Case Digest: Bureau of Customs Employees Association v. Teves, et al.

G.R. No. 181704 : December 6, 2011

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA), represented by its National President

(BOCEA National Executive Council) Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan,Petitioner, v. HON. MARGARITO B. TEVES,
in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance, HON. NAPOLEON L. MORALES, in his capacity
as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, HON. LILIAN B. HEFTI, in her capacity as Commissioner of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Respondents.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335. RA [No.] 9335 was enacted to
optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status.

Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with constitutional
infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights of its members, petitioners directly filed the present
petition before this Court against respondents.

BOCEA asserted that in view of the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and their adverse
effects on the constitutional rights of BOC officials and employees, direct resort to this Court is justified.
BOCEA argued, among others, that its members and other BOC employees are in great danger of losing
their jobs should they fail to meet the required quota provided under the law, in clear violation of their
constitutional right to security of tenure, and at their and their respective families prejudice.
Respondents countered that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not violate the right to due process and right
to security of tenure of BIR and BOC employees. The OSG stressed that the guarantee of security of
tenure under the 1987 Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR provided a reasonable and valid ground for the dismissal of an employee which is germane to the
purpose of the law. Likewise, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided that an employee may only be
separated from the service upon compliance with substantive and procedural due process. The OSG
added that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR must enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.

In Abakada, the Court declared Section 12of R.A. No. 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee to approve the IRR as unconstitutional and violative of the principle of separation of powers.
However, the constitutionality of the remaining provisions of R.A. No. 9335 was upheld pursuant to
Section 13of R.A. No. 9335. The Court also held that until the contrary is shown, the IRR of R.A. No. 9335
is presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEAs members to: (a) equal
protection of laws, (b) security of tenure and (c) due process?

HELD: Ruling in Abakada is adopted.

REMEDIAL LAW: actions; parties

Prefatorily, we note that it is clear, and in fact uncontroverted, that BOCEA has locus standi. BOCEA
impugns the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR because its members, who are rank-and-file
employees of the BOC, are actually covered by the law and its IRR. BOCEAs members have a personal
and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of the enforcement of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: administrative agencies

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has
exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated
sphere. Necessarily imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed
in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest, which means "what has been delegated,
cannot be delegated." This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of
his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. However, this principle of non-
delegation of powers admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is the delegation of legislative power
to various specialized administrative agencies like the Board in this case.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection clause

Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated in a
similar manner, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution
through the states duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the
law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely
on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: due process

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative

proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side. BOCEAs apprehension of
deprivation of due process finds its answer in Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335. The concerned BIR
or BOC official or employee is not simply given a target revenue collection and capriciously left without
any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly give due consideration to all relevant factors that may
affect the level of collection.

As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation on the veracity of, and the proper action on these
anomalies are in the hands of the Executive branch. Correlatively, the wisdom for the enactment of this
law remains within the domain of the Legislative branch. We merely interpret the law as it is. The Court
has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language
thereof. Just like any other law, R.A. No. 9335 has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and
to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one
that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. We have so declared in Abakada, and we now reiterate
that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are constitutional.

DISMISSED.
Pelaez v Auditor General

15 SCRA 569 – Political Law – Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test

In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this was
purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:

The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and may change the
seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require…

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the
auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that
the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by
Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor
their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new law,
cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios,
since barrios are units of municipalities?”

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being
created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created
without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated
such power to create municipalities to the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of
Sec. 68 of the RAC.

HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete
in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable —
to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any
such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or
formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard,
there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted
within or beyond the scope of his authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which
would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is present,
still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what
the phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence,
the proper interpretation is “the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to
such place therein as the public welfare may require.” Only the seat of government may be changed by
the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.

The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently
legislative in character not administrative (not executive).

BIRAOGO VS PTC

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO

vs.

THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

G.R. No. 193036

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP.
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.

vs.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD
FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30,
2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has
no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in
our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely
new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission”
with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman
created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar
species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and
power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws
are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD
No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or
form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;

2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they
belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal
and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing
is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right”
in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to
show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds
reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers
of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in
the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be
the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be
with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted
authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It
is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a
class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Case Digest: Lokin, Jr. & Planas v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 193808 : June 26, 2012

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. AND TERESITA F. PLANAS, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) ET
AL., Respondents.

SERENO,J.:

FACTS:

Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral party registered under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7941,
otherwise known as the Party- List System Act. As stated in its constitution and bylaws, the platform of
CIBAC is to fight graft and corruption and to promote ethical conduct in the countrys public service.
Under the leadership of the National Council, its highest policymaking and governing body, the party
participated in the 2001, 2004, and 2007 elections. On 20 November 2009, two different entities, both
purporting to represent CIBAC, submitted to the COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the
Party-List System of Representation in the May 10, 2010 Elections.

The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who claimed to be the partys acting
secretary-general. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, another Manifestation6 was submitted by herein
respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and Virginia Jose as the partys vice-president and secretary-
general, respectively.

On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 87447 giving due course to CIBACs
Manifestation, WITHOUT PREJUDICE the determination which of the two factions of the registered
party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations which filed two (2) manifestations of intent to participate is
the official representative of said party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations.

On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by President and Chairperson Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva,
submitted the Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the COMELEC Law Department. The nomination
was certified by Villanueva and Virginia S. Jose. On 26 March 2010, Pia Derla submitted a second
Certificate of Nomination, which included petitioners Luis Lokin and Teresita Planas as party-list
nominees. Derla affixed to the certification her signature as acting secretary-general of CIBAC.

Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was unauthorized, respondents filed
with the COMELEC a Petition to Expunge From The Records And/Or For Disqualification, seeking to
nullify the Certificate filed by Derla. Respondents contended that Derla had misrepresented herself as
acting secretary-general, when she was not even

a member of CIBAC; that the Certificate of Nomination and other documents she submitted were
unauthorized by the party and therefore invalid; and that it was Villanueva who was duly authorized to
file the Certificate of Nomination on its behalf.

In the Resolution dated 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted the Petition, ordered the
Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the records, and declared respondents faction as the true
nominees of CIBAC. Upon Motion for Reconsideration separately filed by the adverse parties, the
COMELEC en banc affirmed the Divisions findings.

Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court in accordance with Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:

1) Whether the authority of Secretary General Virginia Jose to file the partys Certificate of Nomination is
an intra-corporate matter, exclusively cognizable by special commercial courts, and over which the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction; and

2) Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and recognizing respondents
as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list.

HELD: As earlier stated, this Court denies the petition for being filed outside the requisite period. The
review by this Court of judgments and final orders of the COMELEC is governed specifically by Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court, which states:
REMEDIAL LAW: review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the COA

Sec. 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.

Sec. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under
Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.

The exception referred to in Section 2 of this Rule refers precisely to the immediately succeeding
provision, Section 3 thereof, which provides for the allowable period within which to file petitions for
certiorari from judgments of both the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Thus, while Rule 64
refers to the same remedy of certiorari as the general rule in Rule 65, they cannot be equated, as they
provide for different reglementary periods. Rule 65 provides for a period of 60 days from notice of
judgment sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court, while Section 3 expressly provides for only 30
days, viz:

SEC. 3. Time to file petition.The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment
or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration
of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission
concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file
the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event,
reckoned from notice of denial.

Petitioner received a copy of the first assailed Resolution on 12 July 2010. Upon the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioners on 15 July 2010, the COMELEC en banc issued the second assailed
Resolution on 31 August 2010. This per curiam Resolution was received by petitioners on 1 September
2010.16 Thus, pursuant to Section 3 above, deducting the three days it took petitioners to file the
Motion for Reconsideration, they had a remaining period of 27 days or until 28 September 2010 within
which to file the Petition for Certiorari with this Court.
However, petitioners filed the present Petition only on 1 October 2010, clearly outside the required
period.

POLITICAL LAW: COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes

In the 2010 case Atienza v. Commission on Elections, it was expressly settled that the COMELEC
possessed the authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a necessary tributary of its constitutionally
mandated power to enforce election laws and register political parties. The Court therein cited Kalaw v.
Commission on Elections and Palmares v. Commission on Elections, which uniformly upheld the
COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes:

The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court.
The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELECs powers and functions under
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party
and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. The Court also declared in another case that the
COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who
must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper
case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.

ELECTION LAW: party-list system law

Furthermore, matters regarding the nomination of party-list representatives, as well as their individual
qualifications, are outlined in the Party-List System Law. Sections 8 and 9 thereof state:

Sec. 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall
submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less
than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required
number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing
may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who
has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or
alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list
system shall not be considered resigned.

Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative

unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and
write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.

By virtue of the aforesaid mandate of the Party-List Law vesting the COMELEC with jurisdiction over the
nomination of party-list representatives and prescribing the qualifications of each nominee, the
COMELEC promulgated its Rules on Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/
Organizations Participating in the 10 May 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Adopting the
same qualifications of party-list nominees listed above, Section 6 of these Rules also required that:

The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence in consonance with the
Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that the nominees truly belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to
represent, which may include but not limited to the following:

a. Track record of the party-list group/organization showing active participation of the nominee/s in the
undertakings of the party-list group/organization for the advancement of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to
represent;

b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the advocacies of the party-list group/organizations (prior
declarations, speeches, written articles, and such other positive actions on the part of the
nominee/sshowing his/her adherence to the advocacies of the party-list group/organizations);

c. Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bona fide member of the party-list group/ organization for at
least ninety (90) days prior to the election; and

d. In case of a party-list group/organization seeking representation of the marginalized and

underrepresented sector/s, proof that the nominee/s is not only an advocate of the party-
list/organization but is/are also a bona fide member/s of said marginalized and underrepresented
sector.
The Law Department shall require party-list group and nominees to submit the foregoing documentary
evidence if not complied with prior to the effectivity of this resolution not later than three (3) days from
the last day of filing of the list of nominees.

Contrary to petitioners stance, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC First Division
and the COMELEC en banc.

The tribunal correctly found that Pia Derlas alleged authority as acting secretary-general was an
unsubstantiated allegation devoid of any supporting evidence. Petitioners did not submit any
documentary evidence that Derla was a member of CIBAC, let alone the representative authorized by
the party to submit its Certificate of Nomination.

Invalidity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804

The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in accordance with the
doctrine of separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate its
legislative power, for doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot be
delegated by the Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not legislative in character may be
delegated.25

Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative
boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the Legislature
must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles that are to control in given cases. The
Legislature should set a definite or primary standard to guide those empowered to execute the law. For
as long as the policy is laid down and a proper standard is established by statute, there can be no
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when the Legislature leaves to selected
instrumentalities the duty of making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits, although there is
conferred upon the executive officer or administrative board a large measure of discretion. There is a
distinction between the delegation of power to make a law and the conferment of an authority or a
discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, for the power to make laws necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be.26

The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the
operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather
administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however,
subvert or be contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be legitimately
exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of administrative
agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that
administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment. It is axiomatic that
the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for
its implementation. Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution.27

To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid:28

1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;

2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;

3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and

4. It must be reasonable.

The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and a recall.29 In addition to the
powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the COMELEC is also charged to promulgate
IRRs implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws that the COMELEC
enforces and administers.30

The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act.31 Hence, the COMELEC met the first requisite.

The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804 underwent the
procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with the procedure prescribed in
the resolution itself.
Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of whether
the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge of Lokin against
Section 13 succeeds.

As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. This simply means that the resulting
IRRs must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It is basic that
an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress,32 for administrative IRRs are solely
intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law. The administrative agency issuing the IRRs
may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces, and cannot
engraft additional non-contradictory requirements not contemplated by the Legislature.33

Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or coalition

shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not
less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required
number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing
may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person who
has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or
alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list
system shall not be considered resigned.

The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of the right to
change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except
when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee
becomes incapacitated. The provision must be read literally because its language is plain and free from
ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such meaning is conclusively
presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. Even where the courts should
be convinced that the Legislature really intended some other meaning, and even where the literal
interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the
Legislature is still the law, from which the courts must not depart.34 When the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application.35
Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may not construe it by expanding
its meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous.36

The legislative intent to deprive the party-list organization of the right to change the nominees or to
alter the order of the nominees was also expressed during the deliberations of the Congress, viz:

MR. LAGMAN: And again on Section 5, on the nomination of party list representatives, I do not see any
provision here which prohibits or for that matter allows the nominating party to change the nominees
or to alter the order of prioritization of names of nominees. Is the implication correct that at any time
after submission the names could still be changed or the listing altered?

MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, that is a good issue brought out by the distinguished Gentleman from Albay
and perhaps a perfecting amendment may be introduced therein. The sponsoring committee will gladly
consider the same.

MR. LAGMAN: In other words, what I would like to see is that after the list is submitted to the COMELEC
officially, no more changes should be made in the names or in the order of listing.

MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, there may be a situation wherein the name of a particular nominee has been
submitted to the Commission on Elections but before election day the nominee changed his political
party affiliation. The nominee is therefore no longer qualified to be included in the party list and the
political party has a perfect right to change the name of that nominee who changed his political party
affiliation.

MR. LAGMAN: Yes of course. In that particular case, the change can be effected but will be the
exception rather than the rule. Another exception most probably is the nominee dies, then there has to
be a change but any change for that matter should always be at the last part of the list so that the
prioritization made by the party will not be adversely affected.37
The usage of "No" in Section 8 – "No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be
allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee
dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes incapacitated, in which case the name of the
substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list" – renders Section 8 a negative law, and is indicative of
the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be
directory, for there is but one way to obey the command "thou shall not," and that is to completely
refrain from doing the forbidden act,38 subject to certain exceptions stated in the law itself, like in this
case.

Section 8 does not unduly deprive the party-list organization of its right to choose its nominees, but
merely divests it of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order in the list of its nominees’
names after submission of the list to the COMELEC.

The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of lawmakers. The
COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list reflects the true will of the
party-list organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the real
intended nominees of the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all
the requirements prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in
newspapers of general circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a
party-list system of election, not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the
nominees of any particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list
nominees in newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to
make intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing the party-list organization to change its
nominees through withdrawal of their nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the
submission of the list of nominees circumvents the voters’ demand for transparency. The lawmakers’
exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of such circumvention.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the assailed
Resolutions, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. This Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the COMELEC
expunging from its records the Certificate of Nomination filed on 26 March 2010 by Pia B. Derla.