Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
by
Janes Gosselin
January 1988
DECLARATION
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
iii
PREFAC E
to explore how the present law has coie to be what it is, how it is involved in the
process of refor* and extension and intensification, in order that we lay assist in
the building, stone upon stone, in stora and rain, of a transnational legal order for
States and peoples and ien;...an order which transcends power and calls for service .1
It is one of the «ore recent developments in the history of international law that
theoretical contributions have becoie of so«e relevance to international lawyers in
the arena of conference diploiacy and other public service activities.
The prominence, even pre-eminence, of the arena in contemporary international
law seems to nave created the need for a different kind of legal theorist, one essen
tially concerned with problem-solving in modern trans-national society, or more prop
erly, with the ’problem of problem-solving’.2
H aving s p e n t a s i g n i f i c a n t p e r io d o f tim e in t h e P a c i
f i c d e a l i n g w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t i s s u e s , i t was
c l e a r t o me, a s i t h a d b e e n t o many o t h e r s , t h a t o n e o f t h e
most p r e s s i n g p r a c t i c a l problem s f a c in g th e r e g io n - - and,
in d e e d , num erous o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e w o rld - - c o n c e rn e d t h e
optim um u t i l i z a t i o n o f s c a r c e m a r i n e r e s o u r c e s , i n c l u d i n g ,
in p a r tic u la r , f i s h e r i e s . 3 I t w a s t h e r e f o r e my i n i t i a l i n
t e n t i o n to p ropose a d e t a i l e d le g a l regim e, p ro b a b ly i n c lu d
ing a b ro a d ly -b a se d i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n , fo r th e con
s e r v a t i o n , management and e x p l o i t a t i o n o f m a rin e f i s h e r y r e
so u rc e s, b alan cin g th e i n t e r e s t s of a l l concerned. That
r e g im e w ould h a v e b e en b a s e d , i n l a r g e m e a s u re , on e x i s t i n g
i n t e r n a t i o n a l la w , p r i m a r i l y a s e n s h r i n e d i n t h e 1982 U n ite d .
N a t i o n s C o n v e n t i o n o n t h e Law o f t h e S e a . P relim in ary in
v e s t i g a t i o n , how ever, r e v e a l e d t h a t a c o n v e n i e n t b a s i s upon
w h ic h s u c h a p r o p o s e d r e g i m e c o u l d b e b u i l t , i n f a c t , was
not av ailab le. In th e f i r s t in s ta n c e , f o r v a rio u s re a s o n s
t h e C o n v e n t i o n d i d n o t by i t s e l f p r o v i d e a s u f f i c i e n t base.**
S e c o n d l y , a n d j u s t a s i m p o r t a n t l y , no c o m p r e h e n s i v e i n t e r
p r e t a t i o n o f t h e p r o v i s i o n s r e l a t i n g t o f i s h e r i e s was a v a i l
a b l e from w hich s p e c i a l i z e d p r o p o s a l s s u c h as t h a t i n i t i a l l y
c o n te m p la te d m ight be d e v e lo p e d . And t h i r d l y , no s y n t h e s i s
R S t J o h n M a c D o n a l d a n d D J o h n s t o n , ’’I n t e r n a t i o n a l l e
g a l t h e o r i e s : new f r o n t i e r s o f t h e d i s c i p l i n e " i n The
S t r u c t u r e a n d P r o c e s s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law: E s s a y s i n
L e g a l P h ilo s o p h y D o c t r i n e and Theory (1983; R S t Jo h n
MacDonald and D J o h n s t o n , e d s ) [ v o l u m e h e r e a f t e r c i t e d
' S t r u c t u r e and P r o c e s s ' ] 1, 7
Of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w y e r s m a k i n g t h e p o i n t s e e , e g ,
R A n a n d , ’’ ’ T y r a n n y ’ o f t h e f r e e d o m - o f - t h e - s e a s d o c
t r i n e " ( 1 9 7 3 ) 12 I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s 4 1 6 ; W F r i e d m a n n ,
" G e n e r a l c o u r s e i n p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w " (1 9 6 9 ) 127
RDC 3 9 , 7 4 ; G F i t z m a u r i c e , " T h e F u t u r e o f p u b l i c i n t e r
n a t i o n a l law and o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g a l s y s te m i n
t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t o d a y : s p e c i a l r e p o r t " i n L i v r e du
C e n t e n a i r e 1 3 7 3 - 1 9 7 3 : E v o l u t i o n e t P e r s p e c t i v e s du
D r o i t I n t e r n a t i o n a l (1973) 196, 260; and C P l a t o n ,
" C o n t i g u o u s z o n e s f o r f i s h i n g p u r p o s e s " (1 9 6 2 ) 37 PLJ
774, 780.
S e e I n t r o d u c t i o n , nn 9 -1 4 and a c c o m p a n y in g t e x t in fra
fo r a d iscu ssio n of th is p o in t.
v
had been attempted of the operations of existing interna
tional fishery organizations from which lessons might be ex
trapolated and principles applied in formulating a fishery
regime for the Pacific.
Given the above difficulties, it is useful to refer to
comments made by Professor Thomas Franck relating to stu
dents engaged in a UNITAR international law clinic that, mu-
tatis mutandis, are relevant to the present situation:
students were not enthusiastic about venturing into the archives; they had coie to
save the world by designing the lodel...prograi. Thus, there arose the large probles
of proving to thei that real »erit resided in taking the petit pas in bridging the gap
between world probless and their solutions. ...Students...really want to work priiar-
ily with ultiiate futures and take great imaginative leaps. ...[IInternational law is
not so futile a subject as to lake it necessary to flee fro* the present in pursuit of
the ultiiate future. ...
In sui, this is a plea for lodesty.3
viii
C O N TENTS
VOLUME I
DECLARATION ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii
PREFACE iv
ABSTRACT viii
ABBREVIATIONS xv
INTRODUCTION
I. Statement of Purpose 1
II. Methodology and Limitations of the Present
Study 7
III. The Study in Outline
A. The Early Period 12
B. The Middle Period 15
C. The Modern Period 16
PART ONE:
THE EARLY PERIOD: FILLING IN THE VACUUM
I. Introduction 68
II. Thomas Jefferson and the Writings of
Publicists 73
III. Fisheries Conventions and State Legislation 75
A. The 1818 Ango-American Convention 77
B. The Anglo-French Fisheries Convention of
1839 78
C. The 1882 North Sea Fisheries Convention 83
D. State Legislation 86
IV. The Behring Sea Fur Seals Arbitration
A. Background to the Dispute 93
ix
B. The United States Position 96
C. The United Kingdom Position 101
D. The Arbitration Award 104
V. The North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration
A. Background to the Dispute 109
B. The Arbitral Proceedings and Award 110
VI. Conclusion 115
I. Introduction 118
II. Private Codification Efforts 120
III. The 1930 Hague Conference
A. The Committee of Experts for the Prog r e s s
ive C odification of International Law 130
B. The 1930 Conference Deliberations 138
IV. Institut de Droit International Re c o n s i d e r a
tion of Fishery Issues 143
V. Conclusion 149
PART TWO:
THE M I DDLE PERIOD: RE C O G N I T I O N OF COASTAL STATE
’SPECIAL INTEREST * IN FISHERIES
I. Introduction 186
II. The Submissions of the United Kingdom and
Norway 188
III. The Judgment of the Court 196
IV. Significance of the Judgment with Respect to
Fisheries 204
V. Conclusion 217
I. Introduction 219
II . Latin American States and Adjacent Fisheries
A. Unilateral and Sub-Regional Claims 222
B. Regional Consideration of Fishery
Jurisdiction 232
III. Latin American Claims and International Law
A. The Latin Americans Argue Their Case 238
1. The Policy Arguments 241
2. The Juridical Arguments 245
B. Counter-Arguments are Put 261
IV. Conclusion 268
I. Introduction 274
II. The International Law Commission
A. The Early Deliberations 275
B. The 1955 International Technical Conference
on the Living Resources of the Sea 286
C. Final Consideration of FisheryIssues 291
D. The ILC's Contribution to the Development
of the International Law of Marine Fisheries
305
III. The 1958 United Nations Law of the Sea
Conference 308
A. The First Committee 312
3. The Second Committee 319
C . The Third Committee 320
D. The Fourth Committee 333
E. Final Discussions in Plenary 335
IV. The Second United Nations Law of the Sea
Conference
A. The Committee of the Whole 339
B. Final Plenary Deliberations 345
V. Conclusions 349
VOLUME II
PART THREE:
THE M O DE R N PERIOD: THE RISE OF 200-MILE ZONES OF
SPECIAL JURISDICTION
I. Introduction 356
II. The Twelve-Mile Claims
A. Europe 362
B. North America 368
C. Asia and the Pacific 374
III. The Two-Hundred Miles Claims
A. Latin America and the Caribbean
1. National Legislation 381
2. Fishing Disputes and Negotiations 385
3. Regional Initiatives
a) The Montevideo Conference1970 389
b) The Lima Conference 1970 391
xi
c) The Santo Domingo Conference 1972 393
B. Africa 399
1. National Legislation 401
2. The Search for a Common Position 405
IV. Conclusion 411
I. Introduction 415
II. Background to the Dispute 416
III. The Legal Proceedings
A. The British and German Arguments 419
B. The Decision of the Court 427
1. The Exclusive Fishing Zone 428
2. Preferential Fishing Rights 433
IV. Observations 437
A. The Exclusive Fishing Zone 439
B. Preferential Fishing Rights 445
V. Conclusion 454
I. Introduction 456
II. Sea-Bed Committee Deliberations
A. The Early Years 457
B. Substantive Fishery Discussions Begin
(1971) 461
C. Fisheries and the Exclusive Economic
Zone (1972) 471
D. Fishery Proposals Proliferate (1973)
1. Coastal State Proposals for 200-mile
zones 482
2. Other Extended Economic Zone Proposals 487
3. Specific Fishery Proposals 490
4. The Special Case of Anadromous Species 492
5. The General Debates 493
III. Observations
A. The Main Problem Areas of the Law 496
1. Allocation 497
2. Conservation 498
3. Full Utilization of Resources
4. Economic Efficiency
5. Marine Scientific Research 500
6. Dispute Settlement
B. The Committee and the Development of the
Law of Marine Fisheries 501
IV. Conclusion 511
I. Introduction 512
II. Conference Proceedings
A. The First Session (1973) 513
B. The Second Session (1974) 514
1. General Statements in Plenary 516
xii
2. Committee Deliberations
a) the Second Committee 519
b) the Third Committee 531
3. Dispute Settlement 534
4. Observations 535
C. The Third Session (1975) 536
1. The Second Committee
a) Introduction 537
b) Fishery Proposals 538
c) The Informal Single Negotiating
Text (ISNT) 542
2. The Third Committee 548
3. Dispute Settlement 549
4. Observations 551
D. The Fourth and Fifth Sessions (1976)
1. Introduction 553
2. The Second Committee 555
3. The Third Committee 559
4. Dispute Settlement 562
5. Observations 563
E. The Sixth Session (1977) 564
1. The Second Committee 565
2. The Third Committee 570
3. Dispute Settlement 572
4. Observations
F. The Seventh Session (1978) 574
1. The Negotiating Groups
a) NG 4 577
b) NG 5 581
2. The Committees
a) C.II 584
b) C.III 585
3. Observations 586
G. The Eighth Session (1979)
1. The Negotiating Groups 587
2. The Committees 588
3. Observations 590
H. The Ninth Session (1980)
1. The Second Committee 591
2. The Third Committee 594
3. Observations
I. The Tenth Session (1981) 595
J. The Eleventh Session (1982) 597
K. The Conference Conclusion 600
III. Observations
A. General Remarks on the Convention 603
B. The Convention Regime and Contemporary
Fishery Problems
1. Conservation and management 607
2. Exploitation 616
3. The Peaceful Use of MarineFisheries 632
IV. Conclusion 638
xiii
I. Introduction 640
II. State Practice (1973-1982)
A. Fishing Activities 641
B. National Legislation 647
G. Bilateral Agreements 658
D. International FisheryOrganizations 661
III. The International Law ofMarineFisheries:
1982 666
IV. Conclusion 688
ANNEXES
xiv
ABBREVIATIONS
xvi
SPFFA South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency
SYIL Soviet Yearbook of International Law
TAC total allowable catch
TAFS Transactions of the American Fisheries
Society
Themis Revue juridique themis de l'Universite de
Montreal
TILJ Texas International Law Journal
Trans Transactions
trans translator
TULR Tasmanian University Law Review
U university
UCLALR University of California at Los Angeles Law
Review
UDLJ University of Detroit Law Journal
UN United Nations
UNCLOS United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNGAOR United Nations General Assembly Official
Records
UNLS United Nations Legislative Series
UNTS United Nations Treaty Series
VJIL Virginia Journal of International Law
VLR Virginia Law Review
VUWLR Victoria University of Wellington Law Review
WLR Washington Law Review
YFS Yearbook of Fishery Statistics [FAO]
YILC Yearbook of the International Law Commission
YUN Yearbook of the United Nations
YWA Yearbook of World Affairs
ZaöRV Zeitschrift fur Ausländisches Öffentliches
Recht und Völkerrecht
xvii
TAB LE S
after page
(Geneva Session)
v d go
MAP
xviii
INTRODUCTION
"If at one tiie i t seeied likely that the historical spirit (the spirit which strove
to understand...law of all ages and cliies) was fatalistic and iniaical to refon,
that t iie already lies in the past__ Nowadays we aay see the office of historical re
search as that of explaining, and therefore lightening, the pressure that the past
lust exercise upon the present and the present upon the future. Today we study the
day before yesterday, in order that yesterday aay not paralyze to-day, and to-day aay
not paralyze to-aorrow."
Frederic Maitland12
I . S ta te m e n t of P u rp o se
3 Ibid 1 3 - 1 5
Ibid 2 2 , and A /C o n f . 6 2 /P V .1 8 5 , at 16
2
ternational community is the regime established to govern
fishery resources. With demand for fish estimated to equal
or perhaps even exceed supply by the end of the century,0, it
is imperative that the international law relating to living
marine resources contributes effectively to the management
and optimal utilization of those resources for mankind as a
whole.'7 But does the regime, in fact, accommodate the in
terests of all States with respect to the management and ex
ploitation of fisheries, and will it stand the test of time
as Ambassador Koh claims to be the case for the Convention
in general?
Before that question can be considered, one must first
answer a more fundamental question: what is the contemporary
international law governing living marine resources? While
initially it might be thought necessary simply to consult
the text of the 1982 Convention for a clear and complete
statement of the law on the subject, that is not the case.
As Professor Robert Jennings states, the Convention "is not
a document for the layman[;]...one needs even inside
knowledge as well as expertise to disentangle the very dif
ferent categories of content".® Throughout the Convention,
so far fro« supplanting custoiary law, and reducing its field of operation to a nini-
■ui, the codifying of great tracts of international law will, on account of the prac
tical and political difficulties of amending «unilateral treaties, whether codifying
or otherwise, give over the developient of international law alaost entirely into the
hands of custoi, operating upon and beyond the codifying tre a tie s.1**
In su m , th e n , an u n d e rs ta n d in g of th e c o n te m p o ra ry in
te rn a tio n a l la w g o v e rn in g m a rin e fis h e rie s dem ands an a p p re
c ia tio n of th e la w beyond UNCLOS I I I and th e b a s ic tre a ty ,
A c c o rd in g t o P r o f e s s o r O s c a r S c h ä c h te r ("T h e n a tu r e an d
p r o c e s s o f l e g a l d e v e lo p m e n t i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l la w " i n
S tr u c tu re and P ro c e ss, supra P re fa c e , n 2, 745, 758-
759) ,
H T h ir lw a y , I n t e r n a t i o n a l C u s to m a r y Law a n d C o d i f i c a
t i o n (1 9 7 2 ) 146 ( e m p h a s is a d d e d ) ; c f , eg , F i tz m a u r i c e ,
su p ra P re fa c e n 3 , 146; and S c h ä c h te r, su p ra n 13, 784
5
both in time and space. The primary purpose of the present
study, therefore, is to contribute to that understanding by
tracing the development of the major legal principles gov
erning living marine resources over the centuries and their
manifestation in and impact upon the regime enshrined in the
1982 Convention.
To date, such a detailed study has not appeared. Nu
merous texts on the law of the sea published over the years
have either treated the norms relating to marine fisheries
in very broad terms,19 or, as in the case of Professor Percy
Fenn's, The Origin of the Right of Fishery in Territorial
W a t e r s , significantly predate the momentous events of the
past two decades and must be considered in that light. Many
essays have been published in recent years relating to ma
rine fisheries but, valuable though many of them are, all
have either dealt with very specific aspects of the law
rather than the law as a whole, or have paid only passing
attention to earlier developments. Probably the most mon
umental legal work on marine fisheries, Johnston's The In
ternational Law of Marine Fisheries: a Framework for Policy-
Oriented Inquiries, presents a "value-based analysis" of
contemporary fishery problems^ rather than focussing on the
II - Me t h o d o l o g y a n d L i m i t a t i o n s of th e P r e s e n t Study
C f , New A p p r o a c h e s , s u p r a n 2 0 , 4 7 7 ; G S c h w a r z e n b e r g e r ,
T h e F r o n t i e r s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law ( 1 9 6 2 ) 4 3 ; J K u n z ,
"On t h e t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s o f t h e l a w o f n a t i o n s " ( 1 9 2 5 )
10 T r a n s o f t h e G r o t i u s S o c 1 1 5 ; a n d M a r i o n M u s h k a t
("T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and i t s s c i e n c e "
( 1 9 8 1 ) 20 I n t e r n a t i o n a l P r o b l e m s 2 1 , 2 2 ) who o b s e r v e s
th at
W r i g h t , s u p r a n 2 0 , 2 8 6 ; c f , C J e n k s , T h e Common Law o f
M ankind (1958) 121; W M R eism an, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l law and
o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r a new w o r l d o r d e r : t h e U p p s a l a m o d e l ”
i n The S p i r i t o f U p p sa la (1 9 8 4 ; A G r a h l- M a d s e n and J
To m an, e d s ) 2 7 , 2 8 ; a n d S c h ä c h t e r , s u p r a n 1 3 , 7 5 4
Like all legal systeis, international law is not a fixed collection of iaiutable
rules, i t is the dynaiic expression of a legal order, the external fonulation of con
stantly changing relations along the active participants in international law. ...
What is important, therefore, is whether and how far the rules and procedures of clas
sical international law do correspond to present-day conditions and needs__ =*■
M u s h k a t , s u p r a n 2 2 ; a n d New A p p r o a c h e s , s u p r a n 2 0 ,
478. S ee g e n e r a l l y , W S c h i f f e r , The L e g a l C om m unity o f
M ankind (1 9 5 4 ), and C d e V is s c h e r , T h e o ry and R e a l i t y
i n P u b l i c I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law ( 1 9 6 8 ; r e v e d ; P C o r b e t t ,
t r a n s ) e s p pp 1 3 7 -1 4 3 .
’’I n s t i t u t i o n a l ” i n t h e s e n s e e m p l o y e d i n t h e t e x t i s
used to d e s c r ib e "an e s t a b l i s h e d . . . u sag e or p r a c t ic e
. . . i n th e p o l i t i c a l or s o c ia l l i f e of a p e o p le ” r a th e r
th a n "an e s ta b lis h m e n t, o r g a n iz a tio n , o r a s s o c ia tio n ,
i n s t i t u t e d f o r t h e p r o m o t i o n o f som e o b j e c t ” { O x f o r d
E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y [ OED]( 1 9 3 3 ) s v " I n s t i t u t i o n " ) .
C f , New A p p r o a c h e s , s u p r a n 2 0 , 4 7 7 ; S c h ä c h t e r , s u p r a
n 1 3 , 7 4 6 ; a n d W r i g h t { s u p r a n 2 0 , 2 6 9 ) who a r g u e s t h a t
We must pursue both the concrete and abstract methods for developing in
ternational law if we are to get results. We aust conceive international
law, on the one hand, as a generalization of the processes which are be
ing used to adjust controversy and conflict aaong nations, and, on the
other hand, as a precise expression of the values which all States share
and consider so important that they wish thea objectively aaintained.
9
v en tio n , o th er relev an t agreem ents and cu sto m ary in te rn a
tio n a l law ; th at is, lo o k in g at th e corpus of leg al norm s
and procedures in term s of both ends agreed upon and the
rig h ts and d u tie s of in te rn atio n a l acto rs w ith respect to
m arine fish e rie s.
G iven th e dynam ic n atu re of th e in tern atio n al leg al
system and its rela tio n to in te rn atio n a l so ciety as a w hole,
th at ex am in atio n can be made m o st illu m in atin g by e m p lo y in g
th e h isto ric a l m ethod in d icated above and m oving beyond the
s tric tly leg al co n tex t w here necessary for ex p lan ato ry pur
poses. P rofessor D aniel O 'C o n n e ll ex em p lifies th at w id ely -
shared view in h is statem en t th at deserves to be c ite d in
e x te n so :
except perhaps in the construction of hard and fast rules of treaty law, the enuncia
tion of a rule of custoaary law, especially of the unstable variety, cannot be exclu
sively a la tte r of counting the nuiber of acting and approving States, or restating a
nuiber of facts about actions and counter-actions, for the process is not of estab
lishing the record but of discerning the eaergence and operation of a principle of
conduct. Nor is that discerment independent of the ju ristic antecedents. For this
reason, the historical aethod of investigating the law of the sea is the only valid
one. It is iipossible to evaluate a situation of action and inaction isolated in ti*e
and space: the situation is a product, not only of historical forces but also of the
history of the law. ...
Since a relatively long period of instability and controversy in the law of
the sea i s. ..t o be anticipated [now that negotiations at UNCLOS III have been con
cluded], i t is iiportant that the evaluation of points of conflict have the benefit of
clear perceptions as to the derivations of particular doctrines and rules, their his
torically conditioned scope and content, their subjection to the tests of experience
and their resultant intellectual authenticity. It is the process that is significant,
not isolated events. ...The historical aethod not only assists in the grasp of the way
law and diplomacy, doctrines and policy, continuously interact, but i t alone enables
one to understand the technical problei of deteraining the point at which proposals
becoae law, claiis change the rules, lex ferenda becoaes lex la ta .= s
T h e locus classicus o n t h e s u b j e c t i s p r o b a b l y t h e
s t a t e m e n t o f P r o f e s s o r V e r z i j l (supra n 3 3 , 4 3 5 - 4 3 6 )
th at
there is one truth that is not open to denial or even to doubt, naaely
that the actual body of international law as it stands today, not only is
the product of the conscious activity of the European aind, but has also
drawn its vital essence froi a coaaon source of beliefs, and in both of
these aspects it is aainly of Western European origin.
F o r s i m i l a r s t a t e m e n t s s e e , eg, G A b i - S a a b , " T h e n e w l y -
i n d e p e n d e n t S t a t e s a n d t h e r u l e s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law:
a n o u t l i n e " ( 1 9 6 2 ) 8 Howard L J 9 5 , 9 6 ; A n a n d , supra n
3 5 ; F i t z m a u r i c e , supra P r e f a c e n 3 , 2 0 9 ; H a m i d u l l a h ,
supra n 3 2 , 6 2 ; W P r e i s e r , " H i s t o r y o f t h e l a w o f n a
t i o n s : b a s i c q u e s t i o n s a n d p r i n c i p l e s " i n EPIL v i i ,
1 2 6 , 1 2 8 ; a n d S y a t a u w , supra n 3 2 , 3 4 .
15
seas. Although fisheries played only a small part in the
initial controversy, opposing positions were taken which
were to subsequently find expression in arguments raised to
the present day.
Chapter Two focusses on eighteenth and nineteenth cen
tury State practice and the growing trend towards equating
the limits of fisheries jurisdiction with those of the
three-mile territorial sea. Two of the most important early
arbitral decisions involving fisheries will also be
analyzed.
By the end of the nineteenth century, growing pressures
on certain fisheries in the North Atlantic gave rise to at
tempts in the Institut de Droit International and Interna
tional Law Association to codify and develop legal princi
ples to cope with the problems. The Hague Conference of
1930 also dealt., in part, with fishery issues. Although all
proved unable to formulate a widely acceptable convention
dealing with fisheries, many of the concepts and proposals
advanced in these early codification efforts sowed seeds
that bore fruit years later. Chapter Three discusses these
early conferences and their position in the broader develop
ment of the law.
[T]he international lawyer aust approach the law of the sea not only with a special
affection born of history but with a special concern for the future of international
law itself.
John R Stevenson1
is Occupation, whereby things not already subjects of property becoae property of the
first occupant, as the wild inhabitants of...water as soon as they are captured.
For...fishes, as soon as they are captured, becoie, by natural law, the property of
the captor, but only continue such so long as they continue in his power__ 12
A r i s t o t l e , R h e t o r i c ( O x f o r d , 1 9 4 6 ; v o l x i o f The W orks
o f A r i s t o t l e ; W Rhys, t r a n s ) 1373. A cco rd in g to V er
d r o s s and Koeck ( s u p r a n 6, 1 7 - 1 8 ) ,
Ib id 13
Fenn, supra n 4, 3
E P o s t e , G a ii I n s t i t u t i o n u m I u r i s C i v i l i s C om m en tarii
Q uatuor (1890; 3 rd e d ) 184. F en n ( s u p r a n 4, 12) e x
p l a i n s t h a t t h e t e r m ' r e s ' i s u s e d i n Roman l a w t o d e s
i g n a t e t h a t w hich i s c a p a b l e o f becom ing t h e o b j e c t o f
r i g h t s a n d i n c l u d e s a l l t h i n g s w h i c h man f e e l s t o b e
re q u ire d e ith e r fo r h is p le a su re or needs. They i n -
21
19
According to the Institutes ,
22
All peoples who are governed by laws and customs use law which is in part
particular to themselves, in part coaion to all ien: the law which each
people has established for itself is particular to that state and is
styled civil law as being peculiarly of that state: but what natural rea
son has established aiong all ien is observed equally by all nations and
is designated ius gentiuM or the law of nations, being that which all na
tions obey. Hence the Roman people observe partly their own law, partly
that which is common to all peoples.
Long before natural law became part of philosophical and juristic teach
ing, the practical lawyers, who in Rome and in many parts of the empire
had to administer the law to hundreds of non-Roman peoples and tribes
living under different customs, had turned the idea of natural law to
practical account. The ancient idea of citizenship [being restricted ex
clusively to Romans] made it impossible to apply Roman civil law to for
eigners. Nor could Roman magistrates apply foreign laws as such. But
they could take, from the material supplied by foreign laws and customs,
those which appeared capable of general application, such as maritime and
other commercial usages, greatly developed among the sea-faring people on
the Mediterranean, and they could mold them into general legal princi
ples. These general principles of justice and reason Roman magistrates
developed empirically from case to case, not by deduction from any gen
eral idea. What they created was not directly a body of natural law
principles, but the ius gentium as the embodiment of the law and us
ages observed among different peoples, and representing general good
sense. Gradually not only the sphere of application, but the meaning of
ius gentium widened. It was described as jus quod apud
omnes populos peraeque custoditur [see text accompanying
this n](In. I, 1), and finally as jus quod naturalis ratio
constituit [law what natural reason establishes](Dig. XII, I, 1).
S e e a l s o n 17 i n f r a . F o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f Roman i n
te rn a tio n a l le g a l re la tio n s g en erally , see P h illip so n ,
su p ra I n t r o d u c t i o n n 3 2 ; S V e r o s t a , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l law
i n E u r o p e a n d W e s t e r n A s i a b e tw e e n 100 a n d 650 A . D . "
(1964) 1 1 3 RDC 4 9 1 ; a n d V i n o g r a d o f f , s u p r a I n t r o d u c
t i o n n 37, ch 3.
I n s t i t u t e s , su p ra n 16, 65 ( I n . , I I , I , 1 ) . T h is ,
o b s e r v e s G o rm ley ( su p ra n 3, 5 7 9 ) , r e p r e s e n t e d no
c h a n g e o v e r t h e p r i o r 'com m on l a w ’ ( s e e , eg , t e x t
a c c o m p a n y i n g n 10 s u p r a ) .
I n t h a t r e g a r d , h e e x p l a i n s ( i b i d ) , " t h e s e a was u n d e r
a d e f i n i t e ' g u a r d i a n s h i p ' o f t h e Roman p e o p l e , " a l
t h o u g h Rom e d i d n o t i t s e l f e x e r t e x c l u s i v e s o v e r e i g n t y
over m aritim e w a te r s :
No one light be forbidden to fish in the sea froi the shore. The right to fish in the
sea...included that of drying nets on the shore, and of building shelters. When a
fisheraan erected a hut, he acquired a right of ownership in i t which lasted as long
as the building retained standing.i e
things becoie the property of individuals in uany ways: for of soie things ownership
arises by natural law which...is called the law of nations,...which the nature of
things introduced with humankind its e lf ...
Hence,...fish...as soon as they are caught by anyone, forthwith fall into his
ownership by the law of nations: for what previously belonged to no one [res nullius]
is, by natural reason, accorded to i ts captor. ...[A]ny of these things that you take
is considered to be yours so long as i t is regulated by your control; but once i t es
capes frot your custody and assuaes its natural state, i t ceases to be yours and again
becoies open to the next taker. 1 ^
Fenn, supra n 4, 23
F en n , supra n 4 , 2 7 ; c f , G o rm le y , supra n 3, 5 7 2 -5 7 5 .
S e e a l s o nn 15 a n d 17 s u p r a .
25
resources and would be drawn upon by jurists and statesmen
to the present day.
Soon after Justinian’s death, the territories he had
recaptured in the West were once more lost to Germanic in
vaders, this time irretrievably, and the separation of the
Greek Eastern and Latin Western Empires became permanent.
In the East, Justinian’s legislation received further atten
tion by jurists but no new developments were made relating
to fisheries.23 Following the fall of Rome, Western Europe
entered the Early Middle Ages in which little significant
advance was made in either legal theory in general, or fish
eries law in particular.23 The European political situation
As t h e I s l a m i c c o n t r i b u t i o n t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w
a p p e a r s t o be i n a r e a s o t h e r t h a n t h o s e r e l a t i n g t o
f i s h e r i e s , i t i s t h e r e f o r e beyond th e sco p e of th e p r e
s e n t s t u d y (on t h e s u b j e c t g e n e r a l l y , h o w e v er, s e e r e f
e re n c e s c i t e d above p lu s M Taube, "E tu d es s u r l e d e v e l-
o p p e m en t h i s t o r i q u e du d r o i t i n t e r n a t i o n a l d a n s 1 ’Eu
r o p e O r i e n t a l e " ( 1 9 2 6 ) 11 RDC 3 4 1 , 3 8 0 - 3 9 7 ) .
C f , F e n n , s u p r a n 4 , 4 9 ; E J e n k s , Law a n d P o l i t i c s i n
t h e M id d l e A ges (1 9 1 3 ; 2nd ed ) 7; M cGarry. s u p r a n 25,
110; P r e i s e r , su p r a I n t r o d u c t i o n n 32, 140; C von S a v i -
g n y , The H i s t o r y o f t h e Roman Law D u r i n g t h e M i d d l e
A g e s ( 1 8 2 9 ) ; W U l l m a n , Law a n d P o l i t i c s i n t h e M i d d l e
A ges (1975) ch s 2 and 6; and V in o g r a d o f f , su p ra n 23,
24. S e e g e n e r a l l y , H H a z e l t i n e , "Roman a n d C a n o n Law
i n t h e M iddle Ages" i n C am bridge M ed ie v a l H i s t o r y
(1926) v, 697.
F e n n , s u p r a n 4 , 4 9 - 5 0 ; a n d P K i n g , Law a n d S o c i e t y i n
t h e V i s i g o t h Kingdom (1 9 7 2 ) 2 1 6 . R e f e r r i n g t o law g e n
e r a l l y , V i n o g r a d o f f { s u p r a n 23, 37) e x p l a i n s t h a t
legal learning...did not entirely disappear with the downfall of the Em
pire. It survived to soie extent together with other reanants of ancient
culture, nore especially through the agency of the learned classes of
those days....The survivals in question, however, are not only slight and
incoherent, but, as a rule, hopelessly aixed up with the atteapt of the
early Middle Ages to effect a kind of salvage of the general learning of
antiquity. There are no definite traces or organised schools of law.
What legal learning there is reaains connected with exercises in graaiar,
rhetoric, and dialectics.
S e e H a z e l t i n e , s u p r a n 2 5 , 7 3 5 f f ; J S c o t t , Law, t h e
S t a t e , a n d t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o m m u n ity ( 1 9 3 9 ) i , c h 17;
U llm an, su p ra n 25, 8 3 f f ; V i n o g r a d o f f , su p ra n 23, 57-
70; and W o lff, s u p r a n 13, 1 8 6 -1 3 8 .
On the high seas the Prince or the Crown had no rights of fishery, save
those which every lan had.
T F u l t o n , The S o v e r e i g n t y o f t h e S ea (1911) 3, 4; J o h n
s t o n , s u p r a I n t r o d u c t i o n n 19, 161; W Newton, " I n e x
h a u s t i b i l i t y a s a l a w o f t h e s e a d e t e r m i n a n t ” ( 1 9 8 1 ) 16
T IL J 369, 3 8 2 -3 8 4 ; A R e p p y , "The G r o t i a n d o c t r i n e o f
t h e f r e e d o m o f t h e s e a r e a p p r a i s e d " (1 9 5 0 ) 9 Fordham L R
2 4 3 , 2 5 0 - 2 5 1 ; a n d J V e r z i j l , I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law i n H i s
t o r i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e (1 9 7 1 ) i v , 13.
F e n n , s u p r a n 4, 53; J o h n s t o n , s u p r a I n t r o d u c t i o n n 19,
161; Newton, s u p r a n 32, 3 8 4 -3 8 5 . Fenn ( su p ra n 4, 59-
60) o b s e r v e s t h a t
P r e s c r i p t i o n ( p r a e s c r i p t i o l o n g i te m p o r is ) was a m eans
o f a c q u i s i t i o n w e l l k n o w n i n c l a s s i c a l Roman l a w ( s e e ,
eg, Thom as, su p ra n 14, 1 5 7 - 1 6 5 ) .
In Spain and Portugal [Bartolus'] opinions were for a long tiie given
binding force by law. Not only is he reputed to have held firs t place in
the [law] schools, during his lifetime, even, but i t is said that in the
courts his authority was so great that the judges did not dare to contra
dict hii. Apparently, to quote Bartolus was to silence the opposing
view.
was not aerely a custoi; nor was i t aerely a custoi invested by law with
certain attributes connected with the creation of rights and duties; it
was a potential source of law, to be used to correct the Roaan law itse lf
when that law was incapable of a beneficial and just application to a
given set of facts. It was this which he taught, and which his followers
taught after hii. The process of reasoning underlying such a position is
siaple. If the Roaan law is not applicable to the needs of the tiae, and
as the needs of the tiae are based upon facts, then i t is necessary to
adapt the law to the new conditions so that i t can be applied to the
facts in a aanner to satisfy the needs. The new conditions becoie the
31
Baldus , his most famous pupil, agrees.39 He also makes
the distinction, sometimes blurred by Roman and early medi
eval jurists, between things which were res ccmmunis and
those res nullius in bonis.**° The latter may be appropri
ated, the former may not. The sea was res communis, al
though, in effect, the mare adiacens was seen as a district
of the coastal State in which the non-proprietary elements
of the civil law of the coastal State were applicable.**1
Subsequent jurists, including Fortesque (c .1385-c.1479)
and Gregorius (d. 1595), built upon the writings of Barto-
lus, Baldus and others in holding that the State had not
only those broad jurisdictional rights referred to above,
but also the specific right to defend and protect fishermen
in the mare adiacens.**z
The jurisprudential process of unifying adjacent marine
waters to the adjoining land was completed by Alberico Gen-
tili, an Italian jurist, who, like Bartolus and others,
sought to derive his law from the analysis of contemporary
international relations. In light of the latter, he con
cluded in 1598 that "the sea is a portion of the land. ...
The adjacent part of the sea belongs to one’s dominion, and
the term ’territory’(territorium) is used both of land and
Ibid 119-121
32
w a t e r Th u s , from t h a t y e a r it was p r o p e r t o speak of
’t e r r i t o r i a l w aters'
P arallel to th e above developm ents re latin g to th e mare
adiacens , o t h e r m e d i e v a l j u r i s c o n s u l t s focussed n o t on t h e
leg al statu s of th e sea but ra th e r on t h a t of p u b lic fish
eries. Those a d h e rin g to th e classical Roman l a w p o s i t i o n
m ain tain ed th e ab so lu tist p o sitio n th a t th e rig h t of fish in g
in th e s e a was u n r e s t r i c t e d . That p o s itio n proved im possi
b le to reco n cile w ith actu al S tate p ractice, how ever, and
o th er ju rists, w h ile acknow ledging th e g e n e r a l v a l i d i t y of
th e Roman l a w , p o sited a s ig n if ic a n t excep tio n th ereto . The
la tte r g r o u p c o m p r i s e d two s u b - g r o u p s , d ifferin g i n t h e em
p h asis each placed on g r o u n d s ju stify in g th e ex cep tio n to
u n reg u lated fish e rie s. O ne a r g u e d th at th e ex clu siv e
rig h ts, p riv ileg es and p r e r o g a t i v e s (th e reg alia) accorded
so v ereig n s under feudal law , a llo w e d them t o grant ius pis-
candi i n t h e mare adiacens . 4 8 The s e c o n d s u b - g r o u p , w hile
a p p reciatin g th e s ig n ific a n c e of th e r e g a lia , stressed th at
in a c c o rd a n c e w ith th e g e n eral law s g o v e rn in g p r e s c r i p t i o n s ,
S tates such as V e n ic e and Genoa c o u ld a c q u i r e fish in g rig h ts
in th e mare adiacens i f th e p erio d i n w hich su ch r i g h t s had
been e x e r c is e d had been o f su fficien t len g th th at no o n e
could rem em ber t h e v a l i d i t y of those rig h ts e v e r h av in g been
T h e w o r k w as f i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1 5 9 8 . The e d i t i o n from
w hich t h e q u o t a t i o n g iv e n in t h e t e x t i s ta k e n i s A
G e n t i l i , De lure Belli Libri Tres ( 1 6 1 2 ) Bk 3 , c h 17
(1933; J C R o lfe , t r a n s ) 384. F e n n ( supra n 4 , 1 2 3 )
g i v e s G e n t i l i ' s d a t e s a s 1 5 5 0 - 1 6 0 8 ; a n d J o h n s t o n ( supra
I n t r o d u c t i o n n 19, 1 6 2 ) , 1 5 5 2 -1 6 0 8 .
F e n n (supra n 4 , 1 3 7 ) p o i n t s o u t t h a t ’r e g a l i a ’ i s a
word o f f e u d a l law and s u g g e s t s t h a t
The reason why the jurists were able to take the Prince's prerogative so
auch as a latter of course in the face of the precepts of the law books
of Justinian is perhaps to be found partly in the fact that the Roaan law
was forced to accept the feudal law [see text accoapanying n 25
supra], and partly in the fact that the royal exercise of the
prerogative in question had continued over so long a period of tiae that
they had becoie habituated to its existence.
33
challenged. Nevertheless, Balbus, the leading authority of
the age on prescriptions, did not take the final step and
conclude that States had dominium over adjacent marine fish
eries .^
As both the legal and political relationship between
the State and its mare adiacens became generally accepted
and the exclusive jurisdiction of the sovereign over those
waters recognized, however, the idea grew that the sovereign
exercising that jurisdiction had a certain property right in
the littoral sea itself. This view was facilitated by the
early belief that sovereignty was inseparable from ownership
of the soil, and that only in the sovereign (monarch or re
public) lay the right to exercise jurisdiction. By analogy,
reasoned jurists, since the sovereign had come to exercise
exclusive rights over the mare adiacens, he must have a
right of ownership as well. It followed further, that fish
eries in the littoral waters were also property and the
rights of fishery were property rights. The maturing con
cepts of the mare adiacens and the rights of maritime fish
ing recognized by ancient custom and the regalia thus merged
over time into a cornerstone of the law of the sea: territo
rial waters (the dominium maris)
by the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries jurists had begun to take into
account the evolution of a coimunity of independent sovereign States and
to think and write about different probleas of the law of nations, real
ising the necessity for soie body of rules to regulate certain aspects of
the relations between such States. Where there were no established cus-
toiary rules, these jurists were obliged to devise and fashion working
principles by reasoning or analogy. Not only did they draw on the prin
ciples of Roaan Law which had becoie the subject of revived study in Eu
rope as fron the end of the eleventh century onwards [see text acccapa-
nying nn 28ff s u p r a ] , but they had recourse also to the precedents of
ancient history, to theology, to the canon law, and to the seai-theologi
cal concept of the 'law of nature’ — a concept which for centuries ex
ercised a profound influence on the developaent of international law.
As we h a v e s e e n , t h e s a m e o b s e r v a t i o n s m ig h t be made
w ith r e s p e c t to B a r to l u s , th e fo u rte e n th cen tu ry ju
r i s c o n s u l t ( s e e nn 37 and 38 and a c c o m p a n y in g t e x t
supra).
36
Fenn, supra n 4, 151-152; F u lto n , supra n 32, 341
37
problem in affairs before it is a problem in law books".37
This situation altered dramatically, however, in the early
seventeenth century with the festering of maritime disputes
of the Dutch with Portugal and England.
the sane aaong all nations; and it is easy to understand, seeing that i t
is innate in every individual and iaplanted in his lind. Moreover, the
law to which we appeal is one such as no king ought to deny to his sub
jects and one which no Christian ought to refuse to a non-Christian.
A l t h o u g h i m p l a n t e d i n t h e m ind o f m an, a r g u e s G r o t i u s
( i b i d 3 ) , t h e law i s n o t u l t i m a t e l y s u b j e c t i v e , f o r
" e v e r y o n e c a n know w h a t h i s d u t y i s fro m t h e v e r y d e
m ands he m akes o f o t h e r s " .
Natural Law is the Dictate of Right Reason, indicating that any act, fron
its agreeient or disagreeient with the rational [and social] nature [of
■an] has in i t a ioral turpitude or a aoral necessity; and consequently
that such act is forbidden or coaaanded by God, the author of nature.
F o r t h i s r e a s o n , H om m es o b s e r v e s ( " G r o t i u s o n n a t u r a l
an d i n t e r n a t i o n a l la w " ( 1 9 8 3 ) 30 NILR 6 1 , 7 0 ) , " G r o
t i u s ' c o n c e p t o f n a t u r a l law t h u s c o n t i n u e s t h e r a
tio n a lis t lin e of th e tr a d itio n a l concept of n a tu ra l
law s i n c e A r i s t o t l e " . S ee i n t h i s r e g a r d nn 6 and 7 and
accom panying t e x t su p ra .
so constituted by nature that although serving soie one person still suffices for the
couon use of all other persons is today and ought in perpetuity to reaain in the saie
condition as when it was first created by nature [ie, res coounis]. ...All things
which can be used without loss to anyone else cone under this category. . . . [Rjunning
water considered as such and not as a streaa is classed by the jurists aaong the
things cooon to all aanhind. ...Its use is free to all.ÄÄ
I b i d 27
I b i d 27-28
I b i d 34
I b id 47-50. See t e x t a c c o m p a n y i n g n 56 s u p r a .
is not one that concerns an inner sea, one which is surrounded on all sides by the
land and at soae places does not even exceed a river in breadth._CTjhe question at
issue is the outer sea, the ocean, that expanse of water which antiquity describes as
the iaaense, the infinite, bounded only by the heavens. ...[T]he question at issue
does not even concern a gulf or a strait in this ocean, nor even all the expanse of
sea which is visible froa the shore.'7'3
I b id 29. See t e x t a c c o m p a n y i n g n 19 s u p r a .
I b id 37. He a l s o s p e c i f i c a l l y e x c l u d e s " i n l e t s o f t h e
s e a " { i b i d ) from t h e a r e a t o w h ich h i s a rg u m e n t r e f e r s .
The e x a c t i m p o r t o f t h e t e x t a c c o m p a n y i n g t h i s n o t e i s
y et a m atter of v ary in g in te r p r e ta tio n . O 'C o n n e ll ( s u
p ra I n t r o d u c t i o n n 19, 1 6 ) , f o r e x am p le, i s o f t h e view
th a t in th e t e x t c ite d G ro tiu s " e x p re s s ly excluded"
c o a s t a l w a te r s from t h e freedom o f t h e s e a s p r i n c i p l e .
P r o f e s s o r I v a n S h e a r e r ( s u p r a n 5 9 , 5 4 ) , on t h e o t h e r
hand, s u g g e s ts t h a t " th e M agoffin t r a n s l a t i o n o f th e
t e x t makes i t a p p e a r more p l a u s i b l e a s a r h e t o r i c a l
f l o u r i s h t o make t h e P o r t u g u e s e p r e t e n s i o n s e v e n m ore
a b s u r e d [ s i c ] " . The p r e s e n t w r i t e r r e a d s t h e p a s s a g e i n
th e form er s e n s e .
C f, Fenn, su p ra n 4, 154
revenues levied on aaritiae fisheries are held to belong to the Crown, but they do not
bind the sea itse lf or the fisheries, but only the persons engaged in fishing. ...[For
those individuals not subjects of the Crown,] the right of fishing ought everywhere to
be exeapt froi to lls, lest a servitude be iiposed upon the sea, which is not suscepti
ble to a servitude.7"7.
could not grant any p r o p r i e t a s to the king. The result is that the
requireients of his arguaent have forced hin into a contradictory posi
tion on the fishery question where the fishery is located near the shores
of any particular state. When he is discussing the freedon of the high
seas, he is at ease, and he is carrying public opinion with hia. But
when he deals with coastal waters, and with the fisheries therein, he is
not able to nake the facts f it snugly into his theory. He divides the
coastal waters fron the high seas; he acknowledges their existence. But
whatever the basis of his division nay be — and he is not apparently
concerned to have a basis — i t is not grounded on any difference in
kind froa the sea proper.
A s e r v i t u d e i s "a l im it e d r i g h t o f an a b s o lu t e
c h a r a c t e r on som ebody e l s e ' s p r o p e r t y . Its ex isten ce
in i n t e r n a t i o n a l law d e p e n d s on c o n s e n t , r e c o g n i t i o n o r
e s t o p p e l o n o t h e r g r o u n d s ” (G S c h w a r z e n b e r g e r a n d E D
B row n ( A M anual o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law ( 1 9 7 6 ; 6 t h e d )
567) .
7 6
G ro tiu s, supra n 62
C f , De P a u w , s u p r a n 5 9 , 6 5 - 7 2 ; F e n n , s u p r a n 4 , 1 6 5 ,
220; J o h n s to n , supra I n tr o d u c t i o n n 19, 166; W R ip h a -
g e n , " G r o t i u s a n d t h e n e w l a w o f t h e s e a " ( 1 9 8 3 ) 1 8 2 RDC
4 1 7 , 4 2 1 , 4 2 2 ; a n d S h e a r e r , s u p r a n 5 9 , 55
42
law seen as prohibiting a coastal State from occupying mari
time waters. Rather, Grotius now writes, natural law leaves
the matter open to regulation by custom, "provided that the
size of that portion of the sea compared with the territory
be not larger than the creek of the sea compared with the
estate".QO The control exercised by the State would be lim
ited to that area of the sea in which "those who sail in
that part of the sea can be compelled from the shore as if
they were on land".*31
No direct reference is made in the work to fishery ju
risdiction in coastal waters. However, Grotius posits only
F u l t o n supra n 3 2 , 7 5 - 7 6 . T his a s p e c t of e a r ly S ta te
fis h e rie s ju ris d ic tio n is p l a c e d i n i t s c o n t e x t by
G i d e l (supra I n t r o d u c t i o n n 15, i i i / I , 2 9 3 ):
B r i t i s h law yer to s t a t e t h a t a s o v e r e ig n i s th e p r o p r i
e to r of th e f i s h e r i e s in h is w a ters (i b i d 172-173).
The t e r m ' B r i t i s h ' u s e d i n t h e t e x t a c c o m p a n y in g
t h i s n o te fo llo w s th e m eanings and c o n n o ta tio n s a s c r i
b e d t o i t b y t h e OED, i e , " o f o r b e l o n g i n g t o G r e a t
B r i t a i n f r o m t h e tim e o f H enry V I I I [ie , 1509]
f r e q u e n t l y u sed to i n c l u d e E n g l i s h and S c o tc h ; i n g e n
e r a l u s e i n t h i s s e n s e from a c c e s s i o n o f James I li e ,
1 6 0 3 ]...". The t e r m ' E n g l i s h ' , m o re p a r t i c u l a r l y , i s
d e f i n e d b y t h e OED a s m e a n i n g " o f o r b e l o n g i n g t o E n g
land" , ie , " th e so u th e rn p a r t of th e is la n d of G reat
B r i t a i n , u s u a l l y e x c lu d in g W ales".
A c c o r d i n g t o Reppy ( s u p r a n 3 2, 2 6 3 - 2 6 4 ) , Mare L ib e r u m
d i d n o t a t t r a c t much a t t e n t i o n u n t i l t h e P r o c l a m a t i o n
o f J a m e s I was m a d e a f e w w e e k s l a t e r : " [ f ] r o m t h a t mo
ment on, i n t h e e y e s o f E n g l i s h a u t h o r s , and in t h e
e y e s o f t h e w o r ld a t l a r g e , Mare L ib e r u m b e g a n t o a s
sume l a r g e r s i g n i f i c a n c e . . . " . Reppy a l s o o b s e r v e s
( i b i d 263) t h a t t h e arg u m en t o f G r o t i u s
was the sane as that presented four years earlier by the English East
India Coapany in a petition to King Jaaes, who at the tiae was negotiat
ing peace with Spain, in which the right of the English to trade with the
Indies was vindicated on exactly the saae grounds as those.. .relied upon
by [Grotius in his] Mare Liberum.
the whole sea, as well as the sain Ocean or Out-land Seas, as those which are within-
land, such as the Mediterranean, Adriatic*, Aegean or Levant, British and Baltick
Seas, or any other of that kinde, which differ no otherwise froa the aain, then as
Hoaogeneous or Siiilarly parts of the saae bodie do froa the whole.99
Ibid 12
48
a c q u ir e dom inion sh o u ld be th e so le determ in in g facto r, not
the e x te n t of th e ocean a re a c o n c e r n e d . 100
O ther argum ents ag ain st p riv ate o w n e r s h i p b a s e d on t h e
natu re of the sea such as those ra is e d by G r o t i u s , t h a t is ,
th e sea is alw ays i n m o tio n and i s b o u n d l e s s , 101 a r e also
specio u s. As r i v e r s and f o u n t a i n s have long been s u s c e p t i
ble of p riv a te ow nership, observes S eiden, "why s h o u l d it
n o t bee acknow ledged in lik e manner t h a t t h e r e may b e O w n e r s
o f any Sea w h a ts o e v e r? S ince th e flu id n a tu re of w ater can
no m o r e h i n d e r a D om inion i n th e one, then in t h e o t h e r . ” 102
He a g r e e s w ith G ro tiu s th at "w h ere D om inions a r e d i s
tin g u ish ed , n o t h i n g c a n be m ore d e s i r a b l e t h e n know n a n d
certain Bounds i n e v e r y p l a c e . . . ” . 103 How ever, he c o n f e s s e s
a failu re to und erstan d why s h o r e s should n o t be l a w f u l
b o u n d a r ie s upon w hich t o b a se a dom inion in the sea, ju st as
trees, d itch es and o t h e r p h y sical featu res a r e on l a n d . Sim
ila rly , in th e open s e a s u s e may b e m a d e o f i s l a n d s , rocks
and ev en l i n e s d elim itin g la titu d e and l o n g i t u d e for bound
ing a t e r r i t o r y . 10-*
G r o t i u s ’ argum ent c o n c e rn in g th e in ex h au stib ility of
th e s e a s ’ re so u rc e s is lik ew ise d ism issed . A ccording to
S eid en ,
we often see, that the Sea it self, by reason of other aen's Fishing, Navigation, and
Coaaerce, becca’s the wors for hia that own's it. ...It is obvious...to every aan
that...the abundance either of Pearls theaselvs, or of those shell-fishes, which pro
duce the®, aay through a proaiscuous and coaaon use of the Sea, bee diainished in any
Sea whatsoever. Where then is that inexhaustible abundance of Coaaodities in the Sea,
which cannot be iapaired? There is truly the saae reason also, touching every kind of
Fishing.10=5
100 I b i d 172-173
103 I b i d 135
10^ I b i d 135-136
1o s I b i d 141-142
49
And fin a lly , he re je c ts th e a rg u m e n ts of ju ris ts such
as V azquez and G ro tiu s who d e n y th e e ffe c tiv e n e s s of p re
s c rip tio n or c u sto m as le g a l c la im s to th e sea. Such v ie w s,
S e id e n w rite s, do not co n fo rm to re a lity and w hat S ta te s
c o n s id e r to be e x is tin g in te rn a tio n a l law :
Aliost all the principal points of the Intervenient Law of Nations, being established
by long consent of persons using thei, do depend upon prescription or ancient Cus-
toi...[a]nd truly, to deny a Title or prescription wholly among Princes, is plainly to
abrogate the very intervenient Law of Nations.1 0 Ä
He t h u s c o n c lu d e s on th e w e ig h t of h isto ric a l e v id e n c e
th a t d o m in io n over th e sea is p e rm iss ib le and th a t th e B ri
tis h have re c o g n iz e d d o m in io n over b ro ad expanses of ocean
w a te rs su rro u n d in g th e ir c o a s t s . 1 0 "7
The Intervenient Law of Nations...take's its rise, not froa any coaaand
iaposed upon several Nations in comon, but through the intervention ei
ther of soae Coapact, or Custoa; and i t is coaaonly styled the Secondarie
Law of Nations__
the conduct of the British was so brutal, so exclusive and dosinating, over the suc
ceeding years, as to provoke a strong reaction in favour of the Grotian concept [of
the freedoa of the seas] with the result that the weaker aaritiae powers, alaost as a
natter of self-preservation, abandoned the banner set up by Seiden . 1 0 0
100 Cf, Reppy, supra n 32, 271; and Eric Fletcher ("John
Seiden (author of Mare Clausum) and his contribution to
international law"(1934) 19 Trans of the Grotius Soc 1,
11), who writes that "the Mare Clausum was the faithful
mirror of the actual and the exhaustive record of the
past. ...Seiden based his treatise on the positive
practice of his day."
The British claias...were extravagant to the point where they encroached upon the high
sea. When Grotius denounced such pretensions, he spoke to the nark. But he denounced
then for the wrong reason. — [T]he question, how far out to sea territorial waters
extend, is essentially different fron the question, whether there can be territorial
waters. ...The real problen was, to restrict territorial waters within reasonable
bounds.1X2
1 - S a m u e l P u f e n d o r f __( 1 6 3 2 - 1 6 9 4 )
The l e a d i n g fig u re of th e 'N a tu r a lis t' school du rin g
th e p erio d was S a m u e l P u f e n d o r f , a German l e g a l academ ic,
who s e t fo rth h is v ie w on t h e sea and i t s resources in De
J u r e N a tu r a e e t G entium , p u b lish ed in 1 6 7 2 . 11<5, He a g r e e s
w ith G ro tiu s th at, g en erally , "some t h i n g s , although u s e fu l
t o men, are because of th e ir ex ten t in ex h au stib le, so t h a t
th e y can l i e open to the use of a l l a n d y e t t h e u s e o f no
sin g le man b e a n y t h e w o r s e . To s u b j e c t s u c h t h i n g s to pro
p rieto rsh ip w ould be m a l i c i o u s a n d i n h u m a n e . " 1 1 '7
However, argues Pufendorf, a cen tral argum ent of G ro
tiu s a g a i n s t dom inion o v e r th e sea, th at is, th e in ex h au s
tib ility of reso u rces, is su b ject to q u a lif ic a tio n . Sup
p o rtin g S eiden, he r e a s o n s th at
fishing can be partially exhausted and becoie less profitable to aaritine peoples, if
any and every nation should want to fish along soae particular shores; especially
since it is often happens that fish...are often found in only one part, and that not
very extensive, in the sea. In such cases nothing [in natural law] prevents the peo
ple dwelling along that shore or neighboring sea froi being able to lay a stronger
11<s S P u f e n d o r f , De J u r e N a t u r a e e t G e n t i u m ( 1 6 7 2 ; T h e
C l a s s i c s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law ( 1 9 3 4 ) # 1 7 ; O l d f a t h e r ,
t r a n s ). ' N a t u r a l i s t s ' , e x p l a i n s O ppenheim {s u p r a n 115,
9 5 ), i s th e term u sed to d e s c r i b e th o s e w r i t e r s d e n y in g
t h e e x i s t e n c e o f any p o s i t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law w h a t
e v e r r e s u l t i n g from c u s to m s o r t r e a t i e s , w h i l e m a in
t a i n i n g t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s o n l y a p a r t o f n a t u
r a l law . F o r a summary o f P u f e n d o r f ' s a p p r o a c h t o i n
t e r n a t i o n a l law g e n e r a l l y s e e N ussbaum, s u p r a n 48,
147-150.
i t is not true that the right of occupation [ i e , ownership] flowed froi necessity
alone; utility...lust also be aade a partner in the latter. Necessity coiuanded occu
pation, utility persuaded to occupation. So that each person seeis according to the
rule of nature to have occupied what was necessary and 'useful to hia.X2!S
a res ccaaunis can be uade aliost useless by proiiscuous use, as often happens in a
sea which has been fished out. But even if a res coMunis offers perpetual use to ev
eryone, it will nevertheless offer a greater use, if it is private property. If, for
exaaple, there should have been given to ie alone the right to fish in this or that
sea, it will be Bore useful than if that peraission be given to everybody__ X2Ä
1 2 "* Ib id 29
120 Ib id 91-92
127
Ib id 37-39, 54
55
ranean Sea because they possessed all of the surrounding
coasts and had guarded their claim with four fleets. How
ever, their claim to ownership subsequently disappeared with
the collapse of the Roman Empire.12“* Today, Bynkershoek
notes, no nation has legitimate claim to ownership of entire
seas or oceans; nor because of the vast areas involved are
such claims to be expected in the future.130
At the same time, however, he observes that virtually
every nations possesses ’’some little part of the [adjacent]
ocean".131 In keeping with the legal nature of the sea and
the concept of ownership, therefore, he suggests a principle
earlier adumbrated by Grotius and others; that is,
12^ Ibid 49-50, 55, 78, 86-87. But see in this regard nn
15 and 17 and accompanying text supra regarding Roman
’dominium' over the Mediterranean.
131 Ibid 80
133 Ibid 43
133 Ibid 44. According to W Walker ("Territorial waters:
the cannon-shot rule"(1945) 22 BYIL 210), Bynkershoek
didn't invent the rule, as the latter had existed in
France and many other Mediterranean countries much ear
lier, at least for neutrality. It seems to Walker that
Bynkershoek meant to do no more than approve the rule.
See also text accompanying nn 81 and 121 supra.
O ’Connell {supra Introduction, n 19, 126) observes
that it is as yet uncertain whether the cannon-shot
56
by th e c o a sta l S ta te w o u ld be mare c la u s u m ; m a r in e w a te rs
beyond, m a r e l i b e r u m . 1 3 -*
In c o n tra s t to G ro tiu s ' p o sitio n in th e Mare L ib e r u m
th a t th e S ta te possesses no m o re th a n im perium o v e r its ad
ja c e n t w a te rs, B y n k ersh o ek arg u es th a t " th e sea w hen occu
p ie d and possessed passes over in to th e o w n e rsh ip , in to th e
p ro p e rty of h im who o c c u p ie s and possesses i t . . . " . 13® In
o th e r w o rd s, fo r B ynkershoek, o c c u p a tio n and p o sse ssio n g iv e
b o th so v e re ig n ty ( im perium ) and o w n e rsh ip (dom inium ), th e re
b e in g , in h is v iew , no d i s t i n c t i o n . 130. T hus,
a nan who holds a sea after a lawful occupation of i t can also prohibit others froi
navigating i t, whether absolutely or conditionally. Absolutely, if for instance, he
were to order thea to keep away froi i t in every possible way, for fishing,...or any
other reason.137.
Ibid 96
The followers of this school select fron natural law, legal aaxias, inci
dents of State practice and decisions of national and international
courts what appears to fit into their a priori iaages of inter
national law.
h a u s tib le , he o b s e rv e s , no S ta te has th e r ig h t to a p p r o p r i
a te th e m or c la im th e s o le r ig h t to th e ir u s e . 1'* 2
3 T h is r u le
is q u a lifie d o n ly to th e e x te n t th a t S ta te s m ay a c q u ir e such
S ta te s . W ith re s p e c t to th e la t t e r , he e x p la in s
O th e r w is e , such r ig h ts as f is h in g on th e h ig h seas do
a re a fo r a v e ry lo n g t i m e . 1 **45,
Les divers usages de la aer, pres des c3tes, la rendent tres susceptible de propriete.
On y peche, on en tir e des coquillages, des perles, de l ’ aabre 4 c. Or'a tous ces
egards, son usage n’ est point inepuisable; en sorte que la Nation a qui les cotes ap-
partiennent, peut s ’ approprier un bien, dont e ile e s tNa portee de s’ euparer, 4 en
fa ire son p ro fit, de a€&e q u'elle a pu occuper le doaaine des terres qu'elle habite.
Qui doutera que les pecheries de perles de Bahre» 4 de Ceylan ne puissent legitimeaent
toaber en propriete? Et quoique la peche du poisson paroisse d'un usage plus in^puis-
abie; s i un peuplg a sur ses cotes une p&herie particuliere 4 fructueuse, dont i i
peut se rendre aaitre, ne lu i s e ra -t-il pas perais de s'approprier ce bienfait de la
Nature cowne une dependance du pays q u 'il occupe1 '* '7; 4 s ’ i l y a assez de poisson
3 Ibid 243
He c i t e s a s a n e x a m p le t h e t r e a t y i n w h ic h A u s t r i a r e
n o u n c e d i n f a v o u r o f E n g la n d a n d H o l l a n d t h e r i g h t t o
s e n d v e s s e ls fr o m t h e N e th e r la n d s t o th e E a s t I n d ie s
(ibid 2 4 5 ) .
s Ibid 246
0 Ibid
Ibid
1=50 I b i d 2 5 3 -2 5 4 . S e e t e x t a c c o m p a n y in g n 135 s u p r a .
S p e a k in g o f a n a t i o n ’s p r i v a t e and e x c l u s i v e r i g h t to
i t s t e r r i t o r y , V a tte l w r ite s ( i b i d 1 9 2 ):
de Nation a Nationr tout ce que 1’on peut dire de plus raisonnable, c'est
qu'en general la Doaination de 1'Etat sur la aer voisine va aussi loin
qu'il est necessaire pour sa surete 4 qu’il peut la faire respecter;
puisque d'un cote, il ne peut s ’approprier d'une chose comune, telle que
la aer, qu'autant qu’il en a besoin pour quelque fin legitiae..., 4 que
d’un autre c3te ce seroit une pretention vaine 4 ridicule de s'attribuer
un droit, que l'on ne seroit aucuneaent en etat de faire valoir.
60
Le droit est plus connu en Europe qu'en Asie; ce-pendant on peut dire que
les passions des princes, la patience des peuples, la flatterie des
ecrivains, en ont corruapu tous les principes.
Ce droit, tel qu'il est aujourd'hui, est une science qui apprend
aux princes jusques \ quel point, ils peuvent violer la justice sans cho-
quer leurs interns.
In i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , t h e m odern S t a t e - s y s
tem w h ic h d e v e l o p e d a r o u n d t h e 1648 P e a c e o f W e s t p h a l i a
p ro v id ed th e s t r u c t u r e fo r a l l a c t i v i t y , re p la c in g th e
f a d e d H o l y Roman E m p i r e . The u n d e r l y i n g p r i n c i p l e o f
t h a t s y s t e m was t h e b a l a n c e o f p o w er ( W h ite , s u p r a t h i s
n o te , 60; M A nderson, Europe in th e E ig h te e n th C e n tu ry
1 7 1 3 -1 7 8 3 (1976, 2nd e d ) 208; Ruddy, s u p ra n 142, 4 3 ) ,
r e f l e c t e d d i r e c t l y , f o r exam ple, in th e T r e a t i e s o f
U t r e c h t o f 1713 (W h ite , s u p r a n t h i s n o t e , 70) and V e r
s a i l l e s o f 1756 ( CTS x l , 3 3 1 , and x x v i i , 4 7 5 , r e s p e c
tiv ely ). T h e S t a t e now r u l e d s u p r e m e ; e a c h j e a l o u s l y
g u a r d i n g i t s own s o v e r e i g n t y , r e c o g n i z i n g n o e x t e r n a l
a u t h o r i t y (A S o r e l , E u r o p e u n d e r t h e O l d R e g i m e ( 1 9 6 4 )
9). W a r f a r e w a s t h e common m e a n s f o r s o l v i n g d i s p u t e s
b e tw e e n S t a t e s , and ’r a i s o n d ’e t a t ’ p r o v i d e d s u f f i c i e n t
ju stific a tio n . Of t h e Age, A n d e r s o n { s u p r a t h i s n o t e ,
176) o b s e r v e s :
The political and diploaatic history of the period was dosinated by war
fare...and its econoaic history profoundly influenced by it. With the
partial exception of the two decades which followed the Treaty of Utrecht
(and even then there were probably never less than half a aillion aen un
der aras in Europe) there was scarcely a year in the century during which
a large-scale struggle was not either raging or about to break cut in
soae part of the continent.
1 355
C f, Ruddy, supra n 141, 38, 55-57, 312
62
H er p h ilo so p h y of in te rn atio n a l law , based on w h a t proved
to be im p recise and perhaps in d eterm in ate p rin c ip le s of n at
ural l a w , 155'7 t o be rep laced by th e in te rn atio n a l law of th e
P o sitiv ists, th at is, leg al ten ets d ep en d in g for th eir v a li
d ity on th e fact th at S tates co n sen ted to them and fo llo w ed
them in p r a c t i c e . 133
T h a t was in d e e d th e c a s e , w i t h t h e i n v o c a t i o n by b o t h
G r o tiu s (su p ra t e x t acco m p an y in g n 6 1 f f ) and S e id e n
(su p ra t e x t a c co m p a n y in g n 98) o f n a t u r a l law in s u p
p o r t o f t h e i r o p p o s in g p o s i t i o n s on r i g h t s t o t h e s e a
and i t s r e s o u r c e s .
In the history of international law, the decisive break with the natural
law philosophy was effected by Vattel, even though he continued to pay
lip service to natural law. Natural law was relegated by Vattel to the
unfathoiable depths of the inner conscience of a state, while the oniy
international law that counts for practical purposes is the external law
63
As important as timeliness was Vattel's ability to
build on and adapt the theories of earlier writers into a
practical, improved statement of law.155*^ His authority was
due not so much to his own originality as to the reasonable
ness of his solutions to the legal problems of the time and
the precision of his descriptions of State practice.100 in
an era of international uncertainty, Vattel was able to ex
plain in clear, concise language the fundamental rules that
States were in practice prepared to accept. O'Connell, for
example, comments that Vattel's treatment of the rights of
the coastal State in the territorial sea, "is so developed
that there can be no doubt that he was writing with all the
authority of an official who knew what was going on in all
the chancelleries of Europe".101
As a result of the above, by the early nineteenth cen
tury his work had become, "a kind of oracle with diplomats,
and especially with consuls,"162 as well as being commonly
All real international law is derived by Vattel froa the will of the na
tions whose presumed consent expresses itself in treaties and custoas.
III. C onclusion
10=5 I b i d 13. As n u m e r o u s w r i t e r s h a v e o b s e r v e d , t h e l a w o f
th e sea e v o lv e s th ro u g h a c o n tin u o u s p ro c e ss of claim
and c o u n te rc la im . P e rh a p s t h e c l a s s i c s t a t e m e n t on t h e
m a t t e r i s t h a t o f P r o f e s s o r s M yres M cD ougal an d N A
S c h l e i ( ’’T h e h y d r o g e n b o m b t e s t s i n p e r s p e c t i v e : l a w f u l
m e a s u r e s f o r s e c u r i t y " ) (1 9 5 4 - 1 9 5 5 ) 64 Y a le L J 6 4 8 ,
655-656):
F ISHER_X_ES_AND__THJE_THREE.ziM _L_IMI_T
I- Introduction
Japan, being a late-coaer, adopted the legal norms prevailing among the
European nations without questioning their validity or legality, and
tried to observe strictly the rules of international law of European ori
gin, Japan never challenged the rule of law based on Christianity and the
European tradition.
H o lin g , i n h i s s e m i n a l e s s a y on m em b e rsh ip o f
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y and t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f i n t e r n a
t i o n a l law ( s u p ra I n t r o d u c t i o n , n 26 , x v ) , i d e n t i f i e s
t h r e e s ta g e s in th e l a t t e r ’s h i s t o r y : (1) t h e p e r i o d o f
t h e ’C h r i s t i a n N a t i o n s ’ (c . 1 6 4 8 - 1 8 5 6 ) ; (2) t h e p e r i o d
o f t h e 'C i v i l i z e d N a t io n s ' (c. 1 8 5 6 -1 9 4 5 ); and (3) th e
p e r io d o f th e ’P e a c e - lo v i n g N a t i o n s ’ , w hich began w ith
t h e UN C h a r t e r .
The drama of international legal relations was being played out, so far
as Africa is concerned, by European Governments among themselves in re
gard to economic, technical and cultural matters. Customary interna
tional law was developing in many respects as a result of the continuous
changes taking place in the continent, but the African dependencies were
mere spectators at the game. The la tte r's contribution, if any, lay in
the fact that it was their territories and their resources that supplied
the raw material for evolving rules and practices of international rela
tions during the hey day of colonization, 1885-1945.
70
That being acknowledged, observes Simone Dreyfus, the
nineteenth century, "c'est, par excellence, le si^cle du
d^veloppement du droit international” .0. The end of the Na
poleonic Wars signalled the demise of absolutism as the gui
ding force in European international relations.'7 Replacing
it was a new system of international co-operation based on
the leadership of the Great Powers, known as the ’European
Concert'.3 The latter pledged always to conduct their af
fairs, between themselves as well as with other States, in
accordance with "la plus strictes des principes du droit des
gens,"3 and to have their only and explicit objective the
maintenance of the general peace of Europe.10 In sum, then,
the political aechanics of the nineteenth century and the methods of cre
ating international law based on the order resulting from the Congress of
Vienna, on the doctrine of the balance of power, and on the recognised
supremacy of the states that formed the European Concert, naturally re-
72
The n in e te e n th and early tw en tieth c e n tu ries also saw
in te rn a tio n a l law d ev elo p th ro u g h im p o rtan t a rb itra l pro
ceed in g s; th e Alabam a a r b i t r a t i o n in p a r t i c u l a r 1=5 e n c o u r a g
ing th e b elief th at even th e m ost serio u s d isp u tes co u ld be
se ttle d acco rd in g to o b jectiv e leg al s t a n d a r d s . 10
Cf, e g , J C a s t a n e d a , ’’T h e u n d e r d e v e l o p e d n a t i o n s a n d
th e d e v e l o p m e n t o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w ” ( 1 9 6 1 ) 15 I n t e r n a
tio n a l O rga n isa tio n 38, 39; 0 L i s s i t z y n , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l
law i n a d i v i d e d w o r l d ” (1 9 6 3 ) #542 I n te r n a tio n a l C o n ci
l i a t i o n 3, 7 -8 ; and R o lin g , supra I n t r o d u c t i o n , n 26,
x i. I n t h i s r e g a r d , C h a r l e s D u p u is ( Le P r in c ip e
d 'S q u ilib r e e t l e C oncert europeen (1909) 502, c i t e d in
N ip p o ld , su pra n 6, 50) com m ents t h a t ,
II est certain que le Concert europeen a eu tres peu de souci des theo
ries juridiques et tres peu de scrupules a empieter sur les droits de
ceux dont les pretentions genaient ses convenances. II n'a pas h^site a
imposer ses lois a qui n'avait pas la force de s ’y soustraire. Au nos de
l'in te r e t europeen, les grandes puissances, d'accord pour eviter de se
faire la guerre, ont juge bon de dieter aux faibles les conditions
qu’elles jugeaient essentielles au aaintien de leur entente.
Ibid
10 & 11 Wm 3, c25
F u l t o n , s u p r a Ch 1 , n 3 2 , 5 8 1 ; G i d e l , s u p r a I n t r o d u c
t i o n , n 15, i i i / I , 4 9 ; a n d G M a n g o n e , La w f o r t h e W o r l d
Ocean ( 1 9 8 1 ) 1 6 2 . A r t i c l e One o f t h e C o n v e n tio n ( su pra
n 31) p ro v id e d t h a t :
had now becoae a fishery liait, and this assiailation of two jurisdictions which
throughout the eighteenth century has rarely been coincidental in fact, was the prod
uct of their rationalization by reference to the property theory of the territorial
sea, eabodied first in the notion of the cannon-shot and then in its supposed equiva
lent, the three-aile liait. ...The equation of the cannon-shot and the three-iile
liait in the work of Azuni...seeas to have been the turning point in the doctrine.3 - *
According to the acknowledged Law of Nations, no Country can claim acre than one Ma
rine league off her own Coasts by any other Title than Concession. . . .One Marine League
is allowed by that Law to 'be the Liait of T erritorial Jurisdiction. All that is held
by any Nation beyond that one League aust be held either by ta c it or by express agree
ment....
146. T h a t t h e F r e n c h p o s i t i o n was n o t e n t i r e l y w i t h o u t
f o u n d a t i o n , h o w e v e r, was a d m i t t e d n i n e y e a r s l a t e r i n
an o p in io n from th e K in g 's A d v o c a te in r e s p o n s e to a
q u e r y from t h e L ords o f t h e C o m m ittee o f P r iv y C o u n c il
f o r T ra d e g e n e r a te d by th e re co m m e n d a tio n s o f th e H ouse
o f Com m ons' S e l e c t C o m m itte e i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e B r i t i s h
fish e rie s (se e n 37 s u p r a ) . The A d v o c a te b e g in s by
s t a t i n g t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law
( P a r r y , su p ra n 25, x x x i i , 14, 1 6 - 1 7 ) :
i t is now, generally admitted that that portion of the Sea which his
[sic] w it h in a le a g u e , or three miles froa the Shore, is to be
considered as foraing a part of the Territory of the Nation, to whoa the
Shores belong, and that within those L iaits, she aay exercise the rights
of Sovereignty, subject however, as I apprehend, to this qualification,
that they do not interfere with the existing rights of others.
The F act.. .appears to be that the French have for many years, been in the
habit of fishing within a very short distance of our Coasts, without
interruption, and i t aay at least be a question of very considerable
d o u b t whether they have not thereby acquired a k in d of prescriptive
right to continue i t .
I n s u p p o r t o f t h a t v i e w h e c i t e s V a t t e l ( s u p r a Ch 1 , n
150 and a c c o m p a n y in g t e x t ) , and c o n c lu d e s by n o t i n g
( i b i d 27) t h a t
They n e v e r t h e l e s s e x p r e s s e d a w i l l i n g n e s s t o a c c e p t a
g en eral th re e -m ile ju r is d ic tio n a l lim it fo r f is h e r ie s a lo n g
th e c o a s ts of each c o u n try , so l o n g a s t h e B r i t i s h c o n c e d e d
t o them a w i d e r j u r i s d i c t i o n a l b e l t i n t h e Bay o f G r a n v i l l e
t o p r o t e c t t h e r i c h o y s t e r b e d s from e x c e s s i v e d redging."*®
On t h e b a s i s o f r e c o m m e n d a tio n s o f a m ixed c o m m is s io n and
fo llo w in g f u r t h e r d e ta il e d n e g o tia tio n s , t h e A n g lo -F ren ch
F i s h e r i e s C o n v e n ti o n was a d o p t e d i n 1839. "*"*
The C o n v e n ti o n was s i g n i f i c a n t i n a num ber o f r e s p e c t s .
F irst, i t e s ta b lis h e d lim its of e x c lu siv e fis h e ry j u r i s d i c
t i o n b e tw e e n J e r s e y (and n e i g h b o u r i n g B r i t i s h i s l a n d s ) and
t h e c o a s t o f F r a n c e , v a r y i n g i n d i s t a n c e from l e s s t h a n
t h r e e t o a b o u t 14 m i l e s from t h e m ainland."*®
Of more g e n e r a l i m p o r t a n c e , t h e C o n v e n ti o n e n s h r i n e d
f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n an i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t p r o v i s i o n
f o r r e g u l a t i n g t h e c o n d u c t o f f i s h e r m e n i n a r e a s b e yo n d t h e
l i m i t s o f a S t a t e ’s r e c o g n i z e d z o n e o f e x c l u s i v e j u r i s d i c
t i o n . "*Ä One a r t i c l e , f o r e x a m p le , p r o v i d e d t h a t " t h e o y s t e r
f i s h e r y o u t s i d e o f t h e l i m i t s w i t h i n w h ic h t h a t f i s h e r y i s
e x c l u s i v e l y r e s e r v e d t o B r i t i s h and F r e n c h s u b j e c t s , r e s p e c -
I b i d 152
I b i d 147
I b id A rt I
C f, C S t e v e n s o n , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l r e g u l a t i o n o f t h e f i s h
e r i e s o f t h e h i g h s e a s " (1908) 2 8 ( 1 ) B o f t h e B u rea u o f
F i s h e r i e s [ U. S . ] 103, 113 ( P a p e r p r e s e n t e d b e f o r e t h e
F o u r t h I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i s h e r i e s C o n g r e s s i n 1908)
82
t i v e l y s h a l l be common to the subjects of both count
ries, while its successor stipulated that dredging for
oysters "between the coast of Jersey and the coast of
France" was prohibited for subjects of both countries be
tween sunset and s u n r i s e . T h o s e and other provisions were
subsequently incorporated into more detailed regulations
signed in 1843 by both France and Great Britain governing
the actions of each State's nationals "fishing in the seas
lying between the coasts of...Great Britain ... and...
France".
And finally, the Convention provided that outside of
the Granville Bay area specially delimited and noted above,
the nationals of each country were to enjoy the exclusive
right of fishery within the distance of three geographical
miles from the low-water mark along their entire respective
coasts.30 Although the three-mile fishery limit laid down
in the 1839 Convention and 1843 Regulations was only binding
on subjects of France and Great Britain, it was subsequently
Art III
Art IV
D. State Legislation
Detailed reviews of individual State's legislation and
other nineteenth and early twentieth century practice relat
ing to fisheries have appeared elsewhere*3 and therefore
need not be exhaustively canvassed at this juncture. For
the purpose of sketching the early development of interna
tional fishery law and setting the scene for the succeeding
discussion, however, it is useful to briefly describe both
the trend that developed during the period and exceptions to
that trend, as well as innovative arrangements in both do
mestic legislation and other State practice that hinted at
the need for a fundamental reappraisal of the laisser-faire
attitude of States generally toward the regulation of inter
national marine fisheries
(1960) 100 RDC 203), and the law of the sea in particu
lar (see, eg, Anand, supra Ch 1, n 165, and by the same
author, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea:
History of International Law Revisited (1982)), only
scattered and incomplete references exist concerning
fishery jurisdiction per se. To complete the picture,
therefore, it is useful to cite some examples of early
non-Western practice.
Probably the earliest reference to fishery juris
diction by States outside Europe and America is that
found in Kautilya’s Arthasastra, written about the
fourth century B.C. and describing contemporary Indian
State practice. It notes the existence of a coastal
State’s fishing rights over adjacent (but undelimited)
maritime waters; the requirement of fishermen to pay
one-sixth of their haul for license fees; and the con
trol by the Superintendents of Ships and Ocean Mines
over fisheries, including pearl and coral fisheries,
sometimes at a considerable distance from the land
{Kautilya’s Arthasastra (1967, 8th e d ; R Shamasastry,
ed) 89, 143. See generally in this regard, Singh,
supra Introduction, n 32, and H Chatterjee, Interna
tional Law and Inter-State Relations in Ancient India
(1958) 35-36.
Later, Grotius in his Mare Liberum observes that
"the inhabitants of the entire coast of Africa and Asia
constantly used for fishing...that part of the sea
nearest their own several coasts and were never inter
dicted from such use by the Portuguese” (Magoffin, supra
Ch 1, n 59, 60). Alexandrowicz (East Indies, supra
this n, 68) suggests that "claimed” might be substitu
ted for "used” as an equally appropriate translation of
Grotius' comment, thus making the latter’s observation
even more relevant.
Similarly, later writers refer to the appearance
by the fourteenth century of a written maritime code in
the South-east Asian archipelago governing various mat
ters, including aspects of fishery jurisdiction (for
text and discussion of the Malacca Maritime Code see J
Pardessus, Collection de Lois Maritimes (1345) vii; and
S Raffles, "The Maritime Code of the Malays” (1879) 1 J
of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Soc no 3,
62-84, and no 4, 1-20), and the development of the
concept of a territorial sea among the States of the
Indonesian archipelago by the end of the sixteenth
century (G Resink, "The significance of the history of
international law in Indonesia” in An Introduction to
Indonesian Historiography (1965; Soedjatmoko, ed) 349,
363) .
While the early independent Hawaiian Kingdom did
not encounter situations in which non-Hawaiians were
fishing off the islands' coasts, there nevertheless ex
isted a legal regime governing marine fisheries similar
to that found contemporaneously in the West. According
to John Wise ("The history of land ownership in Hawaii”
88
Throughout the above period, numerous States followed
Great Britain and the United States in accepting three miles
as the limit of a coastal State's exclusive fishery juris
diction. These included in Europe besides those States p a r
ty to the 1882 North Sea Fisheries C o n v e n t i o n ,0,55 Austria-
Hungary , Greece,67 R u s s i a ,&& Turkey,0,9 and perhaps
Italy.7,0 Outside Europe, the three-mile fishery limit was
Beyond the breakers (or, as the case may be, a mile and
a half), fishing was free to all {ibid).
As may be seen from the above, early developments
in Asia and elsewhere reveal traces of fishery jur i s
diction doctrine similar to those evolving in the West
over the same period or, in some cases, later. Beyond
that it is impossible to draw conclusions at this time,
particularly concerning the impact, if any, such p r a c
tices may have had on international legal doctrine re
lating to marine fisheries. After initial contact with
the West, most early civilizations disappeared from the
international stage (some permanently), not to reappear
until the mid-twentieth century. When they did, they
had a profound influence on the development of i nterna
tional law. That influence will feature prominently in
succeeding chapters of this work.
Ibid 661
F u l t o n , h o w e v e r , o b s e r v e d i n 1911 t h a t " i t i s d o u b t f u l
how f a r t h e t h r e e - m i l e l i m i t h a s b e e n a d o p t e d i n I t a l y ”
( s u p r a I n t r o d u c t i o n , n 16, 6 6 0 ) , and t h e I t a l i a n d e l e
g a t e t o t h e Second U n i t e d N a t i o n s C o n f e r e n c e on t h e Law
o f t h e Sea ( s e e Ch 7 i n f r a ) s t a t e d t h a t I t a l y had a l
ways had a s i x - m i l e t e r r i t o r i a l s e a and no a d d i t i o n a l
f i s h i n g zone (A /C onf.1 9 /8 , p 63).
’’D e c r e e o f 6 November 1 8 6 6 , ” i n U. N. , N a t i o n a l L e g i s l a
t i o n and T r e a t i e s R e l a t i n g t o t h e T e r r i t o r i a l S e a , t h e
C o n t i g u o u s Zone, t h e C o n t i n e n t a l S h e l f , t h e High S e a s
and t o F i s h i n g and C o n s e r v a t i o n o f t h e L i v i n g R e s o u r c e s
o f t h e Sea (1970) 15 UNLS 5 8 , U. N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/15
[ v o lu m e h e r e a f t e r c i t e d ’ 15 UNLS’ ] . I n 1923, t h e t h r e e -
m i l e l i m i t was e x p a n d e d t o 12 m i l e s ( s e e n 80 i n f r a ) .
On o p e n i n g i t s d o o r s t o t h e West i n 1 854, J a p a n a d o p t e d
t h e European i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g a l sy s te m p r i n c i p a l l y as
e x p r e s s e d i n t h e A m e ri c a n j u r i s t , H enry W h e a t o n ’s E l e
m e n ts o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law ( c f , n 3 s u p r a ) . A ccording
to P r o f e s s o r F u jio I t o , th e Jap an ese r e p r i n t e d i t i o n of
t h e C h i n e s e l a n g u a g e t r a n s l a t i o n o f t h a t work was " t h e
s i n g l e m o st i m p o r t a n t p i e c e o f l i t e r a t u r e on i n t e r n a
t i o n a l law t h a t was p r o v i d e d t o t h e J a p a n e s e p e o p l e
d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d 1865 t o 1 8 8 0 ” ( ’’One h u n d r e d y e a r s o f
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law s t u d i e s i n J a p a n " (1 9 6 9 ) 13 JAIL 19,
20; c f , H O t s u k a , " J a p a n ’s e a r l y e n c o u n t e r w i t h t h e
c o n c e p t o f t h e ’ law o f n a t i o n s ' " i n i b i d 35, 4 5 ) .
Wheaton ( E l e m e n t s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1866 e d ;
The C l a s s i c s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law S e r i e s , 1936) 2 1 4 -
2 1 5 , 2 1 7 - 2 1 8 ) h e l d much t h e same p o s i t i o n a s t h a t f o r
m u l a t e d by V a t t e l and h i s p r e d e c e s s o r s :
Ibid 664
Sur la deaande des prud'homes des pecheurs, de leurs deiegues et, a defaut, des syn
dics des gens de aer, certaines peches peuvent etre teaporaireaent interdites sur une
Itendue de aer au del^ de trois ailles du littoral, si cette aesure est coaaandee par
l'interet de la conservation des fonds ou de la p§the des poissons de passage .“5*1
Ibid 311
loz I b i d 828
103 I b id 831. As f o r t h e j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l b a s i s u n d e r l y i n g
t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f p r o p e r t y , t h e US a r g u m e n t may b e
sum m arised as f o llo w s ( i b i d 8 3 4 -8 3 5 ):
the essential facts which rendered aniaals commonly designated wild the subject of
property, not only while in the actual custody of their master, but also when tem
porarily absent therefrom, were...'that the care and industry of aan acting upon a
natural disposition of the aniaals to return to a place of wonted resort secures their
voluntary and habitual return to his custody and power, so as to enable hia to deal
with thea in a siailar sanner and to obtain froa thea siiailar benefits as in the case
of domestic a n ia a ls.'107'
10Ä I b i d 3 3 1 -8 3 2
10^ I b id 832
lo e I b id 8 3 5 -8 3 6
100
tw een th e seal and an im als such as deer and bees w hich w ere
g en erally co n sid ered as p ro p erty so lo n g as they retain ed
animus revertendi. An d b esid es, asserted th e A m ericans, th e
seal fish e ry was "a larg e, and if p ro p erly m anaged, perm an
ent in d u stry , th e p ro p erty of th e n atio n on whose shores it
is c a rrie d o n ’’ . 1 1 0
G iven such a state of a ffa irs, it was asked,
could anything.. .be clearer as a moral, and under natural laws, a legal, obligation
than the duty of other nations to refrain from taking any action which would prevent
the United States, the owner of the lands to which the seal herd resorts, from per
forming the trust which i t acknowledged and had discharged?1 1 1
wherever an important and just national interest of any description is put in peril
for the sake of individual profit by an act upon the high sea, even though such act
would be otherwise justifiable, the right of the individual must give way, and the na
tion will 'De entitled to protect itself against the injury, by whatever force may be
reasonably necessary, according to the usages established in analogous cases.1 13
10^ Ibid 3 3 3
110 Ibid 7 8 3
111 Ibid 8 3 7
112 Ibid 3 3 9
113
Ibid 8 3 9 - 3 4 0
101
of a national interest or right will be submitted to by oth
er nations, and if not, may be enforced by the government at
its discretion".1
11'*
Concluding its argument, the United States characteris
ed its claim as involving the application of a "universal
and necessary principle" to a novel exigency.1155 This posed
no problem since international law developed through the
process of analogy and the application of such principles to
new cases. On the other hand, if the Tribunal considered
that the instant case was outside rules previously estab
lished, determination must then be based on "those broader
considerations of moral right and justice which constitute
the foundations of international law".110
1^ Ibid 843-844
Ibid
no nation has the right to close the sea against the navigation of the
ships of other nations; nor to claii or assert territorial dominion over
the sea; nor to claia or assert the right of jurisdiction, nor to exer
cise jurisdiction, over the sea beyond the 3 ailes of territorial waters,
as recognised by international law.
only so auch of the rules of aorals or the rules of the law of nature, as have re
ceived the inpriiatur of nations — evidenced by the assent of nations expressed or
iiplied — only so auch as has been taken up by that consent into the body of interna
tional law is in truth international law.1 1 9
a n d 1825 ( s e e n 97 s u p r a ) e n c o m p a s s e d t h e B e h r i n g S e a ,
t h u s s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n on R u s s i a ’s
l i m i t e d f i s h e r y j u r i s d i c t i o n ( i b i d 19, 2 0 ) . A rticle I
o f t h e 1824 T r e a t y s t i p u l a t e d t h a t
It is agreed that in any part of the Great Ocean called the Pacific Ocean
or South Sea, the respective citizens or subjects of the high contracting
powers shall be neither disturbed nor restrained, either in navigation,
or in fishing, or in the power of resorting to the coasts, upon points
which aay not already have been occupied....
11S Ib id
12:3 Ibid 15
120 Ibid 33
12-7 Ibid 34
1
Ibid 36
104
the assumption that the fish may be proceeding to a place
within which an exclusive right to take possession would
arise, or even the existence in the coastal State of an in
dustry based on the resource in question. Seals were sub
ject to the same fundamental principle as fish: "the right
of all nations to fish on the high seas is inconsistent with
the claims of any nation to protect fish or other free-swim
ming animals there".130 Excluding rights recognized by con
ventional means, the only right of a State to protect fish
and other free-swimming animals in the high seas was against
that State's own nationals. American reference to domestic
legislation of other States concerning fishing beyond the
three-mile territorial sea in support of their claim was in
applicable, the British contended, because those laws were
not enforced against foreigners.131
Finally, the United Kingdom professed itself willing to
adopt general measures for the control of the fur-seal fish
ery, provided that the measures were "equitable", "framed
with due regard to the common interest", and operated to
preserve the industry "for the enjoyment, not of the United
States alone, but of all those who may lawfully engage in
fishing".133
Ibid
131 Ibid 55. An example of one such law is the French de
cree of 1862 discussed above (see text accompanying n
91 supra).
13Z Ibid 63
133
"Award of the Tribunal of Arbitration, constituted
under Article I of the Treaty concluded at Washington
on the 29th February, 1892, between Great Britain and
the United States (Seal Fishery in Behring Sea). --
Paris, August 15, 1893" (1892-1893) 85 BFSP 1158
105
lands of the United States in Behring Sea, when such seals
are found outside the ordinary 3-mile limit,”13^ and that
"the concurrence of Great Britain [was] necessary to the es
tablishment of Regulations for the proper protection and
conservation of the fur-seal in or habitually resorting to
the Behring Sea...". 13:3
The Tribunal also formulated a number of regulations
applicable outside the jurisdictional limits of both parties
which would, inter alia, prohibit pelagic sealing at any
time within a 60 mile zone around the Pribyloffs and stipu
late the types of vessels permitted to undertake such seal
ing .130
Unfortunately for the purpose of tracing the develop
ment of international law relating to marine fisheries, the
was at the time and has since been hailed as a great blow for freedom, it
could also be regarded as an all-too-characteristic failure of lawyers to
take account of, or perhaps even to comprehend, the relevance of the sci
entific data that had been put before them....
tesy of the sea, the point say well have been reached when the words ’the
right of user’...should be replaced by the formulation 'the right of rea
sonable user’.
13‘
5> See, eg, text accompanying n 122 supra.
i4 e
See nn 31, 32 and accompanying text supra.
110
temporary respites in 1854 and 1871,x*& but on their expira
tion the vexatious issues flared anew. With the passage in
1905 of restrictive legislation by Newfoundland, ’’affairs
reached a critical stage" .x+9 After prolonged negotiations,
a compromis was signed in 1909 by the United Kingdom and the
United States, submitting the controversy to the Permanent
Court of Arbitration at The Hague. 1=50
(1) the hours, days, or seasons when fish aay be taken on the treaty
coasts; (2) the aethod, aeans. and iapleaents to be used in taking of
fish or in the carrying on of fishing operations on such coasts; [and]
(3) any other aatters of a siuilar character—
the right to regulate the liberties conferred by the treaty of 1818 is an attribute of
sovereignty, and as such must be held to reside in the territorial sovereign, unless
1=5=5 Ibid
1=5Ä Ibid 159. For a definition of a 'servitude' in
international law see Ch 1, n 77 supra.
Ibid 169
114
B ritish in te rn a l le g is la tio n , th u s re d u c in g G reat B rita in
and her c o lo n ie s to a s ta te o f d e p e n d e n c e . 1,52
On a s t r i c t c o n s tru c tio n of th e tre a ty , th e re fo re , th e
T rib u n a l w as u n a b l e to concede th e A m e ric a n c la im . H ow ever,
it e x p la in e d , th a t d id n o t m ean t h a t th e B ritish w ere free
to im p o se any re g u la tio n s th e y a lo n e th o u g h t re a so n a b le :
Great Britain, as the local sovereign, has the duty of preserving and protecting the
fisheries. In so far as it is necessary for that purpose, Great Britain is not only
entitled, but obliged, to provide for the protection of the fisheries; always remea-
bering that the exercise of this right of legislation is liaited by the obligation to
exercise the treaty in good f a it h ....10,3
It a lso d e te rm in e d th a t by v i r t u e of th e w ay i n w h ic h
th e compromis h a d b e e n f o r m u l a t e d a n d t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s by
G reat B r ita in , it w as n e c e s s a r y fo r th e re a so n a b le n e ss of
any re g u la tio n passed to be d e c id e d by an im p a rtia l a u th o r
ity in acco rd an ce w ith p ro v isio n s recom m ended by t h e a rb i
tra to rs . Thus, as one o f th e A m e ric a n counsel subse
q u e n tly o b serv ed , " th e c o n te n tio n of th e U n ite d S ta te s th a t
n e ith e r G reat B rita in nor N ew fo u n d lan d ought to be th e s o le
ju d g e of th e re a so n a b le n e ss of re g u la tio n s w as t e c h n i c a l l y
re je c te d , but in fact s u s t a i n e d " . x<s=5
102 Ibid 1 6 7 - 1 7 0
Ibid 1 7 1 - 1 7 2 . I n 1 9 1 2 , a n a g r e e m e n t w as c o n c l u d e d b e
t w e e n t h e US a n d t h e UK g i v i n g e f f e c t t o t h e a w a r d ( s e e
B a c o n , supra n 1 4 5 , c v , a n d ( 1 9 1 2 ) 1 0 5 BFSP 2 0 7 , f o r
t e x t ).
VI - Conclusion
See Bacon, supra n 145, cv, and (1912) 105 BFSP 207.
EARLY C O D I F I C A T I O N E F F O RTS
I- Introduction
Ibid 700
Ibid xxxix
So long as the fisheries are confined to the territorial seas, the laws
of a single state to which they belong can be enforced against all com
ers. But outside the three-aile liait, which is the recognized boundary
of the authority of the State, coaplications arise which only an Inter
national Law can remove. A law, for instance, sight be made providing a
close season for certain kinds of sea-fish, the capture of which takes
place in the deep sea. But if such a law were aade by one State and not
concurred in by the others interested, it would either be inoperative,
even as far as the subjects of the State sanctioning the law were con
cerned, or it would be a great hardship upon then, in preventing them
froa participating in an industry in which their foreign rivals were free
to engage unrestricted.
Ib id
I b i d 76
I b i d 77
I b i d 78, 30
G S a d e n - P o w e l l , " R i g h t s o f f i s h e r y i n t e r r i t o r i a l and
e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l w a te rs " in R eport o f th e F ou rteen th
C o n fe r e n c e o f th e A s s o c i a t i o n f o r t h e Reform and C o d i
f i c a t i o n o f t h e Law o f N a t i o n s ( 1 3 9 0 ) 1 3 8 , 1 9 2 - 1 9 3
123
The following year saw the IDI begin detailed discus
sion on the territorial sea regime.31 Professor Aubert of
Norway presented a paper defending the Norwegian method of
delimiting the territorial sea33 and advocating an extension
of the limits of a coastal State's fishery jurisdiction for
conservation purposes.33 Professor Renault, for his part,
recommended examination of a distinction between the terri
torial sea and a wider littoral sea. In the former, the
coastal State would have full sovereignty, whereas in the
latter "l’Etat riverain exercerait certain droits, sans en
avoir neanmoins la souverainete".24 The topic was placed on
the agenda for the Institute's following session.3®
At that session, held in 1892, Sir Thomas Barclay, the
rapporteur, presented his report, including replies of mem
bers on principles relating to fishery jurisdiction.30 Al
though it was universally recognized that fishing was reser
ved for nationals of the coastal State in the territorial
sea, opinions varied on the latter's breadth.37, Barclay
recommended that the three-mile limit be supported as it was
generally accepted in State practice.33 At the same time,
Ibid 867ff
Ibid 882
Ibid
"Rapport et Conclusion de M Thomas Barclay, Rapporteur
[Troisi^me Commission d'Etude. - Definition et Regime
de la Mer territoriale]"(1892-1896; ed abregee) 3 AIDI
47
27
Ibid 56, 60-62
124
however, he proposed a separate draft article, largely to
cover the question of fishery jurisdiction:
En dehors des eaux territoriales, 1'usages de la ser est litre; aais il en sera use
c o m e d'un bien comun, de facon a ne porter aucun prejudice aux biens et aux person-
nes des ressortissants des Etats riverains oil a la neutrality des ces Etats.
Ibid 71
Ibid 86
Ibid 3 7 1 . In r e a c h in g h is c o n c lu s io n , he c i t e d a
B r i t i s h p a r l i a m e n t a r y r e p o r t o n f i s h e r i e s ( Report from
the Sele ct Committee on Sea Fisheries ( 1 8 9 3 ) 3 7 7 ) :
T h a t r e c o m m e n d a t i o n was s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t e d by l i n e
an d d r i f t - n e t f i s h e r m e n who, a s l a t e a s 1 9 1 1 , d em an d ed
a n e x t e n s i o n o f f i s h e r y l i m i t s t o 1 3 m i l e s ( London
Times, 2 6 A p r i l 1 9 1 1 , 1 2 b ) . I t was n e v e r t h e l e s s o p p o s
ed by t r a w l f i s h e r m e n , and a s a r e s u l t o f t h e im p a s s e ,
th e B r i t i s h G overnm ent d e c lin e d to se ek any i n t e r n a
t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t f o r s u c h an e x t e n s i o n ( s e e n 40 and
a c c o m p a n y i n g t e x t infra) .
3S
R ap p o rt, supra n 3 3 , 374
126
one m ile fu rth er, th u s em bracing all contem porary European
S tate p r a c t i c e . 3&
B a r c l a y ’s proposal was su b seq u en tly adopted by t h e In
s t i t u t e 3 '7' a n d in c lu d ed in a set of ru les w hich e x p l i c i t l y
recognized th at th e th re e -m ile lim it was in su fficien t for
fish ery p ro tectio n purposes and t h a t "th ere is no r e a s o n to
confound in a sin g le zone th e d ista n ce necessary for th e ex
ercise of so v ereig n ty and for th e p ro tectio n of co astw ise
fish in g and th at w hich is necessary to gu aran tee th e n eu t
ra lity on n o n - b e l l i g e r e n t s in tim e of w a r " .30 The r u l e s
w ere a d o p te d in essen tially th e same form by t h e ILA i n th e
fo llo w in g y e a r . 30
In 1896, th e D utch G overnm ent drew th e o ffic ia l atten
tio n of o th er European S tates to th e above r u le s and propos
ed convening an in tern atio n al conference for fix in g th e
lim it of te rrito ria l w aters. It su g g ested as a b asis for
n eg o tiatio n th at six m iles be a d o p te d as th at lim it for all
purposes. R eactio n to th e D utch proposal was g e n e r a l l y
p o sitiv e, except for th a t of th e U n ited K ingdom . As B a r c l a y
su b seq u en tly ex p lain ed ,
the British Government was decidedly unfavourable. The reply given to the Dutch min
ister was that the extension of the limit from three to six miles was not desirable.
'When I remarked to Lord Salisbury,' wrote the minister of the Netherlands in his
despatch, 'that Great Britain, in view of the extent of her coasts and of her fisher
ies, had more than any other nation an interest in the extension of territorial wa
ters,' he answered in his usual playful manner: 'But then we could no longer come and
fish near your coast, for, however extensive ours may be, the fish are found on
yours'
Ib id 375
" E x t r a i t d u p r o c e s - v e r b a l d e s s e a n c e s d e s 2 8 , 2 9 a n d 31
m a rs 1894 [ T r o i s i e m e C o m m issio n . - D e f i n i t i o n e t Regim e
d e l a M er T e r r i t o r i a l e ] ” ( 1 8 9 2 - 1 8 9 6 ; 4 d a b r e g e e ) 2 A I D I
4 4 8 , 457
R ep o rt o f th e S e v e n te e n th C onference o f th e
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law A s s o c i a t i o n [ R e p o r t s h e r e a f t e r c i t e d
' { n u m b e r ) ILA C o n f e r e n c e R e p o r t ' ] ( 1 8 9 5 ) 1 0 2 , 1 0 4
127
Since foreign coasts have been exploited with immediate financial success
to the trawling companies, their interest in the North Sea has diminish
ed. They fear that if the question of fishery regulations beyond the
ordinary three-mile limit is opened up with foreign Powers in the inter
est of the North Sea fisheries, proposals may be made, as a quid pro quo,
by some of the other Powers for similar regulations on their coasts,- and
it is evident from the statements made in Parliament that this view has
hitherto prevailed.
Ibid 105
Ibid 323
Ibid v i i
T h e m e m b e r s o f t h e C o m m i t t e e w e r e : C h a i r m a n : Mr H j a l m a r
H am m arskjöld (S w ed en ), fo rm e r P rim e M i n i s t e r o f Sweden,
G overnor of th e P ro v in c e of U ppsala; V ice-C hairm an:
P r o f e s s o r G D iena ( I t a l y ) , P r o f e s s o r o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Law a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f P a v i a ; M e m b e r s : Mr C h r i s t o b a l
B o t e l l a ( S p a i n ) , f o r m e r l y P r o f e s s o r o f Law a t t h e U n i
v e r s i t y o f M a d rid , L e g a l A d v is e r to t h e S p a n is h Em bassy
a t P a r i s , P r e s i d e n t o f t h e F ra n c o - G e r m a n M ixed A r b i t r a l
T rib u n a l; P r o f e s s o r Jam es B r i e r l y (G rea t B r i t a i n ) , P ro
f e s s o r o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f O x
f o r d ; Mr H F r o m a g e o t ( F r a n c e ) , L e g a l A d v i s e r t o t h e
M i n i s t r y f o r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s o f t h e F r e n c h R e p u b l i c ; Dr
J G ustavo G u e rre ro ( S a lv a d o r ), M in is te r o f S a lv a d o r in
P a r i s ; Dr B C J L o d e r ( t h e N e t h e r l a n d s ) , f o r m e r M ember
o f t h e Suprem e C o u rt o f t h e N e t h e r l a n d s , Ju d g e and l a t e
P re s id e n t of th e Perm anent C ourt of I n te r n a tio n a l J u s
t i c e ; Dr B a r b o s a d e M a g a l h a e s ( P o r t u g a l ) , P r o f e s s o r o f
Law a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f L i s b o n , B a r r i s t e r , f o r m e r M i n
i s t e r o f F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , J u s t i c e a n d E d u c a t i o n ; Dr
132
The first session of the Committee of Experts for the
Progressive Codification of International Law was held from
1 to 8 April 1925. During the session, agreement was
reached on a list of subjects on which reports were to be
Ibid
the only thing to be done is to discard the obsolete rules of the existing treaties,
which were drawn up with other objects, to take a wider view, and to base a new ju
risprudence, not on the defective legislation which has failed to see justice done but
on the scientific and econoaic considerations which, after all the necessary data has
been collected, aay be put forward, coapared and discussed at a technical conference
by the countries concerned.,s,&
S 9
Ibid 217-213
136
over a further zone of six miles beyond the zone of their
sovereignty” .70
Of the 23 Governments commenting on Suarez's proposals,
21 responded favourably."7,1 France was one of the more en
thusiastic supporters of a fishery conference, opining that
it was "desirable, practical and urgent” to regulate the ex
ploitation of marine fisheries by international agreement.73
In her view, the conference could "without undue difficulty”
conclude a general convention for that purpose and question
ed whether preliminary conference arrangements might not be
accelerated.^
In stark contrast, the United Kingdom considered that
regulation of international fisheries was not feasible,
since the necessary considerations upon which regulation
would depend were technical rather than legal, and available
information led to the conclusion that regulation "should be
attempted... by particular conventions relating to particular
products and particular areas between the countries inter
ested," rather than by means of a general convention.74
For some of the responding Governments, even those with
extensive coastlines, fishery questions were not of critical
importance. India, for example, declined to comment as
"there is not intensive exploitation of such products" along
her coasts.73 Similarly, Egypt replied that she had "no
special interest" in the questions posed by Suarez.7'0
The Committee at its 1927 session considered replies
received and agreed that territorial waters ought to be
Ibid
Ibid 190
Ibid
Ibid 196
7 6
Ibid 285
137
dealt with by an international conference.77 In a separate
report to the Council of the League of Nations it declared
that the exploitation of the products of the sea was one of
the subjects the regulation of which by international agree
ment to be most desirable and realisable.7’® The Committee
pointed out, however, that the question had to be considered
in greater depth and for a longer time than had previously
been the case if international agreement was to be reached;
that regulation of "less migratory species" of marine fauna
might be accomplished by means of bi- and multilateral
agreements; and that other migratory species of fauna, such
as the whale, might be regulated by means of a general con
vention. A conference of experts of the type recommended by
Suarez, the Committee suggested, was "the proper body to
formulate an opinion on these problems and on many other
proposals arising from this question, and also on the best
method of formulating rules without undesirable delay” .7’®
Without taking any final decisions on the above, the
League of Nations' Council transmitted the reports to the
Assembly where on 27 September 1927 it was resolved, inter
alia, to hold a "First Codification Conference" to examine
three subjects, including "Territorial Waters".®0 It was
also decided to study in collaboration with the Internation
al Council for the Exploration of the Sea and other inter
ested organizations "the question whether and in what terms,
for what species and in what areas, international protection
of marine fauna could be established".®1 It would then be
decided whether a conference of experts should be held. The
Economic Committee of the League undertook consideration of
the question of marine products, and a Preparatory Committee
Ibid i, 226
Ibid 240
Ibid 246
Ibid xciv
3 X
Ibid
138
w as a p p o i n t e d to arrange for the convening of th e F irst Cod
ifica tio n C onference.
B. The 1930 C o n f e r e n c e D e l i b e r a t i o n s 82
F o rty-seven S t a t e s , plus th e S o v i e t Union i n an ob
server cap acity , atten d ed th e C o d ific a tio n C onference held
i n T h e H a g u e f r o m 13 M a r c h t o 12 A p r i l 1930 (se e T able 2 ).
To f a c i l i t a t e d elib eratio n s, th e P r e p a r a t o r y C om m ittee had
circu lated q u e stio n n aires to in v ited governm ents seeking
th eir view s on, in ter a l i a , th e lim its of, and r i g h t s to be
ex ercised w ithin and a d j a c e n t t o , th e t e r r i t o r i a l s e a . ® 321*
A t h o r o u g h r e v i e w and a n a l y s i s o f e v e n t s i m m e d ia te ly
l e a d i n g t o t h e Hague C o n f e r e n c e a s w e l l a s i t s d e l i b e r
a t i o n s i s found in S R osenne, League o f N a tio n s C o n fe r
e n c e f o r t h e C o d i f i c a t i o n o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law [ 1 9 3 0 ]
( 1 9 7 5 ) [ h e r e a f t e r c i t e d ’Hague C o n f e r e n c e ' ] v o l i , x i i i -
lv i. F o r b r i e f e r r e v i e w s o f t h e C o n f e r e n c e s s e e M H ud
s o n , "The f i r s t c o n f e r e n c e f o r t h e c o d i f i c a t i o n o f i n
t e r n a t i o n a l l a w " ( 1 9 3 0 ) 24 A J IL 4 4 7 ; a n d J R e e v e s , " T h e
c o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e law o f t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s " i n i b i d
486 .
HAGUE U N CLOS
CONFERENCE I II 1 III
Afghanistan X X
Albania X X X
Algeria X
Angola X
Antigua & 3arbuda X
Argentina X X X
Australia X X X X
Austria X X X X
Bah a m a s X
Bahrain X
Bangaldesh X
Barbados X
Belgium X X X X
3enin X
Bhutan X
Bolivia X X X
Botswana X
Brazil X X X X
Bulgaria X X X X
Burma X X X
Burundi X
B y e l o r u s s i a n SSR X X X
Canada X X X X
C ape V e r d e X
C e n t r a l A f r i c a n Rep X
C had X
Chile X X X X
Chin X X X X
Colombia X X X X
C o m o r o s Islands X
Co n g o X
C o s t a Rica X X X
Cuba X X X X
Cyprus X
Czechoslovakia X X X X
Danzig X
Kampuchea X X X
DPR of K o rea X
Dem Y e m e n X
Denmark X X X X
Djibouti X
Dominica X
Dominican Republic X X X
Ecuador X X X
E gypt X X X X
El S a l v a d o r X X X X
Equatorial Guinea X
Estonia X
Ethiopia X X
Fiji X
Finland X X X X
France X X X X
Gabon X
Gambia X
German Dem Republic X X
Fed R e p u b l i c of G e r m a n y X X X X
Ghana X X X
G reece X X X X
Grenada X
Guatemala X X X
Gu i n e a X X
Guinea-Bissau X
Guyana X
H aiti X X X
H o l y See X X X
Honduras X X X
Hungary X X X X
Iceland X X X X
India X X X X
Indonesia X X X
Iran X X X X
Iraq X X X
Ire l a n d X X X X
Israel X X X
Italy X X X X
I v o r y C oast X
Jamaica X
Japan X X X X
Jordan X X X
TABLE 2 (con *t )
HAG U E UNCLOS
CONFERENCE I II III
Kenya X
Laos X X X
Latvia X
Lebanon X X X
Lesotho X
Liberia X X X
Libya X X X
Liechtenstein X
Luxembourg X X X X
Madagascar X
Malawi X
Malaysia X X X
Maldives X
Mali X
Malta X
Mauritania X
Mauritius X
Mexico X X X X
Monaco X X X X
Mongolia X
Morocco X X X
Mozambique X
Nauru X
Nepal X X
Netherlands X X X X
New Zealand X X X
Nicaragua X X X X
Niger X
Nigeria X
Norway X X X X
Oman X
Pakistan X X X
Panama X X X
Papua New Guinea X
Paraguay X X X
P eru X X X X
Philippines X X X
Poland X X X X
Portugal X X X X
Qatar X
Rep of K o r e a X X X
Romania X X X X
Rwanda X
S a i n t L u cia X
St V i n c e n t & G r e n a d i n e s X
Samoa X
San M a r i n o X X X
Sao T o m e & P r i n c i p e X
Saudi Arabia X X X
Senegal X
Seycelles X
S i e r r e L eone X
Singapore X
S o l o m o n Islands X
Somalia X
South Africa X X X X
Spain X X X X
Sri L a n k a X X X
Sudan X X
Suriname X
Swaziland X
Sweden X X X X
Switzerland X X X X
Syria X X X
Thailand X X X
T ogo X
Tonga X
Trinidad & Tobago X
Tunisia X X X
Turkey X X X X
U k r a i n i a n SSR X X X
USSR X X X X
U Arab Emirates X
UK X X X X
U Rep o f C a m e r o o n X X
U Rep of T a n z a n i a X
U SA X X X X
Upper Volta X
Uruguay X X X X
Venezuela X X X
Viet-Nam X X X
Yemen X X
Yugoslavia X X X X
Z aire X
Zambia X
Zimbabwe X
139
The views of States were many and varied. At what
might be taken as one extreme, the United Kingdom's position
was typical of numerous others. "A convention fixing a uni
form breadth [for the territorial sea] of three miles for
all States and for all purposes is both possible and desir
able,” she c l a i m e d . T h e r e were no known special circum
stances justifying a greater limit, and particular needs of
coastal States beyond three miles might be met by "arrange
ments ... embodied in bilateral conventions between the States
concerned” .e=s
At the other extreme, Portugal again presaged much
later discussion by relating territorial sea limits and a
coastal S t a t e ’s rights beyond that area directly to the need
to protect national fishery interests. Either a single 18-
mile limit should be established for the territorial sea in
order to accommodate all coastal State interests, it was ar
gued, or different limits should be set for different pur
poses. Often, coastal populations were heavily dependent on
adjacent fishery resources and the latter were threatened by
foreigners overfishing local stocks, observed Portugal. Be
cause regulation of littoral resources must be constantly
and strictly supervised over a sufficiently wide area to be
effective, it is both costly and primarily affects the State
whose interests were linked with the exploitation of those
waters. Therefore, control can be maintained and exercised
"only by a State within a zone under its sovereignty or as
signed to its exclusive use".96 For those reasons, con
cluded Portugal, "the breadth of the territorial sea for
purposes of fishing and with a view to giving States exclu
sive fishing rights should be much more than six miles".3-7
The fundamental difference of views remained in the
Conference itself. While not directly addressing the issue
Ibid 247
Ibid
Ibid 249-250
Ibid
140
of fisheries, Italy's delegate expressed the sentiments of
many in denying that claims to a territorial sea wider than
three miles would represent a change in existing interna
tional law: "Ctjhere is only one international principle...
and that is...the State’s right to possess territorial wa
ters. The question of the breadth does not depend on a
principle of international law; it is a matter to be settled
by agreement” .130
In an attempt to reach a compromise, a number of States
primarily interested in coastal fishery resources offered to
modify earlier demands for broad territorial waters. Portu
gal's representative, for example, was willing to accept a
six-mile territorial sea, provided that there was also a
six-mile "adjacent zone" where the coastal State would be
accorded "rights over certain matters and, in particular,
police rights over fisheries. . . " . While the coastal State
would not be able to exclude foreign fishermen from the
zone, it would be permitted to apply its domestic fishing
regulations to avoid over-exploitation of resources and con
comitant harmful effects on fish stocks in the coastal
State's own territorial waters.30
Iceland's delegate, while supporting a four-mile terri
torial sea, "provided it were possible to have some rules
for protecting the fisheries in certain areas outside the
territorial waters",31 proposed that consideration be given
to the desirability of the coastal State participating in
scientific research concerning fisheries in adjacent wa
ters.32 On the basis of research results, he continued, "it
might be a subject for consideration whether the rules for
Ibid 1335-1337
Ibid 1344
92
Ibid 1390.
141
controlling fisheries in territorial seas could not be ex
tended to certain areas outside these limits".993
Unswerving opposition to extensive coastal State juris
diction in any form came, however, from the major maritime
nations. The Japanese representative, for example, refused
to recognize that the coastal State should have exclusive
rights with respect to fisheries in territorial waters be
yond three miles, "as that would be equivalent to admitting
that a part of the high sea should be treated more or less
as if it formed part of territorial waters".94
The British spokesman, for his part, consistently main
tained that the width of the territorial sea was ”and has
always been a limit of three miles". 9,55 The most appropriate
means of solving fishery problems such as those raised by
Portugal, he claimed, would be for the various nations
concerned to attempt to reconcile differences by individual
agreements rather than by a single convention governing the
world’s fisheries as a whole.®®
The American delegate, although conceding that ” [s]ome-
times the conservation of fisheries has... been mentioned as
a reason upon which a State may take measures upon the high
sea adjacent to its marginal sea," and that three miles may
be insufficient for fishery regulation,®"7 nevertheless "ac
cepted three marine miles as the breadth of territorial wa
ters subject to the sovereignty of the State".9*® In Confer
ence discussions, the United States did not refer substant-
Ibid 1223-1224
Ibid 1343
w Ibid 1 4 1 3
lo e Ibid 3 6 1
A ccording to S c o t t ("The I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n
a l L a w " ( 1 9 2 7 ) 2 1 AJIL 7 1 6 , 7 2 6 ) , w h o w a s a t t h a t t i m e
P r e s i d e n t o f t h e I D I , " t h e o u t c o m e was d u e t o t h e f e e l
i n g , a p p a r e n t l y g e n e r a l , t h a t res nullius m e a n t o n e
146
”il peut etre desirable...que cette liberte, au moins par
rapport ^ certaines especes de vie marine, soit soumises ^
des restrictions” .110 They suggest that ”il soit possible
de supposer qu'il doit etre sous-entendu que cet usage [ie,
de la peche en haute mer] soit raisonnable et destructif de
son propre objet” .*
111
* Law and the practice of mankind give
all men and all States rights over the sea in the nature of
servitudes, but do not affirm the right of ownership of the
sea itself, as a body of water, much less indicate the na
ture of such a right.
Granted that many aspects of international law relating
to marine fisheries were still in the process of develop
ment, what could be said definitely at present? According
to Wilson and Williams, the concepts of res nullius and res
communis could not usefully be applied to either the high
seas or their resources. Having their origin in land law
and the purposes for which land was used, neither concept
could explain the legal nature of the waters of the sea, nor
were they necessary with respect to fisheries. As for the
former, a res nullius is normally capable of being the ob
ject of individual ownership, but not so the sea. If one
wished, on the other hand, to consider the latter as res
communis, a common property, and not as the object of cer
tain common rights, one encountered the difficulty that wa
ters do not respect limits of the territorial sea and thus
one minute may be territorial while the next minute not.
For this reason, they argue,
un Etat aanquerait a ses devoirs international^ s ’il negligeait de prendre les aesures
appropriees pour eap$cher les pratiques qui, a la luaiere de la science, sont notoire-
aent contraires a 1 ’exploitation et ^ la protection rationnelles des richesses de la
ier.119
Ibid 131
149
V. Conclusion
The origin of the crisis in the law of the sea with regard to fisheries is to be found
in the Proclamations by President Truman (28 September 1945)
Judge de Castro1
I- Introduction
a n d E K o r o v i n ' s r e f e r e n c e t o ’’t h e p o l i c y o f a g g r e s s i o n
and w a r” b e in g i n s e p a r a b l e from " c o n te m p o r a ry d e c a d e n t
c a p i t a l i s m ( i m p e r i a l i s m ) ” and "U.S. i m p e r ia li s m as th e
b u l w a r k and c e n t e r o f w o r l d r e a c t i o n ” ( " C o l d War: t h e
o ry and p r a c t i c e " ( J u n e , 1959) I n te r n a tio n a l A f f a i r s
[Moscow] 6, 1 1 ) .
C f , H o f f m a n , s u p r a Ch 2 , n 1 1 , 2 2 4 ; M o r g e n t h a u , s u p r a n
2, 3 8 6 -3 8 7 ; N o rth e d g e and G r ie v e , su p ra n 2, 2 5 0 -2 5 1 ; P
P a r t r i d g e , "The c o n f l i c t o f i d e o l o g i e s ” in P a th s to
Peace (1957; V W a lla c e , ed) 89, 100; and Evan Luard
( T h e C o l d War: a R e a p p r a i s a l ( 1 9 6 4 ) 1 0 ) , who s u g g e s t s
that
It is indeed arguable that the contest has at all times been at root a
power struggle between dominant nations, for which ideological explana
tions have merely provided a convenient, and morally appealing,
rationalization. It has derived above all from apprehensions, of both
leading powers and their allies on each side, concerning their own
security, believed to be threatened by the actions of the other.
Such i s in d e e d th e a rg u m e n t o f P i t i r i m S o r o k i n
("The r e a l c a u s e s o f t h e R u ssia n -A m e ric a n c o n f l i c t "
( 1 9 4 9 ) 3 ( n . s . ) W o r l d A f f a i r s 1 1 3 , 1 2 1 ) , wh o w r i t e s t h a t
These, then, are the real reasons for the continued 'cold war'.
The prevalent explanations of i t in terms of inherent differences, or of
the 'aggressiveness' of the opposite party contrasted with the 'pure no
b ility ' of one's own party, is a mere smoke-screen hiding the ugly
realities.
T o ta l, e x c lu d in g A nnual
T o ta l W h a le s % In c re a s e
R e f l e c t i n g t h i s t r e n d , t h e R e s o l u t i o n o n E c o n o m i c C o
o p e r a t i o n o f t h e 1955 A s i a n - A f r i c a n C o n f e r e n c e ( s u p r a n
16, 14133) i n t e r a l i a , "recom m ended t h a t A s i a n - A f r i c a n
c o u n t r i e s s h o u l d d i v e r s i f y t h e i r e x p o r t t r a d e by p r o
c e s s i n g t h e i r raw m a t e r i a l s w h e n e v e r e c o n o m i c a l l y f e a
s ib le before e x p o r t..." . S ee a l s o on t h i s p o i n t F a -
t o u r o s , s u p r a I n t r o d u c t i o n , n 24, 7 9 5 -7 9 6 , and S i n h a ,
s u p r a n 4 , C hs 2 a n d 3 .
X 3
S e e , eg, M F r a n k , " F i s h e r i e s o f S o u th A m e r i c a " (March
2 5 , 1 9 4 4 ) F o r e i g n C o m m e r c e W e e k l y 8 ; R M o r g a n , "Some
c o m p a r a t i v e a s p e c t s o f w o r l d s e a f i s h e r i e s " ( 1 9 5 1 ) 36
G eography 111, 116; B O s o r i o - T a f a l l , " B e t t e r u t i l i z a
t i o n o f f i s h e r i e s r e s o u r c e s i n L a t i n A m erica" (1951) 4
FAO F i s h e r i e s B 3 , 6 - 7 , 1 1 , 2 3 ; a n d SOFA 1 9 5 6 , 1 2 5 .
157
t i o n , 1^ i t is not su rp risin g th at the fundam ental tran sfo rm
atio n s ex p erien ced in both th e stru ctu re and f u n c t i o n i n g of
th at so ciety in th e e a rly and m i d - t w e n t i e t h cen tu ry o u tlin ed
above le d to what num erous w r i t e r s describ ed as a 'c r is is '
in in tern atio n al law , both as a system or c o lle c tio n of
ru les b i n d i n g members o f in tern atio n al so ciety and as a sci
e n c e . 20 On o n e s i d e sto o d th e m ajor W estern S t a t e s , con
cerned w ith the w i n n i n g o f t h e C o l d War a n d , tow ards th a t
g o al, th e need to m ain tain th e sta tu s q u o a s much a s p o ssi
b le concerning th e co n ten t of tra d itio n a l norms o f i n t e r n a
tio n al law t h a t th e y had d e v e lo p e d over th e cen tu ries in or
der to p ro tect th eir m u ltifario u s g lo b al in terests, and th e
degree of c o n tro l they ex ercised o v e r t h e m anner i n w hich
norms w e re f o r m u l a t e d . P itted ag ain st them w e re t h e oth er
p ro tag o n ists o f t h e C o ld War, t h e Com m unist S t a t e s , p articu
larly th e S o v i e t U nion (at least in th e e a r ly years), as
w ell as T hird W orld S t a t e s , many o f t h e la tte r only r e c e n tly
having g a in ed independence. W hile r e c o g n i z i n g both th e po-
even as among the older States who were already legal actors in 1939 [the
date he chooses for reference to 'traditional' international law ] aany
of the rules reflected the interests of the stronger States rather than
those of the community generally. ...The rules concerning territo rial
waters and the high seas favoured the great maritime nations, who of
course also included the major naval Powers. And they naturally favoured
the interests of the metropolitan territories of these States rather than
of their colonial possessions.
In view of the pressing need for conservation and protection of fisheries re
sources, the...United States regards it as proper to establish conservation zones in
those areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts.. .wherein fishing activities
have been or in the future aay be developed and aaintained on a substantial scale.
Where such activities have been developed and aaintained by its nationals alone, the
United States regards it as proper to establish explicitly bounded conservation zones
in which all fishing activities shall be subject to the regulation and control of the
United States and may when conditions warrant be liaited to the United States. Where
such activities have been legitiaately developed and aaintained by nationals of other
states, explicitly bounded conservation zones aay be established under agreeaents be
tween the United States and such other states; and all fishing activities in such
zones shall be subject to the regulation and control of, and stay when conditions war
rant be liaited to, the United States and such other states. The right of any state
to establish conservation zones off its shores in accordance with the above principles
is conceded, provided that corresponding recognition is given to any fishing interests
of nationals of the United States which aay exist in such areas. The character as
high seas of the areas in which such conservation zones are established and the right
to their free and uniapeded navigation are in no way thus affected.3 0
Memorandum by t h e A c t i n g S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e and t h e
S e c re ta ry of th e I n t e r i o r (Ickes) to P re s id e n t Roose
v e l t , 2 2 J a n u a r y 1 9 4 5 , i n FRUS ( 1 9 4 5 ) i i , [ h e r e a f t e r
c i t e d ' G r e w / I c k e s ' Memorandum'] 1490 ( e m p h a s is added)
The United States is a maritime nation. The role of our Navy in keeping
the seas free for international commerce must not 'De underestimated.
Moreover, the interest of the United States as a member of the family of
nations in preserving the peace is best served by affording maximum free
dom and range to warships and aircraft of the U.S. Navy.
Ibid
164
has participated in the fishery...".33 And finally, region
al regulations must apply to all those exploiting the fish
ery and "should be made among the states whose continued use
of or relative proximity to the affected resources give them
the interest and intimate knowledge necessary for wise and
effective control...".3S
The policy, it was explained, rested on the premise
that reasonable and just bases for the exercise of fishery
jurisdiction in high seas contiguous to the coastal State
may be found in four factors: proximity of the fisheries to
the coast; development and maintenance of substantial fish
ing activities by the State’s nationals; the absence of such
activities by States other than those proposing to exercise
authority; and the existence of, or need for, conservation
measures in the area in question.37'
As for the possibility of limiting fishing in certain
circumstances,30 the Explanatory Statement observed that it
was not envisaged "that the establishment of conservation
zones under [the] policy [would] effect any general exclu
sion from all such zones of all fishing enterprises of na
tionalities other than of the United States and other states
establishing the zone".30 Similarly, it guaranteed that
” [u]nder the policy the rights of all states which have
taken any substantial part in the fishery are preserved".'*0
The Statement concluded by confirming that high seas
freedoms in the conservation zone "other than fishing would
remain unaffected", and that the adoption of the proposed
measures was "not to be regarded as in conflict with the
general principles of international law, and especially
Ibid
Ibid 1498
Ibid 1499
165
those rules relating to navigation and other aspects of the
freedom of the seas” .41
With the death of Roosevelt, it was left to his succes
sor, President Truman, to enunciate the new American policy.
In the six months interval between the initial approval of
the policy by Roosevelt and its announcement by Truman, the
United States consulted 12 foreign governments, seeking
their support,42 Only Cuba and the United Kingdom responded
substantively, although Canada informally indicated her
position. Cuba alone supported the American proposal, her
endorsement nevertheless being contingent upon accommodation
of Cuban fishing interests in established zones.43
The British were far more cautious. They considered it
reasonable that a State which had alone been responsible for
the development of a high sea fishery had a right to expect
others to conform to measures required to keep the fishery
in satisfactory condition. They also agreed that fisheries
should be regulated regionally rather than globally. How
ever, the United Kingdom strongly preferred emphasis placed
on the principle of the three-mile territorial limit and in
ternational rather than national control of fisheries beyond
Ibid
Where such activities have been or shall hereafter be developed and maintained by its
nationals alone, the United States regards it as proper to establish explicitly
bounded conservation zones in which fishing activities shall be subject to the regula-
N o t a l l b r a n c h e s o f t h e US G o v e r n m e n t w e r e i n f a v o u r o f
th e co u rse u ltim a te ly adopted. In 1944, f o r exam ple,
t h e O f f i c e o f Econom ic A f f a i r s o f t h e S t a t e D e p a rtm e n t
e x p r e s s e d t h e view t h a t " s o s i g n i f i c a n t a d e p a r t u r e
fro m p a s t p r a c t i c e s u n d e r t h e law o f n a t i o n s c a n n o t be
w h o l l y s e p a r a t e d from t h e m eth o d by w h ic h i t m i g h t be
p u t i n t o e f f e c t " . The c o u r s e p r o p o s e d , t h e O f f i c e a r
g u e d , m ig h t " l e a d t o m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , s u s p i c i o n , and
o p p o s i t i o n on t h e p a r t o f many o t h e r c o u n t r i e s ” . It
s u g g e s te d t h a t t h e c o n c u r r e n c e o f a number o f c o u n t
r i e s , in c lu d in g C anada, N ew foundland, th e U n ite d K ing
dom, t h e S o v i e t U n io n , M e x ic o an d E c u a d o r , was " e s s e n
t i a l " b e f o r e t h e US a l o n e t o o k a n y a c t i o n s u c h a s t h a t
p r o p o s e d (M emorandum by t h e O f f i c e o f E c o n o m ic A f f a i r s ,
2 3 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 4 , i n FRUS, supra n 3 0 , 1 4 8 5 - 1 4 3 7 ) . T h e
f o llo w in g y e a r, th e D e p a rtm e n t's I n t e r n a t i o n a l T rade
P o l i c y D i v i s i o n recom m ended t h a t i n s t e a d o f u n i l a t e r a l
a c t i o n and in l i g h t o f t h e p o o r r e s p o n s e from o t h e r
g o v e r n m e n t s t o t h e A m e r i c a n i n i t i a t i v e , " i t w o u ld seem
m ore a p p r o p r i a t e e i t h e r t o f o l l o w up t h e m a t t e r d i r e c t
ly w ith th e v a r io u s g o v ern m en ts, or to u se th e a p p ro p
r i a t e i n t e r e s t e d a g e n c y , t h e FAO, a s a m e a n s t o d e v e l o p
a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c y ” ( T h o r p , supra n 4 2 , 1 5 2 5 ) .
I n t h e l i g h t o f s u c h c o m m e n t s , why t h e n d i d t h e US
proceed to ta k e u n i l a t e r a l a c tio n ? A c c o rd in g to H ol-
l i c k ( O c e a n s P o l i c y , supra n 2 9 , 5 4 ) ,
Ibid
None of the above sources explain the background to the
decision made by the US to amend the fishery policy as
requested by the British (see text accompanying n 44
supra). A memorandum from the Acting Secretary of the
Interior (Fortas) to the Acting Secretary of State,
dated 17 September 1945 (FRUS, supra n 30, 1527) simply
stated that the former was sending the latter the re
vised Proclamation for his action.
Patricia Kinsey ("The tunaboat dispute and the in
ternational law of fisheries"(1969) 6 CWILJ 114, 116)
asserts that "the Proclamation itself is not law, but
an expression of national policy. As such, it is not
enforceable against foreign nationals who might enter
and fish in areas regularly fished by United States
nationals."
The present writer has been unable to find any
support among official statements for such a position,
and it would appear from the accompanying press release
(infra text accompanying n 52) and the wording of the
Executive Order that the policy was meant to have legal
effect (cf, E Allen, "Legal limits of coastal fishery
protection"(1946) 21 Washington L R and State Bar J 1;
and Szekely, supra Ch 2, n 69, 65). Perhaps among the
best evidence that the Proclamation and Executive Order
(at least the latter) were considered as valid American
domestic law is the fact that they were incorporated
within the US Statutes at Large, and that the Supreme
169
the accompanying press release32 stated that the proclaimed
policy related only to the Western Hemisphere, as had been
requested by the British.3:3
a clear distinction aay be drawn between steps taken for the protection of coastal
fisheries, in which recognition aust be given to established fishing activities and
interests of nationals of one country off the coasts of another country, and measures
which lay be adopted with a view to protecting undersea lineral resources contiguous
to the coast.55'5'
I b i d 1500-1501
I b i d 1501
« so
I b i d 1502
171
The S tatem en t co n clu d ed by n o tin g th at th e c o n tin e n ta l
sh e lf was u su ally d efin ed as "th at part of the undersea lan d
m ass ad jacen t to th e co ast, over w hich th e sea is not m ore
than 100 fathom s (600 feet) in d e p t h , ” and th at w here th e
sh e lf was shared w ith an a d jacen t S tate, the b o u n d aries
w ould p ro p erly be d ecid ed "upon a fair and e q u ita b le b asis,
as th e u tiliz a tio n of undersea resources p r o g r e s s e s " . 01
In lig h t of th e alm o st to ta l lack of in te rn atio n a l re
actio n among S tates co n su lted co n cern in g th e proposed p o l
icy , on 28 S eptem ber 1945, P resid en t Trum an p ro claim ed to
g eth er w ith th e p o licy rela tin g to fish e rie s, th e "P o licy of
th e U nited S tates w ith respect to the N atu ral R esources of
th e S u b so il and Sea Bed of th e C o n tin en tal S h e lf" , e x actly
as it had been e a rlie r approved by h is p r e d e c e s s o r .62
Ibid 1 5 0 2 - 1 5 0 3
T h e P r o c l a m a t i o n ( P r o c l a m a t i o n No 2 6 6 7 , 10 Fed Reg
1 2 3 0 3 ; 3 C F R , 1 9 4 3 - 1 9 4 3 Comp 6 7 ; 5 9 Stat 8 8 4 ) a n d i t s
c o m p a n i o n E x e c u t i v e O r d e r (No 9 6 3 3 ; 1 0 Fed Reg 1 2 3 0 5 ; 3
CFR, 1 9 4 3 - 1 9 4 8 Comp 4 3 7 ) a r e i n W h i t e m a n , supra n 2 7 ,
7 5 6 - 7 5 9 , a n d 1 UNLS, supra C h 2 , n 7 3 , 3 8 - 4 1 . The
P ro clam atio n read in p a rt as fo llo w s:
the United States and the State concerned in accordance with equitable
principles. The character as high seas of the waters above the continen
tal shelf and the right to their free and uniapeded navigation are in no
way thus affected.
P a r s o n s [ A n n e x 1 ] , supra n 3 3 . This d id n o t n e c e s s a r
i l y m e an t h a t i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r y q u o t a s w i t h i n a n o v e r
a l l c o n s e r v a t i o n r e g im e w e re c o n s i d e r e d p o s s i b l e . Ac
c o r d i n g t o W a l t e r C ha pm an ( " U n i t e d S t a t e s p o l i c y o n
h i g h s e a s f i s h e r i e s " ( J a n u a r y 1 6 , 1 9 4 9 ) 20 DOSB 6 7 , 7 1 ,
80) ,
the goal at which the United States aims [is] to provide the possibility
of management for each high seas fishery in the world to the end that the
population of fish upon which the fishery works will be kept at that
level at which a maximum crop can be harvested year after year.
The nations of the world could not possibly agree at this time
on who will get what share of that crop.
That part of the problem must be left, for the present, to free
enterprise and competition. There is a crop to be taken in the interna
tional common. Each takes according to his ability. When the safe crop
is taken, all stop the harvest.
I t may b e n o t e d i n p a s s i n g t h a t g i v e n t h e c o m p a r a
t i v e l y h i g h l y d e v e lo p e d s t a t e o f t h e A m erican f i s h i n g
i n d u s t r y a f t e r t h e w a r , t h e US n a t u r a l l y w a s n o t d i s a d
v a n t a g e d by s u c h " f r e e c o m p e t i t i o n " .
See t e x t a c c o m p a n y i n g nn 3 5 a n d 49 supra.
See t e x t a c c o m p a n y i n g n 4 9 supra.
T h a t t h e f i s h e r i e s P r o c l a m a t i o n w as d e s i g n e d to allow
fo r th e e x e rc is e of ex clu siv e fis h in g rig h ts by t h e US
174
policy statem ent as originally approved by R oosevelt and its
accom panying Explanatory Statem ent asserted such a right of
lim itation, although the latte r also did not anticipate any
exclusions actually e v e n t u a t i n g . 69 Even if total exclusion
b e y o n d t h e t e r r i t o r i a l s e a was t h e a c c e p t e d i n t e r p r e t a
t i o n of a number of A m erican e x p e r t s w r i t i n g im m e d ia te
ly fo llo w in g th e p o l i c y 's announcem ent. In e a r l y 1946,
f o r e x a m p le , Edwin B o r c h a rd o f t h e Board o f E d i t o r s o f
t h e AJIL w r o t e t h a t t h e P r o c l a m a t i o n " g a v e a s o m e w h a t
r a d i c a l s o l u t i o n " t o t h e p r o b l e m o f t a k i n g B r i s t o l Bay
s a lm o n on t h e h i g h s e a s , and m arked " a n i n n o v a t i o n i n
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law" as i t so u g h t a " f i s h i n g monopoly in
p l a c e s h e r e t o f o r e r e g a rd e d as r e s n u lli u s [ s i c ] " and
ev id e n c e d "not a growing i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m but a w e ll-
d efin ed natio n alism " ("Resources of the c o n tin e n ta l
s h e l f " ( 1 9 4 6 ) 40 AJIL 5 3 , 5 4 ) . He a d d e d ( i b i d 5 5 ) t h a t
" [ s j in c e th e U nited S ta te s claim s th e se r ig h ts fo r i t
s e l f , i t cannot o b ject to s im ila r or p o ssib ly even
g r e a t e r e n c r o a c h m e n t s on t h e h i g h s e a s by o t h e r
nations".
S i m i l a r l y , P r o f e s s o r J Bingham w r o te c o n t e m p o r a n e
o u s ly ("The c o n t i n e n t a l s h e l f and th e m a rg in a l b e l t " in
i b i d 173, 176) t h a t t h e t r a d i t i o n a l A m erican p o l i c y
invited foreign fishing in areas where [its] fishermen believed the [US]
should exercise exclusive control and if foreign invasion should result,
[its] case for excluding the invaders would be jeopardized by [its] unre
voked previous declarations of policy. ...
The course adopted by.. .President Truman...is wise and progres
sive statesmanship. It at once warns foreigners that the old invitation
to invasion is withdrawn — a warning which generally will be heeded —
and i t gives legal protection in advance to national interests of great
importance which politically [the US] could not abandon or easily compro
mise. There is no doubt that any state with power to do so would defend
its coastal interests in like manner.
Y a m a m o to d o e s n o t i n d i c a t e who m a d e th e e x p la n a tio n s or
a s s e r tio n s r e f e rr e d to above.
In virtually all respects, the policy and its rationale were designed to
protect U.S. salmon resources from the Japanese. ...[Tjhis was made ex
plicit by the inclusion in the [Explanatory Statement] of a statement by
Secretary [of State] Hull in 1938, in the context of the U.S.-Japanese
dispute. 'An industry.. .which has been built up by the nationals of one
country cannot in fairness be left to be destroyed by the nationals of
other countries.' The message was clear. New entrants were not to be
allowed into a developed fishery.
T h a t t h i s re m a in e d th e i n t e n t o f th e p o l ic y as f i
n a l l y e n u m e ra te d i s p e rh a p s r e f l e c t e d by a s ta t e m e n t in
t h e a c c o m p a n y i n g p r e s s r e l e a s e ( W h i t e m a n , supra n 2 7 ,
95 6 -9 5 7 ) t h a t
T h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e US o n t h i s i m p o r t a n t p o i n t a p
p e a rs to have s h if te d s ig n i f ic a n tl y in a s h o rt p e rio d
o f tim e . I n a n o t e fro m D oom an, S p e c i a l S e c r e t a r y t o
th e A s s i s t a n t S e c r e ta r y o f S t a t e , to W rig h t, C o u n se lo r
o f t h e B r i t i s h E m b a s s y , d a t e d 2 0 J u n e 1 9 4 5 ( FRUS , supra
n 30, 1515; s q u a re b r a c k e ts in o r i g i n a l ) , th e fo rm er
w ro te :
In r e s p o n s e to th e s u b s e q u e n t s p e c i f i c s u g g e s tio n
b y t h e UK t h a t t h e p o l i c y s t a t e m e n t r e f r a i n f r o m l i m i t
in g to A m e ric an n a t i o n a l s f i s h i n g o p e r a t i o n s c o n tig u o u s
t o A m e ric a n c o a s t s d e v e lo p e d by A m e ric a n n a t i o n a l s
( W r i g h t t o D o o m a n , supra n 4 4 , 1 5 1 6 , 1 5 1 7 ) , D o o m a n o n 6
176
of new com ers to a pro claim ed fish ery zone w ere n o t tru ly
co n tem p lated by t h e p o licy , acco rd in g to P rofessors M cDougal
and B urke, th e P ro clam atio n "appears to en v isag e th a t th e
reg u latio n s adopted by t h e U nited S tates sh all apply to new
com ers to th e fish ery irresp ec tiv e of th e ir u n w illin g n ess to
abide by t h e r e g u l a t i o n s " . 70
The s p a t e of u n ilatera l claim s by o t h e r S tates fo llo w
ing th e Trum an P r o c l a m a t i o n s g en erated o b je ctio n s from th e
U n ited S t a t e s ' 71 a n d attem p ts by t h e la tte r to c larify th e ir
in ten tio n s in m aking th e 1945 announcem ents. In 1950, for
exam ple, th e U n ited S tates advised Norway t h a t th e fish e rie s
P ro clam atio n did not represent a new c o n c e p t in in te rn a tio n
al law nor d id it alter "in a n y way t h e p re-ex istin g regim e
of th e high s e a s " . ' 72 The p o l i c y related so lely to U n ited
J u l y 1 9 4 5 a d v i s e d W r i g h t t h a t t h e US c o u l d n o t s e e
t h e i r w ay c l e a r t o m e e t i n g t h e s u g g e s t i o n . He e x p l a i n
e d ( FRUS, s u p r a n 3 0 , 1 5 2 2 - 1 5 2 3 ; e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) t h a t :
S e e Ch 6 i n f r a .
FRUS 1 9 5 0 , i , 3 9 3 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) ; b u t s e e t e x t a c c o m
p a n y i n g nn 2 8 , 2 9 , 32 a n d 4 1 , a n d nn 48 a n d 69 s u p r a .
A lth o u g h he d o es n o t c o n s i d e r th e P r o c la m a tio n in d e
t a i l , P r o f e s s o r W aldock s e e s t h e f o r m e r a s n o t m e r e ly a
r e - s t a t e m e n t o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l law o f t h e s e a ("T h e
l e g a l b a s i s o f c l a im s to t h e c o n t i n e n t a l s h e l f " (1951)
36 T r a n s o f t h e G r o t i u s S o c 1 1 5 , 1 3 8 ) :
Chapman, S p e c i a l A s s i s t a n t t o t h e A m e ric a n S e c r e
t a r y o f S t a t e , w e n t someway t o w a r d s e n d o r s i n g t h o s e o b
s e r v a t i o n s i n h i s 1949 a r t i c l e ( s u p r a n 6 5 ) . The v a r i
ous u n i l a t e r a l , b i l a t e r a l and m u l t i l a t e r a l a rra n g e m e n ts
177
States nationals and merely declared the intention to regu
late where necessary their fishing activities in high seas
contiguous to American coasts,73
High seas fishery conservation measures, the United
States subsequently explained, "must be taken in agreement
with other countries having legitimate interests in fishing
in such waters".74 Furthermore, they added, there was no
rule of international law allowing any coastal State "unila
terally to claim sovereignty over adjacent waters heretofore
recognized as high seas".75
If the interpretation subsequently placed by the United
States on their 1945 fisheries Proclamation indeed reflected
the parameters of the ’new' policy and no right was claimed
that was not already possessed by States, what then is the
significance of the Truman Proclamation for the development
of the law? That question might best be answered by consid-
L a u t e r p a c h t , s u p r a n 77, 393-394
The r a t i o n a l e f o r t h e p r i n c i p l e , a c c o r d i n g t o O ppenheim
( i b i d 5 9 3 - 5 9 4 ) , i s t h a t w hich le d G r o t i u s o r i g i n a l l y to
a tta c k p re te n s io n s to e x te n s iv e m a ritim e s o v e re ig n ty ,
nam ely,
in accordance with its true purpose and the ever valid test of reasonableness. Its
true purpose is to ensure freedom of navigation, unhampered by exclusive claims of in
dividual states, and freedoa of utilization of the resources of the sea to a degree to
which they can be equitably utilized by all.®**
went a long way in the direction of supplying what may be called the philosophy of the
new doctrine in terms of national and international interest, of modern scien tific
progress, and of geographical propinquity which make the u tilizatio n of the resources
of the submarine areas by the coastal state feasible and essential. ...[The .American
and other claims] appealed to the te st which is decisive in relation to the freedom of
the sea, namely, the te st of reasonableness and of legitimate common and particular
in terest. For unless the exploitation of submarine resources is to become a source of
frictio n , disorder and uncertainty, i t must be consistent, as a rule, with economic
considerations. Moreover, i t is the only solution compatible with the security of the
coastal state. The coastal state cannot be expected to tolerate permanent in sta lla
tions, of potential military importance and erected by any state however distant, in
the neighbourhood of its maritime fro n tier.53,3
although amounting in some way to a claim to exercise jurisdiction on the high seas in
areas in which fishery rights have hitherto been exercised only by citizens of the
United States, may not necessarily be inconsistent with a rational interpretation of
the principle of the freedom of the seas so long as its primary object is not the ex
clusion of nationals of foreign states. The same applies to the assertion of ju ris
diction, even though exercised by individual states, for the purpose of safeguarding a
general in terest. . . . I f the freedom of the seas is interpreted so as to result either
in a regime of waste or disorder on the high seas — such as must follow from the ab
sence of effective agreement in the matter of protection of fis h e r ie s ...— or in the
s tiflin g of properly conceived interests of individual states, its authority will dis-
a s
L auterpacht, supra n 77, 414
182
appear and it will be increasingly flouted by unilateral assertions of selfish and 10-
nopolistic interest.3 *5*
III. Conclusion
[The] type of case which coies before the International Court of Justice will often be
of such a kind that a considerable element of legal policy will and, within permissi-
ble legal l i i i t s , should enter into the process of deciding them, taking account of
the c liia te of opinion of the day, and of prevailing social and econoiic tendencies.
I - In tro d u ctio n
the Court's decision has been so strikingly different froi what was considered to have
been existing custoiary law, that the conclusion seeis inescapable that the decision
aay be regarded as a source of law in its own right. Probably the best known illu s
tration of 'law-making' by the International Court was its [1951] decision in the
[Anglo-Norwegian] Fisheries case.'*
S i r G e r a l d F i t z m a u r i c e , ’’J u d i c i a l i n n o v a t i o n - - i t s
u s e s an d i t s p e r i l s - - a s e x e m p l i f i e d i n some o f t h e
w ork o f t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o u r t o f J u s t i c e d u r i n g L ord
M c N a i r ’ s p e r i o d o f o f f i c e " i n C a m b rid g e E s s a y s i n I n -
t e r n a t i o n a l Law: E s s a y s i n H o n o u r o f L o r d M cN a ir ( 1 9 6 5 )
2 4 , 25
G r e i g , s u p r a Ch 2 , n 1 6 7 , 4 0 - 4 1 ; c f , S tark e, s u p r a Ch
1 , n 5 5 , 5 3 - 5 5 ) who o b s e r v e s t h a t
G reig , s u p r a Ch 2 , n 1 6 7 , 4 1 ; c f , H L a u t e r p a c h t , T h e
D e v e l o p m e n t o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law b y t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l
C o u rt (1 9 5 8 ) 186; and J V e r z i j l , The J u r is p r u d e n c e o f
t h e W o r ld C o u r t: A C a se b y C a s e C o m m e n ta ry ( 1 9 6 6 ) i i ,
100, 115-116. Dr E d v a r d Ham bro ( " T h e r e a s o n s b e h i n d
th e d e c is io n s of th e In te r n a tio n a l C ourt of J u s tic e "
(1 9 5 4 ) 7 C u r r e n t L e g a l P ro b le m s 2 1 2 , 2 1 5 ) e x p l a i n s t h a t
" [ i ] t i s t h e r e a s o n i n g b e h in d th e ju d g m e n t and n o t th e
187
La zone de peche deliiitee par le decret de 1935 est consid^r& cone do-
laine laritiie norvegien et non cone une partie de la haute *er sur la-
quelle la Norvege pr£tendrait exercer certaines coipetences speciales.
Ibid i, 56
1o
Ibid 59
189
th e c la im a n t S ta te . T hose e x c e p tio n s w ere " stric tly lim ite d
by i n t e r n a t i o n a l la w , and, w hen. . . a llo w e d , th e b a se -lin e s
may b e d r a w n o n l y by g e o m e tr ic c o n stru c tio n from th e p h y si
cal fa c ts w h ic h ju s tify th e e x c e p t i o n " . 12
A lth o u g h "fo r v ery e x c e p tio n a l reaso n s" sh e d id not
c o n te st N o r w a y 's rig h t to a fo u r-m ile te rrito ria l sea, as a
g en eral p ro p o sitio n th e U n ite d K in g d o m w as n o t p rep ared to
accept a lim it g re a te r th a n th re e m i l e s . 13 The t h r e e - m i l e
d is ta n c e w as b r o a d l y based in S ta te p ra c tic e , and a lth o u g h
th e 1930 H ague C o n fe re n c e fa ile d to re c o g n iz e th re e m ile s as
a u n iv e rs a l ru le , th e C o n feren ce d id not c re a te a ru le sanc
tio n in g a g re a te r b re a d th , e x p la in e d th e B r i t i s h . 1** A ny
w id e r c la im , e ith e r to a te rrito ria l sea or w ith sp e c ific
referen ce to fish e ry ju risd ic tio n , had n e c e ssa rily to be
based on an h i s t o r i c title or th e a c q u ie sc e n c e of th e S ta te
a g a in st w h ic h it is i n v o k e d . 13
I b i d 58
S e e Ch 3 , nn 8 2 f f and ac c o m p a n y in g te x t supra.
P le a d in g s, supra n 7, i i , 398. T h e UK c i t e d i n s u p p o r t
o f h e r p o s i t i o n on f i s h e r y j u r i s d i c t i o n t h e f o ll o w i n g
s t a t e m e n t b y t h e N o r w e g i a n j u r i s t , R a e s t a d ( s u p r a Ch 1 ,
n 169, 180 -1 8 1 ; c i t e d in P l e a d in g s , s u p ra n 7, i i ,
399) :
See Ch 6 infra.
Un systeie juridique qui pretendrait iiposer aux Etats des regies precises, rigides et
unifories ne serait concevable que loyennant un jeu coipliquS de soupapes de surete
qui, s ’il devait etre süffisant pour r£pondre aux besoins reels des Etats, priverait
le systeie des avantages de l'uniforiite, sans lui donner cependant la veritable soup-
lesse dont il aurait besoin. De telles constructions lanquent leur but.2 2
P le a d in g s , su p ra n 7, i, 33
Ib id 5 2 6 -5 3 1
2 -*
Ib id iii, 11
192
4 tre co n sid erees corame l'a c c e ss o i r e de la terre ferme" . *2 ®
The la tte r, how ever, was a "co n d itio n n ecessaire, m ais non
c o n d itio n s ü f f i s a n t e " . 20. In ad d itio n , ” [i]l faut encore que
les in t4 re ts leg itim es de 1 'E tat cö tie r ju stifie r ses pre
t e n t i o n s " . 2-7
’L eg itim ate i n t e r e s t s ’ , N orway e x p l a i n e d , in clu d ed not
only se cu rity concerns but a lso econom ic and so c ia l in te r
e sts, tak en in th eir broadest sense. To be ’le g itim a te ',
how ever, th o se in te rests had to be "en harm onie avec les
co n cep tio n s dont s ' in sp ire 1 ’o r g a n is a tio n de la so ci4 te in
tern a tio n a le et des rap p o rts recip ro q u es des E t a t s " . 2®
In sum th en , it was argued, in d elim itin g the ex ten t of
a co astal S t a t e ’s m aritim e so v ereig n ty ,
C'est affaire d epreciation que de determiner quelles sont ces limites du raison-
nable, etant donne qu'il faut prendre en consideration les facteurs topographiques et
hydrographiques, les conditions economiques et les in te n ts vitaux de la population
riveraine, 1 'usage seculaire et les regies juridiques qui se sont degagees au sein de
l'Etat en question.2 ®
253 Ibid i , 3 7 2 . A t t h e s a m e t i m e (i b i d 3 7 3 ) , N o r w a y e x
p la in e d t h a t th e c o a s t a l S t a t e ' s "dom aine m a ritim e s e r a
l i m i t e . . . p a r l a p o s s i b i l i t e d ’y a s s u r e r , d e l a c o t e , l e
r e s p e c t de son o rd e r ju r id iq u e e t p ar la n e c e s s ite ,
com m andee p a r s e s i n t e r e t s l e g i t i m e s , d ’u s e r d e c e t t e
p o ssib ilite ".
2<9> Ibid i i i , 2 7 4
2^ Ibid i , 3 7 2 . T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e tw e e n t h e tw o c o n d i
t i o n s N o r w a y e x p l a i n e d ( ibid i i i , 2 7 5 ) a s f o l l o w s :
20 Ibid i , 534
29
Ibid i i i , 11
193
In her own case, observed Norway, the legitimate inter
ests included the heavy economic dependence of the coastal
population of the region in question on adjacent fishery re
sources: "[c]'est la peche qui a attire les hommes dans cet-
te region, c ’est la peche qui leur permet d ’y vivre".30
In her view, the coastal State did not, in principle,
have to justify its own maritime delimitation, that being a
manifestation of its own sovereignty and thus presumed va
lid. Nevertheless, if it went beyond legitimate interests
in that delimitation it was possible for other States to
claim abuse of right and the dispute to be submitted to in
ternational adjudication.31
Ibid 416
it is quite irrelevant for the ieasure*ent of territorial waters whether the best
fishing grounds are inside or outside the dividing line; whether the population of the
State concerned are fisherien dependent on fishing or whether they are not; whether
trawling is or is not daiaging to stocks of fish.'40
Ibid 416
Ibid 400
Ibid 161
40
Ibid 30
195
S ta te s or fish in g n a tio n s in reg ard to th e p o sitio n of such
g r o u n d s . "*x
x Ibid 3 8 4
3 Ibid. N o rw a y e x p l a i n e d {ibid 2 7 8 ) th a t,
Ibid i v , 508
196
In general, then, Norway had always believed that in
ternational law had sufficient flexibility to take account
of diverse situations and avoid abuses without sacrificing
vital and legitimate interests of coastal States.'*®
Ibid 322
The deliiitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be depen
dent «erely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed in its «unicipal law. Al
though it is true that the act of deliiitation is necessarily a unilateral act, be
cause only the coastal State is coipetent to undertake it, the validity of the deliii
tation with regard to other States depends upon international law.o x
Ibid 131
31
Ibid 132 (emphasis added). On this point, at least,
Judges McNair {Fisheries Case, Dissenting Opinion
(McNair), I.C.J. Reports 1951, 158, 160) and Read
{Fisheries Case, Dissenting Opinion (Read), I.C.J. Re-
198
The real question raised in the choice of base-lines is in effect whether certain sea
areas lying within these lines are sufficiently closely linked to the land doiain to
be subject to the regiie of internal waters. This idea... should be liberally applied
in the case of a coast, the geographical configuration of which is as unusual as that
of Norway.59“*
founded on the vital needs of the population and attested by very ancient and peaceful
usage, «ay legitiiately be taken into account in drawing a line which, loreover, ap
pears to the Court to have been kept within the bounds of what is loderate and reason
able.^
s t a t e d t h a t i t was p r e p a r e d t o a c c e p t t h e l a t t e r ' s d e
l i m i t a t i o n as r e s ti n g upon "a p r a c t i c a l stu d y o f th e
c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f t h e c o a s t l i n e and o f th e c o n d itio n o f
th e in h a b ita n ts '* .
S e e , e g , t h e s t a t e m e n t b y t h e C o u n s e l f o r t h e UK o p e n
in g t h e l a t t e r ' s o r a l p r e s e n t a t i o n , i n P le a d in g s , supra
n 7, iv , 23; th e s e p a ra te O p in io n o f Judge A lv a re z , in
J u d g m e n t, s u p ra n 5 , 1 4 5 ; E v e n s e n , s u p ra n 6 , 6 2 8 ; K o-
b a y a s h i , supra n 6, 2 1; S m ith , supra n 6 , 2 9 3 ; W ald o ck ,
supra n 6, 114; and Young, supra n 6, 244.
C f, G F i t z m a u r i c e , " T h e l a w a n d p r o c e d u r e o f t h e I n t e r
n a tio n a l C o u rt o f J u s t ic e , 1951-1954: p o in ts o f su b
s t a n t i v e l a w . - - " ( 1 9 5 4 ) 31 B Y IL 3 7 1 , 3 8 8 ; G r e e n , s u p r a n
6 , 3 7 6 ; J o h n s o n , supra n 6 , 162, 1 6 4 -1 6 5 ; K o b a y a s h i,
supra n 6 , 24; S m ith , supra n 6 , 2 9 4 ; and W aldock,
supra n 6, 197. The l a t t e r i s p r o b a b ly t h e m ost c r i t i
c a l , co m m enting t h a t
The Court has here made some very iaportant pronouncements on general in
ternational law apparently against the weight both of state practice and
ju ris tic opinion without adequately explaining why i t rejected a ll the
fo n e r authority or how i t fe lt able to present i ts own conclusions as
rules of international law binding upon states.
E d v a r d H am bro ( " L e s o p i n i o n s i n d i v i d u e l l e s e t d i s s i -
d e n t e s d e s m e m b e rs d e l a C o u r I n t e r n a t i o n a l d e J u s
t i c e ” (1 9 6 4 ) 34 NTIR 1 8 1 , 1 9 2 , 193) o b s e r v e s t h a t
far froi detracting froa the Standing of the Judgaents or Advisory Opin
ions, add to their vitality, a comprehension and usefulness and greatly
facilitate the fulfillment of the indirect purpose of the Court, which is
to develop and to clarify international law.
J u d g e H su Mo’ s s e p a r a t e O p i n i o n e x p l a i n e d why h e f e l t
n o t a l l o f t h e s t r a i g h t b a s e l i n e s f i x e d by t h e 1935
N o rw e g ia n D e c re e c o n fo rm e d w ith i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g a l
p r i n c i p l e s ( F i s h e r i e s C a s e , S e p a r a t e O p i n i o n (H s u Mo)
su p ra n 5, 1 5 4 ).
The p h i l o s o p h y o f A lv a r e z i s e x p l a i n e d i n d e t a i l i n h i s
bo o k s, Le D r o i t I n t e r n a t i o n a l Nouveau dans s e s r a p p o r t s
a v e c l a v i e a c t u e l l e d e s p e u p l e s (1959) and Le D r o i t
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Nouveau: so n a c c e p t i o n , so n 4 tu d e (1 9 6 0 ),
and i n a num ber o f h i s a r t i c l e s . O th e r p u b l i c a t i o n s
r e l a t i n g t o t h e 'New I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a w ’ i n c l u d e R
Dupuy, L e s P r i n c i p e s fo n d a m e n ta u x d e d r o i t i n t e r n a t i o n
a l d a n s l a d o c t r i n e d e M. A l e j a n d r o A l v a r e z ( 1 9 5 8 ) , a n d
M S a m o r e , " T h e New I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law o f A l e j a n d r o A l v a
r e z ” ( 1 9 5 8 ) 52 A J I L 4 1 . A u s e f u l s u m m a ry o f h i s p h i l o s
ophy i s a l s o to be fo u n d in I H u s s a in , D i s s e n t i n g and
S e p a r a t e O p i n i o n s o f t h e W orld C o u r t (1 9 8 4 ) 8 3 - 9 6 .
202
Alvarez claimed, the Court "must bring to light, adapt if
necessary, or even create, with regard to the maritime do
main and, in particular, the territorial sea".*3 They may
be briefly summarized as follows:
Given the great variety of economic and geographical
conditions of States it is impossible to set uniform rules
governing territorial sea limits and delimitation. There
fore, each State may determine both the extent and bound
aries of its own territorial sea, provided that it is done
in a reasonable manner having regard to the State's land
territory and needs of its population; reasons and justifi
cation are provided; the rights of other States are not in
fringed; and it is possible to effectively exercise juris
diction over the area concerned. Besides rights over their
territorial sea, coastal States also have duties, particu
larly concerning fisheries.'®'* In addition, States may fix
an area beyond their territorial sea "over which they may
reserve for themselves certain rights".Ä5S The above rights
the Court lust develop the law of nations, that is to say, it lust remedy
its shortcomings, adapt existing principles to these new conditions and,
even if no principles exist, create principles in conformity with such
conditions.
Ibid 153
Ibid 169
205
ternational law and the relevance of economic interests in
matters concerning maritime jurisdiction were of import far
beyond the instant proceedings. Before examining the lat
ter, however, it is necessary to note that the legal value
of the Court’s dicta as standards against which the validity
of national claims to maritime jurisdiction over fisheries
may be assessed“72 is influenced by uncertainties generated
by the economical reasoning of the Judgment itself."73 As
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice remarks, " [t]here is room for genuine
difference of opinion as to the effect of the Court’s deci
sion on many points".'7'* While attempting so many years
later and with the benefit of hindsight to produce the defi
nitive interpretation of the Judgment would for present pur
poses be an unnecessary and probably sterile exercise, it is
useful nevertheless to note briefly the difficulties encoun
tered by analysts at the time in assessing the implications
of the Judgment, the hermeneutics that resulted, and the
fundamental contribution of the Court to the development of
the law.
First, as noted above, although the Court agreed unani
mously that the validity of any maritime delimitation de
pends upon international law,"70 there was no comprehensive
jurisprudential exposition in the Judgment of the founda
tions upon which the decisions were based that would allow
the positive identification of principles and rules of law
governing aspects of maritime jurisdiction other than those
has the nerit of foraulating a general principle, which is at least readily in te llig i
ble and which gives shape to the Court’sjudgient, that is to say, the principle of
complete freedoa of action for the coastal State subject only to the test of reason
ableness and the check provided by the notion of abas de droit. If this interpreta
tion of the Court's judgment is correct, then Judge Alvarez' Opinion should be read in
conjunction with i t , only as supplying a deficiency in the judgaent, as i t is often
the role of an Individual Opinion to do.-7®
Jo h n so n , supra n 6, 1 7 4 -1 7 5
H u s s a in , s u p ra n 6 2 , 125; V e r z i j l , s u p ra n 6 , 1 1 4 . It
a p p e a r s t h a t L a u t e r p a c h t ( s u p r a n 4 , 1 9 2 ) h o l d s m uch
t h e sam e v ie w w h en , w i t h o u t m e n tio n in g A l v a r e z , h e
w rite s :
1. Within reasonable lia its aaritiae States are entitled by law to prescribe
the width of their zones of te rrito ria l waters and also to define the base lines fro i
which these zones are to be ieasured i f they do not follow the...coast__
2. The word ’ reasonable' iaplies (i) a legitimate reason or lotive, ( ii) re
spect for the acquired interests of other States, and ( i i i ) the conforaity of the zone
to the general line of the coast.
3. The protection of fisheries or other iaportant interests fo n a le g itiia te
reason for a delimitation which is also reasonable on other grounds.
4. Historical facts aay properly be cited as evidence of t it le to la ritia e
territo ry. I t seeas probable, though this does not clearly appear froa the judgaent,
that historical evidence could not ju s tify the appropriation of any water areas which
at any given tiae had clearly been part of the high seas.®®
In fu tu re , he re a s o n s ,
T h i s i s t y p i c a l o f s u c h O p i n i o n s , a s H a m b ro (supra n
6 0 , 1 92 ) e x p la in s : " [ c j ’ e s t d i f f i c i l e de se f a ir e une
id e e c l a i r e e t n e t t e s u r l a v a l e u r e t 1 ' im p o r t a n c e d e s
o p in io n s d is s id e n t e s e t i n d i v i d u e l l e s . On n e p e u t j a
m a is s a v o i r q u e l a 4 t e l e u r e f f e t . " See a l s o , h o w e v e r,
h i s e a r l i e r , m o re p o s i t i v e s t a t e m e n t o n t h e v a lu e o f
i n d i v i d u a l O p i n i o n s (supra n 6 0 ) .
S m it h , supra n 6, 295
See te x t a c c o m p a n y in g n 69 supra.
8 3
S m it h , supra n 6, 300
208
So long as...claiis are restrained within ’reasonable’ liiits -- and this is essen
tially a question of fact -- it is unlikely that they can be successfully challenged
in proceedings before the World Court. It seeis certain that the coibined result of
these claiis will be to enlarge the areas withdrawn froi the high seas and placed un
der national sovereignty .0 0
To every State whose land territory is at any place washed by the sea,
international law attaches a corresponding portion of aaritiae territory
__ No aaritiae State can refuse [territorial waters]. International law
iiposes upon a laritiae State certain obligations and confers upon it
certain rights arising out of the sovereignty which it exercises over its
aaritiae territory.
Ibid
92
Ibid 3 7 7 - 3 7 3 . He e x c l u d e d f r o m h i s d i s c u s s i o n t h e
q u e s ti o n of what r i g h t s in r e s p e c t of f i s h e r i e s a
c o a s t a l S t a t e m ig h t be e n t i t l e d t o e x e r c i s e i n a c o n
tig u o u s zone co n cern in g c o n s e rv a tio n , as th e s u b je c t
w as a t t h e s a m e t i m e b e i n g d i s c u s s e d b y t h e I n t e r n a
t i o n a l Law C o m m i s s i o n ( s e e Ch 7 infra) .
210
was to be draw n, if it did not at th e sam e tim e govern th e
b read th to w h i c h it co u ld be e x t e n d e d . . . " . 9* As a n au to
m atic consequence, he co n tin u ed ,
international law lust also prescribe a standard maximum breadth, universally valid
and obligatory in principle, even though variations lay be allowed in particular
cases, e.g., on the basis of long continued (historic) usage. If this is not so, then
international law would not govern the question of the extent of the territo ria l sea,
since there is no practical difference between saying that international law pre
scribes no standard breadth for that sea, and saying that States are free to deteriine
the breadth as they please.9 '*
Ib id 383
Ib id 385
9 0
Ib id 386
211
essential to the dispute with which it was seized, and, gen
erally, avoiding so far as possible making dogmatic state
ments of the law,®® no interpretation of the Judgment can
legitimately claim to be both comprehensive and definitive
with respect to extended implications of the various judi
cial statements (nor, in fact, do the above writers make
such claims). With that qualification, the present writer
would suggest that while, on the one hand, the conclusions
drawn by Smith from the Judgment may perhaps be excessively
concessive concerning the rights of the coastal State to ad
jacent waters (the dicta are too general to be more defini
tive in this respect), the conclusions reached by Fitzmau-
rice, on the other hand, appear overly restrictive.
First, it is questionable whether, in fact, the ICJ's
determination of the dispute as one involving a claim to
territorial waters necessarily implies a blanket rejection
by the Court at the time of the legal validity of fishery
zones distinct from the territorial sea. Recognizing both
the forementioned tendency of the Court towards judicial
caution, as well as the acknowledgment by Norway that her
claim was not to an exclusive fishery zone but a territorial
sea,9"7 it would appear safer to conclude that the Judgment
left the status of such zones open for further discussion.’ ’®
Given its restriction to consideration of the territo
rial sea regime, it is suggested that the Court made a mod
est but nonetheless fundamental contribution to the develop
ment of legal principles relating to marine fisheries by ex
plicitly confirming that the validity of maritime delimita
tion depends upon international law. The importance of that
contribution increases if, as Fitzmaurice argues and the
See n 3 supra.
9 0
Cf, Evensen, supra n 6, 629, and n 65 supra.
212
present writer considers likely, that confirmation logically
extends, albeit implicitly, to comprehend the breadth of the
territorial sea.99
With respect to the latter, however, it neither inevit
ably nor logically follows that the breadth of the territor
ial sea need always be expressed as a precise numerical dis
tance as Fitzmaurice claimed. The ICJ found that the rule
of the low-water mark along the coast was not binding law
with respect to baseline delimitation, despite having behind
it "as much authority in state practice and in juristic
opinion as any customary rule that has ever been canvassed
before an international tribunal".100 It is arguable, at
least, therefore, given the far more disparate State claims
concerning the breadth of their territorial waters, that the
Court would have similarly declined to endorse the three-
mile limit as universally binding customary international
law.101 a lacuna would not necessarily have been the re
sult, even if, as Fitzmaurice claims, that rule had at one
time been customary law, and accepting his contention that
" [t]o displace must be to replace".102 The Court made clear
10:3 See t e x t a c c o m p a n y i n g n 52 s u p r a .
are those such as the vital econoaic interest of the regions involved,
the practical needs and the local requireients of the coastal population,
the historic eleient in the case as a proof of such needs and the «ore or
less close relation between the water areas in question and the land. It
seeas only natural that the Court in this regard has not stated all the
elements which lay be of iiportance in the individual case. The elements
expressly lentioned were eleaents of actual iaportance in the case pend
ing before the Court. In other cases new facts and eleaents lay play an
iaportant role and the intrinsic value of the eleaents aentioned say vary
in each case. The Court stressed, however, that in considering these
various eleaents as the basis for deteraining the territo ria l waters of a
state, this territo ria l belt aust not, to any appreciable extent, depart
froa the general direction of the coast.
or source of the right [here mentioned are the Court’s statements cited
in text accompanying nn 55 and 57 supra].
i i i . When the legitimacy of an act depends as a latte r of law on
its reasonableness, the existence of special interests such as economic
ones iay be a justificatory factor, or at any rate a factor to be taken
into account. ...
When faced with a situation in which practice is not unifoni and in which the prepon
derant practice does not yield a rule which, in the case before it, renders possible a
solution deeaed to be in accordance with justice and econoaic or geographic reality,
the Court »ay deea itself justified in adopting a solution which, although far fro*
achieving certainty, is deeaed to eabody the rational principle best suited to provide
the basis of the general rule.1 1 9
It is w ith r e s p e c t to th e la tte r th a t t h e C o u r t m ad e a n
im p o rta n t, m ore g e n e r a l , c o n trib u tio n to th e ju risp ru d e n tia l
S e e n 53 a n d a c c o m p a n y in g t e x t supra.
1^ Ibid 2 9 3 - 2 9 4
There can be little doubt that, even if only sub-consciously, the lajority opinion of
the Court in this case reflected a view which was gaining even greater currency out
side (with the eiegence [sic] of the newer nations and the necessity for aid to the
under-developed countries) that the law of the sea, as it had been evolved by the
older «aritiae countries, was unduly restrictive of the rights, and above all of the
econoiic interests, of the coastal state.122
V. C onclusion
On r&iste a 1'invasion des araees; on ne resiste pas a 1' invasion des idees.
Victor Hugo1
I- Introduction
For a decade and lore prior to 1957, the United States stood as the
supreie and unchallenged arbiter of international relations in the non-
Conunist world. U.S. power was extended politically, ailitarily, and
econoiically in a pervasive global pattern, displacing the prewar eipires
of Europe and Japan, and replacing the» with a Pax Aaericana throughout
the 'free world'.
" D e c r e e No 1 4 , 7 0 8 , c o n c e r n i n g n a t i o n a l s o v e r e i g n t y o v e r
e p i c o n t i n e n t a l s e a and th e A rg e n tin e c o n t i n e n t a l s h e l f ,
11 O c t o b e r 1 9 4 6 ” , i n 1 UNLS, supra Ch 2 , n 7 3 , 4 - 5 .
C o m m e n tin g o n t h e c l a i m t o s o v e r e i g n t y , L o r i n g ( supra n
4, 399) e x p la in s :
" D e c r e e No 4 4 9 , f o r t h e r e g u l a t i o n o f s h a r k f i s h i n g by
fo re ig n v e s s e ls in w aters under th e j u r i s d i c t i o n of th e
R e p u b l i c , 17 D e c e m b e r 1 9 4 6 " , i n i b i d 1 6 . A ccording to
H o l l i c k ( F o r e i g n P o l i c y , s u p r a Ch 4 , n 2 6 , 7 1 ) , o v e r t
c o n f l i c t s w e r e a v o i d e d a n d no A m e r ic a n p r o t e s t s w e re
lo d g e d d u e , a t l e a s t i n p a r t , t o P a n a m a's w i l l i n g n e s s
t o l i c e n s e US f i s h i n g v e s s e l s a t a r e a s o n a b l e r a t e , a n d
t h e e f f o r t s o f t h e A m e ric an T u n a b o a t A s s o c i a t i o n and
A m erican Embassy o f f i c i a l s t o s e t t l e d i s p u t e s i n f o r m a l
ly "and to p e rs u a d e th e Panam anians to back o f f t h e i r
claim s".
L o r i n g ( supra n 4 , 4 0 0 ; of , S z e k e l y , supra n 4 , 1 5 2 )
s u g g e s t s t h a t n o m e n t i o n w as m ade o f ' l e g i t i m a t e ' i n
t e r e s t s o f o th e r S ta te s p ro b a b ly b e ca u se n a tio n a ls o f
o t h e r S t a t e s w ere n o t f i s h i n g o f f P e ru a t t h e tim e .
S e e a l s o n 2 2 infra.
S e e , eg, C o s t a R i c a ’ s " M a r i t i m e F i s h i n g a n d H u n t i n g
A c t , e n a c t e d 2 8 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 8 " a n d " D e c r e e - L a w No 8 0 3 ,
c o n c e r n i n g c o n t i n e n t a l an d i n s u l a r s h e l f , 2 N ovem ber
1 9 4 9 " i n 1 UNLS, supra Ch 2 , n 7 3 , 8 - 1 0 ; E c u a d o r ’ s " D e
c re e c o n c e rn in g th e l im it s o f th e t e r r i t o r i a l s e a , 6
N o v e m b e r 1 9 5 0 " i n 8 UNLS, supra n 3 , 9 - 1 0 , a n d " C o n g r e s
s i o n a l D e c r e e c o n c e r n i n g t h e c o n t i n e n t a l s h e l f , 21 F e b
r u a r y 1 9 5 1 " i n 1 UNLS, supra Ch 2 , n 7 3 , 3 0 0 ; E l S a l v a
d o r ’s " P o l i t i c a l C o n s t i t u t i o n , o f 7 S e p te m b e r 1950" i n
6 UNLS, supra Ch 2 , n 8 1 , 1 4 ; t h e H o n d u r a n " P r e s i d e n
t i a l D e c r e e No 9 6 , o n 28 J a n u a r y 1 9 5 0 " i n S z e k e l y , su
pra n 3 , b o o k l e t 1 2 , 1 9 - 2 1 ; I c e l a n d ' s "Law No 4 4 " , su
pra n 3 ; a n d t h e R e p u b l i c o f K o r e a ’ s " P r e s i d e n t i a l P r o
c l a m a t i o n o f S o v e r e i g n t y o v e r A d j a c e n t S e a s , 18 J a n u a r y
1 9 5 2 " i n 8 UNLS, supra n 3 , 1 4 - 1 5 .
H o l l i c k ( Foreign Policy, supra Ch 4 , n 2 6 , 8 4 )
s u g g e s ts t h a t th e " f lo o d o f c la im s " sw e e p in g th ro u g h
L a t i n A m e ric a a t t h e t i m e ,
aay have been linked to the heating up of the cold war via the outbreak
of war in Korea, as well as the influx of new U.S. fishing vessels [part
ly due to the failure at the sane tine of the California sardine fishing
industry, leaving aany vessels idle]. Indeed, soae of the claias of the
period aade specific reference to security zones. In addition to the im
petus given to wartiae uncertainty and fears of resource shortages [see
Introduction to Ch 4], the Korean War diverted the attention of the
United States, by then the aajor opponent of expansionist offshore
claias.
See a l s o n 22 infra.
A d e t a i l e d s u r v e y o f t h e p r o t e s t s m a d e by S t a t e s t o t h e
v a rio u s c la im s i s beyond th e sco p e o f th e p r e s e n t w o rk ,
and t h i s d i s c u s s i o n w i l l be l i m i t e d t o t h e A m e ric a n
p r o t e s t s , w h ic h a r e t y p i c a l o f t h o s e lo d g e d . M ore com
p l e t e r e f e r e n c e s a r e f o u n d i n M M o u to n , The Continental
227
w hile e x p re s s in g sym pathetic su p p o rt for co n sid eratio n s re
latin g to fish ery co n serv atio n t h a t had le d A rg e n tin a to
take u n ila te r a l actio n , at t h e same tim e p r o t e s t e d th a t ’’t h e
p rin cip les u n d erly in g th e C la tte r 's ] D eclaratio n d iffer in
l a r g e m e a s u re from t h o s e o f t h e U n ite d S t a t e s P roclam ations
and a p p e a r t o be a t v a r i a n c e w i t h t h e g e n e r a l l y accepted
p rin cip les of in tern atio n al l a w ” . 21 The A m e ric a n p r o t e s t
p articu larly concerned claim s of so v ereig n ty "over th e con
tin e n ta l sh elf and o v e r t h e s e a s a d jac e n t to th e co asts of
A rgentina o u tsid e th e g e n erally accepted lim its of t e r r i t o
rial w aters", and t h a t th e D e cla ra tio n failed "w ith re s p e c t
to fish in g , to accord re c o g n itio n to th e rig h ts and i n t e r
ests of th e U nited S ta te s in th e h igh se a s off th e co asts of
A r g e n t i n a " . 22
S h e l f ( 1 9 5 2 ) 8 9 - 9 6 , a n d ( 1 9 5 6 ) 51 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law
S i t u a t i o n a n d D o c u m e n t s ( U . S . N a v a l War C o l l e g e ) [ h e r e
a f t e r c i t e d ' I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law S i t u a t i o n ' ] 4 0 1 - 5 0 2 , r e
l a t i n g t o p r o t e s t s b y t h e UK ( t o t h e CEP S t a t e s , C o s t a
R i c a , E l S a l v a d o r , H o n d u r a s a n d I c e l a n d ) , t h e US ( t o
A r g e n t i n a , t h e CEP S t a t e s a n d E l S a l v a d o r ) S w e d e n ( t o
t h e CEP S t a t e s ) , a n d B e l g i u m a n d t h e N e t h e r l a n d s ( t o
Icelan d ). I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , i t may b e n o t e d t h a t o n
7 A p r i l 1 9 5 1 , F r a n c e a d v i s e d t h e UK t h a t t h e r e wa s no
duty to p r o te s t in th e absence of form al ad v ice of a
c l a i m ( s e e M outon, s u p r a t h i s n, 9 1 ) .
Ib id . S i m i l a r p r o t e s t s w ere a d d r e s s e d on t h e same d a t e
to C h i l e ( i b i d 796 -7 9 7 ) and P e ru { i b i d 7 9 8 - 7 9 9 ) . As f o r
t h e e x t e n t o f A m erican " r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s " in th o se
w a te r s a t t h e tim e , L o rin g {su p ra n 4, 400; em phasis
added) s t a t e s t h a t
No United States fishing interests existed in 1947 within the areas af
fected by the Argentine, Chilean and Peruvian claias, but the booling
southern California tuna fleet expected to expand its operations off Peru
and Chile in the near future. The United States thus had evidently ais-
calculated. Its Fisheries Proclaiation -- recognizing the 'right' of
other coastal states to establish 'explicitly bounded' high seas conser
vation zones, provided United States fishing interests 'which lay exist
in such areas' were 'adequately' recognized [see Ch 4, text accoipanying
nn 30 and 50 supra] — had failed to provide for future U.S. interests.
Since the 1930s, the U.S. has had only liiited whaling operations and
relatively few tuna boats fishing off Ecuador. Only after the discovery
in 1947 of a rich tuna fishing ground sixty liles off the Peruvian coast
did the level of U.S. fishing efforts there increase significantly.
A u g u s t e ( s u p r a n 6 , 1 0 7 , n 7) w r i t e s w i t h r e s p e c t
t o t h e A m e ric an p r o t e s t t o A r g e n t i n a t h a t t h e r i g h t s
r e f e r r e d t o w e re t h o s e o f f i s h i n g by a l l S t a t e s on t h e
h ig h s e a s , r a t h e r th a n to any r i g h t s t h a t m ig h t h av e
b e e n a c q u i r e d by e a r l i e r a c t i v i t i e s o f A m e ric a n f i s h e r
men o f f A r g e n t i n e c o a s t s . He s u g g e s t s ( i b i d 1 0 9 ) t h a t
t h e p r o t e s t "w as an e x a m p le o f t h e c i t i n g o f i n t e r n a
t i o n a l la w , l e s s b e ca u se o f a S t a t e ’s i n t e r e s t s in th e
r u l e o f la w , b u t f o r t h e m ore i m p o r t a n t d e f e n c e o f i t s
own n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s " . In th e l a t t e r r e g a r d , he co n
t i n u e s ( i b i d 243, n 2 ),
the U.S. was sore concerned with the econoiic side of the question [of
extended laritiie claias] than international law, per se, but utilized
the legal weapon as it was the only possible resort. With the existence
of the Cold War. . . it was unlikely that severe econoaic pressures or ex
tensive ailitary action would be instituted, as it was iapossible to
foretell the reactions of the Latin Aaerican States or the repercussions
of such actions.
A d i f f e r e n t v ie w o f A m e ric a n in v o lv e m e n t i n L a t i n
A m e r i c a n f i s h e r i e s w as e x p r e s s e d b y S e n a t o r G r e e n , t h e
t h e n C h a i r m a n o f t h e US S e n a t e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Com
m i t t e e , w ho, o n 17 A u g u s t 1 9 4 9 , s t a t e d t h a t " t h e t u n a
f i s h e r y o f th e w e st c o a s t o f L a tin A m e r i c a . . . i s a m ost
v a l u a b l e f i s h e r y and h as been d e v e l o p e d e x c l u s i v e l y b y
U nited S t a t e s f i s h e r m e n . ( c i t e d in S B a y itc h , I n t e r -
a m e r i c a n Law o f F i s h e r i e s ( 1 9 5 7 ) 1 2 , n 8 ; e m p h a s i s
ad d ed ).
W h ite m a n , s u p r a Ch 4 , n 2 7 , 8 0 1 . No s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e
t o t h r e e m i l e s w as c o n t a i n e d i n e a r l i e r p r o t e s t n o t e s .
Nor d i d an y A m e ric a n p r o t e s t n o t e r e f e r t o P r e s i d e n t
R o o s e v e l t ' s 1 9 3 9 a d v i c e t o t h e B r i t i s h t h a t t h e US t e r
r i t o r i a l w a t e r s e x t e n d a s f a r a s r e q u i r e d b y US i n t e r
e s t s an d n o t n e c e s s a r i l y t o o n l y t h e 200 m i l e s s p e c i
f i e d i n t h e l a t t e r ' s A n ti-S m u g g lin g A ct o f 1935 ("R e
g im e o f t h e h i g h s e a s [M em orandum p r e s e n t e d b y t h e S e c
r e t a r i a t ] ( A /C N . 4 / 3 2 ) " i n ( 1 9 5 0 ) Y I L C i i , 6 7 , 8 1 ) .
229
nationals and vessels in regard to the claim. Ecuador re
sponded by seizing American fishing boats.2**
Feeling threatened by rhe above protests and the pos
sibility of economic sanctions,20 the CEP States in 1952
convened the First Conference on the Exploitation and Con
servation of the Maritime Resources of the South Pacific.
There they adopted the Declaration of Santiago on the Mari
time Zone, proclaiming "as a principle of their internation
al maritime policy” that they each possessed "sole sover
eignty and jurisdiction" over adjacent maritime waters
"extending not less than 200 nautical miles from their
coasts".20 At the same time, however, "innocent and inof
fensive passage"' of vessels through that zone would be per
mitted .27
Following the Conference, the CEP States initiated more
rigorous enforcement of their claims, seizing American and
other fishing vessels. Perhaps the most noteworthy capture
at this time was that of fishing vessels belonging to Aris
totle Onassis which had been sent from Germany with the spe
cific intent of challenging Peru's 200-raile limit.20
Ibid 1203
Ibid 1106
Ib id
I b i d 2 3 8 ; F o r e i g n P o l i c y , s u p r a Ch 4 , n 2 6 , 9 2 ;
W h i t e m a n , s u p r a Ch 4 , n 2 7 , 1 0 9 6 - 1 0 9 7 ; a n d S a m e t and
F u e r s t ( s u p r a n 6 , 1 3 ) , who o b s e r v e t h a t
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law S i t u a t i o n , s u p r a n 2 0 , 2 4 4 - 2 4 6 . Ac
co rd in g to P r o f e s s o r J o s e f Kunz ( " C o n t i n e n t a l s h e l f and
in te rn atio n a l la w : c o n f u s i o n a n d a b u s e " ( 1 9 5 6 ) 50 A JIL
828, 847), t h e US o b j e c t e d t o t h e P r i n c i p l e s o n s e v e n
procedural grounds:
[t]he draft had clearly been prepared previously with the intention of
taking the meeting by surprise [and]...the move was seen as a political
one,...(w]hat counts...after a ll is that the majority of States voted
[for] the Resolution instead of rejecting i t . . . .
235
p o p u la tio n , and its se c u rity a n d d e f e n s e ” . -*® At th e sam e
tim e , how ever, it w ent f u r th e r in d e c la rin g th e rig h t of a
c o a sta l S ta te to a d o p t and a d m in iste r n o n -d isc rim in a to ry
fish e ry c o n se rv a tio n m easu res in h ig h seas areas c o n tig u o u s
to its te rrito ria l sea, as w e ll as
the right of exclusive exploitation of species closely related to the coast, the life
of the country, or the needs of the coastal population, as in the case of species that
develop in territorial waters and subsequently Migrate to the high seas, or when the
existence of certain species has an iiportant relation to an industry essential to the
coastal country, or when the latter is carrying out iiportant works that will result
in the conservation or increase of the species.-*0
The R e s o l u t i o n w as a d o p t e d by a v o t e of 15 t o 1 (th e
U n ite d S ta te s) w ith fiv e a b ste n tio n s (B o liv ia , C o lo m b ia ,
C uba, D o m in ic a n R e p u b lic a n d N i c a r a g u a ) . -*"7 In v o tin g
a g a in st th e R e s o lu tio n , th e U n ite d S ta te s argued, in ter
a l i a , t h a t much o f t h e R e so lu tio n w as b o t h c o n tra ry to in
te rn a tio n a l la w a n d w as " c o m p le te ly o b liv io u s of th e in te r-
The records of the Council Meeting do not shed sufficient light on this
part of [the] resolution.. .to enable use to see what the bases of these
various cases of exclusive exploitation are.
...The Inter-Aierican Specialized Conference, which net a few weeks later
[see nn 51-58 and accoapanying text infra], decided nothing on this point
and did not even consider it directly.
I n t e r e s t i n g l y , i n l i g h t o f s t r e n u o u s A m e ric a n o p
p o s i t i o n t o t h e R e s o l u t i o n , t h e r i g h t b e i n g a s s e r t e d by
t h e C o u n c i l w as i n p a r t t h e sam e r i g h t c l a i m e d by t h e
US i n t h e B e h r i n g S e a F u r S e a l s A r b i t r a t i o n ( s e e Ch 2 ,
nn 1 0 8 -1 1 6 an d a c c o m p a n y in g t e x t s u p r a ) , an d i n p a r t a
r i g h t w h i c h w o u l d b e c l a i m e d i n f u t u r e b y t h e US w i t h
r e s p e c t t o a n a d r o m o u s s p e c i e s ( s e e Ch 7 , n 9 1 a n d
ac c o m p a n y in g t e x t i n f r a ) .
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law S i t u a t i o n , s u p r a n 2 0 , 2 4 6 - 2 5 5 . The
S m eth erm an s ( s u p r a n 2 4 , 961) s u g g e s t t h a t t h e i n c r e a
s e d s u p p o r t f o r t h e CEP b y o t h e r L a t i n A m e r i c a n S t a t e s
"w as p a r t i a l l y an e x e r c i s e i n Y ankee b a i t i n g . But i t
a l s o h a i l e d a n ew c h a p t e r i n t h e i n c r e a s i n g l y p r o b l e m
a t i c , w o rld w id e q u a r r e l b e tw e e n t h e d e v e lo p e d m a ritim e
n a t io n s and th e u n d e rd e v e lo p e d c o a s t a l n a t i o n s " . In
t h i s r e g a r d s e e a l s o n 52 an d a c c o m p a n y in g t e x t i n f r a .
236
ests and rights of States other than the adjacent coastal
States in the conservation and utilization of marine re
sources” and the recognized need for international co-opera
tion for conservation p u r p o s e s . B e c a u s e of the above ob
jections and abstentions, as well as the less than whole
hearted support for the Resolution expressed by Brazil,
Guatemala, Honduras. Panama and Venezuela,'*'9’ the Council by
a vote of 11 to 9 reduced the status of the Resolution to a
"preparatory study" and transmitted it to the forthcoming
specialized conference.590
That Conference was held at Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican
Republic, in 1956.31 The ultimate product of the Conference
was the Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo, adopted by unanimous
agreement, which dealt with the continental shelf, marine
resources and territorial waters.32 The Resolution stated
Ibid 256-257
37
See, eg, comments by Mexico (ibid 257-258).
238
ev er, m a in ta in e d th a t th e fo rm er R e so lu tio n c o n stitu te d " th e
la te s t and m ost a u t h o r i t a t i v e e x p re ssio n of th e O rg a n isa tio n
o f A m e ric a n S ta te s on t h e s u b je c ts d isc u sse d t h e r e i n ” . 3®
The C iu d a d T ru jillo m e e tin g w as t h e fin a l, m a jo r m u lti
la te ra l exchange of v ie w s on t h e le g a l re g im e g o v e rn in g
fish e rie s p rio r to th e firs t U n ite d N a tio n s C o n f e r e n c e on
th e Law o f th e Sea. B efo re tu rn in g to th e la tte r, how ever,
it is u sefu l to c o n s id e r in m ore d e t a i l th e a rg u m e n ts ad
vanced in su p p o rt of th e L a tin A m e ric a n c la im s and th e
c o u n te r-a rg u m e n ts, and to m ake som e o b s e r v a t i o n s re g a rd in g
th e s ta te of th a t re g im e on t h e eve of th e C o n feren ce.
Ib id
On t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s g e n e r a t e d by am b ig u o u s te rm in o lo g y ,
S z e k e l y (supra n 4 , 6 0 ) c o m m e n ts t h a t
The problei steamed, probably, froi the fact that the different laws were
dealing with soae new law of the sea concepts, based on principles or
doctrines hardly yet developed, such as the eaerging Continental Shelf
legal concept. Having few or no precedents to borrow fro«, the laws were
basically very iaperfect instruaents, leaving rooa for the speculative
iaagination of the interpreter. It is often difficult, therefore, to de-
teraine exactly what type of an instruaent it is that is being dealt
with, to which aaritiae areas or resources i t applies, what the nature of
the claiaed authority is, and what liaits are established.
c i a A m a d o r, s u p r a n 6 ; S a m e t a n d F u e r s t , s u p r a n 6 , 4 2 -
68; and S z e k e ly , su p ra n 4 , 7 3 -1 0 2 . T he sam e s i t u a t i o n
as th a t d e s c rib e d above p r e v a ile d in to th e 1960s and
e a rly 1970s. S e e Ch 8 , n n 7 4 a n d 75 a n d a c c o m p a n y in g
te x t in fra .
As f o r t h e p o s s i b l e i n t e n t o f t h o s e f o r m u l a t i n g
n a t i o n a l c la i m s i n a n a m b ig u o u s f a s h i o n , H o e f f e l ( s u p r a
n 1 1 , 4 4 0 - 4 4 1 ) c o m m e n ts t h a t w i t h r e s p e c t t o P e r u
A t t h e C iu d a d T r u j i l l o C o n f e r e n c e ( s e e nn 5 1 -5 8 a n d
a c c o m p a n y in g t e x t s u p r a ) , e g , P e r u 's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
s t a t e d ( c i t e d i n G a r c i a A m a d o r, s u p r a I n t r o d u c t i o n n
1 6 , 7 9 ) t h a t P e ru w as «
only trying to prevent the existence of the immense wealth in the sea
which bathes its coasts froi being jeopardized by wholesale and
indiscriiinate fishing. ...Peru has no intention of excluding foreigners
from fishing in its maritime zone. All that it desires is that they
should, in the same way as Peru's nationals, accept and coiply with the
measures for conservation laid down, and thus preserve for the future an
iiportant source of wealth.
I n t h e sam e v e i n , G a r c ia A m ador ( i b i d 7 8 - 7 9 ) c i t e s
c o m m e n ts m a d e a t t h e s a m e C o n f e r e n c e b y P r o f e s s o r J u l i o
B u s t a m a n t e , w ho h a d e a r l i e r s i g n e d t h e S a n t i a g o D e c l a
r a t i o n on b e h a lf o f C h ile :
Cf G a r c i a R o b l e s , s u p r a n 3 9 , 42.
240
some cases, conflicting concurrent positions held by senior
representatives of the same government as to the precise na
ture of the latter's claim. ■®,x Nevertheless, a common leit
motif of the vast majority of claims is the purported need,
and right, of the coastal State to protect, conserve, and
(in some cases) reserve, the living resources of the adja
cent maritime waters for the benefit of its own nationals .
Thus, rather than attempt an analysis of the various types
of claims asserted, it is more profitable for present pur
poses to examine the arguments underpinning the rights
claims over fishery resources.
Although rarely, if ever, do States of the region ex
plicitly admit that any of the arguments supporting the
above claims are anything but expositions of basic legal
principles, it is clear that some arguments function main
ly as a factual or policy base upon which rest others of a
primarily juridical nature.0"* Consequently, like the Truman
1- The P o l i c y A rsu m e n ts
U n d e r p i n n i n g m any o f t h e L a t i n A m e r i c a n c l a i m s w as t h e
arg u m en t t h a t c o a s t a l S ta te s sh o u ld be a llo w e d to d e lim it
th e ir m a r itim e z o n e s on t h e b a sis o f g e o g r a p h ic a l and g e o lo
g ic a l r e a l i t i e s . 1,5,55 That p o s itio n was h i g h l y d e v e l o p e d by
t h e CEP S t a t e s , w h ic h a r g u e d t h a t t h e i r c la im s to m a ritim e
s o v e re ig n ty had t h e i r sc ie n tific b a sis in th e d e fe n se of th e
’ b io m a ' o f t h e S o u th A m e ric an w e s t c o a s t ,® * "and n o t m e re ly
A lo n g t h e w e s t c o a s t o f S o u th A m e ric a t h e A ndes d e s c e n d
a lm o s t v e r t i c a l l y , i n to th e P a c i f i c O cean, w ith one r e
s u l t b e in g th e v i r t u a l t o t a l a b se n c e o f a c o n t i n e n t a l
s h e lf. R i v e r s f lo w in g r a p i d l y from t h e m o u n ta in s p r o
d u c e m a s s i v e l a n d e r o s i o n , d u m p in g r i c h m i n e r a l and
b i o l o g i c a l e le m e n ts i n t o c o a s ta l w a te rs . C o m b in e d w i t h
n u t r i e n t s a l t s b r o u g h t t o t h e s u r f a c e from t h e o c e a n
d e p t h s b y u p w e l l i n g g e n e r a t e d b y t h e H u m b o lt c u r r e n t ,
t h e y r e s u l t i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f c o p i o u s a m o u n t s o f ma
r i n e o r g a n i s m s a n d m ak e t h e w a t e r s o f f t h e CEP c o a s t s
am ong t h e r i c h e s t a r e a s o f p e l a g i c f i s h i n t h e w o r l d .
S e e i n t h i s r e g a r d , e g , t h e 1952 D e c l a r a t i o n o f S a n t i
ago ( s u p r a n 2 6 ) , and G G a ig , " A s p e c to s d e l d e re c h o s o -
242
th e c o n se rv a tio n of s to c k s of fis h in w h ic h o th e r c o u n trie s
may h a v e a c o m m e r c i a l i n t e r e s t . . . " . s7 The "p erfect u n ity
and in te rd e p e n d e n c e am ong t h e c o m m u n itie s th a t liv e in th e
sea, th e e n v iro n m e n t t h a t su sta in s th e m , and th e c o a sta l
p o p u la tio n w h ic h needs b o th fo r its s u rv iv a l", th e y c la im e d ,
w as th e concept "from w h ic h th e p re fe re n tia l rig h t of th e
c o a sta l S ta te , in th e s c ie n tific fie ld , d e r i v e s " . ‘s,°
b r e l a s o b e r a n i a y j u r i s d i c c i o n d e l a 200 m i l l a s d e l
M ar P e r u a n o " ( 1 9 7 3 ) 3 4 4 R e v i s t a d e M a r i n a 3 2 1 .
A c c o r d i n g t o t h e CEP S t a t e s , " [ t ] h e W e s t e r n l i m i t
o f t h i s b io m a v a r i e s , b e i n g w i d e r i n t h e C h i l e a n c o a s t
and n a rro w e r in f r o n t o f E c u a d o r, b u t i t a v e ra g e s a p
p r o x im a te l y 200 m i l e s . . . " ( S z e k e l y , s u p r a n 4 , 1 3 2 ).
H o e ffe l ( su p ra n 11, 428, 429) c o n c lu d e s t h a t
C f A u g u ste , su p ra n 6 , 1 8 8 -1 8 9 . I t w o u ld t h u s appear
t h a t th e e x p la n a tio n o f th e o r ig i n o f 2 0 0 -m ile c la im s
o f f e r e d by A r m a n e t a n d H o l l i c k ( s e e n 15 s u p r a ) sh o u ld
be te m p e re d , a s th e ab o v e r e f e r e n c e seem s to i n d ic a te
t h a t b i o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s may w e l l h a v e h a d s o m e in flu
e n ce in th e s e l e c t i o n o f th e 2 0 0 -m ile l i m i t .
Q u o te d i n A u g u s te , s u p r a n 6, 189. A u g u ste e x p l a i n s
( i b i d 1 8 9 -1 9 0 , 201) t h a t
S z e k e ly , su p ra n 4, 133. S ee e x p r e s s i o n s o f t h e sam e
a r g u m e n t a d v a n c e d by M C i s n e r o s , "T h e 200 m i l e l i m i t i n
t h e S o u t h P a c i f i c : a n ew p o s i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w
w i t h a hum an an d j u r i d i c a l c o n t e n t " ( 1 9 6 4 - 1 9 6 5 ) A . B . A .
S e c t i o n o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l a n d C o m p a r a t iv e Law, P r o c e e d
in g s 56, 58-59.
243
More generally, it was argued that the Humbolt current
prevented the formation of clouds and rain over South Ameri
can west coast areas, resulting in poor agricultural condi
tions and hence a heavy dependence of the CEP States on
fishery resources as a source of food as well as for econo
mic development purposes.10^
Economic motives, in fact, lay at the heart of the en
tire Latin American position on fisheries. Fundamental to
an understanding of that position is an appreciation of the
Latin American States most basic policy goal: national and
regional security. The latter was seen to be based not on
military strength, but rather on the economic development of
the countries of the region: jointly and severally. A key
feature of economic development plans was the better utili
zation Of natural resources, emphasis being placed on adja
cent marine fisheries both to supplement land-based food
supplies and to provide valuable resources for industriali
zation programmes and international trade."7,0
The advancement of national claims to littoral seas was
made to overcome what the Latin Americans considered to be
the major impediment to the accomplishment of those aims:
the wasteful exploitation of fishery resources off their
coasts as a result of unrestricted fishing by foreign ves
sels. Complaining of the "excessive and exhaustive exploi
tation" of fisheries by such vessels, the 1945 Mexican Dec
laration, for example, noted the urgent need to "adequately
protect, work and develop the exceptionally rich fish re-
O f A b a d ie - A i c a r d i, su p ra n 6, 106-107; A uguste, su p ra n
6, 3 4 9 - 3 5 0 ; B B uzan, "The c o a s t a l S t a t e m ovem ent" i n
T o w a r d s a New I n t e r n a t i o n a l M a r in e O r d e r ( 1 9 8 2 ; F L a u r -
s e n , e d ) [v o lu m e h e r e a f t e r c i t e d ’NIMO'] 15, 19; R
F r i e d h e i m , U n d e r s ta n d in g t h e D e b a te on O cean R e s o u r c e s
( 1 9 6 8 - 1 9 6 9 ) 3 - 4 ; L H e n k i n , " O l d p o l i t i c s a n d new d i r e c
t i o n s " i n New D i r e c t i o n s , s u p r a n 3 , 3 , 6 ; S a m e t a n d
F u e r s t , s u p ra n 6, 7 3 -7 4 ; Sm etherraan, s u p ra n 24, 951,
961; S z e k e l y , s u p ra n 4, 140; and Z a c k l i n , su p ra n 6,
60 .
The N o r t h - S o u t h a r g u m e n t was commonly p h r a s e d i n
term s of p o w erfu l m aritim e n a tio n s s e e k in g to m a in ta in
t r a d i t i o n a l norms a t t h e e x p e n s e o f p o o r e r S t a t e s .
G a rc ia Sayan (su p ra n 61, 2 0 ), e g , w r i t e s :
F rie d h e im ( su p ra t h i s n, i b i d ) p o i n t s o u t t h a t
" [ t ] h e ' S o u t h ' s t a t e s do n o t h a v e a m o n o p o ly on n a t i o n
a l i s m i n w o r d o r i n d e e d wh en d e a l i n g w i t h o c e a n r e
s o u r c e s , " i n s t a n c i n g , i n t e r a l i a , t h e Truman P r o c l a m a
tio n s. S e e i n t h e l a t t e r r e g a r d , B o r c h a r d , s u p r a Ch 4 ,
n 68.
T G a r a i o c a , "The c o n t i n e n t a l s h e l f and t h e e x t e n s i o n o f
t h e t e r r i t o r i a l s e a " ( 1 9 5 6 ) 10 M ia m i L Q 4 9 0 , 4 9 4 , 4 9 8 ;
L o r in g , su p ra n 4, 4 1 9 -4 2 0 ; S z e k e ly , su p ra n 4, 156;
and Y e p e s , s u p ra n 6, 12. For f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n of
t h i s p o i n t s e e nn l O S f f and a c c o m p a n y i n g t e x t i n f r a .
246
th e p o p u la tio n and p ro m o tin g e c o n o m ic d e v e lo p m e n t by th e op
tim u m u tiliz a tio n of a d ja c e n t m arin e reso u rces. W h e th e r th e
la tte r w ere v ie w e d as sim p ly b e lo n g in g to th e S ta te ab Ini
tio;™ h a v in g been b e s to w e d upon it by n a t u r e ; 79 or ap p ro
p ria b le by v irtu e of e ith e r th e ’v i t a l in te re sts' of th e
c o a sta l S ta te ® 0 o r th e in te g ra l re la tio n sh ip b e tw e e n m a rin e
and te rre s tria l e n v i r o n m e n t s ® *1 (o r a c o m b in a tio n th e re o f),
th e above rig h t of s e lf-p re se rv a tio n becam e tra n s la te d in to
a d u ty encum bent upon in d iv id u a l g o v e rn m e n ts to co n serv e and
m anage th o se reso u rces so as to a c h ie v e th e above n a tio n a l
o b je c tiv e s .® 2 Thus th e e s se n tia l lin k b e tw e e n p o lic y and
ju rid ic a l a rg u m e n ts is fo rg e d .® 3
A m ajo r le g a l im p e d im e n t to th e a c h ie v e m e n t of th e ir
o b je c tiv e s w as seen to be th e tra d itio n a l law of th e sea,
S e e , eg, ’’R u l e s o n F i s h i n g in C o l o m b i a n W a t e r s ” o f 13
D ecem ber 1957 ( in S z e k e ly , supra n 3 , b o o k le t 5, doc
11) .
upheld the view that the Declaration [of Santiago] was consistent with
the principle of the freedoa of the seas in that it explicitly acknowl
edged the right of all States to innocent and inoffensive passage. As
they clearly stated, that right did not include the freedoa to fish or,
at any events, such freedoa could not be claiaed in any zone of the sea
over which a 'definite State jurisdiction' extended.
Ibid 6 0 . Cf t h e 1 9 5 4 d e c l a r a t i o n o f t h e P e r u v i a n F o r
e i g n M i n i s t e r t h a t " t h e w o rld must a c c e p t t h e f a c t t h a t
A m e r i c a i s e l a b o r a t i n g i t s own c o d e o f r i g h t s b a s e d o n
s o c i a l n e ed s w hich a r e a t v a r i a n c e w ith t h e freedom o f
t h e s e a s "(World Today, supra n 3 2 , 2 ) .
C isneros, supra n 6 8 , 58
C i s n e r o s , supra n 6 8 , 61 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) ; cf, G a r c i a
S a y a n , supra n 6 1 . S e e a l s o t h e s i m i l a r a r g u m e n t by
t h e US i n t h e B e h r i n g S e a F u r S e a l s A r b i t r a t i o n ( supra
Ch 2 , n 1 1 0 - 1 1 2 a n d a c c o m p a n y i n g t e x t ) .
C i s n e r o s , supra n 6 8 , 6 1 . T h e a p p r o a c h t a k e n by C i s
n e r o s e t al r e f l e c t s t h e s t r o n g i n f l u e n c e o f n a t u r a l
law on L a t i n A m e r ic a n t h e o r i s t s g e n e r a l l y . Szekely
(supra n 4 , 1 4 6 - 1 4 7 ) n o t e s t h a t m o s t L a t i n A m e r i c a n i n
t e r n a t i o n a l la w y e r s h av e b een and c o n t i n u e t o be t r a i n
ed u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e t h e o l o g i c a l and l a y n a t u
r a l law s c h o o l s w h ic h e m p h a s iz e c o n c e p t s e n u n c i a t i n g
m o s t l y p r i n c i p l e s e i t h e r de lege ferenda o r r e g a r d e d a s
so s i m p l e and r e a s o n a b l e t h a t t h e y m ust be u n i v e r s a l l y
v alid . S e e a l s o a s i m i l a r a r g u m e n t a d v a n c e d b y t h e US
249
While agreeing with many of the above arguments, Felix
Garcia Amador, a Cuban jurist, followed a somewhat different
tack, linking changes in the principle of freedom of fishing
to the 'doctrine of abuse of rights'. Because fishery re
sources had proved exhaustible, he reasoned, freedom to fish
could no longer be conceived in terms of a right "of abso
lute and unlimited use".91 Restrictions to that freedom
were now necessary because of the important position of
fishery resources in world economics and their role as a
valuable food source. Traditionally, only the concerted ac
tion of all States concerned with the conservation of a par
ticular fishery resource was compatible with the freedom of
fishing principle, Garcia Amador observed. However, compet
ing commercial, economic and social needs of modern society
revealed "certain loopholes and fundamental deficiencies" in
the rigid application of a system of collective regulation
for conservation purposes. Most importantly, he noted, it
was possible for a single State to render a conservation
programme ineffective by failing to cooperate on the imple
mentation of measures. Allowing such a situation to con
tinue would mean "subordinating the interests in the conser
vation of the riches of the sea to their exploitation, as is
occasionally done for purely commercial and private ends” .93
Although in the past it was impossible to 'abuse' the free
dom of fishing principle, he admitted, that was no longer
the case, and it may be necessary and justified to take
steps to avoid that happening. When considered from the
position of the coastal State, he continued, it was even
more difficult to admit the unrestricted exercise of the
freedom to fish, particularly in cases when fishery re
The enlargement of the te rrito ria l sea would deprive other states of the freedom to
fish which they now enjoy. But i t is necessary nowadays to see whether this activity
is legal or ille g a l. The freedom of the seas grants rights of usage. And as such the
freedom to fish existed. But modern techniques deplete the fisheries and what was
once a right of usage has turned into an illegitim ate usufruct.9 0
As w ith th e fre e d o m of f is h in g p r in c ip le , o p in io n s v a r
ie d as to th e le g a l v a lid ity th ro u g h o u t h is to r y of th e th re e
- m ile lim it of te r r ito r ia l w a te rs . Som e a u t h o r i t i e s , such
as P ro fe s s o r Y epes, a C o lo m b ia n ju r is t, w e re of th e v ie w
th a t " la p re te n d u e r e g le des tr o is m ille s , que d 'a u c u n s vou-
d r a ie n t e r ig e r en dogm e du d r o it in t e r n a tio n a l, n 'a ja m a is
re u n i le s e le m e n ts n ^ c e s s a ir e s pour e tre c o n s id e r e e com m e u n
p r in c ip e in d is c u te de d r o it in t e r n a tio n a l c o u t u m i e r " . 9<s
O th e rs conceded th a t w h ile at le a s t u n til th e daw n o f
th e 2 0 th c e n tu ry " te r r ito r ia l w a te rs w e re c o n s id e r e d u n iv e r
s a lly and w ith o u t q u e s tio n to m ean a b e l t of th re e n a u tic a l
Ibid 1 6 6 . G a r c i a S a y a n (supra n 6 1 , 3 ) e x p la in s t h a t
i t was b e c a u s e P e ru w as fa c e d w it h j u s t such a s itu a
t io n t h a t she to o k u n ila t e r a l a c tio n :
El Peru, con mayores razones s i cabe que los paises que lo antecedieron
en su proclamacion, necesitaba dar une solucion pronta y definida a su
probleaa sin esperar el lento cuando no inalcanzable consenso de la co-
munidad internacional, y mediante una formula que le permitiera oponerse,
desde luego, a las intrusiones de expediciones pesqueras extranjeras que
comprometieran los intereses ecoriomicos del pais.
A A ra m b u ru y M e n c h a c a , " C h a r a c t e r a n d s c o p e o f th e
r i g h t s d e c la r e d and p r a c t ic e d o v e r th e c o n t in e n t a l sea
a n d s h e l f " ( 1 9 5 3 ) 4 7 AJIL 1 2 0 , 1 2 2
" S t a t e m e n t o f r e a s o n s s u b m i t t e d by t h e s p o n s o r s [ A r g e n
t i n a , C h i l e , P e ru and M exico] o f t h e D r a f t C o n v e n tio n
on t h e T e r r i t o r i a l W a t e r s a n d R e l a t e d Q u e s t i o n s o f t h e
I n t e r - A m e r i c a n J u r i d i c a l C om m ittee" In te r -A m e r ic a n J u
r i d i c a l C o m m itte e (R io d e J a n e i r o , 1 9 5 2 ) [ h e r e a f t e r
c i t e d 'S t a t e m e n t o f R e a s o n s ' ] , i n S z e k e l y , s u p r a n 4,
P t I I , d o c 1 6 ; c f , G a r c i a A m a d o r , s u p r a n 6 , 26
Le seul principe certain c’est le droit que possede tout Etat saritiie a
exercer sa propre souverainete sur une zone plus ou aoins large de la ser
baignant ses cotes. ...
[L]e probleie de l ’ltendue de la ier territoriale est une de ces
questions qui, selon le droit international, appartiennent au doiaine re
serve de 1’Etat. N'&ant pas reglee par le droit international et, plus
encore, ne pouvant pas etre reglee par ce droit, cette question releve de
la coipetence nationale de 1'Etat. C'est la, done, un probleie que tout
Etat a le droit de deteriiner d'une saniere autonoae et, il va sans dire,
en respectant strictesent les droits acquis des autres Etats et les
principes reconnus du droit international.
1 00 S e e , e g , A ram buru y M e n c h a c a , s u p r a n 9 5 , 1 2 0 ; G a r c i a
S ayan, su p ra n 61, 17; and Y e p e s, su p ra n 6, 5 6 -5 8 .
The L a t in A m e ric a n s , o f c o u r s e , a r e n o t a lo n e in h o ld
in g t h i s p o s iti o n . S e e , e g , Ch 1 , n 1 6 6 s u p r a .
by a unilateral act, the United States has proclaiaed that i t has rights
over xean space beyond the traditional distance of three niles;
and...thereby the United States is abandoning the three-«ile rule which
it has defended until recently.
What the United States Governient did not know then, but what i t
has since learned, is that when an iaportant nation asserts the un ilat
eral right to take certain action, what lay be copied by other nations is
not necessarily the action its e lf but rather the basis upon which the ac
tion was taken. Thus, Chile, Ecuador and Peru did not believe theiselves
to be constrained by the text of the Truian Proclaiations when they
agreed on the Declaration of Santiago....One of their arguaents is that
i f the United States had a unilateral right to claia the resources of the
seabed adjacent to i t s coasts to the exclusion of a ll other countries,
they, too, had a sia ila r unilateral right to lake claias consistent with
th eir own national in terests.
C f s ta te m e n ts by B o rc h a rd and B in g h a m , supra Ch 4, n
68.
See a ls o in t h i s r e g a r d , Ch 4 , nn 9 2 - 9 4 and
a cc o m p a n y in g t e x t s u p r a .
xo& Y epes, su p ra n 6, 3 7 -3 8
1X0 Y epes, su p ra n 6, 46
T he a b o v e c o n s id e r a t io n s w e re r e f le c t e d i n th e
f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t b y E c u a d o r a t t h e C iu d a d T r u j i l l o
C o n f e r e n c e ( c i t e d i n A u g u s t e , supra n 6 , 1 9 1 - 1 9 2 ) :
the iaportant thing is not the contour of the subaarine areas but the
aaritiae resources....[W]e know fu ll well that the stocks of fish in the
subaarine areas...aay be abundant but aay also be scanty, despite the
scie n ti-fic view that the epicontinental sea is the richest in
fish....B ut we aust also adait that there aay be abundant stocks of fish
where no subaarine terrace exists and scanty stocks on extensive and well
defined terraces....
1X 2 Y epes, supra n 6, 63
1 X 3
Ibid 6 4 ; c f G a r a i o c a , supra n 7 7 , 4 9 7 - 4 9 8 ; a n d U l l o a
( c i t e d i n A u g u s t e , supra n 6 , 1 9 1 ) . On t h e t h e o r y o f
c o m p e n s a t i o n s e e a l s o H o e f f e l , supra n 1 1 , 4 3 1 - 4 3 5 a n d
S z e k e l y , supra n 4 , 1 5 9 - 1 6 1 .
253
F in ally , and m ost fu n d am en tally , L atin A m erican S tates
d eclared th at th eir claim s m et what L au terp ach t d escrib es as
th e d ecisiv e test in rela tio n to th e freedom of th e sea;
th at is, 'r e a s o n a b le n e s s ' and sa tisfy in g 'le g itim a te common
and p articu lar i n t e r e s t ' . 1 1 "* The general L atin A m erican po
sitio n reg ard in g th e test was w ell stated by a C hilean rep
resen tativ e to th e U nited N atio n s when d i s c u s s i n g law of th e
sea m atters: 'r e a s o n a b le n e s s ' depended on th e g eo g rap h ical
and econom ic co n d itio n s proper to each co u n try , and a lim it
reaso n ab le in A m erica m ig h t p o ssib ly not be so e l s e w h e r e . 113
G iven th e r e g io n 's p articu lar geographic and econom ic co n d i
tio n s , th e L atin A m ericans c o n sid ered th eir claim s reason
ab le in th at th ey rep resen ted a defense of v ita l in te rests
and th e p ro tectio n of th eir p e o p l e s . 110
as an abstract i d e a " . 1 2 1
c e p t, he a rg u e d , th e in te r e s ts o f th e in te r n a tio n a l com m u
n ity w as o n ly one fa c to r to be b o rn e in m in d in d e te r m in in g
’ r e a s o n a b le n e s s ’ , and m ust be c lo s e ly r e la te d to o th e r fa c
te re s ts r e fle c te d in S ta te p r a c tic e , A u g u s te c o n c lu d e d ,
W h ile c la im s in v o k e d by L a tin A m e r ic a n S ta te s as p re c e
d e n ts fo r th e ir ow n a c tio n s w e re d iv e r s e in n a tu re , n o te d
o f ’ r e a s o n a b le n e s s ’ . The o n ly ju d g e w as th e S ta te c o n c e rn
g e n e ra l s ta n d a rd o f o th e r S ta te s ’ b e h a v io u r in s im ila r c ir
c u m s ta n c e s . 123
121 A u g u s te , s u p ra n 6, 319
1=22 Ib id 3 1 9 -3 2 0
123 Ib id 320
12^ Ib id 322
120 Oda, supra n 62, 94; cf, Kunz, supra n 44, 844
12e S e e , eg, M e m o ra n d u m b y D r W i l b e r t M C h a p m a n t o t h e O f
f i c e o f th e S p e c ia l A s s is t a n t to th e U nder S e c r e ta r y
f o r W ild lif e and F i s h e r i e s , to th e U nder S e c r e ta r y o f
S t a t e ( W e b b ) , d a t e d 2 9 M ay, 1 9 5 0 , i n FRUS ( 1 9 5 0 ) i ,
889; and H P h l e g e r , " R e c e n t d e v e lo p m e n ts a f f e c t i n g th e
r e g i m e o f t h e h i g h s e a s " ( J u n e 6 , 1 9 5 5 ) 3 2 DOSB 9 3 4 ,
935.
I n a c o n f i d e n t i a l m em orandum d a t e d 23 J u n e 1 9 5 0
("T h e S eco n d S e c r e t a r y o f t h e B r i t i s h E m bassy ( T e b b i t t )
t o Mr F G a r n e r R a n n e y o f t h e O f f i c e o f B r i t i s h C om m on
w e a l t h a n d N o r t h e r n E u r o p e a n A f f a i r s " i n FRUS ( 1 9 5 1 ) i ,
1 6 8 6 ) , t h e B r i t i s h e x p r e s s e d t h e v ie w t h a t " i t i s q u i t e
u n c e r t a i n w h e t h e r t h e H ag u e C o u r t w o u ld g i v e a ju d g m e n t
in fa v o u r o f th e t h r e e - m i l e l i m i t i f a c a s e w ere
b ro u g h t b e fo re i t " .
263
A second and r e la t e d b a s ic o b je c tio n w as th a t th e L a tin
A m e r ic a n a s s e r t io n th a t S ta te s m ig h t d e t e r m i n e th e lim its of
t h e ir t e r r it o r ia l w a te rs in a c c o rd a n c e w ith t h e ir e c o n o m ic ,
m ilita r y and o th e r in te r e s t s c o n s t it u t e d "a tre m e n d o u s
th re a t to th e fr e e d o m of th e seas a n d m ay le a d to in te r n a
t io n a l a n a r c h y " . 131
T h is p r o s p e c t w as v ie w e d p a r tic u la r ly s e r io u s ly by th e
U n ite d S ta te s . H e rm a n P h l e g e r , h e r th e n L e g a l A d v is e r , as
s e rte d in 1955 th a t th e im p o r t a n c e of th e fr e e d o m of th e sea
p r in c ip le fo r th e in te r n a tio n a l c o m m u n ity g e n e r a lly m ade
” [t]he a p p r o p r ia tio n by any s ta te of a re a s of th e h ig h seas
...as unsound m o r a lly as when G r o t iu s w r o t e " . 1 3 2 ' F u rth e r
m o re , he n o te d , A m e r ic a n d e fe n s e , c o m m e r c ia l s h i p p i n g and
a ir tra n s p o rt, and th e p r o s p e r ity of her fis h in g in d u s tr y
a ll w o u ld be p r e ju d ic e d by a n y s e r io u s c o m p r o m is e of th a t
p r i n c i p l e . 133
132 P h le g e r , supra n 1 2 8 , 9 3 5
[the] principle of the Freedoi of the Seas and its coipanion Uniting
concept of the narrow larginal sea have not decreased in their vital im
portance to the United States [since the country’s independence]. On the
contrary these concepts are of greater aoient now to the United States
than they have been formerly by reason of the fact that the United States
has becoie the lajor naval power of the world and has had thrust upon i t
a lajor portion of the responsibility for laintaining these as well as
other concepts of international law .
E ls e w h e r e ( " U n i t e d S t a t e s p o l i c y o n h i g h s e a s
f i s h e r i e s " ( J a n u a r y 1 6 , 1 9 4 9 ) 20 DOSB 6 7 ) h e w r i t e s t h a t
th e n a rro w n e s s o f th e band o f t e r r i t o r i a l w a te rs " i s
a s s u r e d b e c a u s e t h e n a v a l p o l i c y a n d t h e c o m m e r c ia l
p o lic y - - and o r d i n a r i l y th e f is h e r y p o lic y - - o f th e
m a j o r m a r it im e n a t io n s dem and t h a t t h e s e a s be o p e n e d
t o u n im p e d e d n a v i g a t i o n " .
264
The Truman Proclamations, properly construed, did not
violate that principle, it was contended.13'* Latin American
States, on the other hand, had misinterpreted and erroneous
ly applied the principles contained in those Proclamations,
particularly that relating to the continental shelf. Ac
cording to Professor Richard Young, for example, the CEP
claims were much different from the ’’limited doctrine" of
the continental shelf found in the 1945 Proclamation, and
”[s]tripped of these fashionable allusions to the shelf, the
claim appears in its true guise as more effort to win for a
coastal state rights over the high seas...".1383
Referring to the argument that superjacent waters were
necessarily subject to the same legal regime as that of the
continental shelf below, Young observed that a horizontal
division of rights was by no means unknown, particularly in
civil law countries, where a surface owner might not be en
titled to sub-surface minerals .13e>
As for Latin American justification of their claims in
terms of conservation needs, Oda argued that while there
were disadvantages to strict adherence to the freedom of the
sea principle, "there is no reason, why control and regula
tion of fisheries should be vested in any one state".13'7’
Such authority exercised by a single State could lead to the
imposition of unacceptable conditions or even prohibiting
nationals of other States fishing in the area. It can be
said without exaggeration, he submitted, that claims to ex
ercise fishery jurisdiction for conservation purposes had
been asserted primarily to gain a favourable share of the
13“* Phleger, supra n 12S, 936, 939; cf, Kunz, supra n 44,
844. See Ch 4, nn 63ff and accompanying text supra for
a more detailed discussion of this point.
Ibid
1-*3 Cited in Auguste, supra n 6, 189-190, n 4.
266
such as Aramburu y Menchaca "fail to cite authority that
this concept has been accepted in the field of law".
The theory of compensation advanced by Latin American
writers was similarly subjected to harsh criticism. Kunz,
for example, argued that "a new norm concerning the conti
nental shelf can only apply to states which have a continen
tal shelf."*
1'** Furthermore, the 'principle of juridical
equality of States’ referred to by Yepes, "means equality
before the law, but not necessarily equality in law".1'*0.
Criticisms were also voiced concerning the manner in
which Latin American States sought to change the law. Kunz,
for example, complained that it had become too frequent that
States invoked "mere proposals de lege ferenda or unilateral
claims as norms of the 'new' international law", and far
from being a 'progressive' law, they constituted, in fact,
"a strong and dangerous step backward".1'*-7’
The United States agreed. "To discard and abandon
traditional concepts of international law in favor of uni
lateral action and claims by each nation facing on an in
ternational sea would lead only to chaos,” claimed one
1'*'* Oda, supra n 62, 94. See also nn 66-69 and accompany
ing text supra.
Sans doute peut-on [dire] que l'inegalite est la condition naturelle des
Etats_ _
On peut cependant etre d'avis different. Le progfes des systeaes ju-
ridiques consiste non seuleaent a proclaaer l'egalite theorique dite de
droit, aais a coapenser, dans la aesure du possible, les inegalitas de
fait.
Ibid
133 H e r r i n g t o n , supra n 1 3 0 , 1 0 2 2 . T h e a u th o r e x p la in e d
(ibid ) t h a t a p r o b l e m w a s c r e a t e d
when wide-ranging fleets of fishing boats fron one country exploit the
stocks of fish in the high-seas waters off the coasts of another with
such intensity that the continued productivity of these resources is en
dangered. Not only does such exploitation threaten the continued produc
tivity of the resource but i t also gives rise to a psychological problem
aiong people of one country who observe boats of another country operat
ing in the high seas off their coasts. They theiselves aay be Baking
l i t t l e or no use of these stocks of fish, nevertheless, they soietiies
develop a strong feeling that these fish are potential resources of spe-
268
S ta te s w as p rep ared to re c o g n iz e th a t th e " le g itim a te " ,
" s p e c i a l ” 15555 i n t e r e s t s of S ta te s in fish e ry reso u rces o ff
th e ir c o a sts sh o u ld be r e s p e c te d , as w e ll as th e rig h t of
o th e r m em bers of th e in te rn a tio n a l c o m m u n ity . In th e A m e ri
can v ie w ,
IV . Co n c l u s i o n
cial concern to their own country and that the future of the resources is
endangered by the 'foreign' fleet. Therefore, in spite of the fact that
the stocks are part of an international resource whose extent, behavior,
and aethod of capture would have been little known were it not for the
operations of the 'foreign ' fleet, a popular claaor develops for govern-
aent action to prevent or liait these operations.
iss p h le g e r, supra n 1 2 8 , 9 4 0
the preeninence was not...easily translatable into effective power to influence inter
national fisheries policy. Since fisheries policy is scarcely a proiinent concern in
the hierarchy of national policies, the full weight of goverment influence would
never be brought to bear in this area. Moreover, U.S. fishing interests were autually
inconsistent — including distant-water and coastal fisheries as well as the case of
salaon fisherien — and a single national policy was difficult to foraulate.
Thus, Ü.S. fisheries policy in the post-war period was characterized by ef
forts to protect the status-quo special interests.1 3 '7
una soberania liiitada, co«o tiene que ser la que reconoce el derecho de
libre navegacion, no coaprende el espacio aereo y se traduce, en suaa, en
el ejercicio de atributos o coipetencias especiales coao son las referi-
das al control y proteccion, con exclusion de otros, de los recursos iin-
erales o pelagicos existentes en deterainada zona del aar y del subsuelo
subaarino.
Las extensiones oceanicas soaetidas a esto genero de 'soberania
de derechos', involucran o se superponen a la antigua faja de 'aguas ter
ritoriales'. Entiehdese que respecto de estas subsisten, en toda su
plenitud, los atributos que generalaente les son reconocidos por la coau-
nidad internacional, incluso el del espacio aereo.
B u t s e e a l s o , h o w e v e r , d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f ILC
m e m b e rs o f t h e C h i l e a n d e c r e e (Ch 7 , n 13 a n d a c c o m
p a n y in g t e x t i n f r a ).
S e e , e g , J o s e f K u n z , " N a t u r a l - l a w t h i n k i n g i n t h e mod
e r n s c i e n c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w " ( 1 9 6 1 ) 5 6 A JIL 951,
9 5 3 - 9 5 4 ; S z e k e l y , s u p r a n 4 , 1 2 6 ; a n d n 90 s u p r a . Sze-
k e l y ( s u p r a n 4, 11) e x p l a i n s t h a t t h e n a t u r a l law t r a
d i t i o n ' r e s u l t e d i n " t h e l a c k o f a b i l i t y o f L a t i n A m e ri
c a n w r i t e r s and g o v e rn m e n t sp o k esm en t o d i s c r i m i n a t e
b e tw ee n p r o p o s i t i o n s d e l e g e f e r e n d a and l e g e l a t a in
in te rn a tio n a l la w ..." . T h i s , i n t u r n , m ad e i t d i f f i
c u l t to a n a ly z e th e v a rio u s c la im s . C f C R o n n i n g , Law
and P o l i t i c s in I n te r - A m e r ic a n D ip lo m a c y (1963) 111.
S e e a l s o i n t h e a b o v e r e g a r d t e x t a c c o m p a n y i n g n 147
supra.
271
re so lv e th e d is p u te s on t h e b a s i s of le g a l c o n sid e ra tio n s
a l o n e . 1<so
T h ird ly , and c l o s e l y re la te d to th e above, L a tin A m e ri
can S ta te s d isa g re e d fu n d a m e n ta lly w ith th e U n ite d S t a t e s on
th e re la tiv e im p o rta n c e o f f a c t o r s to be c o n s id e r e d in de
te r m in in g w h e th e r a m a ritim e c la im w as j u s t and r e a s o n a b le .
The U n i t e d S t a t e s , f o r ex am p le, su p p o rte d its c la im to th e
c o n tin e n ta l s h e lf by s t r e s s i n g , inter alia , t h a t t h e l a t t e r
w as " n a t u r a l l y a p p u rte n a n t" to th e a d ja c e n t la n d m ass, w h ile
a t t h e sam e tim e a r g u i n g th a t th e liv in g reso u rces of th e
s u p e r ja c e n t w a te rs re m a in ed s u b j e c t to th e re g im e o f th e
h i g h s e a s . 161 T h e CEP a n d o t h e r c o a s t a l S t a t e s , ho w ev er,
d isp u te d th e a lle g e d i n h e r e n t p rim a c y o f t h e g e o l o g i c a l r e
la tio n sh ip b e tw ee n t h e c o n t i n e n t a l sh e lf and th e a d ja c e n t
la n d m ass a s a l e g a l b a sis fo r th e a sse rtio n o f m a ritim e
c la im s. As Tom F a r e r a n d P a u l a n n C a p l o v i t z observe,
States lacking the blessings of a broad shelf were unprepared to accept liiply the Di
vine dispensation [relating to fisheries resources above the shelf found in the United
States and siiilar claias]. If the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and certain other happily en
dowed States could appropriate chauvinistically the resources of the ground off their
coasts, then other States were deteriined to appropriate the resources of the water
above their far deeper and hence inaccessible.. .coastal grounds. They were unper
suaded by the insistence that geological realities required new conceptions of the na
tional doiain.1,02
101 S e e Ch 4 , nn 7 2 -7 5 supra.
103 Cf B a t h , supra n 6 4 , 72
272
the United States, on the other, lend support to the view
that rules of international law are essentially phenomeno
logical, not ontological, in nature, and therefore only ex
ist in so far as they are recognized by members of the in
ternational community. That existence is thus subser
vient to the national interests of States comprising that
community. Whereas prior to WWII the major maritime nations
had generally been able to impose their views of the common
interest on other States, their inability to pressure the
Latin American States into recanting their established
claims or convince them to submit those claims to judicial
assessment, resulted in the simultaneous appearance for the
first time in centuries of two significant, substantially
distinct positions on the legal regime governing marine re
sources, including fisheries, based on two equally different
sets of national interests. Furthermore, given the ICJ’s
1951 Fisheries Judgment and the implications thereof discus
sed above, it became increasingly difficult to argue that
the basic approach adopted by the Latin American States --
if not the entire ambit of their claims -- was devoid of
legal validity. The 'coastal State' had indeed emerged as a
significant actor in the law of the sea.103
At the same time, however, the Latin American claims
went far beyond those of Norway in the Fisheries case by ar
guing that a critical factor in assessing the legal validity
of a State's claim to adjacent marine fisheries was the im
portance of the latter to the general economic development
of the country, not merely to needs of small and isolated
coastal communities. That theme would be taken up in subse
quent arguments by other States in similar circumstances and
1 6 6
Cf Brown, supra n 6, 250; and J Vargas, "Latin America
and its contribution to the law of the sea" in NIMO,
supra n 76, 51, 53
C H A PTER SEVEN
EARLY U N IT E D N A T IO N S C O N SID E R A T IO N
OF F I S H E R Y I S S U E S
Battle, J.1
I- Introduction
Ibid 201
Ibid 202
Ibid 224
Ibid 232
was not a sovereignty, but just as the coastal State had been acknowledged [by the
ILC] to possess a right of exploration and exploitation over the continental
shelf,10, so in the case under consideration it was acknowledged to possess the nec
essary rights for the protection of larine fauna . 1 "7
Ibid 88-89
Ibid 302
Ibid
Ibid
21 Ibid. In referring to Truman's Proclamation, Hudson
cited only its policy assertion, ie, "Where such activ-
279
Jean Spiropoulos (Greece) considered Francois’ proposal
impractical, as international law gave no State exclusive
high seas jurisdiction. Should there be general support for
the adoption of international regulations, he opined, a con
ference would need to be summoned to formulate rules binding
on all States universally by a "kind of High Seas Board” .22
Hudson's approach was supported by ILC members favour
ing formulation of an arrangement encompassing the high seas
as a whole and not simply those adjacent to territorial wa
ters,23 and by those opposed to riparian nations’ claims to
exercise unilateral fishery jurisdiction in any form.2**
Objecting to Hudson's proposals were Commission members
(particularly from Latin America) anxious to prevent power
ful fishing nations from taking action which the former
thought detrimental to coastal State interests, as well as
those who considered that Truman’s fisheries Proclamation
had already advanced claims beyond those of Hudson.23
the United States laid claim to a special zone where American nationals
would enjoy special rights. It was true that the Proclamation referred
to negotiations with a view to an agreement, but that did not alter the
fact that a claim was made to a special zone in which the coastal State
would have special rights in regard to the protection of the marine
fauna.
280
Throughout the session the Commission remained equally-
divided on whether, in principle, priority should be given
to the coastal State concerning conservation.2®- Compromise
draft articles were ultimately approved, containing Hudson's
proposal; a coastal State right to take an equal part with
fishing States in any conservation zone within 100 miles of
that State's territorial sea, even if its nationals were not
engaged in fishing in the area;27 and an elaboration of Spi-
ropoulos’ original proposal whereby a permanent internation
al body would conduct scientific studies and make conserva
tion regulations for adoption by States for any area should
the States concerned be unable to agree amongst themselves
on appropriate measures.20 There being equal support for a
proposal that pending the establishment of the above body
the coastal State should be entitled to lay down non-dis-
criminatory conservation measures in high seas areas adja
cent to its own territorial waters, the Commission decided
simply to bring it to the attention of States without spon
soring it.20
Ibid 314-315
29
Ibid 415; A/1858, supra n 5, 143
281
The ILC also accepted a Francois proposal that contigu
ous zones not comprehend the recognition of special fishing
rights, as nationals of other States might be deprived of
the right to fish in such areas.30
The above draft articles were subsequently transmitted
to States for comment.31 While many of the 18 replies were
positive,33 the range of views was extreme. The United
Kingdom, for example, recorded her ’’emphatic opposition" to
any form of coastal State fishery regulation, as "unilater
ally declared conservation zones outside territorial waters
are illegal as being in contravention of the principle of
the freedom of the seas".33 In the same vein, she was not
prepared to accept a continental shelf convention lacking a
provision declaring superjacent waters to be high seas.
Chile held the opposite view, arguing that the draft
Commission articles were "unrealistic" and "out of harmony"
with usual State practice.3** Chile and other Latin American
States, the former claimed, had already categorically de
clared that their rights over the submarine shelf contiguous
to their coasts were "proper to or inherent in sovereignty
and dominion" and not merely to those of jurisdiction and
control.3* To avoid both legal contradictions between the
Ibid 267
Ibid 243
282
regime governing waters above the shelf and that governing
the shelf itself, as well as disputes likely to arise there
from, Chile proposed that the Commission affirm that
the sovereignty of a coastal State extends to its continental shelf and to the super
jacent high seas, subject to the liaitations iaposed by international law to ensure
the innocent and peaceful passage of the ships of all nations and the establishaent
and aaintenance of subaarine cables.3,0.
3^ Ibid
Ibid
Ibid. The reference to "innocent and peaceful passage"
(see text accompanying n 36 supra) would seem to indi
cate the Chile’s claim of sovereignty over waters su
perjacent to the shelf was, in effect, an extension of
its territorial sea -- innocent passage being one of
the hallmarks of the territorial sea regime. Given her
position on the contiguous zone, however, as well as
the statement in her 1947 Declaration that her claim
does not affect "the rights of free navigation on the
high seas"(ibid 244-245), it appears that the 200-mile
zone claimed was not an extended territorial sea but
rather a restricted resource zone. From the miscella
neous statements made by Chile, the significance of the
100-mile contiguous zone with respect to fisheries is
unclear, given the Chilean claim to sufficient sover
eignty up to 200 miles to guarantee ownership of fish
ery resources. Is it implied that between 100 and 200
miles Chile would not be able to protect her fisheries
(see text accompanying n 40 supra)?
Ibid 217
Ibid
A State which arbitrarily and without good reason, in rigid reliance upon the princi
ple of the freedoi of the seas, declines to play its part in seasures reasonably nec
essary for the preservation of valuable, or often essential, resources froi waste and
exploitation abuses a right conferred upon it by international law. The prohibition
of abuse of right, in so far as it constitutes a general principle of law recognized
by civilized States, provides to a considerable extent a satisfactory legal basis for
the general rule as foraulated in Article
Ibid 2 1 9
Ibid
F I K o z h e v n i k o v (USSR) a n d J a r o s l a v Z o u r e k ( C z e c h o s l o
v a k ia ) b o th oppo sed any p r o p o s a l a c c o r d i n g an i n t e r n a
t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y j u r i s d i c t i o n to im pose c o n s e r v a t i o n
r e g u l a t i o n s or p ro v id in g fo r com pulsory a r b i t r a t i o n of
fish ery d isp u tes. They a r g u e d t h a t h i g h s e a f i s h e r y
r e g u l a t i o n s h o u l d s i m p l y t a k e p l a c e am o n g t h e S t a t e s
c o n c e r n e d , " w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f s o v e r e i g n t y " (i bid
144, 160, 1 6 1 ). T h e i r p o s i t i o n was d i s t i n c t l y a m i n o r
i t y o n e , h o w e v e r , a n d t h e r e m a i n i n g m e m b e r s o f t h e Com
m i s s i o n v o t e d i n f a v o u r o f t h e a r t i c l e (ibid 1 6 4 ) .
32
Ibid 2 1 9
286
Although the ILC had discussed the territorial sea re
gime at both its 1952 and 1954 sessions, neither saw any
substantive consideration of fishery issues relating there
to. Members were unable to agree on an article governing
the breadth of the territorial sea, and in its Report to the
UNGA the Commission simply listed nine suggestions advanced
at the 1954 session.533
UN doc A/Conf.10/L.40
Ib id
UN d o c A / C o n f . 1 0 / S R . 2 1 , p 11
Rom e C o n f e r e n c e R e p o r t , s u p r a n 5 5 , p a r a 4 8 . The v o t e
w as 21 t o 2 0 , w i t h 3 a b s t e n t i o n s . V o t e s on t h e Norwe
g i a n r e s o l u t i o n n o t t o c o n s i d e r t h e p r o p o s a l w ere as
f o l l o w s ( G a r c i a Amador, s u p r a I n t r o d u c t i o n , n 16, 155,
n 2) :
I n f a v o u r : U n i t e d S t a t e s (US), C a n a d a , Denmark, E g y p t,
F r a n c e , F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c o f Germany (FRG), G r e e c e , I s
r a e l , I t a l y , J a p a n , M onaco, N e t h e r l a n d s , Norway, Po
l a n d , P o r t u g a l , S p a i n , Sweden, T u rk e y , U nion o f S o u th
A f r i c a ( S A ), U nion o f S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c s
( U S S R ) , a n d t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m (UK)
Ag a i n s t : U r u g u a y , Y u g o s l a v i a , A r g e n t i n a , A u s t r a l i a ,
B r a z i l , C h i l e , C o lo m b ia , C o s ta R ic a , Cuba, E c u a d o r, El
S a l v a d o r , G u a te m a la , I c e l a n d , I n d o n e s i a , K o re a , M exico,
Panam a, P a ra g u a y and P e ru
A b s t a i n i n g .- C h i n a , H o n d u r a s a n d N i c a r a g u a .
G e o r g e s S c e l l e s u b s e q u e n t l y r e p o r t e d ( ( 1 9 5 5 ) Y IL C
i , 1 0 7 ), h a v in g r e c e i v e d a l e t t e r from a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
a t t h e C o n f e r e n c e e x p l a i n i n g some o f t h e b a c k g r o u n d t o
th e q u e stio n :
He a l s o r e c e i v e d a l e t t e r f r o m a L a t i n A m e r i c a n
p o l i t i c i a n in d ic a tin g (ib id ) th a t " th e q u e s tio n of th e
t e r r i t o r i a l s e a was a b u r n i n g o n e i n S o u t h A m e r i c a , a n d
290
The Conference nevertheless did acknowledge more gener
ally that "when formulating conservation programmes, account
should be taken of the special interests of the coastal
State in maintaining the productivity of the resources of
the high seas near to its coast".*'* It also agreed that one
of the "guiding principles" to be followed in formulating
conventions for fishery conservation should be that "all
States fishing the resource, and adjacent coastal States,
should have equal opportunity of joining the convention and
of participating in the consideration and discussion of reg
ulatory measures" .055
While views on the significance of the decision taken
on the ’special interest’ of the coastal State in adjacent
marine fisheries varied markedly, the Conference neverthe
less provided the first international recognition of the
concept.00. The latter would take on much greater signifi
cance in succeeding years, as will be seen.
Ibid para 76. See ibid para 23 for a list of the types
of measures that might be applied in a conservation
programme
The CEP States all lodged reservations to the Con
ference Report. Peru and Chile {ibid Annex A) maintain
ed "the primacy of the regulations on conservation of
the living resources of the sea contained in their na
tional legislations and in the international conven
tions to which they [were] parties". Ecuador stated
(ibid)that the Report and its conditional approval left
When claiiing sovereign rights over a maritime zone, States were priiarily concerned
with conservation measures rather than with reserving exclusive fishing rights to
their nationals. It was clear that if the coastal State's right to promulgate fishery
conservation measures were [sic] acknowledged, that would permit the disclaimer of any
right of the coastal State to proclaim exclusive fishing privileges.7,3
At th e sam e t i m e , it w as re c o g n iz e d th a t th e p ro p o sa ls
w ere a t th a t sta g e d e lege ferenda a n d , th u s, p ro v isio n fo r
c o m p u lso ry a rb itra tio n w as e s s e n t i a l if su p p o rt w as t o be
fo rth c o m in g from m a jo r fish in g n a t i o n s . “73
W h ile n o t d i s a g r e e i n g fu n d a m e n ta lly w ith G a rc ia Ama
d o r 's p ro p o sa ls, o th e rs in c lu d in g S ir G e ra ld F itz m a u ric e
(U n ite d K in g d o m ,) fe lt th a t th e d raft a rtic le s " m ig h t b e c o n
s id e re d to tilt th e b a la n c e to o h e a v ily in o n e d i r e c t i o n , *by
s tre ssin g a lm o st e x c lu s iv e ly th e p o s itio n of th e c o a sta l
S t a t e " . “7-*- O th e r S ta te s w ere a l s o in s p e c ia l p o sitio n s, he
n o te d , th e y h a v in g engaged in fis h in g fo r many y e a r s in d is
ta n t w a te rs w here th e lo c a l c o a sta l S ta te s had not fish e d to
any g r e a t e x te n t. T hose fis h e rie s had com e t o assum e c o n
sid e ra b le e c o n o m ic im p o rta n c e fo r th e fo rm er S ta te s, he ob
serv ed , and t h e r e f o r e th e y a c q u ire d w hat m ig h t be r e g a r d e d
S e e , eg, c o m m e n t s b y F i t z m a u r i c e (i bi d 8 9 - 9 0 ) , C a r l o s
S a l a m a n c a o f B o l i v i a (i bi d 8 9 ) a n d S a n d s t r o r a {ibid),
who c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e p r o p o s e d r e g i m e
entailed no very grave concession to the coastal State, for the latter's
competence to promulgate unilateral conservation measures would be in the
nature merely of a provisional right. Should, however, compulsory arbi
tration not be an element of the scheme recognition of the special posi
tion of the coastal State would confer an inherent right to adopt unila
teral conservation measures.
7 ^.
Ibid 8 2
294
as a vested interest in continuing to fish in those areas
under reasonable conditions.^5
By the end of the session, compromise articles had been
formulated, the main features of which may be summarized as
follows. First, it was confirmed that a State whose nation
als were alone exploiting a high seas fishery may unilater
ally adopt conservation measures; and if nationals of two or
more States were engaged in fishing in any high seas area,
they must enter into negotiations to prescribe necessary
measures if any of those States so requested.'7e-
Secondly, such measures would be applicable to new en
trants to the fishery; and, if the former were not accepted,
the matter would be determined by arbitration or another
agreed method of peaceful settlement at the request of any
of the interested parties .^
Thirdly, a coastal State having a special interest in
maintaining the productivity of contiguous high seas fisher
ies was entitled to participate on an equal footing in any
system of research and regulation in that area, even though
its nationals did not fish there. The spatial limitation of
contiguity was to be based on the criterion of the coastal
S e e , eg, c o m m e n t s by t h e UK (ibid 3 3 - 8 4 ) a n d t h e US
(ibid 9 3 - 9 4 ) . S e e a l s o t e x t a c c o m p a n y i n g n 81 supra.
Ibid 4 8 - 5 0 . R e i t e r a t i n g t h e a r g u m e n t a d v a n c e d by e l -
K h o u r i ( s e e n 8 2 a n d a c c o m p a n y i n g t e x t supra), I c e l a n d
e x p l a i n e d (ibid 5 0 ) t h a t t h e I L C ' s d r a f t a r t i c l e s o n
c o n se rv a tio n d id not a d e q u a te ly p r o te c t n a tio n a l
in te re sts:
Y a m a m o t o {s u p r a Ch 4 , n 6 8 , 5 2 ) o b s e r v e s t h a t " a g e r m "
o f t h e a b s t e n t i o n p r i n c i p l e i s t o b e f o u n d i n t h e Amer
i c a n p o s i t i o n i n t h e F u r S e a l s A r b i t r a t i o n ( s e e Ch 2 ,
t e x t a c c o m p a n y i n g n 111 s u p r a ) .
W h ile t h e r e was c o n s i d e r a b l e s u p p o r t f o r t h e p r i n
c i p l e o f a b s t e n t i o n among C o m m issio n m e m b e r s , i t was
n o te d t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e w ent beyond m ere c o n s e r v a t i o n
m e asu re s and in v o lv e d r e s t r i c t i n g r i g h t s of e x p l o i t a
tio n . I t t h e r e f o r e h a d no p l a c e i n A r t i c l e s d e a l i n g
s t r i c t l y w i t h c o n s e r v a t i o n ( ( 1 9 5 6 ) YILC i , 1 2 2 - 1 2 6 ) .
T h e ILC i n i t s f i n a l r e p o r t t o t h e UNGA c o m m e n t e d t h a t
t h e p r i n c i p l e "may r e f l e c t p r o b l e m s a n d i n t e r e s t s w h i c h
d eserv e re c o g n itio n in in te r n a tio n a l la w ", but th a t th e
C om m ission la c k e d t h e n e c e s s a r y t e c h n i c a l and eco n o m ic
e x p e r t i s e t o m ore t h a n draw a t t e n t i o n t o t h e p r o p o s a l
(A /3159, s u p ra n 67, 2 9 0 ).
M c D o u g a l a n d B u r k e ( s u p r a Ch 4 , n 7 0 , 9 5 8 ) c o m m e n t
th a t
aost of the Coaaission seemed to have only the vaguest notion of the im
plications of the conservation aeasures they were preparing to recommend.
...[T]he provision for allocation of use hardly makes the principle of
abstention any less a conservation measure than the other articles under
examination in the Commission__
Dr W i l b e r t Chapm an ( " T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f i s h i n d u s
t r y a n d t h e 1958 an d 1960 U n i t e d N a t i o n s C o n f e r e n c e s on
t h e Law o f t h e S e a ” i n T h e L a w o f t h e S e a : I n t e r n a t i o n
a l R u l e s and O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r t h e Sea ( 1 9 6 8 ) [volum e
h e r e a f t e r c i t e d ' I n t e r n a t i o n a l R u l e s ' ] 35, 48) s t a t e s
t h a t d u r i n g t h e 1 9 5 6 I L C d e l i b e r a t i o n s , US o f f i c i a l s
e x p l a i n e d t h e p r i n c i p l e i n d e t a i l t o some C o m m issio n
members an d t h o u g h t t h a t a t l e a s t a b a r e m a j o r i t y s u p
p o rted i t . H o w e v e r, when t h e M e x ic a n member (a v o c a l
su p p o rte r of c o a s ta l S ta te r ig h ts ) a lso endorsed i t ,
d e s c rib in g i t as "th e p r in c ip le of e x c lu sio n of th i r d
p a r t i e s " , t h e E n g l i s h and D u tch m em bers c h a n g e d t h e i r
m inds and d e c i d e d t o o p p o s e i t . T h e US, t h e r e f o r e , a d
v i s e d t h e i r m e m b e r o f t h e ILC t o w i t h d r a w t h e p r i n c i p l e
o f a b s t e n t i o n a r t i c l e from c o n s i d e r a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n
have i t d e fe a te d in a v o te .
The a b s t e n t i o n p r i n c i p l e was e m b o d i e d i n t h e 1952
I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n v e n tio n f o r N orth P a c i f i c F i s h e r i e s ,
b e t w e e n C a n a d a , J a p a n a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 2 0 5 UNTS
301
N a tio n a l resp o n ses w ere c o n s id e re d by th e C o m m issio n in
1956 w h ile p re p a rin g its fin a l rep o rt on th e te rrito ria l and
h ig h seas re g im e s. A lth o u g h it w as u n a n im o u sly ag reed th a t
S ta te s had e x c lu siv e fish in g rig h ts w ith in th e ir te rrito ria l
seas, it a g a in p roved im p o ssib le to ag ree on th e l a t t e r ’s
b re a d th . The IL C sim p ly re ite ra te d , in ter a lia , th a t, in
its v ie w , in te rn a tio n a l law d id not p e rm it an e x te n s io n of
th e te rrito ria l sea beyond 12 m i l e s .
M ore e x p l i c i t and p ro lo n g e d d isc u s s io n of fish e ry is
sues to o k p la c e d u rin g c o n s id e ra tio n of c o n se rv a tio n a rti-
6 5 ) . F o r d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e c o n c e p t s e e E A l l e n , "A n e w
c o n c e p t f o r f i s h e r i e s t r e a t i e s ” (1 9 5 2 ) 46 A JIL 3 1 9 ; W
H e r r i n g t o n , "C o m m en ts o n t h e p r i n c i p l e o f a b s t e n t i o n "
i n P a p e rs P r e s e n t e d a t t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e c h n ic a l Con
f e r e n c e on t h e C o n s e r v a t i o n o f t h e L i v i n g R e s o u r c e s o f
th e Sea (A /C o n f.1 0 /7 ) 3 4 4 -3 4 9 ; S O da, I n te r n a t io n a l
C o n tro l o f Sea R e so u rc e s (1961) 1 9 7 -1 9 8 , 2 1 0 -2 1 3 ; C S e-
l a k , " T h e p r o p o s e d I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n v e n tio n f o r t h e H ig h
S e a s F i s h e r i e s o f t h e N o rth P a c i f i c ” (1 9 5 2 ) 46 AJIL 3 2 3 ;
R v an C le v e , "T he e c o n o m ic an d s c i e n t i f i c b a s i s o f t h e
p r i n c i p l e o f a b s t e n t i o n ” i n A / C o n f . 1 3 / 3 7 ; G v a n d e r Mo
l e n , "T he p r i n c i p l e o f a b s t e n t i o n and t h e freed o m o f th e
s e a s " ( 1 9 5 9 ) 6 N IL R 2 0 3 ; a n d Y a m a m o to , s u p r a Ch 4 , n 6 8 .
A /3 1 5 9 , s u p r a n 6 7 , 2 5 6 . S e e a l s o t e x t a c c o m p a n y in g n
83 s u p r a . In d is c u s s io n s i n d ir e c t ly r e la te d to f i s h e r
i e s an d t h e t e r r i t o r i a l s e a , t h e C o m m issio n d e c l i n e d t o
re c o g n iz e any e x c lu s iv e r ig h t o f th e c o a s ta l S ta te to
engage in f is h in g in th e c o n tig u o u s zo n e, c i t i n g la c k
of S ta te su p p o rt fo r th e e x te n s io n of such r ig h ts be
yond th e t e r r i t o r i a l se a ( ib i d 295). S e e a l s o nn 30
an d 40 a n d a c c o m p a n y in g t e x t s u p r a .
I n a r e l a t e d d e c i s i o n , t h e IL C r e c o g n i z e d t h e
r i g h t o f h o t p u r s u i t , c o m m e n tin g ( i b i d 2 8 5 ) t h a t
The aajority of the Commission was of the opinion that the right
of hot pursuit should...be recognized when the ship is in a zone contigu
ous to the territorial sea, provided such pursuit is undertaken on the
ground of violation of rights for the protection of which the zone was
established. Thus, a State which has established a contiguous zone for
the purposes of customs control cannot commence hot pursuit of a fishing
boat accused of unlawful fishing of the territorial sea if the fishing
boat is already in the contiguous zone. Some members of the Commission
were of the opinion that since the coastal State does not exercise
sovereignty in the contiguous zone, no pursuit commenced when the ship is
already in the contiguous zone can be recognized. The majority of the
Commission did not share that opinion. It admitted, however, that the
offenses giving rise to hot pursuit must always have been committed in
internal waters or in the territorial sea: acts committed in the con
tiguous zone cannot confer upon a coastal State a right of hot pursuit.
302
d e s of the high seas regime. Included for the first time
in the Articles was a definition of 'conservation of the
living resources of the high seas', that is: "the aggregate
of the measures rendering possible the optimum sustainable
yield from those resources so as to secure a maximum supply
of food and other marine products” .^*
Provisions relating to the prescription of conservation
regulations by non-coastal fishing States that had earlier
received endorsement in principle were further tightened
during the session. Given the powerful resources of modern,
industrialized fishing fleets, it was finally decided, for
example, that States whose nationals were alone exploiting a
fishery should have not only the right to impose conserva
tion measures but also the duty to do so if necessary.9®
Much more controversial were the provisions concerning
the role of coastal States in fishery conservation. Radhab-
[t]he fact that the coastal State's right is based on its special inter
est in laintaining the living resources, iiplies that any extension of
this zone beyond the liiits within which such an interest lay be supposed
to exist would exceed the purpose of the provision.
100 A rtic le 5 4 (2 )
101 A rtic le 55
102 I t sh o u ld be n o te d t h a t th e v a r io u s d r a f t a r t i c l e s r e
l a t i n g to d is p u te s e ttle m e n t un d erw en t m u ltif a r io u s
c h a n g e s d u r in g t h e y e a r s th e y w ere b e in g d i s c u s s e d by
t h e IL C , a n d a d e t a i l e d r e v i e w t h e r e o f i s b e y o n d t h e
s c o p e o f t h e p r e s e n t w ork. The f o l l o w i n g com m ent by
t h e C o m m i s s i o n o n t h e f i n a l p r o d u c t , h o w e v e r , m ay b e
c i t e d (ibid 2 9 1 ) :
The draft text leaves the parties entirely free as regards the method of
settlement. They may submit their disputes to the International Court of
Justice by agreement or in accordance with mutual treaty obligations;
they say set up courts of arbitration; they may, if they so desire, seek
to compose their disagreements through a commission set up for the pur
pose, before resorting to these procedures. It is only where the parties
fail to agree on the method of settling a dispute that the draft text
provides for arbitration, while leaving the parties an entirely free
choice as to arrangements for arbitration. If, however, the parties fail
to agree on this subject within three months from the date of the origi
nal request, the draft provides for the setting up of a Commission partly
or wholly without their co-operation.
The p r o p o s a l had b e e n s t r o n g l y a d v a n c e d by I c e l a n d
(A /C N .4 /9 9 , s u p ra n 84, 4 9 - 5 0 ) . As w i t h t h e a b s t e n t i o n
p r i n c i p l e a b o v e ( s e e n 93 s u p r a ) , t h e C o m m is s io n d e
c i d e d t h a t i t was n o t i n a p o s i t i o n t o e x a m in e f u l l y
t h e p r o p o s a l 's i m p l i c a t i o n s and i t s i n h e r e n t e le m e n ts
o f e x c l u s i v e u s e o f h i g h s e a s f i s h e r y r e s o u r c e s by t h e
co asta l S tate. T h e IL C t h e r e f o r e r e f r a i n e d f r o m m a k i n g
any c o n c r e t e rec o m m e n d a tio n (A /3159, su p ra n 67, 2 9 3 ).
F o r t h e C o m m is s io n ’s d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e i s s u e s e e (1956)
YILC i , 1 8 3 - 1 8 5 .
to exaiine the law of the sea, taking account not only of the legal but also of the
technical, biological, economic and political aspects of the problei, and to eubody
the results of its work in one or aore international conventions or such other instru-
aents as it aay deea appropriate.107
[there] was an inadequate conception (in some quarters] of the freedoa of fishing on
the high seas, which took no account of considerations of deiocracy and economic jus
tice. Such a conception was at the base of the indefensible and outaoded policy of
laissez-faire in the fishing of the high seas. ...[Furtheraore], there was an over-em-
phasis on legal niceties. Law was respected in so far as i t was based upon reason,
equity, and free consent and adapted itself to changing conditions. 1 1 Ä
X1^ O f f i c i a l R e c o r d s . S e c o n d U n i t e d N a t i o n s C o n f e r e n c e on
t h e L a w o f t h e S e a . (UN d o c A / C o n f . 1 9 / 8 ) 9 4 ; c f ,
s t a t e m e n t s by t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f M e x ic o ( i b i d 7 6 ) ,
J o rd a n (A /C o n f.1 3 /3 9 , su p ra n 111, 18) and P e ru ( i b i d
7). H e re a fte r a l l re fe re n c e s to r e p o r ts e tc o f th e
1 9 6 0 C o n f e r e n c e (UNCLOS I I ) w i l l b e m a d e b y t h e UN
d o cu m en t num ber ( i e , A / C o n f . 1 9 / . . . ) .
A c c o r d i n g t o F r i e d h e i m ( s u p r a n 1 0 9 , 3 1 ) , t h i s w as
m a i n l y f o r tw o r e a s o n s . F i r s t , m any ' d i s s a t i s f i e d
S t a t e s ’ la c k e d l e g a l t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e and w ere
f r i g h t e n e d t h a t th e y m ig h t assu m e u n p e r c e iv e d o b l i g a
t i o n s i f th e y w ere to a g re e to d e t a i l e d p r o v is io n s .
S e c o n d ly ,
[t]he primary purpose of the Conference was codification and, although i t aust give
due thought to the changes necessary for promoting the progressive development of in
ternational law , i t should always bear in aind that any departure froa existing rules
aust only be adiitted if i t contributes to that developaent and was in the interest of
the entire community.x
A /C o n f .1 3 / 4 2 , s u p r a n 11 1 , 4 8 -4 9 ; c f , s t a t e m e n t by t h e
G h a n a ian d e l e g a t e (A /C o n f.1 9 /8 , sup ra n 114, 135) t h a t
h i s c o u n t r y 's f e a r s t h a t i t s f i s h e r y r e s o u r c e s m ig h t be
e x p l o i t e d by o t h e r S t a t e s
xx^ A / C o n f . 1 3 / 3 9 , s u p r a n 1 1 1 , 25; c f , s t a t e m e n t s by t h e
r e p re s e n ta tiv e s of I ta l y (ib id 12), th e N eth erlan d s
( i b i d 1 1 ) , S w e d e n ( i b i d 1 2 ) a n d t h e FRG ' ( A / C o n f . 1 3 / 4 1 ,
supra n 111, 16). V e r z i j l ( s u p r a n 1 1 0 , 2 ) , a member
o f t h e D u t c h d e l e g a t i o n a t UNCLOS I , n o t e d s h o r t l y a f
t e r th e C onference th a t
One of the aain weapons aost frequently used in [the] fight for
political victory was the adroit juggling with the twofold aia of codifi
cation and of progressive development of international law: the same del
egations which, on one topic, urged strongly the replacement of tradi
tional rules, on another clung to the old rules and obstinantly opposed
the idea of further development.
312
Even major maritime Powers professing themselves more
amenable to compromise, such as the United Kingdom and the
United States, sought to preserve important elements of the
legal status quo by claiming that existing norms benefitted
all States. The American representative, for instance, ar
gued that the freedom of the sea principle taken most broad
ly "was the most equitable for all States, whether large or
small, and was no mere historic relic. Freedom was perhaps
of even greater importance to small States than to large
ones...."xie
The above categorization of interests, while generally
valid, is nevertheless subject to qualification. Most major
maritime States, for example, also had significant coastal
fishing communities demanding legal protection. As well, a
number of smaller, economically-weaker States such as Ceylon
(later Sri Lanka), Cuba, Portugal and Spain had relatively
important distant-water fishing interests. On the other
hand, Canada, a comparatively highly-developed country, was
actively engaged in strengthening the legal position of
coastal States vis-ci-vis fisheries. All of their particular
interests had also to be taken into consideration when at
tempting to negotiate a fishery regime.
Each of the above factors influenced Conference pro
ceedings , as may be seen in both Committee and Plenary
sessions.
the United States, together with Great Britain, Japan, Holland, Belgiua,
Greece, France, West Geriany and other laritiae nations, adopted as its
firs t goal in the Conference the preservation of the traditional limit of
the territo ria l sea at three Biles except as aodified by reasonably
greater historical lia its . It did so, not siaply because that lia it
[had] long been recognized in international law, but for coipelling ail-
itary and coaaercial reasons.
I n t h e v i e w o f t h e a b o v e S t a t e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e US, a
g r e a t e r b r e a d t h ( s u c h a s 12 m i l e s a s p r o p o s e d by t h e
S o v i e t U n io n and some o t h e r S t a t e s ) w o u ld h a v e a llo w e d
R u s s ia n su b m a rin e s (w hich o u tn u m b ered A m erican subm a
rin e s ) to o p e ra te u n d e te c te d in th e t e r r i t o r i a l w aters
o f n e u t r a l S t a t e s , as w e ll as have s e v e r e l y im peded th e
o p e r a t io n s o f A m erican m i l i t a r y and co m m ercial v e s s e l s .
See on t h i s p o i n t , e g , A Dean, "Freedom o f t h e s e a s "
( 1 9 5 8 - 1 9 5 9 ) 37 F o r e ig n A f f a i r s 83 [ h e r e a f t e r c i t e d
'F re e d o m o f t h e S e a s '] 8 9 -9 1 ; and L B e c k e r, "The b r e a d
th o f th e t e r r i t o r i a l se a and f i s h e r i e s j u r i s d i c t i o n "
( M a r c h 1 6 , 1 9 5 9 ) 4 0 DO SE 3 6 9 , 3 7 0 - 3 7 1 .
A c c o rd in g to G reg o r T unkin (s u p r a n 106, 5 1 ), i t
w a s t h e US w h i c h a t t e m p t e d t o i n t r o d u c e C o l d Wa r e l e
m ents i n t o t h e C o n fe re n c e . C om m enting on t h e d e s i r e o f
t h e US t o l i m i t t h e e x t e n t o f c o a s t a l S t a t e m a r i t i m e
j u r i s d i c t i o n , he s t a t e s ( i b i d 49) t h a t
not only [because] it had itself adopted the twelve-aile liait, but also
[because of] its policy of helping siall and econoaically less advanced
countries to develop their national econoaies and iaprove their standards
of living.
Those who supported the joint proposal.. .would reject the idea that the
peoples of the saaller nations aust be disowned and prevented froa enjoy
ing the living resources of the seas adjacent to their coasts for the
benefit of private interests in foreign countries thousands of ailes
away.
S e e , eg, c o m m e n t s b y d e l e g a t e s o f t h e UK ( i b i d 1 0 4 ) a n d
New Z e a l a n d ( N Z ) , t h e l a t t e r o f w h i c h r e l a t e d t h e i s s u e
to th e b ro ad er i n t e r n a t i o n a l c lim a te of th e tim e ( i b i d
150) :
It has been suggested that the 'cold war1 was a reason for ac
cepting the proposal that each State should be free to fix the breadth of
its own territorial sea up to a aaxiaua limit of twelve ailes. ...New
Zealand...considered the converse to be true. In a period of interna
tional tension there was all the acre reason for ensuring that freedoa of
navigation was not overshadowed by pretensions of national sovereignty.
Ibid 177. S e e T a b l e 4 , c o l u m n A f o r r e c o r d o f v o t e s
c a s t . E c u a d o r s u b s e q u e n t l y e x p l a i n e d (ibid) t h a t s h e
had a c t u a l l y in te n d e d to v o te in f a v o u r o f t h e p r o p o s a l
b u t h a d a b s t a i n e d by m i s t a k e . The C o n f e r e n c e d e c i d e d
( 4 8 - 1 7 - 1 7 ) t h a t i t w as n o t p o s s i b l e t o c h a n g e v o t e s
once th e y had been r e c o r d e d . For background to t h a t
d e v e l o p m e n t and t h e a p p a r e n t a t t e m p t by a d e l e g a t e t o
c o e rc e th e E cuadorian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e in to changing h is
v o t e s e e L B e c k e r , " Som e p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m s o f t h e L e
g a l A d v i s e r " ( M a y 1 9 , 1 9 5 8 ) 38 DOSB 8 3 2 , 8 3 6 .
A S o v i e t p r o p o s a l (A /C o n f . 1 3 /C . 1 / L .8 0 , i n A / C o n f .
1 3 / 3 9 , supra n 1 1 1 , 2 3 3 ; e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) w h i c h w o u l d
have allow ed S ta te s to d e term in e th e b re a d th of t h e i r
t e r r i t o r i a l sea acco rd in g to e s ta b lis h e d p r a c tic e w ith
i n t h e l i m i t s " a s a rule , o f t h r e e t o t w e l v e m i l e s , h a
v in g r e g a r d to h i s t o r i c a l and g e o g r a p h ic a l c o n d i t i o n s ,
econom ic i n t e r e s t s , t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e s e c u r i t y of
t h e c o a s t a l S t a t e and t h e i n t e r e s t s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l
n a v i g a t i o n " wa s r e j e c t e d , 2 9 - 4 4 - 9 (ibid 1 7 7 - 1 7 8 ) .
S o r e n s e n (supra n 1 0 6 , 2 4 6 ) c o m m e n t s t h a t t h e S o
v i e t p r o p o s a l " f o u n d l i t t l e f a v o u r e v e n amon g t h e
’t w e l v e - m i l e r s ' b ecau se th e p h ra se ’as a r u l e ’ l e f t th e
ex act im p lic a tio n s of th e p ro p o sals u n c e rta in " . See,
eg, s t a t e m e n t s i n P l e n a r y s e s s i o n b y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f
I r a n a n d U r u g u a y ( A / C o n f . 1 3 / 3 8 , supra n 1 0 6 , 4 1 ) .
L o f t u s B e c k e r , US L e g a l A d v i s e r ( q u o t e d i n Swan
a n d U e b e r h o r s t , supra n 1 0 6 , 1 1 3 3 ) s u b s e q u e n t l y c o m
m ented t h a t
On t h e q u e s t i o n o f b l o c v o t i n g a n d t h e p o s i t i o n o f
v a rio u s groups re g a rd in g th e b re a d th of th e t e r r i t o r i a l
s e a s e e a l s o B a i l e y , supra 1 0 6 , 1 5 - 2 2 ; R F r i e d h e i m ,
" F a c t o r a n a l y s i s a s a t o o l i n s t u d y i n g t h e law o f t h e
s e a " i n Offshore Boundaries, supra n 54, 4 7 , 5 7 - 6 0 ; A
G ro s , "La C o n v e n t i o n s u r l a P e c h e e t l a C o n s e r v a t i o n
d e s R e s s o u r c e s B i o l o g i q u e s d e l a H a u t e M e r " ( 1 9 5 9 ) 97
RDC 1, 6 8 - 7 5 ; B H e i n z e n , " T h e t h r e e - m i l e l i m i t : p r e
s e r v i n g t h e f r e e d o m o f t h e s e a s " ( 1 9 5 8 - 1 9 5 9 ) 11 Stan
ford L R 5 9 7 , 6 5 2 - 6 5 3 ; a n d J o h n s o n , supra n 1 0 6 , 8 0 - 8 2 .
TABLE 4
VOTES OF FISHERY PROPOSALS:
UNCLOS I AND II
UNCLOS I UNCLOS II
A B C D E F G H I J K L
Afghanistan Y N N Y A
Albania N N N N N N N Y N N
Argentina Y N Y Y Y N Y N Y A Y Y
Australia N Y N N N Y A Y A N Y Y
Austria N Y A A Y A A Y Y
Belgium N Y N N N Y N Y N N Y Y
Bolivia Y Y A A N Y Y Y A Y Y
3razil N Y N N N A Y Y N Y Y
Bulgaria Y N N N N N N N N Y N N
Burma Y N N Y Y N V N Y Y A N
Byelorussian SSR Y N N N N N N N V N N
Cambodia Y Y Y Y Y Y A A
Cameroon N Y Y
Canada N N Y Y N Y Y N Y N Y Y
Ceylon Y N N Y Y Y A Y A A Y Y
Chile A A N Y Y N Y N Y A Y N
China N Y A A N Y A Y A N Y Y
Colombia A N N N Y N N Y A Y Y
Costa Rica A A A Y Y N Y A Y N Y Y
Cuba N Y N N N Y Y I A Y Y
Czechoslovakia Y N N N N N Y N A Y N N
Denmark N Y A A A Y Y Y Y N Y Y
Dominican Republic N Y N N N Y Y A N Y Y
Ecuador A N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y N
El Salvador N N N Y Y N Y N Y A
Ethiopia Y Y Y
Finland A A A A A Y A A A A Y Y
France N Y N N N Y N Y N N Y Y
Fed Rep Germany N Y N N N Y N Y N N Y Y
Ghana Y N A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Greece N Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y
Guatemala Y N N Y Y N N Y A A Y
Guinea Y A N
Haiti N Y Y N N Y N A Y
Holy See A A A A Y A Y Y
Honduras A Y A A Y Y N Y Y
Hungary Y N N N N A Y N N
Iceland A N N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
India Y N N Y Y A Y Y Y Y A N
Indonesia Y N N Y Y N Y N Y Y N N
Iran Y A A Y Y N Y Y Y Y A A
Iraq Y N N Y A Y N N
Ireland N Y A Y A Y Y Y A N Y Y
Israel N Y A N A Y A Y A N Y Y
Italy N Y A N N Y N Y N N Y Y
Japan N A Y N N Y N A N N N A
Jordan N Y N Y N Y
Rep of Korea A N A Y Y N A N A N Y Y
Laos Y N Y Y
Lebanon Y N N A N Y
Liberia N Y Y Y N Y Y A N Y Y
Libya Y N N Y Y N Y N N
Luxembourg N Y N N Y N Y Y
Malaya Y N N Y Y Y A Y
Mexico Y N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y N
Monaco N Y N N N Y Y N N Y Y
Morocco Y N N Y N Y N N
Nepal Y A A Y A Y
Netherlands N Y N N N Y N Y N N Y Y
New Zealand N Y N N A Y N Y N N Y Y
Nicaragua N Y A N Y A Y Y N Y Y
Norway N Y Y Y N Y N Y N N Y Y
Pakistan N Y A N A Y Y N A Y Y
Panama Y N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y N
Paraguay A Y A Y A Y Y
Peru A N N Y Y N Y N Y N Y N
Philippines Y A N Y Y N Y A A Y Y A
Poland Y N N N N A N N N Y N N
Portugal N Y A N N Y N Y N N Y Y
TABLE 4 (con't)
A B C D E F G H I J K L
Romania Y N N N N N N N N Y N N
San Marino Y N Y Y
Saudi Arabia Y N N Y Y N Y Y N N
Spain N Y A N Y Y N Y N N Y Y
Sudan Y N N
Sweden N A Y N N Y N Y N N Y Y
Switzerland N Y A N A Y A Y A N Y Y
Thailand N Y Y Y N Y A Y A N Y Y
Tunisia Y N N Y Y A Y N Y Y A Y
Turkey N Y Y Y N Y Y A A Y Y
Ukrainian SSR Y N N N N N N N N Y N N
U of South Africa N Y N N N Y A Y A N Y Y
USSR Y N N N N N N N N Y N N
UAR Y N N Y Y A Y N Y Y N N
United Kingdom N Y N N N Y N Y N N Y Y
United States N Y N N N Y A Y A N Y Y
Uruguay Y N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y
Venezuela Y N N A A N A N Y Y A N
Rep of Viet-Nam A Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Yemen Y N N
Yugoslavia Y N A Y Y N Y N Y Y Y N
(Y = yes N = no A = abstain)
317
Other proposals attempted to distinguish between the
questions of coastal State fishery jurisdiction and the
breadth of the territorial sea per se, with the latter’s at
tendant implications for Cold War military and commercial
activities. In a major departure from its initial position,
the United States, for example, suggested a six-mile terri
torial sea, plus an additional six-mile zone in which the
coastal State would have the same fishery rights as in the
territorial sea. Those rights would be subject to the right
of foreign vessels that had fished ’’regularly in that por
tion of the zone having a continuous baseline and located in
the same body of water" during the previous five years to
fish in the outer six miles of the zone under an obligation
to respect conservation regulations and other rules of in
ternational law.12B According to the Americans, the propos
al represented a great sacrifice and provided a reasonable
balance between the many conflicting interests of the inter
national community.12^
Other States disagreed. The Canadian representative,
for example, argued that a State which had regularly sent a
few fishing vessels into waters within 12 miles of a foreign
coast "could continue to exploit in perpetuity not merely
the same specific areas but the whole ’major body of water’
concerned” and could even increase the number of fishing
Canadian views at the Conference tangled with those of the United States
and the United Kingdo«. The chairaan of the Canadian delegation [who
aade the statement in the text accoapanying this note] can be and was
outspoken on occasion. The Canadian election which took place during the
Conference followed aore than noraal outbursts of anti-United States
feeling in Canada_ _
the law of the high seas contains certain rules, aost of thea already
recognized in positive international law, which are designed, not to
liait or restrict the freedoa of the high seas, but to safeguard its ex
ercise in the interests of the entire international coaaunity. These
rules concern particularly:
(iii) The rights of States relative to the conservation of the living re
sources of the high seas.
m e a s u r e s w o u l d b e n o t i f i e d t o t h e FAO a n d w o u l d a p p l y
t o new com ers no l a t e r t h a n s e v e n m o n th s t h e r e a f t e r (A /
C o n f . 1 3 / C . 3 / L .5 5 , s p o n s o r e d by F r a n c e , N e t h e r l a n d s ,
P o r t u g a l , S w e d e n , UK a n d USA; i n i b i d 1 5 1 ) . T his, as
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o b s e r v e d , w ould p r o v i d e a p e r i o d f o r
d i s c u s s i n g p ro b le m s b e f o r e t h e m e a su re s becam e e n f o r c e
a b l e (ibi d 4 9 ) . The p r o v i s i o n was a d o p t e d 4 7 - 0 - 1 0
(ibid 5 1 ) . A r t i c l e 5 3 (1 ) was a p p ro v e d on f i r s t r e a d
i n g , 3 2 - 7 - 1 3 ( i bi d) ; a n d o n s e c o n d r e a d i n g , 5 8 - 0 - 1
(ibid 1 1 3 ) .
A P o l i s h - S o v i e t p r o p o s a l (A /C o n f. 1 3 /C . 3 / L .2 9 , in
ibid 1 4 2 ) t h a t c o n s e r v a t i o n m e a s u r e s w o u l d a p p l y o n l y
t o new com ers w hose S t a t e s d id n o t s u g g e s t v a r y i n g o r
c l a r i f y i n g t h e m , w a s r e j e c t e d 3 8 - 8 - 1 3 ( i bi d) .
Cf c o m m e n t s b y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e FRG ( i b i d 1 6 ) ,
G r e e c e (i bi d 1 5 ) a n d S w e d e n (ibi d 1 2 - 1 3 ) , t h e l a t t e r o f
whom c o n c e d e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t S w e d e n " w a s p r e p a r e d t o
c o n s id e r s p e c i a l c la im s t h a t m ig h t be p u t fo rw a rd on
b e h a lf o f S t a t e s w hose econom ic c o n d i t i o n s w ere su c h
t h a t f i s h i n g was t h e i r p r i n c i p a l , o r e v e n t h e i r o n l y ,
s o u rc e o f incom e".
A l a r g e n u m b er o f S t a t e s m ade s i m i l a r c o m m e n ts ,
o f te n in c lu d in g a rg u m e n ts r e l a t i n g to th e n eed s o f d e
v e lo p in g c o u n tr ie s . The Y u g o s la v ia n d e l e g a t e , f o r i n
s t a n c e , o b s e rv e d ( i b i d 21) t h a t
A /C o n f . 1 3 / C . 3 / L .2 1 , s p o n s o r e d by C o s ta R ic a , M e x ic o ,
P e r u a n d t h e UAR; i n A / C o n f . 1 3 / 4 1 , s u p r a n 1 1 1 , 1 4 0 .
S e e a l s o t e x t a c c o m p a n y in g n 64 s u p r a .
x ■+& I b i d 38
324
proposed qualification would sow confusion.x^9 The proposal
was defeated in C.II, 26-32-8.1:50
The coastal - non-coastal State conflict surfaced dra
matically with a proposal to delete Articles 54 and 55 rec
ognizing the special interest of the coastal State in adja
cent living marine resources. It was, however, decisively
rejected.131 Instead, C.III adopted two other amendments to
Article 54 to cover situations not specifically dealt with
by the ILC. First, States whose nationals fished in high
seas areas adjacent to the territorial sea of a coastal
State would not be able to enforce conservation measures op
posed to those adopted by the coastal State. The latter’s
would prevail.132 Secondly, in the event of the coastal
State not having itself adopted conservation measures, other
Ibid 64
15353 Ibid 65. The debate between Cuba and Mexico on this
issue demonstrates that not all Latin American States
shared the same position of law of the sea matters.
provided that in the case of disputes (concerning leasures unilaterally iiposed by the
coastal State under Article 55], the measures shall only be suspended when it is
apparent to the coaaission on the basis of priaa facie evidence that the need for the
urgent application of such Measures does not exist.
103 Ibid 77
c o a s ta l S ta te sh o u ld re c e iv e s p e c ia l c o n s id e r a tio n i f
r e s t r i c t i o n s a r e im p o se d on t h e i n t e n s i t y o f f i s h i n g "
( A / C o n f . 1 3 / C . 3 / L . 6 6 , i n ibid 1 5 3 ) . I t was s e e n a s d u
p l i c a t i n g th e I c e l a n d i c p r o p o s a l and t h e r e f o r e w i t h
d r a w n ( i bid 1 1 9 ) .
T h e P h i l i p p i n e s a n d t h e RVN h a d j o i n t l y p r o p o s e d
( A / C o n f . 1 3 / C . 3 / L . 6 0 , i n ibid 1 5 2 ) t h e a d d i t i o n o f t h e
f o ll o w i n g p a r a g r a p h to A r t i c l e 49:
T h e p r o p o s a l w a s s u b s e q u e n t l y w i t h d r a w n ( ibid 1 0 0 , 1 0 1 )
a n d t h e f o l l o w i n g new p r o p o s e d a m e n d m e n t s u b m i t t e d , c o
s p o n s o r e d b y t h e ROK ( A / C o n f . 1 3 / C . 3 / L . 8 6 , i n i bid 1 5 9 ) :
The UK, USSR and Peru all considered that the Ecu
adorian proposed resolution was covered by the Iceland
ic amendment, and on that basis Ecuador withdrew her
proposal {ibid). Even in the Plenary, however, the
Philippines declined to support the proposal as they
viewed the latter as referring only to Iceland (A/Conf.
13/38, supra n 111, 45).
Ibid; cf, a s i m i l a r c o m m e n t b y t h e N o r w e g i a n
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e (ibid 1 1 9 )
Ibid 111
B o t t o m - f i s h and o t h e r f i s h w ere t o be s u b j e c t t o t h e
regim e of th e h ig h s e a s . S e e i n t h i s r e g a r d n 68
supra. F o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f C o m m i t t e e n e g o t i a t i o n s on
t h i s m a t t e r and t h e f i n a l r e s u l t s e e R Young, " S e d e n
t a r y f i s h e r i e s a n d t h e C o n v e n t i o n on t h e C o n t i n e n t a l
S h e l f " ( 1 9 6 1 ) 55 A J I L 3 5 9 , 3 6 6 - 3 6 8 .
A /C o n f. 1 3 /4 2 , s u p r a n 111, 59; c f , c o m m e n t s by t h e
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f J a p a n ( i b i d 56) a n d M on ac o ( i b i d 5 7 )
133 S e e , e g , t h e c o m m e n t s o f t h e d e l e g a t e s o f Burma ( i b i d
4 9 ) a n d I c e l a n d ( i b i d 5 9 ) , t h e l a t t e r o f whom e x p l a i n e d
th at
333
D- Th e F o u r t h C o m m i t t e e
The F o u r t h C o m m itte e (C .IV ) exam ined th e ILC a r t i c l e s
on t h e c o n t i n e n t a l sh elf. Im portant for present purposes
w as t h e d e b a t e on t h e natu re of th e resources g o v e r n e d by
th e c o n tin e n ta l sh elf r e g i m e . 1(3:3 On t h e o n e h a n d , G reece,
Turkey and o t h e r s argued t h a t th e co astal S tate should have
rig h ts only to m ineral and n o t t o liv in g resources of the
sh elf. In tro d u cin g G re e c e 's proposal to th at e ffe c t, her
d eleg ate, f o r exam ple, claim ed th at "all th e liv in g re
sources w ere of th e w a te rs of th e sea, and w ere a c c o r d i n g l y
su b ject to th e regim e of th e high s e a s ; only th e m in eral r e
sources belonged to th e co n tin en tal sh elf p ro p erly so
c a l l e d " . ieu*
A number o f S t a t e s , on t h e o th er hand, argued th at th e
C om m ittee s h o u ld accept th at because of th e ph y sical connec
tio n betw een c e r t a i n bottom fish and t h e s e a - b e d and th e
m ethods u s e d for h arv estin g t h e m , 103 as w ell as "co n sid era-
B o t t o m - f i s h and o t h e r f i s h w ere t o be s u b j e c t to th e
regim e of th e h ig h s e a s . S e e i n t h i s r e g a r d n 68
supra. F o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f C o m m i t t e e n e g o t i a t i o n s on
t h i s m a t t e r and t h e f i n a l r e s u l t s e e R Young, " S e d e n
t a r y f i s h e r i e s a n d t h e C o n v e n t i o n on t h e C o n t i n e n t a l
S h e l f " ( 1 9 6 1 ) 55 A J I L 3 5 9 , 3 6 6 - 3 6 8 .
A /C o n f. 1 3 /4 2 , s u p r a n 111, 59; c f , c o m m e n t s by t h e
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f J a p a n ( i b i d 56) a n d M on ac o ( i b i d 5 7 )
ls;s S e e , e g , t h e c o m m e n t s o f t h e d e l e g a t e s o f Burma ( i b i d
4 9 ) a n d I c e l a n d ( i b i d 5 9 ) , t h e l a t t e r o f whom e x p l a i n e d
th at
334
tions of democracy and economic justice” , especially the
needs of developing coastal States,100 bottom-fish should be
subject to the continental shelf regime -- and hence belong
to the coastal State.
Neither of the above proposals found widespread accep
tance in C .IV however. Restricting coastal State rights to
mineral resources, argued the British, would abolish "de
facto rights” already belonging to certain States over cer
tain species beyond their territorial seas.107 In addition,
commented Ceylon’s delegate, ”[i]t would be absurd to give
coastal States the right to explore and exploit resources
far below the seabed but not resources within easy reach on
top of it".100 At the same time, he objected to the term
’natural resources’ being extended to include bottom-fish
and other fish as had been proposed.109 The term 'bottom-
fish' had various meanings and should be clearly defined.
Of even greater practical importance, the American rep
resentative observed, was that if such a broad definition of
natural resources was adopted the article would comprehend
half the entire yield of world fisheries, including fish
which moved beyond the territorial sea of a single State.
The inclusion of such fish within the continental shelf re
gime "would adversely affect conservation schemes", he as-
Many fish were closely connected with the seabed and others — for in
stance, flat fish -- were so closely connected with the bottOB when older
that they had to be dredged up fron the seabed. Moreover, off-shore den-
ersal fishing in the North Atlantic largely involved the use of gear
which either lay on the seabed or was trawled along it; the seabed there
fore represented a necessary basis for the gear.
Ibid 61
133 Ibid 62
109 Burma advanced a proposal (A/Conf.13/C.4/L.3, in ibid
127) that would have defined 'natural resources' to in
clude "so-called bottom-fish and other fish which, al
though living in the sea, occasionally have their habi
tat at the bottom of the sea, or are bred there". The
phraseology employed by Burma, of course, follows that
used by the ILC (see n 183 supra).
335
serted.190 It would also, of course, similarly impact upon
foreign fishing activities.
In the end, C.IV compromised, with natural resources
being deemed to include
1S>° Ibid
and p r e fe r e n tia l c o a s ta l S ta te f is h in g r ig h t s .
Four p r o p o s a ls w e re v o te d upon r e la t in g to th e f ir s t
tw o in te r - r e la te d is s u e s . N one r e c e iv e d th e n e c e s s a ry tw o -
m uch lo b b y in g th e A m e r ic a n p ro p o s a l e a r lie r c o n s id e r e d in
p a b le o f m o v in g o ff th e s e a -b e d its e lf . He c o n c lu d e s
th a t
193 A /C o n f . 1 3 /L . 29 . S e e T a b le 4 , c o lu m n H f o r r e c o r d o f
v o te s c a s t. A c c o r d in g t o T u n k in (supra n 106, 48),
" C a jlth o u g h th e U . S . A . b r o u g h t e v e r y k in d o f p r e s s u r e
to b e a r, b o th d ip lo m a t ic a lly and d ir e c t ly u p o n th e C on
fe re n c e i t s e l f , i t w as u n a b le t h e s e c u r e t h e a d o p t io n
o f its r e s o lu tio n " .
E x p l a i n i n g w h a t t h e US c o n s i d e r e d t o be th e f a c
to rs im p a c t in g u p o n th e d e c is io n o f v a r io u s S t a te s t o
v o te a g a in s t i t s p r o p o s a l, D ean ( s u p r a n 9 5 , 6 1 5 -6 1 6 )
w r ite s :
Panama did not wish to y ie ld her alleged rig h ts to claim that the 3ay of
Panama is an h is to ric water which can be le g a lly excluded from the high
seas. Others, such as Burma, wished to claim twelve miles in order to
exclude Japanese fishermen from her t e r r it o r ia l waters. The Philippines
and Indonesia voted 'no' in order to preserve th e ir claims to the waters
surrounding and in between the islands in an archipelago. Canada had a
general election while the Conference was in progress and took in to ac
count Canadian fishermen's desire to exclude foreign fishermen from the
rig h t to fis h w ithin twelve miles of her shores, a re s u lt that would have
been profoundly detrimental to our cod, h alibu t and salmon fish e rie s.
Others, such as Afghanistan and Nepal, t e r r it o r ia lly located
near borders of the Soviet Union or it s s a te llite s , abstained fo r p o l i t i
cal reasons, as did certain Arab States whose neighbours voted 'n o '.
Chile abstained in committee, but voted ’ no' in plenary, because in the
interim our Secretary of the In te rio r had recommended in a report to the
Senate Finance Committee that we restore t a r if f s on copper. Tunisia and
Morocco voted 'no' in order to exclude France from exercising fish in g
rig h ts w ithin nine miles of th e ir coasts.
Ibid
338
The final vote on the Icelandic proposal, 30-21-18,
fell short of that needed for adoption.190 Instead, the
Conference adopted, 67-0-10, a South African resolution rec
ommending that where conservation needs result in a limita
tion of catch in high seas areas adjacent to a coastal
State, other States should co-operate with the latter
15,9 Ibid 48
had been [aotivated] by a desire to assert the claia to fish off the Pe
ruvian coasts by 'tuna clippers', flying the United States flag, which
had, in certain cases, begun to operate only after 1950.
Ibid 123
343
ued, " [t]he six-mile formula had been conceived as part of
the cold war between the major powers, and the rest of the
world had no choice in the matter".214 Furthermore, added
the Mexican delegate, the proposal contained no limitations
on either species or volume of fish allowed to be caught
during the phasing out period.213
Despite the above objections, the proposal was adopted,
43-33-12, and transmitted to Plenary.210
21=3 Ibid 16. He pointed out that the six-mile limit had
been proposed as early as 1895. See in this regard Ch
3, n 40 and accompanying text supra.
In a d d itio n to th e above, Ic e la n d r e in tr o d u c e d th e p ro
posal u n s u c c e s s fu lly advanced in 1958 ,:zx~7' h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
p o in tin g out at th e sam e t i m e th e "fu n d a m e n ta l lo o p h o le " in
th e re s o lu tio n on s p e c i a l s itu a tio n s a d o p te d at UNCLOS I :
th a t is ," a ll m easures to be t a k e n w e re s u b je c t to th e a p p ro
val and consent of th o s e ve ry S ta te s w h ic h w e re fis h in g in
th e a re a s c o n c e rn e d , and w h ic h w e re t h e r e f o r e u n lik e ly to
fa v o u r r e c o g n itio n of th e c o a s ta l S ta te ’s p r e fe re n tia l p o s i
t i o n " . 313
Once a g a in th e m a in o p p o s itio n to th e above cam e f r o m
th e B r itis h , whose r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c la im e d th a t ” [s ]p e c ia l
s itu a tio n s c o u ld a p p ly to fis h e r y S ta te s as w e l l as to coas
ta l S ta te s " and th a t th e p ro p o sa l " b r is tle d w ith c o m p lic a
t i o n s " . 2 1 ’5> In any ca se , he a d d e d , th e s itu a tio n in 1960 was
c o m p le te ly d iffe r e n t to th a t of 1958 b e c a u s e of th e new 12-
m ile A m e r ic a n -C a n a d ia n p ro p o sa l and u n d e r th e F is h e r ie s Con- *
2 1 ^ A / C o n f. 1 9 /8 , supra n 1 1 4 , 128
345
vention coastal States ’’would be able to take care of con
servation requirements beyond the twelve-mile zone” .220
The Committee ultimately adopted the Icelandic proposal
and transmitted it to Plenary.221
221 Ibid 151. The vote was 31-11-46. Commenting after the
vote was taken, the U K ’s delegate suggested that the
large number of abstentions reflected a general feeling
among States that the problem required further study,
perhaps by a specialized UN agency (ibid 154). Ice
land's representative, on the other hand, thought that
the number of abstentions reflected the need to study
further the question during the Conference itself, oth
erwise States would have voted against the proposal
(ibid). It appears from subsequent developments that
the latter interpretation was the more accurate. While
there was widespread sympathy for the Icelandic posi
tion (see, eg, comments by the representatives of Is
rael (ibid 101) and Switzerland (ibid 126)), there was
nevertheless dissatisfaction with Iceland’s proposal as
formulated (see, eg, comment by the representative of
Colombia (ibid 148)).
(a) The fisheries and the econoaic development of the coastal State or the feeding of
its population are so aanifestly interrelated that, in consequence, that State is
greatly dependent on the living resources of the high seas in the area in respect of
which preferential fishing is being claimed;
(b) It becomes necessary to limit the total catch of a stock or stocks of fish in such
areas in accordance with the provisions of the [Fisheries] Convention....3 3 *
223 Ibid
33-7 F o r an A m erican a c c o u n t o f t h e d e v e lo p m e n t o f t h i s
p r o p o s a l s e e Dean, s u p r a n 202, 7 7 7 -7 7 9 .
347
rights and claims of non-coastal States were adequately pro
tected .2:20
The three-Power proposal was quickly endorsed by a num
ber of other States, the American delegate, for instance,
describing it as "constructive” and urging its support by
the Conference.229 Colombia’s spokesperson considered the
amendments a "satisfactory fusion" of the various individual
proposals submitted to protect coastal State rights.230
While expressing sympathy for Iceland's position, he consid
ered that the set of amendments proposed by the three Latin
American States provided even more safeguards for Iceland
than the latter’s own proposals.231
With the appearance of the three-Power proposal and
rising pressures late in the Conference to negotiate an
overall regime satisfying as many States as possible,232 the
general support for Iceland's uncompromising position began
to dissipate and they were rejected.233
Those decisions did not, however, reflect any less sup
port for the concept of coastal State preferential fishing
rights, as the Brazil-Cuba-Uruguay compromise amendment to
the joint Canadian-United States proposal was adopted in
Plenary, 58-19-10, being the largest support garnered for
239 Ibid 21
230 Ibid 28
231 Spokespersons for both the Philippines and Turkey ex
plained after the vote on the various proposals that
they had voted against the Icelandic proposals only be
cause they also thought that Iceland would be well-pro
tected by the three-Power proposals (ibid 34).
233 The vote was 54-28-5 (ibid 30). See Table 4, column L
for the record of votes cast. For an American account
of the factors influencing the final vote by the CEP
States on this proposal see Dean, supra n 202, 780-782.
According to Bowett (supra n 202, 433), "[cjlearly the
United States had brought pressure to bear on several
States". Chapman (supra n 93, 55), while admitting
that "bargaining, lobbying, arm-twisting, reasoning
[and] browbeating" were even more "vigorous" than in
1958, observes at the same time that the joint Ameri-
can-Canadian proposal would have so compromised some US
interests "that the Navy and fishery people on the U.S.
delegation breathed a sigh of relief after the vote and
had a rousing party that night".
While a discussion of the pros and cons of employ
ing a two-thirds majority rule for the adoption of any
proposal at the 1958 and 1960 Conferences is beyond the
scope of the present work, their failure to see agree
ment on some key elements led to criticisms of the
rule. Francois {supra n 202, 251), eg, argued shortly
after UNCLOS II that "le principe de la majorite simple
devrait etre accepte, parce qu'il donne la seule solu
tion logique au probl^me de 1'adoption des conventions
par une conference diplomatique".
236
Ibid 31. The resolution (A/Conf.19/L.9, sponsored by
Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Saudi Ara
bia, Sudan, UAR, Venezuela and Yemen) appears in ibid
172.
349
With the failure of any of the above proposals to at
tract the necessary support, the Final Act of the Conference
contained only one reference to fisheries: a resolution urg
ing that technical assistance be provided to developing
countries to aid them in making "adjustments” in their coas
tal and distant-water fishing industries.23®
V- Conclusion
tio n e d h e r e i n . 2 -*x
S e c o n d ly , by im p o s in g a d u ty on S ta te s p a r tie s to th e
tio n s r e q u ir e d , th e C o n fe re n c e r e c o g n iz e d th a t th e a b s o lu te
T h is i s e v id e n t fro m th e w o r d in g o f th e C o n v e n tio n ’ s
P r e a m b le . See A n n e x I I I infra.
3!‘* 1 F o r a d e t a i l e d d is c u s s io n o f t h e C o n v e n tio n s e e W
B is h o p J r , " T h e 1 9 5 8 G e n e v a C o n v e n t io n o n F i s h i n g a n d
C o n s e r v a t io n o f t h e L i v i n g R e s o u r c e s o f t h e H ig h S e a s "
( 1 9 6 2 ) 6 2 Columbia L R 1 2 0 6 ; d e F e r r o n , supra C h 6 , n
166, i i , 9 5 - 1 0 3 ; G r o s , supra n 1 2 7 , 1 3 1 ; M c D o u g a l a n d
B u r k e , supra C h 4 , n 7 0 , 9 7 8 - 9 9 8 ; P a t e y , supra n 1 0 6 ,
4 5 5 ; and V e r z ijl, supra n 1 0 6 , 1 2 2 - 1 3 0
th e y c o n s id e r e d to be m o re ju s t and e q u it a b le r u le s s a tis fy
I t is u s e fu l a t th is p o in t to n o te a d is t in c t io n S to n e
m akes ( supra Ch 4, n 20, 351) in s u g g e s tin g t h a t
longer an arguaent fron law whether the breadth of te rrito ria l sea and
fishery lia its should be three or twelve ailes. Yet the countries sent
their lawyers rather than their politicians to head their delegations at
the 1958 Conference and auch of the debate there was conducted on the
arid question whether the three aile lia it was or was not established
fron the past, as the law of the Medes and Persians. With one side argu
ing about the past and the other arguing about the future, there wasn’t
likely to be any coaing together.
Cf B o w e t t , supra n 2 0 2 , 4 3 4 - 4 3 5 ; J e s s u p , supra n 1 0 6 ,
2 6 4 - 2 6 5 ; a n d G S c h w a r z e n b e r g e r , " T r e n d s i n t h e la w o f
t h e s e a : f r o m L e v i a t h a n t o J a w s ? ” ( 1 9 7 9 ) 33 YWA 3 2 8 , 3 6 3
354
fundamental grounds of justice and equity and less on tradi
tionally recognized specific norms.
A second major development, and one widely supported as
the key to a compromise was the advancement of the concept
of the EFZ. While not a new idea in itself, as Professor
Burke points out, "this was the first time it had such an
influential sponsor [as the United States]".2®0
Thirdly, the even more broadly endorsed proposal to ac
cord certain States preferential fishing rights beyond their
EFZ based on economic necessity, constituted in the words of
the Mexican delegate at the close of UNCLOS II, "a signifi
cant step in the development of international law".2® 1 in
fact, as will be seen, the qualified success of the proposal
would serve to stimulate States to pursue the matter further
on a unilateral and multilateral basis and presaged many ar
guments advanced in later years in support of expanded
coastal State jurisdiction or sovereignty over fisheries.
But what about in 1960? What might one conclude to be
the state of the law at the end of UNCLOS II? In some key
respects, it remained uncertain.2®2 In closing statements
to the Conference, a number of delegates pointedly explained