Aristotle's Ethics J. 0. URMSON 15 Nov 2002 cL L LACK WELeas mechan phocpyng, rng cer wit ee ‘ACIP catego fr his book inva fom Be Siblopaab pica inde, Contents Pesce Retraces Pics Bee it: Pinney Discusion Beles Chancer atranad Mins Response Choice Parva Elen of Chancer ‘The Excelences of Intelligence Pleasure 3 4 3 ‘ 7 Strength and Weakness of Wil 8 9) Socal Relationships 0 k Eudaeronia Further Reading Index 128 129108 Imatked of becaue hey touch and not his setving ie ff ting this ba inca Fring eevee the we of he ar ace the Philosophers have always beer, between enjoying. - and, Plaatre Y are cases of pleas oF enoyee eT Of Proce sacs ese oF enjoyment of actirny ro Sanlea po Of Welng Se acta nici, ty be mised by the won einer ‘sctiviey’, which is tho discussion being used ata term of ee, plese Ne tat Cat has to be active, cn tae Plasane As the word sctiviyis bag nace Oi thing is mach se sare satualy 50 called. One does nor need ve on lying there frit tobe pleasant: sex do something, noe being rvtee, ime and the like are enough aac poe Bn ity lel an acivicy i the en ea inns the bringing about of an ead pan take time, though ie may lee free beach one has i a denying ime, and if ne iy the beach. Ie must alo be ony she excellence of temperaace is contend oi we the so ch and tate and sggening Sensations that are produced By towrh pot denied that these plearor and almott, in fact, does, tod then stitutes the exp. 2 D) Social Relationships 4c the beginning ofthe Niomaben Eihis (10540 25+» 4) Ara lo that ees a depactment ofthe thos of polis bth ate conered with deicmining th gcd fr aa Bat this consider only the good for man tstted oy ag ‘ommanisy, wher plitis proper wll ince te ey nf Sil citi, which ao ext for the good for me, te te sample socal coment. So ethics is the prokegeeroe ae polis, andthe nal emtece ote wok in Serie ne one Aico’ (1815 22-23). The ed ofthe eheal wah ote eure he of pols, Beh stesso Slats obs ocd 142i siden wor inthe Nema ise seo 18 she a usally tated) ‘Mant mace goes ‘eit Whac Ail meus hati aac esa Nr age it thee wo books go beyond the bounds of seem to be an editorial hs dfned by Aisle, and cheeno Social Relaionsbipy Saran heth broly genuine. Ths Book Vil en nat Soares th th wend Ply we no Sates (11545 34), while Bok IX ends act Pe CrP wth the weds "We should nex snes a (72s 19% his is surly clumsy stitching ogc Pieces. Moreover there is no reference to apred thse wo hale ote te of he Nima Ey and tee ye the oversight in these two In Chapeer 2 of Book VIII Aristcle repeats his regula view that there are generically three objects of love and dest, she Pleasant, the good and the useful. In speaking of loving she useful we are obviously talking traditional translations, ce doube it would be better to say that we value it, On the flistinction te bases in Chapeer 3 «second between theceeypesof fiendship (in his wide sense). We have relationships with people because such relationships are useful, such people as those whom owadays we might call business asccates, with other people such a8 bridge partners and witty conversatioalst, we form ‘sssociations for entertainment and pleasure. These two typet of sociation, if they are no more than that, do noe, like true BY Social Relationshaps my 18 their objece but che utility oF oe epee patina eid rele is rare, foritcan, “The third typeof sociation, rue friendship, ‘both of whom are good and who wish pee e ete ee Sencar ee ict wiy msc The hc pe of ‘ation may be berween two bad men or berween a good Bee Atmel bake, er codhip can eric ly beween good men and equals and must be reciprocal. eee ee ress ‘benefit. sa called , bowee, scl elaionshis, sot naturally ae aire scree ‘canibeeps ae theo er sno, hsb al wi er a bce ef he deci of Ari's views on thi pc ae unikely tbemales to merc wees, who may deny the ‘seguir ad od the view that nach cae the soe xg vt pene han ned ple, Bs, Arora tence hat loving i mea the xsece ‘Bendy ha ingore (1159433039) help to mig is aly cused Cee een alse ng coahigs vik fare pen mt He Singin he fd forms of goveramen, ach having its own characteristic per ‘tion, making sin Schematic they are. Goud Form Peveion Monarchy yranny ‘Asitoracy Oligarchy Tumecncy Democracy (OF these the fis ewo are self-explanatory: timocracy isa form of {orernment in which power is widely and evenly spread beeween ‘Al sho satisfy «property qualifcaton, its perversion democracy, ‘ing the sate where all are equal in authority, whatever ehete ‘ata = something Aristoce regards as not as bad as tyranny ofmz Sail Ratoni aligarchy, but key to be diorganied a illadvie, The wid ‘ens ofthe Athenian detail the ancien pilsose, with a deep sapcion of exseme dint demesne Aasote was noc shone to eas was Poe hogan aes fave power withoe the rapomibiity tobe expel whos with a stake in the country. “4 ln ‘Arise now fads the flowing prs ‘The good relation of father ro mi ike monarchy; es pervenion ‘a cyranny ‘The good relation of husband ro wile ike siccracy; but where. the wife is oe allowed ber proper share of inlecnce and the hab demic ia everyeing the reson become sn ro oligarchy ‘The good relation of brothers like timocracy; but « household there nobody holds sway is like « democracy. How far chese parallels are accurate and illuminating in deal tay be debated; bue hey form part of Aristotle's general view that a household is a microcosm reflecting the more iaclusive relationships holding wichin « state and exhibiting parallel merits and defects, ‘The farther decails of Arittcl's account of the principles governing vatious types of association, from crue friendship 10 Commercial relationships like that of the shoemaker and his customer (1163b 38), need not be further examined here. They tare readily comprehensible and vary from the wise and penet rating to those relecting outdated and unfamiliar social scenes and practices. FRIENDSHIP AND EGOISM ‘There remains a crucial problem: in general, the tone of the ethical writings is egocentric. All che ingrediens put forward as elements in the good life seem to be advocated as promoting the well being of the agent. This scems crue of the excellences of inceligence and character at well as of less cencral maters suchas ieee 1” f eis po es ese oo! birth ad mae oe on Ae ent come i Shh has declared tobe an exsential element in Se Ha ren fs mil dn Capes 4 8 of Book IX “Asal stars by saying tac the mai feacres of friendship — disieeted ear fr welfare and ie, and sharing life, interests, js and ric ~ are ss much tue of good man's cation Fine a of his lations eo his friends. The good man does tei the life e lens, dos not wish to be diferent and in (Roca regads himself in the way that he s supposed to regard steeds ofthe main excures of Fendship consitate love of the fend, we most say that the good man loves hime ‘iste i, ofcourse, aware that sell-love 1s usually a term of sae. People Blame those who love themselves mast and cll | them vefselfas aterm shame, whereas the good man ‘cfr ens ake, aod sacries his own interest (11680 29-33) Bur Arstote says that this a misunderstanding. The {pod maniss lover of self in the ood vente, and the wicked man lore himself inthe bad sense “This line of thought is interes inl ehed in he eighteenth century by Bahop Butler who, io his mons preached in the Rolls Chapel, tld his fasionablen4 Social Relationships ‘and cynical audience that the trouble with true selflove was that it was t00 rare, not that it was too common, ‘What Aristotle now has (1169s 18 ff) to say is crucial and ‘must be quoted at length: ei rv of the good man tha he does much fr the sake o his foods and hs foun. and wl defor tem ifocese will surrender boch wealth and honows and. gescally he ‘ood men fight for, but gaining nobility for hits ox he ecfers great pleasure for short time vo'cadurng igh pleasure, and clive nobly fora year ater then er many ys tn nondescript fashion, and one fe and gene acon te soay stmall ones This presumably happens te thse ‘who de iy athe, for they chose something grat and fe fr them selves... Inall praiseworthy deeds the good min apps o Alle to himself che grease share of noily. In thn way then, one shouldbe a lover of sel, a has been iid, but na the way most people are This line of argument, ac least at frst sight, does not do what is required of ic. There is a great difference berween a sacrifice for the sake of another, which can be rightly described 438 fine or noble, and giving up something to another in order to atcain the greater good of having achieved something fine and noble, Ifone makes 2 sacrifice for another in order to attain a greater good, then it is not true that one has made the sacrifice for the sake of that ocher. If this line of argument is correce, Aristotle has filed to reconcile his view oflicndship 2 involving disinterested care forthe friend's welfare with his ‘general view that men seek what they take co be thei highest ‘Rood. Buc we must look carefully at this notion of acting in & cereain way ‘because iti fine (noble) or Yor the sake of what is fine (noble). Aristotle introduces his notion a aumber of times in che Nicomacheen Ethia, particulatly in contexts which Seem to involve a person in acing against his incerests. Thus, he speaks in the presene context of scefice fora friend forthe sake of what is fine and in his discussion of bravery he mote than once speaks ofthe brave man as facing death because ss P ws : Sie Relations deg, nn), he Mb 30-39 est he Fe tie, ce wetland the esa of the base, the harmful and ee Sal pew pe ese oma Se ie ety ae ews; i is ths wed fe ular word for "base in ethical contexts, 8 also the — Ariscocl defines the Aalor up nce bri (13668 3) parane ecaute good Scere ete toe today coclsions om he Be in ehial conten i opposed fo wha is Saino may bebe tb stk ak Dati mennnr be orb pon ed woman fer pial and meagre sats. To eat moderately may be good, frreminetselfsarifce wll be Bre. A good man will not be ‘Bietolive wth himself fhe behaves sorddly oc mean, ad 30 til nse athe to die. So the Be or oble should pethaps be Tug ofa this special ype of the good cat the oppose of the mean and base This interpretation seems ro harmonize best trite defnitios othe Rte and ee Tops, since the notion be fcng may well ave an acstheic ora chia cone. The inintion berween what i simply wrong and what is mean, Stabby oc bs one which nowadays can il gain sympaerc ondeandig ‘So, now, if the situation is such chat one can save one's fried only by sacrificing onc’ own life, and one makes this sacrifice ‘becuse one would despise oneselt forever ater if one did not, is one loving one's fiend for his owe sake or being selfish? One imighe reply that unless he were 4 true fiend, and aot a mere6 Sacial Reatonsips business acquaintance or boon companion, there would be Puthing sordid in noe making the scrifc, that iis poesae because one values him for his own sake that it would beng) Further discussions follow in Aristotle's text, including 1 mont claborace chain of argument to show that one cannot lave mone than afew rue friends, something one might accept intuitively without che argument. Mose of thee are sel(-explanacory and need no discussion here. Bue something should be aid abot the ‘notion of self-sufficiency. Ie willbe remembered thc in Book | of the Nicomachan Exbics Aristotle had already said that one of the ‘riteria of the endaomon life was that ic was sef-suficient, in Book X he is going roll us that one of the grounds for regarding fe devoted co contemplation as the most eudacnon is that it ‘eminently satisfies that criterion (11776 21). Ie might sem, and incautious commentators have often suggested, that this ‘emphasis on self-sufficiency fies in badly with the claims in the discussions of friendship that iis an essential pat ofthe good ie and chat nobody would choose to live withour friends Ie should be nored that Aristocle explicitly discises these doubts, in Book IX, Chapeer 9. What of the contention tha the self-sufficient man has no need of fiends (11696 5)? Having ‘reiterated the importance and valve of friends, Aristotle makes the distinction that he needs. The life ofthe contemplative man ‘ced few external goods, 20 such a man will have lite need of ‘iendships of uility’ of business associations; the life of such a ‘man is also intrinsically pleasant, so he will not aced companions tokeep him amused. Thus, his rain acupaion in life can go on withoue dependence on other people ro aud him. This is the wayFurther Reading GENERAL INTRODUCTIONS To AnistoTiE JU Ackil Ariat the Philaepber (Oxford, 1981) J: Barnes Avisate (Oxford, 1982, BOOKS ON ARISTOTLE’ ETHics MER Hardie: Arias Ethical Thy: 2od e. (One, 1980) J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R.Sorsh it (eds) Articles on Avie Ethie and Paltis; London, 97 8 (ed), Estat om Avista’: Ethic, (Berkeley, 1980) sctviy 9-104, 108, 124-5 spate: goad 37 topic 39-40, 49-50, 52, 39, os lies 31 bravery 27, 63-7 Bate J. 113 ddoice 9-53, 56 91 es leven 82-3, ‘ompalion 4-5 soi 112-16 fd 10, 11,92, 54-5, 101-3, inch. | pas, 87-8, 90, 37.113. ch IO pate Ende Bibs 6. $39 8 scl, of body 3, 21 of chanete 3,21, ch. 2 pai, ae itligenc 3,21, ch. pain Sa ead 1, 13 foe (noble) 114-15, force 43-4 form of che good 22-4, 123 Aendhip ch 9 pate Got 121-4 od 1, 22-4, 57 oi exctlence 31 Hume, D855 focention ch. 4 pain, 58 ‘arornce of ee 45-9 of picipe 47, Kaoe 1.5, 36, 37 oowicige 92-5, 121 Magne Merl 13, 118 mean 28-35 ‘mein wo end 1, 52