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Noah Kayser-Hirsh

PHIL 205

4/30/18

Reading Response #6

Before his description of the origins of “bad conscience,” Nietzsche describes the origins

of punishment. He comes to the conclusion that “instigators of evil,” when punished, do not feel

guilt for having committed their wrongdoing but rather an unexpected dissatisfaction with the

way things played out. He states that “punishment thus tames man, but it does not make him

“better,” (OGM, 56). For Nietzsche this means that “bad conscience” cannot have originated in

punishment. Nietzsche compares the person developing “bad conscience” to a water animal that

has to live on land. The water animal is adaptable enough to survive, but it must forgo all his

basic instincts and constantly use its consciousness, which Nietzsche calls “their poorest and

most erring organ!” (OGM, 56). A person who finds herself in a society is just like this water

animal. Once free to act on instinct, she now must constantly use her consciousness to get by.

The instincts that she suppresses bubble up inside of her, and the very same instincts are the ones

the “organization of the state” actively works against. Among these instincts, Nietzsche believes,

is the desire to cause pain. Thus the suppression of these instincts, their “turning backwards

against man himself,” create this “bad conscience,” so that the person may fulfill their desire to

cause pain inwardly. The other origin of “bad conscience” that Nietzsche points out is born out

of the duty felt towards one’s ancestors. Nietzsche points out that people feel indebted to their

ancestors, the first ancestor of all the most. Because they recognize the sacrifices the ancestor
made and the benefits that sacrifice brought, the living person is also compelled to make

sacrifices. Further the effect of the ancestor’s work is unwavering, it is felt more and more as

time passes. In parallel, the feeling of debt towards the ancestors grows more and more. Thus

this “pang of conscience” develops here in a different way than Nietzsche described earlier.
References:

Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic. Indianapolis, IN:

Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1998.

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