1.

UNDUE AND UNJUSTIFIABLE DELAY OF 6 YEARS IN RESOLVING THE COMPLAINTS AGAINST

PETITIONERS WOULD WARRANT DISMISSAL OF SAID COMPLAINTS

G.R. No. 129978 May 12, 1999

FELICIDAD M, ROQUE and PRUDENCIO N. MABANGLO, petitioners,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; HON. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO DESIERTO; and HON. MARGARITO
P. GERVACIO, JR., Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Consistent with the rights of all persons to due process of law and to speedy trial, the Constitution
commands the Office of the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed against public officials. Thus,
the failure of said office to resolve a complaint that has been pending for six years is clearly violative of
this mandate and the public officials' rights. In such event, the aggrieved party is entitled to the dismissal
of the complaint.

The Case

Filed before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus praying that the respondent public officers be directed
to dismiss Ombudsman Case Nos. OMB-MIN-91-0201 and OMB-MIN-91-0203 and subsequently to issue
the necessary clearance in petitioners' favor.

The Facts

The undisputed facts are narrated in, respondents' Memorandum 1 as follows:

Petitioner Felicidad M. Roque was a Schools Division Superintendent of the Department

of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), assigned in Koronadal, South Cotabato, until
her compulsory retirement on, May 17, 1991 (pp. 2-3, Petition).

Petitioner Prudencio N. Mabanglo was likewise a Schools Division Superintendent of the

DECS, assigned in Tagum, Davao Province, until his compulsory retirement on May 8,
1997 (ibid.).

On January 14, 1991, Laura S. and Carmencita Eden T. Enriquez of the COA, by virtue
of COA Regional Office Assignment Order No. 91-174 dated January 8, 1991, conducted
an audit on the P9.36 million allotment released by the DECS Regional Office No. XI to
its division offices (Annexes M and N, Petition).

As a result of the audit, auditors Soriano and Enriquez found some major deficiencies
and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019),
violations of COA Circular Nos. 78-84 and 85-55A, DECS Order No. 100 and Section 88
of Presidential Decree No. 1445 (ibid.).

Consequently, affidavits of complaint were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao against several persons, including petitioner Mabanglo on May 7, 1991, and
against petitioner Rogue on May 16, 1991 (ibid.).

In an Order dated June 11, 1991, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found the
complaints proper for a preliminary investigation. The case involving petitioner Mabanglo
 was docketed as OMB-MIN-91-0201 while that involving petitioner Roque was docketed
as OMB-MIN-91-0203 (Annex O, Petition).

Thereafter, petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits (p. 4, Petition).

On March 18, 1997, OMB-MIN-91-0201, which involved petitioner Mabanglo, was

resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, finding that all the respondents
[were] probably guilty of violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Republic Act 3019). The same was approved by respondent Ombudsman
Desierto on September 19, 1997.

An Information dated March 18, 1997, for Violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019,
as amended, was filed before the Sandiganbayan, Manila, against several respondents,
among them, petitioner Prudencio N. Mabanglo. The same was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 24229.

On April 30, 1997, OMB-MIN-91-0203, which involved petitioner Roque, was resolved by
the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, recommending the filing [of cases] and
prosecution of all the respondents for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act
3019. The same was approved by respondent Ombudsman Desierto on August 22, 1997.

Two Informations similarly dated April 30, 1997, for violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic
Act 3019, as amended, and for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic 3019, as amended,
were filed before the Sandiganbayan, Manila. The Informations charged several
respondents, among whom was petitioner Roque. The cases were docketed as Criminal
Case No. 24105 and Criminal Case No. 24106, respectively.

On August 14, 1997, petitioners instituted the instant petition for mandamus premised on
the allegation that "[a]fter the initial Orders finding the cases proper for preliminary
investigation were issued on June[,] 1991 and the subsequent submission of their
counter-affidavits, until the present[,] or, more than six (6) years, no resolution has been
issued by the Public Respondent [and no] case [has] been filed with the appropriate court
against the herein Petitioner" (par. 3, p. 4, Petition).

On November 24, 1997, this Honorable Court issued a temporary restraining order
directing respondents to cease and desist from further proceeding with the cases filed
against petitioners. 2

On August 21, 1998, petitioners asked the Court to cite respondents in contempt, contending that a
criminal information was filed in violation of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). In compliance with
this Court's Resolution dated October 21, 1998, 3 the respondents filed their Comment to the respondents
filed their Comment to the Petition for Contempt. 4

Issues

In their Memorandum, 5 petitioners present before this Court the following issues:

Whether or not there was undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving [the] complaints
against petitioners (respondents therein) which violated their constitutional right to [a]
speedy disposition of cases[; and]

Whether or not, such undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving the complaints against
petitioners, would warrant dismissal of said complaints. 6
In addition, we shall also discuss (1) the propriety of mandamus as a remedy and (2) the respondent's
liability for contempt for allegedly violating the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on
November 24, 1997.

THE COURT'S RULING

The Court grants the Petition for Mandamus, but denies the prayer to cite respondents in contempt of
court.

Preliminary Issue:

Propriety of Mandamus

Respondents argue that petitioners cannot, by this special action for mandamus, compel the ombudsman
to dismiss the criminal charges filed against them, since such dismissal involves a discretionary, not a
ministerial, duty.

The argument is not meritorious. As a general rule, the performance of an official act or duty, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion or judgment, cannot be compelled by mandamus. This
Court, however, has held that the rule does not apply "in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion,
manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority." 7 In First Philippine Holdings Corporation v.
Sandiganbayan, the Court explained:

Ordinarily, mandamus will not prosper to compel a discretionary act. But where there is
"gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority" equivalent
to denial of a settled right to which petitioner is entitled, and there is "no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, the writ shall issue." 8

The Court gave a similar ruling in Kant Kwong v. Presidential Commission on Good Government. 9

Although as averred by respondents, "the recognized rule is that, in the performance of

an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed
by Mandamus to act but not to act one way or another, "yet it is not accurate to say that
the writ will never issue to control his discretion. There is an exception to the rule if the
case is otherwise proper, as in cases of gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or
palpable excess of authority."

In Angchangco Jr. v. Ombudsman, 10 this Court likewise held:

It is correct, as averred in the comment, that in the performance of an official duty or act
involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act,
but not to act one way or the other. However, this rule admits of exceptions such as in
cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of
authority." 11

The exceptions cited apply to this case. It is undisputed that there has already been a long and
unwarranted delay in the resolution of the graft charges against the two petitioners. The Complaint
against Petitioner Mabanglo was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao way back on May
7, 1991, and that against Petitioner Roque on May 16, 1991. On June 11, 1991, the said Office found the
Complaints sufficient for preliminary investigation. Signficantly, no action was taken until after the lapse of
almost six years. For violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019, the same Office recommended the filing of an
Information against Petitioner Mabanglo only on March 18, 1997, and against Petitioner Roque only on
April 30, 1997.

Main Issue: Violation of Petitioners'

 Constitutional Rights

Clearly, the delay of almost six years disregarded the ombudsman's duty, as mandated by the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770, to act promptly on complaints before him. More important, it
violated the petitioners' rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against them.
Although respondents attempted to justify the six months needed by Ombudsman Desierto to review the
recommendation of Deputy Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took almost six years
for the latter to resolve the Complaints. Thus, in Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, this Court dismissed a
Complaint that had been pending before the Office of the Ombudsman for more than six years, ruling as
follows:

After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Court finds
the inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal
complaints against petitioner to be violative of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process and a speedy disposition of the cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal
of said criminal cases...

Similarly, in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, this Court dismissed the Complaints, which the
then tanodbayan was able to resolve only after the lapse of three years since the cases had been
submitted for disposition, viz.:

We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to
due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct
of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the
procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only
under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional
guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights
(both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the
petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed
reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. We
are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by
indulging in the speculative assumption that "delay may be due to a painstaking and
grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government
official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment,
which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the
petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities
required by Republic Act 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and
factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would justify a
delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two
charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving [of] unwarranted benefits to a
relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not
warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the
case." (Emphasis supplied.)

We are not persuaded by respondents' arguments that the Petition for Mandamus became moot and
academic when the Complaints were resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao and the
Informations were filed. The same contention was rejected in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, wherein the Court
declared that long and unexplained delay in the resolution of the criminal complaints against petitioners
was not corrected by the eventual filing of the Informations. The Court ruled:

It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation
should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation
does not warrant dismissal of the information. True — [for] the absence of a preliminary
 investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue
delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation cannot be corrected, for until now, man
has not yet invented a device for setting back time.

. . . the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the
information in the instant case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the
petitioner to due process and the speedy disposition of cases against him. Accordingly,
the informations . . . should be dismissed . . .. 17

Although petitioners prayed only for the issuance of a ruling directing the dismissal of Ombudsman Case
Nos. OMB-MIN-91-0201 and OMB-MIN-91-0203, this Court, in the interest of the speedy disposition of
cases, resolves to dismiss the above cases directly. This ruling is in line with Angchangco, in which the
Court dismissed the complaints outright, although petitioner therein sought merely to compel the
ombudsman to do so.

Additional Issue:

No Contempt of Court

Petitioner Mabanglo moves to have respondents and their agents cited in contempt of court for allegedly
filing an Information against him in violation of the November 24, 1997 TRO issued by the Court, which
ordered them to cease and desist from proceeding with the cases.

The Petition to cite respondents in contempt is patently devoid of merit. In the first place, the Information
against Petitioner Mabanglo was filed on September 25, 1997, before the issuance of the TRO on
November 24, 1997. Hence, the TRO could not have been violated. In the second place, the said Petition
for Contempt filed in contravention of Section 4 (2), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Court, 18 which states
that if a petition for contempt arises from or is related to a principal action pending in court, it "shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately," unless the court orders that both the principal action and the
petition for contempt be consolidated for joint hearing and decision. In the instant case, the Petition for
Contempt, which arose from the Petition for Mandamus, was filed as an integral part of the latter and
under the same docket or case number. There is no showing that this Court has ordered their
consolidation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED and Ombudsman Case Nos. OMB-91-0201 and
OMB-91-O203 are accordingly DISMISSED. The Petition to declare respondents in contempt is hereby
DENIED. No costs.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
2. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, DUE TO ITS FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE CRIMINAL CHARGES
AGAINST PETITIONER FOR MORE THAN SIX YEARS, HAS TRANSGRESSED ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS AND TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION
OF THE CASES AGAINST

[G.R. No. 122728. February 13, 1997]

CASIANO A. ANGCHANGCO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, ZALDY

TAMAYO, GILDA NAVARRA, ODELIA LEGASPI, SALVADOR TAMAYO, GASPAR
ABORQUE, ROEL ABAS, REMEDIOS OLITA, ET AL., TEODORO TORREON, ET AL., JIMMY
MARTIN, MENRADO ALLAWAN, MARGARITO ESCORIAL, NORBERTO OCAT and
ALEJANDRO ERNA, respondents.

DECISION

MELO, J.:

Before us is a petition for mandamus seeking to: a) compel the Ombudsman to dismiss Ombudsman
Cases No. MIN-3-90-0671, MIN-90-0132, MIN-90-0133, MIN-90-0138, MIN-90-0188, MIN-90-0189, MIN-
90-0190, MIN-90-0191, and MIN-90-0192; and b) direct the Ombudsman to issue a clearance in favor of
petitioner Casiano A. Angchangco.

The facts are as follows:

Prior to his retirement, petitioner served as a deputy sheriff and later as Sheriff IV in the Regional
Trial Court of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City.

On August 24, 1989, the Department of Labor and Employment (Region X) rendered a decision
ordering the Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. (NIASSI) to pay its workers the
sum of P1,281,065.505. The decision having attained finality, a writ of execution was issued directing the
Provincial Sheriff of Agusan del Norte or his deputies to satisfy the same. Petitioner, as the assigned
sheriff and pursuant to the writ of execution issued, caused the satisfaction of the decision by garnishing
NIASSI's daily collections from its various clients.

In an attempt to enjoin the further enforcement of the writ of execution, Atty. Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr.,
President of NIASSI, filed a complaint for prohibition and damages against petitioner. The regional trial
court initially issued a temporary restraining order but later dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

In addition to the civil case, Atty. Calo likewise filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint
against petitioner for graft, estafa/malversation and misconduct relative to the enforcement of the writ of
execution. Acting on the complaint, the Ombudsman, in a Memorandum dated July 31, 1992,
recommended its dismissal for lack of merit.

Meanwhile, from June 25 to 28, 1990, several workers of NIASSI filed letters-complaints with the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao alleging, among others things, that petitioner illegally deducted an
amount equivalent to 25% from their differential pay. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao endorsed
to the Court the administrative aspect of the complaints which was docketed hereat as A.M. No. 93-10-
385-OMB. The Court in an En Banc Resolution dated November 25, 1993 dismissed the case for lack of
interest on the part of complainants to pursue their case.

Although the administrative aspect of the complaints had already been dismissed, the criminal
complaints remained pending and unresolved, prompting petitioner to file several omnibus motions for
early resolution.
 When petitioner retired in September 1994, the criminal complaints still remained unresolved, as a
consequence of which petitioner's request for clearance in order that he may qualify to receive his
retirement benefits was denied.

With the criminal complaints remaining unresolved for more than 6 years, petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss, invoking Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 72335-39, March 21, 1988). Sad to say, even this
motion to dismiss, however, has not been acted upon. Hence, the instant petition.

Acting on the petition, the Court issued a resolution dated December 20, 1995 requiring respondents
to comment thereon. In compliance therewith, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and
Motion (in lieu of Comment), which is its way of saying it agreed with the views of petitioner. On July 22,
1996, we issued another resolution requiring the Ombudsman to file his own comment on the petition if
he so desires, otherwise, the petition will be deemed submitted for resolution without such comment. After
several extensions, respondent Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed a
comment dated October 7, 1996.

The Court finds the present petition to be impressed with merit.

Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required to
be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as
a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law (Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court).

After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Court finds the
inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints against
petitioner to be violative of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases pursuant to the
pronouncement of the Court in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan (159 SCRA 70 [1988]), wherein the Court,
speaking through Justice Yap, said:

We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due
process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of
preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by
the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process
constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due
process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as
embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Right (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the
inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3)
years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the
case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay
by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and
grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official." In the first place,
such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected.
Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his
sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did
not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling
scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary
investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted
benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not
warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.

It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be
deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of
the information. True but the absence of a preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now,
man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.

Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman in the instant case has failed to discharge its duty mandated by
the Constitution "to promptly act on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials and
employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof."

Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its
chief use and not a discretionary duty. It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused,
in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either (Rules of
Court in the Philippines, Volume III by Martin, 4th Edition, page 233).

It is correct, as averred in the comment that in the performance of an official duty or act involving
discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or
the other. However, this rule admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is gross abuse of
discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority (Kant Kwong vs. PCGG, 156 SCRA 222,
232 [1987]).

Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal charges against
petitioner for more than six years, has transgressed on the constitutional right of petitioner to due process
and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, as well as the Ombudsman's own constitutional
duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it. For all these past 6 years, petitioner has remained
under a cloud, and since his retirement in September 1994, he has been deprived of the fruits of his
retirement after serving the government for over 42 years all because of the inaction of respondent
Ombudsman. If we wait any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his retirement benefits, not
to speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice which calls for the issuance of the writ
prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to give DUE COURSE to the petition and to GRANT the
same. Ombudsman Cases No. MIN-3-90-0671, MIN-90-0132, MIN-90-0133, MIN-90-0138, MIN-90-0188,
MIN-90-0189, MIN-90-0190, MIN-90-0191, and MIN-90-0192 are ordered DISMISSED. The Office of the
Ombudsman is further directed to issue the corresponding clearance in favor of petitioner.
 3. THE FAILURE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN TO DECIDE THE CASE EVEN AFTER THE LAPSE
OF MORE THAN TEN YEARS AFTER IT WAS SUBMITTED FOR DECISION INVOLVES MORE THAN
JUST A MERE PROCRASTINATION IN THE PROCEEDINGS.

G.R. No. 145851 November 22, 2001

ABELARDO B. LICAROS, petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The unreasonable delay of more, than ten (10) years to resolve a criminal case, without fault on the part
of the accused and despite his earnest effort to have his case decided, violates the constitutional right to
the speedy disposition of a case. Unlike the right to a speedy trial, this constitutional privilege applies not
only during the trial stage, but also when the case has already been submitted for decision.

The Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to compel the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) to dismiss Criminal Case No. 6672 against herein petitioner, who is
charged as an accessory.

The Facts

Undisputed by the special prosecutor2 and the Sandiganbayan3 are the material facts as narrated by
petitioner in this wise:

"4.1 On 5 June 1982, the Legaspi City Branch of the Central Bank was robbed and divested of
cash in the amount of P19,731,320.00.

"4.2 In the evening of June 6, 1982, Modesto Licaros (no relation to herein petitioner), one of the
principal accused, together with four companions, delivered in sacks a substantial portion of the
stolen money to the Concepcion Building in Intramuros, Manila where Home Savings Bank had
its offices, of which herein petitioner was then Vice Chairman and Treasurer. The delivery was
made on representation by Modesto Licaros to former Central Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros,
Sr., then Chairman of the Bank and father of herein petitioner, that the money to be deposited
came from some Chinese businessmen from Iloilo who wanted the deposit kept secret; that
Governor Licaros left for the United States on May 28, 1982 for his periodic medical check-up, so
left to his son, herein petitioner, to attend to the proposed deposit.

"4.3 Even the prosecution admits in their Reply Memorandum that from the evidence presented,
that in the evening of June 8, 1982, herein petitioner attempted to report the incident to General
Fabian Ver but he could not get in touch with him because the latter was then out of the country;
that it was only the following day, June 9, 1982, when herein petitioner was able to arrange a
meeting with then Central Bank Governor Jaime C. Laya, Senior Deputy Governor Gabriel
Singson, and Central Bank Chief Security Officer, Rogelio Navarete, to report his suspicion that
the money being deposited by Modesto Licaros may have been stolen money. With the report or
information supplied by herein petitioner, then CB Governor Laya called up then NBI Director
Jolly Bugarin and soon after the meeting, the NBI, Metrocom and [the] CB security guards joined
forces for the recovery of the money and the apprehension of the principal accused.

"4.4 All the aforesaid Central Bank officials executed sworn statements and testified for herein
petitioner, particularly CB Governor Jaime C. Laya, CB Senior Deputy Governor Gabriel Singson
and CB Director of [the] Security and Transport Department Rogelio Navarette, and were one in
saying that it was the report of herein petitioner to the authorities that broke the case on 9 June
1982 and resulted in the recovery of the substantial portion of the stolen money and the arrest of
all the principal accused.

"4.5 On July 6, 1982, after preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan (now Special Prosecutor)
filed an Information for robbery with the Sandiganbayan docketed as Crim. Case No. 6672
against two groups of accused:

Principals:

(1) Modesto Licaros y Lacson, [P]rivate [I]ndividual

(2) Leo Flores y Manlangit, CB [S]ecurity [G]uard

(3) Ramon Dolor y Ponce, CB Assistant Regional Cashier

(4) Glicerio Balansin y Elaurza, CB Security [G]uard

(5) Rolando Quejada y Redequillo, Private Individual

(6) Pio Edgardo Flores y Torres, Private Individual

(7) Mario Lopez Vito y Dayungan, Private Individual

(8) Rogelio De la Cruz y Bodegon, Private Individual

Accessory After the Fact:

(1) Abelardo B. Licaros, Vice Chairman and Treasurer, Home Savings Bank and Trust
Co. (HSBTC), Private Individual.

"The Tanodbayan did not adopt the recommendation of the NBI that Abelardo B. Licaros be
charged as principal apparently because no one of those whose statements were taken including
the above principal accused ever testified that he participated in the planning or execution of the
robbery so that he could be held also in the conspiracy' as alleged by the NBI.

"4.6 On November 26, 1982, the Tanodbayan filed an Amended Information naming the same
persons as principals, except Rogelio dela Cruz who is now charged as an accessory, together
with private respondent Abelardo B. Licaros. De la Cruz died on November 6, 1987 as per
manifestation by his counsel dated and filed on November 17, 1987.

"4.7 On November 29, 1982, the accused were arraigned including herein petitioner, who
interposed the plea of not guilty.

"4.8 On January 7, 1983, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan a 'Motion for Discharge'
of herein petitioner to be utilized as a state witness which was granted in a Resolution dated
February 11, 1983. The Supreme Court, however, on petition for certiorari filed by accused
Flores, Modesto Licaros and Lopez Vito, annulled the discharge because it ruled that the
Sandiganbayan should have deferred its resolution on the motion to discharge until after the
prosecution has presented all its other evidence.

"4.9 At the close of its evidence, or on July 23, 1984, the prosecution filed a second motion for
discharge of herein petitioner to be utilized as a state witness but the Sandiganbayan in a
Resolution dated September 13, 1984 denied the Motion stating in part that the motion itself does
not furnish any cue or suggestion on what petitioner will testify in the event he is discharged and
placed on the stand as state witness.

"4.10 Meanwhile, as of March 8, 1983, the prosecution has presented ten (10) witnesses. Among
those who testified were NBI Agents Victor Bessat and Apollo Sayo, who took and identified the
sworn statements of accused Leo Flores, Ramon Dolor, Rogelio de la Cruz, Mario Lopez Vito and
Modesto Licaros; M/Sgt. Raynero Galarosa, who took and identified the sworn statement of
accused Pio Flores and the sworn supplemental statement of accused Glicerio Balansin; Sgt.
Eliseo Rioveros, who took and identified the sworn statement of accused Glicerus Balansin; and
CIS Agent Maria Corazon Pantorial, who took the sworn statement of accused Rolando Quejada.
None of these witnesses, nor any of the principal accused who executed the sworn statements
implicated herein petitioner to the crime of robbery directly or indirectly.

"4.11 On September 17, 1984, the prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence. In a
Resolution dated October 1, 1984, the Sandiganbayan admitted the evidence covered by said
formal offer and the prosecution [was] considered to have rested its case.

"4.12 In a Resolution dated June 25, 1985, the Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution's motion
to reopen the case to allow its witness Lamberto Zuniga to testify on the conspiracy and to
identify a sworn statement given before the NBI on June 15, 1982. Having been established that
petitioner was not part of the conspiracy, the testimony had no materiality nor relevance to the
case insofar as petitioner is concerned.

"4.13 On January 14, 1986, petitioner filed a Motion for Separate Trial contending that the
prosecution already closed its evidence and that his defense is separate and distinct from the
other accused, he having been charged only as accessory. The [Motion] was granted in an Order
dated January 17, 1986.

"4.14 Thereafter, herein petitioner commenced the presentation of his evidence. Aside from his
testimony and that of his late father, former Central Bank Governor-Gregorio S. Licaros, petitioner
presented the top officials of the Central Bank namely then Central Bank Governor Jaime C.
Laya, then Senior Deputy Governor Gabriel C. Singson, then Central Bank Security and
Transport Dept. Chief Rogelio M. Navarette who identified their sworn statements taken before
the investigators and who testified that it was the petitioner's report on June 9, 1982 that broke
the case and resulted in the recovery of the substantial portion of the stolen money and the
apprehension of the principal accused.

"4.15 On August 8, 1986, petitioner filed his Formal Offer of Exhibits. On August 14, 1986,
petitioner filed his Memorandum praying that judgment be rendered acquitting him of the offense
charged.

"4.16 In a Resolution dated August 26, 1986, the Sandiganbayan, through Presiding Justice
Francis E. Garchitorena (then newly appointed after the EDSA revolution), admitted all the
exhibits covered by said Formal Offer of Exhibits at the same time, ordering the prosecution to file
its Reply Memorandum, thereafter the case was deemed submitted for decision.

"4.17 On September 26, 1986, the prosecution filed its Reply Memorandum. Petitioner also filed
his Reply Memorandum on September 29, 1986 praying that judgment be rendered acquitting
him of the offense charged.

"4.18 In a Resolution dated October 8, 1986 copy of which was received by petitioner on October
15, 1986, the Sandiganbayan deferred the decision of the case regarding herein petitioner 'until
after the submission of the case for decision with respect to the other accused.'
 "4.19 Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration on October 16, 1986, but the Sandiganbayan
in a Resolution dated December 16, 1986 and promulgated on January 6, 1987 denied the same,
the dispositive portion of which read(s):

'IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by accused
Abelardo B. Licaros is denied.

'The decision as to the accusation against him will be rendered together with the
accusation against the other accused without relating the evidence separately presented
at the separate proceeding held for the separate sets of accused one way or the other.'

"4.20. As admitted by the prosecution in its Comment on the Omnibus Motion dated March 31,
2000, the 'case was submitted for decision on June 20, 1990.'

"4.21 As of this writing, and more than ten (10) years after the case was submitted for decision,
the Sandiganbayan has not rendered the Decision.

"4.22 The Sandiganbayan has not rendered the Decision even while the proceedings involving
herein petitioner as an accessory in a separate trial were terminated as early as October 8, 1986,
while those against all the principal accused were deemed submit[t]ed for decision on June 20,
1990.

"4.23 As early as October 16, 1986, herein petitioner already invoked his constitutional right to
speedy justice when he filed a Motion on said date praying for, among other things, that the
Sandiganbayan reconsider its Resolution dated October 8, 1986 deferring the decision of the
case against herein petitioner 'until after the submission of the case for decision with respect to
the other accused' and that a judgment of acquittal be rendered.

"4.24 The Honorable Sandiganbayan has not also rendered a resolution on herein petitioner's
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss filed on March 23, 2000 which was deemed submitted for resolution
on May 5, 2000, the last pleading having been filed on said date. In the said Omnibus Motion,
petitioner prays for the dismissal of the case insofar as it involves herein petitioner for violation of
his constitutional right to speedy disposition of the case. Sad to say, even this Motion to Dismiss
has not been acted upon.

"4.25 On 15 August 2000, herein petitioner filed his Motion to Resolve. This was followed by
Reiterative Motion for Early Resolution filed on September 21, 2000.

"4.26 Notwithstanding the lapse of more than ten (10) years after the case was deemed
submitted for decision, the Sandiganbayan has not rendered the Decision. Hence, this petition." 4

The Issues

Petitioner interposes the following issues for the consideration of this Court:

"The unexplained failure of the SANDIGANBAYAN to render the decision for more than ten (10)
years after the case was deemed submitted for Decision is tantamount to gross abuse of
discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority.

B
 "The unexplained failure of the SANDIGANBAYAN to render the Decision for more than ten (10)
years violated herein petitioner's constitutional right to due process and to a speedy disposition of
the case.

"Recent Decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court mandate the immediate dismissal of the
case against herein petitioner."5

In brief, the main issue is whether petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case has
been violated. We shall also discuss, as a side issue, the propriety of mandamus as a remedy under the
circumstances in this case.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.6

Main Issue:
The Right to a Speedy Disposition

On June 20, 1990, Criminal Case No. 6672 was deemed submitted for the decision of the
Sandiganbayan. Since then, no action has been taken by the anti-graft court. On March 23, 2000,
petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, grounded on the violation of his right to a speedy
disposition. Unfortunately, even this Motion has not been ruled upon by public respondent.

Under Section 6 of PD 1606 amending PD 1486, the Sandiganbayan has only 90 days to decide a case
from the time it is deemed submitted for decision. Considering that the subject criminal case was
submitted for decision as early as June 20, 1990, it is obvious that respondent court has failed to decide
the case within the period prescribed by law. Even if we were to consider the period provided under
Section 15(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which is 12 months from the submission of the case for
decision, the Sandiganbayan would still have miserably failed to perform its mandated duty to render a
decision on the case within the period prescribed by law. Clearly then, the decision in this case is long
overdue, and the period to decide the case under the law has long expired. 7

Even more important than the above periods within which the decision should have been rendered is the
right against an unreasonable delay in the disposition of one's case before any judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative body.8 This constitutionally guaranteed right finds greater significance in a criminal case
before a court of justice, where any delay in disposition may result in a denial of justice for the accused
altogether. Indeed, the aphorism "justice delayed is justice denied" is by no means a trivial or
meaningless concept that can be taken for granted by those who are tasked with the dispensation of
justice.

Indubitably, there has been a transgression of the right of petitioner to a speedy disposition of his case
due to inaction on the part of the Sandiganbayan. Neither that court nor the special prosecutor
contradicted his allegation of a ten-year delay in the disposition of his case. The special prosecutor in its
Comment9 even openly admitted the date when the case had been deemed submitted for decision, as
well as respondent court's failure to act on it despite petitioner's several Motions to resolve the case. The
special prosecutor stated as follows:

"With the termination of presentation of evidence for the prosecution and the principal accused in
this case, the same was deemed submitted for decision on June 20, 1990.

"Alleging violation by respondent court of his right to speedy disposition of the case, petitioner on
March 23, 2000 filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss. His motion was deemed submitted for
resolution by the respondent court on May 5, 2000.
 "On August 15, 2000, petitioner filed before the respondent court a Motion to Resolve and a
month thereafter a Reiterative Motion for Early Resolution. No decision has yet been rendered by
respondent court."10

For its part, the Sandiganbayan candidly admitted that the said criminal case had not been ruled upon all
this time, because it "was one of those cases that got buried"11 in the archives during the reorganization in
that court. Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena's explanation (contained in his Comment) is quoted
in full hereunder:

"1. The factual narrative by the petitioner in the instant matter is substantially correct;

"2. Indeed, originally petitioner Licaros had filed a Motion for Resolution of his portion of the case
after he submitted his evidence separately;

"3. Eventually, the instant case was submitted for decision;

"4. Indeed, it would have been ripe to resolve the instant case including that portion which
pertained to petitioner Licaros;

"5. The matter was duly assigned for drafting of the decision (not the undersigned).

"6. Sometime in 1995, a draft of the Decision was submitted for consideration by the other
justices of the Division;

"7. In the meantime, movements took place in the composition of the justices who constituted the
First Division later.

"8. In 1997, the entire Court was re-organized with the addition of two (2) new Divisions and six
(6) new justices;

"9. At this time, the cases in the Sandiganbayan, whether in progress or submitted were re-
distributed from the original Divisions to which they had been raffled to the new Divisions;

"10. The instant case remained with this Division;

"11. While the burden of each Division has considerably lightened, the new justices had to
undergo an orientation in this Court;

"12. Not all cases were immediately re-assigned to the different members. The instant case was
one of them;

"13. Then, this Court relocated to its present premises which required not only packing and
crating the records but the problem of not being able to unpack them very easily due to the
absence of an adequate number of shelves and cabinets available;

"14. Due to the difficulty in funds, the Philippine Estate Authority which was supposed to have
provided new furniture including shelves and cabinets out of the payments made to it, was unable
to do so;

"15. To this date, the three original Divisions do not have all the needed shelves and many
records remain in cardboard boxes both in chambers and in the offices of the Division Clerk of
Court. (In the library and in the Archives, the boxes for books and old records remained
unopened.);

"16. In all this, the instant matter was one of those that got 'buried';
 "17. Significantly, when the records of this case were returned to the undersigned, the records of
this case were not logged in the record book through some oversight of his staff which the
undersigned cannot explain so that it did not appear in the tracking process of the records of this
office;

"18. At this time, work is being done on the case for the preparation and finalization of the
decision which the undersigned has taken upon himself.

"19. Insofar as this Division is concerned, the responsibility for this situation belongs exclusively
to the undersigned, both in his capacity as chairman and as Presiding Justice;

"The undersigned respectfully reiterates: there is indeed fault and the fault is exclusively that of
the undersigned — for which the undersigned begs for the kindness of this Honorable Court and
humbly submits to its wisdom and judgment."12

Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,13 Angchangco Jr. v. Ombudsman14 and Roque v. Office of the
Ombudsman,15petitioner claims that he is entitled to a dismissal of the criminal case against him. An
unreasonable delay of three years in the disposition of a case violates the accused's constitutional rights,
as the Court explained in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan:

"Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional
guarantee of 'speedy disposition' of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in
the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's
constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or
justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar."16

Because of an inordinate delay of more than six years in the disposition of Angchangco Jr. v.
Ombudsman, the High Court ordered its dismissal, as follows:

"After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Court finds the
inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints
against petitioner to be violative of his constitutional guaranteed right to due process and to a
speedy disposition of the cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases
pursuant to the pronouncement of the Court in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan . x x x " 17

More recently, in Roque et. al. v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court dismissed the criminal cases
against petitioner therein, on the following explanation:

"Clearly, the delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty, as mandated by the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770, to act promptly on complaints before him. More
important, it violated the petitioners' rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of cases
filed against them. Although respondents attempted to justify the six months needed by
Ombudsman Desierto to review the recommendation of Deputy Ombudsman Gervasio, no
explanation was given why it took almost six years for the latter to resolve the Complaint." 18

On the other hand, the special prosecutor contends that the above-cited rulings of the Court should not
apply to the present case, because what was involved in those cases was a delay on the part of the
Office of the Ombudsman or the Office of the Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) with respect to
the holding of a preliminary investigation. He argues that the case against herein petitioner has already
been proven by the ombudsman with the filing of the corresponding Information before respondent court.
Moreover, the prosecution has already fully discharged its mandated duty to present evidence against the
accused. In other words, the special prosecutor is of the view that the accused's right to a speedy
disposition of his case is not violated when the prosecution aspect of the case has already been duly
performed.
We cannot accept the special prosecutor's limited and constrained interpretation of the constitutionally
enshrined right to a speedy disposition of cases. It must be understood that in the ordinary course of a
criminal proceeding, a court is responsible for the ultimate disposition of the case. This is true irrespective
of the prosecution's punctual performance of its duty. Hence, notwithstanding the filing of the information,
the presentation of evidence and the completion of the trial proper, the eventual disposition of the case
will still depend largely on the timely rendition of judgment by a court. And where it does not act promptly
on the adjudication of a case before it and within the period prescribed by law, the accused's right to a
speedy disposition of the case is just as much prejudiced as when the prosecution is prolonged or
deferred indefinitely. Accordingly, with all the more reason should the right to the speedy disposition of a
case be looked upon with care and caution when that case has already been submitted to the court for
decision.

In Abadia v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court had the occasion to rule on the nature and the extent as well as
the broader protection afforded by the constitutional right to the speedy disposition of a case, as
compared with the right to a speedy trial. Thus, it ratiocinated as follows:

"The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to expand
substantive fair trial rights and to protect citizens from procedural machinations which tend to
nullify those rights. Moreover, Section 16, Article III of the Constitution extends the right to a
speedy disposition of cases to cases 'before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies.' This protection extends to all citizens, x x x and covers the periods before, during and
after the trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2) which guarantees merely the right
to a speedy trial."20 (Emphasis supplied)

It has been held that a breach of the right of the accused to the speedy disposition of a case may have
consequential effects, but it is not enough that there be some procrastination in the proceedings. In order
to justify the dismissal of a criminal case, it must be established that the proceedings have
unquestionably been marred by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. 21

In the case before us, the failure of the Sandiganbayan to decide the case even after the lapse of more
than ten years after it was submitted for decision involves more than just a mere procrastination in the
proceedings. From the explanation given by the Sandiganbayan, it appears that the case was kept in idle
slumber, allegedly due to reorganizations in the divisions and the lack of logistics and facilities for case
records. Had it not been for the filing of this Petition for Mandamus, petitioner would not have seen any
development in his case, much less the eventual disposition thereof. The case remains unresolved up to
now, with only respondent court's assurance that at this time "work is being done on the case for the
preparation and finalization of the decision."22

In Guerrero v. Court of Appeals,23 the Court denied a Petition seeking to dismiss a criminal case
grounded on an alleged violation of the accused's right to a speedy disposition. However, the accused in
the said case was deemed to have slept on his rights by not asserting them at the earliest possible
opportunity. The Court explained its ruling in this wise:

"In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the case was submitted for
resolution in 1979. It was only in 1989 when the case below was reraffled from the RTC of
Caloocan City to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon and only after respondent trial judge of the latter
court ordered on March 14, 1990 the parties to follow-up and complete the transcript of
stenographic notes that matters started to get moving towards a resolution of the case. More
importantly, it was only after the new trial judge reset the retaking of the testimonies to November
9, 1990 because of petitioner's absence during the original setting on October 24, 1990 that the
accused suddenly became zealous of safeguarding his right to speedy trial and disposition.

xxx xxx xxx

"In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his own right
to speedy disposition only when respondent trial judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to
 assume that he would have just continued to sleep on his right — a situation amounting to laches
— had the respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the
records and of ordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the case, The matter could
have taken a different dimension if during all those ten years between 1979 when accused filed
his memorandum and 1989 when the case was reraffled, the accused showed signs of asserting
his right which was granted him in 1987 when the new constitution took effect, or at least made
some overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the stenographer to
transcribe the stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his, silence would have to
be interpreted as a waiver of such right."24

In the instant Petition, however, the accused had been assertively and assiduously invoking his right to a
speedy disposition even before the case was submitted for decision on June 20, 1990. 25 In fact, he has
already filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss,26 a Motion to Resolve27 and a Reiterative Motion for Early
Resolution,28 all of which have fallen on deaf ears in the Sandiganbayan. Thus, in the light of the
foregoing circumstances, he cannot be said to have slept on his rights, much less waived the assertion
thereof. Quite the contrary, he has been persistent in his demand for the eventual disposition of the
criminal case against him.

Indeed, petitioner has been kept in the dark as to the final outcome of the case, which was deemed
submitted for decision more than ten years ago. And though such failure or inaction may not have been
deliberately intended by respondent court, its unjustified delay has nonetheless caused just as much
vexation and oppression, in violation of the right of petitioner to a speedy disposition of his case. Hence,
his reliance on the aforementioned cases for the dismissal of the criminal case against him may be
sustained, not so much on the basis of the right to a speedy trial, but on the right to a speedy disposition
of his case, which is of broader and more appropriate application under the circumstances.

In Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan,29 penned by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., the Court laid down
certain guidelines to determine whether the right to a speedy disposition has been violated, as follows:

"The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right
has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length
of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay."30

As earlier discussed, more than ten years has lapsed since the subject case has been deemed submitted
for decision. The delay cannot at all be attributed to petitioner, who has neither utilized dilatory tactics nor
undertaken any procedural device to prolong the proceedings. As a matter of fact, he has been
continuously pushing for the resolution of his case even during the early stages of the prosecution.
Moreover, it is undeniable that such delay has caused much prejudice, distress and anxiety to herein
petitioner, whose career as bank executive and businessman has suffered the stigma of being shackled
to an unresolved criminal prosecution, virtually hanging like a Damocles' sword over his head for more
than a decade. We need not stress the consequences and problems inherent in this pending litigation
and/or criminal prosecution which include the prospects of unrealized business transactions, stagnant
professional growth, hampered travel opportunities and a besmirched reputation. Furthermore, it is worth
noting that petitioner has been charged merely as an accessory after the fact due to his being a senior
executive of the bank where the principal accused tried to deposit the stolen money. Clearly then, the
dismissal sought by herein petitioner is justified under the circumstances and in accordance with the
guidelines set forth in the above-cited case.

Procedural Issue:
Mandamus as an Appropriate Remedy

Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when mandated by the Constitution. 31 To reiterate, the right
of the accused to the speedy disposition of a case is a right guaranteed under the fundamental law.
Correlatively, it is the bounden duty of a court, as mandated by the Constitution, to speedily dispose of
the case before it. Thus, a party to a case may demand, as a matter mandated by the Constitution,
expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.32

Ideally, a petition for mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial but not of a discretionary
duty.33More specifically, persons or public officials may be directed to act with or to exercise discretion,
but not as to how that discretion should be exercised. However, our jurisprudence is replete with
exceptions in this matter. Thus, it has been held that in a case where there is "gross abuse of discretion,
manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority," the writ may be issued to control precisely the exercise
of such discretion.34

As discussed above, the Sandiganbayan's inordinate delay in deciding the subject criminal case
prejudiced the right of petitioner to a speedy disposition of his case. Such undue delay can be
characterized as no less than a grave abuse of discretion, resulting in manifest injustice on the part of
petitioner. In view of these circumstances, the case falls squarely into the established exception and will
justify this Court's action of substituting the discretion of respondent with that of its own.

In the very recent case Lopez Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman et al.,35 the Court deemed it appropriate to
dismiss directly the criminal suit before the Sandiganbayan in the interest of the speedy disposition
thereof. Thus, it ruled as follows:

"x x x [T]his Court applying the ruling in the Roque case, citing Tatad, likewise resolves to directly
dismiss the informations already filed before the Sandiganbayan against petitioner 'in the interest
of the speedy disposition of case' "

We find that the circumstances obtaining in the action cited above are similar to those in the instant
Petition and thus warrant the same course of action; namely, dismissal of the case against herein
petitioner. However, no administrative sanction against respondent court or its members can be meted
out in the present proceedings. Due process requires that before such penalty can be imposed, the
proper administrative proceedings must be conducted, as in fact one is already being undertaken in AM
No. 00-8-05-SC entitled "Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan."

Epilogue

In sum, we hold that the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner for violation of his right to a
speedy disposition of his case is justified by the following circumstances: (1) the 10-year delay in the
resolution of the case is inordinately long; (2) petitioner has suffered vexation and oppression by reason
of this long delay; (3) he did not sleep on his right and has in fact consistently asserted it, (4) he has not
contributed in any manner to the long delay in the resolution of his case, (5) he did not employ any
procedural dilatory strategies during the trial or raised on appeal or certiorari any issue to delay the case,
(6) the Sandiganbayan did not give any valid reason to justify the inordinate delay and even admitted that
the case was one of those that got "buried" during its reorganization, and (7) petitioner was merely
charged as an accessory after the fact.

For too long, petitioner has suffered in agonizing anticipation while awaiting the ultimate resolution of his
case. The inordinate and unreasonable delay is completely attributable to the Sandiganbayan. No fault
whatsoever can be ascribed to petitioner or his lawyer. It is now time to enforce his constitutional right to
speedy disposition and to grant him speedy justice.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and, as against petitioner, Criminal Case No. 6672
pending before the Sandiganbayan is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 4. DELAY OF 11 YEARS

G.R. No. 139571-72. March 28, 2001

ROGER N. ABARDO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH
DIVISION), respondent.

DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] which seeks to set aside the following Resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan[2] in Criminal Case Nos. 16744 and 16745: (1) the Resolution dated December 1,
1998, which denied petitioner Roger N. Abardos Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Reinvestigation and
the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss; and (2) the Resolution dated July 16, 1999, which denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
The facts, as gathered from the records, are as follows:
On May 21, 1991, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan two separate
informations for falsification of public documents[3] docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 16744 and 16745,
against herein petitioner who was then the provincial assessor of Camarines Sur.
The information in Criminal Case No. 16744[4] charged petitioner and six others with falsifying Tax
Declarations Nos. 008-13, 008-14, 008-15, 008-17, 008-18, 008-19, 008-20 and 008-21 on or about
December 8, 1988 by making it appear that property consisting of 1,887 hectares had been declared in
the name of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) since 1985 and that, having been reclassified to
first-class unirrigated land, the market value thereof has increased to P16,008.00 per hectare when in fact
said property, which was formerly classified as pasture land under Tax Declarations Nos. 3915 and 3916
issued in the name of Rosita Alberto, had a market value of only P1,524.00 per hectare and was declared
in the name of UCPB only in 1988. The same property was subsequently transferred by UCPB to Sharp
International Marketing (Phil.) Inc. (Sharp) and the tax declarations issued in the name of Sharp are the
subject of Criminal Case No. 16745[5]. In the latter case, petitioner and five others were charged with
falsifying Tax Declarations Nos. 008-22 to 008-29 on or about December 8, 1988, by making it appear
that the property covered therein was transferred from UCPB to Sharp, and by also increasing its
appraisal to first-class unirrigated riceland when in truth and in fact the same is cogonal and mountainous.
At the scheduled arraignment on July 8, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash [6] on the grounds
that the facts charged in the informations do not constitute the crime of falsification of public documents;
that the informations contain averments which constitute a legal excuse or justification; and that the
criminal offense of falsification of public documents cannot be validly filed against petitioner.In view of the
pendency of the said motions, petitioners arraignment was postponed until further notice. On July 24,
1991, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed an Opposition[7] to petitioners Motion to Quash.
On September 3, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution [8] denying the Motion to Quash for
lack of merit on the ground that with the filing thereof, petitioner hypothetically admitted the material
allegations in the information; that petitioner may not raise facts in his motion to quash which would
negate the allegations in the informations; and that the informations sufficiently allege all the elements of
the crime of falsification of public documents as charged. A motion to reconsider the said resolution was
denied.
Eventually, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to
set aside the Resolution issued by the Sandiganbayan on September 3, 1991 denying his motion to
quash. As a consequence, the arraignment scheduled for October 7, 1991 was reset to November 28,
1991, upon motion of petitioners counsel.[9]
Thereafter, petitioners arraignment was reset several times upon motion of his counsel and for the
same reason, as follows: the arraignment scheduled on November 28, 1991 was reset to January 16,
1992;[10] on January 16, 1992, the arraignment was again reset to March 3, 1992; [11] while on March 3,
1992, the arraignment was reset to May 28, 1992.[12] Thereafter, in an Order[13] dated May 28, 1992, the
arraignment of petitioner was cancelled and reset to July 28, 1992, in view of the reorganization of the
Sandiganbayan.
In a Resolution dated March 5, 1992,[14] the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, no grave abuse
of discretion being imputable to the Sandiganbayan. Similarly, the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner was denied. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, principally, on the ground that the
issues raised by petitioner in his motion to quash are matters of defense which should be raised and
provedduring the trial.
On July 28, 1992, petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to both cases. [15] On even
date, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order setting the trial of petitioner on the date of trial of his co-
accused whose cases are being reinvestigated.[16]
In a letter dated March 20, 1997 to the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner requested for the
payment of his retirement benefits which had been withheld since his compulsory retirement in 1994 due
to the pendency of the subject criminal cases.[17] This letter was brought to the attention of the
Sandiganbayan in a letter dated September 22, 1997.[18]
In a Resolution adopted on November 4, 1997, the Sandiganbayan set for a conference all the
lawyers of the defense and the prosecution on November 19, 1997 at 8:30 a.m. to see how these cases
can move faster.[19] In an Order dated November 19, 1997,[20] the two cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 16744
and 16745) together with eight other cases were set for preliminary conference and pre-trial on January
27 & 30, 1998 and trial on February 2, 3, 5 & 6, 1998, all at 8:30 a.m.
On January 7, 1998, co-accused Salvador P. Pejo filed a Motion for Leave to Participate in the
Reinvestigation of the Cases[21] which was granted in an Order dated January 9, 1998.[22]
In an Order dated January 27, 1998,[23] the Sandiganbayan gave the prosecution a period of sixty
days to conduct a thorough reinvestigation of Criminal Cases Nos. 16739 to 16749 involving all the
accused therein and ordering it to submit its report within the same period containing its findings and
recommendation together with the action taken by the Ombudsman, and consequently, the settings on
January 30, 1998 and February 2,3,4,5 and 6, 1998, were cancelled.
On August 12, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Reinvestigation [24] on the
ground that the ultimate purchase by the Philippine government of the Garchitorena estate at the price of
P33,000.00 has veritably rendered all the pending criminal cases moot and academic. On August 17,
1998, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution giving the prosecution fifteen (15) days to file its Comment
to petitioners Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Reinvestigation. On October 12, 1998, petitioner filed a
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss[25] on the ground that the criminal cases should now be dismissed to
implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998
considering that the two pending criminal cases against petitioner have already exceeded the extended
time limit under Section 7 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98; and that petitioner is duty-bound to move
for the dismissal of the two cases before trial, otherwise, he will be deemed to have waived his rights to
dismiss under Section 14, Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98.
On December 1, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion for Early Resolution[26] to speed up the early
judgment and resolution of the above-entitled cases.
In a Resolution[27] dated December 1, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied for lack of merit petitioners
two motions (Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Reinvestigation and the Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss). His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a Resolution dated July 16, 1999.[28]
Hence, the instant petition on the following grounds:
I. THE ULTIMATE PURCHASE BY THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT OF THE
GARCHITORENA ESTATE AT THE PRICE OF P33,000,000.00 HAS VERITABLY
RENDERED ALL THE CRIMINAL CASES MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
 II. THAT CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 16744 AND 16745 AGAINST THE HEREIN PETITIONER
SHOULD NOW BE DISMISSED TO IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 8493, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1998 AS DIRECTED
IN SEC. 15 THEREOF, AND BY REASON OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN ITS CIRCULAR NO. 38-
98.
Anent the first ground, petitioner argues that the supervening event of purchase by the government
of the Garchitorena estate and its distribution to the farmer-beneficiaries have rendered the issues in the
criminal cases moot and academic.
This contention is palpably without merit.
Petitioner was charged with two counts of falsification of public documents under Article 171,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which punishes any public officer who, taking advantage of his
official position, shall falsify a document by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. In gist, the
first information filed with the Sandiganbayan alleged that petitioner falsified Tax Declarations Nos. 008-
13 to 008-21 by making it appear that property consisting of 1,887 hectares had been declared in the
name of UCPB since 1985 and that, having been reclassified to first-class unirrigated land, the market
value thereof has increased to P16,008.00 per hectare. The truth is, the property was classified as
pasture land under Tax Declarations Nos. 3915 and 3916, issued in the name of Rosita Alberto, with a
market value of only P1,524.00 per hectare. The second information alleged that petitioner falsified Tax
Declarations Nos. 008-22 to 008-29 by making it appear that the property covered therein was transferred
from UCPB to Sharp, and by also increasing its appraisal to first-class unirrigated riceland when in truth,
the same is cogonal and mountainous. The statements adequately express, in essence, the elements of
the crime of falsification of public documents under Article 177, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
The eventual purchase by the Philippine government of the subject land and its distribution to
farmer-beneficiaries does not render the criminal cases moot and academic or to put it more accurately,
relieve petitioner of criminal liability. Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony; and a
felony is an act or omission punishable by the Revised Penal Code. [29] Petitioner was charged with
falsification of public documents as defined and punished in Article 177, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code. The causes of extinction of criminal liability are provided in Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code which may be enumerated as follows: by the death of the convict, by service of the sentence,
amnesty, absolute pardon, prescription of the crime, prescription of the penalty and by marriage of the
offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of the Code. Verily, the supervening event adverted to by
petitioner does not fall under any of the circumstances by which criminal liability may be extinguished.As
aptly pointed out by the Office of the Special Prosecutor in its Comment on behalf of the People, in the
crime of falsification of a public document, the principal thing punished is the violation of public faith and
the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.[30] In this regard, petitioner cannot seek refuge
behind the argument that the criminal case has been rendered moot and academic as the purchase by
the government of the Garchitorena estate does not foreclose the courts determination of whether a crime
has been committed for which a public official may be answerable.
Next, petitioner argues that the two pending criminal cases against him have already exceeded the
extended time limit under Section 7 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 for the trial of cases.According
to petitioner, after his arraignment on July 28, 1992, the trial of the cases have not commenced for
unknown reasons. In this regard, petitioner invokes the remedy provided in Section 14 of the said circular
in seeking a dismissal of the cases.
Unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases in judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies is
a serious problem besetting the administration of justice in the country. As one solution on the problem of
delay in the disposition of criminal cases, Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy Trial
Act of 1998, intended to ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court was passed by the Senate and the
House of Representatives on February 4, 1998 and February 3, 1998, respectively. Supreme Court
Circular No. 38-98 which was promulgated[31] for the purpose of implementing the provisions thereof took
effect on September 15, 1998.[32]
 Consistent with Republic Act No. 8493, SC Circular 38-98 sets a time limit for arraignment and pre-
trial. Section 2 thereof provides that arraignment, and the pre-trial if the accused pleads not guilty to the
crime charged shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused. However, Section 7[33] thereof, provides for an extended time limit with respect to
the period from arraignment to trial for the three years following the statutes effectivity, as follows: for the
first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity, the time limit shall be one hundred eighty (180)
days; for the second twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days; for the
third twelve-month period, the time limit shall be eighty (80) days. Petitioner then invokes Section 14[34] of
the circular in seeking the dismissal of the two criminal cases filed against him.
On the other hand, the Office of the Special Prosecutor submits that Republic Act No. 8493 does not
apply to petitioner on the ground that the following circumstances may be considered as exceptions to the
time within which arraignment, pre-trial and trial should commence: petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
questioning the denial of his motion to quash; his counsel asked for postponement of his arraignment on
October 7, 1991, November 28, 1991, January 16, 1992 and March 3, 1992; adding to the delay was the
reorganization of the Sandiganbayan with the passage of RA 8249; Criminal Case Nos. 16744 and 16745
were consolidated with eight (8) other criminal cases and there are more than twenty (20) accused
involved in these cases; separate motions for reinvestigation were filed.
In support of the submission that certain delays should be excluded in computing the time limits
imposed by the statute and its implementing rules and regulations, the Special Prosecutor cites Section
9[35] of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 which excludes the period of the pendency of a motion to
quash, bill of particulars, or other causes justifying suspension of arraignment and Section Section 9 (a)
(3) and (e)[36] thereof which excludes delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory
orders and when the accused is joined with a co-accused over whom the court has not acquired
jurisdiction.
The time limits provided by Republic Act No. 8493 could not be applied to the case at bar as
petitioner was arraigned way back in July 28, 1992. At that time, there was yet no statute which
establishes deadlines for arraignment and trial; and the time limits for trial imposed by Republic Act No.
8493 are reckoned from the arraignment of the accused. Nevertheless, Republic Act No. 8493 does not
preclude application of the provision on speedy trial in the Constitution. [37] Indeed, in determining whether
petitioners right to a speedy trial has been violated, resort to Section 16, Article III of the 1987
Constitution is imperative. It provides that:

All persons shall have the right to speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.

The Constitution mandates dispatch not only in the trial stage, but also in the disposition thereof,
warranting dismissals in cases of violations thereof without the fault of the party concerned, not only the
accused.[38] However, the right of an accused to a speedy trial should not be utilized to deprive the state
of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. [39] Hence, certain factors are considered and
balanced against each other in answering the judicial inquiry as to whether such right was
violated. In Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan[40], the Court ruled thus:
It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy
trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause
or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his
right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay,
the defendants assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the
delay, are considered.
The rule was reiterated succinctly in Alviso vs. Sandiganbayan[41], viz.:
xxx. Withal, it must not be lost sight of that the concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relative term
and must necessarily be a flexible concept. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of
whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are the
length of delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused,
and the prejudice caused by the delay.

Briefly stated, the determination of whether or not the constitutional right invoked by petitioner has
been violated, the factors to consider and balance are the duration of the delay, reason therefor, assertion
of the right or failure to assert it and the prejudice caused by such delay.[42]
In junking petitioners Motion to Dismiss on the ground of violation of his constitutional right to a
speedy trial, the Sandiganbayan attributed the delay to petitioner as he resorted to all remedies, fair and
foul to prolong the case. According to the Sandiganbayan:

As borne out by the records, after the filing of the Information against him, Abardo filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation and thereafter, A Motion to Quash. When both motions were denied by this Court, he
went to the Honorable Supreme Court on a petition for Certiorari. These circumstances contributed to the
delay in the early termination of the present cases. The cause of the delay is attributable to the desire of
the accused to quash the present cases against him without the need of presenting evidence. Accused
therefore cannot be heard to complain when he himself is the cause of the delay.

After an assiduous examination of the records, we hold the contrary.

The records disclose that the two informations against petitioner were filed almost a decade ago
or way back on May 21, 1991. The Sandiganbayan faults the petitioner as the cause of the delay. The
antecedents disclose otherwise. The time it took for petitioner to file his motion to quash; the denial
thereof by the Sandiganbayan; and the time it took him to question the denial of his motion to quash
before the Supreme Court was less than a year from start to finish. The motion to quash was filed on July
8, 1991; the Sandiganbayan denied it on September 3, 1991; and the Supreme Court upheld the denial
on March 5, 1992 and dismissed his petition. While his arraignment originally scheduled on July 8, 1991
was reset several times on motion of petitioners counsel due to the foregoing proceedings, petitioner
wasarraigned as early as July 28, 1992 or just over a year after he filed a motion to quash.
What glares from the records is that from his arraignment on said date, there was an unexplained
interval or inactivity of close to five years in the Sandiganbayan. Consequently, on March 27, 1997,
petitioner brought to the attention of the Ombudsman the withholding of his retirement benefits and that
no hearing of the case has yet been conducted. The letter was also brought to the attention of the
Sandiganbayan. On November 4, 1997, the Sandiganbayan set a conference on November 19, 1997 to
see how the cases can move faster. In an Order dated November 19, 1997, Criminal Cases Nos. 16744
and 16754 were set for preliminary conference and pre-trial on January 27 & 30, 1998, and trial on
February 2, 3, 5 & 6. Verily, a long period of time was allowed to elapse without the petitioner having his
case tried.
Granting that the delay or interval was caused by the separate motions for reinvestigation filed by the
different accused, again, there is no explanation why the reinvestigation was unduly stretched beyond a
reasonably permissible time frame. Apparently, the Office of the Ombudsman did not complete the
reinvestigation during the five-year interval, thus, in an Order dated January 27, 1998, the Sandiganbayan
gave the prosecution a period of sixty days to conduct a thorough reinvestigation of Criminal Cases
16739 to 16749 involving all the accused therein and ordering it to submit its report within the same
period with its findings, recommendations and action taken by the Ombudsman. As a consequence, the
settings on January 30, 1998, February 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, 1998 were all cancelled. Despite the deadline
given to the Ombudsman for the reinvestigation, the Office of the Special Prosecutor disclosed in its
Comment that the reinvestigation of the cases has not yet been completed. According to the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, an order was issued by the Sandiganbayan on January 19, 2000, that [it] appearing
that as manifested by the prosecution the reinvestigation is still being completed. the trial part of these
cases are deferred, thus, the hearings set for February 14, 15, 16 & 17, 2000 were again cancelled and
the pre-trial on all the cases were tentatively set on February 28 and 29, 2000. It is, therefore, apparent
that the delay is not solely or even equally chargeable to petitioner, but to the Office of the Ombudsman
where the conduct of the reinvestigation has languished for an unreasonable length of time.
It cannot be said the petitioner failed to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case. During the
five-year period between 1992 and 1997, petitioner wrote the Office of the Ombudsman about the
prejudice caused him by the cases, a copy of which was furnished the Sandiganbayan. On December 1,
1998, he filed a Motion for Early Resolution of the cases.
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition of cases
in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman[43], where the Court found the delay of six years by the Ombudsman
in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy
disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman[44], where the Court held that the
delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsmans duty to act promptly on complaints before him;
and in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan[45], where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in not quashing the information which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was filed
and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. So it must be in the
instant case, where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade already.
Clearly, the delay in this case disregarded the Ombudsmans duty, as mandated by the
Constitution[46] and Republic Act No. 6770,[47] to enforce the criminal liability of government officers or
employees in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service to the
people. The fact that up to this time no trial has been set, apparently due to the inability of the
Ombudsman to complete the reinvestigation is a distressing indictment of the criminal justice system,
particularly its investigative and prosecutory pillars.
For all these past eleven years, petitioner has remained under a cloud and stigmatized by the
charges against him, and since his retirement in 1994, he has been deprived of the fruits of his retirement
after serving the government for over 40 years all because of the inaction of the Ombudsman. If we wait
any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his retirement benefits, and more importantly, to
clear his name.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and sets aside the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan, dated December 1, 1998 and July 16, 1999 in Criminal Case Nos. 16744 and
16745. The Court directs the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the aforesaid cases.
SO ORDERED.
 5.

G.R. No. 187728 September 12, 2011

CHURCHILLE V. MARI and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. ROLANDO L. GONZALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Sogod,
Southern Leyte, and PO1 RUDYARD PALOMA y TORRES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of Sogod, Southern Leyte (RTC), dated January 16, 2009,
dismissing the criminal case for rape against PO1 Rudyard Paloma y Torres (private respondent),
and the Resolution2 dated March 16, 2009, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, be
annulled and set aside.

The records reveal the following antecedent facts.

On October 25, 2004, petitioner AAA, private complainant below, executed a sworn statement
before an Investigator of the 8th Regional Office, Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) in Tacloban City, where she stated that she was raped by herein
private respondent on October 10, 2004 at her boarding house at Sogod, Southern Leyte. A
preliminary investigation of the case was commenced on November 4, 2004 before the Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sogod. A warrant of arrest was issued against
private respondent, so he voluntarily surrendered to the Chief of Police of Sogod on November 18,
2004 and was then incarcerated at the Sogod Municipal Jail.

On November 20, 2004, private respondent filed a Motion for Bail. Hearings on the motion
commenced on December 7, 2004, but petitioner failed to appear. Only private respondent
presented evidence. Thus, on March 16, 2005, the MCTC of Sogod issued an Order allowing private
respondent to post bail set at ₱200,000.00. After posting a surety bond, private respondent was
released from confinement.

Pursuant to the issuance of A.M. No. 05-8-26, divesting first-level courts of authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of criminal complaints cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, records of the
subject case were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Southern Leyte.3 The
Prosecutor's Office issued a Resolution dated May 26, 2008, finding probable cause against private
respondent and, accordingly, an Information for Rape was filed on June 11, 2008. A warrant of
arrest was immediately issued against private respondent.

On June 27, 2008, private respondent was committed to detention4 and, on June 30, 2008, the RTC
issued an Order5 stating that accused had voluntarily surrendered to the Office of the Clerk of Court
and arraignment was set for July 31, 2008. In the meantime, on July 3, 2008, private respondent
filed a Motion to Admit Cash Bond in Lieu of Surety Bond; thus, in an Order dated July 10, 2008, the
RTC cancelled the July 31, 2008 schedule for arraignment and reset the arraignment and hearing on
said motion for August 20, 2008. At said scheduled date for arraignment and hearing on the motion,
nobody appeared for the prosecution. Hence, the RTC issued the Order6 dated August 20, 2008
resetting the arraignment for October 31, 2008 and stating that:

x x x this Court hereby orders the public prosecutor x x x and/or his assistant prosecutor x x x to
appear and prosecute this case on the next scheduled hearing from arraignment up to the
termination of the trial of this case otherwise this Court will order the dismissal of this case for failure
to prosecute or nolle prosequi.7

On October 28, 2008, petitioner AAA, private complainant below, filed through her private counsel, a
Motion for Cancellation of Hearing,8 manifesting that Atty. Pedro Felicen, Jr. had been granted the
authority to prosecute by the Provincial Prosecutor and praying that the scheduled arraignment on
October 31, 2008 be cancelled due to the pendency of private complainant's petition for transfer of
venue before this Court. The authorized private prosecutor did not appear on said hearing date. The
hearing on October 31, 2008 proceeded as the RTC ruled, in its Order9issued on the same day, that
unless restrained by a higher court, the mere pendency of a petition for transfer of venue is not
sufficient reason to suspend the proceedings. Moreover, counsel for accused invoked the accused's
right to a speedy trial and, thus, private respondent was arraigned in the presence of the Provincial
Prosecutor who was designated by the RTC to represent the prosecution for the purpose of
arraignment. Pre-trial was set for November 13, 2008. Nevertheless, said schedule for pre-trial was
cancelled (per Order10 dated November 4, 2008) as the Presiding Judge of the RTC had to attend a
PHILJA Seminar, and pre-trial was reset to November 24, 2008. On November 24, 2008, the day of
the pre-trial itself, the private prosecutor again filed a Motion for Cancellation of Hearing, again using
as justification the pendency of the petition for transfer of venue. The RTC issued an Order on even
date, reading as follows:

During the scheduled pre-trial conference of this case, the public prosecutors of Leyte, the private
prosecutor and the private complainant failed to appear despite proper notices sent [to] them. A
motion for cancellation of hearing was filed by the authorized private prosecutor, Pedro Felicen, Jr.
for reasons stated therein to which this Court finds to be not meritorious, hence, the same is denied.
x x x the public prosecutor as well as the counsel for the accused were directed to make their oral
comments on the first endorsement of the Hon. Deputy Court Administrator, regarding the motion to
transfer venue of this case to any of the RTC, at Tacloban City, x x x.

x x x Thereafter, the pre trial proceeded by discussing matters concerning the amicable settlement,
plea bargaining agreement, stipulation of facts, pre-marking of documentary exhibits, number of
witnesses, trial dates and nature of the defense. There being no other matters to discuss on pre-trial
in order to expedite the early disposition of this case, the pre-trial proper is now deemed
terminated.11

The said Order also scheduled the initial hearing for trial on the merits for December 12, 2008. On
December 12, 2008, no one appeared for the prosecution, prompting counsel for accused private
respondent to move for dismissal of the case on the ground of failure to prosecute. Private
respondent's motion to dismiss was denied per Order12dated December 12, 2008, and hearing was
reset to January 16, 2009.

Again, on the very day of the January 16, 2009 hearing, the private prosecutor filed an Urgent
Motion for Cancellation of Hearing, stating that it

was only on January 14, 2009 that he was furnished a copy of the notice of the January 16, 2009
hearing and he had to attend a previously scheduled hearing for another case he was handling, set
for the very same date. Thus, in the Order dated January 16, 2009, the RTC disposed, thus:
x x x Again notably absent are the private prosecutor, the two public prosecutors designated by the
Department of Justice to prosecute this case as well as the private complainant herself.

A last minute urgent motion to reset was filed by the private prosecutor, but the same is denied
being in violation of the three (3) day rule in filing written postponements. After hearing the
arguments coming from both the public prosecutor assigned to this Court and counsel for the
defense, the Court deems it proper to act on the urgency of the matter prayed for by the said
counsel. Considering that the accused has been languishing in jail since June, 2008 up to the
present and to allow him to stay in jail for a single minute, it is quite unreasonable and would violate
his right to speedy trial.

WHEREFORE, finding the motion of the counsel for the accused to be based on grounds that are
meritorious, this Court pursuant to x x x the rule on speedy trial (RA 8433) [should be "8493"] hereby
orders this case dismissed for failure of the prosecution to prosecute or nolle prosequi.13

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the same per Resolution dated
March 16, 2009.

Hence, the present petition for certiorari, alleging that public respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rashly and precipitately dismissing the rape
case against private respondent. Respondents counter that there was no grave abuse committed by
the trial court and setting aside the dismissal of the rape case would put private respondent in
double jeopardy.

The Court finds the petition bereft of merit.

Firstly, petitioners failed to observe the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. In Garcia v. Miro,14 the Court,
quoting Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto,15 ruled thus:

The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should
not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to
issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or
where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be
exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or
other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by
the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of
the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action
for the writ's procurement must be presented. This is, and should continue, to be the policy in this
regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.16 (Emphasis supplied.)

On this point alone, the petition is already dismissible. However, on several occasions, this Court
found compelling reasons to relax the rule on observance on hierarchy of courts. In Pacoy v.
Cajigal,17 the Court opted not to strictly apply said doctrine, since the issue involved is double
jeopardy, considered to be one of the most fundamental constitutional rights of an accused. Hence,
the Court also finds sufficient reason to relax the rule in this case as it also involves the issue of
double jeopardy, necessitating a look into the merits of the petition.

Petitioners insist that the RTC dismissed the criminal case against private respondent too hurriedly,
despite the provision in Section 10 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (Republic Act No. 8493), now
incorporated in Section 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 3. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within
which trial must commence:

(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but
not limited to the following:

xxxx

(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or
transfer from other courts;

x x x x18

A careful reading of the above rule would show that the only delays that may be excluded from the
time limit within which trial must commence are those resulting from proceedings concerning
the accused. The time involved in the proceedings in a petition for transfer of venue can only be
excluded from said time limit if it was the accused who instituted the same. Hence, in this case, the
time during which the petition for transfer of venue filed by the private complainant is pending,
cannot be excluded from the time limit of thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order imposed
in Section 1, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.

The records reveal that the 30-day time limit set by Section 1, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court had, in
fact, already been breached. The private prosecutor received the Pre-trial Order19 dated November
24, 2008 on December 3, 2008, while the Provincial Prosecutor received the same on December 2,
2008.20 This means that at the latest, trial should have commenced by January 2, 2009, or if said
date was a Sunday or holiday, then on the very next business day. Yet, because of the prosecution's
failure to appear at the December 12, 2008 hearing for the initial presentation of the prosecution's
evidence, the RTC was constrained to reset the hearing to January 16, 2009, which is already
beyond the 30-day time limit. Nevertheless, the prosecution again failed to appear at the January 16,
2009 hearing. Indeed, as aptly observed by the RTC, petitioners showed recalcitrant behavior by
obstinately refusing to comply with the RTC's directives to commence presentation of their evidence.
Petitioners did not even show proper courtesy to the court, by filing motions for cancellation of the
hearings on the very day of the hearing and not even bothering to appear on the date they set for
hearing on their motion. As set forth in the narration of facts above, the prosecution appeared to be
intentionally delaying and trifling with court processes.

Petitioners are likewise mistaken in their notion that mere pendency of their petition for transfer of
venue should interrupt proceedings before the trial court. Such situation is akin to having a pending
petition for certiorari with the higher courts. In People v. Hernandez,21 the Court held that "delay
resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders" must be read in harmony with
Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which provides that the "[p]etition [under Rule 65] shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding in the case."22 The trial court was then correct and acting well within its discretion when
it refused to grant petitioners' motions for postponement mainly because of the pendency of their
petition for transfer of venue.

The trial court cannot be faulted for refusing to countenance delays in the prosecution of the case.
The Court's ruling in Tan v. People23 is quite instructive, to wit:

An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by
Section 14 (2) of Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free
from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an
innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of
having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective
on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is
justice denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more
so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.

Following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise
known as "The Speedy Trial Act of 1998," was enacted, with Section 6 of said act limiting the trial
period to 180 days from the first day of trial. Aware of problems resulting in the clogging of court
dockets, the Court implemented the law by issuing Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, which has
been incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 119.

In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court had occasion to state -

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was
designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over
him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the
courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial
and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied
such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative
term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not
mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed
to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures
rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in
mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not
weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.

The Court emphasized in the same case that:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the
court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the
delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. x x x.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such
delay. Different weights
1âwphi 1

should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. x x x.

Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accused's right to speedy trial is deemed

violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In
determining whether petitioner was deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance
are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or
failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.
 xxxx

We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required
to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is
clearly insufficient, and particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case.24

Here, it must be emphasized that private respondent had already been deprived of his liberty on two
occasions. First, during the preliminary investigation before the MCTC, when he was incarcerated
from November 18, 2004 to March 16, 2005, or a period of almost four months; then again, when an
Information had already been issued and since rape is a non-bailable offense, he was imprisoned
beginning June 27, 2008 until the case was dismissed on January 16, 2009, or a period of over 6
months. Verily, there can be no cavil that deprivation of liberty for any duration of time is quite
oppressive. Because of private respondent's continued incarceration, any delay in trying the case
would cause him great prejudice. Thus, it was absolutely vexatious and oppressive to delay the trial
in the subject criminal case to await the outcome of petitioners' petition for transfer of venue,
especially in this case where there is no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction
issued by a higher court against herein public respondent from further proceeding in the case.

Hence, the Court does not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in
dismissing the case against private respondent for violation of his constitutional right to speedy trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 187728 September 12, 2011

CHURCHILLE V. MARI and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. ROLANDO L. GONZALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Sogod,
Southern Leyte, and PO1 RUDYARD PALOMA y TORRES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of Sogod, Southern Leyte (RTC), dated January 16, 2009,
dismissing the criminal case for rape against PO1 Rudyard Paloma y Torres (private respondent),
and the Resolution2 dated March 16, 2009, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, be
annulled and set aside.

The records reveal the following antecedent facts.

On October 25, 2004, petitioner AAA, private complainant below, executed a sworn statement
before an Investigator of the 8th Regional Office, Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) in Tacloban City, where she stated that she was raped by herein
private respondent on October 10, 2004 at her boarding house at Sogod, Southern Leyte. A
preliminary investigation of the case was commenced on November 4, 2004 before the Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sogod. A warrant of arrest was issued against
private respondent, so he voluntarily surrendered to the Chief of Police of Sogod on November 18,
2004 and was then incarcerated at the Sogod Municipal Jail.

On November 20, 2004, private respondent filed a Motion for Bail. Hearings on the motion
commenced on December 7, 2004, but petitioner failed to appear. Only private respondent
presented evidence. Thus, on March 16, 2005, the MCTC of Sogod issued an Order allowing private
respondent to post bail set at ₱200,000.00. After posting a surety bond, private respondent was
released from confinement.

Pursuant to the issuance of A.M. No. 05-8-26, divesting first-level courts of authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of criminal complaints cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, records of the
subject case were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Southern Leyte.3 The
Prosecutor's Office issued a Resolution dated May 26, 2008, finding probable cause against private
respondent and, accordingly, an Information for Rape was filed on June 11, 2008. A warrant of
arrest was immediately issued against private respondent.

On June 27, 2008, private respondent was committed to detention4 and, on June 30, 2008, the RTC
issued an Order5 stating that accused had voluntarily surrendered to the Office of the Clerk of Court
and arraignment was set for July 31, 2008. In the meantime, on July 3, 2008, private respondent
filed a Motion to Admit Cash Bond in Lieu of Surety Bond; thus, in an Order dated July 10, 2008, the
RTC cancelled the July 31, 2008 schedule for arraignment and reset the arraignment and hearing on
said motion for August 20, 2008. At said scheduled date for arraignment and hearing on the motion,
nobody appeared for the prosecution. Hence, the RTC issued the Order6 dated August 20, 2008
resetting the arraignment for October 31, 2008 and stating that:

x x x this Court hereby orders the public prosecutor x x x and/or his assistant prosecutor x x x to
appear and prosecute this case on the next scheduled hearing from arraignment up to the
termination of the trial of this case otherwise this Court will order the dismissal of this case for failure
to prosecute or nolle prosequi.7

On October 28, 2008, petitioner AAA, private complainant below, filed through her private counsel, a
Motion for Cancellation of Hearing,8 manifesting that Atty. Pedro Felicen, Jr. had been granted the
authority to prosecute by the Provincial Prosecutor and praying that the scheduled arraignment on
October 31, 2008 be cancelled due to the pendency of private complainant's petition for transfer of
venue before this Court. The authorized private prosecutor did not appear on said hearing date. The
hearing on October 31, 2008 proceeded as the RTC ruled, in its Order9issued on the same day, that
unless restrained by a higher court, the mere pendency of a petition for transfer of venue is not
sufficient reason to suspend the proceedings. Moreover, counsel for accused invoked the accused's
right to a speedy trial and, thus, private respondent was arraigned in the presence of the Provincial
Prosecutor who was designated by the RTC to represent the prosecution for the purpose of
arraignment. Pre-trial was set for November 13, 2008. Nevertheless, said schedule for pre-trial was
cancelled (per Order10 dated November 4, 2008) as the Presiding Judge of the RTC had to attend a
PHILJA Seminar, and pre-trial was reset to November 24, 2008. On November 24, 2008, the day of
the pre-trial itself, the private prosecutor again filed a Motion for Cancellation of Hearing, again using
as justification the pendency of the petition for transfer of venue. The RTC issued an Order on even
date, reading as follows:

During the scheduled pre-trial conference of this case, the public prosecutors of Leyte, the private
prosecutor and the private complainant failed to appear despite proper notices sent [to] them. A
motion for cancellation of hearing was filed by the authorized private prosecutor, Pedro Felicen, Jr.
for reasons stated therein to which this Court finds to be not meritorious, hence, the same is denied.
x x x the public prosecutor as well as the counsel for the accused were directed to make their oral
comments on the first endorsement of the Hon. Deputy Court Administrator, regarding the motion to
transfer venue of this case to any of the RTC, at Tacloban City, x x x.

x x x Thereafter, the pre trial proceeded by discussing matters concerning the amicable settlement,
plea bargaining agreement, stipulation of facts, pre-marking of documentary exhibits, number of
witnesses, trial dates and nature of the defense. There being no other matters to discuss on pre-trial
in order to expedite the early disposition of this case, the pre-trial proper is now deemed
terminated.11

The said Order also scheduled the initial hearing for trial on the merits for December 12, 2008. On
December 12, 2008, no one appeared for the prosecution, prompting counsel for accused private
respondent to move for dismissal of the case on the ground of failure to prosecute. Private
respondent's motion to dismiss was denied per Order12dated December 12, 2008, and hearing was
reset to January 16, 2009.

Again, on the very day of the January 16, 2009 hearing, the private prosecutor filed an Urgent
Motion for Cancellation of Hearing, stating that it

was only on January 14, 2009 that he was furnished a copy of the notice of the January 16, 2009
hearing and he had to attend a previously scheduled hearing for another case he was handling, set
for the very same date. Thus, in the Order dated January 16, 2009, the RTC disposed, thus:

x x x Again notably absent are the private prosecutor, the two public prosecutors designated by the
Department of Justice to prosecute this case as well as the private complainant herself.

A last minute urgent motion to reset was filed by the private prosecutor, but the same is denied
being in violation of the three (3) day rule in filing written postponements. After hearing the
arguments coming from both the public prosecutor assigned to this Court and counsel for the
defense, the Court deems it proper to act on the urgency of the matter prayed for by the said
counsel. Considering that the accused has been languishing in jail since June, 2008 up to the
present and to allow him to stay in jail for a single minute, it is quite unreasonable and would violate
his right to speedy trial.

WHEREFORE, finding the motion of the counsel for the accused to be based on grounds that are
meritorious, this Court pursuant to x x x the rule on speedy trial (RA 8433) [should be "8493"] hereby
orders this case dismissed for failure of the prosecution to prosecute or nolle prosequi.13

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the same per Resolution dated
March 16, 2009.

Hence, the present petition for certiorari, alleging that public respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rashly and precipitately dismissing the rape
case against private respondent. Respondents counter that there was no grave abuse committed by
the trial court and setting aside the dismissal of the rape case would put private respondent in
double jeopardy.

The Court finds the petition bereft of merit.

Firstly, petitioners failed to observe the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. In Garcia v. Miro,14 the Court,
quoting Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto,15 ruled thus:

The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should
not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to
issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or
where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be
exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or
other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by
the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of
the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action
for the writ's procurement must be presented. This is, and should continue, to be the policy in this
regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.16 (Emphasis supplied.)

On this point alone, the petition is already dismissible. However, on several occasions, this Court
found compelling reasons to relax the rule on observance on hierarchy of courts. In Pacoy v.
Cajigal,17 the Court opted not to strictly apply said doctrine, since the issue involved is double
jeopardy, considered to be one of the most fundamental constitutional rights of an accused. Hence,
the Court also finds sufficient reason to relax the rule in this case as it also involves the issue of
double jeopardy, necessitating a look into the merits of the petition.

Petitioners insist that the RTC dismissed the criminal case against private respondent too hurriedly,
despite the provision in Section 10 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (Republic Act No. 8493), now
incorporated in Section 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 3. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within
which trial must commence:

(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but
not limited to the following:
 xxxx

(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or
transfer from other courts;

x x x x18

A careful reading of the above rule would show that the only delays that may be excluded from the
time limit within which trial must commence are those resulting from proceedings concerning
the accused. The time involved in the proceedings in a petition for transfer of venue can only be
excluded from said time limit if it was the accused who instituted the same. Hence, in this case, the
time during which the petition for transfer of venue filed by the private complainant is pending,
cannot be excluded from the time limit of thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order imposed
in Section 1, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.

The records reveal that the 30-day time limit set by Section 1, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court had, in
fact, already been breached. The private prosecutor received the Pre-trial Order19 dated November
24, 2008 on December 3, 2008, while the Provincial Prosecutor received the same on December 2,
2008.20 This means that at the latest, trial should have commenced by January 2, 2009, or if said
date was a Sunday or holiday, then on the very next business day. Yet, because of the prosecution's
failure to appear at the December 12, 2008 hearing for the initial presentation of the prosecution's
evidence, the RTC was constrained to reset the hearing to January 16, 2009, which is already
beyond the 30-day time limit. Nevertheless, the prosecution again failed to appear at the January 16,
2009 hearing. Indeed, as aptly observed by the RTC, petitioners showed recalcitrant behavior by
obstinately refusing to comply with the RTC's directives to commence presentation of their evidence.
Petitioners did not even show proper courtesy to the court, by filing motions for cancellation of the
hearings on the very day of the hearing and not even bothering to appear on the date they set for
hearing on their motion. As set forth in the narration of facts above, the prosecution appeared to be
intentionally delaying and trifling with court processes.

Petitioners are likewise mistaken in their notion that mere pendency of their petition for transfer of
venue should interrupt proceedings before the trial court. Such situation is akin to having a pending
petition for certiorari with the higher courts. In People v. Hernandez,21 the Court held that "delay
resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders" must be read in harmony with
Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which provides that the "[p]etition [under Rule 65] shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding in the case."22 The trial court was then correct and acting well within its discretion when
it refused to grant petitioners' motions for postponement mainly because of the pendency of their
petition for transfer of venue.

The trial court cannot be faulted for refusing to countenance delays in the prosecution of the case.
The Court's ruling in Tan v. People23 is quite instructive, to wit:

An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by
Section 14 (2) of Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free
from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an
innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of
having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective
on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is
justice denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more
so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.

Following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise
known as "The Speedy Trial Act of 1998," was enacted, with Section 6 of said act limiting the trial
period to 180 days from the first day of trial. Aware of problems resulting in the clogging of court
dockets, the Court implemented the law by issuing Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, which has
been incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 119.

In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court had occasion to state -

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was
designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over
him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the
courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial
and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied
such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative
term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not
mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed
to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures
rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in
mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not
weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.

The Court emphasized in the same case that:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the
court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the
delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. x x x.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such
delay. Different weights
1âwphi 1

should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. x x x.

Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accused's right to speedy trial is deemed

violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In
determining whether petitioner was deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance
are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or
failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.

xxxx

We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required
to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is
clearly insufficient, and particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case.24

Here, it must be emphasized that private respondent had already been deprived of his liberty on two
occasions. First, during the preliminary investigation before the MCTC, when he was incarcerated
from November 18, 2004 to March 16, 2005, or a period of almost four months; then again, when an
Information had already been issued and since rape is a non-bailable offense, he was imprisoned
beginning June 27, 2008 until the case was dismissed on January 16, 2009, or a period of over 6
months. Verily, there can be no cavil that deprivation of liberty for any duration of time is quite
oppressive. Because of private respondent's continued incarceration, any delay in trying the case
would cause him great prejudice. Thus, it was absolutely vexatious and oppressive to delay the trial
in the subject criminal case to await the outcome of petitioners' petition for transfer of venue,
especially in this case where there is no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction
issued by a higher court against herein public respondent from further proceeding in the case.

Hence, the Court does not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in
dismissing the case against private respondent for violation of his constitutional right to speedy trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.