Calalang vs Williams

G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940

J. Laurel

Calalang is a private citizen-taxpayer. Williams is the Chairman of National Traffic Commission (NTC).
The latter recommended to the Secretary of Public Works that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30
a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the
date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. This is in pursuance to a Commonwealth Act 548
giving it such power.

Issues: 1. Whether NTC's power to promulgate rules and regulation for the regulation and control of the
use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power.

2. Whether the Act was unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge
the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion.
3. Whether it infringes upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.

SC: 1. NO. It is the concept of "Subordinate legislation." It is In Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro, we
held: The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made. What was conferred upon thru the said Act was merely to carry out the legislative policy
laid down by the National Assembly.

2. NO. Valid exercise of State's police power. The act aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. It was inspired by a
desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare,
then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Liberty is a blessing
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society will fall into anarchy

3. NO. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in
its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est
suprema lex.

Del Rosario vs De los Santos

G.R. Nos. L-20589-90
March 21, 1968
J. Fernando

Petitioner-landowner assails the validity of Section 14 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1955, 1 which
empowers a tenant "to change the tenancy contract from one of share tenancy to the leasehold tenancy
and vice versa and from one crop-sharing arrangement to another of the share tenancy." It started when
2 tenants of the petitioner filed before the CAR to avail of this Sec 14.
Issue: Whether the section is unconstitutional for it hampers property rights?

SC: No. As Pre. Magsaysay said: He who has less in life should have more in law.

The framers of the Constitution mindful of the then growing feeling of dissatisfaction with the ability of the
government to cope with the poverty and misery of the vast majority of our people inserted the protection
to labor 2 and social justice 3 provisions of the Constitution. Thus they left no doubt about the validity of
remedial legislation intended to minimize, if not to do away entirely with, the oppressive condition that
usually was associated with agricultural labor.

is 'to establish agricultural tenancy relations between landholders and tenants upon the principle of social
justice; to afford adequate protection to the rights of both tenants and landlords, to insure an equitable
division of the produce and income derived from the land; to provide tenant-farmers with incentives to
greater and more efficient agricultural production; to bolster their economic position and to encourage
their participation in the development of peaceful, vigorous and democratic rural communities.'"

Obligations of contracts must yield to police power of the State.

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka

347 U.S. 483 (1954)

Petition of children of Negros seeking aid from Court because they had been denied admission to schools
attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This
segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment.

3 judges denied the relief, following the "separate but equal" doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy
v. Fergson which state that treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal
facilities, even though these facilities be separate.

Issue: Whether they are denied the equal protection of the law?

SC: YES. Any contrary pronouncement in Plessy is now rejected.

Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored
children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the races is
usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard]
the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits
they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.

We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others
similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained
of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Scott v. Sandford
60 U.S. 19 How. 393 393 (1856)

It was an action of trespass vi et armis instituted in the Circuit Court by Scott against Sandford. Before the
suit, Scott just obtained a verdict and judgment for his freedom in Circuit Court of St. Louis.
Sanford demurred the case for it has no cause of action because Scott is not a citizen of Missouri. He
said that Scott is a negro of African descent; his ancestors were of pure African blood, and were brought
into this country and sold as negro slaves. And the plaintiff was a negro slave, the lawful property of the
defendant, and, as such, the defendant gently laid his hands upon him, and thereby had only restrained
him, as the defendant had a right to do.

Issue: whether the descendants of such slaves (African brought to US), when they shall be emancipated,
or who are born of parents who had become free before their birth, are citizens of a State in the sense in
which the word "citizen" is used in the Constitution of the United States.

SC: NO. Hence, he is not entitled to sue in the courts.

The words "people of the United States" and "citizens" are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing.
They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty
and who hold the power and conduct the Government through their representatives. They are what we
familiarly call the "sovereign people," and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of
this sovereignty. The question before us is whether the class of persons described in the plea in
abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think
they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word
"citizens" in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that
instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that
time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings who had been subjugated by the dominant
race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or
privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.

But there are two clauses in the Constitution which point directly and specifically to the negro race as a
separate class of persons, and show clearly that they were not regarded as a portion of the people or
citizens of the Government then formed.

No one of that race had ever migrated to the United States voluntarily; all of them had been brought here
as articles of merchandise. The number that had been emancipated at that time were but few in
comparison with those held in slavery, and they were identified in the public mind with the race to which
they belonged, and regarded as a part of the slave population rather than the free. It is obvious that they
were not even in the minds of the framers of the Constitution when they were conferring special rights
and privileges upon the citizens of a State in every other part of the Union.

Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

G.R. No. L-14078
March 7, 1919
J. Malcolm

Rubi filed petition for writ of habeas corpus. Alleging that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of
their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under
the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

Resolution No. 25 of the Provincial Board adopted that in order to educate the Non-Christian people
(Mangyans) of Mindoro, it is resolved to place them in one permanent settlement. It was in Tigbao, shore
of lake Naujan. Those who shall refused will be imprisoned for not more than 60 days.

Sec of Interior: Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the
manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction — burning and destroying the forests and making
illegal caiñgins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its
interests, what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for
which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on
account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected
to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.

Issues: Non-Christians; Compare to the American Indians; and Whether the petitioners were
unduly deprived of their liberty and whether the writ shall issue?

SC: NO. They are not unduly deprived and writ shall not issue.

Who are the Non-Christians? Traced back from the Ph history. During Spanish era (God, Glory and Gold
conquest), the REDUCCION is to eliminate the ancient rituals of Indios in the least inconvenient manner,
they were reduced into a "poblaciones" communities where there are water, lands, mountains, live stock
so they won't mix with the Spaniards.

In US acquisition, they are the uncivilized tribes (tribal govt) are surrounded by civilized areas, to where
they refuse to conform, these govt shall be strictly regulated by the State. Jones Law which made the 12
districts to be represented in the Ph Congress. The creation of the Bureau of non-Christian tribes.

Following.. Non-Christian inhabitants has religious and geographical significance. It is indicative of the
degree of civilization rather than of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious
denomination will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom. It
refers not to religious belief, but, in a way , to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the
Philippine Islands of a law grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled
communities.

The American Indians. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. There are communities dependent
on the United States. dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe
no allegiance to the States, and receive from the no protection. In a case, the Fed SC ruled the validity of
Indian Reservation for it is for the community's safety.

In the case of Rubi, petitioner is a person in the definition of person who is entitled of the writ of Habeas
Corpus.

Consti Questions:
1. Undue delegation of powers of Congress- NO.
2. Non-Christians applicability as religious discrimination-- NO. It refers to natives of the
Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization
3. Liberty, due process, equal protection

"Liberty regulated by law." Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and
the upright and honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)Civil Liberty may be said to
mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the
peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others.

The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute
which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely
arbitrary in nature. There is a valid classification here.

The legislative intent of the law is in line with the police power of the State. What the Government wished
to do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and
to improve the health and morals — was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method was
termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has
been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it
required, if they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live
under restraint in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized
people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes.
Guiazon vs de Villa
G.R. No. 80508
January 30, 1990
J. Gutierrez, Jr.

41 petitioners asks the Court for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the military and police
officers represented by public respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives"
in Metro Manila Targeting places where "subversives" are hiding. They are citizens of Manila, leaders,
taxpayers. Respondent opposed for lack of legal standing.

Illegal arrests of civilians, raiding houses without Search warrant, display of guns, arbitrary detention,
beatings, maulings, mental and physical torture. All are human rights violations.

Issue: Whether the Saturation Drives are in consonance of the President's Calling Out powers when there
are lawless violence to be suppressed? And whether they are entitled of the relief sought?

SC: Remand the case. No erring soldier or policeman we can order to prosecute. Let the petitioners
present evidence.

Dismissed for there are no proper parties and no proof.

The right to be left alone is guaranteed by the Consti. Right to be secured in one's home (Castle doctrine
in Crim Pro) is protected. It is the procedure applied in intrusion which is regulated.

The nature of the affirmative relief hinges closely on the determination of the exact facts surrounding a
particular case. The violations of human rights alleged by the petitioners are serious. If an orderly
procedure ascertains their truth, not only a writ of prohibition but criminal prosecutions would immediately
issue as a matter of course. A persistent pattern of wholesale and gross abuse of civil liberties, as alleged
in the petition, has no place in civilized society.

However, the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. We see
nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots
or violent demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A show of force is sometimes
necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not violated. A blanket prohibition such as
that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one confrontations where search
warrants and warrants of arrests against specific individuals are easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the
military and the police decide to sit down in their offices because all concerted drives where a show of
force is present are totally prohibited.

DISSENTING OF J. CRUZ.
This is not to say that liberty and authority are irreconcilable enemies. The two must in fact co-exist, for
only in a well-ordered society can rights be properly enjoyed. Implicit in that theory, however, is the other
imperative: that the highest function of authority is to insure liberty. On the improper parties in the
ponencia: It is fear that surrounds the petitioners. THe saturation happened not in the place of the rich but
in the deprived people.

I believe that where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if he may not be directly
injured. Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makes him a proper party. It is not only the
owner of the burning house who has the right to call the firemen. Every one has the right and
responsibility to prevent the fire from spreading even if he lives in the other block. Blanket denial of the
Sol Gen is not enough.
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC. vs. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
G.R. No. 135306. January 28, 2003
J. Bellosillo

Respondents filed before RTC a class suit representing nationwide Muslims against the petitioners for a
libelous article in Bulgar, a daily tabloid. Its remarks said that Muslim god are pigs which for them are
sacred, they do not eat it even if they go hungry. They defense is that there is no malice to injure, nor
specifically mention Muslim person.

RTC dismissed arguing that there is no readily identified Muslim defamed. CA reversed stating it is libel. It
is a clear defamation of the class.

Issue: Whether Libel exists? Whether petitioners have right to institute the class suit?

SC: No. RTC decision reinstated.

Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or
reputation through false and malicious statements. It must be stressed that words which are merely
insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however
opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for
defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages.

In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar article.
Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private respondents have no individual
causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged. Private respondents must have
a cause of action in common with the class to which they belong to in order for the case to prosper.

An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and distinct in the community. Each
Muslim, as part of the larger Muslim community in the Philippines of over five (5) million people, belongs
to a different trade and profession; each has a varying interest and a divergent political and religious view
-some may be conservative, others liberal. A Muslim may find the article dishonorable, even
blasphemous; others may find it as an opportunity to strengthen their faith and educate the nonbelievers
and the "infidels."

Muslim" is a name which describes only a general segment of the Philippine population, comprising a
heterogeneous body whose construction is not so well defined as to render it impossible for any
representative identification.

The Christian religion in the Philippines is likewise divided into different sects: Catholic, Baptist,
Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Lutheran, and other groups the essence of which may lie in an inspired
charlatan, whose temple may be a corner house in the fringes of the countryside. As with the Christian
religion, so it is with other religions that represent the nation's culturally diverse people and minister to
each one's spiritual needs. The Muslim population may be divided into smaller groups with varying
agenda, from the prayerful conservative to the passionately radical. These divisions in the Muslim
population may still be too large and ambiguous to provide a reasonable inference to any personality who
can bring a case in an action for libel.

Plessy v. Ferguson
163 U.S. 537
(1896)
J. Brown

Plessy, a citizen of US, who has a mixed descent of Caucasian and African, which blood color not
discernible on him. He bought a first class ticket at Louisiana. He took the seat on the coach, where
passengers of white race are accommodated. Petitioner was required by the conductor to take the seat
accommodate to those Non-white race. He refused and was taken by the police.

Decision of Judge Ferguson sustained the petitioner's demurrer and made him plea to the info against
him. The basis is the law of Louisiana segregating the seats of white and colored men in the trains.
Providing equal but separate accommodations to both race.

Issue: Whether the law is constitutional as it conflict with the 13th amendment eliminating slavery? Or with
the 14th amendment of equal protection?

SC: NO.

On the 13th. Acts of a mere individual, the owner of an inn, a public conveyance or place of amusement,
refusing accommodations to colored people cannot be justly regarded as imposing any badge of slavery
or servitude upon the applicant, but It would be running the slavery argument into the ground," said Mr.
Justice Bradley, "to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to
the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his
concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business."

The statute is merely a distinction founded in the color of the two races and which must always exist so
long as white men are distinguished from the other race by color -- has no tendency to destroy the legal
equality of the two races, or reestablish a state of involuntary servitude.

On the 14th. The power to assign to a particular coach obviously implies the power to determine to which
race the passenger belongs, as well as the power to determine who, under the laws of the particular
State, is to be deemed a white and who a colored person.

The case reduces itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation, and,
with respect to this, there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature. In
determining the question of reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages,
customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort and the
preservation of the public peace and good order.

Korematsu v. United States

323 U.S. 214 (1944)
J. Black

Petitioner was an American citizen with Japanese descent. He was convicted of violation of the Civilian
Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Command General which directed that, after May 9, 1942, all persons of
Japanese ancestry should be excluded from that "Military Area" of San Leandro California. CA affirmed

Issue: Whether the affirmance is correct?

SC: YES.

Like curfew (in the Hirabayashi case), exclusion of those of Japanese origin was deemed necessary
because of the presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members of the group, most of whom
we have no doubt were loyal to this country. It was because we could not reject the finding of the military
authorities that it was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal
that we sustained the validity of the curfew order as applying to the whole group. In the instant case,
temporary exclusion of the entire group was rested by the military on the same ground.

Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direst
emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions. But when, under conditions
of modern warfare, our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be
commensurate with the threatened danger.

This is not an issue of racial prejudice. To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference
to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not
excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are
at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion
of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that the
military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the
West Coast temporarily, and, finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our
military leaders -- as inevitably it must - determined that they should have the power to do just this. There
was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered that the need for action
was great, and time was short. We cannot -- by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight --
now say that, at that time, these actions were unjustified.

XXXXXXXXXX
Gideon vs Wainright (Missing)

Miranda vs Arizona
384 U.S. 436 (1966)

Miranda v. Arizona

Facts

The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona addressed four different cases involving custodial
interrogations. In each of these cases, the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a
prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none of these cases was
the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In
all the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions and, in three of them, signed statements that were
admitted at trial.

Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a police station where he
was identified by the complaining witness. He was then interrogated by two police officers for two hours,
which resulted in a signed, written confession. At trial, the oral and written confessions were presented to
the jury. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape and was sentenced to 20-30 years
imprisonment on each count. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda’s constitutional
rights were not violated in obtaining the confession.

Vignera v. New York: Vignera was picked up by New York police in connection with the robbery of a
dress shop that had occurred three days prior. He was first taken to the 17th Detective Squad
headquarters. He was then taken to the 66th Detective Squad, where he orally admitted the robbery and
was placed under formal arrest. He was then taken to the 70th Precinct for detention, where he was
questioned by an assistant district attorney in the presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed the
questions and answers. At trial, the oral confession and the transcript were presented to the jury. Vignera
was found guilty of first degree robbery and sentenced to 30-60 years imprisonment. The conviction was
affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals.

Westover v. United States: Westover was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a suspect in two
Kansas City robberies and taken to a local police station. A report was also received from the FBI that
Westover was wanted on a felony charge in California. Westover was interrogated the night of the arrest
and the next morning by local police. Then, FBI agents continued the interrogation at the station. After
two-and-a-half hours of interrogation by the FBI, Westover signed separate confessions, which had been
prepared by one of the agents during the interrogation, to each of the two robberies in California. These
statements were introduced at trial. Westover was convicted of the California robberies and sentenced to
15 years’ imprisonment on each count. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.

California v. Stewart: In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in which one of the
victims died of injuries inflicted by her assailant, Stewart was identified as the endorser of checks stolen in
one of the robberies. Steward was arrested at his home. Police also arrested Stewart’s wife and three
other people who were visiting him. Stewart was placed in a cell, and, over the next five days, was
interrogated on nine different occasions. During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart stated that he
had robbed the deceased, but had not meant to hurt her. At that time, police released the four other
people arrested with Stewart because there was no evidence to connect any of them with the crime. At
trial, Stewart’s statements were introduced. Stewart was convicted of robbery and first-degree murder and
sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that Stewart should have been
advised of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.

Issues

Whether “statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation” are
admissible against him in a criminal trial and whether “procedures which assure that the individual is
accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate
himself” are necessary.

Supreme Court holding

The Court held that “there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of
criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is
curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.” As such, “the
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure
the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way.”

The Court further held that “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons
suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would otherwise do so freely.” Therefore, a
defendant “must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona in Miranda, reversed the
judgment of the New York Court of Appeals in Vignera, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in Westover, and affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of California in Stewart.
UNITED STATES v. WINDSOR, executor of the ESTATE OF SPYER, et al.
No. 12–307.
Argued March 27, 2013—Decided June 26, 2013

The State of New York recognizes the marriage of New York residents Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer,
who wed in Ontario, Canada, in 2007. When Spyer died in 2009, she left her entire estate to Windsor.
Windsor sought to claim the federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses, but was barred from
doing so by §3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which amended the Dictionary Act—a law
providing rules of construction for over 1,000 federal laws and the whole realm of federal regulations—to
define ―marriage‖ and ―spouse‖ as excluding same-sex partners.

Windsor paid $363,053 in estate taxes and sought a refund, which the Internal Revenue Service denied.
Windsor brought this refund suit, contending that DOMA violates the principles of equal protection
incorporated in the Fifth Amendment. The US has not yet complied with the judgment against it to refund
Windsor of the tax paid.

Issue: Whether DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the equal liberty of persons that is protected
by the Fifth Amendment.

SC: YES. Marriage laws may vary from State to State, but they are consistent within each State.

DOMA rejects this long-established precept. The State‘s decision to give this class of persons the right to
marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import. But the Federal Government uses the
state-defined class for the opposite purpose—to impose restrictions and disabilities.

DOMA violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government.
The Constitution‘s guarantee of equality ―must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot‖ justify disparate treatment of that group. DOMA‘s principal
effect is to identify and make unequal a subset of state-sanctioned marriages. It contrives to deprive
some couples married under the laws of their State, but not others, of both rights and responsibilities,
creating two contradictory marriage regimes within the same State. It also forces same-sex couples to live
as married for the purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law, thus diminishing the
stability and predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it proper to acknowledge and
protect.

OBERGEFELL et al. v. HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al.

No. 14–556.
Argued April 28, 2015—Decided June 26, 2015

Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee define marriage as a union between one man and one
woman. The petitioners, 14 same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are deceased,
filed suits in Federal District Courts in their home States, claiming that respondent state officials violate
the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have marriages lawfully performed in
another State given full recognition.

Respondents argue that it would demean the timeless institution if marriage shall be extended to same-
sex couples. Petitioner argues respect to them.

Each District Court ruled in petitioners‘ favor, but the Sixth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed.

Issue: Whether The Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize same-sex marriages validly
performed out of State.
SC: YES. Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses guarantee the right to marry.

The history of marriage, which is the union of two people of the opposite sex, is one of both continuity and
change. Changed understandings of marriage are characteristic of a Nation where new dimensions of
freedom become apparent to new generations.

The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause extend to
certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices defining
personal identity and beliefs. It includes same-sex marriages. In assessing whether the force and
rationale of its cases apply to same-sex couples, the Court must respect the basic reasons why the right
to marry has been long protected. It compels the Court to decide for the right of same-sex couples to
marry.

4 principles enshrined in the case:

1. The right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual
autonomy.
2. The right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any
other in its importance to the committed individuals. Like the right of a married couple to use
contraceptions.
3. It safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of
childrearing, procreation, and education.
4. marriage is a keystone of the Nation‘s social order.

JOSE D. LINA, JR., vs ISIDRO D. CARINO

G.R. No. 100127. April 23, 1993
J. Feliciano

Senator Lina filed petition for Mandamus and Prohibition against Carino, Secretary of Education
questioning its authority to issue DECS Order No. 30 allows private schools to increase tuition and other
school fees, subject to the guidelines there set out. It has no authority to issue because at that time, the
authority was transferred to State Assistance Council ("SAC") by Republic Act No. 67Z8

Issues: Whether DECS Order No. 30 null and void on two (2) grounds: (1) that respondent Secretary
does not have the legal authority to issue that Order, and (2) that DECS Order No. 30 violates Section 10
of R.A. No. 6728 which established a comprehensive requirement of consultation (in view of the
application not only to tuition fee but also to "other school fees")

SC: 1. YES. 2. NO. Petition dismissed.

We are not convinced by the argument that the power to regulate school fees 'does not always include
the power to increase' such fees. Such 57 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise known as the
Education Act of 1982.

We do not read the first sentence of Section 42 as granting an unlimited power to private schools to
establish any rate of tuition and other school fees and charges that it may desire and to enforce collection
of such fees or charges from students. We think it entirely clear that the second sentence of Section 42 is
a limiting provision, that is, a provision which, far from authorizing a private school to adopt any level of
tuition and other school fees or charges no matter how exorbitant, subjects the schedule of rates and
charges adopted by a particular school to the rules and regulations promulgated by the DECS.

On the argument of justice and equity whereby so-called 'other fees' may become so burdensome that
the students and parents concerned may be deprived of the right of being heard or consulted on matter
directly affecting their interest. Justice and equity demand that any increase in the tuition fee, tuition fee
assessment or 'other fees' which in its totality increases the cost of education, should and must be
subjected to consultation, as required in Section 10, R.A. No. 6728.

The Court believes that petitioner's argument — cogent though it may be as a social and economic
comment — is most appropriately addressed. not to a court which must take the law as it is actually
written, but rather to the legislative authority which can, if it wishes, change the language and content of
the law. As Section 10 of R.A. No. 6728 now stands, we have no authority to strike down paragraph 1 (d)
of DECS Order No. 30 as inconsistent with the requirements of Section 10.