- EQUAL PROTECTION -
and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement
SEXUAL DISCRIMNINATION
163 SCRA 386, 1988
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs. DRILON
FACTS:
 The Department of Labor and Employment issued Department
Order No. 1, Series of 1988 in the character of "GUIDELINES
GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS”.
 The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.
(PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of
Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement,"
challenges its Constitutional validity.
 On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment
informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor
Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan,
Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria,
and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged
"guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the
Philippine State.
ISSUE:
WON Department Order No. 1 in the nature of a police power measure
is valid under the Constitution, assailing:
 "discrimination against males or females;"
 that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to
domestic helpers and females with similar skills;"
 and that it is violative of the right to travel
 it is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking
power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in
character.
HELD:
 The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the
contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law"
under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights
among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided
that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not
confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all
members of the same class.
 As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the
unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad,
especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions
marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The
sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers,
even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies
of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent
Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional
rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In
fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.
 The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel
does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among
other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be
provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid
implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to
"afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent
Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the
Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable
simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have
stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a
valid qualification thereto.
 Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No.
1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that
police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean
that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have
mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor
whereof.
 "Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of
employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more
paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent,
just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send
its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy
their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the
Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates
have adequate protection, personally and economically, while
away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an
evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or
inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has
precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
 The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the
petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the
Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other
freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction,
where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling
economic way of life.
 Petition dismissed.
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
99 PHIL, 1856
PEOPLE vs. HERNANDEZ
FACTS:
 This is a case of kidnapping with murder involving the Huks,
members of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, the military
arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines.
 Counsel for Faustino del Mundo, alias Commander Sumulong,
admits that the said accused ordered the killing of the victim,
Marciano T. Miranda, 41, the barrio captain of Barrio Balitucan,
Magalang, Pampanga, who was an alleged army informer and
who was opposed to the candidacy of Rogelio Tiglao, a provincial
board member.
 The kidnapping and killing were politically motivated. Miranda
refused to support Tiglao, the candidate for Congressman of the
Huks. He supported Rafael Lazatin, the Nacionalista candidate.
ISSUE: Del Mundo contends that he should be convicted only of
homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal medium and that the
trial court erred in convicting him of the said complex crime and in
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
HELD:
 Del Mundo did not testify in his defense. As already stated, the
trial court convicted him of kidnapping with murder together with
Pangilinan, Macasaquit and Cabrera, sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua and ordered him to pay an indemnity of P17,000 to
Miranda's heirs. Macalino and Meneses were acquitted. Salas
died during the pendency of the case. Only Del Mundo appealed.
His counsel de oficio contends that there was no intention to
deprive Miranda of his liberty and no premeditated plan to kill him.
 That contention is not well-taken. The fact is that Miranda was
forcibly removed from his barrio and deprived of his liberty for
several hours and was then brought to another place where he
was killed. While under interrogation, his grave was already being
prepared. The fatal blow, which was inflicted upon him, caused
him to fall into his grave.
 We find that there was a conspiracy to liquidate Miranda and that
the kidnapping was utilized as a means to attain that objective.
From the surrounding circumstances, it maybe inferred that Del
Mundo masterminded the kidnapping or induced it and that, as
observed by the Solicitor General, the killing was intended to
terrorize the supporters of Lazatin.
 Miranda was a public officer. His kidnapping is covered by article
267(4) of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death for that offense.
 The killing of Miranda was murder because his hands were bound
when he was mortally assaulted (U.S. vs. Elicanal, 35 Phil. 209
and other cases).
 Even without taking into account evident premeditation, the death
penalty has to be imposed because article 48 of the Revised
 Penal Code requires that the graver penalty for kidnapping, which
is more serious than murder, has to be meted out to Del Mundo
 However, inasmuch as Del Mundo is now seventy-eight (78)
years old, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon him.
 WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified in the sense
that the death penalty imposable on Del Mundo is commuted to
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in article
40. In all other respects, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
85 PHIL 648, 1950
PEOPLE vs. ISNAIN
FACTS:
 Accused was caught in the act of stealing coconut while his two
other companions managed to ran away.
 Accused admitted to committing the said crime
ISSUE: The only question raised with much earnestness by his
attorney de oficio is that article 310 of the Revised Penal Code
classifying as qualified theft, the stealing of coconut is unconstitutional,
because it punishes the larceny of such products more heavily than the
taking away of similar produce, such as rice and sugar, and thereby
denies him the equal protection of the laws.
HELD:
 In the matter of theft of coconuts, the purpose of the heavier
penalty is to encourage and protect the development of the
coconut industry as one of the sources of our national economy.3
Unlike rice and sugar cane farms where the range of vision is
unobstructed, coconut groves can not be efficiently watched
because of the nature of the growth of coconut trees; and without
a special measure to protect this kind of property, it will be, as it
has been in the past the favorite resort of thieves.4 There is
therefore, some reason for the special treatment accorded the
industry; and as it can not be said that the classification is entirely
without basis, the plea of unconstitutionality must be denied
 The crime is punished by article 309, paragraph 5, in connection
with article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 417. (Republic Act No. 120, enacted after
the offense, is not applicable.) The penalty is prision correccional
to its full extent. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence law, the
appellant should be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 4
years and 2 months of arresto mayor nor more than 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional. Thus modified, the appealed
decision will be affirmed, with costs. so ordered.
GR No. 130716, December 09, 1998
CHAVES VS. PCGG
FACTS:
 Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former
government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses
and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public
treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's
economy," alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were
several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets
sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1)
the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets
deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the
reported execution of a compromise, between the government
(through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share
these assets.
 Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the
correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions
involving the national interest, demands that respondents make
public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to
PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He
claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten
wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it
has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be
greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people.
ISSUE: WON the government, through the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), be required to reveal the proposed
terms of a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards
their alleged ill-gotten wealth.
HELD:
 In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in
connection with their official functions must be accessible to the
public, consistent with the policy of transparency of governmental
affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an
opportunity to determine whether those to whom they have
entrusted the affairs of the government are honesty, faithfully and
competently performing their functions as public servants.
Undeniably, the essence of democracy lies in the free flow of
thought; but thoughts and ideas must be well-informed so that the
public would gain a better perspective of vital issues confronting
them and, thus, be able to criticize as well as participate in the
affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and
effective manner.
 With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority
emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of
the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public
concern and imbued with public interest. We may also add that
"ill-gotten wealth," by its very nature, assumes a public character.
Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly
originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes,
therefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon reconveyance
they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the
satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be
adjudged by competent courts. Another declared overriding
consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is
that it may be used for national economic recovery. The foregoing
disquisition settles the question of whether petitioner has a right to
respondents' disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at
concerning the Marcoses' purported ill-gotten wealth. Petition
granted.
111 SCRA 433, 1982
NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
 Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the
validity of the Presidential Decree creating the Sandiganbayan,
He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents committed in
connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in
several cases. Upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash
on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. Respondent Court
denied such motion. There was a motion for reconsideration filed
the next day; it met the same fate. Hence this petition for certiorari
and prohibition
ISSUE: WON Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the
respondent Court is violative of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.
HELD:
 To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end
of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and
property. Those adversely affected may under such
circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can
show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired
by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit
of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support
in reason. To quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws
operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same
manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue
preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous.
 The premise underlying petitioner's contention on this point is set
forth in his memorandum thus: " 1. The Sandiganbayan
proceedings violates petitioner's right to equal protection,
because - appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a
mere matter of discretion; - appeal likewise was shrunk and
limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts
and trial evidence; and - there is only one chance to appeal
conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of the
traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are
entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts
and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals and
thereafter to the Supreme Court." ,that is hardly convincing,
 considering that the classification satisfies the test requiring that it
"must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must
not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally
to each member of the class. The Constitution specifically
mentions the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan
precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot
be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that
those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have
been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present
Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the
accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a
public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition is
dismissed.
GR No. 142030, April 21, 2005
GALLARDO VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
 Atty. Victor dela Serna, for and in behalf of the Public Health
Workers (PHWs) of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a sworn letter-complaint charging
herein petitioners Mayor Gallardo, the vice mayor, Sanggunian
Bayan members, all public officers of the Municipality of
Bansalan, Davao del Sur, with violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 for their alleged refusal to appropriate in
the municipal budget the amount representing payment of the
mandatory statutory obligations of the Municipality of Bansalan
accruing to the complaining PHWs in the nature of unpaid salary
differential and magna carta benefits.
 The information filed with the Sandiganbayan stated that herein
petitioners caused undue injury to the Public Health Workers
(PHWs) of the Municipality of Bansalan, by refusing to perform
their duties to include an appropriation in the municipal budget for
the payment of the mandatory statutory obligations of the
Municipality of Bansalan due to the complaining PHWs in the
nature of unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits in
the aggregate amount of P3,833,798.10.
 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan
granted the motion. A special prosecutor recommended the
dismissal of the case but Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto
disapproved the recommendation. The Sandiganbayan denied
petitioners’ motion.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners are denied due process and not accorded
the equal protection of laws.
HELD:
 Petitioners claimed that they were denied due process because
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disapproved the
recommendation of the special prosecutor.
 The Ombudsman, contrary to the investigating prosecutor’s
conclusion, was of the conviction that petitioners are probably
guilty of the offense charged, and for this, he is not required to
conduct an investigation anew. Whatever course of action that the
Ombudsman may take, whether to approve or to disapprove the
recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, is but an
exercise of his discretionary powers based upon constitutional
mandate.[17] Generally, courts should not interfere in such
exercise.
 The equal protection clause requires that the law operates
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all
persons are treated in the same manner, the conditions not being
different, both in privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. It
allows reasonable classification. If the classification is
characterized by real and substantial differences, one class may
be treated differently from another. Simply because the
respondent Ombudsman dismissed some cases allegedly similar
to the case at bar is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or
caprice on his part, absent a clear showing that he gravely
abused his discretion in pursuing the instant case. The
Ombudsman dismissed those cases because he believed there
were no sufficient grounds for the accused therein to undergo
trial. On the other hand, he recommended the filing of
appropriate information against petitioners because there are
ample grounds to hold them for trial. He was only exercising his
power and discharging his duty based upon the constitutional
mandate of his office. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
for lack of merit
PUBLIC POLICY
[G.R. No. 157279. August 9, 2005.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. GIOVANNI PALMA ET AL.
FACTS:
 PNB was formerly a government owned and controlled
corporation but on 26 May 1996, it was already privatized and
incorporated as a private commercial bank.
 R.A. 6758, 'An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and
Position Classification System in the Government' took effect on 1
July 1989 covering all government owned corporations. Section
12 thereof provides for the consolidation of allowances and
additional compensation into standardized salary rates, but
certain additional compensation were exempted from
consolidation. In the present case, the Salary Standardization
Law clearly provides that the claimed benefits shall continue to be
granted only to employees who were "incumbents" as of July 1,
1989.
 "The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued
Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10) to
implement R.A. 6758. On 12 August 1998, the Supreme Court, in
the case of Rodolfo S. de Jesus, et al. of the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA) vs. Commission on Audit held that DBM-
CCC No. 10 was ineffective due to its non-publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
 "In view of the declaration made by the Supreme Court in the
above-mentioned case, a petition for mandamus was filed by
respondents on 20 December 1999. Respondents alleged, that
they are employees hired by PNB on various dates after 30 June
1989; that from the dates of their respective appointments until 1
January 1997 they were unjustly deprived and denied of the
allowances being enjoyed by other employees of PNB. According
to respondents, the declaration that DBM-CCC No. 10 was
ineffective paved the way to their entitlement to the
allowances/fringe benefits. The withholding of their entitlement to
the same benefits is an unfair discrimination and a violation of
respondents' rights to the equal protection clause of the
Constitution since incumbents or employees of PNB who were
already in the service as of 1 July 1989 received the benefits and
allowances. To rectify the injustice against respondents issued
General Circular No. 1-312/97 on 14 March 1997, extending the
benefits to respondents effective 1 January 1997. But
Respondents contend that extending to them the
allowances/fringe benefits meant that they are entitled to the
payment of the same and, hence, they should be given their
allowances reckoned not only from 1 January 1997 but from the
date of their respective appointment, to which PNB did not accede
to. The trial court ruled in favor of the Respondents, and the Court
of Appeals denied petitioner’s appeal. Thus, this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are entitled to the questioned
fringe benefits
HELD:
 The respondents were not entitled to the benefits because they
were hired only after JUNE 30 1989. An incumbent is a person
who is in present possession of an office.
 Finally, to explain what July 1, 1989 pertained to, we held in the
prior cases as follows: The date July 1, 1989 becomes crucial
only to determine that as of said date, the officer was an
incumbent and was receiving the RATA, for purposes of entitling
him to its continued grant." Respondents were not deemed
incumbents as defined by settled jurisprudence. Petitioner was
correct in contending that by extending the assailed benefits to
respondents on January 1, 1997, it was not thereby admitting that
the latter were priorly entitled to them. It contends that its
privatization on May 27, 1996 enabled it to grant benefits as it
deemed fit. It could not have granted them while it was still a
government agency, because RA 6758 barred such grant as an
illegal disbursement of public funds. It allegedly accorded them
those benefits, not because it had finally acceded to their
interpretation of the law, but because it was only then that — as a
private entity — it could legally do so.
 The collateral attack on the constitutionality of RA 6758 due to
alleged violation of the equal protection clause cannot prosper,
because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly — not
collaterally. Furthermore, the constitutional issue was not raised in
the trial court; hence, it cannot now be availed of on appeal to this
Court. Besides, the arguments of respondents rest upon the
validity of Section 12 of RA 6758. How then can they now
challenge the very basis of their arguments?
 A law is deemed valid unless declared null and void by a
competent court; more so when the issue has not been duly
pleaded in the trial court. The question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity. Respondents not only failed to
challenge the constitutionality of RA 6758; worse, they used it in
seeking compensation from petitioner. The settled rule is that
courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it.
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.
[G.R. No. 148208. December 15, 2004.]
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, INC., vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and
the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
Almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653 or the New
Central Bank Act, petitioner Central Bank Employees Association, Inc.,
filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the
President, to restrain them from further implementing the last proviso in
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is
unconstitutional because the classification of BSP employees provided
by law is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. The thrust of petitioner's
challenge is that the assailed proviso makes an unconstitutional cut
between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers
or those exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 6758 or the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file
(Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the
coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). Petitioner contended that the
classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based
on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on
the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner further contended
that the assailed proviso is also violative of the equal protection clause
because after it was enacted, the charters of the Government Service
Insurance System, Land Bank of the Philippines, Development Bank of
the Philippines and Social Security System were also amended, and
their respective personnel were all exempted from the coverage of the
SSL. Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of Government
Financial Institutions (GFI), the BSP rank-and-file employees are also
discriminated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not a provision of law, initially valid, can become
subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that its continued
operation would violate the equal protection of the law
HELD:
 Supreme Court held that with the passage of the subsequent laws
amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial
institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, constitutes invidious
discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the BSP.
 The Supreme Court struck down the assailed proviso and held
that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the
charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions
(GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section
15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes
invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. The disparity of treatment
between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other
seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious
discrimination. No one can, with candor and fairness, deny the
discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total
exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was
withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes
without any rational basis. The Court emphasized that the equal
protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security
shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not
identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden
or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is
equally binding on the rest. With the lack of real and substantial
distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment between the
rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the
enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the
continued application of the challenged proviso anathema to the
equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as
an outlaw.
 Wherefor, the continued operation and implementation of the last
proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is held
unconstitutional.
[G.R. No. 56515. April 3, 1981.]
UNITED DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION (UNIDO), vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Petitioner United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), in two letter-
requests to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated March 10
and 17,1981, asked for exactly the same opportunity, the same prime
time and the same number of television and radio stations all over the
country to be used in its campaign for "NO" votes in the plebiscite for
the amendments to the 1973 Constitution proposed by the Batasang
Pambansa as that utilized by President Marcos in his nationwide
"Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" in campaigning for "YES" votes on the
proposed constitutional amendments. The Commission, in its
Resolution of March 18, 1981 denied petitioner's "demand'' being of
the view that the President's remarks on the proposed amendments in
the forementioned radio-television program carried live by twenty-six
(26) television and two hundred forty-eight (248) radio stations
throughout the country were initiated under his leadership and capacity
as President/prime Minister in the exercise of his constitutional
prerogative to determine the program and guidelines of national policy
pursuant to Article IX, Section 2 of the Constitution and not as the head
of any political party. Petitioner's Motion for reconsideration proved
futile, hence this present action, assailing the Comelec's resolutions as
contrary to the Constitution, unjust, unfair and inequitable for violating
the basic principles of equality, good faith and fair play, the same not
conducive to insure a free, orderly and honest elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC violated the equal protection clause
for denying UNIDO the same air time in Media as that of the President
in campaigning for the “NO” votes in the plebiscite for the amendments
to the 1973 Contstitution.
HELD:
The Supreme Court, in dismissing the appeal, held that when the
President spoke in the nation-wide program "Pulong-Pulong sa
Pangulo" on March 21, 1981, he did so in his capacity as President-
Prime Minister and not as the head of the KBL; and that what petitioner
asks cannot be granted for being beyond what the charter, the laws
and pertinent Comelec regulations contemplate, for being more than
what the opposition is duly entitled vis-a-vis the duty, obligation and/or
privilege inherent in the head of state to directly dialogue with the
sovereign people when the occasion demands, for being impractical
under prevailing circumstance, and for its failure to join in the petition
the television and radio stations as indispensable parties, thereby
depriving the Court of jurisdiction to act.
Appeal dismissed.
227 SCRA 703 (1993)
PJA VS PRADO
*no case digest submitted*
248 SCRA 700, 1995
OLIVAREZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
*no case digest submitted*
GR No. 127410, January 20, 1999
TIU VS. COURT OF APPEALS
*no case digest submitted*
G.R. No. 132527. July 29, 2005
COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. et al vs. RUBEN
TORRES, as Executive Secretary, et al
FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, RA No. 7227 was enacted, providing for, among
other things, the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and
Subic military reservations and their extensions into alternative
productive uses in the form of special economic zones in order to
promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in
particular and the country in general. The law contains provisions on
tax exemptions for importations of raw materials, capital and
equipment. After which the President issued several Executive Orders
as mandated by the law for the implementation of RA 7227. Herein
petitioners contend the validity of the tax exemption provided for in the
law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders issued by President for
the implementation of the tax exemptions constitutes executive
legislation.
HELD:
 To limit the tax-free importation privilege of enterprises located
inside the special economic zone only to raw materials, capital
and equipment clearly runs counter to the intention of the
Legislature to create a free port where the “free flow of goods or
capital within, into, and out of the zones” is insured.
The phrase “tax and duty-free importations of raw materials,
capital and equipment” was merely cited as an example of
incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone.
Public respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, on which petitioners
impliedly rely to support their restrictive interpretation, does not
apply when words are mentioned by way of example. It is obvious
from the wording of RA No. 7227, particularly the use of the
phrase “such as,” that the enumeration only meant to illustrate
incentives that the SSEZ is authorized to grant, in line with its
being a free port zone.
 The Court finds that the setting up of such commercial
establishments which are the only ones duly authorized to sell
consumer items tax and duty-free is still well within the policy
enunciated in Section 12 of RA No. 7227 that “. . .the Subic
Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining,
industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to
generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and
to attract and promote productive foreign investments.” However,
the Court reiterates that the second sentences of paragraphs 1.2
and 1.3 of Executive Order No. 97-A, allowing tax and duty-free
removal of goods to certain individuals, even in a limited amount,
from the Secured Area of the SSEZ, are null and void for being
contrary to Section 12 of RA No. 7227. Said Section clearly
provides that “exportation or removal of goods from the territory of
the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the
Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes
under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of
the Philippines.”
G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000
ISAE v. Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing
FACTS:
Private respondent, International School Inc. is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents. The school hires both foreign
and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying them as
foreign-hires and local-hires. The local-hire faculty members of said
International School, mostly Filipinos, complained against the better
treatment of their colleagues who have been hired abroad. These
foreign-hires enjoy certain benefits not accorded the local-hires which
include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave
travel allowance and a salary rate 25% higher than that of the local-
hires. Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by
the school is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher
salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the classification employed by the respondent
school constitutes racial discrimination.
Held: YES.
 The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment
of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities."
The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person,
"in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
[to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith."
 The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of
employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code
provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both
the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its
primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment
opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms
and conditions of employment.
 In this case, the point-of-hire classification employed by
respondent school to justify the distinction in the salary rates of
foreign-hires and local hires is an invalid classification. There is
no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by
foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of
according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public
policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.
 The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this
jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal
work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications,
skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be
paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its
"international character" notwithstanding. If an employer accords
employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that
these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne
by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one
employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain
why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would
be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against
that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee
is treated unfairly.
GR. No. 143076. June 10, 2003
PHILRECA vs. DILG
FACTS:
On May 23, 2003, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own
behalf and in behalf of other electric cooperatives organized and
existing under PD 269 which are members of petitioner Philippine
Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). The other
petitioners, electric cooperatives of Agusan del Norte (ANECO), Iloilo 1
(ILECO 1) and Isabela 1 (ISELCO 1) are non-stock, non-profit electric
cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269, as amended, and
registered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA).
Under Sec. 39 of PD 269 electric cooperatives shall be exempt from
the payment of all National Government, local government, and
municipal taxes and fee, including franchise, fling recordation, license
or permit fees or taxes and any fees, charges, or costs involved in any
court or administrative proceedings in which it may be party.
From 1971to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects
envisioned by PD 269, as amended, the Philippine Government, acting
through the National Economic council and the NEA, entered into six
loan agreements with the government of the United States of America,
through the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) with electric cooperatives as beneficiaries. The loan
agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax application
of the loan and any property or commodity acquired through the
proceeds of the loan.
Petitioners allege that with the passage of the Local Government Code
their tax exemptions have been validly withdrawn. Particularly,
petitioners assail the validity of Sec. 193 and 234 of the said code.
Sec. 193 provides for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges
granted to all persons, whether natural or juridical, except cooperatives
duly registered under RA 6938, while Sec. 234 exempts the same
cooperatives from payment of real property tax.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Local Government Code (under Sec. 193 and 234)
violated the equal protection clause since the provisions unduly
discriminate against petitioners who are duly registered
cooperatives under PD 269, as amended, and no under RA 6938
 or the Cooperatives Code of the Philippines?
2. Is there an impairment of the obligations of contract under the
loan entered into between the Philippine and the US
Governments?
HELD:
1. No. The guaranty of the equal protection clause is not violated by
a law based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be
reasonable must (a) rest on substantial classifications; (b)
germane to the purpose of the law; c) not limited to the existing
conditions only; and (d) apply equally to all members of the same
class. We hold that there is reasonable classification under the
Local Government Code to justify the different tax treatment
between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 and electric
cooperatives under RA 6938.
First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under
PD 269 and those under RA 6938. In the former, the government
is the one that funds those so-called electric cooperatives, while
in the latter, the members make equitable contribution as source
of funds.
a. Capital Contributions by Members – Nowhere in PD 269 does it
require cooperatives to make equitable contributions to capital.
Petitioners themselves admit that to qualify as a member of an
electric cooperative under PD 269, only the payment of a P5.00
membership fee is required which is even refundable the moment
the member is no longer interested in getting electric service from
the cooperative or will transfer to another place outside the area
covered by the cooperative. However, under the Cooperative
Code, the articles of cooperation of a cooperative applying for
registration must be accompanied with the bonds of the
accountable officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer
elected by the subscribers showing that at least 25% of the
authorized share capital has been subscribed and at least 25% of
the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paid-
up share capital be less than P2,000.00.
b. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives – The extent
of government control over electric cooperatives covered by PD
269 is largely a function of the role of the NEA as a primary
source of funds of these electric cooperatives. Amendments were
primarily geared to expand the powers of NEA over the electric
cooperatives to ensure that loans granted to them would be
repaid to the government. In contrast, cooperatives under RA
6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent
organizations with minimal government intervention or regulation.
Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local
Government Code is germane to the purpose of the law. The
Constitutional mandate that “every local government unit shall
enjoy local autonomy,” does not mean that the exercise of the
power by the local governments is beyond the regulation of
Congress. Sec. 193 of the LGC is indicative of the legislative
intent to vet broad taxing powers upon the local government units
and to limit exemptions from local taxation to entities specifically
provided therein.
Finally, Sec. 193 and 234 of the LGC permit reasonable
classification as these exemptions are not limited to existing
conditions and apply equally to all members of the same class.
2. No. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional
prohibition on the impairment of the obligations of contracts does
not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within the
prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the
existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial.
Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect a change
in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not
with respect to non-parties.
The quoted provision under the loan agreement does not purport
to grant any tax exemption in favor of any party to the contract,
including the beneficiaries thereof. The provisions simply shift the
tax burden, if any, on the transactions under the loan agreements
to the borrower and/or beneficiary of the loan. Thus, the
withdrawal by the Local Government Code under Sec. 193 and
234 of the tax exemptions previously enjoyed by petitioners does
not impair the obligation of the borrower, the lender or the
beneficiary under the loan agreements as, in fact, no tax
exemption is granted therein.
GR Nos. 133640, 133661 and 139147, 25 November 2005,
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN vs. SECRETARY OF HEALTH
FACTS:
 Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994
was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide
an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood
donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was
approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and
was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18,
1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994. On April 28, 1995,
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated
by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).
 Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides, Phase-out of Commercial
Blood Banks - All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out
over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act,
extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the
Secretary.”
 Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall
effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period
of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years
after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be
based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood
supply and demand and public safety.”
 Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of
1994, petitioners have already been operating commercial blood
banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled “An Act Regulating
the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the
Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks and Blood
Processing Laboratories.”
 The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the
establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood
banks and blood processing laboratories.
 On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to
petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 constitutes undue
delegation of legislative powers
2. Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 and its implementing rules
violate the equal protection clause
3. Whether or not RA 7719 is a valid exercise of police power
HELD:
 Petition granted. The assailed law and its implementing rules are
constitutional and valid.
 Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994
is complete in itself.
 It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature
intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has
mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these
is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country.
 The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the
guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions,
that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and
adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. The
Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719,
broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. In this regard,
the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the
Act when said phase-out period was extended in accordance with
the Act as laid out in Section 2.
 What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the
laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will
cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation,
discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but
classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or
capriciously is permitted. The classification, however, to be
reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the
law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d)
must apply equally to each member of the class.
 We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the
following reasons: First, it was based on substantial distinctions.
Second, the classification, and the consequent phase out of
commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law,
 that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe
blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood
transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a
commodity. Third, the Legislature intended for the general
application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the
peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to
apply only to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law applies
equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.
 The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the
State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental
concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted
in the exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote and
preserve public health and safety.
 Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a
wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by
petitioners, is for Congress to determine.
GR No. 158793, June 8, 2006
Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways
FACTS:
 On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial court a
Petition for Declaratory Judgment with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 01-
034. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of the following
administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions
of Republic Act 2000, entitled "Limited Access Highway Act"
enacted in 1957:
a. DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968;
b. DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993;
c. Art. II, Sec. 3(a) of the Revised Rules on Limited Access
Facilities promulgated in 199[8] by the DPWH thru the Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB).
 Previously, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH
issued on June 25, 1998 Department Order (DO) No. 215
declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as
limited access facilities.
 Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8,
2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the
said administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on
motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon
Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll
Expressway under DO 215.
 On June 28, 2001, the trial court, thru then Presiding Judge
Teofilo Guadiz, after due hearing, issued an order granting
petitioners’ application for preliminary injunction. On July 16,
2001, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court,
conditioned upon petitioners’ filing of cash bond in the amount of
P100,000.00, which petitioners subsequently complied with.
 On July 18, 2001, the DPWH acting thru the TRB, issued
Department Order No. 123 allowing motorcycles with engine
displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access
facilities (toll ways).
 Upon the assumption of Honorable Presiding Judge Ma. Cristina
Cornejo, both the petitioners and respondents were required to
file their respective Memoranda. Petitioners likewise filed [their]
Supplemental Memorandum. Thereafter, the case was deemed
submitted for decision.
 Consequently, on March 10, 2003, the trial court issued the
assailed decision dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO
123. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal of
their petition; but it was denied by the trial court in its Order dated
June 16, 2003.
 Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB regulations contravene RA
2000
2. Whether AO 1 and DO 123 are unconstitutional
HELD:
 The Supreme Court declared constitutional AO 1, issued by the
then Department of Public Works and Communications on
February 19, 1968, that bans the use of bicycles, tricycles,
pedicabs, motorcycles, or any nonmotorized vehicle on limited
access highways. The Court explained that since the tollway is
not an ordinary road, the same “necessitates the imposition of
guidelines in the manner of its use and operation.”
 On the other hand, the Court declared unconstitutional and in
violation of “The Limited Access Highway Act” (RA 2000)
Department Orders 74 and 215 released by the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) as well as the Revised
Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities of the Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB). Department Orders 74 and 215, dated
April 5, 1993 and June 25, 1998, respectively, declared the North
and South Luzon (DO 74), and the Manila-Cavite Toll
Expressways (DO 215) as limited access facilities. The Court
explained that at the time DPWH issued these orders, it no longer
had authority to regulate activities related to transportation.
 In contrast, AO 1 was issued in 1968 by the then Department of
Public Works and Communications when it had the authority to
regulate limited access facilities.
 Likewise, the Court upheld the decision of the Makati City
Regional Trial Court, Branch 147 declaring DO 123, which limits
access to the above expressways to only 400cc motorcycles, as
unconstitutional for want of authority of the DPWH to promulgate
the said order.
G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000
People vs. Jalosjos
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of
Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed
to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of
popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be
represented.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to
discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives
HELD:
 Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights
arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by
law.
 The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members
of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the
Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.
 The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should
be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with
a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To
allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually
make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008
Trillanes vs Pimentel
FACTS:
 At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300
heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation
 of the President and key national officials.
Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state
of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the
rebellion.[1] A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension
and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the
militant soldiers that evening.
 In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood
Incident," petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along
with his comrades, with coup d'etat defined under Article 134-A of
the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati.
 Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in
detention, threw his hat in the political arena and won a seat in
the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30,
2007.
 Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007,
petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an
"Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend
Senate Sessions and Related Requests”
 The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his
requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to
three.[7] The trial court just the same denied the motion.
 The present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of
the trial court, and for prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests”
constitutional.
HELD:
 The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in
their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
 It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken
into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. No less
than the Constitution provides.
 All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.
 It is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for
release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the
evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an
application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid
curtailment of his right to provisional liberty.
 He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case
against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released
on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners
whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can
not practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and
detention.
 Petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain
detention prisoners who have also been charged with non-
bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and
former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "social
functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the more
serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner
harps on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.
 In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment
of detention prisoners, petitioner expressly admits that he
intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form of
being placed under Senate custody or house arrest, yet he at the
same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to others.\
 Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant
to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would
be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002
USA vs PURGANAN
FACTS:
 Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,# the United
States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the
Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16,
1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and
accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the
extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan
Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary
of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice
(SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
 Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought
and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the
RTC of Manila, Branch 25.# The TRO prohibited the Department
of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his
extradition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent
copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to
grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment
and supporting evidence.
 The Court held that private respondent was bereft of the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process.
 Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United
States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with
the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition
 In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for
the issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to
Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
 Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez
filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,”# which
prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for
hearing. The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the
case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner
manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial
court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior
to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
 In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in
case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P100,000.
 The Court directed the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash.#
After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required
cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.
ISSUE: Whether or not being an elected member of the House of
Representatives is compelling enough for the Court to grant his
request for provisional release on bail.
HELD:
 After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for
bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they
have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no
danger to the community; and (b) there exist special,
humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by
the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail
therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a
special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of
right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar
facts of each case.
 In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a
question of constitutional equal protection.
 The Constitution guarantees: ‘x x x nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of laws.’ This simply means that all
persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government
may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person.
Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
 The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public
officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly [from]
prison. The duties imposed by the ‘mandate of the people’ are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to
legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
 members.
 A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the
call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
 A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or
otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or
against groups or types of individuals.
 The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.
 We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is
not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to
all those belonging to the same class.
GR No. 147387, December 10, 2003
Farinas vs Executive Secretary
FACTS:
 The petitioners come to the Court alleging in the main that
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring
every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in
its title.
 According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006
constitutes a proscribed rider.
 Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the
use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office
other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by
considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of
the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor
germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
 The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it
repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving
intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to
appointive officials, thus:
 SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any
person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
 They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates
against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an
elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is
holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom
upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue
in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election
for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has
been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains -
they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices
upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
 The respondents petitions contending, preliminarily, that the
petitioners have no legal standing to institute the present suit.
 Invoking the “enrolled bill” doctrine. The signatures of the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill
and the certification signed by the respective Secretaries of both
houses of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill
was duly enacted into law.
 The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is not a
proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of
the Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, “An Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices,” is so broad
that it encompasses all the processes involved in an election
exercise, including the filing of certificates of candidacy by
elective officials.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.
HELD:
 The petitioners’ contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue
benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and
violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
 The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not
absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from the other.# The Court has explained the nature of
the equal protection guarantee in this manner:
 The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only
to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not.
 Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions.# On the other hand, appointive officials hold their
office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing
authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure# while
others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
 Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is
that appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil
service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under
the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees
holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take
part in political and electoral activities.
 By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two
classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their
tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for
any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not
within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom
of this classification.
 Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored
upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons
belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the
equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
 In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched
principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve
themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute.
That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the
government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on
constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to
determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the
limits of legislative power.# No such transgression has been
shown in this case.
 WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED
GR No. 1288845, June 01, 2000
INT’L SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS VS QUISUMBING
*no case digest submitted*