. An affidavit was attached to the motion,
stating that if only he would be allowed to present evidence, he could show that he had a valid defense and he could prove
that the signature on the promissory note was forged. Peng objected to this motion. Several affidavits by Peng himself and
witnesses were attached to his objection.The court denied Custodioâs petition and subsequent motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: WoN Custodio never came under the jurisdiction of the court for the purposes of the amended complaint because
the same was not served upon him with summons .

HELD: The appeal is dismissed. The right of a plaintiff under Section 1 of Rule 17 to amend his pleading once
as a matter of course before a responsive pleading (which a motion to dismiss is not one) is served, has been
held to be one which the court should always grant, otherwise mandamus will lie against it. Besides, the
amendment was merely one of form; it did not change the cause of action, but only set forth the promissory note
on which the action was based. *Summons issue: The amended complaint contained no new matter; it only sets
forth the promissory note upon which the cause of action is based. In the case at bar also the defendant had
already appeared when the amended complaint was served-defendant had, in fact, presented a motion to
dismiss. We rule that after the defendant has appeared by virtue of a summons and presented a motion to
dismiss, he may be served with the amended complaint, without need of another summons, and in the same
form and manner ordinary motions or papers are served.