WILLS SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS (ARTS.
783-795)
1. !MONTINOLA v HERBOSA CA REP 2ND
377 CAPISTRANO;
1963 NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the
CFI Manila
FACTS: Montinola filed this action against the heirs of
Jose Rizal for the recovery of possession of personal
property (the RIZAL RELICS) allegedly sold to him by
Dona Trinidad Rizal. The trial court held that neither
party is entitled to possession of property, relying
principally on the fact that in Rizal’s MI ULTIMO
ADIOS, there was a stanza where Rizal allegedly
bequeathed all his property to the Filipino people:
“Sintang Pilipinas, lupa kong hinirang…Huling paalam
ko’t sayo’y iiwan. Ang lahat at madlang iniwan sa
buhay.” The handwritten work of Rizal to the mind of
the trial court constitutes a holographic will giving to
the State all his property. (The Court also relied on
the enforceability of Spanish judgment convicting
Rizal and adjudging in favor of the state P100,000 as
indemnity as another basis for holding that it is the
State that had superior lien over Rizal’s property but
for our purposes, only the issue of succession is
herein discussed)
ISSUE: WON Rizal’s MI ULTIMU ADIOS which was
handwritten by Rizal is a holographic will, which
bequeaths to the State all his property (the Rizal
relics).
HELD - An instrument which merely expresses a last
wish as a thought or advice but does not contain a
disposition of property and was not executed with
ANIMUS TESTANDI cannot be legally considered a
will. - Rizal’s MI ULTIMO ADIOS is a literary piece of
work and was so intended. It may be considered a
will in a grammatical sense, but not in a legal or
juridical sense. Assuming arguendo that the
concerned 13th stanza in the said writing was a
holographic will, the fact remains that it is still
worthless for noncompliance with the mandatory
provisions of the Spanish Civil Code. - Art 688
requires that it be drawn on stamped paper
corresponding to the year of its execution, written in
its entirety by the testator and signed by him and
must contain a statement of the year, month and day
of execution. Art. 689 requires that holographic wills
be protocoled and shall be presented for this purpose
to the judge of first instance of the last domicile of
the testator or to the one of the place where he died
within 5 years from the day of the testator’s death.
Without these requisites, the holographic will shall not
be valid. last page, all this, in the presence of the
three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his
last will and that the said three witnesses signed their
names on the last page after the attestation clause in
his presence and in the presence of each other. The
oppositors did not submit any evidence. - The trial
court found said will to be a holographic will.
Although at the time it was executed and at the time
of the testator's death, holographic wills were not
permitted by law , the trial court still admitted to
probate the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho
Abadia. The TC did so because at the time of the
hearing and when the case was to be decided the
new Civil Code was already in force, which permitted
the execution of holographic wills. According to the
trial court, to carry out the intention of the testator is
the controlling factor and may override any defect in
form.
2. CASTAÑEDA v. ALEMANY
GR No.1439, March 19, 1904
3 PHIL 426
FACTS: Appellant constested the validity of the will of
Doña Juana Moreno upon the ground that although
the attestation clause in the will states that the
testator signed the will in the presence of three
witnesses who also each signed in each presence, the
will was not actually written by the testator.
ISSUE: Is it necessary that a will be written by the
testator herself?
HELD: No. Section 618 of the Civil Code requires (1)
that the will be in writing and (2) either that the
testator sign it himself or, if he does not sign it, that it
be signed by someone in his presence and by his
express direction. Who does the mechanical work of
writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact,
therefore, that in this case the will was typewritten in
the office of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no
consequence.
The mechanical act of drafting the will can be left to a
third person. What is important is the testator signs
the will or he let another person to sign but under his
direction.
Art 785. The duration or efficacy of the designation
of the heirs, devisees or legatees, or the
determination of the portions which they are to take,
when referred to by name, cannot be left to the
discretion of a third person.
3. JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA
COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000]
FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and
Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, (predecessor-in-interest of Johnny S.
Rabadilla) was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855
square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot
No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil
was duly probated and admitted. The relevant
provision of the said Codicil which is put to issue is:
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot
No. 1392, in the event that the one to whom I have
left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell,
lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee,
mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect
and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of
sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each
month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of
Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic,
until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer,
lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have
respected my command in this my addition (Codicil),
Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately
seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's
heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants,
(sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to
give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until
Maria Marlina shall die. I further command in this my
addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot
No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should
they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot
 WILLS SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS (ARTS. 783-795)
negotiate with others than my near descendants and
my sister.
Pursuant to the same Codicil, the lot in dispute was
transferred to Dr. Jorge Rabanilla (deceased) who
was survived by his wife Rufina and children,Johnny,
Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y
Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint against the
heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions
of subject Codicil. The plaintiff then prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to
reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of
the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT in the
name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the
issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of
the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
On November 15, 1998, an amicable settlement was
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the
obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to
Maria. However, there was no compliance with the
aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a
partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding
to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rights and obligations of
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla were transferred/transmitted to
his heirs upon his death.
HELD: YES. It is a general rule under the law on
succession that successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent and compulsory heirs are called to
succeed by operation of law. The legitimate
children and descendants, in relation to their
legitimate parents, and the widow or widower,
are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his
mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the
latter by operation of law, without need of further
proceedings, and the successional rights were
transmitted to them from the moment of death of the
decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code,
inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his
death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his
death. And since obligations not extinguished by
death also form part of the estate of the decedent;
corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on
the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise
transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot
No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the
condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered
to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the
death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs
succeeded to his rights and title over the said
property, and they also assumed his (decedent's)
obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to
herein private respondent. Such obligation of the
instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of
private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment
or performance of which is now being demanded by
the latter through the institution of the case at bar.
Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action
against petitioner and the trial court erred in
dismissing the complaint below.
4. Seangio vs. Reyes
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
FACTS: During the settlement of the intestate estate
of Segundo Seangio, Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia,
all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. Their
main contention was that Segundo left a holographic
will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of
the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause.
They contend that when it is shown that the
deceased has a will, intestate proceedings should be
suspended. Alberto Seangio and Alfredo moved for
the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on
the ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any
disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus
does not meet the definition of a will under Article
783 of the Civil Code. According to them, the will only
shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the
decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else;
that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor
instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is
preterition which would result to intestacy.
Issue 1: Was there a valid disinheritance? Yes. Article
919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the
disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate
as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty
of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or
her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the
testator of a crime for which the law prescribes
imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation
has been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of
adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the
testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to
make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the
parents or ascendant who disinherit such child or
descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by
the child or descendant
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable
or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the
penalty of civil interdiction.
The holographic will of Segundo explicitly says in
detail the reason why Alfredo was disinherited:
“Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa
naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at
nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon
ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at
anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo
Seangio dahil siya ay nagging lapastangan sa akin at
isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at
mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong
kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin
na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na
ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw. Labis kong
ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin
pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya
asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking
Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at
hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng
malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng
China Banking. At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni
Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga customer ng
Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko
at ng anak ko si Virginia. Dito ako nagalit din kaya
gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at
hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na
si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak
at hindi siya makoha mana.
Issue 2: Were the formal requisites of a holographic
will present?
 WILLS SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS (ARTS. 783-795)
Yes. Segundo’s document, although it may initially
come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by
the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose
mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms
of the instrument, and while it does not make an
affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance
results in the disposition of the property of the
testator Segundo in favor of those who would
succeed in the absence of Alfredo. Holographic wills,
therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not
learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case,
should be construed more liberally than the ones
drawn by an expert, taking into account the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the
instrument and the intention of the testator. In this
regard, the Court is convinced that the document,
even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana,
was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary
act and was executed by him in accordance with law
in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is
probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.
Issue 3: Were the compulsory heirs preterited?
No. With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court
believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line
were not preterited in the will. Segundo’s last
expression to bequeath his estate to all his
compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo.
Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the
exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere
mention of the name of one of the petitioners,
Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute
her as the universal heir. Her name was included
plainly as a witness to the altercation between
Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
5. G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990
ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
ROWENA FAUSTINO-CORONA, respondents.
Rufino B. Javier Law Office for petitioner.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private
respondent.
FACTS: This case is a chapter in an earlier suit
decided by this Court involving the probate of the two
wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in
New York, U. S.A. naming private respondent Rowena
Faustino-Corona executrix. In said decision, the court
upheld the appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special
administrator of Mrs. Vitug’s estate with her (Mrs.
Vitug’s) widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug,
pending probate.
Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority
from the probate court to sell certain shares of stock
and real properties belonging to the estate to cover
allegedly his advances to the estate, plus interests,
which he claimed were personal funds. As found by
the CA the alleged advances were spent for the
payment of estate tax, deficiency estate tax, and
“increment thereto.”
Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the
ground that the same funds withdrawn were conjugal
partnership properties and part of the estate, and
hence, there was allegedly no ground for
reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure
to include the sums in question for inventory and for
“concealment of funds belonging to the estate.”
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive
property having acquired the same through a
survivorship agreement executed with his late wife
and the bank.
The trial courts upheld the validity of such agreement.
On the other hand, the CA held that the survivorship
agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa
which “did not comply with the formalities of a valid
will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code,”
and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation
inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under the
provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: W/N the survivorship agreement between the
spouses Vitug constitutes a donation?
HELD: NO. The conveyance in question is not, first of
all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied in
a will. A will has been defined as “a personal, solemn,
revocable and free act by which a capacitated person
disposes of his property and rights and declares or
complies with duties to take effect after his death.” In
other words, the bequest or device must pertain to
the testator. In this case, the monies subject of
savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of
conjugal funds In the case relied on, Rivera v.
People’s Bank and Trust Co., we rejected claims that
a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one
party’s separate properties in favor of the other, but
simply, their joint holdings.
There is no showing that the funds exclusively
belonged to one party, and hence it must be
presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired
during the existence of the marital relations.
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter
vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to take
effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not
a donation between the spouses because it involved
no conveyance of a spouse’s own properties to the
other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no
modification petition of the conjugal partnership, as
held by the Court of Appeals, by “mere stipulation”
and that it is no “cloak” to circumvent the law on
conjugal property relations. Certainly, the spouses are
not prohibited by law to invest conjugal property, say,
by way of a joint and several bank account, more
commonly denominated in banking parlance as an
“and/or” account. In the case at bar, when the
spouses Vitug opened savings account No. 35342-
038, they merely put what rightfully belonged to them
in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it
in favor of the other, which would have arguably been
sanctionable as a prohibited donation.
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs.
Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latter has
acquired upon her death a vested right over the
amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of the
Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court
ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left
by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error.
Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms no
more part of the estate of the deceased.
6. G.R. No. 12099 October 30, 1997
MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G.
REYES, LYN AGAPE, ESTEBANA GALOLO, and
CELSA AGAPE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIO
VIVARES, respondent.
FACTS: On January 3, 1992, Torcuato Reyes
executed his last will and testament. He bequeathed
 WILLS SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS (ARTS. 783-795)
all his prop to his wife Asuncion (Oning) and his
brother Jose. The will consisted of two pages and was
signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence of three
witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and
Soledad Gaputan. Private respondent Julio A. Vivares
was designated the executor and in his default or
incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares. PR filed a
petition for probate of the will. The recognized natural
children of Torcuato with Estebana Galolo and Celsa
Agape filed an opposition. The court declared that the
will was exec according w/ the forma prescribed by
law. However, it ruled that Asuncion was never
married to the deceased (Hence, dispo made in will is
invalid).
Julio Vivares filed an appeals before the CA with the
allegation that the oppositos failed to present ay
comp. evidence taht Asuncion was legally married to
another person. The CA affirmed the trial court's
decision but with the modification that dispo in favor
of Oning was valid.
ISSUE: whether or not the formalities of the will had
been complied with.
HELD: As a general rule, courts in probate
proceedings are limited to pass only upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated.
Thus, the court merely inquires on its due execution,
whether or not it complies with the formalities
prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of
the testator. It does not determine nor even by
implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the
will's provisions. The intrinsic validity is not
considered since the consideration thereof usually
comes only after the will has been proved and
allowed. There are, however, notable circumstances
wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined as
when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and
the probate of the will may become a useless
ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The intrinsic
validity of a will may be passed upon because
"practical considerations" demanded it as when there
is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions
are of doubtful legality. Parenthetically, the rule on
probate is not inflexible and absolute. Under
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do
and pass upon certain provisions of the will. The
lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic
validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a
result, the declaration of the testator that Asuncion
"Oning" Reyes was his wife did not have to be
scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The
propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of
the devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the
will's intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired
upon by the probate court.
7. G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985
SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA
GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA
JUGO, respondents.
FACTS: Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in
Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament
where he named and appointed petitioner Sofia
Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his
estate. It is clearly stated in the will that the testator
was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by
whom he had two legitimate children, but since 1952,
he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife
and had been living with petitioner as husband and
wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator
Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia, were
married on Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace.
The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his
legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children his entire
estate and the free portion thereof to herein
petitioner. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition
for the probate of the last will and testament of the
deceased, but the legal wife of the testator Rufina
and her children filed an opposition alleging
inter alia that the execution of the will was procured
by undue and improper influence on the part of the
petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the
will, the testator was already very sick and that the
petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage
with the testator, she is wanting integrity and thus
letters testamentary should not be issued to her.
The lower court denied the probate of the will on the
ground that as the testator admitted in his will to
cohabiting with the petitioner because on the face of
the will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is
evident.
The appellate court declared the will to be
valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner
is null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation made by the
testator in favor of herein petitioner was valid.
HELD: No. There is no question from the records
about the fact of a prior existing marriage when
Martin Jugo lived together in an ostensible marital
relationship for 22 years until his death. It is also a
fact that Martin Jugo and Sofia Nepomuceno
contracted a marriage before the Justice of the Peace
of Tarlac. The man was then 51 years old while the
woman was 48. Nepomuceno contends that she acted
in good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was
legally married to the testator. The records do not
sustain that she acted in good faith for 22 years in
the belief that she was legally married to the testator,
since the last will and testament itself expressly
admits indubitably on its face the meretricious
relationship between the testator and petitioner, the
devisee.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil
Code is against the making of a donation between
persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It
is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot
give even assuming that the recipient may receive.
The very wordings of the will invalidate the legacy
because the testator admitted he was disposing the
properties to a person with whom he had been living
in
concubinage.
8. G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,1 petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA
MARLENA2 COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS, respondents.
FACTS: A certain Aleja Belleza died but he instituted
in his will Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee to a 511,
855 hectare land. A condition was however imposed
to the effect that:
1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;
2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria
Belleza, sister of Aleja, during the lifetime of said
Maria Belleza;
3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria
Belleza, the near descendants, shall continue
delivering the fruits to Maria Belleza;
4. that the said land may only be encumbered,
mortgaged, or sold only to a relative of Belleza.
In 1983, Dr. Rabadilla died. He was survived by
Johnny Rabadilla.
 WILLS SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS (ARTS. 783-795)
In 1989, Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in order
to compel Johnny to reconvey the said land to the
estate of Aleja Belleza because it is alleged that
Johnny failed to comply with the terms of the will;
that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits;
and that the the land was mortgaged to the Philippine
National Bank, which is a violation of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term “near
descendants” in the will of Aleja pertains to the near
descendants of Aleja and not to the near descendants
of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near
descendants at the time of his death, no can
substitute Dr. Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver
the fruits of the devised land.
ISSUE: Whether or not Johnny Rabadilla is not
obliged to comply with the terms of the Will left by
Aleja Belleza.
HELD: No. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is
bereft of merit. The “near descendants” being
referred to in the will are the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla.
Ownership over the devised property was already
transferred to Dr. Rabadilla when Aleja died. Hence,
when Dr. Rabadilla himself died, ownership over the
same property was transmitted to Johnny Rabadilla
by virtue of succession.
Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance
includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably,
whatever rights Dr. Rabadilla had by virtue of the
Will were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time
of his death. And since obligations not extinguished
by death also form part of the estate of the decedent;
corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Will on the
deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise
transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. It
is clear therefore, that Johnny should have continued
complying with the terms of the Will. His failure to do
so shall give rise to an obligation for him to reconvey
the property to the estate of Aleja.
. HELD:
9. LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA,
plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial
Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA
NEPOMUCENO,
Facts:
On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a
wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will
in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and
bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta
Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal
properties, giving the other half to his brother Don
Fausto Villaflor.
The 12th clause of the will provided, however,
that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be deemed
annulled from the moment he bore any child with
Doña Fausta Nepomuceno.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922,
without begetting any child with his wife Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno. The latter, already a widow, thereupon
instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the Court of
First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her
husband's estate and in that proceeding, she was
appointed judicial administratrix. In due course of
administration, she submitted a project of partition,
now Exhibit "E". In the order of November 24, 1924,
now exhibit "C", the probate court approved the
project of partition and declared the proceeding
closed. As the project of partition, Exhibit "E", now
shows Doña Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue
thereof the ownership and possession of a
considerable amount of real and personal estate. By
virtue also of the said project of partition, she
received the use and possession of all the real and
personal properties mentioned and referred to in
Clause 7th of the will. The order approving the
project of partition (Exh. "C"), however, expressly
provided that approval thereof was "sin perjuicio de lo
dispuesto en la clausula 8.o del testamento de Nicolas
Villaflor." .
On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died
without having contracted a second marriage, and
without having begotten any child with the deceased
Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled in
Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court,
with the defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly
appointed and qualified judicial administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is
admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor mentioned
by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta
Leonor Villaflor".
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present
action against the administrator of the estate of the
widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958,
contending that upon the widow's death, said plaintiff
became vested with the ownership of the real and
personal properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas
Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight
(8th) clause.
Issue:
Whether or not the grandniece is entitled to the
ownership of the properties upon the death of Dona
Faustina.
YES, the grandniece can get the property,
despite the fact that the widow never remarried. She
is the reversionary legatee of Don Nicolas. It has been
clearly indicated in the will that what had been
granted to the widow were only the “use and
possession” of the properties “while living,” the clear
intent of the testator being only to grant her a life
interest or usufructuary interest -an interest which
could have ceased even during her lifetime had she
remarried
. Art. 791 of the Civil Code requires that each
word of the will be given some effect.Further as ruled
in In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil., 233, that the
intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly
expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of
interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial,
relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be
settled in accordance therewith, following the plain
and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it
clearly appears that his intention was otherwise.
On the other hand, it would have been different
had OWNERSHIP over the properties been given to
the widow. In such a case, since there was no
remarriage, the grandniece cannot inherit.
10. G.R. No. L-14074 November 7, 1918
 WILLS SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS (ARTS. 783-795)

In the matter of the probation of the will of death of the testator, without the testator having left
Jose Riosa. a will that conforms to the new requirements.

MARCELINO CASAS, applicant-appellant, Issue: WON the will is valid.

Vicente de Vera for petitioner-appellant. RULING: YES. The validity of the execution of a will
must be tested by the statutes in force at the time of
Facts: its execution and statutes subsequently enacted have
no retrospective effect. All statutes are to be
construed as having only a prospective operation
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will
unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to
made in the month of January, 1908, in which he
give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared
disposed of an estate valued at more than P35,000.
or is necessarily implied from the language used. In
The will was duly executed in accordance with the law
every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved
then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil
against the retrospective effect. The language of Act
Procedure. The will was not executed in accordance
Mo. 2645 gives no indication of retrospective effect.
with Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section 618,
Such, likewise, has been the uniform tendency of the
prescribing certain additional formalities for the
SC on cases having special application to
signing and attestation of wills, in force on and after
testamentary succession. Our statute announces a
July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in writing,
positive rule for the transferee of property which must
signed by the testator, and attested and subscribed
by three credible witnesses in the presence of the be complied with as a completed act at the time of
the execution, so far as the act of the testator is
testator and of each other; but was not signed by the
testator and the witnesses on the left margin of each concerned, as to all testaments made subsequent to
the enactment of Act No. 2645, but is not effective as
and every page, nor did the attestation state these
to testaments made antecedent to that date. The
facts. The new law, therefore, went into effect after
court considered three (3) views in addressing the
the making of the will and before the death of the
issue:
testator, without the testator having left a will that
1.) validity of will are tested by the laws in force at
conforms to the new requirements.
the time of the death of the testator (considered the
right of one to make a will as an inchoate right). This
Issue: view was rejected by the court. “The act of
bequeathing or devising is something more than
Whether or not the law existing on the date of inchoate or ambulatory. In reality, it becomes a
execution of a will or the law existing at the death of completed act when the will is executed and attested
the testator controls. according to the law, although it does not take effect
on the property until a future time.
Held: 2.) validity of wills must be tested by statutes in force
at time of execution. This view is the one adopted by
the SC.
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that
3.) statutes relating to the execution of wills, when
the validity of the execution of a will must be tested
they increase the necessary formalities, should be
by the statutes in force at the time of its execution
construed so as not to impair the validity of a will
and that statutes subsequently enacted have no
already made and, when they lessen the formalities
retrospective effect. Retrospective laws generally if
required, should be construed so as to aid wills
not universally work injustice, and ought to be so
defectively executed according to the law in force at
construed only when the mandate of the legislature is
the time of their making.
imperative. When a testator makes a will, formally
executed according to the requirements of the law
existing at the time of its execution, it would unjustly
disappoint his lawful right of disposition to apply to it The will in question is admittedly not executed and
a rule subsequently enacted, though before his death. attested as provided by the Code of Civil Procedure as
amended. Nevertheless, it is proper to observe that
the general principle in the law of wills inserts itself
While it is true that every one is presumed to know
even within the provisions of said section 634. Our
the law, the maxim in fact is inapplicable to such a
statute announces a positive rule for the transference
case; for he would have an equal right to presume
of property which must be complied with as
that no new law would affect his past act, and rest
completed act at the time of the execution, so far as
satisfied in security on that presumption. . . . It is
the act of the testator is concerned, as to all
true, that every will is ambulatory until the death of
testaments made subsequent to the enactment of Act
the testator, and the disposition made by it does not
No. 2645, but is not effective as to testaments made
actually take effect until then. General words apply to
antecedent to that date.
the property of which the testator dies possessed,
and he retains the power of revocation as long as he
lives. The act of bequeathing or devising, however, To answer the question with which we began this
takes place when the will is executed, though to go decision, we adopt as our own the second rule,
into effect at a future time. particularly as established by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa is valid.
11. In re will of riosa
G.R. No. L-14074 November 7, 1918

FACTS: Jose Riosa made a will in January 1908,

disposing of his entire estate. The will was executed 12. G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954
according to the law in force at that time, complying
with all the requisites then required. He died April 17, In re: Will and Testament of the deceased
1917. However, between the execution of the will and REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
his death, the law on formalities on execution of wills SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL.,
was amended by Act No. 2645 (July 1, 1916; it added petitioners-appellees,
formalitites required such as signatures on each page vs.
of the will). The new law, therefore, therefore, went MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL.,
into effect after the making of the will and before the
 WILLS SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS (ARTS. 783-795)
Facts:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia
executed a document purporting to be his Last Will
andTestament. Resident of the City of Cebu, he died
on January 14, 1943. He left properties estimated
atP8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres
Enriquez, one of the legatees, filed a petition for
itsprobate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the
estateof the deceased if he left no will, filed
opposition.During the hearing, it was established that
Father Sancho wrote out the will in longhand in
Spanishwhich the testator spoke and understood, and
that he signed on the left hand margin of the front
pageof each of the three folios or sheets of which the
document is composed, and numbered the same
withArabic numerals, and that he signed his name at
the end of his writing at the last page. All this was
donein the presence of the three attesting witnesses
after telling that it was his last will. The said
threewitnesses signed their names on the last page
after the attestation clause in his presence and in
thepresence of each other.The trial court found and
declared the will to be a holographic will. Although at
the time it was executedand at the time of the
testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted
by law, still, because at thetime of the hearing and
when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code
was already in force, whichCode permitted the
execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view,
and to carry out the intention of the testator which
according to the trial court is the controlling factor
and may override any defect inform, said trial court
by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate
the will as the Last Will andTestament of Father
Sancho Abadia. The oppositors appealed from that
decision, and because onlyquestions of law are
involved in the appeal, the case was certified to the
Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not legislature can validate a void
will?
Ruling:
No. The validity of a will as to its form depends
upon the observance of the law in force at the time it
is made." The above provision is but an expression or
statement of the weight of authority to the affect that
the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law
enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the
time the supposed will is presented in court for
probate or when the petition is decided by the court
but at the time the instrument was executed. One
reason in support of the rule is that although the will
operates upon and after the death of the testator, the
wishes of the testator about the disposition of his
estate among his heirs and among the legatees is
given solemn expression at the time the will is
executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then
becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid
down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa,
39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be
followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of
the testator should be the ruling and controlling factor
and that all adequate remedies and interpretations
should be resorted to in order to carry out said
intention, and that when statutes passed after the
execution of the will and after the death of the
testator lessen the formalities required by law for the
execution of wills, said subsequent statutes should be
applied so as to validate wills defectively executed
according to the law in force at the time of execution.
However, we should not forget that from the day of
the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title
of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a
vested right, protected under the due process clause
of the constitution against a subsequent change in
the statute adding new legal requirements of
execution of wills which would invalidate such a will.
By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will
which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the
legal requirements at the time of its execution then
upon his death he should be regarded and declared
as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit
by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with
more liberal requirements or which dispenses with
such requirements as to execution should be allowed
to validate a defective will and thereby divest the
heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate
succession. The general rule is that the Legislature
can not validate void wills.
13. G.R. No. L-5064 February 27, 1953
BIENVENIDO A. IBARLE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ESPERANZA M. PO, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
1st. — That Leonard j. Winstanley and Catalina
Navarro were husband and wife, the former having
died on June 6, 1946 leaving heir the surviving
spouse and some minor children;
2nd. — hat upon the death of L.J. Winstanley, he left
a parcel of land described under Transfer Certificate
of title No. 2391 of the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Cebu;
3rd. — That the above mentioned property was a
conjugal property;
4th. — That on April 15, 1946, the surviving spouse
Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire
parcel of land to the spouses Maria Canoy, alleging
among other things, that she needed money for the
support of her children;
5th. — That on May 24, 1947, the spouses Maria
Canoy and Roberto Canoy sold the same parcel of
land to the plaintiff in this case named Bienvenido A.
Ebarle;
6th. — That the two deeds of sale referred to above
were not registered and have never been registered
up to the date;
7th. — That on January 17, 1948 surviving spouse
Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley, after her
appointment as guardian of her children by this court
(Special proceeding no. 212-R) sold one-half of the
land mentioned above to Esperanza M. Po, defendant
in the instant case, which portion belongs to the
children of the above named spouses.
Issue:
Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful
claim to the property?
Ruling:
 WILLS SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS (ARTS. 783-795)
Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The
rights to the succession of a person are transmitted
from the moment of his death." in a slightly different
language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil
Code as article 777.
Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil
Code of Spain, says:
The moment of death is the determining factor
when the heirs acquire a definite right to the
inheritance, whether such right be pure or contingent.
It is immaterial whether a short or long period of time
lapses between the death of the predecessor and the
entry into possession of the property of the
inheritance because the right is always deemed to be
retroactive from the moment of death. (5 Manresa,
317.)
The above provision and comment make it clear
that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold
the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it
already belonged to the seller's children. No formal or
judicial declaration being needed to confirm the
children's title, it follows that the first sale was null
and void in so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant
having been made by authority of the competent
court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact
that it has not been recorded is of no consequence. If
registration were necessary, still the non-registration
would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to no
other cause than his own opposition.
14. QUIRICO L. SATURNINO, petitioner, vs.
FELIZA Luz PAULINO, MAXIMO DALEJA, JUANA
LUCAS, NEMESIO LUCAS, DoNATA GUILLERMO,
and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Upon the death of Jaime Luz Paulino, on February
10, 1937, he was survived by his children—Timoteo
Esteban, Macario and Feliza, all surnamed Luz
Paulinoand a grandson-Quirico L. Saturnino, son of
his deceased daughter Antonia Luz Paulino. Among
the properties left by Jaime Luz Paulino is a house
and lot, situated in Barrio No. 13, municipality
of Laoag, province of Ilocos Norte, and more
particularly known as Lot No. 11366 of the
Laoag Cadastre. On October 22, 1945, his daughter
Feliza Luz Paulino executed a deed of absolute sale of
said property in favor of the spouses Maximo Daleja
and Juana Lucas and Nemesio Lucas and Donata
Guillermo, for the aggregate sum of P1,200.00.
As said sale was made without his knowledge or
consent, Quirico L. Saturnino offered verbally and in
writing to the vendees to return then and there to
them, in actual cash, 4/5 of the purchase price of said
property, but defendants, for themselves and in
representation of their respective husbands who were
absent, refused acceptance thereof.
For this reason, Quirico L. Saturnino instituted this
action against the defendants for delivery to
the defendant vendees by way of
reimbursement, together with the amount of
P50 Philippine currency, to cover the expenses
incurred in the preparation of the deed of sale,
and stating that he was ready and willing to
deposit other additional sums that the court
may deem just and necessary. On these
averments plaintiff prayed in the complaint that
judgment be rendered in his favor and, among
others, declare the sale made by defendant Feliza Luz
Paulino to her her co-defendants illegal with respect
to one-fifth of the lot and to declare said one-fifth
undivided share of the plaintiff.
On November 14, 1945, defendants answered the
complaint with counterclaim, wherein it is alleged,
among other things, that all their inheritance from the
deceased Jaime Luz Paulino had been divided in
accordance with Section 596 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and the last verbal wish of the decedent
before his death, giving the residential lot in question
together with the house of strong materials
constructed thereon to Feliza Luz Paulino as her
exclusive and only share, and leaving her brothers,
Timoteo, Esteban and Macario, and their nephew
Quirico Saturnino to divide all the agricultural lands
among themselves, which division was duly effected.
Meanwhile, or on November 19, 1945, Quirino L.
Saturnino had filed a petition for the probate of the
will and testament of Jaime Luz Paulino.
On or about March 10, 1950, respondents herein filed
a supplemental answer alleging that plaintiff—
petitioner herein—has no legal capacity to sue,
because the property in litigation therein is part of the
estate which is the subject matter of the probate
proceedings, in which an administrator was appointed
but no adjudication had, as yet, been made.
The CFI rendered decision in favor of the petitioner
declaring- the sale made by the defendant Feliza Luz
Paulino to her co-defendants null and void with
respect to one-fifth (1/5) of the lot in question and
the plaintiff is declared owner thereof as his undivided
share.
On appeal from this decision, the defendants
contended that the lower court had erred in declaring
the sale of the lot in question invalid with respect to
one-fifth share of the appellee, among others.
According to the Court of Appeals, although the will of
the testator has been allowed, no settlement of
accounts has been effected, no partition of the
properties left by the decedent has been made, and
the heirs have not legally received or been
adjudicated or assigned any particular piece of
the mass of their inheritance. This being the
case, and pending such partition, adjudication
or assignment to the heirs of the residue of the
estate of the testator Jaime Luz Paulino, none
of his heirs can properly allege or claim to have
inherited any portion of said residue, if there
be any, because his or her right of inheritance
remains to be in the nature of hope.
Consequently, neither Feliza Luz Paulino, nor any of
her coheirs, can legally represent the estate of the
decedent, or dispose as his or hers of the property
involved in this case.
Hence, this instant petition for review.
Issue: WON the right of inheritance of herein
petitioner is in the nature of mere hope.
Held:
 WILLS SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS (ARTS. 783-795)
No. Pending "partition, adjudication or assignment to
the heirs" of a deceased estator, their "right of
inheritance" is not merely" in the nature of hope,"
for—pursuant to Article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain,
which was in force in the Philippines at the time of
the death of Jaime Luz Paulino—"the rights to the
succession of a person are transmitted from the
moment of his death" and the heirs—pursuant to
Article 661 of the same Code—"succeed to the
deceased in all his rights and obligations by the mere
fact of his death." In other words, the person
concerned is an heir and he may exercise his rights as
such, from the very moment of the death of the
decedent. One of those rights is that of redemption
under Article 1067 of the aforesaid code (Article 1088
of the Civil Code of the Philippines).
15. IN RE ESTATE OF JOHNSON
FACTS: Johnson is a native of Sweden but a citizen of
America (by virtue of naturalization). He died in the
city of Manila leaving a will. This document is a
Holographic instrument, written in the testators own
handwriting and signed by himself and two witnesses
(he followed the formalities set by the state of Illinois
w/c only requires 2 witnesses) only instead of three
as required by the Code of Civil Procedure.
The will was presented in CFI Manila for the probate
of this will, on the ground that the will was duly
executed accordance with the formalities of that state
hence could properly be probated in the Philippines
pursuant to Section 636 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which states: A will made within the
Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another
state or country, which is executed in accordance
with the law of the state or country of which he is a
citizen or subject, and which might be proved and
allowed by the law of his own state or country, may
be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine
Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed
according to the laws ofthese Islands..
ISSUE: WON a will executed in conformity with the
statute of US is extrinsically valid in the Philippines?
RULING: The authority expressed in section 636 of
the Code of Civil Procedure for the probate of the will
of a citizen of another state or country is applicable to
the case of a citizen of a State of the American Union
domiciled in the Philippine Islands. Thus, the will
made by Johnson can be validly admitted to probate
proceedings because even if it did not conform with
the laws of the Phils., it conform with the laws of his
nationality.
16. SULPICIA JIMENEZ VS FERNANDEZ
Fermin Jimenez was the owner of a 2, 932 sq land, he
had 2 children named carlos and Fortonato. Fortunato
predeceased Ferminle aving behind a daughter,
Sulpicia. After the death of Fermin Jimenez, the entire
parcel of land was registered under Act 496 in the
name of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle
and niece) in equal shares pro-indiviso.
Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and his
illegitimate daughter, Melecia Cayabyab, also known
as Melecia Jimenez, took possession of the eastern
portion of the property consisting of 436 square
meters.
Melecia Jimenez sold said 436 square meter-portion
of the property to Edilberto Cagampan and defendant
Teodora Grado executed a contract entitled
"Exchange of R eal Properties" whereby the former
transferred said 436 square meter-portion to the
latter, who has been in occupation since.
On the other hand, Sulpicia Jimenez executed an
affidavit adjudicating unto herself the other half of the
property appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon
manifestation that she is the only heir of her
deceased uncle. A TCT was then issued in petitioner's
name alone over the entire 2,932 square meter
property.
Sulpicia Jimenez, joined by her husband, instituted
the present action for the recovery of the eastern
portion of the property consisting of 436 square
meters occupied by de fendant Teodora Grado and
her son.
ISSUES:
1. WON Melecia Cayabyab had any right over the
eastern part of the property she took possession of
and later sold?
No. Melecia Cayabyab/ Melecia jimenez is
not the daughter of Carlos Jimenez and therefore,
had no right over the property in question.
Respondents fai led to present concrete evidence to
prove that Melecia Cayabyab was really the d aughter
of Carlos Jimenez.
Assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was the
illegitimate daughter of Carlos Jimenez there can be
no question that Melecia Cayabyab had no right to
succeed to the estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not
have validly acquired, nor legally transferred to
Edilberto Cagampan that portion of the property
subject of this petition.
Melecia Cayabcab could not even be
considered an acknowledged natural child under Civil
Code 1889 (w/c is in force when Carlos Jimenez Died)
because Carlos Jimenez was then legally married to
Susana Abalos and theref re not qualified to marry
Maria Cayabyab and consequently Melecia Cayabyab
was an illegitimate spurious child and not entitled to
any successional rights in so far as the estate of
Carlos Jimenez was concerned. To be an heir under
the rules of Civil Code of 1889, a child must be
either a child legitimate, legitimated, or
adopted, or else an acknowledged natural child
— for illegitimate not natural are disqualified to
inherit.
17. Testate of Amos Bellis vs. Edward A. Bellis,
et al
 WILLS SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS (ARTS. 783-795)
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and
of the United States. He had five legitimate children
with his first wife (whom he divorced), three
legitimate children with his second wife (who survived
him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.
6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2)
wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and
properties to his seven surviving children. The
appellants filed their oppositions to the project of
partition claiming that they have been deprived of
their legitimes to which they were entitled according
to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the
deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed
by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two
separate wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the
case in the determination of the illegitimate children’s
successional rights
RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in view of those matters that
Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states
said national law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and
domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will
should be governed by his national law. Since Texas
law does not require legitimes, then his will, which
deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is
valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children
are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law,
which is the national law of the deceased. So, even
if the Philippine lae provides that illegitimate
children cannot be deprived of their legitimate,
if the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration allows
deprivation of any inheritance of illegitimate
children then that Will is still INTRINSICALLY
VALID because the will is measured not by
Philippine law but by the national law of
decedent.
18. CAYETANO VS LEONIDAS, G.R. No. L-54919
May 30, 1984
FACTS: Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her
father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her
sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia,
Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the
surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only
compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto himself the
ownership of the entire estate of the deceased
Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition
for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion
Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United
States and for her appointment as administratrix of
the estate of the deceased testatrix. Nenita alleged
that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time
of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633
Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. That
during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will
and testament according to the laws of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as
executor; that after the testatrix death, her last will
and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and
registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of
Philadelphia, U.S.A.
An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by
herein petitioner Hermogenes Campos alleging among
other things, that he has every reason to believe that
the will in question is a forgery and that the intrinsic
provisions of the will are null and void; and that even
if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are
invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they
would work injustice and injury to him. RTC ruled that
the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C.
Campos be admitted to and allowed probate in the
Philippines.
WHETHER: Whether or not Philippine law
governs in determining the intrinsic validity of
the will of Adoracion C. Campos?
RULE: No. The national law of the decedent must
apply. It is sufficiently established that Adoracion was,
at the time of her death, an American citizen and a
permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039
of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2). However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and regardless of
the country wherein said property may be found.
Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law
of the nation of the decedent.
The law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the
law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law
of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the
Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and
that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix
to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that
such law should not apply because it would be
contrary to the sound and established public policy
and would run counter to the specific provisions of
Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity
of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article
16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of
the decedent must apply.
19. MICIANO VS. BRIMO
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
FACTS:
 WILLS SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS (ARTS. 783-795)
The partition of the estate left by the deceased
Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case. The
judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of
partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved
it. The opposition is based on the fact that the
partition in question puts into effect the provisions of
Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance
with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which
reason they are void as being in violation or article 10
of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides
the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary
successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity
of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession
is in question, whatever may be the nature
of the property or the country in which it
may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that
said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance
with the Turkish laws, in as much as he did not
present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws
are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on
such laws, they are presumed to be the same as
those of the Philippines.
Part of his will, nonetheless, states: “it is my wish that
the distribution of my property and everything in
connection with this, my will, be made and disposed
of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to
respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel
beforehand whatever disposition found in this will
favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply
with this request.”
ISSUE: What law governs the succession of the
estate of Brimo?
RULE: The national law of the decedent governs the
succession of the estate of Brimo.
The approval of the scheme of partition in this respect
was not erroneous. The institution of legatees in this
will is conditional, and the condition is that the
instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to
distribute his property, not in accordance with the
laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines. However, said condition is
contrary to law because it expressly ignores the
testator's national law when, according to article 10 of
the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the
testator is the one to govern his testamentary
dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions
above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and
consequently valid and effective even as to the herein
oppositor.
20. TESTATE ESTATE OF CHRISTENSEN
January 31, 1963
FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen was born in New York but he
migrated to California where he resided for 9 years.
In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became
a domiciliary until the time of his death. In his will, he
instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria
Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy
sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia.
Counsel for the acknowledged natural daughter Helen
claims that under Article 16, par. 2 of the Civil
Code, California law should be should be applied; that
under California law, the matter is referred back to
the law of the domicile. On the other hand, the
counsel for Maria Lucy contends that the national law
of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not
being entitled to anything under California law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the national law of the
deceased should be applied in determining the
successional rights on his heirs?
HELD:
Yes, the national law of the decedent governs. The
Supreme Court grants more successional rights to
Helen. It said in effect that there are two rules
in California on the matter: the internal law
which applies to California’s domiciled in California,
and the conflict rule for Californian’s domiciled out of
California. Christensen, being domiciled in the
Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed.
For the determination of the successional rights under
Philippine Law, the case was remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary
dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country where said
property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar
requires the determination of the meaning of the
term "national law"is used therein.
The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil
Code refers to no other than the private law of the
State of California.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is
the internal law of California. But as above explained
the laws of California have prescribed two sets of
laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and
another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
Reason demands that We should enforce the
California internal law prescribed for its citizens
residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules
for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce
the law of California as in comity we are bound to go,
as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we
must enforce the law of California in accordance with
the express mandate thereof and as above explained,
i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and
its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
 WILLS SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS (ARTS. 783-795)
The conflict of laws rule in California, Article
946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case,
when a decedent is not domiciled in California,
to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the
case at bar. The Philippine court must apply its own
law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state
of the decedent, if the question has to be decided,
especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the
deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is
the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of
his will depriving his acknowledged natural
child, the appellant, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946
of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law
of California.
21. PCIB vs ESCOLIN 56 S 266
In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American
citizen from Texas made a will. In May 1957, while
she was domiciled here in the Philippines she died.
In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her
husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie however
also stated in her will that should her husband later
die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother
and sister.
In December 1962, Charles died who was also
domiciled in the Philippines. Atty. Leon Gellada, the
lawyer of Charles filed a motion before the probate
court (there was an ongoing probate on the will of
Linnie) so that a certain Avelina Magno may be
appointed as the administratrix of the estate. Magno
was the trusted employee of the Hodges when they
were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles
himself left a will but the same was in an iron trunk in
Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he’d like to
have Magno appointed as administratrix. Judge
Venicio Escolin approved the motion.
Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition
for probate was filed for the said will. Since said will
basically covers the same estate, Magno, as
admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said
petition. Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was
granted. Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator.
But Magno refused to turn over the estate.
Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted
Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s brother
and sister and since that is her will, the same must be
respected. Magno also contended that Linnie was a
Texan at the time of her death (an alien testator);
that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional
rights are governed by Linnie’s national law; that
under Texas law, Linnie’s will shall be respected
regardless of the presence of legitimes (Charles’ share
in the estate).
PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter
back to Philippine laws because Linnie was domiciled
outside Texas at the time of her death (applying
the renvoidoctrine).
ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply?
HELD: The Supreme Court remanded the case back
to the lower court. Both parties failed to adduce proof
as to the law of Texas. The Supreme Court held that
for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question
of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be
presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court
however emphasized that Texas law at the time of
Linnie’s death is the law applicable (and not said law
at any other time).
The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized
to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States
of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as
facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.)
Here the requirements of the law were not met.
There was no showing that the book from which an
extract was taken was printed or published under the
authority of the State of West Virginia. Nor was the
extract from the law attested by the certificate of the
officer having charge of the original, under the seal of
the State of West Virginia. No evidence was
introduced to show that the extract from the laws of
West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will
was executed. No evidence of the nature thus
suggested by the Court may be found in the records
of the cases at bar.
22. G.R. No. 119064 August 22, 2000
NENG "KAGUI KADIGUIA" MALANG, petitioner,
vs. HON. COROCOYMOSON, Presiding Judge of
5th Shari'a District Court, Cotabato City, HADJI
MOHAMMAD ULYSSIS MALANG, HADJI ISMAEL
MALINDATUMALANG, FATIMA MALANG,
DATULNA MALANG, LAWANBAI
MALANG,JUBAIDA KADO MALANG, NAYO OMAL
MALANG and MABAY GANAPMALANG,
respondents.
On December 18, 1993, while he was living with
petitioner in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula died without
leaving a will. On January 21, 1994, petitioner filed
with the Shari’a District Court in Cotabato City a
petition for the settlement of his estate with a prayer
that letters of administration be issued in the name
of her niece, Tarhata Lauban. Petitioner claimed in
that petition that she was the wife of Hadji Abdula;
that his other legal heirs are his three children named
Teng Abdula, Keto Abdula and Kueng Malang, and
that he left seven (7)parcels of land, five (5) of which
are titled in Hadji Abdula’s name "married to Neng P.
Malang and a pick-up jeepney. On February 7, 1994,
the Shari’a District Court ordered the publication of
the petition. After such publication on March 16,
1994, Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang ("Hadji
Mohammad",for brevity), the eldest son of Hadji
Abdula, filed his opposition to the petition He alleged
among other matters that his father’s surviving heirs
are as follows: (a) Jubaida Malang, surviving spouse;
(b) Nayo Malang, surviving spouse; (c) Mabay
Malang, surviving spouse; (d) petitioner Neng Malang,
surviving spouse; (e) oppositor Hadji Mohammad
Ulyssis Malang who is also known as "Teng Abdula,"
son; (f) Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang, also known
as "Keto Abdula," son, (g) Fatima Malang, also known
as "Kueng Malang, "daughter; (h) Datulna Malang,
son, and (i) Lawanbai Malang, daughter. Oppositor
Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang alleged that since he
and his brother, Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang, had
helped their father in his business, then they were
more competent to be administrators of his estate.
ISSUE:
What law governs the succesional rights of Hadji
Abdul?
DECISION:
Hadji Abdula died intestate on December 16,
1993. Thus, it is the Muslim Code which should
 WILLS SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS (ARTS. 783-795)
determine the identification of the heirs in the order
of intestate succession and the respective shares of
the heirs.
Meanwhile, the status and capacity to succeed
on the part of the individual parties who entered into
each and every marriage ceremony will depend upon
the law in force at the time of the performance of the
marriage rite.
The status and capacity to succeed of the
children will depend upon the law in force at the time
of conception or birth of the child. If the child was
conceived or born during the period covered by the
governance of the Civil Code, the Civil Code
provisions on the determination of the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the child would appear to be in
point. Thus, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty
days following the celebration of the marriage, and
before three hundred days following its dissolution or
the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to
be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be
admitted other than that of the physical impossibility
of the husbands having access to his wife within the
first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the
husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband
and wife were living separately,
in such a way that access was
not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the
husband.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate,
although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.
If the child was conceived or born during the
period covered by the governance of the Muslim
Code, i.e., from February 4, 1977 up to the death of
Hadji Abdula on December 18, 1993, the Muslim Code
determines the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the
child. Under the Muslim Code:
Art. 58. Legitimacy, how established. --- Legitimacy of
filiation is established by the evidence of valid
marriage between the father and the mother at the
time of the conception of the child.
Art. 59. Legitimate children. ---
(1) Children conceived in lawful wedlock
shall be presumed to be
legitimate. Whoever claims illegitimacy
of or impugns such filiation must prove
his allegation.
(2) Children born after six months
following the consummation of
marriage or within two years after the
dissolution of the marriage shall be
presumed to be legitimate. Against this
presumption no evidence shall be
admitted other than that of physical
impossibility of access between the
parents at or about the time of the
conception of the child.
Art. 60. Children of subsequent marriage. --- Should
the marriage be dissolved and the wife contracts
another marriage after the expiration of her idda, the
child born within six months from the dissolution of
the prior marriage shall be presumed to have been
conceived during the former marriage, and if born
thereafter, during the latter.
Art. 61. Pregnancy after dissolution. --- If, after the
dissolution of marriage, the wife believes that she is
pregnant by her former husband, she shall, within
thirty days from the time she became aware of her
pregnancy, notify the former husband or his heirs of
that fact. The husband or his heirs may ask the court
to take measures to prevent a simulation of birth.
Upon determination of status and capacity to
succeed based on the foregoing provisions, the
provisions on legal succession in the Muslim Code will
apply. Under Article 110 of the said Code, the sharers
to an inheritance include:
(a) The husband, the wife;
(b) The father, the mother, the
grandfather, the grandmother;
(c) The daughter and the sons daughter in
the direct line;
(d) The full sister, the consanguine sister,
the uterine sister and the uterine
brother.
When the wife survives with a legitimate child or
a child of the decedents son, she is entitled to one-
eighth of the hereditary estate; in the absence of
such descendants, she shall inherit one-fourth of the
estate. The respective shares of the other sharers, as
set out in Article 110 abovecited, are provided for in
Articles 113 to 122 of P.D. 1083.
23. LLORENTE vs. CA
GR 124371 Nov. 23,2000
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were
married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an
enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he
left for the US where through naturalization, he
became a US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife,
he discovered that she was living with his brother and
a child was born. The child was registered as
legitimate but the name of the father was left blank.
Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on
became final. He married Alicia and they lived
together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made
his last will and testament stating that all his
properties will be given to his second marriage. He
filed a petition of probate that made or appointed
Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before
the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died.
Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s
estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the
motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified the
judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-
owner of whatever properties, she and the deceased,
may have acquired during their 25 years of
cohabitation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Law shall apply.
 WILLS SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS (ARTS. 783-795)
RULING:
Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen
when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation
when he married Alicia and executed his will. As
stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided that they are validly
required in their National Law. Thus the divorce
obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that
governs him is not Philippine Law but his National
Law since the divorce was contracted after he
became an American citizen. Furthermore, his
National Law allowed divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo
Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession,
both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may
be found."
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must
be alleged and proved.
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded,
the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the
fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred
back" to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this
case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law
of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same
breath it made the categorical, albeit equally
unproven statement that "American law follows the
‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when
determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.
First, there is no such thing as one American
law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the
Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American
law. There is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States. Each
State of the union has its own law applicable to its
citizens and in force only within the State. It can
therefore refer to no other than the law of the State
of which the decedent was a resident. Second, there
is no showing that the application of
the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New
York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically
invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice,
who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour.
The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and
her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It
declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever
property she and Lorenzo acquired during their
cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the
complete disregard of the will, already probated as
duly executed in accordance with the formalities of
Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the
factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts,
wills, and other public instruments shall be governed
by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the
diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in
their execution."
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property
to his second wife and children by her is glaringly
shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to
frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not
covered by our laws on "family rights and duties,
status, condition and legal capacity."
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall
inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign
law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the
will was executed in accordance with the formalities
required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In
fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that
whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not
intend to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the
amount of successional rights to the decedent's
national law.
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass
upon the other issues raised.
24. DOROTHEO VS. CA
320 SCRA 12 Dec. 8, 1999
Aniceta Reyes died in 1969 without her estate being
settled. Thereafter, her husband Alejandro also died.
In 1977, Lourdes Dorotheo filed a special proceeding
for the probate of Alejandro’s last will and testament.
The children of spouses filed their opposition. The
RTC ruled that Lourdes being not the wife of
Alejandro the will is intrinsically void; the oppositors
are the only heir entitled to the estate. Lourdes filed a
Motion for Consideration arguing that she
is entitled to some compensation since she took care
of Alejandro prior to his death although they were not
legally married to each other. This was denied by the
trial court. The CA dismissed her appeal for her failure
to wile the same within the extended period.
ISSUE: May a last will and testament admitted to
probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that
has become final and executor still be given effect?
 WILLS SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS (ARTS. 783-795)

RULING: NO.

A final and executor decision or order can no longer

be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it
may be.

The Supreme Court ruled that the will of Alejandro

was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions
thereof are void. Alejandro gave all the property to
the concubine. Such is invalid because one cannot
dispose what he does not own. In this case, the
whole property is the conjugal property of Alejandro
and Aniceta. Such has become final and executor.
The only instance where a party interested in probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is
when he is left out by reason
of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence
with circumstances do not concur herein.

*It should be noted that probate proceedings deals

generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought
to be probated, particularly on three aspects:
ð whether the will submitted is
indeed, the decedent’s last will and
testament;
ð compliance with the prescribed
formalities for the execution of wills;
ð the testamentary capacity of the
testator;
ð and the due execution of the last
will and testament.

Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a

determination of whether the testator was of sound
and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that
he had freely executed the will and was not acting
under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and
that the will is genuine and not a forgery,that he was
of the proper testamentary age and that he is a
person not expressly prohibited by law from making a
will.

The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions

regarding the same may still be raised even after the
will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not
necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will
and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the
will was validly executed, if the testator provides for
dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs
of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to
the laws on succession,the unlawful
provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given
effect.