CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
- EMINENT DOMAIN -
WHO EXERCISES THE POWER?
GR No 14355 Oct. 31, 1919
CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY CEMETERY
FACTS:
 The City of Manila, in exercising the owner of Eminent Domain,
presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said City
raying that certain lands described therein, be expropriated for the
purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the
extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila. Herein respondents contend
that there are other parcels of land offered for such improvement
proposed by the City at a lesser cost and that the chosen parcel
of land by the City is a cemetery where the dead loved ones of
the Chinese community were buried. Herien respondents also
averred that the City of Manila will have to spend a great deal
amount of money in the relocation and rebuilding of sepulchres,
tombstones and monuments of those affected by the
expropriation should they pursue to use the Chinese Cemetery.
The trial judge, Hon. Del Rosario decided that there was no
necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in
question. The City of Manila appealed contending that under the
law, it has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire and
neither the court not the land owners can inquire into the
advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask concerning the
necessities therefore; and that the courts are mere appraisers of
the land involved.
ISSUE: May the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity
of the expropriation?
HELD:
 del Sur did not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid, expropriation
Section 241 of Act no. 190 provides that “ the govt. of the Phil
islands, or of any province or department thereof, or of any
municipality, and any person, or public or private corporation
having, by law, the right to condemn private property for public
use, shall exercise that right in the manner prescribed under Sec.
242( a complaint in expropriation proceeding shall be presented;
that the complaint shall state with certainty the right of
condemnation, with a description of the property sought to be
condemned together with the interest of each defendant
separately.). Section 243 provides that if the court shall find upon
trial that the right to expropriate the land in question exists, it shall
then appoint commissioners. Thus, Sec. 243 means that when
the legislature conferred upon the courts the right to ascertain
upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent
domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear
proof upon: 1. whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain is public; and 2.whether the land is public or
private. Supreme Court also averred that the exercise of the right
of eminent domain is necessary in derogation of private rights,
and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly
construed. Therefore, if there is no greatest necessity existing for
an expropriation, it should not be made for such purposes until it
is fully established that such necessity exist. In the present case,
even granting that a necessity exist for the opening of Rizal St.
through the cemetery, record shows that adjoining and adjacent
lands have been offered to the city free of charge which will
answer every purpose of the City of Manila. The cemetery, then,
still being under care and maintenance of the living should be
spared from such expropriation where there are other lands
offered for expropriation at a much lesser expense to serve the
same purpose. The judgment of the lower court is hereby
affirmed.
268 SCRA 368 (1997)
MODAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410
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FACTS:
 On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89,
"Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for
Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4
Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the
Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports
Facilities."
 In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then
Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. On September 11,
1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said
Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is
unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in
Bunawan for the establishment of the government center."
 The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent,
subsequently filed a petition for Eminent Domain against
petitioner Percival Moday before the RTC at Prosperidad, Agusan
del Sur.
 On March 6, 1991, public respondent municipality filed a Motion
to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This
Case stating that it had already deposited with the municipal
treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2,
Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the
government's best interest for public respondent to be allowed to
take possession of the property.

Despite petitioners' opposition and after a hearing on the merits,
the RTC granted respondent municipality's motion to take
possession of the land. Petitioners' motion for recon was denied
by the trial court. Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for
certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court, but was dismissed by appellate court. The CA held that the
public purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No.
43-89 and that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan
of petitioners' property could proceed. Respondent appellate court
also denied petitioners' motion for recon.

Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three
buildings on the subject property: 2 wooden structures, and one
made of concrete.
ISSUE: Whether or not the municipality to exercise the right to eminent
domain, since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution
No. 43-89.
HELD:
 On December 8, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining and restraining public respondent Judge
Evangeline Yuipco from enforcing her and respondent
municipality from using and occupying all the buildings
constructed and from further constructing any building on the land
subject of this petition.
 Acting on petitioners' Omnibus Motion for Enforcement of
Restraining Order and for Contempt, the Court issued a
Resolution on March 15, 1995, citing incumbent municipal mayor
Anuncio C. Bustillo for contempt, ordering him to pay the fine and
to demolish the "blocktiendas" which were built in violation of the
restraining order.

Former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo paid the fine and manifested
that he lost in the May 8, 1995 election. The incumbent Mayor
Leonardo Barrios, filed a Manifestation, Motion to Resolve
"Urgent Motion for Immediate Dissolution of the Temporary
Restraining Order" and Memorandum on June 11, 1996 for the
Municipality of Bunawan.
 Petitioners contend that the CA erred in upholding the legality of
the condemnation proceedings initiated by the municipality.
According to petitioners, the expropriation was politically
motivated and Resolution No. 43-89 was correctly disapproved by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
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 The CA declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's reason for
disapproving the resolution "could be baseless, because it failed
to point out which and where are those available lots.'"
Respondent court also concluded that since the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan did not declare the municipal board's resolution as
invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. The
Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the
CA.
 Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan
exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is
inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's right to
appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State,
private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed
by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be
validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and
public utilities. For the taking of private property by the
government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and
there must be just compensation.
 The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of
eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the local Government Code in force at
the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of
said law states:
Sec. 9. Eminent Domain. ― A local government unit may,
through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its
sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute
condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
 Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides:
Sec. 153. Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. ― (1) Within
thirty days after receiving copies of approved ordinances,
resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the municipal
mayor, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the
documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if
there be none, to the provincial fiscal, who shall examine them
promptly and inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing
of any defect or impropriety which he may discover therein and
make such comments or recommendations as shall appear to
him proper.
 used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of
(2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal
ordinance, resolution or executive order is beyond the power
conferred upon the sangguniang bayan or the mayor, it shall
declare such ordinance, resolution or executive order invalid in
whole or in part, entering its actions upon the minutes and
advising the proper municipal authorities thereof. The effect of
such an action shall be to annul the ordinance, resolution or
executive order in question in whole or in part. The action of the
sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis
supplied.)
 The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal
Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render
said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section
153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the
power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground
that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the
Mayor to issue.
 Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with the
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to
disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of
Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent
domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate
said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P.
Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid
and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for
the condemnation of petitioners' property.
 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to
As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged that
Percival Moday incurred the ire of then Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo
when he refused to support the latter's candidacy for mayor in
previous elections. Petitioners claim that then incumbent Mayor
C. Bustillo used the expropriation to retaliate by expropriating their
land even if there were other properties belonging to the
municipality and available for the purpose. Specifically, they
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allege that the municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property
adjacent to petitioners' land, evidenced by a sketch plan.
 The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use
must be public, compensation must be made and due process of
law must be observed. The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of
such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the
taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking,
has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent domain must
be genuine and of a public character. Government may not
capriciously choose what private property should be taken.
 After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find
no evidentiary support for petitioners' allegations. The uncertified
photocopy of the sketch plan does not conclusively prove that the
municipality does own vacant land adjacent to petitioners'
property suited to the purpose of the expropriation. In the
questioned decision, respondent appellate court similarly held that
the pleadings and documents on record have not pointed out any
of respondent municipality's "other available properties available
for the same purpose." The accusations of political reprisal are
likewise unsupported by competent evidence. Consequently, the
Court holds that petitioners' demand that the former municipal
mayor be personally liable for damages is without basis.
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
Court is LIFTED.
GR No. 136349, January 23, 2006
MASIKIP vs. CITY OF PASIG
FACTS:
 Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a
parcel of land with an area of 4,521 square meters located at
Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila.
 In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig,
now City of Pasig, respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to
expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be
the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to
Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then
Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.
 Again, on March 23, 1994, respondent wrote another letter to
petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly "in line with the
program of the Municipal Government to provide land
opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community."
 On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that
the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional,
invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient
nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor
sectors of our community."
 In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent reiterated that the
purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s property is "to provide
sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents."

trial court a complaint for expropriation, docketed as SCA No.
873. Respondent prayed that the trial court, after due notice and
hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; that
commissioners be appointed for the purpose of determining the
just compensation; and that judgment be rendered based on the
report of the commissioners.

On April 25, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and on May
Dismiss, on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to
expropriate the property for the sports and recreational
activities of the residents of Pasig. As to the issue of just
compensation, the trial court held that the same is to be
determined in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner filed a motion for recon but it was denied by the trial
court. Forthwith, it appointed the City Assessor and City Treasurer
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of Pasig City as commissioners to ascertain the just
compensation. This prompted petitioner to file with the Court of
Appeals a special civil action for certiorari. On October 31, 1997,
the Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
 Petitioner’s Motion for Recon was denied.
ISSUE: What constitutes a genuine necessity for public use.
HELD:
 Where the taking by the State of private property is done for the
benefit of a small community which seeks to have its own sports
and recreational facility, notwithstanding that there is such a
recreational facility only a short distance away, such taking cannot
be considered to be for public use. Its expropriation is not valid. In
this case, the Court defines what constitutes a genuine necessity
for public use.
 In the early case of US v. Toribio, this Court defined the power of
eminent domain as "the right of a government to take and
appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public
exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of
providing a reasonable compensation therefor." It has also been
described as the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take
private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty
and inherent in government.
 The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch
of the government. It delegates the exercise thereof to local
government units, other public entities and public utility
corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local
governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may
exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Section 19
of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160)
prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent
domain to local government units and lays down the parameters
for its exercise, thus:
"SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may,
through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose
or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That, the
power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid
and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and
such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That, the local
government unit may immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon
making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on
the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated:
Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the
fair market value at the time of the taking of the property."
 Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the
following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation,
(b) the necessity of the taking, and (c) the public use character of
the purpose of the taking.
 1029 among the identified sites for socialized housing. On July,
The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily
originates from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited to
such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila,
we held that the very foundation of the right to exercise
eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity
must be of a public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of
the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the
taking of the land. In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College, we
ruled that "necessity within the rule that the particular property to
be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute
but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would
combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least
inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the
property owner consistent with such benefit."
 
Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410
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failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate
petitioner’s property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the
basis for the passage of the Ordinance authorizing the
expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the
Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-
profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be
gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of
having their own private playground and recreational facility.
Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose
is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity
has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an
alternative facility for sports development and community
recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to
all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
 WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The
challenged Decision and Resolution of the CA are REVERSED.
The complaint for expropriation filed before the trial court by
respondent City of Pasig, is DISMISSED.
GR No. 155746, October 03, 2004
LAGCAO vs. JUDGE LABRA
FACTS:
 In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of
Cebu. One of these lots was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills,
Cebu City, with an area of 4,048 square meters. In 1965,
petitioners purchased Lot 1029. But then, in late 1965, the 210
lots, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province
tried to annul the sale of Lot by the City of Cebu to the petitioners.
This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific
performance and damages in the then CFI.
 On July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and
on June 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court. Pursuant to the ruling of the appellate court, the
Province of Cebu executed a deed of absolute sale over Lot 1029
in favor of petitioners.

After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot
only to discover that squatters already occupied it. Thus,
petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters.
The MTCC, rendered a decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the
squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the
MTCC’s decision and issued a writ of execution and order of
demolition.
 However, when the demolition order was about to be
implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters to
the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the
ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the
squatters. Acting on the mayor’s request, the MTCC issued two
orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days from
February 22, 1999. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the
suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu
City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized
housing site pursuant to RA 7279. Then, on June 30, 1999, the
SP of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 1772 which included Lot
19, 2000, Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted by the SP of Cebu
City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation
proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 which was registered
in the name of petitioners. The intended acquisition was to be
used for the benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and sale
to the actual occupants thereof. For this purpose, the ordinance
appropriated the amount of P6,881,600 for the payment of the
subject lot. This ordinance was approved by Mayor Garcia on
August 2, 2000.

On August 29, 2000, petitioners filed with the RTC an action for
declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being
unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the complaint filed by
petitioners whose subsequent motion for recon was also denied.
In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is
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unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property
for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary
to the concept of "public use" contemplated in the Constitution.
They allege that it will benefit only a handful of people. The
ordinance, according to petitioners, was obviously passed for
politicking, the squatters undeniably being a big source of votes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the intended expropriation by the City of Cebu
of a 4,048-square-meter parcel of land owned by petitioners
contravenes the Constitution and applicable laws.
HELD:
 Local government units have no inherent power of eminent
domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the
legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local
government units the power to expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843
was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. － A local government unit may,
through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or
purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless,
upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution and pertinent laws xxx. (italics supplied).
 Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of
petitioners’ lot was enacted by the SP of Cebu City to provide
socialized housing for the homeless and low-income residents of
the City.
 There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this
power: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. Thus, the exercise
by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not
absolute.
 The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine
necessity and that necessity must be of public character.
Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which
private property should be expropriated. In this case, there was
no showing at all why petitioners’ property was singled out for
expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the
particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no
reason for the choice of petitioners’ property as the site of a
socialized housing project.
 RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property
for purposes of urban land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10
thereof provide:
SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. － Lands for
socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development,
Zonal Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and
Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or
BLISS which have not yet been acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more practicable and
advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in
this section shall not apply. The local government units shall
give budgetary priority to on-site development of government
lands. (Emphasis supplied).
 SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. － The modes of acquiring
lands for purposes of this Act shall include, among others,
community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint
venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation:
Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to
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only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted:
Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels
of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for
purposes of this Act: xxx. (Emphasis supplied).
 In the recent case of Estate or Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice Jose
B.L. Reyes et al. vs. City of Manila, we ruled that the above-
quoted provisions are strict limitations on the exercise of the
power of eminent domain by local government units, especially
with respect to (1) the order of priority in acquiring land for
socialized housing and (2) the resort to expropriation proceedings
as a means to acquiring it. Private lands rank last in the order of
priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein,
expropriation proceedings may be resorted to only after the other
modes of acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with these
conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards
of oftentimes helpless owners of private property against what
may be a tyrannical violation of due process when their property
is forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use.
 We have found nothing in the records indicating that the City of
Cebu complied strictly with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279.
Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners’ property
without any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of
Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that
the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first
exhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No.
1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy
petitioners’ property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160. We
therefore find Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for
being violative of the petitioners’ right to due process.
 It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had
already obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against the
illegal occupants of their property. The judgment in this ejectment
case had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ of execution
and an order of demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trial
court to suspend the demolition on the pretext that the City was
still searching for a relocation site for the squatters. However,
instead of looking for a relocation site during the suspension
period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for
the expropriation of petitioners’ lot. The unconscionable manner in
which the questioned ordinance was passed clearly indicated that
respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA
7279.
 For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also
be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. It must
be in accordance with certain well-established basic principles of
a substantive nature. These principles require that an ordinance
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must
not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5)
must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must
not be unreasonable.
 Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing
substantive requirements. A clear case of constitutional infirmity
having been thus established, this Court is constrained to nullify
the subject ordinance. We recapitulate:
first, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the pertinent
provisions of the Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160;
second, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was
plain oppression masquerading as a pro-poor ordinance;
third, the fact that petitioners’ small property was singled out for
expropriation for the purpose of awarding it to no more than a
few squatters indicated manifest partiality against petitioners,
and
fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a
reasonable relation between the end sought and the means
adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to provide
adequate housing to slum dwellers, the means it employed in
pursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal, sensible
and called for by the circumstances.
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G.R. No. 152230. August 9, 2005
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. vs.
MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA
The assailed decision affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the respondent Municipality
(now City) of Pasig as having the right to expropriate and take
possession of the subject property.
FACTS:
 The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R.
Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to
Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses,
mostly made of light materials, were located. The road had to be
at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so
that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration.
Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for water and
electrical outlets. The municipality then decided to acquire 51
square meters out of the 1,791-square meter property of Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco
Kho.
 On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an
Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate
expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and
appropriate the fund therefore. The ordinance stated that the
property owners were notified of the municipality’s intent to
purchase the property for public use as an access road but they
rejected the offer.On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a
 complaint, amended on August 6, 1993, against the Ching
Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under Section 19 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code. The plaintiff alleged that it already notified the
defendants, by letter, of its intention to construct an access road
on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the same
portion.
 The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of
the property based on the latest tax declaration covering the
property. On plaintiff’s motion, the RTC issued a writ of
possession over the property sought to be expropriated. On
November 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice
of lis pendens at the dorsal portion under the name of the Jesus
Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Incorporated (JILCSFI)
which had purchased the property. Thereafter, the plaintiff
constructed therein a cemented road with a width of three meters;
the road was called Damayan Street.
 In their answer, the defendants claimed that, as early as February
1993, they had sold the said property to JILCSFI as evidenced by
a deed of sale bearing the signature of defendant Ernesto Ching
Cuanco Kho and his wife.
 JILCSFI averred, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that
the plaintiff’s exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular
class and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless. It
alleged that the property sought to be expropriated is not the best
portion for the road and the least burdensome to it.
 Certificate of Title No. 11946. It was originally owned by Ismael D.
The intervenor filed a crossclaim against its co-defendants for
reimbursement in case the subject property is expropriated.
 The petitioner asserts that the respondent must comply with the
requirements for the establishment of an easement of right-of-
way, more specifically, the road must be constructed at the point
least prejudicial to the servient state, and that there must be no
adequate outlet to a public highway. The petitioner asserts that
the portion of the lot sought to be expropriated is located at the
middle portion of the petitioner’s entire parcel of land, thereby
splitting the lot into two halves, and making it impossible for the
petitioner to put up its school building and worship center.
 During the trial, the plaintiff presented witnesses, who were
residents of the town, testifying that it was they who requested for
the construction of the road.
 appellee. In 1995, defendant-appellee begun construction of
The defendant, on the other hand, presented some residents who
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410
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counterclaimed that there are other roads leading to E. R. Santos
Street.
 On September 3, 1997, the RTC issued an Order in favor of the
plaintiff. The RTC held that there was substantial compliance with
the definite and valid offer requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No.
7160, and that the expropriated portion is the most convenient
access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid.
 Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
 In a Decision dated March 13, 2001, the CA affirmed the order of
the RTC. The appellate court upheld the public necessity for the
subject property based on the findings of the trial court that the
portion of the property sought to be expropriated appears to be,
not only the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas
Bukid, but also an easy path for vehicles entering the area,
particularly fire trucks.
 Moreover, the CA took into consideration the provision of Article
33 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, which regards the “construction or extension
of roads, streets, sidewalks” as public use, purpose or welfare.
ISSUE: WON the subject property which is intended to be used for
public purposes may be expropriated by the respondent.
HELD: No, the subject property, although intended for public cannot be
expropriated by the Municipality of Pasig.
 The Supreme Court held that failed to show the necessity for
constructing the road particularly in the petitioner’s property and
not elsewhere.
 As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing in
the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the
trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the
subject property during the trial, the petitioner was not notified.
 The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process.
In this case, the petitioner was not notified of any ocular
inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court based
on the said inspection has no probative weight. The findings of
the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular inspection must,
therefore, be rejected.
 IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the
complaint of the respondent without prejudice to the refiling
thereof.
G.R. No. 163130, September 7, 2007
SAN ROQUE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (through the Armed Forces of
the Philippines)
FACTS:

The subject parcels of land are located at Lahug, Cebu City and
were part of Lot No. 933. Lot No. 933 was covered by Transfer
Rosales, Pantaleon Cabrera and Francisco Racaza. On 5
September 1938, subject parcels of land, together with seventeen
(17) others, were the subject of an expropriation proceeding
initiated by the then Commonwealth of the Philippines docketed
as Civil Case No. 781. On 19 October 1938, Judge Felix Martinez
ordered the initial deposit of P,500.00 as pre-condition for the
entry on the lands sought to be expropriated. On 14 May 1940, a
Decision was rendered condemning the parcels of land. However,
the title of the subject parcel of land was not transferred to the
government.
 Eventually, the land was subdivided and T.C.T. No. 11946 was
cancelled and new titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of
Cebu. Two parcels covered by T.C.T. Nos. 128197 (Lot No. 933-
B-3) and 128198 (Lot No. 933-B-4) were acquired by defendant-
townhouses on the subject parcels of land.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
 On 22 February 1996, plaintiff-appellant filed the present case
alleging that it is the owner of the subject parcels of land by virtue
of the 1938 Decision in the expropriation case, thus, T.C.T. Nos.
128197 and 128198 are null and void. It argued that defendant-
appellee, had no right to possess the subject properties because
it was not its lawful owner.
 In its Answer defendant-appellee claimed that it was a buyer in
good faith. It also claimed that there was no valid expropriation
because it was initiated by the executive branch without
legislative approval. It also alleged that the expropriation was
never consummated because the government did not actually
enter the land nor were the owners paid any compensation
 On August 25, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
Republic's complaint and upholding SRRDC's ownership over the
subject properties as supported by SRRDC's actual possession
thereof and its unqualified title thereto. The RTC ruled that
SRRDC's ownership is borne out by the original owner's title to
Lot No. 933 and the subsequent transferees’ respective titles all
of which bore no annotation of the fact of expropriation and did
not indicate the Republic's favorable lien. It also found that there
was no valid expropriation since the records are bereft of a
showing that consideration was paid for the subject properties.
 Aggrieved, the Republic appealed the decision to the CA insisting
on its absolute ownership over the subject properties grounded on
the following: (1) the CFI Decision in the expropriation case, Civil
Case No. 781; (2) the ruling of this Court in Valdehueza v.
Republic and (3) the expropriated properties, including Lot No.
933, are devoted to public use.
 The CA reversed the RTC Decision on the finding that the appeal
from the CFI Decision in the expropriation case was never
perfected by the original owners of the subject properties and
thus, the expropriation of Lot No. 933 became final and binding on
the original owners, and SRRDC, which merely stepped into the
latter's shoes, is similarly bound. The CA further held that laches
and estoppel cannot work against the Republic despite its failure
from 1940 to register Lot No. 933 in its name, or to record the
decree of expropriation on the title. Accordingly, the CA found no
necessity to rule on the applicability of Valdehueza v. Republic in
the case.
 Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent, claiming its right to eminent domain,
was the dutiful owner of the subject property, despite failure
to register it.
2. Whether petitioner was a buyer of good faith
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner on both issues.
 Time and again, the SC declared that eminent domain cases are
to be strictly construed against the expropriator. The payment of
just compensation for private property taken for public use is an
indispensable requisite for the exercise of the State’s sovereign
power of eminent domain. Failure to observe this requirement
renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed public
purpose. To disregard this limitation on the exercise of
governmental power to expropriate is to ride roughshod over
private rights.
 From the records of this case and our previous findings in the
related cases, the Republic manifestly failed to present clear and
convincing evidence of full payment of just compensation and
receipt thereof by the property owners.
 Section 251 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the law in force at the
time of the Commonwealthcase likewise provides for the
recording of the judgment of expropriation in the Registry of
Deeds. Said provision reads, to wit:
SEC. 251. Final Judgment, Its Record and Effect. – The record of
the final judgment in such action shall state definitely by metes
and bounds and adequate description. The particular land or
interest in land condemned to the public use, and the nature of
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410
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the public use. A certified copy of the record of judgment shall
be recorded in the office of the registrar of deeds for the
province in which the estate is situated, and its effect shall
be to vest in the plaintiff for the public use stated the land
and estate so described. (Emphasis supplied)
 From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the
Republic to cause the registration of the subject properties in its
name or record the decree of expropriation on the title. Yet, not
only did the Republic fail to register the subject properties in its
name, it failed to do so for fifty-six (56) years.
 Another basic question is whether or not SRRDC is a buyer in
good faith.
 The CA found SRRDC wanting in good faith because it should be
imputed with constructive knowledge, or at least, sufficiently
warned that the Republic had claims over the property in view of
indications that the subject land belonged to a military reservation.
 An innocent purchaser for value is one who, relying on the
certificate of title, bought the property from the registered owner,
without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in,
such property, and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the
time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other person in the property.
 In the instant case, the Republic’s adverse claim of ownership
over the subject properties may have given SRRDC’s
predecessors-in-interest, the sellers, voidable title to the subject
properties. However, we stress that prior to SRRDC’s acquisition
of the subject properties, Lot No. 933 had already been
subdivided and covered by separate titles of the subsequent
transferees. These titles, including the titles to the subject
properties, had not been voided at the time of the sale to SRRDC
in 1994. As such, SRRDC acquired good title to the subject
properties, having purchased them in good faith, for value, and
without notice of the seller’s defect of title, if any.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
The August 15, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSEDand the August 25, 1998 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court is REINSTATED. TCT Nos. 128197 and 128198, in the
name of petitioner San Roque Realty and Development
Corporation, are upheld and declared valid.
OBJECTS OF EXPROPRIATION
G.R. No. L-18841, January 27, 1969
RP vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY
FACTS:
 Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA
Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby
telephone messages, coming from the United States and received
by RCA's domestic station, could automatically be transferred to
the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by the PLDT
for transmission from the Philippines to the United States.
 The arrangement was later extended to radio-telephone
messages to and from European and Asiatic countries. Their
contract contained a stipulation that either party could terminate it
on a 24-month notice to the other. On 2 February 1956, PLDT
gave notice to RCA to terminate their contract on 2 February
1958.
 Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications
set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own
appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the
PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. The
Bureau has extended its services to the general public since
1948, using the same trunk lines owned by, and rented from, the
PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule of rates.
Through these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System
(GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in the
same way that the latter could make a call to the former.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
 On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of
Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA
Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service
whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls
received by RCA's station to and from local residents.
 On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company, complained to the Bureau of
Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions
under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-
connected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk
lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use
of government offices but even to serve private persons or the
general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and
gave notice that if said violations were not stopped by midnight of
12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections.
When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines
being rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The
result was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone services,
from the rest of the world, except the United States.
 The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT on
8 January 1958 that both enter into an interconnecting
agreement, with the government paying (on a call basis) for all
calls passing through the interconnecting facilities from the
Government Telephone System to the PLDT. The PLDT replied
that it was willing to enter into an agreement on overseas
telephone service to Europe and Asian countries provided that the
Bureau would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of the
Public Service Commission.
 On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the
defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No.
35805), praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the
PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for
the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system
throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as
the court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary
injunction against the defendant company to restrain the
severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore
those severed.
 PLDT, on the other hand denied any obligation on its part to
execute a contrary of services with the Bureau of
Telecommunications; contested the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance to compel it to enter into interconnecting
agreements, and averred that it was justified to disconnect the
trunk lines heretofore leased to the Bureau of
Telecommunications under the existing agreement because its
facilities were being used in fraud of its rights. PLDT further
claimed that the Bureau was engaging in commercial telephone
operations in excess of authority, in competition with, and to the
prejudice of, the PLDT, using defendants own telephone poles,
without proper accounting of revenues.
 expense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not
compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau
because the parties were not in agreement; that under Executive
Order 94, establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications, said
Bureau was not limited to servicing government offices alone, nor
was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since the
PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that their use by
the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the
Bureau was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles
of the PLDT; and, in view of serious public prejudice that would
result from the disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the
preliminary injunction permanent, although it dismissed both the
complaint and the counterclaims.
 be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals
Both parties appealed.
ISSUE: WON PLDT is compelled to enter into a contract compulsory
rendering the company to provide inter-connectivity services, despite
its objection.
HELD:
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410
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 The Supreme Court agreed with the court below that parties
cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is
had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the
contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the
essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of
the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence,
intimidation, or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil
Code of the Philippines).
 But the court a quohas apparently overlooked that while the
Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it,
the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of
eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the government telephone system and that of
the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require,
subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by
the court.
 While the defendant telephone company is a public utility
corporation whose franchise, equipment and other properties are
under the jurisdiction, supervision and control of the Public
Service Commission (Sec. 13, Public Service Act), yet the
plaintiff's telecommunications network is a public service owned
by the Republic and operated by an instrumentality of the National
Government, hence exempt, under Section 14 of the Public
Service Act, from such jurisdiction, supervision and control.
 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance, now
under appeal, is affirmed, except in so far as it dismisses the
petition of the Republic of the Philippines to compel the Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company to continue servicing the
Government telephone system upon such terms, and for a
compensation, that the trial court may determine to be just,
including the period elapsed from the filing of the original
complaint or petition. And for this purpose, the records are
ordered returned to the court of origin for further hearings and
other proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. No costs.
G.R. No. L-14355, October 31, 1919
THE CITY OF MANILA vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET
AL.
FACTS:
On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a
petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain
lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public
improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila. The
defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community
of Manila] opposed the expropriation alleging that the Chinese
cemetery has for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the
Chinese Community of the City of Manila and that the expropriation, in
fact, was not necessary as a public improvement for other routes were
available which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less
The trial court decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation
of the particular strip of land in question, and absolved each and all of
the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding
as to costs. The City of Manila then appealed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE: WON the Chinese Cemetery may be validly expropriated by
the City of Manila.
HELD:

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by
the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation
of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must
with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and
laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants.
When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater
public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his
consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by
doubtly interpretation.
 The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must
exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to
determine the question, they must only find (a) that a law or
authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but
(b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance
with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed
upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land
must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public.
 It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private.
The former is a cemetery used by the general community, or
neighborhood, or church, while the latter is used only by a family,
or a small portion of the community or neighbourhood. Where a
cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of the
ground can be taken for other public uses under a general
authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and
unoccupied parts which are held in good faith for future use. The
cemetery in question is used by the general community of
Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of
a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public
property. The petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the
reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the
law to expropriate public property. In the present case, even
granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in
question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening
the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining
and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge,
which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff.
 For all of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court should be
and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first
instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However,
where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover
a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to,
or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to
have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific
performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a
judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not
be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively
by courts of first instance.
 In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the
recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by
the government of its authority and right to take private property
for public useHence, the courts determine the authority of the
government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the
observance of due process. The subject matter of an
expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent
domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

WHERE EXPROPRIATION SUIT IS FILED

G.R. No. 138896, June 20, 2000
RGY. SAN ROQUE vs. HEIRS OF PASTOR

FACTS:
 Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay,
Cebu (Branch 1) a Complaint to expropriate a property of the
respondents. In an Order dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed
the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned
that "[e]minent domain is an exercise of the power to take private
property for public use after payment of just compensation. In an
action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action
is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also
involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent
domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court and not with this Court."
 The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it,
holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real
property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated
would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC
or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed
before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less
than P20,000.
 Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a
pure question of law.

ISSUE: Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for
eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed value of the
subject property is below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos?

HELD:
 An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation thus
RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over
expropriation case as provided for by Section 19 (1) of BP 129,
which states that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;…”.
 If the issue is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410
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