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PHIL 205
4/30/18
Reading Response #6
Before his description of the origins of “bad conscience,” Nietzsche describes the origins
of punishment. He comes to the conclusion that “instigators of evil,” when punished, do not feel
guilt for having committed their wrongdoing but rather an unexpected dissatisfaction with the
way things played out. He states that “punishment thus tames man, but it does not make him
“better,” (OGM, 56). For Nietzsche this means that “bad conscience” cannot have originated in
punishment. Nietzsche compares the person developing “bad conscience” to a water animal that
has to live on land. The water animal is adaptable enough to survive, but it must forgo all his
basic instincts and constantly use its consciousness, which Nietzsche calls “their poorest and
most erring organ!” (OGM, 56). A person who finds herself in a society is just like this water
animal. Once free to act on instinct, she now must constantly use her consciousness to get by.
The instincts that she suppresses bubble up inside of her, and the very same instincts are the ones
the “organization of the state” actively works against. Among these instincts, Nietzsche believes,
is the desire to cause pain. Thus the suppression of these instincts, their “turning backwards
against man himself,” create this “bad conscience,” so that the person may fulfill their desire to
cause pain inwardly. The other origin of “bad conscience” that Nietzsche points out is born out
of the duty felt towards one’s ancestors. Nietzsche points out that people feel indebted to their
ancestors, the first ancestor of all the most. Because they recognize the sacrifices the ancestor
made and the benefits that sacrifice brought, the living person is also compelled to make
sacrifices. Further the effect of the ancestor’s work is unwavering, it is felt more and more as
time passes. In parallel, the feeling of debt towards the ancestors grows more and more. Thus
this “pang of conscience” develops here in a different way than Nietzsche described earlier.
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