The Debasement of The Dollar of The Middle Ages

Economic History Association
The Debasement of the "Dollar of the Middle Ages"

Author(s): Costas Kaplanis
Source: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Sep., 2003), pp. 768-801
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Economic History Association
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The Debasement of the "Dollar of the
Middle Ages "
COSTAS KAPLANIS
The debasement of the Byzantine gold coin during the reign of Constantine IX
Monomachus (1042-1055) marked the end of more than seven centuries of near
stability and the beginning of a sharp fall in the coin's gold content. I reject a widely
accepted view that the debasement was caused by the increase in the number of
transactions in an expanding economy. I explain the debasement as being a measure
undertaken to finance the protracted war against the Pechenegs in the latter half of
Constantine's reign.
Just over 50 years ago Robert Lopez, in an article published in this JOUR-
NAL, brought to the readers' attention the Byzantine gold coin, the so-
called bezant or what is now more commonly called nomisma from its medi-
eval Greek name.1 He dubbed it "the Dollar of the Middle Ages" on the
basis of its impressive stability in weight and fineness for almost seven
centuries as well as its wide acceptance as an international medium of ex-
change.2 The nomisma suffered a slight decline in fineness in the tenth cen-
tury, which accelerated in the eleventh during the reign of Constantine IX
Monomachus (1042-1055) and by the end of the century its gold content
had fallen to 10 percent. Despite its importance as a medieval currency, the
case of its debasement has not entered the recent lively debate as to the
The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Sept. 2003). ? The Economic History
Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507.
Costas Kaplanis is a Ph.D. Student, Department of Byzantine and Modem Greek Studies, King's
College, University of London. Address: Heath House, 64 Redington Road, London NW3 7RS, United
Kingdom. E-mail: costas@kaplanis.com
I would like to thank Judith Herrin for her help and encouragement and for first suggesting that I
look at this problem. I would also like to thank this JOURNAL's editor and three anonymous referees
whose comments and recommendations significantly improved this article. Finally, thanks are also due
to Richard Brealey, Ian Cooper, Michael Crawford, Julian Franks, Jonathan Goodman, Mervyn King,
Michael Metcalf, Robert Mundell, Anthony Neuberger, and Gabriel Stein.
'Lopez, "Dollar." The nomisma is sometimes called nomisma histamenon to distinguish it from a
lighter gold coin, the nomisma tetarteron. For the purposes of this article, it is only the nomisma
histamenon that I call nomisma, while referring to the lighter coin as simply tetarteron.
2 An example of an eleventh-century use of the nomisma in Western Europe is given by Pirenne,
Economic and Social History, p. 114, where he notes that in 1071 Countess Richilda of Hainault
"pledged her estate of Chevigny to the abbot of Saint-Hubert for the enormous sum of 500 gold
bezants" (his source was La chronique de Saint Hubert, dite Cantatorium, ed. K. Hanquet, p. 68
(Brussels, 1906)). The design of the nomisma was also imitated in some western coins: for example
the obverse and reverse types of a silver penny of the Danish King, Sven Estrithson (1047-1075)
exactly reproduced that of a nomisma issued by Michael IV (1034-1041) (see Hendy, "Michael IV").
For the circulation of both full-weight and light-weight solidi outside the frontiers in the early Byzan-
tine period see the comments of Hendy, "Light weight solidi," p. 61. Comments on the diffusion of
Byzantine money outside the empire can be found in Grierson, "Coinage"; and Morrisson, "Byzantine
Money," pp. 962-66.
768
Debasement 769
reasons for medieval debasements, which has mainly concentrated on west-

ern Europe.3
Byzantine historians who have looked at the debasement under Constan-
tine IX are divided into those who believe that it was a "crisis" debasement,
caused by budgetary problems, and those who believe that it was linked to
an inelastic supply of precious metals and an increase in the number of
transactions in the context of economic expansion (henceforth called the
"expansionist" explanation). According to Michael Angold "this phenome-
non has given rise to possibly the most important debate on the Byzantine
economy over the last twenty-odd years... One of the centres of the debate
has been over how consciously the imperial government was manipulating
the currency as an instrument of economic policy."4
In this article I reject the thesis that the debasement of the nomisma during
the reign of Constantine IX was related to an increase in the number of
transactions linked to economic expansion. Unlike the medieval West where
the money supply was generated mainly by private bullion being brought to
the mint, in Byzantium it was the state that generated the money supply
through the payment of the army and the civil service. A debasement, there-
fore, would hit the army and the state officials first, so it would only be
undertaken with extreme care or in extreme circumstances.
I will argue that the debasement was ordered by Constantine IX Mono-
machus to help finance the war against the Pechenegs who invaded Byzan-
tine territory by crossing the Danube in 1046/47. Their advance was massive
and has been compared as equal in historical significance as the crossing of
the Danube by the Goths in the fourth century. The Byzantines failed to
dislodge them and had to sign an expensive peace in 1053.5
THE COURSE OF THE DEBASEMENT
In the absence of any documentary evidence of the debasement d

the reign of Constantine IX, scholars have "discovered" it only th
numismatic evidence. The latest study of the history of the weight and
ness of the nomisma is that of Cecile Morrisson, Claude Brenot, Jea
Barrandon, Jean-Pierre Callu, and Jacques Poirier.6 It updates prev
published works on the debasement.7 According to this study, the d
3 Recent articles include Rolnick et al., "Debasement Puzzle"; Sussman, "Debasements"; Gl

and Redish, "Currency Depreciation"; Motomura, "Best and Worst of Currencies"; and
"Money." Earlier work includes that of Cipolla, "Currency Depreciation."
4 Angold, Byzantine Empire, pp. 9-10.
5 Vasiliev, History, p. 325; and Diaconu, "Petchenegs," p. 238. The importance of this w
strangely escaped the attention of many modem Byzantine historians.
6 Morrisson et al., L 'Or monnaye.
7 Such as those of Lopez, "Crise du Besant"; Grierson, "Debasement" and "Notes"; and Mo
"Devaluation."
770 Kaplanis
ment period can be divided into three stages. Firstly, a gradual debasement
from Constantine VII (913-959) until Michael IV (1034-1041). The nomis-
ma's gold content fell below 95 percent for the first time during the reign
of Constantine VII. Under Basil II (976-1025) the percentage dropped
close to 90 percent (though his last issue contained 94.9 percent) whilst the
percentage under Constantine VIII (1025-1028) and Michael IV (1034-
1041) remained between 90 and 94 percent. This phase was thus very mild
and was punctuated by issues of high quality, such as the last issue of Basil
II.8 It took place over such a long period that it is doubtful whether it was
deliberate.
Secondly, there was a more pronounced wave of debasement starting
from the reign of Constantine IX (1042-1055) to the reign of Romanus IV
(1068-1071). As can be seen from Table 1 and Figure 1, this debasement
took place in the latter half of the reign of Constantine IX Monomachus
(1042-1055). Measuring the precise extent of the debasement during his
reign is difficult. The numismatic data are scant, and different methods have
been used to estimate the gold content in each coin. There were four issues
of the nomisma under Constantine. The first and second do not appear to
differ in fineness from the nomismata issued by Michael IV (1034-1041).
Coins of the third issue show a distinct drop in gold content of about 4 to 5
percent and the last one, dated in 1054, a further drop of around 6 percent.
Thus the total amount of debasement of the nomisma was around 10 to 11
percent, the gold content of coins from the last issue standing at around 81.5
percent. There were two issues of a lighter coin, the tetarteron.9 The first one
was debased by roughly 8 to 9 percent relative to the last issue of Romanus
III Argyrus (1028-1034) (no issue of tetartera during Michael IV's (1034-
1041) reign is documented) and the second one by an additional 13 to 14
percent relative to the first one. The total debasement of the tetarteron was
thus around 22 percent, double that of the nomisma, with the last issue of
tetartera containing about 73 percent gold. The silver coin, the miliaresion,
was not debased during his reign (there were 12 miliaresia to a nomisma).
Constantine IX's debasement marks the beginning of the great debasement of
the eleventh century and constitutes a puzzle as it was not associated with an
obvious economic crisis. There is no consensus of opinion amongst scholars
as to its causes, and it forms the subject of this article. After Constantine, the
gold content of the nomisma stays in the range 70-78 percent until the last
issue of Romanus IV (1068-1071) when it falls below 70 percent.
Thirdly, a rapid debasement occurred under Michael VII (1071-1078),
Nicephorus III (1078-1081), and Alexius I (1071-1118) until 1092 when it
8 Morrisson et al., L 'Or monnaye, pp. 216-17.

9 The tetarteron was introduced by Nicephorus II Phocas (963-969) and was inferior in weight (but
not, at its introduction, in fineness) to the nomisma histamenon by 1/12. For the purpose of its introduc-
tion see Hendy, "Light Weight Solidi."
Debasement 771
TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE GOLD CONTENT OF NOMISMA AND TETARTERON:
PERIOD: 1025-1067
Nomisma Tetarteron
Emperor N Mean Median Range N Mean Median Range

A Constantine VIII 10 93.5 93.8 89.2 - 97.5 4 92.9 92.5 92.0 - 94.5
(1025-1028)
B Romanus III 13 92.3 92.0 87.8 - 95.0 3 92.2 92.0 91.5 - 93.1
(1028-1034)
C Michael IV 10 91.0 90.8 81.5 - 97.0 n/a
(1034-1041)
D Constantine IX
(1042-1055)
1 4 90.6 90.3 87.3 - 94.5
2 4 89.3 90.7 83.0 - 92.9
3 10 86.8 86.6 84.8 - 89.0 3 84.5 83.7 83.4 - 86.5
4 6 81.6 81.5 76.5 - 85.1 8 73.3 73.1 70.0 - 75.9
E Theodora 5 80.0 79.3 76.0 - 86.8 7 72.3 72.2 70.6 - 73.8
(1055-1056)
F Michael VI n/a 5 71.2 72.0 66.0 - 75.4
(1056-1057)
G Isaac I Comnenus 5 77.2 78.2 75.8 - 78.6 1 72.9 72.9 72.9 - 72.9
(1057-1059)
H Constantine X 19 75.4 75.5 72.3 - 78.4 2 70.5 70.5 69.5 - 71.4
(1059-1067)
I Eudocia 6 74.9 74.9 72.0 - 77.3 n/a
(1067)
Notes: Where a choice was available for the same coin, the result obtained by proton activation was
preferred to the one obtained by neutron activation, which was in turn preferred to the one obtained by
specific gravity. One observation from the reign of Constantine X Doukas and one from the reign of
Michael IV were discarded as their accuracy was qualified by the author. Other than in the case of
Constantine IX Monomachus, issues of the same reign were taken together. Variations in gold content
are not only to be ascribed to measurement errors or the effects of time: errors occurred also during
minting and sub-standard coins exist for all periods of Byzantine coinage which, according to Hendy,
"is no doubt to be accounted for by the inattention on the part of the mint" (Hendy, "Light weight
solidi," p. 74).
Source: Underlying data: Morrisson et al., L 'Or monnaye, pp. 218-26.
reached a low of almost 10 percent.'? This process was halted with the mon-
etary reforms of Alexius I in 1092 and the introduction of a new gold coin,
the hyperpyron. This last phase of debasement, beginning in the reign of
Michael VII, was undoubtedly caused by the budgetary problems that were
facing the empire after the defeat at Mantzikert in 1071. This is testified both
by Nicephorus Bryennius and by Anna Comnena, and all scholars seem to
agree on this, including Morrisson. l Unlike the previous phase, this debase-
ment was carried out by melting existing silver coins (which also contained
copper) and adding them into the mixture minted into nomisma, a sign of a
more desperate situation.
0 Morrisson et al., L 'Or monnaye, pp. 224-31.

Bryennius, Hyle, Bk 4.1, pp. 254-56. Morrisson, "Devaluation," p. 20.
772 Kaplanis
95 -
5 --- Nomisma
--o- Tetarteron
90-
85 -
, 80 -
75 -
70
1025 1030 1035 1040 1045 1050 1055 1060 1065 1070
FIGURE 1
DEBASEMENT OF THE BYZANTINE GOLD COIN: PERIOD 1025-1067
Note: Fineness is the mean percentage gold content shown in Table 1.
PREVIOUS STUDIES AND EXPLANATIONS OF THE DEBASEMENT DURING

THE REIGN OF CONSTANTINE IX (1042-1055)
The debasement that occurred in the eleventh century was firs

lighted by Philip Grierson.12 Using the specific gravity method and a
of ninety nomismata and tetartera, he analyzed their weight and f
from the middle of the tenth to the last quarter of the eleventh cent
concluded that the great debasement of the nomisma began during th
of Constantine IX Monomachus and, drawing from the writings of a
porary Byzantine historian, Psellus, held the emperor and his wife
sponsible for it.
The application of the more accurate technique of neutron activatio
the analysis of more coin samples by Morrisson (in collaboration with
Gordus) in 1976 confirmed the conclusion that the debasement wa
by Constantine IX.13 Morrisson et al. refined these results in L 'Or m
in which they identified an initial but very slow wave of debaseme
began in the early tenth century and a rapid debasement during the r
Constantine IX Monomachus.
Unlike Grierson, who tried to explain this debasement by reference to the
state's budgetary problems caused by the profligacy of the emperor and his
12 Grierson, "Debasement."
13 Morrisson, "Devaluation," p. 5.
Debasement 773
wife, Morrisson came up with a novel explanation, namely that the first and
second debasements were caused not by a budget deficit but were: "le fruit
d'une augmentation du volume des transactions monetaires dans l'empire.
A cette epoque (Xe siecle - 1068 environ), les causes de l'augmentation sont
bien une extension du secteur monetaire de l'economie byzantine liee a celle
du territoire byzantin, aux transformations de l'organisation militaire et
fiscale et probablement un certain accroissement de la production meme si
pour certains regnes, tels ceux de Theodora ou d'Isaac I Comnene, les
besoins immediats des finances imperiales ont ete le facteur determinant."14
Constantine IX Monomachus was exonerated from responsibility for the
debasement: ". .. il est donc impossible de rendre Monomaque responsable
d'une devaluation que des causes politiques et economiques bien anterieures
a son regne expliquent aisement."15
Recent work has claimed that the Byzantine economy was expanding
during this period.16 Morrisson cites as evidence the increase in the minting
and circulation of bronze coinage in the period 969-1081, which she says
is incontestable. This increase in the demand for bronze coinage would have
led to an increase in the demand for gold coinage, which allowed the de-
basement to happen without an inflationary outcome (before 1068).
Unlike Grierson, Morrisson rejects the testimony of Psellus against
Constantine IX as slander and suggests that other contemporary writers such
as Joannes Skylitzes and Michael Attaleiates are less negative about him.
Moreover, none of these contemporary writers mention anything about a
debasement. She says that it is impossible to confirm that the debasement
coincided with an exhaustion of the state's reserves during Constantine's
reign, so one must look for other reasons to explain the debasement.17
She further observes that a debasement of the silver denier was happening
in Europe at the same time (it was devalued by 50 percent from the end of
the tenth century to the twelfth century) and suggests that this also happened
in the context of economic prosperity and not of budgetary problems.18 She
makes a similar comment about the debasement of the Iraqi dinar in the
14 "the result of an increase in the volume of monetary transactions in the empire. In this period (tenth
century-c. 1068) the causes of this increase are an extension of the monetary sector of the Byzantine
economy linked to the extension of the Byzantine territory and to the transformation of the military and
fiscal organization, and probably a certain growth in production even though for certain reigns, such
as those of Theodora or Isaac Comnenus, the immediate financial needs of the imperial finances were
the determining factor." Morrisson et al., L 'Or monnaye, pp. 152-53.
15 ... it is therefore impossible to make Monomachus responsible for a debasement, which is easily
explained by political and economic causes well previous to his reign." Morrisson, "Devaluation,"
p. 19.
16 See for example Harvey, Economic Expansion. Lefort, "Rural Economy," p. 267, says that the rise
in population from the ninth century on "appears certain." In an earlier work, Antoniades-Bibicou,
"Demographie," had claimed there was a reduction in population in the eleventh century.
17 Morrisson, "Devaluation," p. 16.
18 See also Grierson, "Debasement," p. 386.
774 Kaplanis
eleventh century, although she does admit that there was no equivalent
debasement of the dinar in Fatimid Syria and Egypt or the Maghreb.l9 Carlo
Cipolla claims that one reason for the deterioration in metallic (silver) con-
tent of various European monetary units before 1500 was the increase in the
demand for money (because of growth in population, increased monetisation
of the economy, and so on) in the face of an inelastic supply of precious
metals.20 Morrisson, quoting Cipolla, makes a similar argument in the con-
text of eleventh-century Byzantium.
Several scholars have adopted the expansionist explanation of the debase-
ment, some have not, and some have stayed on the fence.21 One aspect of the
puzzle is how one can explain the debasement in the face of evidence that
the Byzantine economy was expanding at the time. Morrisson's answer,
drawing on the work of Cipolla, was that this debasement was not a
"devaluation de crise" but a "devaluation d'expansion."
THE BYZANTINE MONETARY SYSTEM IN THE ELEVENTH CENTURY
Before examining the debasement, it is useful to outline the basic By

tine monetary system in the eleventh century, before the reforms of A
I in 1092. The state in this period operated a tri-metallic coinage system
with distinct preference for gold, which was the required means of pa
of taxes. As has been revealed by a twelfth-century treatise known as
kai Nea Logarike, taxpayers before the reforms of 1106-1109 were requ
to pay their taxes in nomismata, and if there was a fractional liability o
two-thirds nomisma, the taxpayer was required to pay it in a whole no
ma, the tax-collector returning the difference in small change.22 The
denominations of the nomisma (the semissis and tremissis) had disappe
by the eighth century, so the gold coin was not used in low-value p
transactions, a role performed by the bronze and silver coinage.23 The
derived most of its income from land and personal taxes, with only a
proportion coming from trade.24 The main way of feeding gold coins in
19 Morrisson, "Devaluation," pp. 29-30.

20 Cipolla, European Society, p. 201.
21 Those accepting it include: Svoronos "Remarques" p. 51; Lemerle, Cinq Etudes, p
Oikonomides, "Role," p. 1012. Those rejecting it include: Hendy, Studies, pp. 3-4, 233; and
Byzantine Empire, pp. 10, 84. Treadgold, Byzantium, p. 140, says that "there cannot be much d
the disastrous debasement of the nomisma beginning with the reign of Constantine IX was i
to reduce the cost of the now largely useless army." On the fence is Harvey, Economic Ex
p. 89. Harvey says that the debasement was "probably" matched by an increase in the nu
transactions but in a footnote criticizes Morrisson's 1976 article for the use of Fisher's equat
22 See Hendy, Studies, p. 286. The state practice of discriminating in favor of gold and aga
own base metal coinage dates back to the early period: ibid., p. 251.
23 Morrisson, "Byzantine Money," p. 951. Apart from land and buildings, gold coins were a
in the purchasing of luxury goods such as manuscripts (see Kravari, "Note").
24 A. H. M. Jones estimated that the early Byzantine state received 95 percent of its revenue fr
and 5 percent from trade (Later Roman Empire, I, p. 465). In the fourteenth century (when th
Debasement 775
economy was through government expenditure, which consisted largely of

wages paid, most of them in gold, to the army and the civil service. It has
been proposed but without any evidence that taxes represented 57 percent
of all coins in circulation and that the monetization level in Byzantium was
around 45 percent of GDP in the twelfth century.5 No records indicating the
size of the imperial budget survive, but estimates range from four to six
million nomismata for the beginning of the eleventh century.26 The state
obligations were denominated mainly in gold, sometimes expressed by
number of nomismata and sometimes by their weight.27 This money was
then spent in the economy, with the largest proportion going to landowners
and peasants in exchange for food, who then gave part of it back to the state
in the form of taxes. Some of it clearly escaped this cycle and entered the
area of commerce, both home and abroad, but the bulk did not. Owners of
gold coins (soldiers, officials, landowners) could go to money-changers to
obtain small change for their expenses, and the latter could then sell those
gold coins to individuals who wanted them to pay their taxes, or even back
to the state.28 Money changers belonged to a state-regulated guild whose
rules survive in the tenth century Book of the Eparch. They played a role in
the state's occasional efforts to control the composition of the circulating
coinage: for example, early evidence shows that money changers were at
times obliged to sell gold coins to the state as they received them from the
public.29 With respect to mints, following the centralizing reforms of
Heraclius (610-641) in about 629, there was one main mint, that of Constan-
tinople, which was entirely owned and controlled by the state. Early legisla-
tion prohibited the minting of private bullion by state mints though it seems
that this law was relaxed (for precious metals) in the twelfth century.30 The
importance of the military use of coinage is suggested by the fact that the
was much smaller territorially and trade had picked up) the corresponding percentages were calculated
to be 80 and 20. One would expect, therefore, that in the period we are interested in (eleventh century),
the percentages would be somewhere in between. See Hendy, "From Public to Private," pp. 32-33.
Laiou ("Byzantine Economy," p. 1155) estimates the proportion of revenue from agriculture in the
twelfth century to have been just over 80 percent.
25 Morrisson, "Byzantine Money," pp. 948-50; Laiou, "Byzantine Economy," pp. 1154-55. These
estimates are not based on any hard facts so they should be treated with extreme caution.
26 Morrisson, "Byzantine Money," p. 941; and Treadgold, History, p. 575.
27 For example, the payments to leading imperial commanders in the so-called Book of Ceremonies
compiled partly at the orders of Constantine VII (913-959) are denominated in pounds (litrai) of gold
(Constantine, Porphyrogennetos, De Cerimoniis, p. 696). This did not imply weight of pure gold;
merely actual weight of coins. Liudprand of Cremona, a visitor to the court of the Emperor Constantine
Porphyrogennetos (913-959), was an eye-witness to the payment in gold coins (sealed in bags) to state
officials (Liudprand, Embassy, p. 156). Gold coins frequently circulated officially sealed in purses with
their number marked on the outside.
28 Hendy, Studies, pp. 250-53; and Morrisson, "Byzantine Money," p. 952.
29 Hendy, Studies, pp. 250-51. This information comes from a fourth century letter from the prefect
of Rome to the emperor. It is only an assumption (a reasonable one, however) that the state used money
changers for similar purposes in the eleventh century.
30 Hendy, "From Public to Private," p. 36.
776 Kaplanis
master of the mint belonged to the department of the vestiarion which was
also responsible for the manufacture and provision of military equipment.31
Unfortunately no Byzantine mint records survive.
Thus, unlike other western medieval states where the money supply was
generated mainly through the minting of private bullion, in Byzantium the
money supply was generated by the state, which wanted to facilitate in this
way its expenditure and taxation cycle.32 Moreover, the state legislated
against the export of precious metals; the latest evidence for such a law
appears in the Book of the Prefect whose rules were likely to have been
applicable in the eleventh century. It is clear, however, that the state had
little means of enforcing this law, but its existence does suggest that the
state did not perceive it to be in its interest to promote the international
commercial role of the nomisma as it involved an undesired leakage of gold
from the empire's borders. Arguably, the state could have earned seignior-
age if it allowed individuals to bring bullion to the mint and exchange it for
nomismata, but there is no evidence that it did so in the eleventh century.
The "Dollar of the Middle Ages," therefore, was a private and not a state-
sponsored phenomenon. It was only in the thirteenth century that this law
was partially relaxed, distinguishing between bullion and coined metal,
exports of the latter being now allowed.33 The Byzantine state's monetary
policy was until then not dictated by trade considerations as most of its
revenues derived from the taxation of land.34 The lynchpin of the tax system
was the nomisma so the State would have been very reluctant to tamper
with it. This is in direct contrast to the governments of the Italian states,
which, according to Cipolla, from the eleventh century onwards were
"practically always controlled by the merchant class" and always preferred
a weakening of the currency to an increase in taxation as a solution to bud-
getary problems.35
COINAGE MANIPULATION AS A FISCAL SOLUTION
An emperor could do several things to deal with a short-term fin

contingency: raise taxes; directly cut expenditure, whose major compon
were civil and military salaries; melt down imperial or ecclesiastical
ware and convert it into coin; sell imperial assets; appeal to the popu
or friends of the imperial family; confiscate property, including that
31 Philotheus, Kletorologion, (ninth century), in Bury, Imperial Administrative System, p.

32 France in the fifteenth century is an example of the former: see Sussman, "Debasements
For an exposition of the differences in coinage use between Byzantium and the West see Hend
and West."
33 By the Treaty of Nymphaeum signed with the Genoese in 1261.
34 See Day, "Monetary Mechanisms," p. 971.
35 Cipolla, "Currency Depreciation," p. 419.
Debasement 777
church; and finally, manipulate the coinage. There was in general very little
opportunity for the state to borrow.36
The manipulation of the coinage was done in three ways: lightening the
weight of the coinage; lowering the fineness but keeping the weight the
same (debasement); or introducing a new coin of lower weight but the same
nominal value as the main coin, a form of"crying-up" or enhancement. The
Byzantine State had never until the reign of Constantine IX adopted a con-
scious policy of debasing the coinage, but it did use the other two ways of
coinage manipulation to save money. Although the weight of the nomisma
had been kept more or less intact, the weight of the copper coinage was
tampered with. Generally such coinage manipulations were connected with
financial contingencies due to war. For example the variations in weight of
the copperfollis of Heraclius (610-641) can be connected to the successes
and failures of the military events of his reign.37 The introduction of a light-
weight gold coinage during the reign of Justinian I (527-565) and of
Nicephorus II (963-969) can also be related to their military campaigns.38
What were the potential costs to the emperor of using these three methods
to manipulate the gold coinage? A reduction in the weight of the nomisma
would be easily detectable and might cause immediate protests. Symboli-
cally, it would diminish the image of the emperor within the empire. Organi-
zationally it would have been extremely disruptive, especially as taxes were
collected by weight, where the main weight measure equaled that of the
nomisma.39 This method, therefore, appears inferior to that of a direct cut in
salaries, which at least leaves the symbolic value and traditional administra-
tive role of the nomisma intact. It is not surprising that it was not used at all
until the weight of the nomisma was officially reduced via the monetary
reforms of Alexius I in 1092.
The introduction of a new but lighter gold coin was considered a better
alternative to the reduction of the weight of the nomisma itself. The tetar-
teron introduced by Nicephorus II (963-969) had the same fineness but its
weight was one-twelfth less than the nomisma. The government wanted to
enforce the acceptance of the light-weight coins in regular commercial trans-
36 Hendy, "From Public to Private," p. 33.

37 Ahrweiler-Glykatzi, "Nouvelle Hypothese," p. 3; Morrisson, L 'Or monnaye, p. 129; and Hendy,
Studies, p. 498.
38 Hendy, Studies, p. 233.
39 Grierson, Catalogue, p. 37. The collection of taxes by weight is confirmed in early Byzantine
documents. The fact that taxes were denominated in nomismata in the middle Byzantine period should
not change the fact that the tax collector often checked payments by weighing them, not by counting
them. This would take into account payment in clipped coins. Documents show that sometimes pay-
ments were recorded both by the number of coins and their actual weight (Hendy, Studies, p. 349). Tax
collectors carried measures and weights (mensurae atqueponderae) with them: Codex Theodosianus,
XI.8.3 (409). Each nomisma equaled a hexagion, the theoretical weight standard, and payments made
according to it were made "according to the public standard" or demosio zygo: Hendy, Studies, p. 346.
Note that weight in this context means actual weight of the coin, not the weight ofjust the gold content.
778 Kaplanis
actions at par with the nomisma.40 Skylitzes, who wrote in the eleventh
century, says that Nicephorus made payments in tetartera but demanded that
tax payments continued to be paid only in nomismata, in effect attempting
to profit from the difference in weight in the two coins.41
The attempt to cry-up the value of the tetarteron when it came to state
payments and commercial transactions, but refuse to accept it as being inter-
changeable with the nomisma when it came to tax payments, was obviously
not popular and caused a lot of confusion, attracting the criticism of both
Skylitzes and Ioannis Zonaras (who wrote in the twelfth century and based
his history on Skylitzes).42 Effectively, the presence of the tetarteron along-
side the nomisma would have either driven the latter out of domestic circula-
tion apart from tax-payment time (in the spirit of Gresham's law), or the
market would have ignored the law, treating the two coins in accordance
with their gold content.
From the emperor's point of view, in addition to the obvious saving in
gold, paying in tetartera had the advantage that it allowed him to claim that
no salary reduction was involved as the circulation of the tetarteron at par
with the nomisma was backed up by law. It also allowed him to maintain the
organizational as well as the symbolic value of the nomisma intact.
In terms of who was paid in tetartera, H. Ahrweiler-Glykatzi suggests
that Nicephorus II introduced the tetarteron to pay the newly formed merce-
nary army of the tagmata, employed to carry out his policy of reconquest.
D. M. Metcalf concurs, saying that subsequent emperors probably did the
same and that such a view fits in well with the hoard evidence.43 One can
40 Such a regulation appears in the Book of the Prefect, a collection of regulations for the main
Constantinopolitan guilds dated in the early tenth century during the reign of Leo VI (886-912). The
fact, however, that it predates the issue of the tetarteron by Nicephorus suggests that light-weight coins
had been issued, albeit in smaller quantities as none have been found, before. For a discussion see
Hendy, "Light Weight Solidi," pp. 73-78.
41 Skylitzes, Synopsis, p. 275. We cannot interpret this comment as meaning that the State refused
tetartera; simply that it treated them as being worth one-twelfth less than the nomisma. Otherwise the
government would have had an enormous problem of tax collection given that the tetarteron formed
a significant part of the gold coin output during the reign of Constantine IX. As mentioned earlier, the
traditional Byzantine practice was to receive taxes by weight, so it would have been a matter of indif-
ference whether payment was received in tetartera or nomismata. Likewise we should not assume that
all payments were made in tetartera: see the comment by Grierson, Catalogue, p. 37, fn. 109 and the
next section. Only in special cases did the State accept the tetarteron at par with the nomisma, as in the
case of an Act of the Monastery of Iviron of 1065 where the State accepted tetartera for half of the
referred tax payment. This was considered a privilege. See Ahrweiler-Glykatzi, "Nouvelle Hypothese,"
p. 5; and Hendy, "Light Weight Solidi," pp. 67-71.
42 Zonaras, Epitome, p. 305; and Skylitzes, Synopsis, p. 275.
43 Metcalf, Coinage in the Balkans, p. 39. Two mid-eleventh-century hoards of Basil II tetartera
were found in Dobrudja, in the lower Danube, supporting this hypothesis: see Grierson, Catalogue,
p. 39. Treadgold uses these hoards as evidence that it was the inactive soldiers who were paid in
tetartera (Treadgold, Byzantium, p. 140) This is inaccurate as the lower Danube was the scene of many
battles both in the tenth and the eleventh century (see Stephenson, Byzantium's Balkan Frontier,
pp. 49-51, 93-98).
Debasement 779
only speculate as to why such a strategy was chosen. One reason might have
been that many existing officer and civil servant salaries were denominated
in weight, so there would have been no saving in paying them in tetartera.
Another reason might have been that the state perceived it less risky to pay
newly hired mercenaries in tetartera rather than change the coin of payment
of existing employees.
Let us turn now to a debasement as a means of coinage manipulation. This
benefited the state by allowing it to mint more coins, which it could use for
its own expenditure, using the same amount of bullion. Unlike the issue of
the tetarteron which was an overt method of raising revenue, a debasement
ran the risk of being viewed as an underhand way of taxing state employees,
with potentially dangerous implications for the emperor.44
A disadvantage of a debasement was that it required a rise in taxes to
retrieve the extra coins that were minted and spent, as the vast majority of
tax revenues were fixed, based not on income but on the value of the land
and the number of people in a household. Furthermore, it gave an incentive
to people to pay their taxes in the most debased coins and hoard older coins
of higher fineness.45 In other words it involved a net leakage of gold from
the expenditure-taxation cycle. To keep up with the same nominal expendi-
ture the state either had to continue debasing, raise taxes (which could be
difficult to enforce), or treat the debased coins as worth only their bullion
value (which would be administratively difficult). Thus a debasement could
only give the government a short amount of time to correct its finances
(through the successful outcome of a war, say) otherwise it would end up in
a vicious cycle of debasement.
Debasements in medieval western states such as France or England have
been analyzed by scholars in some detail, helped by the availability of de-
tailed mint data. The success of a debasement in the West depended on
individuals being induced to bring bullion or old coins to the mint for re-
minting. The state then collected seigniorage, which sometimes formed a
substantial part of its revenues. The conditions in which a debasement would
induce people to sell fresh bullion or old coins to the mint are discussed by
Nathan Sussman although his conclusions have been challenged by Arthur
44 Two examples from the East show the risks of a debasement to a ruler. The first comes from Iraq
under the Caliphs. In 993 an issue of low-quality silver dirhams (the so-called ghiyathi) led to a rise
in prices and provoked a mutiny in the army. As a result, the state was forced to reissue better quality
dirhams (Ashtor, Histoire des Prix, p. 41). The second example is from the early Ottoman Empire.
Mehmed II (1441-1481) engaged in a series of debasements where those who stood to lose most were
the employees of the state. After the first debasement of 1444, which reduced the silver content of the
akce by 11 percent, the janissaries protested by assembling together and demanding that the govern-
ment either go back to the previous coinage or raise their salaries (Pamuk, Monetary History, pp.
55-57). The danger of a similar reaction to a Byzantine debasement would not have been small:
Cheynet, Pouvoir, identifies 44 revolts and conspiracies occurring in the period 1025-1050.
45 Hendy, Coinage and Money, pp. 53-55.
780 Kaplanis
Rolnick, Francois Velde, and Warren

why debasements should have this eff
As mentioned earlier, the Byzantine
or old coins in exchange for new ones
in Byzantium. In so far as goldsmiths
of the debasement, they could have of
holders of old coins to persuade them
themselves. The state would not nec
All gains accruing to the government
ees less gold than before, whilst pre
service. The success of a Byzantine
state employees acquiescing to this sa
They would do that either if they per
unaffected (i.e., no inflation) or if the
a fall in their real wages. A debaseme
it would have been only undertaken as
DEBASEMENT AND THE EMPEROR'S DECISION PROBLEM
The emperor considering debasement of the currency has to balanc

need for current revenues against future problems which may arise fr
loss of reputation, the resentment occasioned by a hidden and d
method of raising revenue, as well as the impairment of the normal fu
ing of the taxation and expenditure cycle. He also has to compare this
with a straightforward cut in salaries, which would have the same ef
current revenues but would be more immediately obvious and hen
immediately dangerous to his position.
More formally, each feasible policy has an effect on the utility of cu
period consumption, as well as on the discounted expected utility of f
consumption weighted by the probability of survival of the emperor f
period.47 Often policies will involve a trade-offbetween the two. The u
short-term consumption will be extremely high when the emperor is th
by war or rebellion, events that were quite common in the eleventh ce
In a stable situation (i.e., in one where the state is not faced with a
contingency) a debasement policy is likely to be suboptimal as the ma
utility of an increase in short-term spending will be relatively small
pared to the negative long-term effects. A debasement will lower the
bility of the emperor's survival (by raising the probability of an army
46 Sussman, "Debasements," pp. 52-54. Rolnick et al., "Debasement Puzzle," p. 802.

47 A useful model capturing the essence of a similar decision problem is provided by Gro
Van Huyck, "Sovereign Debt," in the context of a ruler's decision whether to repudiate or d
sovereign debt.
Debasement 781
or making it harder for the ruler to keep his troops, or even through a general
loss of reputation) and could also reduce future expected consumption be-
cause it introduces uncertainty and costs in the tax collection process. It
would only be undertaken, therefore, in an extraordinary situation, where the
marginal utility of short-term spending is high enough to compensate for the
long-term negative effects.
Such a situation would occur if there was an exogenous shock such as a
declaration of war against the empire. This does not mean, however, that a
debasement will always be the optimal choice in those circumstances. One
has to compare it with other policies that have the same effect on current
revenue, but a different long-term effect. Take, for example, a direct salary
cut. A rational emperor will prefer a debasement to a salary cut only if he
believes that it will not be recognized immediately so that its effect on his
reputation and his expected future consumption will occur at a later point in
time compared to that of a salary cut, which is immediately known.48 This
will be a purely subjective judgment as it will have to be offset by the fact
that the debasement introduces confusion in tax collection (which a salary
cut does not) and may in the long term be more adverse on the emperor's
probability of survival if it is considered a devious way of reducing salaries.
By the same token if the crisis requires a significant rise in short-term spend-
ing in which a debasement will be as immediately obvious as a salary cut
(because when the debasement is large there is a noticeable change in the
color of the coin), then the salary cut will dominate as a policy, as it did
when the Persian invasions in the seventh century prompted Heraclius
(610-641) to cut salaries by half.49
When the need for cash is not immediate, a rise in taxes will probably be
preferred as a means of raising revenue as it has a less negative effect on the
emperor's survival chances than a debasement or a salary cut. This is be-
cause the emperor will consider it safer to upset the landowners and the
peasants than the army. However, if he finds that he has already exhausted
his tax-raising abilities, he may be forced to resort to a debasement or a
salary cut even in cases where the need for cash is not urgent.
Economic growth enters the emperor's decision problem as one element
in the information set that the emperor takes into account. It is unlikely,
however, that economic growth by itself would trigger a debasement be-
cause, unlike a war, it does not raise the marginal utility of current revenue
gains sufficiently to compensate for the possible long-term negative effects.
48 See Sussman's comments ("Debasements," pp. 53 and 63) on the delayed detection of debase-
ments.
49 Chronicon Paschale; p. 158. See also Hendy, Studies, pp. 228 and 494. A salary cut after a
devastating invasion may be "excusable," and thus more preferable to the emperor than a "devious"
debasement, as it is associated with an unforeseen contingency for which the sovereign was not directly
to blame.
782 Kaplanis
On the contrary, if economic growth is associated with higher tax revenues

it might actually reduce the marginal utility of current gains. According to
the expansionist hypothesis, the debasement was not effected for the sake of
short-term fiscal gains. In that case, one needs to show that the emperor
believed that somehow there were long-term benefits from a debasement,
which offset the negative effects described.
THE FISCAL PROBLEM OF CONSTANTINE IX
The purpose of this section is to attempt to demonstrate that the deb

ment ordered by Constantine IX Monomachus in the latter part of his
was one of the measures taken to address an unexpected fiscal contingen
It is unfortunate that no official budget figures have survived so we can
deduce the existence of a problem from contemporary sources and e
as well as the particular type of monetary response. My conclusion i
the fiscal crisis was caused by the protracted wars against the Pecheneg
the latter half of Constantine's reign. I will show that the debasement
part of a more general policy of coinage manipulation to deal with this
lem, and I will provide estimates of the savings generated from this po
Finally I will explain why even if there was economic expansion (and
not confirm or deny that there was), that in itself could not have b
motive for debasement.
By far the greatest expenditure item in the state budget was the army. The
issue of how the army was remunerated has been extensively discussed.50 By
the tenth century the system was developing into one in which the obligation
of military service (strateia) was increasingly commuted for cash. The in-
creasing commutation of the service to cash meant that the state started
hiring full-time troops. By the middle of the eleventh century there was also
a massive increase in the employment of mercenary forces.51 The abandon-
ment of the provincial (or theme) system in favor of constant standing ar-
mies on the frontiers and the use of mercenary forces meant that after three
centuries during which the state requirement for cash was small, there was
now a much greater need for coinage.52 In addition to this, the expansion of
the territory of the empire in the period 959-1025 required more military
expenditure to defend it. Warren Treadgold estimates that the imperial bud-
get rose from 1.9 million nomismata in 775 to 3.1 million in 842, 3.9 million
in 959, and reached 5.9 million in 1025.53
50 Haldon, Recruitment and Warfare; and Treadgold, Byzantium.

5 Haldon, Warfare, p. 92.
52 The theme system was established in the seventh century and consisted of soldier-farmers endowed
with land in return for military service. Because of the granting of land, military pay was very low.
53 Treadgold, Byzantium, pp. 195-97. Figures of a similar order of magnitude are produced by
Morrisson, "Byzantine Money," p. 933.
Debasement 783
How did the government finance this increased expenditure on the army?
According to the evidence from Psellus, Basil II (976-1025) managed to
accumulate substantial reserves amounting to 14.4 million nomismata, a
result of cutting down on expenditures and adding to revenues.54 The in-
creased revenues were probably due to various fiscal reforms, new taxes
accruing from recently acquired territories, booty from the conquests, and
possibly increased revenues from newly reconquered mines.55 However, this
comparatively healthy situation left by Basil II did not continue for long.
Signs of the state's heightened demand for cash can already be discerned in
the reign of Michael IV (1034-1041). There was every sign that military
expenditure was kept high for defensive reasons during the reign of
Constantine IX Monomachus. Apart from the fact that the state had a much
larger area to defend, there were two major rebellions against the emperor
that had to be suppressed;56 there was a Russian attack on Constantinople in
1043; Turkish raids began along the eastern frontier in the 1040s; and wars
started with the Pechenegs in 1048 which lasted for six years.57
The state had few methods of funding this expenditure. Raising taxes
would not have been an easy option, as the example of the Bulgarian revolt
in 1040/41 in protest against the commutation of their taxes into cash
showed. In any case taxes had already been raised by Michael IV (1034-
1041) so further rises would have proved even more difficult.58 Commuting
army pay from cash to kind, which rescued the state's finances in the sev-
enth century whilst keeping the army intact, was out of the question, given
the nature of the new army structure discussed previously.
The existence of fiscal problems during the reign of Constantine IX is
clearly mentioned in the sources. Apart from the testimony of Psellus, which
has already been discussed, Skylitzes, writing in the second half of the elev-
enth century, says that Constantine faced a deficit caused by his own profli-
gacy (due to lavish spending on construction) and that he tried to correct it
by various means including the employment of aggressive tax collectors and
the abolition of the Iberian army, which consisted of 50,000 people. The
dismantling of the army was accompanied by the demand to pay taxes in
lieu of military service.59 Cecaumenus, another contemporary, records harsh
54 Psellus mentions (Chronographia, Vol. 1, p. 82 (1:31)) the figure 200,000 talents which cannot
be taken literally as it would amount to the absurdly high sum of one thousand four hundred and forty
million nomismata. Most historians assume that Psellus, a classicizing historian, meant pounds, though
Angold (Byzantine Empire, p. 31) interprets it literally. Round figures mentioned by chroniclers such
as this one are notoriously unreliable.
55 On conquests, see Oikonomides, Fiscalite, p. 142. According to Psellus, Chronographia, Vol 1,
p. 85 (1:31), booty formed a substantial part of Basil's reserve.
56 Those of Maniakes in 1043 and of Torikios in 1047.
57 Stephenson, Byzantium's Balkan Frontier, p. 89.
58 Oikonomides, Fiscalite, p. 147.
59 Skylitzes, Synopsis, p. 476.
784 Kaplanis
measures for tax collection employed in Iberia and Mesopotamia.60

Attaleiates, writing mainly from first-hand experience, says that Constantine
tightened the reins two years before the end of his reign.61 Writing in the
twelfth century and thus influenced by Skylitzes and Psellus, Zonaras also
accuses him of profligacy leading to the exhaustion of the imperial treasures,
which required him to tap into the "forbidden" reserves and to commute
certain military obligations into taxes.62
THE PECHENEG WAR
So all the historians agree that Constantine faced a fiscal problem, b

was it sufficient to cause the debasement? For that to be true, there m
have been an emergency that could not be addressed in a traditional ma
ner. What I will argue is that this emergency was the war against th
Pechenegs. It is clear from both Skylitzes and Attaleiates that this war was
by no means a simple affair; it was protracted, expensive, and ended u
successfully for the empire. Both historians devote significant space
describing it. No less than 800,000 of this warlike nation were reported
have crossed the frozen Danube in 1046/47 and settled on Byzantine soil
Their arrival came at an unfortunate time for the emperor, who, in t
autumn of 1047, had to face a serious rebellion against him led by Le
Tomices. In that rebellion, which was suppressed by Christmas 104
Constantinople nearly fell. It is precisely in this year that we first hear of
Norman mercenaries operating in the capital, who appear to have bee
won over with lavish promises of money.64 Bitter struggles with th
Pechenegs took place between 1048 and 1053. The western army failed
dislodge them, suffering a series of defeats, and, according to Attaleiat
Constantine was forced to transfer the whole of the eastern army to fight
them and at the same time, according to Skylitzes, enrolled more soldi
and employed more mercenaries.65 The heavy presence of troops fighti
the Pechenegs is also reflected in the large number of Constantine IX coins
found in the area.66 Indeed, the abolition of the Iberian army and the d
60 Cecaumenus, Strategikon, p. 79 (section 20).

61 Attaleiates, Historia, p. 102 (section 50).
62 Zonaras, Epitome, Vol 3, p. 146.
64 Shepard, "Uses," pp. 285-86.
65 Attaleiates, Historia, p. 72 (section 32). Skylitzes, Synopsis, p. 476.
66 Coin finds at the Lower Danube seem to peak during the reign of Constantine IX (see Metcalf
Coinage in South-Eastern Europe, p. 65). This surge in coin circulation was probably caused by
presence of large number of troops sent there to fight the Pechenegs. Stephenson's interpretation of th
large number of coin finds as evidence of the growth of trade between Constantinople and the low
Danube can only be partly true, at least for the reign of Constantine IX (Stephenson, Byzantiu
Balkan Frontier, p. 84). Normal trade would in fact have been disrupted as a result of these wars wh
the presence of paid troops would have boosted exchanges ( Harvey, Economic Expansion, p. 87;
Debasement 785
mand for cash instead could easily have been part of the strategy of divert-
ing resources from the east towards the war against the Pechenegs.67 This
move, however, encouraged further incursions by the Seljuqs in the east,
so Constantine had to deal with this threat at the same time. In the end the
emperor was not able to expel the Pechenegs and signed a thirty-year
peace offering the Pechenegs "gifts and imperial titles" and probably
pledging to pay tribute to them.68 This was the most costly war the empire
had to face since the campaigns of Basil II and must have dealt an ex-
tremely heavy blow on the already strained state finances.69 Their advance
into Byzantine territory was probably as serious a defeat for the empire as
Mantzikert was in 1071. Not only did this defeat establish the Pechenegs
as a continuous threat to the empire for the next 40 years, but it also
marked the beginning of the end of the 750-year-old Imperial monetary
system established by Diocletian.70
MONETARY RESPONSE TO THE FISCAL EMERGENCY
The debasement of the nomisma was part of the overall monetary strat
of the government to cope with the financial demands of the war. The f
piece of evidence to support this view comes from the fact that it affect
only the last two of the four issues during Constantine's reign. If we assu
that the four issues were spaced roughly equally, the debasement coincide
with the war and its aftermath. The last one has been dated 1054, one ye
after the war had ended, suggesting that the finances of the state had be
left in a very bad shape.71 The two issues of tetartera are likely to h
Preda, "Byzantine Coins"). As Metcalf says "in troubled times, and in a frontier region where ther
a good deal of military activity, there is no way to be sure whether one particular discovery wa
soldier's pay, a traveller's hoard, or the savings of a local inhabitant." (Coinage in South-Eas
Europe, p. 66).
67 See also the comments by Stephenson, Byzantium's Balkan Frontier, p. 92.
68 Attaleiates, Historia, p. 90 (section 43). Diaconu, "Petchenegs," p. 238.
69 The vigor with which Constantine IX pursued this war stands at odds with the view that he was
an insignificant and weak-willed ruler, as Ostrogorsky (History, p. 326) claims.
70 V G. Vasilievsky, writing in 1872, was the first historian to identify the historical significance of
the Pecheneg advance in 1046-1047. He concluded that "This event, which has escaped the attention
of all modem historical works, had enormous significance for the history of humanity. In its conse-
quences it was almost as important as the crossing of the Danube by the western Goths ...." Cited in
Vasiliev, History, p. 325.
71 The accuracy of this dating depends on whether one believes its explanation. The fourth issue of
the nomisma bears the unusual feature of stars on either side of the emperor's head on the reverse side,
something that prompted numismatists to associate its issue date with the supernova of 1054 that gave
rise to the Crab Nebula, which was so bright that it could be seen in broad daylight for two years. The
problem is that none of the Byzantine historians mention it, not even Psellus who was interested in
astronomy. What is more interesting and perhaps more relevant to our point of associating this issue
with the effects of the wars, is the fact that the emperor is shown grasping a sword. The "military" type
of gold coin was a novelty introduced by Constantine IX and first appeared on this (last) issue. It also
appears on his silver coins. Grierson, Catalogue, pp. 733-34.
786 Kaplanis
coincided with these last two issues of nomismata as they show a similar
pattern of debasement.72
The second clue that the debasement had to do with this war is given to
us by the resumption of tetartera. As mentioned earlier, the original issue of
the tetarteron by Nicephorus II (963-969) was connected to his military
campaigns. The issue of tetartera was continued by his successor John
Tzimisces (969-976) (who presumably also used them to pay for his own
military campaigns) and during his reign they formed a substantial propor-
tion of the gold coins in circulation. They were used less by Basil II (976-
1025) and very little by his successors whilst the empire was at peace, until
Constantine IX started reissuing them.73 One should recall that the early use
of light-weight gold coins by Justinian I (527-565) was also connected to
his military campaigns. Constantine IX, like Nicephorus II (963-969) and
John Tzimisces (969-976) before him, realized that taxes could not be suffi-
ciently augmented to finance this major war, and thus resorted to the use of
the tetarteron, an already established way of paying for military campaigns.
Grierson, on the basis of finds, concludes that tetartera may have formed up
to half the coinage in circulation in the reign of Constantine IX and subse-
quent emperors.74 It is highly probable, therefore, that the active soldiers
who formed the bulk of the army were paid a significant part of their salaries
in tetartera. The attested employment of Norman mercenaries in 1047 and
other evidence of Byzantine embassies abroad in an effort to hire more
mercenaries during this period may suggest that tetartera were issued to pay
them.75
The debasement of the nomisma was linked to the emperor's reintroduc-
tion of tetartera. The government knew that it could not go on replacing
nomismata with tetartera as this would have hampered the collection of
taxes. The value of the tetarteron to the state arose from the fact that ex-
penses were paid in it at par with the nomisma, but taxes were denominated
in nomismata and collected by weight. If too many tetartera had been issued
72 From now on we will take this to be the case, and references to the third or fourth issue of the
nomisma will assume that they coincided with the first and second issue of tetartera. A similar issue
of underweight (clipped) silver coins (miliaresia) was shown by Hendy to have been issued at the same
time as the full weight miliaresia, suggesting a similar pattern of simultaneous issue of the nomisma
and the tetarteron (Hendy, "Light Weight Solidi," pp. 69-70).
73 Grierson, Catalogue, p. 28; and Treadgold, Byzantium, p. 139.
74 Grierson, Catalogue, p. 28. For the reign of Constantine IX, Grierson identifies finds of 64 tetar-
tera and 88 nomismata. As there were four issues of the nomisma and only two of the tetarteron (which
I assume coincided with the last two issues of the nomisma) this suggests that tetartera could have
constituted even more than 50 percent of the output of the last two issues. In the case of Constantine
IX's successor, Theodora, the number of tetartera is almost identical to the number of nomismata
found (45 and 48 respectively). Such figures prompt Grierson to suggest that "the mid eleventh century
tetartera may well have formed up to half the gold coinage in circulation."
75 Shepard, "Uses," p. 289. The payment of mercenaries is also suggested by a sudden spread of
Byzantine types in Danish coinage in the late 1040s (Grierson, "Commerce," p. 136).
Debasement 787
there would have been a risk that the nomisma would have lost its status as
the main coin and hence its status as the unit of account.
It is clear that the authorities were more reluctant to debase the nomisma
than the tetarteron as can be seen from the fact that its fineness was more
than 10 percent higher than that of the simultaneously issued tetarteron at
the last issue. One question that arises is why the authorities took the step of
debasing the nomisma at all and did not simply debase the tetarteron even
more to achieve the savings required. The answer is twofold. Firstly, if the
fineness of the tetarteron was allowed to be below that chosen at the last
issue (73 percent) there was a big risk that the coin would start losing its
yellow color.76 The authorities probably judged that if that happened its
general acceptability might have been impaired seriously, even though the
debasement would have been already obvious to the experts. This may also
explain why the tetarteron retained approximately this level of fineness until
the crisis after the battle of Mantzikert in 1071, whereas the fineness of the
nomisma continued to fall (see Table 1). Secondly, a large gap in the level
of fineness between them would have rendered the enforcement of parity
between the two coins even more difficult, especially if signs of this gap
became visible to the naked eye.
For the state to have chosen to debase the coinage instead of cutting sala-
ries, it must have believed that even if the debasement were detected by
goldsmiths or money changers, it would still be a more palatable method
than a straightforward wage cut involving an identical amount of savings.
The relatively small rate of debasement left the color unchanged and it might
have taken some time for it to be fully known, especially amongst the troops
at the frontier whose access to goldsmiths and money changers might have
been limited. The state might have also hoped that a successful end to the
war would have allowed it to bring the fineness back to its original level.
GAINS FROM COINAGE MANIPULATION
Let us assume then, based on Grierson's hypothesis, that Constantine IX

third issue of the nomisma was combined with an issue of tetartera whos
number was the same as that of the number ofnomismata minted. The ga
that could be achieved by replacing 50 percent of the output of nomismat
with the lighter tetartera were limited to 4.35 percent of the budget
Table 3). Judging that this was not enough to finance the war, the emper
ordered that the two coins be debased, with the less politically sensitive a
administratively important tetarteron suffering the greater debasem
Appendix 1 derives the formula for the nominal gains achieved when
state changes the existing coinage which consists only of undeba
76 See Morrisson, "Byzantine Money," p. 944.
788 Kaplanis
TABLE 2
GAINS FROM COINAGE MANIPULATION OF CONSTANTINE IX
A B
Extra Coins Minted as a Percentage Same as A Less Opportunity Cost
of Original Tax Proceeds of Silver Used for Debasement
Using Mean Using Median Using Mean Using Median
Third Issue
8.7 11.1 8.2 10.3
Fourth Issue
10.8 10.4 9.5 9.2
Notes: The methodo

median refer to the
50 percent. I assume t
issue of the nomism
of the silver coin, t
nomismata to
which are deba
the debasement
would have bee
ply replaced hal
fineness. From
the debased tet
a quarter of the
If we assume
nomismata, a f
the year 1025,
435,000 and 55
estimate how
ported, as the p
campaign, varie
for simple sold
paign in the ni
that the war a
not only emplo
east to the war
As shown in Table 2 the debasement of the fourth issue resulted in
roughly the same percentage gains in terms of extra coins minted as the third
issue; in other words it was merely a measure to maintain, not increase the
level of nominal spending achieved by the earlier debasement. The fact that
the fourth issue was also debased means that the authorities felt they could
repeat it without the risk of an immediate backlash from recipients of sala-
77Haldon, Warfare, p. 126.

78 Cost estimate is from Treadgold, Byzantium, p. 189.
Debasement 789
TABLE 3
ATTRIBUTION OF GAINS FROM COINAGE MANIPULATION
Third Issue Fourth Issue
Using Mean Using Median Using Mean Using Median
Issue of tetarteron 4.35 4.35 0 0

Debasement of tetarteron 2.75 4.0 7.33 7.13
Debasement of nomisma 1.63 2.72 3.45 3.30
Total (percentage) 8.73 11.07 10.78 10.43
Notes: Each number represents the extra coins minted as
caused by each type of coinage manipulation. The calcula
pendix 1 and were done as follows. Firstly, I calculated the
the new issue consisted of 50 percent tetartera, but with no
tetarteron. This gives us the first line of the table. Then I
tetarteron, which gave me an additional gain in coins, show
debasement of the nomisma and the extra coins minted as a
simplicity, I ignored any cross-product effects, which are
gain is recorded from the issue of tetartera in the fourth is
was the same as in the third issue.
ries. We are in no position to know, however

to pay higher salaries to compensate for the
Assuming the fourth issue has been correct
tion arises as to why the authorities continue
war had ended. There are several reasons. Fir
necessarily spell an end to the government
had not ended successfully and the emperor
pay a tribute to the Pechenegs. There must
the lands occupied by the aggressors.80 Se
Pechenegs remained, despite the peace treaty
war was resumed by Emperor Isaac Comn
the throne just two years after Constantine
emperor could not alleviate the financial cond
troops without putting the empire at risk ag
the emperor had to fight off Turkish incurs
massive issue oftetartera and the accompanyi
sion and uncertainty that must have affected
us clearly that the emperor employed aggres
years before the end of his reign, the period
took place.82
79 See what follows for a discussion on the available wag

80 This will have included loss of trade tax, the so-called
dating to the late tenth century show the presence of kommer
of this tax. (Stephenson, Byzantium's Balkan Frontier, pp
82 Attaleiates, Historia, p. 102 (section 50).
790 Kaplanis
CRITIQUE OF THE EXPANSIONIST THESIS
My critique of the expansionist thesis does not depend on the hypothesis

that the economy was expanding at the time. I will simply argue that even
if the economy was expanding, the debasement could not have been a direct
response to this phenomenon.
The most general argument against the expansionist hypothesis has al-
ready been mentioned in the context of the analytical framework developed
to model the emperor's decision problem. If the expansionist hypothesis is
true and the debasement had no fiscal causes, then by definition the emperor
took this step not to increase his short-term spending but because he judged
that there would be some long-term benefit to him and the empire. Whereas
it is always possible that a far-seeing and benevolent emperor might have
worried about the monetary constraints to the on-going economic expansion
and might have wanted to do something about it, the proposition that he
would risk paying the army and the civil servants less gold, that he would
surreptitiously dilute the fineness of the coin that bore his own effigy and
was for centuries a symbol of his and the empire's power, that he would put
at risk the stability of the monetary system by tampering with its center-
piece, just in order to facilitate the conduct of business by merchants and
traders, a class that was undeniably considered inferior by him and the ruling
landowning class, is simply beyond credibility.83
Beyond this general point, there are other more specific points which
argue against this hypothesis. As mentioned earlier, gold coins were used
mainly to pay taxes and in large transactions. On the other hand, the state
discouraged the payment of taxes in silver and bronze coins, which allowed
them to be used in commercial transactions. Now we know that not only was
the silver coinage not debased by Constantine IX, but also that silver which
could have been used to mint more silver coins was used instead to alloy the
gold coin. If the government was worried about accommodating private
economic activity why would it choose to debase only the gold coinage at
the expense of the more "transaction friendly" silver coin?
The obvious reason why the silver coinage was not debased was that none
or few of the obligations of the state were expressed in silver so there would
have been no gains from a debasement. Evidence from coin finds suggests in
fact that there was a drop in silver coin issuance in the eleventh century which
could partly be explained by the fact that silver was used to alloy the gold coin.
Furthermore, if the state was interested in facilitating transactions, why
would it reintroduce the tetarteron side by side with the nomisma and issue
83 Although it is true that Constantine IX Monomachus opened the doors to the senate to people in
the market in order to gain their support, this does not imply either that the centuries-long prejudice
towards merchants and traders had changed, nor of course that Constantine was willing to sacrifice the
interests of his own employees in favor of this class. See Angold, Byzantine Empire, p. 94.
Debasement 791
it in such large amounts, making transactions more confusing than before?

In private transactions involving gold coins, individuals would always prefer
to pay with the light weight tetarteron rather than the nomisma, as sellers
were legally obliged to accept it at par with the latter. The only payment
which did not afford an advantage to the tetarteron was the payment of taxes
which were collected by weight; thus the use of the nomisma would have
been confined to that. This would have certainly complicated, not facilitated,
private transactions, and Skylitzes himself comments on how the introduc-
tion of the tetarteron by Nicephorus II (963-969) had made transactions
difficult.84 We find evidence for such difficulties in an incident in the Life
of St. Lazarus describing how a monk wanted to pay for a psalter with a
tetarteron but was refused by the seller who demanded a nomisma.85
One can imagine how much more complicated transactions would have
become when Constantine IX combined the reintroduction of the tetarteron
with a debasement, at substantially different rates, of both the nomisma and
the tetarteron. The debasement could have led to hoarding of older coins of
higher fineness, reducing the number of gold coins available for commercial
transactions even further. Alternatively it could have led to old coins trading
at a premium. Documents show that coins had names to distinguish them
from others of different quality. For example the last issue of Constantine
which suffered the largest debasement had a name designating it, the
"Stellatus," which, in Morrisson's words, was "... peut-etre ... le signe
d'une attention portee aux valeurs variables des pieces ..."86 However, if
every time there was a transaction involving gold coins they had to be as-
sayed, or the price had to vary according to a prior belief as to the actual
gold content of the coin, with all the uncertainties that entailed, the result of
the debasement would have been to hinder, not help transactions. This
higher cost of the use of gold coins as a medium of exchange would have led
to a fall in their velocity of circulation.
This leads us to the claim that an unchanged price level after the debase-
ment is evidence that it was absorbed by a higher number of transactions.
Using Fisher's equation (MV = PT) Morrisson assumes that velocity (V) was
constant so the increase in the money supply (M) as a result of the debase-
ment was absorbed by a higher number of transactions (T) leaving prices (P)
constant. P is defined in terms of the current nomisma. However we have
seen already that V must have fallen; this implies that if prices did remain
unchanged that could have been a result of the increase in Mbeing offset by
the fall in V and not by an increase in T.
8 Skylitzes, Synopsis, p.275.

85Acta Sanctorum, 3 November (Brussels, 1910), p. 536, quoted in Ahrweiler, "Nouvelle
Hypothese," p. 5.
86. ... perhaps ... the sign of attention paid to the variable values of coins. ." Morrisson, "Deval-
uation," pp. 13-14.
792 Kaplanis
Even in the unrealistic case where V is constant, stability in prices after

a debasement is not sufficient to distinguish between the fiscal and the ex-
pansionist hypothesis. Let us assume without loss of generality that the only
component in the price index is agricultural goods produced by farmers. Let
us also assume that the only reason farmers need coins is to pay their taxes.
When they go to sell their produce they notice that they are paid in debased
coins. Should they raise their prices? Not if they intend simply to transfer
those coins as tax payments to the government.
To distinguish between the two hypotheses one needs to observe the
behavior of prices both before and after the debasement. Economic expan-
sion would lead to an increase in the demand for coinage which would be
reflected in a fall in prices before the debasement, assuming a constant ve-
locity of circulation of money. The authorities would then respond by in-
creasing the supply through a debasement. The debasement would then
bring prices back to their original level.
Unfortunately we do not have sufficiently frequent price data around the
debasement to know exactly what happened. Morrisson herself admits the
price data available to us are sparse.87 Antoniadis-Bibicou, in her study of
prices and salaries in the eleventh century, finds that the roga (pension)
granted to a protospatharios remained the same at 1 pound and that of a
magistros at 20 pounds during the period 912 to 1074.88 However, the
stability of payments to state dignitaries could merely suggest that they
received a lower real payment and implies nothing about the stability of the
general level of prices. With respect to prices, Antoniades-Bibicou dis-
cusses those of slaves and of corn. She only has one example for a slave in
the eleventh century, derived from non-legal sources, and she finds it too
high to be realistic. Similarly, no set of corn prices is provided for the pe-
riod 1042-1068.
Later studies by Jean-Claude Cheynet, Elisabeth Malamut, and Morrison
and by Morrisson and Cheynet do not change the fact that the price data for
the eleventh century are inconclusive.89 There are very few prices for land
transactions and they are too specific to allow any generalizations. The same
applies for vines, animals, and houses. There are four prices for slaves in the
eleventh century, including the one mentioned previously. A slave was sold
for 20 nomismata before 1050 and another slave for 24 nomismata in
1059-a result that is certainly not conclusive but also not inconsistent with
a price increase to match the debasement. With respect to the price of corn,
the authors believe that the normal price in Constantinople in the first half
of the eleventh century was 1/12 nomisma per modios.90 The same price
87Morrisson, "Devaluation," p. 18.

88Antoniades-Bibicou, "Demographie."
89Cheynet et al., "Prix"; and Morrisson and Cheynet, "Prices."
90 A modios (thalassios) of wheat weighed 12.8 kg (Schilbach, Metrologie, p. 95).
Debasement 793
prevailed in Miletos in Asia Minor in 1073 but, as the authors note, this
effectively represents an appreciable increase in the price of corn because
Miletos produced corn and the price would be expected to be lower there.
Other prices available during the tenth and eleventh centuries show consid-
erable variation in the price of corn, which the authors ascribe to supply
conditions.91 The data on army and others' salaries are not refined enough
to provide any clues either. Given the data available, we cannot conclude
that prices did or did not adjust during this period.
At the time of the Byzantine debasement there were important monetary
developments in both the Muslim and the western Christian world: the for-
mer had been struck from the late tenth century by the so-called silver fam-
ine, characterized by an almost complete cessation of the striking of silver.
There was also a widespread depreciation of the silver coinage in Italy and
France.92 Could there have been a general shortage of precious metals that
led to these debasements?
In an important article Andrew Watson claimed that "much of the evi-
dence which has been used to support the thesis of a bullion famine has been
misread" and that "when governments resorted to debasement to finance
their activities, it was more likely because of overspending or fiscal inade-
quacy than because of a general shortage of precious metals."93 Although I
agree with this conclusion as far as the Byzantine debasement is concerned,
it would still be interesting to examine whether there was a shortage of
precious metals in our period of interest.
There are two ways by which a shortage of precious metals could have
developed. The first one is a drop in the production of domestic mines. We
have some evidence that this did not occur. An analysis of the content of the
coins debased before 1070 reveals that this was carried out by the addition
of fresh supplies of unrefined gold ore. By determining the lead trace in the
coins, Jean-Noel Barrandon was able to distinguish between alloys formed
by the addition ofunpurified ore and those formed by the addition of molten
silver coins.94 He found that the debasement before 1070 was effected purely
by the addition of ore which contained a large proportion of silver, perhaps
up to 30 percent. Using this information with the observed rate of debase-
ment, one is able to calculate the weight of new metal added to the mixture.
Morrisson found that large amounts of fresh metal were necessary to carry
out the debasements before 1070.95 Applying this methodology (see Appen-
dix 2) to the third issue of the nomisma, which we assume coincided with
91 See a similar kind of observation in the context of a fifteenth-century French debasement by

Sussman, "Debasements," p. 61.
92 Grierson, Catalogue, p. 42; and Watson, "Back to Gold," pp. 2-3.
93 Watson, "Back to Gold," p. 31.
94 "Les methodes d'analyse des monnaies d'or," in Morrisson et al., L 'Or monnaye, pp. 33-34.
95L 'Or monnaye, p. 144.
794 Kaplanis
the first issue of the tetarteron, we find that the weight of new ore, assumed
to be 70 percent gold and 30 percent silver, amounted to no less than 36
percent of the weight of the original coins that entered into the mixture.96 If
the four issues of Constantine were spaced at roughly equal intervals this
would imply that around ten percent of annual revenues came from freshly
mined metal. This is a high percentage and not one that would suggest a
sudden fall in mining production.
Some of these fresh supplies of metal are likely to have come from mines
reconquered during the wars of the tenth century. One of the largest mining
areas in the empire was in the Taurus mountains about 40 km north-west of
the Cilician Gates (currently called Bolkardag). Nicephorus II Phocas
(963-969) captured the whole of Cilicia in 965 when Tarsus surrendered, so
presumably the Byzantines were then free to exploit these mines.97
The second way by which a shortage of precious metals could have
developed is an increase in the export of precious metals. Although the state
had legislated against such exports, it would have found it hard to prevent
such outflows. In some cases it actually encouraged trade with hostile no-
mads across the Danube in order to deter them from raiding. Much of the
numismatic evidence of the eleventh century comes from the Danube fron-
tier and the north-east Balkans.98 Although some of this can be explained
by military presence in those regions, it is also evidence of substantial
cross-frontier trading which probably began with the signing of a commer-
cial treaty with the Rus in 911. It is, therefore, quite possible that the empire
suffered an increase in the net outflow of precious metals as a result of this
increased trade.99 There is, however, no way we can tell whether outflows
from trade matched or exceeded the increase in domestic production of gold
and silver.
96 See also Morrisson's derivation of the formula estimating the proportion of new metal added in
L 'Or monnaye, pp. 141-43. For the choice of 70-30 see Morrison et al., L 'Or monnaye, p. 143. In my
estimation I make the simplifying assumption that all the coins to be reminted belonged to the previous
(second) issue of Constantine IX.
97 In one of the mines a coin of Romanus III (1028-1034) was found, showing clearly that it was
active during this period: Pitarakis, "Mines Anatoliennes," p. 174.
98 Metcalf, Coinage in South-Eastern Europe, p. 67.
99 The law against the export ofprecious metals may seem contradictory to the fact that the Byzantine
state signed a commercial treaty with the Rus in 911 which led to a substantial increase in imports such
as wax, honey, and slaves. However, as Shepard, "Constantinople," says, the explanation for this treaty
"lies less in the realm of trade ... than in Byzantine diplomacy" (p. 259). In other words the state
offered trading facilities to the threatening Rus in order to deter them from raiding. The encouragement
of trading to prevent raiding is also suggested by Stephenson ("Byzantium's Balkan Frontier," p. 45)
in the case of the Magyars who sold salt to the Byzantines in exchange for jewelry and so on. In his
own words, "political considerations overrode any economic concerns, and business was conducted
according to the principle that trading prevented raiding." The Byzantine state was so worried about
the massive increase in trade with the Rus that in 944 it introduced restrictions (such as imposing a
maximum value of silks that could be bought by each Rus).
Debasement 795
CONCLUSION
I have argued that the debasement of the nomisma ordered by Consta

IX Monomachus in the latter half of his reign was connected with the f
emergency caused by the protracted and difficult war he waged against
Pechenegs, a war whose importance has been ignored by many histo
The debasement of the nomisma was part of a wider coinage manipu
involving a substantial issue of a light-weight gold coin, the tetarte
which was also debased and was probably used to pay the active troops. T
sacrifice of the nomisma came about reluctantly, with most of the proc
from the manipulation coming from the debased tetarteron. The co
manipulation raised the nominal amount of spending by about ten pe
in each of the last two issues of Constantine.
I have also argued that the widely accepted hypothesis that the debase-
ment was the emperor's response to economic expansion in the face of an
inelastic supply of precious metals has no theoretical or empirical support
within the Byzantine modus operandi. If anything, the coinage manipula-
tion ordered by Constantine would have hindered, not helped economic
expansion.
The Byzantine gold coin was considered by successive Byzantine
emperors for over seven hundred years as a symbol of prestige and power.
Although its international circulation did not offer any direct financial bene-
fit in terms of seigniorage, it did enhance the image of both the emperor and
the empire abroad. The debasement ordered by Constantine IX
Monomachus cost the nomisma its position as the "dollar of the middle
ages" and paved the way for its eventual replacement by the Florin in the
thirteenth century.
Appendix 1: Estimating the Gains from the

Debasement and the Issue of the Tetarteron
The amount of gold is the same before and after reminting. We ignore any fresh amount
of gold entered into the mixture as our purpose is to estimate the increase in the number of
coins as a result of the debasement and the minting of tetartera, relative to the number
received in taxes and thus available for reminting
NoWnfn + Towno = N1wnfn + Tlwtf (1)

where N and T represent the number of nomismata and tetartera respectively, W' and w'
their respective weights in grams and/" andj' their respective finenesses (percentage ofw
in gold). The subscript 0 refers to the period before reminting and 1 to the period after.
Let us now concentrate on the third issue of the nomisma which we assume to have been
coincident with the first issue of the tetarteron under Constantine IX. Define V to be the
additional number of coins minted using the assumption that there were no tetartera in
circulation before the third issue (i.e., To = 0)
796 Kaplanis
V N1 + T, -No (2)
We assume that the weight of the nomis

and that silver was added to maintain the
in L 'Or Monnaye, we assume that this wa
melting down existing silver coins. Howev
used in the mixture could have been used
(S) added in the mixture is given as follo
S = w"N + w'T - w"No (3)
Given that there were 12 silver miliaresia to the nomism

tional new coins minted, Vs, as a proportion of the origin
V"/IN= V- 12w"m) N (4)
where wm is the weight of the miliaresion.

Using equations 2, 3, and 4 we have that
N, I w0
vs/No = N- 1
Given that the weight of the
equation 1 we can express N1
and the proportion of tetarter
both of which we have estima
Vs N(12Wi
12wIn + 1 I wn)(
- 12wm w' w (6)
where a N
f 12 )1 1-k
Noting that r = wl/1

representing the net
debasement and the in
the nomisma during
Vs/No=(a-1)(1-r)+ (ak 1 - )l (7)

Let us now consider the fourth issue of the nomisma which we assume coincided with
the second issue of the tetarteron. We assume that the number of gold coins received in
taxes was the same as the year before the third issue; in other words there was no increase
in nominal tax revenue even though there was an increase in nominal expenditure as result
of the issue of tetartera and the debasement. Furthermore, as the tetarteron was debased
more than the nomisma, a rational taxpayer would prefer to pay as great a proportion of
his taxes in tetartera as possible. This implies that the government would receive all the
Debasement 797
tetartera it had issued back, the balance con

third issue, we cannot assume that To = 0.
system, so we assume instead that the state
as it received in taxation i.e., k = T, / (T7 +
It can be shown, using a similar approach a
the tax revenues arising from the debasemen
sumed coincident debasement of the second is
0 , I70~ 1 1r
fo+ 12 1i-k )
where I =
where (f 12 l-kf
A represents a kind of weighted ratio of the finenesses before and after the debasement. I
the fourth issue, as the proportion of tetartera minted was kept the same as before, all t
savings arose from the debasement of the two gold coins.
Appendix 2: Estimating the Amount of New Meta

Added During the Debasement
Let Mbe the mass of new metal consisting only of gold and silver. We can theoretically
divide the silver contained in this new metal into that which goes to debase the existin
coins to be reminted, and that which is combined with the gold contained in this new met
to produce new coins. Thus we have
M S+ AS+ G (9)
where S is the mass of the silver used

silver and G the amount of gold in t
additional coins. Define b as the (know
G
b= ((10)
M
The remaining notation is the same as that used in Appendix 1. The average gold content
in the new issue (which can be estimated), c, is given as follows
Nwnfn + t f n + (11)
Nlwn + Tlw ' I lk
12(1- k)
Coins produced using only the new metal will by definition have the same gold content
as the average gold content in the new issue, that is
798 Kaplanis
G G
c= - (12)
G+ AS M-S (12)
Using equations 10 and 12 we obtain an expr
cS
M= - - (13)
c-b
We can now obtain an expression using known variables of the ne

proportion of the weight of the original mixture
( 11 ka
cla+ -1
M cS ca 121 (1-
n = ~~= (14)
Now" c-b c-b
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The Debasement of the "Dollar of the Middle Ages"

reasons for medieval debasements, which has mainly concentrated on west-

THE COURSE OF THE DEBASEMENT

In the absence of any documentary evidence of the debasement d

3 Recent articles include Rolnick et al., "Debasement Puzzle"; Sussman, "Debasements"; Gl

8 Morrisson et al., L 'Or monnaye, pp. 216-17.

Emperor N Mean Median Range N Mean Median Range

0 Morrisson et al., L 'Or monnaye, pp. 224-31.

Note: Fineness is the mean percentage gold content shown in Table 1.

PREVIOUS STUDIES AND EXPLANATIONS OF THE DEBASEMENT DURING

The debasement that occurred in the eleventh century was firs

THE BYZANTINE MONETARY SYSTEM IN THE ELEVENTH CENTURY

Before examining the debasement, it is useful to outline the basic By

19 Morrisson, "Devaluation," pp. 29-30.

economy was through government expenditure, which consisted largely of

COINAGE MANIPULATION AS A FISCAL SOLUTION

An emperor could do several things to deal with a short-term fin

31 Philotheus, Kletorologion, (ninth century), in Bury, Imperial Administrative System, p.

36 Hendy, "From Public to Private," p. 33.

Rolnick, Francois Velde, and Warren

DEBASEMENT AND THE EMPEROR'S DECISION PROBLEM

The emperor considering debasement of the currency has to balanc

46 Sussman, "Debasements," pp. 52-54. Rolnick et al., "Debasement Puzzle," p. 802.

On the contrary, if economic growth is associated with higher tax revenues

THE FISCAL PROBLEM OF CONSTANTINE IX

The purpose of this section is to attempt to demonstrate that the deb

50 Haldon, Recruitment and Warfare; and Treadgold, Byzantium.

measures for tax collection employed in Iberia and Mesopotamia.60

THE PECHENEG WAR

So all the historians agree that Constantine faced a fiscal problem, b

60 Cecaumenus, Strategikon, p. 79 (section 20).

MONETARY RESPONSE TO THE FISCAL EMERGENCY

GAINS FROM COINAGE MANIPULATION

Let us assume then, based on Grierson's hypothesis, that Constantine IX

76 See Morrisson, "Byzantine Money," p. 944.

Using Mean Using Median Using Mean Using Median

Notes: The methodo

77Haldon, Warfare, p. 126.

Third Issue Fourth Issue

Using Mean Using Median Using Mean Using Median

Issue of tetarteron 4.35 4.35 0 0

ries. We are in no position to know, however

79 See what follows for a discussion on the available wag

CRITIQUE OF THE EXPANSIONIST THESIS

My critique of the expansionist thesis does not depend on the hypothesis

it in such large amounts, making transactions more confusing than before?

8 Skylitzes, Synopsis, p.275.

Even in the unrealistic case where V is constant, stability in prices after

87Morrisson, "Devaluation," p. 18.

91 See a similar kind of observation in the context of a fifteenth-century French debasement by

I have argued that the debasement of the nomisma ordered by Consta

Appendix 1: Estimating the Gains from the

NoWnfn + Towno = N1wnfn + Tlwtf (1)

We assume that the weight of the nomis

S = w"N + w'T - w"No (3)

Given that there were 12 silver miliaresia to the nomism

V"/IN= V- 12w"m) N (4)

where wm is the weight of the miliaresion.

Noting that r = wl/1

Vs/No=(a-1)(1-r)+ (ak 1 - )l (7)

tetartera it had issued back, the balance con

Appendix 2: Estimating the Amount of New Meta