The Greco Turkish War of 1897

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THE UNIVERSITY
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Thé Greco-Turkish War

of 1897
~10
The
Grtcwturkisb (flaw of I897
From Official Sources
by a
German Staff Officer

translated by '
Frederica Bolton
With 21 Portraits and 6 Maps
LONDON
SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & Co., Lim.
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Contents
Page
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Origin and Cause of the War . . . . . 14
Greece before the War . . . . . . . . 31
The Greek Army System . . . . . . . . . . 38
TheGreekFleet............. 57
The Military System of Turkey . . . . . . 61
The Turkish Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
The Theatre of War . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
The First Array of the two Armies . . . . . In
The Beginning of the War . . . - . . . . 118
The Advance into and Occupation of Thessaly . . 140
From Larissa to Pharsala . . . . . . . I54
The Battle of Domokos . . . . . . . . . 186
The Battles at the Furka Pass ami the Othrys Range . 204
The Greek and Turkish Operations . . . . . . . 218
The War in Epirus . . . . , 222
The Operations at Sea . . . . . . . . . 247
The Conclusion of Peace . . . . . . . . . . 253;
The Net Results of the War . . . . . . . . 265
Riza Pasha . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
Vocabulary to explain the maps.
Albanien, Albania;
Batterie, battery;
Befestigungen, fortifications, intrenchments;
Corps-Artillerie7 artillery of the corps;
Canal, canal;
Defilée, defiles;
Defileen, defiles;
Eisenbahn, railway;
G: = Golf, gulf;
Grenze, frontier;
Griechenland, Greece;
Griech.: = griechisch = Greek (Adjective);
Infanten'e, Infantry;
Jonisch, Ionian;
km = Kilometer = 5/8 English mile;
Marsch = march;
Meer = sea;
in: = Meter = 3937 inches, e: g: 2070 m = 67913 ft.
11: = nach, to, towards;
O = Ost, east;
Pass, pass;
Recognoscirung, reconnoitring;
Riickzug, retreat;
S: = See, lake;
Tempethal, vale of Thempe;
Th: : Thal, dale, valley, vale;
Thessalien, Thessaly;
verschanzt : intrenched;
V. 1 von, of, or, from.
INTRODUCTION.
The sanguinary war between Turkey and Greece,
arising out of the revolt in Crete and the sub
sequent conflicts there, was suddenly and rapidly
brought to an end through the intervention of the '
Great European Powers. Nevertheless, in conse
quence of the community of European interests con
cerned in the preservation of peace, the hostile
encounter between the two nations roused the
sympathy and attracted the attention of all Europe
in a very remarkable degree, it being felt that
every complication in the East contains the germ
of further conflict, of which no one can foretell
the ultimate issue. i‘
Germany, although not immediately concerned in

the conflicting interests existing in the Balkan
Peninsula, followed with lively sympathy the course
' of events in Thessaly and Epirus during April and
May,1897, and for reasons of its own watched them
attentively.
2 THE WAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
The eyes of Germany were rivetted more

especially upon Turkey, not only because the
course of the war and its termination excited
greater political sympathy, but because it was the
first time since Prussian Officers had acted as
instructors to the Turkish Army and had made
their influence as teachers and organisers felt, that
this Army had entered upon a wide field of military
activity, and afforded an opportunity of testing the
results of German training.
The numerous military successes achieved by

the Turkish Army during the campaign, and the
rapid and energetic blows delivered which crushed
the military opposition of the enemy, were fully
appreciated in Germany, and confirmed the opinion
that the thoroughness which characterised the
conduct as well as the operations of the war, is
largely to be attributed to the careful and laborious
work of German Officers.
In the Ottoman Army this has been repeatedly

admitted and acknowledged. The numerous dis
tinctions and signs of deference which greet the
German Officer, the missions entrusted to him, the
spheres of influence accorded to him, the support
given in laying the foundation of reforms dictated
by the spirit of modern times, have secured
INTRODUCTION. 3
Germans a highly honourable and important position

on the Bosphorus.
During the war just ended this position made
itself felt in many ways. One particular occurrence
which the “Times” correspondent at Turkish Head
Quarters relates at the time of the occupation of
Larissa is characteristic.
He says: “I returned to the town somewhat
late one evening from a ride, accompanied by a
Circassian. As we approached the closed gates
the Turkish sentinel’s challenge, “Who goes there?”
rang out in the silence of the night. “German
Pasha” returned my escort without hesitation.
Since I did not know the watchword, I placidly
accepted my title of German Pasha until I had
gained admittance. Then, however, I cried: “I am
an Englishman".
The gate opened, and I saw that the guard
had turned out and were presenting arms. I asked
the Officer of the watch the reason of this and
he answered: “Because, Sir, you are a German
Officer”.
We need not apologize for giving a slight
sketch of the work of the Prussian instructors and
of the results attained.
When, at the end of the seventies, the Sultan
expressed to the Emperor William 1. his desire to
1*
attach several German Officers to the Turkish

service, with a view to a complete reorganisation
of the army, the late monarch selected Colonel Kaehler,
Majors v. Hobe and Kamphovener, and Captain
Ristow. A year previously the Prussian Commissariat
Councillor von Schilgen had entered the Com
missariat branch of the Turkish service. These
Officers were all raised to the rank of Pasha, and
signed a contract for three years, at the expiration
of which they were to return to the Prussian
service. The Sultan received all these Officers
personally, and assigned to each the task of draw
ing up a detailed report on the department
entrusted to him.
General Kaehler was instructed to report on the
organisation of the General Staff. Major Kamp
hovener had, in addition to other duties assigned to
him, the special task of reporting on the Infantry;
Major v. Hobe was to report on the Cavalry,
Capt. Ristow on the Artillery, and v. Schilgen on
the Commissariat. All these Officers were invested
with ample authority, and each had assigned to
him a Turkish Adjutant, by whose help he was
enabled to obtain all necessary information.
The instructors began their work with zeal, and
each sought, within the sphere allotted to him, to
gain that particular point of view that would enable
INTRODUCTION. 5
him to see what changes were needed, before

making the proposals for the actual reforms to be
recommended. The reports submitted were laid
before two Commissions, of which one was to pass
an opinion on the military, the other on the financial
aspect of the recommendations.
Abdul Hamid Subsequently approved of the
majority of the reforms recommended by the military
commission for the reorganisation of the army. The
reforms proposed included the foundation of the
Army organisation which is still in force, a remodelling
of the army in Army-Corps and Divisions, and a
division of the Country into twelve districts, a
complete re-armament of the forces, the creation of
reserves &c.
In the year 1883 Baron von der Goltz of the Head
Quarter Staff joined the Officers already engaged
at Constantinople. This step was taken in order to
provide the directing hand required for the entire
remodelling of the Turkish military system.
The striking services rendered by Baron von
der Goltz on the Turkish Head- Quarter Staff,
the solid merit of his literary work, the ver
satility of his acquirements and knowledge, added
to his social gifts, very soon won for this Officer
the particular regard of the Padishah, and the cor
dial sympathyof the military circles of Constantinople.
Duringthe years I 883—i 886 Baron von der Goltz’s

attention was more particularly turned to the reorgani
sation of the military schools. He set to work
to alter the French methods of instruction and the
curriculum laid down according to old-fashioned
French models. More especially new courses of
study and particularly practical exercises which had
been entirely neglected, such as exercises in field
days, trial rides on horseback with set problems
to solve, journeys and marches required of a Head
Quarter Stafi, were gradually introduced. Habits
of activity thus encouraged bore good fruit, as the
war just terminated has shown. Seyfulla Pasha and
Enver Pasha, Whose names have been so frequently
mentioned with great honour, were the students or
the earlier courses of instruction in which they gave
proof of brilliant ability and zeal.
The military schools made good progress in the
twelve years 1883—1895, during which Baron
von der Goltz was the Inspector General of
Education, inclusive of the preparatory schools. The
number of students rose from 4,000 to 14,000.
From the year 1886 Goltz Pasha undertook, in
addition to his post as Inspector General, the post
of Sub-Inspector General held till his death by
General Kaehler, and was entrusted by the Sultan
with the plans for the reform of the army. The
INTRODUCTION. 7
plan of Army Reform drawn up by von der Goltz

in 1886 was approved by the Sultan and was
carried out in all its essentials before the end of
the year 1893. It serves as the foundation of the
present organisation of the Turkish military force
and includes the following;
I ) The introduction of universal conscription among
the Mahommedans by means of a new Recruit
ing Act.
2) The remodelling of the Reserves and the
“Landwehr” by a regulation for Reserves and
“Landwehr.”
3) The constitution of the “Landsturm”, as well as
of supernumeraries and reserve-battalions in war on
the basis of corresponding regulations, as well as
the creation of new reserves, and of a second class
of supernumeraries.
4) Preparations for the mobilisation of the forces.
5) A new division of the Whole Empire into
24 Divisional, 48 Brigade, 96 Regimental, and
384 Battalion districts.
6) A new law for taxes to be paid in kind, so as to
facilitate the collection of transport in time of war.
7) The new regulations for troops of the line in the
year 189 5.
For each and all of these fundamental arrange
ments for the military force of the nation, Goltz
Pasha made the plan and saw it carried out.

With untiring energy he overcame the oppo
sition which constantly placed obstacles in his way,
and more than once he carried the introduction of
a measure by making it the condition of his con
tinuing in the Service, i. e. of the renewal of his
contract. That the reorganisation, which was
proved to be absolutely necessary by the mobili
sation against Greece in 1885, was proceeded with
at all, is due solely to the unwearied efforts of this
Officer.
Besides the work already mentioned, the per
formance of which was surrounded by the greatest
difficulties, General von der Goltz also turned his
attention to the practical training of the Officers in
the various branches of Head-Quarter Staff service,
and himself undertook Staff journeys, organised
sham fights, cavalry manoeuvres in the open country
&c. Parz' passu with these practical labours he
published the following works in the Turkish
language, which had a large circulation:
1. A Handbook for the Officer in the Field.
2. Tactical Problems and Examples.
3. Head-Quarter Staff Service (2 Pts.).
4. Instruction Book on the Attack and Defence
of Forts in War.
5, Instruction Book on Service in the Field.
INTRODUCTION. 9
These works contain 3000 printed pages. No. 1

has gone through four editions, No. 5 through three.
The proceeds of these works were handed over to
the printing press of the military schools.
From this many-sided and far-reaching activity
of the Prussian General, who was at once Quarter
Master General, Instructor- General in Tactics,
Commander in Chief and Chief Engineer, as well
as Historian and Reorganiser, the very best results
have followed.
His fertile activity in the direction of army
organisation, of military education and Staff-reform, had
an influence that made itself felt more especially in
the development of the Turkish plan of operations
against Greece in 1885, when war was imminent,
and was acknowledged in the most honourable
manner by the Sultan. Six months before von der
Goltz’s withdrawal from the army, His Majesty be
stowed on him the dignity of Field Marshal in
April, 1895, and presented him with a costly sword
of honour. At his official farewell Goltz was
received in private audience by the Commander of
the Faithful, who thanked him for the distinguished
services rendered to himself and to his army, and
expressed a hope that the parting might not be
final, and that the Turkish military authorities might
yet look forward to his return and gain further
advantage from his animating influence and activity.

The General honoured with such distinction has
meanwhile, as is well-known, returned to the army
in his native country, in which he holds a high
command.
The German Army may well be proud of again
seeing him in its ranks, and of knowing that his
talents and his powers are again at its service.
Of the remaining Officers, all have risen high in
the Turkish service. Lieut. Col. Grumbkow (Grumb
kow Pasha) was entrusted with the training of the
artillery, and, within certain limits, with the super
vision of its arms and ammunition, as well as of
the men.
Grumbkow Pascha won the special favour
of the Sultan by his energetic action against
Larissa, and by the bold stroke which led to his
occupation of the town.
WVhen the German reformers entered the
Turkish service in 1883, they found the people in
the same military condition in which they had
fought the Russians six years before. The Moslem
soldiers, who form excellent material for an
army, were without suitable or trained leaders;
they stood in need of the systematic,
practical, application of the arts of war during a
period of peace. The machinery of administration
INTRODUCTION. 1I
was clumsy, the cog-Wheels had no grip. Oppor

tunism, belief in a blind Fate, and the habits of
contemplation and of procrastination regulated their
actions.
Things have indeed altered since the creative
activity of German Officers, during a decade and a
half, impressed on the Ottoman army the main
outlines of European military practice in regard to
organisation, equipment, training, mobilisation, and
administration, and brought it somewhat nearer to
the level of the other armies on the continent of
Europe. .
In a country where an imperial permit — to be
obtained With much trouble and difficulty —— is
necessary before a company of infantry, or of
artillery, can be taken out for target practice, or a
cavalry squadron can undertake a ride to reconnoitre,
Where much time is spent, and lost, in testing and
examining the simplest report by committees and
superior committees, —— in such a country every
real practical result indicates a vast expenditure of
effort, fortitude, tact, and patience. And this
expenditure was made possible by the honest, steady,
and painstaking exertions of the German Officers,
who, whilst rendering useful service to a foreign
government, have secured to their own country the
honour of opening up a new career of military
power and military efficiency to amighty and friendly

nation.
The following pages are intended to give a
short general outline of the course of the war,
without in any way claiming to be an historical
publication, for which the time has not yet arrived.
The vague and varying assertions of individual
leaders, the contradictory testimony of eye-witnesses,
the defective accounts from the various seats of
war, make it clear that a careful arrangement and
examination of available material cannot as yet be
undertaken.
The sources from which this narrative has been
drawn are mostly the notes and communications
of the English and German War Correspondents at
Head -Quarters, who undertook their duties with
praiseworthy energy and devotion, who followed
the course of events with acute powers of obser
vation, and who took pains to give, as far as
possible, an unbiased reproduction of their im
pressions and experiences.
An attempt has been made to depict actual
events from these notes, remarks, opinions, and
descriptions, and to trace the sketch with a light,
hand.
It is written in a popular style; it is a causerz'e
rather than a dissertation; it aims at collecting the
INTRODUCTION. 1 3.
scattered data for the sequence of events, and

stringing them together on a connecting thread,
with the object of placing before the reader the
striking characteristics which this latest campaign
afforded to the observer.
May this little work, intended to retain and fix
the fading outlines of the'war in the memory of
its contemporaries, be kindly received and leniently
judged!
14 THE \VAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
Origin and Cause of the War.
The prelude to the Turco-Greek war, which

after a lapse of years once again disturbed the
peace of Europe, was the revolt in Crete. This
quickly reawakened the ill-feeling between Turkey
and Greece, which, though dormant for more than
a decade, had always been existing below the surface,
since the conclusion of the peace of 1878. By
the terms of this peace the claims of Greece to
Thessaly and Epirus were to a certain extent
admitted, although the actual cession ofthese provinces
- was not alluded to.
In the year 1881, the Turco-Greek question
again arose. After somewhat lengthy negotiations
between the intervening Great Powers of Europe
and the Porte, conferences at Constantinople were
set on foot. Lengthy debates took place in which
Turkey strove to concede as little, and the Greeks
ORIGIN AND CAUSE OF THE WAR. 15
to demand as much, as each could; the latter

began to support and press their demands by
energetic preparations for war, more especially
with the object of obtaining the cession of the
districts situated to the south of the river Salamvria
in Thessaly, and to the south of the river Arta in
Epirus. The evacuation and cession of these
portions of the country were to be superintended
by international delegates, and after its accomplish
ment an accurate frontier line was to be fixed by
a further international commission.
The evacuation took place at the times assigned.
In November, 1881, the whole of the ceded districts
were occupied by the Greeks, and measures were
immediately taken for their administrative, military,
and parliamentary incorporation with the kingdom
of Greece.
As soon as Turkey felt assured of the peaceable
ending of this struggle, she sent 12,000 men into
Albania under Dervish Pasha to suppress all hope
of autonomy there. On the 202 of April he
overcame Ali Pasha at Verisovic, and compelled
the town of Prisrend, the centre of the disaffected
movement, to surrender.
So, for the time being, peace was restored to

the Balkan Peninsula.
When the war broke out in 1885 between Servia

and Bulgaria, the Greeks regarded it as an oppor
tunity for the fulfilment of their former desires, and
again proceeded to prepare for war. All the efforts
of the Great Powers, however, were directed to
prevent active measures being taken by Greece,
and in case of need they were prepared to resort
to force; for hostilities between the two states might
possibly have had the effect of provoking Russia or
France to come forward in support of Greece.
But the Greek Prime Minister declared that
Greece was prepared to insist upon her claims to
Thessaly and Epirus at all costs, and even to take
the field at once in support of them.
Greece was confident of success. The very first
movement made by Turkish troops would prove the
signal for rebellion in Albania and Macedonia, and
Europe would not look on placidly. On the 24;h of
January, 1886, a common note of the six Great
Powers followed, with the warning, that since there
was no existing justifiable cause for a war against
Turkey, and since such a war would be very dis
advantageous to the interests of peace and of inter
national commerce, the Powers could not permit
a naval attack upon Turkey on the part of Greece.
The answer of Greece, dated Feb. 3’3 set forth that
all hindrance to the free use of her forces was in
ORIGIN AND CAUSE OF THE WAR. I7
compatible with her independence, and that she

refused to be held responsible for the possible out
break of the conflict.
Greece continued her opposition, encouraged by
fresh hopes from the change of the ministry in
London. She felt she could reckon upon the with
drawal of Gladstone — the foe of Turkey — from
the European Concert, and upon his support for
Greece. But here she was mistaken. The new
minister for Foreign Affairs, Lord Rosebery, pur
sued the same policy in the East as his predecessor
without opening up any prospect of support for
Greece, and the King on the 42} of December
published a decree establishing a camp of exercise
for 12,000 men, and for carrying out various
other military preparations. The Opposition now
sided with the government, the Chamber approved
of its policy, and on the 142 of December, Dely
annis laid on the table a proposal for raising a credit
loan of 2,600,000 Drachmas (= L.104,000) for the
camp of exercise at Thebes, the calling-out of two
classes of the reserves, and for the purchase of
horses. The minister who thus identified himself
with a sort of general mobilisation, was the same
Delyannis who, in 1880, had aroused a similar ob
jectless national enthusiasm for the acquirement of
foreign territory, and in consequence had burdened
2
the 21/2 millions of his countrymen with the crush

ing load of a debt of 26 Millions in paper, and
555 Millions in gold.
Thereupon the Great Powers on the 262 of
April, 1886 sent Greece an ultimatum in which
disarmament was required within eight days, holding
Greece responsible in the event of refusal, and
demanding a decided answer. As Delyannis’ answer
to the ultimatum on the 272 of April was regarded
as quite unacceptable, the ambassadors of the Great
Powers (France excepted) left Athens on the
72 of May, and the chargés d’afi'aires who had been
left behind gave Delyannis notice on the 8t:h of May,
that the Greek coasts were declared to be in a
state of blockade. The immediate result of this
measure — a measure in the highest degree in
jurious to Greek commerce — was, that Delyannis on
the 92 of May handed in his resignation.
The formation of a new Cabinet was very
difficult; no one was willing to enter upon an
inheritance, which necessitated primarily the humi
liation of Greece. Tricoupis who now entered
upon the management of affairs soon came to
terms with the Porte after dismissing the Reserves,
and withdrawing the troops from the Turkish
frontier. On the 31;“ of May he informed the
governments of Berlin, Vienna, London, St. Peters
ORIGIN AND CAUSE OF THE WAR. IQ
burg and Rome that the disarmament had taken

place, and accordingly on the day following, the
representatives of these governments announced
to Tricoupis that the blockade was raised.
An outbreak of war was thus for the time
averted by the determined attitude of the Great
European Powers, but the national and religious
hatred which separates the two nations instead of
being allayed has continued since then to grow deeper
and more intense. This bitter feelingled to a fresh out
break in the spring of 1896; this time in the island of
Crete, where the Christian -— that is to say the
preponderating — Greek population of the island,
in spite of the amnesty declared by the humane
Governor Turkhan Pasha, came into open conflict
with the Turkish garrisons stationed there: a
relentless guerilla war ensued, with cruel excesses
on both sides, in which the Turks were almost invari
able worsted. On the 42 of July, representatives of the
Great Powers at Athens gave the Greek govern
ment the friendly advice that it should endeavour
to persuade the Cretans to accept the reforms offered
by the Porte; to this the Greek government replied
by declining all responsibility for the events in
Crete. The ambassadors of the Great Powers in
Constantinople then jointly addressed the Committee
of Reform in Crete, counselling the cessation of
2.
hostilities and urging the opening of negotiations for

a permanent peace. The basis proposed was the
financial independence of the island under aChristian
governor, with the right of retaining their own
custom receipts, and the removal of the Turkish
garrisons from the towns.
In the event of the Committee declining to accede
to these proposals, they were informed that Crete
would at once forfeit the sympathy of Europe.
Matters had, however, proceeded too far for con
ciliation, and further violent encounters took place;
the Turks were defeated at Rythmo on the
2 32 of July, and again at Canea on the 62 of August,
whereupon the representatives of all the provinces
appointed a provisional government in the place of the
Committee of Reform. Afiairs having thus reached
a climax, the Sultan on the 29‘:11 of August granted the
concessions proposed to him by the ambassadors of the
Great Powers, and on the 5'2 of September they were
accepted by the representatives of the rebels.
The revolt in Crete roused afresh the national
and religious fervour of the Greeks. The Panhellenic
ideal was revived in full vigour, and people indulged
in every kind of manifestation calculated to flatter
the national vanity.
In view of these events, the Powers came to
an understanding concerning a note to be addressed
ORIGIN AND CAUSE OF THE WAR. 2I
to the Greek government. Its contents were in

the main: that Crete was to have an autonomy on
the principle of equal rights to Christians and
Mahommedans, and it was therefore necessary that
Greece should withdraw her army and her fleet.
No exact date was given for this withdrawal,
as the instructions to the ambassadors difi'ered on
this point; but it was agreed that this note should
be delivered; to the Greek government. Meantime
Russia, with the consent of Germany, Austria
Hungary and France, took a more determined step.
Through the Russian ambassador at Athens, a
categoricaldemand was made on the 2 52 of February,
1897, that Greece should within 3 days withdraw
her fleet and her whole military force from Crete.
At the same time Russia threatened, that in case
Greece should offer further opposition, create
difficulties, or allow herself to be encouraged
in her course by self-seeking friends, she would take
immediate reprisals and proclaim a blockade of
the Greek ports. To this ultimatum, which had made
a deep impression on Greece, no answer had been
given on the 1;? of March, 1897. The Admirals of the
warships lying off Crete issued a proclamation to
the Cretans on Feb. 2 5i} declaring that the occupation
of Canea and Heraklion had taken place to avoid
bloodshed until the Great Powers should have
agreed upon a final solution of the Cretan question.

To this Proclamation the insurgents sent a reply,
signed by several leaders, to Admiral Canevaro,
through the Greek Commodore Reineck, declaring
that all union between Crete and the Porte was at
an end, and that Crete would accept nothing short
of union with Greece. Meantime Crete was the scene
of constant conflict and conflagration. On the
2 82 ofFebruary, when the Turks left Canea under cover
of Nizams in order to bring the natives provisions, a
fight began, in which several Turks and Nizams were
killed. A Turkish frigate fired three shots on the
insurgents, but ceased firing in obedience to the
command of the foreign ships. The Turks with
their provisions had to withdraw. On the same
day Tzickalaria and Nerokuru were in flames.
Turkey and Greece now began to hasten their
preparations for war. The Porte sent an order
to Salonika to hasten the despatch of 72 Bat
talions of Redifs to the Greek frontier. These
Battalions were to start from Asia, Rodosto and
Tshorlu, whence they were to be transported in
100 consecutive railway trains to Constantinople.
Head-quarters and a camp were to be established
at Kailar, 12 miles from the Station of Sorowitch
on the Salonika-Monastir railway, while more than
100 Waggons were sent off to Adrianople, laden
with artillery, rifles, and munition. In consequence

of these measuresthe Greek government on the 272} of
February published a decree, calling out the reserves
of the years ‘91 and ‘92.
The reply of Greece to the note of the Powers
was in the negative, as she felt it. her duty to
intervene in the fresh disorders in order to help
her brethren; moreover the autonomy proposed
was no solution, since the first condition essential
to its success was its acceptance by the Cretans,
and they having refused it, she felt herself bound to
abide by their decision. She also maintained that
the recall of the fleet and the troops would be the
signal for fresh outbreaks, in the face of which the
Greeks could not remain inactive.
The collective note sent by the Powers to Turkey
was accepted in view of the grave situation of the
7":h of March, and the hope was expressed of arriving
at an understanding with the Powers in regard to
the proposed autonomy for Crete. Meantime warlike
preparations continued to be made in Greece and
Turkey. For purposes of military equipment, trans
port steamers were constantly bringing vast quan
tities of munition, arms and provisions to Thessaly
and the concentration of troops on the frontier
steadily continued. Public feeling in Greece was in
the highest state of excitement; French volunteers
who landed at Athens were received with unbounded

enthusiasm.
On the Turkish side, most of the garrisons from
Lower Albania and from the Lim district were sent
to the Thessalian frontier. Official information
declared that by the 82 of March 40,000 infantry,
16 field batteries, and 24 squadrons of cavalry
would be assembled on the Greek frontier. The
Bashi-bazouks of the 3 Vilajets in Lower Albania
were to form an independent corps of 6 to 7000 men.
The supreme command of these troops was entrusted
to Marshal Edhem Pasha.
In consequence of {the blockade of Crete deter
mined upon by the Powers, and announced to Turkey,
the Greek government recalled the war-ships
Alpheios and Peneios from Crete. The cruiser
Wykali had already returned to the Piraeus during
the night of the 182 of March. French and Italian
Officers went to the Greek camp, and called upon
Colonel Vassos to embark his troops and evacuate
Crete within 36 hours.
Meantime the question of the occupation of
Crete was beset with difficulties, since no Power
seemed inclined to accept any proposal in connection
with it. Italy and France held back out of con
sideration for public opinion at home, while Russia
and England were unwilling to come forward. No
formal proposal had been made for the appointment

of a governor. The German Vice-Consul in Candia
complained that all the emblems at the consulate
had been torn down.
The leaders of the insurgents met in council on
the 19“:h on board the Italian Admiral’s ship, and
declined autonomy, but in spite of this it was pro
claimed the next day in Canea by means of street
placards. Accounts of fighting came in constantly
from Kisamos, Retimo, Heraklaion, and Sitia where
the insurgents were the aggressors. An encounter
took place in the neighbourhood of Canea during
the night of the 192, in which 25 were wounded
and 6 killed. On the 181—1}, the Austrian torpedo cruiser
Sebenico sank a Greek war-ship which had fired
on it off Crete; the crew saved themselves by
swimming ashore.
In consequence of the notification to the Greek
government of the blockade of Crete determined
upon by the Powers, the said government issued a
protest to the representatives of the Powers at Athens,
declaring that a blockade must place Crete in the
greatest straits since an immediate scarcity of pro
visions must ensue. In spite of the blockade, the
fighting in Crete went on. On the 2 52 of March the
Greeks made an attack on the Turkish outposts
near Canea, more especially on the Malaxa block
house, which was bombarded. The small Turkish

garrison evacuated it after the loss of 20 killed and
wounded. At 3 in the afternoon the foreign men
of-war opened fire upon the Greeks from Suda Bay;
about 100 shot were fired. The next morning the
fighting was resumed and continued all day. The
Turkish Vice-admiral Sami Pasha on board a Turkish
transport landed near Canea and unshipped a quantity
of ammunition and stores. The leaders of the in
surgents were informed by messengers from the
Powers of the autonomy proposed for the island,
but they refused to acknowledge or accept it. On
the 132 of April a serious encounter took place near
Canea between the insurgents and the Turks, in
which both sides suffered loss. By Order of the
Commanders of the squadron the Turkish leaders
were conducted to the island of Rhodes. Austrian
gun-boats cruised between Selino and Kissamo, and
chased the Greek barks running the blockade.
Meantime as the water supply had been cut off
and provisions ran short, typhus and small-pox made
their appearance on the island. Desperate fighting
was continued by the insurgents, supported by the
Greek troops sent to their assistance.
The response made by Athens and the provinces
to these efforts, was a sure indication of the ap
proaching outburst ofwar on the Turco-Greek frontier.
The Prime Minister Delyannis on the 1321 of April

proposed a loan of 2 3 Million Drachmas (= L.920,ooo)
for the war Department, and recommended the
passing of the budget. He asserted that the Powers
had as yet given no opinion Whatever on the pro
posals made by Greece for a peaceable solution of
the Cretan question! Greece nevertheless cherished
the hope that the Powers might still accept her
proposal. The situation on the frontier had not
been created by Greece but by the peculiar policy
of the neighbouring state, which had forced on
Greece the necessity for a like speedy concen
tration of an army. On behalf of the opposition,
Ralli carried the motion, that in face of existing
circumstances the chamber should not enter into
any debate on the budget. To this Delyannis
agreed. On the 152 of April he placed three
proposals before the chamber. The first empowered
the government to raise the issue of treasury bills
from 14 to 30 Million Drachmas. (= L. 560,000 to
L.l,200,000). Should this measure prove inade
quate, the second proposal was intended to give the
government the power of concluding a national loan
of 24 Million Drachmas (= L.960,ooo). The
third proposal was to issue small bank notes for I
and 2 Drachmas (rod. to IS. 8d.) to the amount
of 4 Millions (== L.16o,000). In the sitting of
the 1 82 of April, Delyannis explained that the Turkish

government had on the previous day handed
'in a declaration concerning the alleged aggressive
attitude of Greece.
He then explained the latest events which he
contended proved the contrary. Turkey had been
the attacking party, her troops had attacked the
Greek troops who were occupying neutral positions,
and had sunk the steamer Macedonia in the entrance
to the Gulf of Arta. Turkey, continued the Premier, has
declared war. Greece has accepted it. He then com
municated telegrams concerning events on the frontier.
In consequence of the violation of the Turco
Greek frontier-line, the Extraordinary Council of
the Turkish Ministers held on the 1721 of April deter
mined to declare war against Greece, and to acquaint
Prince Mavrocordato, (the Greek Ambassador at
Constantinople) whith their decision. The Greek
arms and emblems were in consequence removed
next day from the Greek Embassy there, and
the breaking off of diplomatic relations with
the Turkish government was announced by Prince
Mavrocordato, who left Constantinople on the 192.
The Turkish Ambassador likewise left Athens. At
the same time the subjects of the two hostile coun
tries were warned respectively to leave the enemy’s
territory within fourteen days.
The note in which the Greek Minister for Foreign

Affairs answered the Turkish formal declaration of
war is too characteristic to be omitted here. It ran
as follows: The Minister for Foreign Affairs of'
H. M. the King of the Hellenes has had the honour
of receiving the note which was adressed to him
by the Turkish Ambassador at Athens under date
of today, acquainting him with the fact that owing
to hostilities opened by Greece against Turkey,
the diplomatic relations between the two countries
appear to be broken off. While attempting to cast
upon Greece the responsibility of breaking ofl~~
diplomatic relations, the Imperial Government appears
to overlook the fact, that Greece, far from pro
ceeding to acts of hostility against Turkey, has on
the contrary had to suffer repeated attacks from the
Turkish army during the last few days, and at
various points, and especially in consequence of the
armed conflict which took place on the 28f:h of March
(0. S.) at the point “Prophet Elias”. The Royal
Government had felt it necessary, by means of a
verbal note, to call the attention of the Imperial
Government to the attitude of the Ottoman troops,
at the same time expressing the hope that the
Sublime Porte would take such swift and effectual
measures as might check the repetition of such acts.
So far, however, from sharing the spirit of moderation
which had prompted this step, the Imperial Government

seemed inclined, on the contrary, to precipitate events.
Thus the Turkish Army attempted only the day before
yesterday to possess themselves of a point on the
frontier, Analypsi, which had been regarded as neutral
according to Common agreement, and this without
any provocation whatever on the part of the Royal
troops. Only in consequence of the resistance
encountered there was the attempt to violate neutral
territory averted. Nor could the Royal Government
pass over in silence that from 5 o’Clock in the
morning, before the breaking off of diplomatic
relations between the two countries had been
officially communicated by the Imperial Embassy,
and while the Royal Ambassador at Constantinople
had not received the said notification till an ad—
vanced hour of the night, the forts of Prevesa
opened fire upon the Hellenic stations at Actium,
and sank the Pan-Hellenic Company’s boat “Mace
donia” as she was leaving the Gulf of Ambra. In
view of these facts, which prove how unfounded is
the assertion of the Sublime Porte that Greece had
been guilty of acts of hostility against Turkey, the
government of the King cannot in any sense be
regarded as responsible for the consequences likely
to result from so grave a state of affairs.
GREECE BEFORE THE WAR. 31
Greece before the War.

Probably no state ever entered upon a conflict
under more difficult and trying circumstances, than
did Greece in the year 1897. ‘
Ruined finances at home, shaken national credit
abroad, a party-system divided by faction; the
army totally unprepared, without officers or leaders
trained either in the art or the conduct of war; in this
condition the country rushed into danger. There
was an entire absence of all calculation of the
resources to be placed in the balance against
Turkey. Doubtless a less numerous army animated
by courage and resolution may, when acting on
the defensive, achieve great results and hold mighty
armies in check. This is proved by the struggles
of the Spaniards and the Tyrolese in the beginning
of the century against the French and their
experienced Marshals; but in modern warfare
numbers, above all, play a decisive part in the attack.
32 THE WAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND GBEECE.
In their jeering defiance of the Turks, the

Greeks certainly exPected that after the first
victorious conflicts they would find allies in the
Servians, Bulgarians, and Montenegrins. The King,
the leading Minister in the Chamber, the Greek press,
and the Phil-Hellenic journals in England were
all of this opinion.
They declared quite openly that Greece would
rouse the whole Balkan Peninsula at one stroke
if Crete were not made over to them. According
to universal opinion, the mobilised army was to
be the nucleus and the point d’appui of a general.
rising against Turkish rule, to be brought about
among the Christians of the Greek Church in
Macedonia and Albania.
Montenegro was no less relied upon; indeed the
army there had quietly been put upon a war-footing,
and the Albanians had been provided with arms
and ammunition for the struggle against Turkey.
The latter had been strongly urged in the same
direction from other quarters, so that Turkey was
menaced with greater danger in the Adriatic
provinces than in Macedonia. In all the Balkan
States it was known that the leaders of the
so-called Albanian league were in communica
tion with Roumania, Austria, and Italy. From
Bucharest an understanding with the Kutzolacs
was advised, in order to secure an Albanian

autonomy that should include both nationalities.
The Iesuit mission at Tisonna having been reinforced
from Austria, the Albanians were being urged to
place themselves under the protection of one of
the great Christian Powers. From Italy, too, the
old agitation to bring the Albanians under Italian
influence was sensibly growing. In any case, it
was perfectly certain that in all these directions
there was the anticipation of an universal national
rebellion of the Albanians at the first check the
Turkish arms might receive.
Moreover, King George had for some time
been in correspondence with Montenegro, Servia
and Bulgaria, declaring that Greece would require
from Turkey nothing but the fulfilment of the
Treaty of Berlin, which meant the cession of Epirus
and the Olympic mountain-range. Nothing what
ever prejudicial to the interests of the remaining
Balkan States, therefore, was intended.
The three rulers of the above-mentioned countries
had confidentially made known that they would
be ready to join a common undertaking against
Turkey. The declarations jointly made to the
Greek chargé d’afl'aires at Sofia, especially by King
Alexander of Servia and Prince Ferdinand at their
meeting there in answer to King George’s letter,
a
ofiered a strange contrast to the assurances of peace

subsequently addressed by both rulers to the Sultan
and the Great Powers.
Greece consequently believed that she could
certainly reckon on allies , willing to take
Turkey at a disadvantage; and even when well
meaning friends pointed out to her the utter
futility of such hopes, she remained obstinater
defiant, convinced that the fate of the Balkan
Peninsula depended on her determination alone.
To this belief were added the recollections of
the war of Liberation. Orators, journalists, poets,
were constantly referring to the glorious deeds of
that conflict as an imperishable title to fame, and
to the admiration of the universe. As in the
twenties of this century, so in the nineties, the
enthusiasm for Philhellenism would everywhere
blaze forth, the moment the signal for the last
war against the Crescent should be given by
Greece. The feeble echoes wafted back from Italy,
England, and France, in response to this clamour
satisfied excited passion. The Greek newspapers
declared, that the governments of Rome, Paris,
and London, would be unable long to withstand
popular opinion. Added to this there was an in
credible over- estimate of their own national
military power, and a corresponding under-estimate
of the resources of Turkey. “Perhaps”, said orators

and journalists, “it might be granted that the
Turkish infantry was better trained in the use of
small arms, but the excellence of the Greek artillery
would entirely counterbalance this advantage. The
invincible Greek fleet would only have to appear
before Salonika or Smyrna to spread terror far
and wide; Chios and Samos would rise at its
approach; even the fortifications of the Dardanelles
could not withstand their guns.
Since the naval battle at Navarino, Greece has
been the spoiled child of Europe. During seventy
years her physicians have in vain attempted to
sustain, strengthen, and cure her. Neither trouble nor
expense has been spared; Republic, Monarchy,
Constitution, nothing has taken root on this stony
ground. The memory of the antique has stimulated
conceit and ambition till the Greeks have grown
insufferable.
Much that is perfectly incomprehensible in the
attitude of modern Greece is partly explained by
the existence of a powerful National Association,
aiming at well-defined objects. This Association
has for years anticipated and prepared every popular
movement, has collected large sums of money, and
is influential not only in the government of the
country but also at court. The majority of its
3.
members are numerous wealthy Greeks living all

over the world as well as in their own country.
A large number of Greek Officers also are members
of this association, and as has been already stated,
it wields powerful influence at court. It is this
influence which determined King George to place
himself at the head of the national movement,
overbalancing the influences of other and related
courts, and to persist in his unyielding attitude on
the Cretan question. When this peculiar national
Association is examined somewhat more closely,
it is found that its constitution is in no respect
based on monarchical principles.
It may doubtless be taken for granted that the
ultimate objects of the National Hellenic Association,
penetrating all classes of the people, is the attain
ment of Panhellenism, and the politicial union
of all Hellenic nationalities not as yet under Greek
rule. This “Hetairia Ethnike”, or Secret National
Society, has for years contributed large sums of
money, which have been placed at the disposal of
the government for war purposes. The wealthy
Greeks living abroad more especially send immense
contributions, partly in money, partly in arms, partly
in equipment and clothing.
During the years that have elapsed since their
last revolt, the Greeks have not learnt either to
GREECE BEFORE THE WAR. 3']
submit to law, or to accept and occupy the

position which they hold in the community of
European states and nations.
In political and public life, real and practical
interests were constantly sacrificed to mere chimoeras.
The increase of territory which the Berlin Congress
had conceded to Greece, i. e. the fertile province
of Thessaly, was of no avail in satisfying the
ambitious plans and claims of the nation. Relying
on their European religion and culture, they taxed
the patience and generosity of Europe to the
utmost, and took refuge after every ill-considered
step or measure behind the shield of their ancient
classic splendour, which appears to exempt them
from all responsibility to others before the tribunal
of national justice and of civilisation.
The Greek Army System.

The Greek Army is the product of the repeated
changes which it has undergone for seventy years
under the direction of French and Bavarian in
structors. In the year 1892 it received its present
organisation on the basis of universal conscription,
introduced as far back as 1878. Service begins with
the twenty-first year and lasts thirty years. This
includes 2 years in the standing army, 10 years in
the reserve, 8 years in the territorial army (Land
wehr) and 10 years more in the Landwehr Reserve.
During this time the troops of the reserve are liable
to be called out twice for a fortnight’s training, and
under special circumstances, after the last year of
completed service, they may be retained with the
colours for a further period of 3 or 4 months.
On the other hand, the Landwehr is not called out
for training, and though in case of war they are
liable for service in the field, would probably be
THE GREEK ARMY SYSTEM. 39
relegated to garrison duty. The Landwehr Reserve can

only be called out if the numbers of the Land
wehr are insufficient. The latter has no military
organisation at all. The Landwehr is divided into
8 Classes of 12,000 men = 96,000, which yields
after the deduction of 20 per cent. 76,800 men. The
Landwehr Reserve may be set down at 57,000 men.
It will be easily understood, however, that with
defective measures for mobilisation, constant financial
difficulties, and other hindrances, these numbers
are never even approximately reached. The Land
wehr and its Reserve must consequently be regarded
only as a depét for troops in making an estimate
of the military power of Greece. The annual con
tingent of recruits in the last few years reached
11,000 men, of which 8,000 presented themselves.
As a rule about 1000 men a year escape con
scription.
The standing army consists, in time of peace
of 10 Infantry Regiments of 3 Battalions each,
3 Cavalry Regiments, 3 Artillery Regiments, and
1 Regiment of Engineers; making a total of
38 Battalions, 12 Squadrons, 11 field and 9 mountain
batteries, and 10 Companies of Engineers; at most
25,000 men. Among these are included about
1,900 Officers, with about 33,000 horses and mules.
For purposes of war this force is organised in
3 Corps of from 12 to 14 Battalions, 4 Squadrons,

and 6 or 7 Batteries each, according to their de
stination. To form the reserves of an army in the
field, theoretically there should be 9 Infantry
Battalions, 4—7 Battalions of Rifles, 3—6 Squadrons
of Cavalry, 6—8 Field Batteries, and 3—9 Com
panies of Engineers. For the actual Reserve there
are in round numbers 12 5,000 men bound to serve
with the colours, but as they have neither staff
organisation, nor arms, nor equipment, they cannot be
regarded as playing a very important part in the
defence of the country.
Since 1880 the Infantry has been armed with
Gras rifles; but through neglect and the. want of
proper care, most of them are probably far from being
serviceable weapons; there is said to be in store a
total of 120,000 Gras, 50,000 Chassepots, and 6,000
arms of other patterns.
The supply of horses for the cavalry is one of
the weakest points in the Greek army system; one
third of the peace establishment is always deficient,
and of the remaining two thirds 50 per cent. in
round numbers, are utterly unfit for service. The
native horses being but little suitable for purposes
of war, the cavalry is almost entirely dependent
for its supply on foreign countries.
The Artillery is divided into 3 Regiments, two
with 7 batteries each, and one with 6 batteries.

Of these some are armed with 87 mm. guns
= 3.45 in.) and some with 75 mm. guns, (= 3 in.
very nearly). One or two of the mountain batteries
have guns of the latter calibre. Besides these
there is a company of Artillery artificers, and a
company of Artillery Train. Altogether there are
86 Field and 54 Mountain guns, being respectively
16 and 51 guns short of the necessary complement.
The prescribed military training of 40 days for the
reserve, and 15 days for the Landwehr have never
been seriously enforced.
The ordinary training of the troops has latterly
been more and more neglected partly in con
sequence of the low numbers, and partly on account
of the multifarious duties required of the troops on
the frontier, as police, and in the repression of
brigandage. The small interest taken by the
Officers in the training of the troops has been still
further diminished by the political events of the
country, especially the elections, the changes of
ministry, and by the financial as well as political
difficulties by which the country has always been beset.
The young and inexperienced subalterns are
without practice, stimulus, or authoritative super
vision by their superiors. The War Ministry was
compelled by lack of funds to discontinue the rifle
__-.--»._..hA_b___‘
42 THE \VAR BET‘VEEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
practice of the Infantry entirely, and to reduce

that of the Artillery to a minimum. As far as the
military development of the troops is concerned
therefore, the last few years have been almost
entirely lost.
One of the most mischievous features in the
Greek army is the share taken by the Officers in
political life. In the year 1895, for example,
104 Officers came forward as candidates in the
parliamentary elections, of whom 30 were chosen
as representatives. Even if this share in politics
cannot strictly be measured by the standards of
Western Europe (for the sympathy of the army
with the public life of such newly-erected consti
tutions as the Balkan States is unavoidable), it
nevertheless is certain that these conditions are fatal
to the spirit and discipline of the respective armies.
The continuous disorders that had troubled
Turkey for two years, and the grave defects of the
Turkish system of government upon which these
disorders threw light, had roused in Greece the
hope of a speedy breaking-up of Turkey. At the
same time the conviction had deepened that the
Greek military system in its present condition was
by no means fitted to support, or eventually to
defend, the Greek claims upon the inheritance to
which they hoped to succeed.
The Greek sympathy with the rising in Crete

as well as the popular intrigues called into
existence in Western Macedonia by the Greeks,
had everywhere excited popular fervour. This
had ripened into a newspaper discussion encouraged
more especially by the Officers of the Army, on
the necessity of a thorough military reform. It was
taken up in government circles, and it was said
that both the journey of the King in 1896, and his
conferences with various sovereigns and leaders of
politics among the Great Powers, had convinced
him that the end of the Turkish Empire was really
approaching, and had conduced to his determination
to reform the army.
This resolution would scarcely have been taken
at a time of financial crisis if the temper and
disposition of the Officers had not rendered some
reassuring measure imperative. The prime minister
Delyannis therefore declared himself in favour of
army-reform, and reminded the king that in his
opening address to the Chamber he had referred
to extraordinary expenses, and to the possibility
that the budget might conclude with a deficit. Mean
while money was ready for the most urgent necessities.
The king, however, did not rest satisfied with this
declaration, but desired that the nation also should
be made acquainted with these new resolutions, to
44 THE WAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND GBEECE.
which Delyannis after some opposition agreed.

Thus the commands of the King were communicated
to the prime minister in the following terms on the
42 of December, 1896.
To the Prime Minister.

“Sir,
The general manoeuvres held during the past
summer have shown the necessity of their being
repeated on a larger scale. Since I desire that the
perfecting of the Hellenic army should form
the one aim of its organisation, and render it
worthy of its mission, I regard as of the utmost
importance the formation of a permanent camp, in
which the army, relieved of the duties which fall
to its share in the towns, can give itself up exclu
sively to the attainment of its military purpose, to
the carrying out of great manoeuvres, and to the
necessary technical training and development.
For this purposes I consider it to be absolutely
necessary to call in the reserves for service with
the colours, in order to form a fighting force of
from IO to 12,000 men, and to fill up the gaps in
the cavalry. In pursuance of these objects I con
sider the appointment of a commission of superior
Officers desirable, who will have to decide on the
THE GREEK ARMY SYSTEM. 45.
best rifle for our army. The Government will then.

proceed to the purchase of the weapon chosen.
I am convinced that these objects will be attained
by these measures and the decisions arising from
them. For years the Greek army has been occupied
with various duties that practically lie outside the
sphere of its real business. It is now time for it
to return to its sole vocation and mission, the
uninterrupted training and development of its powers,
as far as the financial means of the state allow.
The formation of a permanent camp which I
entrust to my government will inaugurate the
realisation of the ardent desire I cherish with
regard to the military position of the country.”
King George’s message roused the greatest
fervour and enthusiasm. On the day of its
promulgation the most important paper in the
capital — “the Acropolis” — said:
“The people have again found their King, and
all who love their nation, or are stirred by the
true patriotic feeling which it rouses within them,
will cordially endorse this appeal. If no destructive
party feeling steps in, it is to be hoped that from
this day forth the army may be restored to its
real functions, and thus a fresh, hopeful spirit,
animating the army, will react upon the whole
national life.”
The national rejoicing, however, was somewhat

damped by the voice of the leading European
Journals, by whom the royal message was received
with considerable surprise: Greece was told to
remember her financial responsibilities, and she was
further reminded that every political action which
might disturb a peace attained only by surmounting
almost insuperable obstacles, must be severely
deprecated and decisively checked. In spite of all,
however, efforts to carry through the measures of
armyreform were immediately set on foot with commen
dable rapidity. As early as the 142 of December,
Delyannis, in obedience to the King’s message,
drafted the plans for the loans necessary to meet
the expenses for the erection of a camp, for the
manoeuvres to be held in the spring of 1897, for
the calling in of two classes of reserves for 40 days
during the manoeuvres, and for the purchase of
horses. The loans desired amounted only to
2,600.000 Francs (= L. 104,000) and were to be
covered by the surplus of the budget of 1897. For
the erection of a camp, a suburb of Thebes, Agi‘i
Theodorii was chosen,to accommodate 1 3— 1 6,000 men.
The reserves to be called out were the men who
had served in the conscriptions of 1887 and 1891;
there was also a further plan for calling out
the Reserves of 1893. The orders already issued
were for the end of February. At the same time

all Reserve Officers were to be called out by turns.
The permanent camp was calculated to accommodate
2 Infantry Regiments, 1 Cavalry and 1 Artillery
Regiment, 2 Companies of Engineers, 2 Sections
of Telegraphists with the necessary staff. Mean_
while events took a very different turn.
The ordinary military manoeuvres in the previous
year had taken place at the beginning of May, 1896,
for the Artillery at Cantza near Athens; in the
middle of June, and on the 72 of August, for the In
fantry troops of the capital in the neighbourhood
of Athens; and at the end of June for the
Engineers. Manoeuvres for various arms were
held in the first week of September in the neigh
bourhood of Larissa.
It became clear towards the end of the year
1896, when the list of promotions was published,
that discipline was entirely deficient among the
Greek Officers. The list disappointed the hopes of
many Officers unfitted for promotion, and was in
consequence followed by many resignations.
On the 1: of December this ill-feeling broke out
in a public demonstration which was almost equal
to an Officiers’ “pronunciamento.” About 1400 Officers
of the Infantry, Cavalry, and Administrative Services,
sent in to the Crown Prince as President their
resignation as members of a military Club, founded

by him for the promotion of social cameraderie. As
reasons for this step the following points were
adduced: The irregular and unequal distribution of
promotion among the second and first Lieutenants
and the Captains, the lower rates of pay in the In
fantry, Cavalry and Administrative Services as com
pared with those of the Artillery and Engineers,
the withdrawal of the two latter from military police
duty, the extraordinary promotion of several Officers
with appointments about the Court, in addition to
the other inequalities of the latest promotions, and
finally, the universal decline of the whole military
system.
Upon this the superior Officers tried to come into
touch with the leaders of the opposition, but even
before actual negotiations were opened, the King,
as head of the army, determined upon issuing the
message to the Prime Minister given in an earlier
part of this chapter, thus not only clearing the
way for the desired improvement in the military
forces of Greece, but also providing against an
actual mutiny among the Officers.
The grievances of the Officers were doubtless
somewhat diminished by the message, but the
government was compelled to make further con
cessions to existing disaffection in order to pacify
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The Crown-Prince Constantine

the Officers completely. The King and his sons made

every exertion to raise the espn't de corps and the
proper sense of duty among the Officers. The
unmannerly spirit of the Greek Officer, however,
has its root deep in the universal national spirit,
the immoderate action of party, and the absolutely
unfettered freedom of the press. So long as these
remain unimproved and unregulated, the most
conciliatory measures can bear no wholesome
fruit.
Let us now turn to some of the superior Officers
of the Greek army, to whom the difficult task
had been assigned of guiding operations in a
conflict with an enemy numerically stronger; better
organised, and better equipped. Partly from
dynastic and partly from personal reasons, the
Crown Prince Constantine, Duke of Sparta, 26 years
of age, was made Commander-in-Chief of the
principal army — obviously. too weighty and respon
sible a burden for his youthful shoulders to sustain.
The Crown Prince is, in the eyes of the Greeks,
all the more identified with their nationality since
he bears the name of Constantine, a name diffusing
a magic charm through long dynasties of imperial
rulers, of whom the first was the founder of the
brilliant capital on the Bosphorus, and the last the
hero who met his death in bravely defending it.
4
Crown Prince Constantine was born at Athens on

the 21;t ofJuly (2 '2 of August), 1868, and received an
excellent education as well as the highest training
in science from the learned German scholar Liiders.
On the 13 2 of December, 1886, the Prince attained his
majority and received a commission as Captain in
the 12 Regiment of Infantry, after which he studied
Jurisprudence and Political Science at Leipsic. On
the 272 of October, 1889, he married at Athens the
Prussian princess Sophie, the third daughter of the
Emperor Frederick III. and sister of the present
German Emperor. The Crown Princess Sophie,
born on the 14":h of June, 1870, received in May, 1891,
into the orthodox Greek Church, has born her
husband two sons and a daughter. Crown Prince
Constantine, who generally resided at the Castle of
Dekelia near Athens, has several times already
carried on the government during the lengthier
absences of the King, and is Lieut. General and
Commandant of the “Inspection” of Athens.
While the second son of the King, athletic
Prince George, entered the Navy, his younger
brother Prince Nicholas, born at Athens in 187 2,
joined the Artillery, in which he at present
holds the rank of Captain. In the middle of
February, 1897, he set off for Arta on the Epirote
frontier, where 4000 Infantry, 8 Squadrons and
Prince Nicholas
6 Batteries, were at once assembled under his

command.
The chief of the Crown - Prince’s Staff was
his Head Chamberlain, Sapuntsakis, though it is
impossible to find that he possesed any qualification
for the post.
Sapuntsakis in peace- time was simply Head
Chamberlain — in a word Chief of the General
Staff of the Crown - Prince’s — Valets‘, and
the chief controller of the royal kitchen; and
when he became the Chief of the Crown-Prince’s
Staff in War, he continued to take the
same kindly interest in the royal baggage and
cuisine, which, according to the testimony alike
of friend and foe, were the most carefully prepared
portion of the whole Greek campaign; the credit
for this at least, must be given to Sapuntsakis.
He was supported by the old comrade and adjutant
of the Crown-Prince, Hadjipetros, who as an
experienced gourmet, — a sort of culinary General
Staff Officer —— is said to have exercised an impor
tant moral influence on the General Staff presided
over by Supuntsakis, nay, over the Crown-Prince
himself, more than was quite consistent with his
official status. Beside Sapuntsakis, Hadjipetros is
always named as the author of the disasters of
Larissa and Pharsala. Against M. M. Sapuntsakis
4.
and Hadjipetros the resentment of the Greek people

— innocent of culinary science — was principally
directed. For this reason both were recalled from
camp in the midst of the war. M. Sapuntsakis,
a man well over fifty, certainly corresponds in
appearance and presence to all that can reasonably
be expected in a Lord Chamberlain; — an elegant
appearance, with the manners of a man of the
world, a countenance free from the remotest trace
of obstinacy or self-will, a small moustache carefully
arranged a“ la brasse, cheeks and chin smoothly
shaven, the dark colour of the hair and beard
carefully preserved. When M. Sapuntsakis speaks,
which he does with a considerable nasal twang,
his look betokens benevolent nonchalance, when he is
spoken to, aristocratic indifference. His brow narrow
ingas it rises, renders the head unattractive. Sapunt
sakis is seen to best advantage wearing the tall,_ steep
Officer’s cap, which increases the angle of the face in a
becoming manner. His companion Hadjipetros is the
beau ideal of what Greek ladies consider a smart
Officer should be. He is tall and full in person, the
warlike expression of his countenance is emphasised
by a powerful, well developed aquiline nose, and
a bushy, well defined, drooping moustache. It is
only necessary to cast a glance at this elegant,
interesting, almost handsome man to feel assured
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Delyannis, President of the ministry

that he is accustomed to conquests, if not over

a powerful enemy in the field, at least over the
weaker sex in the peaceful arena of the drawing
room and the boudoir.
The Prime Minister Delyannis who was in reality
responsible for the War Policy of Greece, in spite
of the fact that the King nominally undertook
the sole reponsibility, was born in 1826, at Kalavoyta
in the Peloponessus. He successively filled theoffices
of Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Education,
and Minister of Finance; and was principal am
bassador of Greece at the Congress of Berlin, where,
thanks to the zealous support of France, Thessaly
and parts of Epirus were secured to his countrymen.
He was Prime Minister on the 62 of May 1886, when
the blockade of the Greek ports was declared by
the ultimatum of the Great Powers, but resigned
his position on the 9112 of May, when the necessity of
disarmament became apparent. Delyannis is the
declared favourite of the lower classes, with whom
he converses in the Romaic dialect; indeed the
King placed high value on his services in spite of
the inconsiderate attitude which on the 292 of Feb
ruary, 1892, again led to his resignation of the office
of Prime Minister; he, doubtless, considers that the
policy of the court, like that of the people, is pro
bably no nearer the attainment of its hopes than in
1877 and 1886, when France openly favoured the

aspirations of the Cabinet of Athens.
Rallis, who had returned to Athens on the
25‘:h of April from Thessaly, where he had abundant
opportunity of observing the gross inefficiency and
the lack of discipline among the troops, was pre
pared in spite of belonging to the opposition, to
exhort the populace of Athens to remain quiet and
collected. Indeed he was so far successful, as to
persuadeamob of unruly citizens to restore to their
owners the arms which they had plundered from
various shops.
On the 30‘:h of April the Ministers took the oaths,
and on the 12 of May the new head of the Cabinet
laid before them his programme, in which the chief
points were, the Reorganisation of the Army, and
the continuation of the War until its termination in
an honourable peace. After Delyannis had assured
the new goverment of his unreserved support in the
attainment of this aim the Chamber was adjourned.
Demetrius Rallis, whose father was an eminent
lawyer who had served as Minister more than once .
under King Otho, studied law in Paris, and became
Professor at the University of Athens while retaining
his practice as an advocate. Formerly a zealous
partisan of Tricoupis, he separated from him in
1889 and formed the “third party”. He several times
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Colonel Vassos
held the portfolio of Justice and of Education. Rallis,

who is 52 years of age, is very popular in Attica,
which has several times elected him to the Chamber.
One of the most prominent Officers of the Greek
army, who had made a name for himself both by
his energy and his discretion under various circum
stances, was Colonel Vassos.
The Colonel, who completed his military studies
abroad, was universally regarded as one of the most
competent Officers in the Greek army. Over fifty
years of age, he was possessed of a soldierly pre
sence, was intrepid to the verge of foolhardiness, an
eloquent orator, and above all master of various lan
guages and dialects, which gave him an immense
advantage in his dealings with the leaders of the
insurgents on the one hand, and with the Admirals
of the Great Powers on the other. ‘
This widely known Officer, who embodied the
aspirations and hopes of the Hellenic nation in
Crete, is not really of Greek, but of Montenegrin
origin. His father was Vasso Pajovitch of the clan
Belopawlovitch, who left the mountains of Czerna
gora at the age of fourteen to seek suitable means
of livelihood in Greece. The revolt of 1821 broke
out; the young Montenegrin joined his new coun
trymen in the struggle for liberty, and performed
such deeds of valour on the classic soil of his
adopted country that he won the rights of a citizen of

Hellas. Settled on his own land, Vassos married
a Greek wife. These were the parents of Colonel
Timoleon, who did not attain to importance and
popularity until after the resignation of King Otho.
He made a marriage of affection with the daughter
of the Austrian ambassador, Baron Testa. The
son of this marriage fought last year in Crete as
a volunteer. One of the daughters of the Colonel
was, up to the time of her marriage to the son of
the late private secretary of the King, one of the
maids of honour to Princess Sophie.
Among those who rendered their country splen
did service by their courage and intelligence must
also be mentioned Colonel Smolensk, previously
Minister of War, Colonel Manos, and Lieutenant
Colonel Limbritis, the subsequent chief of the Staff
of the Crown Prince.
Colonel Smolenski
THE GREEK FLEET. 57
The Greek Fleet.

When the war broke out it appeared as if an
essential part of its operations must be assigned to
the fleet; not alone in establishing main lines of
communication for the army, but also in supporting
it by means of descents on land, bombardment of
forts, and above all by exciting revolt on the
islands inhabited by a Greek population under
Turkish rule. These were tasks for the discharge
of which the Greek Navy'was well fitted, both by
its composition and equipment, if commanded with
energy and skill. It seemed just possible that such
co-operation, if cleverly planned and skilfully carried
out, might compensate for the numerical difference
between the conflicting armies, and even turn the
scale in favour of Greece; proving further a
powerful moral force, if successful in offensive
operations and in bold ventures against the
enemy.
The Greek Fleet was divided officially into a

Fleet of the Line and a Fleet for Coast-Defence. The
first comprised the three cruisers Miaulis and the
transports Mykale and Sfaktiria, four gunboats, the
torpedo - depot-boat Kanaris and twelve torpedo
boats. The first -named armoured turret ships are
sister-ships, 4885 tons displacement; they are
105 metres (= 117 yds.) long, 16 metres (= 20 yds.)
beam, have a draught of 6 metres (= 20 feet), with
engines of 6700 horse power, which enable them
with their twin screws to attain a speed of
17 knots an hour. They are armoured to the
water line with 13.8 inch compound steel, the turret
armour is equally strong, and the armoured
protective deck is of 2 inch steel. The three
heavy 10.6” guns are mounted two forward and
one aft; besides this they each carry five 6” guns
and one 4”, all Canet guns. Four light 31/2” guns
and ten quick-firing 2.2” guns together with
16 machine-guns complete their armament; while
each in addition is armed with 3 torpedo tubes.
They are built of steel, and two of them were
launched in 1889, the third in 1890.
The other ships named are without armour or
armoured deck protection. The cruiser Miaulis
which carries 4 long 6.7” Krupp guns, 4 light
guns, 2 machine guns, and two small torpedo-boats
Colonel Manos
THE GREEK FLEET. c 59
on board, was launched in 1879, and is of 1770

registered tons, and can attain a speed of 15 knots
with its 2200 horse-power engines. The 4 gun
boats carry each a 4.7” Krupp gun; the torpedo
depot-boat carries two Krupp guns, and the
remaining boats have only machine guns. The
torpedo- boats have a speed of 20 knots, but as
they were built in 1881 and 1885, they are no
longer up to date.
The coast-defences comprise in the first line the
iron-clad gun-boat Basileus Georgios, which is also
capable of going to sea. She has a length of
245 ft. beam 36 ft. and a draught of 14.4 ft. a
displacement of 2100 tons, twin-screws, and a speed
of 1 2knots. Herarmament consists of two 21 cm. (=8”)
Krupp guns, four light guns, and two machine
guns. The ship is 3 5 years old, but may
still be considered serviceable. Next come two
unarmoured gun-boats, the Amorakia and the
Akteion, each armed with a heavy 10” Krupp gun
and two machine guns. These gun-boats were
launched respectively in 1881 and 1885 and have
the same speed as the older iron-clad gun-boats.
Further there are to be added to the coast defences
the three small “mine-layers”, Aegialia, Monemvasia,
and Naupaktia built of iron, launched in 1881, and
intended to do the work indicated by their names
In addition there are six first class torpedo-boats,

two second class, and two Nordenfelt submarine
boats.
The corvette Hellas, the old iron-clad corvette
Olga, a wooden vessel built in 1869, and a small
sailing brig, are used as training ships. The Hellas,
training ship for cadets, has two 6” Krupp guns,
one quick-firing gun, and two machine guns.
Twelve gun-boats and the Royal Yacht Amphitrite
are used for penal service. Of the gun-boats
.seven date from 1884, and are therefore of tolerably
modern construction; these are the Acheloos,
Alpheios, Eurotos, Pineos, Kissa, Kickli, and Aidon;
they are steel ships, each armed with two 3.5”
Krupp guns and two machine guns, and have a
speed of 9 to 10 knots. The other five are literally
“old tubs”, which were launched as far back as
1856; the Kissa, the Kickli, and the Aidon, are
nutshells of only 86 tons displacement.
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF TURKEY. 61
The Military System of Turkey.

The defensivepower of Turkey has frequently been.
undervalued and unfavorably judged since the Russo
Turkish War of 1878—79. Later, when revolt
broke out in different districts in the interior and
it became necessary to call out a considerable force,
weakness became only too apparent. The system of
mobilisation, too, proved very deficient in many
essential points, and altogether failed when the
necessity arose for rapid concentration.
Nevertheless there can be no doubt that Turkey
has always possessed a reserve of strength and
staying power, which enables the country to resist
alike shocks from within, and from without, and
which invariably seems capable of unexpected effort
whenever her faith or nationality is imperilled.
The foundation of the modern Turkish military
system is universal conscription. But as a matter
of fact, conscription is so inadequately carried out
that the gravest disorders result from it. According

to law, only Moslems can bear arms; and all the
numerous Non -Ma.hommedans of the empire are
consequently excluded from military service. Indeed
the Mahommedan Religion forbids the right of
bearing arms to members of any other religious
faith. Moreover, so many exceptions are made in
calling in the conscripts that not only annoyance,
resentment, and dissatisfaction are roused, but the
actual earning of their own livelihood is rendered
difficult and precarious. Conscription, as it now
exists, presses almost exclusively upon the dwellers
in the plains, and withdraws the strongest and most
capable from agriculture and the cultivation of
the soil.
The physique of the men at the disposal of the
army is excellent. They are strong, well-built,
unpretentious, trained in the home and by their
religion to practise obedience, sobriety, self-denial,
and strict piety, so that they are capable of becom
ing a dangerous weapon in skilful hands.
Religion, which plays an important part in the
daily life of the Turkish soldier, is an important
factor in fostering and cementing discipline. Five
times daily the troops assemble in the mosque,
and absence from prayer _is far more rigorously
punished than absence from duty or overstaying
of leave. Religious customs are prevalent every

where, nevertheless the step from these to fanaticism
is a long one.
Lieutenant General v. d. Goltz (Goltz Pasha) who
is intimately acquainted with the Turkish military
system, and who has carefully studied Officers and
men both in peace and war, says in his notes, that
in spite of the defeats of modern times the tradition
of conquest survives to this day in the Turkish
army. Even the meanest feels himself a member of
a ruling race in the midst of a confusion of
nationalities, to whom he considers himself
immeasurably superior. Field Marshal Moltke says
very correctly: “A Turk has no hesitation whatever
in admitting that Europeans are the superiors of his
countrymen in science, skill, wealth, enterprise, and
power, without its occurring to him for an instant
that for these reasons a Frank could place himself
on a level with a Moslem.
A feeling like, this which often developes into
the fault of arbitrariness, may be turned to good
account in the soldier.
The conviction that he belongs to and represents
a chosen race, rouses in him the sense that it is
his duty to prove himself worthy of his privileges.
His home education helps to fit him for
training and military discipline; its very uniformity
()4 THE WAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
is useful. The child of the poor peasant or

shepherd is as carefully taught all the forms of
social intercourse as the child of persons of rank,
He learns the same greetings, the same form of
addressing others, the same answers to conventional
questions, the same customs, such as rising before
his parents or waiting till invited to join in the
conversation, and the same external unmoved self
control.
Respect for age and for authority, submission
to the will of superiors and of the powerful without
loss of a certain feeling of equality and self
importance, are further useful in uniting the masses.
This union is strengthened by the feeling of
occupying an isolated position in the midst of the
peoples by whom they are surrounded.
The Turk is not permanently capable of
enduring life under foreign rule in other countries;
he is irresistibly drawn back to his countrymen
and companions. By degrees the Mahommedans
leave the ceded provinces, although the change in most
instances provides increased material well-being.
Only Russian rule has, so far, been successful in
reconciling its new Mahommedan subjects to their
changed circumstances and in attaching them to
the soil. Latterly, however, Austria can point to a
similar result in Bosnia. '
Lastly, the enormous influence which the mere

name of the Padishah wields over the minds of
his subjects must be remembered. Whether the
reigning sovereign happen to be popular as a
monarch or not, his commands are alike law and
fate to the Faithful. They are held to be immu
table, a power against which there is no appeal,
no resistance possible. When the Sultan has spoken
in any matter, all discussion is closed: his
approbation or disapprobation penetrates into private
life, and makes itself felt in the merest trifles.
Closely interwoven with the exalted Moslem virtue
of self-control is resignation to fate, the ready and
_willing acceptance of what is apportioned to the
individual by Divine Providence -— “Kismet”.
What Goltz lays much stress upon is the simpli
city and the temperance of the Turkish soldier.
Drunkenness is an unknown vice among the young
men of the people, neither does the pursuit of
pleasure make havoc among them as in Western
lands. Till they join the army they lead a simple,
healthy life, frequently one of privation; nevertheless
they are free from the pressure of want that weighs
down the nations of the over-populated West, ten
. ding to render them at an early age squalid and
hopeless. The Turk is not prematurely bowed
down by labour, like the populations of our manu
i)
facturing towns, and he remains capable of bearing

arms and taking the field to a more advanced age.
Peasants, herdsmen, and hunters form the main
body of the army, and the artisan is hardly to be
found in its ranks. Most of the men are familiar
with the use of arms from their youth up; the life
in camp is but a repetition of what they have
already learnt in their wandering life or from travel.
But little remains to be done before the new recruit
is fit to take his place in the ranks, and therefore
the Turkish War Department never hesitates to
incorporate recruits with trained troops. The little
that remains to be learnt technically they rapidly
acquire from their older comrades.
The men called out to serve with the colours
are divided into two classes. In the first of these
classes the men serve 3 years with the colours,
(Nizam troops) 3 years in the reserve (Ichtiaz)
8 years as Landwehr (Redif) and 6 years in the
“levée en masse" (Mustafiz). They are said to
number about 45,000 a year. The second class is
with the colours for from 5 to 9 months of the
year, of these 20,000 are yearly taken into the
regular army, and are then sent home to be kept
at the disposal of the active army.
It may therefore be assumed that about 65,000
men are thus yearly trained, altho’ variously
adapted to military service in consequence of the

varying terms of service. Another branch of men
liable to service consists of the 30,000 men who
train only on 150 Sundays, similar to the former
German recruiting reserve. These are drawn upon
only for assisting in recruiting.
The average strength of the army in time of
peace may be taken in round numbers as 225,000
men. Mobilisation and calling out of the reserves
raises this number to 380,000 men, while 150,000
remain behind in Depots, Military Institutions &c.
Of the 600,000 men comprising the Landwehr only
280,000 have been trained; of the 300,000 men of
the “levée en masse”, only 180,000 men.
In time of war the maximum strength of
the army may be set down as 800,000 without
counting the many thousands of volunteers or
Bashi-bazouks.
The empire of Turkey is divided into 6 military
districts. In time of peace each contributes 1 Army
Corps of troops of the line; in time of war 2
additional Army-Corps of Landwehr troops, as well
as 1 Corps of the “levée en masse”.
The standing army at present consists of 15
Battalions of Rifles, 2 Zouave Regiments of 2
Battalions each, 63 Infantry Regiments each of 4,
and 3 of 3 Battalions each; besides 17 independent
5‘
Battalions: a total therefore of 297 Battalions with

a nominal force of 800 men in the 21-? and 3.21, of
500 men in the 12, and of 400 each in the remai
ning Corps and Divisions; but these numbers are
never reached. The Cavalry is composed of 39
Regiments of 650 horses each; the Artillery of
5 Divisions of horse Artillery, and 32 Regiments
consisting of 3 Divisions of field and mountain
Artillery, consisting together of 15 horse Artillery,
169 field and 44 mountain Batteries each of 6 guns;
the garrison Artillery of 5 Regiments of 4 and 3
Battalions, the Engineers’ troops of 4 field Battalions
with 3 Companies of sappers and miners and
4 Companies of telegraphists, also 16 Companies
of fortress pioneers. There are besides 4 Battalions
of arsenal Artillery and 1 Division of Train. These
forces are organised in 7 Army Corps numbered
successively and having their Head- Quarters at
Constantinople, Adrianople, Monastir, Erzeroum,
Damascus, Bagdad and Yemen; and the 3 independent
Divisions of Hedsha, Tripolis, and Crete. The first
6 Army-Corps each comprise 2 Infantry Divisions,
each of 2 Brigades, each of 2--3 Regiments,
besides I Rifle Battalion, 1 Cavalry Division of
3 Brigades, 3 Artillery Brigades each of 2 Regiments
in 2 Divisions each having 3 Batteries besides
1 mounted Division, 1 engineer Battalion and
3 Squadrons of Train; the seventh Army-Corps is

decidedly weaker in Cavalry and Artillery. As
the Cavalry of the line is insufficient to form the
Cavalry Division, a sort of Cavalry Militia has been
raised (Hamidie) in the 42 Corps-district (Erzeroum)
by the help of the native Kurd tribes, which is
said to consist of 6 Regiments, each of 600
mounted men.
When the army is mobilised each of the first
6 Corps contributes 4 Divisions of Redifs, for which
even in peace the necessary staffs exist, and the
standing army provides the necessary Cavalry and
Artillery (each division has an Artillery Regiment).
The strength of the Battalion varies between
600—1000 men. -
The levée en masse (Mustafiz) is divided into
Battalions of from 600—1000 men, who are used as
garrison troops. The infantry are armed with the
Martini Henry rifle which they used in the Russo
Turkish war. It is a very good weapon both as
regards accuracy and rapidity of fire. Towards the
end of the eighties, the Turkish government decided.
to adopt the Mauser rifle with a magazine to carry
8 cartridges. An order for 500,000 was given, but in
the year 1890, when rifles of small calibre were
adopted by all the European armies, the Turks
adopted and ordered 200,000 of a rifle very
much resembling the one in use in the Belgian

army. In many respects it reminds one of the
Austrian Mannlicher rifle, which suits the Tur
kish soldier admirably since it requires no careful
treatment and wears well.
There were consequently 500,000 Mauser rifles
ready for the army with suitable ammunition. Up
to the present they have remained in the depots
and have only been given out singly.
Reports about the arming of the Artillery vary
considerably. The Turkish field Artillery has guns
of 8,7 em. (---= 3'4 in.) calibre, the horse Batteries are
provided with guns of 7,5 cm. (= 3 in.) calibre,
and the mountain Batteries with guns of 6,5 cm.
(2'6 in.) calibre. Four Army-Corps have 6 Regiments
to every 6 Batteries of 6 guns. One Corps (Bagdad)
has 17 Batteries, one (Yemen) 7 Batteries etc.
The field Artillery of the Turkish Army is
undeniably the best trained and equipped of the
three principal arms. This superiority they owe to
the old foreign instructors Kuczkowski,Wendt, and
others, also to Ristow Pasha of the German Mission,
lately deceased. These gentlemen were successful,
after long years of unwearied labour, in infusing
some of the Prussian spirit into the service. The
Turkish Artillery Officers themselves have no hesi
tation in admitting this — a contrast to their com
rades in other departments, who find little to say

in favour of the foreign instructor; as a matter of
fact, none have exercised an influence comparable to
that of the above named Artillery Instructors.
As long ago as after the war of 1866, Krupp
began to push his manufactures in Turkey. In the
very outset he had to encounter and overcome the
opposition of Halil Pasha, Inspector General of
Ordnance, who had been trained in England and
valued Armstrong and everything English highly.
_In the seventies Krupp’s system was at length de
finitely adopted, and at present the entire equip
ment of the Turkish field Artillery and the greater
part of the armament of the fortifications comes
from Krupp’s works.
In consideration of the warlike complications
with Greece and other probable enemies on the
Balkan Peninsula, the three Army-Corps, on this
side of the Dardanelles, Nos. 1, 2, and 3, (Constan
tinople,Adrianop1e, and Monastir) became important;
the third was the one Stationed nearest to Greece.
This Corps had been on a war footing long
before the outbreak of the war with the Greeks,
after 10 Battalions of the I-it- Army-Corps (Constan
tinople) and 13 Battalions of the 5'2 (Damascus)
== 23 in all had been ordered to reinforce the 32.
The 32 Army-Corps itself consisted of 2 Divisions
= 4 Infantry Brigades = 8 Infantry Regiments =

32 Battalions; 2 Montenegro Frontier Battalions,
2 Rifle Battalions, 1 Cavalry Division of 3 Brigades
= 6 Regiments of 5 Squadrons, 3 Brigades field
Artillery of 2 Regiments in 2 Divisions each =
36 Batteries; 1 Division of horse Artillery, 1 Pioneer
Battalion, 1 Train Battalion, and 1 Telegraph Com
pany. Simultaneously with the mobilisation of the
32Army-Corps, orders were given to bring up Nizams
from the eastern districts and Asia Minor, together
with Landwehr (Redif) troops, and to place an army
of 80,000 men in the field against Greece.
Turkish military training, both individually and
collectively, is insufficient from the European point
of view; nevertheless it would not be correct to
draw a conclusion from this fact as to the capabi
lity or preparedness of the Turkish Army for war.
The men come largely from tribes accustomed to
arms from childhood. Some are so to speak “born
soldiers”, and keep their fighting instincts and
qualities active by constant conflicts with their
neighbours, and here and there with the authorities,
and in the exercise of brigandage. These men
(Kurds, Albanians &c.) seem made for guerilla
warfare. For war on a large scale they would be
equally serviceable if they had modern military
training. The training of the Infantry in the
Battalion, and of the Artillery in the Battery may

perhaps be adequate for fighting in masses, or for
defence, but the higher combination of the two
is an imperfect instrument in modern strategy.
As regards the cavalry, it comes up to modern
requirements neither for service on the battle field
nor for protection, nor for scouting purposes. On
the other hand the daily routine in the army is
generally well and thoroughly carried out. Even
small unimportant sections are carefully officered.
Quietly and without much bustle, the daily duties
are gone through. Orderly, sentry, and out-post
duty play the principal parts; the distribution of
rations, fetching water, and all manner of other
work fill up the remaining time. They generally
drill twice daily, namely in the morning and at
sunset, strictly to plan and to time. The precise
punctuality to which Europeans are accustomed,
the sustained attention we demand, are entirely
absent, but discipline and good-will are there in
abundance; excesses of any sort are extremely rare.
Obedience, to be sure, is of a somewhat passive
kind.
The discipline which makes every sacrifice to
carry out an order given, in the face of the greatest
difficulties, comes far short of the mark. The
soldier easily regards an opposing and un
expected impediment as the will of fate and

hesitates to overcome it. Oriental apathy comes
into play; one is soon comforted after a disappoint
ment. On the other hand, a. capable leader at
once calls forth indefatigable good will and
intrepidity. With the Turks as with all robust
peoples of lower civilisation, courage and contempt
of death are held in the highest esteem, altho’ not
much talked about. Every one takes these
qualities for granted, and religion plays a great
part in their development. The Mahommedan
laments the dead without display or lengthy
mourning, since death has no terrors for him; he
never loses sight of the fact that death is natural and
inevitable. His self-command and dignity after
misfortune are worthy of imitation. “May Heaven
preserve you from worse!” is the comfort the
Moslem offers to a friend struck down by mis
fortune. The soldier who falls in face of the
enemy is accounted blessed by the multitude,
since he enters at once on all the delights of
Paradise.
Thus the Turkish soldier, whether encountering
danger or an overwhelming superiority of numbers,
nay, in the presence of almost certain destruction
never, according to trustworthy testimony, loses
his self-control. This renders him capable of
Omer Rushdi Pasha
extraordinary and marvellous deeds when acting

on the defensive, where spirited activity is of
less importance than endurance and resistance.
It is an injustice to deny to the Turkish soldier
the power of taking the initiative in attack, and
relegating his usefulness to positions of mere defence.
Anyone who has followed the fighting at Plevna in
detail has had the opportunity of confuting such
an opinion. The re-taking of the redoubts on the
south west of the place on the 12;h of September,
1877, clearly testifies to the contrary.
But Mahommedan resignation to the fate
ordained by Allah has a dark as well as a bright
side. On the one side it creates and cherishes
exalted military virtues, patience and fixed deter
mination, martial enthusiasm, and the contempt of
death; on the other, indolence and indifference, and
it is a foe to progress. Because the Koran says
somewhere that “many are wiser than one”, every
trifling matter must successively be brought before
the Council of the Medjidie, Commissions, Committees,
Inspections, or by whatever other names these
brooding haunts of wisdom are known.
One strange circumstance about the Turkish
army is, that the Landwehr is the real kernel of
its strength. As General v. d. Goltz notes, all the
Generals who took part in the last war are
unanimous in preferring the “Redif” to the troops

of the line. The men are generally 26 to 34 years of
age. Not till he attains this age does the Turkish
peasant attain to the full development of his
strength, owing to his very simple and healthy
manner of life. The men of the Redif have tall,
robust figures, are strong, have great power of
endurance, and remarkable personal courage. They
naturally suffer from insufficient drill, just as the
Line does, but drill is less imperative than with us,
owing to the different habits of the people.
The existence of a complete Staff makes it easy
to assemble the Redif Battalions. According to
the new arrangements made during the last few
years, of dividing the empire into districts, the men
can be at Head-Quarters ready to march on the
seventh day. Most of the districts are now in
telegraphic communication with the Capital, and
the completion of telegraph lines in all directions
is being rapidly carried on.
The appointment of Superior Officers in the
Army dates from the time of Abdul Medjid,
Who continued the work of his great and
energetic father Mahmoud. These superior Officers
are only few in number, but their reputation is
great; they include such names as Osman Pasha,
Mahmud Hamdi Pasha, Midhat and Riza Pasha,
Seifulla Pasha
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF TURKEY. '77
who mark the Renaissance period among the

Osmanli. The reign of Abdul Aziz was most
fruitful in producing good men, and nearly all the
Commanders in the present war, Edhem as General
issimo, Omar Nechat, Hamdi, Hadji Hairi, Hakki
and Hifzi Pasha first came to the front during that
period. The Turkish Officer is very fairly educated
and particularly well instructed in his profession.
The cadets of the Military school in Constantinople
have all to learn German, Russian, and French; in
the Navy they learn English. They receive their
education in three courses or schools, divided into
19 Classes, viz. 6 Rushdieh, 7 Idadieh, and 6 Herbieh
Classes, of which the last six are at the Military
Academy. Neither are the men nor the inferior
Ofiicers quite uneducated. The school system
which cannot certainly compare favourably with the
better European systems, renders very fair service.
If the soldiers were not so well prepared by the
schools on the one hand, and by their drill on the
other, they could never obey carefully planned
directions. Colonel Seiffullah Bey may be quoted
as an illustration of progress in Turkey, of whom
v. d. Goltz Pasha said: “If it comes to a war with
Greece I will be Generalissimo and Seiffullah my
Adjutant, or else Seifiullah will become Generalissimo
and I shall be his Adjutant”. This Seiffullah is an
78 THE WAR BET\VEEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
offshoot of the very latest school, and it is univer

sally asserted that had the Turks had no Seiffullah,
they would scarcely have been able to point to
such surprising results in the rocky districts of
Thessaly.
If the results obtained by Edhem Pasha are more
closely investigated it will be found that the school—
master has been abroad! This remark, originally
applied to Germany, may justifiably be transferred
to Turkey, since it is fully admitted that the Turkish
successes are everywhere only a brilliant reflection
of German military schooling in the Ottoman Empire.
Of the well-known Generals engaged in the
Greek war, the one with the widest reputation is
undoubtedly Osman Pasha, the Lion of Plevna, altho’
he held no actual command during this campaign.
Born 60 years ago at Amasia, he has scarcely
ever crossed the frontiers of his native country:
only twice has he entered Russia, as a young sub
lieutenant in the fighting near Eupatoria in 18 5 5,
and under OmerPasha on the*) Abchasian shores and
latterly as prisoner after the catastrophe of Plevna.
After the suppression of the revolt of the Druses
in 1860, Osman became Captain of cavalry; in 1867,
he fought in Crete and was promoted to the Staff
*) Abchasia on the N. E. shores of the Black Sea. (Transli)

Enver Pasha
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF TURKEY. 7Q
with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel; as Colonel he

fought under Redif Pasha in 1871, in Yemen. In
the autumn of 1875, he was made General of
Division and Pasha, and led the advance in the
Turco-Servian war of 1876 with his Corps at Widdin.
He distinguished himself so greatly at Weliki-Igwor
and Saitshar, that he was made Mushir (Marshal) in
November by the Padishah. On the outbreak of
the Russo-Turkish war in the spring of 1877, he
was stationed with 3 5,000 men at Widdin. From
here he planned an incursion into Roumania, but
was obliged to give up his bold project of acting
on the offensive. When, however, the main Russian
army pressed forward into the valley of the Intra
atTirnova, and crossed the Balkans on the 132 of July
by the Shipka Pass, Osman suddenly appeared at
Plevna, threatened the Russian right flank and rear,
defeated Schilder-Schuldner on the 20_t__h,v. Kriidener
and Schachowskoi on the 302 and 312, and although
he was driven from his intrenchments at Griwitza by
the Roumanians, he resisted all the attacks of both
Russians and Roumanians to drive him from Plevna,
which he had strongly intrenched.
After the hotly contested successes in July, the
Padishah had bestowed the title of Ghazi (the
Victorious) upon him. When Osman Pasha returned
from his captivity at the end of March, 1878, he
Pi?
became the re-organiser of the army and served as

Minister of War for 10 years, 1878—1888. During
the Bulgarian disorders of 1885 and 1886, 22 Field
Divisions were speedily collected on the Balkan
peninsula, making a total of 300,000 troops. This
result could not have been secured without the
careful and vigilant support of the Marshal, whose
power of organisation and military activity met the
plans of the German instructors half-way.
Edhem Pasha, the universally victorious Com
mander of the Turkish army in Thessaly, is not
more than 45 years of age. The very appearance
of the Marshal, his spare sinewy form somewhat
over middle height, his eyes as hard as steel, his
light elastic movements, testify to his indefatigable
energy and to his powers of endurance. “He is a
man who can take action Without boasting of his
successes”. At the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish
war in 1877, he was already Colonel, and during the
tedious conflict round Plevna he commanded a
Brigade for a time under Osman Pasha. Even at
that time he attracted the attention of the Sultan
and of the Ministry of War. As Vali (Governor
General) of the Vilayet Kossovo, he sought to rival
the Austro-Hungarian administration of Bosnia in
his own district, but his period of office was too
short to be productive of lasting results.
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF. TURKEY. 81
Appointed to the command of the Turkish

forces drawn up on the Macedonian and Thessalian
frontier, he left Constantinople on the 12 of March
1 897, and established his Head-Quarters the following
evening atElassona. Immediately afterthe declaration
of war he took possession on the 172 and 182 of
April of the important Meluna Pass and the heights
commanding it, with the exception of. the Block
house on the Kriteri, advanced the head of his
column into the Thessalian plain on the 192, and
on the 232, broke through the Greek centre after
an artillery contest at Karadere and the subsequent
battle at Mati. Simultaneously threatening the
Greeks on their right flank he succeeded in occupy
thing Turnavos on the 242, Larissa on the 25 ill,
removing his Head-Quarters there on the 272.
After the heavy fighting of the 5 2 of May, he invested
Pharsalos, upon which the Greek army evacuated
almost the whole of Thessaly.
On the 72 the Division comanded by Haki
Pasha entered Velestino, on the 82 of May the
Turks occupied Volo.
Edhem Pasha was now appointed Commander
in Chief of the whole army assembled against the
Greeks.
As Chief of the Staff, Omer Rushdi Pasha
acted at Edhem Pasha’s side. This Officer is of a
s
contemplative, phlegmatic disposition, not inclined

to take an energetic initiative, quite the type of
the old Turkish Staff Oflicer, constantly occupied
in avoiding friction and hindrances in the conduct
of affairs. Omer Rushdi was the moderating,
palliating element in the direction of the war, the
advocate of well-considered measures on the
offensive, and averse to bold combinations and
undertakings.
In the war of 1877—78, he was active in the
Eastern army of the Danube under Mehmed Ali,
then he was appointed chief of the Stafl'. With
his quiet, gentle disposition and many-sided culture
he united indefatigable industry. For this reason
his Sovereign called on him to fill a succession of
exalted posts in the army. In the eighties he
was as Colonel, a member of the Commission on
Fortification in Roumelia, later, Chief of the Stafi
of the 12 Corps (Constantinople) and subsequently
General in Command of the 52 Corps (Damascus).
Omer guided the business at Head Quarters
with a firm and safe hand, and it was his special
care and duty to keep open the communications
with the army in the rear.
His foremost support was Seiffullah Pasha, in
many respects the very opposite of his superior
Officer, and without doubt one of the most gifted,
cultured, and earnest Staff Officers in Turkey. To

striking military capacity he adds diplomatic ability,
and is at the same time a man of the world who
quickly adapts himself to all circumstances. He
has probably a brilliant diplomatic future before
him. He is master of the French, Russian, Greek,
Persian and Arabian languages, and possesses
organising capacity, his lively disposition however
occasionally carrying him a little too far in de
fence of his opinions. Seiffullah served through the
war with Russia as Captain on the Head-Quarter
Staff. After the campaign he was member of the
International Frontier Commission in Bulgaria, and
then for a long time on the Head-Quarter Staff.
He worked for a time under Goltz Pasha at the
Military Academy of Pankaldi, and was more than
11 years military attaché to the Turkish Embassy
at Athens. Endowed with remarkable powers of
endurance and an indefatigable pedestrian, he has
wandered nearly all over Greece on foot, and
acquired an intimate and accurate knowledge of the
country and the people. This knowledge stood him
in good stead during the last war, and rendered his
services very advantageous to his Chief. After the
occupation of Larissa, the Sultan conferred on him
the rank of Pasha and made him Governor of the
town. During the progress of the war he occupied
6.
positions of constantly increasing influence and

importance at Head-Quarters. Foreign Officers and
correspondents present at the seat of war, found in
Seiffullah Pasha the most courteous and kindly in
formant and counsellor.
The duty of conducting operations was shared
between Seiffullah Pasha and Enver Pasha, who is
one of the most gifted Officers of the Turkish Staff;
he won recognition for his bold and rapid operations
in Thessaly, and doubtless has a brilliant future
before him. Enver Pasha was one of the most
able administrators at Head-Quarters, and remained
an active soldier in spite of his many years of use
fulness as teacher at the Military Academy, and of
his studies on the General Staff of the 32 Army
Corps (Monastir). He was particularly successful
in stimulating by his own ambition, ambition in
others, and in diffusing a spirit of unity among the
commanders of Divisions in intelligently supporting
and carrying out the plans of their Superior Of
ficers. Enver Pasha was Lieutenant-Colonel at the
beginning of the contest, and was promoted to the
rank of General at the end, in recognition of his
services. For a short time he was military attaché
to the Turkish embassy in Vienna.
Let us now turn briefly to the Superior Officers
of the Thessalian army.
Hairi Pasha
At ~the head of the 12 Division we find Hairi

Pasha, 55 years of age, a former student of the
General Staff College, whose abruptness and tena
city of character were the cause of frequent col
lisions with his superiors, as well as with his sub
ordinates. He fOught in the Russian war as Lieu
tenant Colonel and Commander of a Battalion at
Plevna, then became Chief of the Survey commission
in Hedjas, and for some time belonged to the Staff.
Promoted to be Lieutenant General he was first
appointed to the command of the “Redif” Division
from Broussa, then to that from Ueskiib which he
led to the theatre of war, and with whom he fought
bravely for the possession of the Meluna Pass at
Domenick and at Damassi.
Hairi Pasha has been reproached for not leading

his Division rapidly enough against the left wing of
the Greeks at Pharsalus and Domokos, and thus losing
the opportunity of inflicting a far more crushing
defeat upon the Greeks.
The second Division was commanded by Nechat

Pasha. Already in his 5721 year he can look back
on an eventful military life. Nechat is rightly
regarded as one of the most intelligent, mentally
active, and enterprising Superior Officers; and he
was specially favoured in having a brigade armed
with Mauser rifles assigned to him. Their

engagement at Domokos, however, led to no tactical
success.
Nechat Pasha served in the Russo-Turkish war
in the Army of the Western Danube, as Chief of
the General Stafl' under Prince Hassan of Egypt.
When the Russian Army moved forwards towards
Constantinople, he was enstrusted with the task of
strengthening the lines of Tshataldsha; and later
he directed the erection of other works intended
to cover the Capital. When the mobilisation
against Greece in 1885 was determined upon, he
advanced with the Redif Division of Broussa to
Elassona. In the last war he led the Redif Division
of Balikessir.
Memduh Pasha, the commander of the 3 2 Division,
was also originally on the General Staff, of which
he was one of the most talented and active
members. He had already distinguished himself
in the War of 1877—78, in which he was Lieu
tenant Colonel. Then Chief 0f the Staff of the
42 Army Corps, and later Commander of a Brigade
at Erzeroum, when he was entrusted with the
task of superintending the construction of fortified
blockhouses on the Russo-Asiatic frontier. From
this post he was called into the Ministry of War
to take part in the work of organisation. He
Nechat Pasha.
served in the war with the Redif Division of

Broussa, which he led to the attack on the strong
Greek position at Halmyros and Velestinos.
The Commander of the 62 Division was Hamdi
Pasha, who fought on the extreme left wing with
his Division on the march into Thrace at Karia,
Deliller &c.
Hamdi has the reputation of being a smart
soldier and a man of action; he was remarkable
for his “sang froz'd” in the fierce fighting in the
Shipka Pass in 1877. Through filling many posts
in Asiatic and African Turkey, in Van, in Erzeroum,
and in Tripoli, he had the opportunity of gathering
rich and varied military experience, and a wide
acquaintance with the country. When the war
broke out he was in command of the Redif
Division of Trebizond, and at once joined the
mobilised army.
Major General Haidar Pasha, entrusted with the
command of the 42 division, is the son of Marshal
Ismael Pasha; his advancement has been rapid,
thanks to the protection of his father. At a
comparatively early age he became Colonel and
Adjutant to the Sultan, without having served on
the Staff. Later, his promotion became slower and
he was apparently overlooked. He had taken no
part in any war. He attained in due course the
rank of General in 1896, and became Commander

of the Redif Brigade of Saloniki. With this
Brigade he was at the theatre of war, and after
the appointment of Omer Rushdi as Chief of the
Staff of the army of operation in Thessaly, he was
put in command of the Division rendered vacant by
Omer Rushdi’s promotion. Nearly all the leading
Officers here briefly sketched have, as is evident,
passed from the General Staff and made their way
in the army in consequence of their scientific
military education, and of their knowledge and
experience of military service. Memduh Pasha
alone, commanding the 3'2“ Division, has risen from
the ranks. He distinguished himself at Plevna in
1877, by his bravery, but his striking military
ability was not shown or developed till he over
came the revolted Druses of Hauron in conjunction
with Ibrahim Pasha at Mazraa in 1895, and at once
suppressed the dangerous and widespread disorders
in this part of the country.
In recognition of his energetic and well-planned
action against the armies of the insurrection, he
received his promotion as General and was appointed
Governor of Hauron. As Lieutenant-General he
was then transferred to Albania in 1896, and made
Governor of Dibra. Here also it required a firm
hand to keep the wild, lawless inhabitants in
7., . ma-’a.. , '—-_,_W~_ ______., ,_._ -

Hakki Pasha
check. Lastly he commanded the Redif Division

of Mitrowitza all through the Turko-Greek war.
The Commander of the Artillery, Riza Pasha,
was a young and well-educated General who
united accurate technical knowledge with a thorough
appreciation of the duties of a Superior Officer.
An old student of the School of Artillery on the
Golden Horn, he was not much over 40 when he
received his command. While still very young
he was ordered to spend 4 years in Germany in
further study, and at the same time appointed to
the 272 Field Artillery Regiment. He is a
modern, thoroughly trained Artillery-Officer, and
a brave and energetic man. He succeeded in a
very short space of time, just before the outbreak
of hostilities, in re-organising and developing the
Artillery so completely, that it produced remar
kable results during the war, owing chiefly to
the excellent training of the Subordinate Officers,
and their intelligent appreciation of the orders
given.
In Epirus, the veteran Achmet Hifzi Pasha
held the chief command. His warlike reputation
dates from the Russian war, in which he commanded
a Division of Osman Pasha’s army. At the head
of his troops he defended the position of Dobenick.
between Plevna and Orkhania, in the most brilliant
manner. His gallant conduct on that occasion

earned him the soubriquet of “the Hero of
Dobenick”.
After the war he was promoted to be Lieutenant
General; in 1885, he was made Governor of Ianissa,
and in 1887, in addition, Commander of the Greek
frontier. At the time of the war breaking out he
was 70 years of age, had been an Officer 50 years,
and Lieutenant-General about 20.
Finally let us turn to the three Commanders on
the Epirote frontier during the war. These were
the Lieutenants-General Mustapha Pasha, Osman
Pasha, and Mohamed Sadedin Pasha.
Mustapha Pasha had passed much of his service
in the Ministry of War in both military and ad
ministrative capacities. Here he was occupied with
questions of organisation, partly of the Infantry and
the Staff, and partly of the Commissariat. In the year
1886, he was appointed to the command of aRedif
Brigade (Yosgad). In these spheres of action,which
presuppose an accurate acquaintance with the army,
he laid the foundation of thorough reforms. When
the Armenian outbreak took place in 1893, Mustapha
Pasha was entrusted with its suppression, and on
account of his prompt success he was promoted to
the rank of Lieutenant-General. At the beginning
of the last war he came to Epirus with his Division,
Hamdi Pasha
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF TURKEY. 9!
but as a part of his Albanian Battalions mutinied,

he was put under arrest and conducted to Con
stantinople.
Lieutenant General Osman Pasha, as Captain on
the Head-Quarter Staff, was sent to Russia to serve
in regiments there for two years, then he was
attached to the Turkish Embassy in St. Petersburg.
He rendered special service in the fortification of
the Dardanelles, and was therefore included in the
Superior Commission to whom the plans for the
fortifications were entrusted.
In the beginning of the Greek war he was made
Lieutenant-General and Commander of Division,
and led his troops successfully, particularly in the
fight on the Luro.
Lieutenant-General Mohamed Sadedin Pasha,
member of the Head-Quarter Staff, was Aide-de
Camp to Medjid Pasha in the Herzegovina, and
later during the war served in the campaign near
Silistria. After this war, during which he rose to the
rank of Colonel at the early age of 26, he was
attached for some time to the Ministry of War and was
there engaged in the Finance department.
During the Armenian revolt he was sent as Im
perial Commissary to Van, where he was successful
in pacifying the excited population. In recognition
of his services the Sultan presented him with the
()2 THE WAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
Great Cross of the Osmanié Order in diamonds. In

the Greek war he received the command of a
Division of Reserves, and fought with these in
Osman’s Division on the Luro.
After the conclusion of the truce he returned to
his old department in the War Office.
Haidar Pasha
THE TURKISH FLEET. 93
The Turkish Fleet.

In addition to her military forces the naval
power of Turkey must be taken into consideration,
although its influence on the operations of the
war was of a very subordinate character. The
Turkish war-navy consists of the three casemate
ships Messudye, Hamidye, and Assar-i-Tewfik.
The first named vessel which was launched as
far back as 1874, is of 9120 tons *); she carries
12 Armstrong muzzle-loading guns, three 7” Krupp
guns, 6 quick-firing guns, and 7 machine guns.
Her plates are about one foot thick, but like the
last of the three ships named only of iron. The
speed of all the three vessels is only 13 knots
per hour. The other two Iron-clads are smaller,
*) A first-class English men-of-war is of 9500 tons and up

wards, with a speed of no less than 13 Knots.
“The Royal Navy” by a Lieutenant, R. N.
Swan Sonnenschein 8: C0. (1897).
the Hamidye being only of 6700 tons, and the

Assar-i-Tewfik of 5600 tons; but the Hamidye is
armoured with compound 9” plates and her heavy
equipment of Artillery consists wholly 0f Krupp
breach-loaders. She has ten 10.2” guns, two 6”, six of
3.5”, and two machine guns. The Assar-i-Tewfik
has eight 9.5” guns and two 8", four quick-firing
guns, and seven machine guns.
The “Assar-i-Tewfik” and the “Messudieh” may

possibly be regarded as ships of the line, but the
four iron-clad turret-ships “Azizieh“, “Mahmudieh“,
“Osmanieh“ and “Orkanieh“ are valueless, being
too thinly armoured; but as transports they can
take 2000 men on board. The frigate “Hamidieh”
is a specimen of Turkish naval architecture; it was
laid down during the reign of Abdul Aziz in 1870,
and with great difficulty finished in 1885; but
when she was launched bearing the proud name
of the present Sultan, she proved unmanageable;
accordingly she was towed back into the arsenal,
where she has since spent her life in philosophic
contemplation.
On each of the four turret-ships Azizieh,Mahmudye,

Osmanieh, and Orkanieh the heavy guns are placed
in two iron-clad turrets protected by 10” plates; the
armament consists of Krupp guns, being two 10.2 ”
Memduh Pasha
'\
,1
guns, eight 6", six 4”, four quick-firing and seven

machine guns, two torpedo tubes and each carries
a small torpedo-boat on board.
Next comes the turret-ship Abdul-Kadir doing
duty as an iron-clad cruiser; she has a displacement
of 7,873 tons, 11,500 horse-power, with twin screws,
and is powerfully armed. According to C. Beseke’s
report the ship is still on the stocks, and will turn
out a modern, and in every way efficient, addition
to the Turkish fleet. Next come seven smaller
iron-clad corvettes of 2000 to 2800 tons displacement;
these are the Feth-i-Bulend, Mukkaddeme-i-Hair,
Awn-Illah, Muin-i-Saffer, Idshalje, Assav-i-Shevket,
and Nedshim-i-Shevket; they have a speed of 1 1 to 13
knots and are armed with heavy Armstrong muzzle
loaders, and with medium-sized Krupp guns, small
quick-firing guns, machine guns and torpedo
equipments. They could best be utilized for coast
defence, but they are all but unprotected against
modern artillery, their plates having a thickness of
less that 5 inches.
Turkey also possesses a double-turreted Monitor
the Hifs-i-Rahman of 2500 tons, feebly protected
and armed with Armstrong muzzle-loaders; she
has a speed of only 12 knots, and was built in
1868. To the fleet of iron-clads must further be
added two river gun-boats, the Feth-ul-Islam and
the Memduhye, of only 330 tons each, armed with

smooth-bore guns, as well as the iron-clad gun
boat the Hisber, of 400 tons, carrying 2 Krupp
4.75” guns, 2 quick-firing guns, and 2 machine
guns. ,
In addition to the iron-clads here enumerated
Turkey has a torpedo-fleet of 3 torpedo gun-boats
of modern construction (the Nimet, the Peleng-i
Derja, and the Shahin-Derja); two of these were
built in Germany (Gaarden) and one having a
speed of 19 to 22 knots in Constantinople; also two
torpedo-boat destroyers (the Berk-Efl'chan and the
Tajjer) built on the Germania wharf in Kiel, having
a speed of 25 knots; 15 first class torpedo-boats,
7 second class, 1 third class, and 2 submarine
boats. M0st of the torpedo-boats have been built
in German yards and represent the most modern
portions of the fleet.
Of unarmoured ships, which cannot be employed
in modern warfare, Turkey has eight first, second,
and third class cruisers; four of these are serviceable,
being protected internally with horizontal iron
decks; besides these, 28 first, second, and third class
gun-boats, several paddle and screw steamers used
as scouts, training ships, and as transports.
Since the expedition to Sukhum-Kaleh under
Hobart Pasha, Manthorp Bey and an English Staff
in 1877, the Turkish iron-clads have never been

combined in a squadron, and if they were now
required to manoeuvre in line, owing to their total
lack of all training, collisions and misadventures
would no doubt occur, in spite of the natural aptitude
of the men for sea-service.
Of late the modest retirement of the Sultan’s
fleet has only occasionally been broken in upon.
Now and then a torpedo boat would go to sea
alone, but when several vessels had to go out
together, as for instance when the German Emperor
on board the Hohenzollern paid a visit to Con
stantinople, and had to be met and welcomed by a
number of ships, extraordinary efforts had to be
made.
98 THE WAR BET‘VEEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
The Theatre of War.

The district in which the two hostile armies met
in order to bring their differences to an issue, in
cluded the Turkish provinces of South Macedonia
and Epirus, Greek Thessaly and Phocis. The line
of the Pindus mountains divides this space into two
distinct fields of operation.
The most important of these two is Thessaly,
which mostly is a flat and level plain; while Epirus,
the second, lying to the westward, is very moun
tainous, and consequently less suitable for military
operations.
All the roads uniting Thessaly and Epirus are
simple bridlepaths leading across the passes of the
Pindus. In consequence of this lack of land-com
munication with Epirus, Turkey was at a very
marked disadvantage as compared with Greece, who
held the command of the sea; and was compelled to
send all reinforcements to Epirus by way of Monastir.
THE THEATRE OF WAR. 99
The principal passes over the Pindus are; the

Zygos Pass leading from Yanina and Grevena over
Metsovo to Trikhala; the Djumanalta Pass from
Grevena to Kalabaka, the terminus of the Greek
Northern line from Volo to Trikhala and Kalabaka;
the Zorgya Pass from Koziani to Domenico; the
Sarantoporos pass from Koziani t0 Elassona, and
finally the Ozeros Pass. In the parts of the Pindus
to the north of the Zygos Pass the communications
for a distance of upwards of sixty miles are still
worse; the Turka and the Grevena Pass are only
bad bridlepaths, and the Monastir-Korcya-Yanina is
only partly made. Only two districts, therefore are
fitted for the operations of war: the Epirote, where
the greatest difficulties and obstacles exist and the
Thessalian which is a mere cauldron -shaped plain.
This plain is- bounded on the west by the Pindus,
on the East by the Olympus and Ossa range, in
the North by spurs of the main range, the Khassia
Mountains, and spurs of Olympus, and finally, in the
South, by the Othrys Mountains and the lofty
precipitous Mountains of Oeta.
Almost all invasions of Thessaly from the North
have been, not along the coast, but across the
mountains inland. The physical outlines of the nor
thern frontier determine this. In the East, Olympus
rises as a great corner buttress towards the sea,
7.
furrowed by deep ravines, so that the road by the

sea which runs along steep declivities, is rendered
perilous by rushing mountain torrents and water- '
falls, and can easily be defended at its entrance into
the Vale of Tempe.
The western corner buttress is formed by the

Mountain range of Metzovo. A very passable road
leads upwards from the river valley of the Vistritza
opening into South Macedonia, from Grevena to a
pass of 5400 feet above sea level, and renders pos
sible an advance from Metzovo into Epirus upon
Yanina, or into the Western Thessalian Plain upon
Trikhala. This is the Zygos Pass already referred
to as the principal road.
Both extreme points are united by a wall of

mountains running east and west; these are the in
hospitable Khassia and Bounasa Mountains, which
are only crossed by bridlepaths between Diskata
and Trikhala. It is only at the junction with the
western declivity of Olympus that a deep depression
occurs. This is where the valley of the Thessalian
Xeraghis approaches the Vistritza for a distance of
12 or 13 miles, and is united at Servia by the road
over the Pass of Portas, 3100 feet above the sea.
When Thessaly was ceded in 1881, the Turks made
a point of reserving to themselves the whole basin
s
Mustapha paSha
THE THEATRE OF WAR. IOI
of the Xeraghis with its deep southern curve. They

thus were at liberty from their base of operations
at Servia either to follow the southern course of the
stream to Demeniko and Damasi, and thus to
threaten Tyrnavo and Larissa from the West, or
to reach these two towns from the East by way of
Elassona and the frontier pass of Meluna, 1480 feet
above sea level, and Mati.
From 3 to 9 miles to the south the river
Salamvria (Peneus) flows through the Vale of Tempe.
Its course is approximately parallel to the Greek
Thessalian northern frontier, while the frontier of
the Greek language is about 40 miles further north. On
the Salamvria are the larger towns of Trikhala and
Larissa containing 15—16,ooo inhabitants.
Immediately north of the lower Salamvria,
Olympus rises on Turkish territory to a height of
9,750 feet, bounded on the east by the Gulf of
Saloniki and shut in on the west by the Santa
poros or Xeraghis, a tributary of the Salamvria.
On a little tributary of the Santaporos, flowing
direct from Olympus, lies the little town of Elassona
which played a considerable part in the war. Its
Turkish inhabitants live in 200 houses on the left
bank of the stream, the Greeks in 50 houses on the
right bank. The mixture of Mussulmans and
Christians in the same town, tho’ in distinct quarters,
is to be found on both sides of the political frontier,

exactly as at Elassona.
The Vale of Tempe is full of picturesque beauty,
which gives it a character of repose and charm,
while the ever-flowing mountain streams contribute
a sense of constant freshness and animation. The
mountains on both sides are covered with plants
and grasses; on the rocks ivy, bear’s wort, and other
plants are found, and on the slopes here and there
are small gardens with almond and pomegranate
trees, carefully, planted and cultivated, while purling
streams of purest water rise in their midst, rendering
the air everywhere remarkably fresh and healthy.
Some distance below the entrance to the Vale
of Tempe the eye is arrested by the village of Hassan
Baba which, situated on a circular plain at the foot of
Kissavos (Ossa), possesses a celebrated mosque built
by a certain Hassan from whom the place doubtless
takes its name. The mosque is beautifully situated
among cypresses and pyramid-shaped elms and is sur
rounded by plantain trees and delightful walks. The
high road on the right bank of the Peneus (Salamvria)
leads through Baba and is much visited by travellers
from Larissa to Saloniki.
Many are of opinion that Baba is built on the siteof
the ancientElatea. From Baba the road runs through a
picturesque plantain wood, the trunks garlanded with
Osman Pasha
the wild vine. The dim river, overshadowed by

plantains, traverses this lovely valley as though it had
reached a haven of rest. The waters, flowing noise
lessly, seem to issue from the trees that border the
river banks. In many places the banks are covered
with Agnus castus or with grass.
The old Thessalians used to celebrate a festival
here every year, in :memory of a terrible earthquake
which devastated the country and formed the Vale of
Tempe, the rushing torrents of water restoring the
beautiful plains of Larissa to their previous fertility.
At the time of this festival all the inhabitants of the
surrounding towns met in the Vale of Tempe. Every
where incense was offered to the gods. The Peneus
was covered with boats ceaselessly moving hither and
thither. In the woods, on the meadows, and on the
banks of the river, tables were spread. A singular
custom at this time allowed slaves to associate with
their masters, the latter waiting on the former, who
played their part with unrestrained freedom.
For the invasion of Thessaly by the Turks, the
two districts through which a line of rail runs from
Larissa to V010, and from Kalambaka over Trikhala,
Pharsalos and Pheroe to V010, afford the greatest faci
lities. Here the ground is tolerably easy, while the
other districts of the peninsula are very difficult and
rugged. Moreover the cultivation of the land on
these lines ofl'ers adequate means of subsistence

unless purposely destroyed. The district of the
Salam vria is particularly fertile.
Between Larissa and Elassona, the respective head
quarters of the hostile armies, the following lines of
communication exist along the Macedonian and
Thessalian frontier:
1. A footpath through the Herias valley over
Domenik, Damassi, through the Pass of Raveni (where
Greek territory begins) and Bughasi to Tirnavos and
Larissa. This is a long route, the path running alter
nately ontherightandtheleftside of theHerias. To the
east lies the Kitiri Mountain Range, a spur of Olympus.
2. The shortest line of communication between
Elassona and Tirnavos branches off from the former
path and across the pass of Meluna, 71/2 miles to
the east of Skompa, between the Mountains Parna
and Papa Livadia. The ascent on the Turkish side
to the highest point, 1885 ft. above sea level, is steep,
with an easier descent towards Tirnova. The pass
is situated on the line of the frontier.
3. and 4. Two other bad roads lead from Elas
sona to Karya (Hoskoey to the Nezero lake).
5. A road along the steep shore to the east of
Olympus leads from Katerina to Platamontana in
Macedonia, and thence to the mouth of the Salamvria.
The general formation is everywhere the same;
limestone rock, vrarely covered with trees and

deeply indented with ravines; the passes are at times
dry torrent beds, occasionally rendered impassable
by wild dashing streams, the paths are wretched, and
the summits on both sides bald and treeless. This
description refers equally to the Meluna Pass.
The demarcation of the frontier line in 1881, was
here on the whole favourable to Turkey; and by
means of the batteries of Menaxa, protected by
earthworks on the commanding summit of the Meluna
Pass, from which the whole valley can be held,
and the equally strong battery of Viglia, not far
from Damassi, armed with3.6" and 6” Krupp guns, the
two most important entrances to the pass were
suitably protected.
Mention must also be made of the Turkish
battery at Tsiloraki at the northern end of the
Meluna Pass, as well as of the Karaulas frontier
Blockhouses along the whole frontier on all the
important heights. On the Greek side but few
blockhouses were erected; the Meluna Pass had
been covered by the Kriechowa blockhouse pro
tected by earthworks, and for the rest, the heights
near Zarkos had been slightly fortified for the de
fence of the Raveni pass at Sideropulos.
The streams of Northern Greece are of little
strategic value; in summer they are more or less
dried up, so that they offer no obstacles at that

season. In the winter they swell and rush wildly
along, yet they can be bridged over without much
difficulty, owing to their having no great breadth.
The important streams are the Salamvria in the North
running from west to east, the little frontier stream
Arta in the west, and finally the Aspropotamos
flowing south.
The two lines of railroad from Volo to Larissa,
and from Volo to Kalampaka via Trikhala, were im
portant to the Greek army. The highly important
line from Athens to Larissa through Thebes and Lamia
was under construction till 1894, when the under
taking was stopped owing to lack of funds, and it
has never been completed. On some new maps the
line is marked as finished but this in an error.
Thessaly is divided into two great plains of
unequal size, the smaller in the north, the larger in
the south-west; the separating mountains are the
Dodanji and the Dobrudshi Dagh (1000——1,2oo ft.)
'and in the south, the Khassidiari Mountains and the
Kara Dagh (3,2 50 ft.)
The northern plain is, surrounded by the Thes
salian frontier mountains on the north, and separated
from the sea by Ossa and Pelion. It is surrounded
on three sides by lofty mountain ranges. Broad
valleys connect the northern with the south-western
Ill/ul/l/m
mi |l
J,
I‘/
‘;
Pasha
plain in the direction of V010, and towards Karditsa

and Trikhala.
In the southern part of the Thessalian plain lies the
town of Pharsala, or Pharsalos, on the river Enipeus,
in a fertile plain on the northern slope of a hill, on
the long, sharp ridge of which the ruins of the old
Acropolis bear witness to its former importance. On
the south side the steep slope descends to the plain.
Pharsalos is important, as the Volo-Trikhala line of rail
here crosses the road from Larissa to Lamia.
Like the lofty mountain wall on the northern
frontier, the Othrys range extends as a broad barrier
from the majestic double pyramid of Tymphrestos (or
Veluchi) on the west, to the Gulf of Volo on the east.
It is a well-watered, verdant, table-land broken by
ranges of hills, and descends to the plains on both
sides by steep rocky slopes. On the east side the
plateau terminates between outlying ramparts in the
fertile coast valley of Hamyros. To the north
the chain is broken by deep ravines forming the
bed of the river Enipeus or Tshanarli and its two
western tributaries, the Domokiotikos and the
Pentemylia. The road along the valley of the
Enipeus is tedious and leads to the coast plain of
Almyro. The valley of the Domokiotikos forms
the important line of road from Larissa to Lamia
and Athens. On a steep eminence above the valley
and the road stands the town of Domokos, cele

brated for its magnificent view over the whole of
Thessaly, its broad plains framed in by Pelion and
Ossa (Kissavos) on the east, the majestic snow
crowned heights of Olympus on the north, and the
Alpine mountain of the “Five Brothers” of Agraphia
and Veluchi on the west.
Domokos lies like a saddle on the back of a
lofty mountain ridge. This little town of about
1600 Turkish and Greek inhabitants is the custo
mary halting place on the Lamia-Pharsala road.
From Domokos a pretty straight road of upwards
of 11 miles leads over the Phurka Pass, the lowest
pass of the Othrys mountains. A journey of eight
hours further brings one to Lamia. This road is
difficult, but considering the means and circumstances
of the country, in good order. With the exception
of this pass, only stony mountain paths cross the
chain,which reaches altitudes of from 5 ,000 to 6,000 feet.
These paths, almost without exception, run north and
south without any communication with one another
on the plateau itself.
These mountain paths become practically im
passable in wet weather. They are the only ones
however, on which reserves and provisions can be
forwarded from Athens and from the sea-port of
Stylis.
From west to east between the Othrys range and

the Oeta in the valley of the Spercheus, runs a well
kept road into which most of the mountain paths.
strike. It leads from Varibopi to Lamia and thence
onward to Stylis.
As a seaport to which all reinforcements can be
brought by sea, Stylis is of great importance. At this
point provisions, munitions &c. are disembarked, and
transferred to beasts of burden for carriage across
the Othrys Mountains, over the Phurka or other
passes. There are, in addition, three bridlepaths
running from North to South over the Othrys range,
and further west there is a path to Yhardmeni.
On the Turkish side, reinforcements &c. have to
be brought from a great distance, but the Thessalian
plain is itself capable of provisioning a portion of the
army, and from the very first the means of transport
had been more carefully organised than on the Greek
side. The lines of communication in the country in
which the troops moved were sufficient, and altho’ the
railway lines were rendered useless on both sides, the
consequences were apparently not grave. The last
great barrier that nature places in the way of an
army pressing forward from the North on the march
to Athens, is the mighty mountain-chain of Oeta to
the south of the Spercheus valley, which far surpasses
in ruggedness and desolation the southern outlines of
the Othrys mountains. Between the steep ascents 0f

the Kallidromon, a group of the Oeta mountains, and
the Bay of Lamia, the pass of Thermopylae leads across
the mountain chain. This pass, in ancient times the
only practicable road for an army marching from
Thessaly to Central Hellas, was of immense strategic
importance. Its importance is diminished in modern
times, since the shore has been greatly changed by
floods. The ground is marshy in winter, but is dried
up completely in the summer, so that altho’ the passage
for masses of troops may be, and is, rendered dif
ficult by nature in wet weather, it is no longer correct
to refer to the pass of Thermophylae as an effective
barrier to the march of an army.
THE FIRST ARRAY OF THE T\VO ARMIES. III
The First Array of the two Armies.

The Greek Army.
As early as February and March, 1897, the Greek

Army had been put on a war footing and been partly
moved into Thessaly. At the same time several new
formations were organised; fourth Battalions were
created and combined into regiments. But during
mobilisation the defective organisation of the train and
the want of horses were specially felt. For a long
time, ever since the 15 E of February, when the first
Reserves were called in, a good deal had been done
in this matter, but the evil was not altogether remedied,
When war had been declared, the formation of an
active Army was entered upon, the superior Com
mands were filled and Head-Quarters were occupied.
The “Ordre de bataille” of the Greek Army in
Thessaly was as follows:
Commander-in-Chief, His Royal Highness,
Crown-Prince Constantine,
Adjutant in Attendance, Captain Hadjipetros;

Chief of the Staff: Colonel Sapuntsakis,
Major-General: Dresinos
,, Papadiamantopulos
Major: Gulimis,
,, Zographos,
Six Lieutenants being Ordinance-Officers;
Chief Commissariat Officer : Lieutenant-Colonel Galanis,
Senior Medical Officer: Dr. Diamantopulos.
Head-Quarters: Larissa.
1% Division of Infantry: General Makris.
1E Infantry-Brigade: Colonel Dimopulos.
1i Regiment of Infantry of 2 Battalions.
359 n ., ,. 2 ..
2"_d Infantry-Brigade: Colonel Antionades.
732 Regiment of Infantry
82 ,, ,, 11
Also included in the 11‘ Division;
4 Battalions of Rifles (Evzones),
1 Regiment of Cavalry,
4 Field and 3 Mountain Batteries.
The first Division posted in Larissa and in the
neighbourhood, occupied with their outposts the
mountain-passes at the frontier, and formed the right
wing of the Greek army.v
29:1 Division: General Mauromichalis.
3E Infantry-Brigade: Colonel Mastrapas.
THE FIRST ARRAY OF THE T‘VO ARMIES. I I3
2“.d Regiment of Infantry.

42 dittO.
42 Brigade of Infantry: Colonel Kaklamanos.
52 Regiment of Infantry.
112 ditto.
4 Battalions of Rifles (N0. 5, 8, 9, 10).
2 Regiments of Cavalry.
3 Field and 2 Mountainbatteries.
The 2'2 Division was posted at Trikala and Kala
baka and formed the left wing of the Thessalian army.
Both Divisions were in the month of April reinforced
by 18 Battalions of the Reserves and of the Terri
torial army, as well as by 8000 Free Corps and by
foreigners, who formed separate legions and were not
put absolutely under military command.
The Greek forces assembled in Thessaly in the
month of April amounted in round numbers to 34,500
Infantry, 15,000 of the Territorial army, 8000 Free
Corps and 4000 of other arms, making a total of
between 58,000 and 59,000 combatants. The Free
Corps were armed with Chassepot-rifles.
The Turkish Army.
At the commencement of the complications with

Greece the Turks re-inforced and placed on a war
8
[14 THE WAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
footingthe 3EArmy-C0rps posted in Macedonia, having

its Head-Quarters at Monastir. To this Corps
were told off 10 Battalions from the 15 Army
Corps District (Constantinople), and 13 Battalions
from the 52‘ Army-Corps (Damascus); together 23
Battalions.
Simultaneously with the mobilisation of the 35!
Army-Corps in Macedonia, orders were issued to
call out the Landwehrtroops from the eastern
districts and from Asia Minor, and put into the
field against Greece an army of 80,000 men.
At the beginning of the month of April the
army was grouped and the commands distributed
as follows:
Commander-in-Chief, Field-Marshal Edhem Pasha.
Chiefs of the Staff: General of Division Omer,
Rushdi Pasha, Seyfullah Pasha, Kenan Bey;
Chief of the Artillery: General of Brigade,
Riza Pasha,
Chief Commissariat Officer: General of Brigade,
' Hamdi Pasha.
1it Division Haz'rz' Pasha — First Array in
the mountains at Domenik, afterwards at Mologusta,
and lated at Tshechissar (south of Dhamasi) in the
plains.
222 Division Nechat Pas/1a. First concentrated
THE FIRST ARRAY OF THE TWO ARMIES. 115
in the mountains at Skomba (they were the whole

time engaged against the Kritiri mountain) then at
Turnavos and further on: These two Divisions
formed the right wing of the army.
32 Division Memduh Pasha. afterwards cross
First concentrated in the moun- ing the Karadere
tains at Elassona. or Meluna Pass
42 Division Haz'a'ar Pasha. into the plains.
First concentrated in the moun- These two Divi
tains at Elassona. Attached to sions formed the
these was the “Independent Centre of the
Brigade” Mohammed Pasha at Army of Opera
Elassona. tions.
52 Division Hakkz' Pasha. First concentrated
in the mountains at Diskata, then moved down
through the Karadere or Meluna Pass into the
plains; first acting as line of communication
between the two Army-groups at Elassona and
Janina. — then attached to the centre of the Army
of Operations.
62 Division Hama'z' Pasha. First concentrated
in the mountains at Leftokaria, Karia or Kossokioi,
then in continued conflict against the Greek posts
in the mountains; finally moved down into the
plain; captured Deliler; formed part of the left
wing.
81
72‘ Division Husni Pas/la. First concentrated

at Katerina — (this Division was newly formed
and partly armed with rifles of small calibre) then
leaving behind an adequate force at Katerina
moved down from the Tempe valley into the plain;
this formed part of the left wing.
Division of Cavalry Suleiman Pasha: in advance.
Total at the Salamvria in Thessaly:
71/2 Divisions of Infantry
1 Division of Cavalry } about four Army-corps'
The Artillery reserve: 9 batteries at Elassona
commanded by Riza Pasha. The 72‘ Division
posted at Katerina to cover the left flank. The
Army of Macedonia occupied an exceedingly
strong and skilfully prepared flanking position on
the slopes of Olympus, to oppose any attempt at
landing on the part of the Greeks.
The normal strength of a Division was to have
been 16 Battalions of 7 50 men each and 4 Batteries,
but this was not uniformly adhered to. Thus the
Division on the extreme left wing at Katerina
never exceeded about 12,000 men, owing to the
numerous detachments that had to be left behind
during their advance.
The Cavalry Division numbered 25 Squadrons
with 3 Horse Artillery Batteries.
THE FIRST ARRAY OF THE TWO ARMIES. I [7
In addition to these larger tactical groups there,

were numerous bodies of Infantry employed in
protecting the frontier. The sections told off for
that purpose were all of them lodged in so called
Blockhouses, which even in times of peace, are
found along the frontier.
The Beginning of the War.

In the early days of the month of April much
agitation and excitement prevailed on the Thessalian
and Macedonian frontiers, bands of Greek insurgents
and of brigands resorting to inroads and acts of
violence obviously intended to irritate and harass
the Turks, and to encourage the population of
Macedonia to rise in the rear of the Turkish troops.
The Turkish commanders looked on at these
unscrupulous efforts with calm equanimity, and
confined themselves to repulsing these presumptuous
attacks, until the acts of violence perpetrated by
the Greeks in Turkish territory left no doubt as
to the aim in view. This was to kindle open
revolt in Macedonia, and thus give the signal for
the outbreak of a widely spread warlike movement
among the nationalities of the Balkan peninsula.
As the Turks refused to respond to this defiant
challenge by an attack, it was found necessary to
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. I 19
resort to the guidance and command of officers

and volunteers from the regular Greek army, and
to aim at attaining the objects desired, by systematic
plans and military tactics more in accordance with
the rules of warfare.
The first undertakings of this kind were started
on the 91‘ and 10Lh of April. Swarms of Irregulars
burst into Turkish territory in two different
directions. The one set aimed at provoking the
Turkish outposts, with the other it was proposed
simultaneously to break through the lines of
communication at two points between the Turkish
Thad-Quarters on the eastern scene of operations,
and the western Head-Quarters in Epirus. The
first object failed, and the second was only partly
successful.
This irregular volunteer war was directed by
a bold, enterprising Greek officer, Alexander
Mylonas, who had divided his forces into _16
parties. Their object was to penetrate as far as
possible to the flank and rear of the Turks,
encouraging the elements of disafi'ection and
stimulating a national revolt, as well as wearying
and harassing the hostile troops on the frontier.
The skirmishing parties sent out to interrupt the
communications between the east and the west,
and pass the enemy’s front lines, encountered the
troops of Hakki Pasha’s division stationed at

Diskata, and were sent back with broken heads.
A few days later, another and greater advance
was made from the Greek position, which plainly
betrayed the purpose of threatening the Turkish
communications. On the 15Lh of April stronger
detachments advanced against the districts of
Bairakli and Silos, 10 miles to the north of Elassona.
They hoped to find both either weakly garrisoned
or not at all, but they were suitably received by
the Turks, who had observed the movement. The
Greeks retired at the double upon the mountains
of Analypsis and Potika immediately on the frontier.
The frontier line runs along the ridge of Analypsis
which here commands the pass leading into the
Macedonian plain. The Turks pursued the retreating
aggressors and surrounded the mountain, hoping
by means of prisoners to substantiate the fact
that regular Greek troops had conducted the attack.
The encounter spread on both sides along the
frontier and caused much noise and fireworks, but
without loss on either side and without actual
result. On the 1621 of April the fighting grew
more serious, and involved a larger number of
combatants on both sides. It was continued all
through the day and through the moonlit night
till late on the 173'.1 of April, the Saturday before
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. IZI
Easter, when they rested exhausted, but intending

to renew the struggle on Monday the 192 April.
These skirmishes certainly had one result: it
was proved by the Turks that Greek regulars
had taken part in the fighting, and that the ren
contre had not been merely with volunteers and
insurgents. The immediate result was a formal
declaration of war against Greece from Constanti
nople.
Crown-Prince Constantine and his General Staff
proposed remaining to defend the mountains,
whereby the stronger opponent would be prevented
from deploying his full strength, and time would
be gained for rising in the rear of the Turks.
The Contests for the possession of

the Mountains.
After Edhem Pasha had received orders to
begin operations against the Greek army, he ordered
an advance on the 182 of April.
The method, object, and direction of the advance
were determined by the consideration, that while
retaining the enemy in the front, the main object
would be to outfiank the left Wing of the Greeks with
the disengaged troops, and to press forward with a
few divisions upon the line of Tyrnavos-Larissa.
_~--.-~_.2—a__ :mzzs-ez—rrae ... __.y n_. _.,\.

The possibility of carrying out this plan was

rendered likely by the dip to the south of the
frontier line, and by the mountain passes of Bughasi
Reveni and of Kalamaki opening upon the line of
Tyrnavos-Larissa. A determined advance would
bring the Turks to the rear of their enemies.
In order to regain the positions won by the
Greeks while acting on the offensive, and to force
the Greek troops back over the frontier, Edhem
Pasha went to the front in two columns: the
principal column of the Turks (2'12 and 4!! Division)
against Meluna, and the 52‘ division against
Kurtsiovali. For the execution of the flank
movement the right wing was ordered to march
from Domenik, in the river valley of the Xeraghis
upon Damassi, all three divisions in the main
direction of Tyrnavos. On the left wing the 62‘
Division stood on the defensive opposite Analypsis
and the pass of Nezero. On the extreme right
wing the 35 Division at Diskati covered the
Turkish advance against Tyrnavos.
This movement on the offensive developed into
a series of isolated combats on the ridge of the
mountain; these and theirramifications which occupied
the days from the 18Lh to the 2319 of April were
fought with all the determination and energy which
national and religious hatred could infuse. In
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 12$.
order to gain a clear idea of these combats, it

will be necessary to group them in three divisions.
On the eastern portion of the front, the struggle
was carried on for the possession of the pass of
Nezero and the Analypsis mountain; in the centre,
all efforts were directed to gaining the Meluna Pass;
and on the west, on the Turkish right wing, the
Raveni Pass with the connecting defiles and valleys.
It is not to be denied that these conflicts were
characterised by heroism and by strong dramatic
interest. The Greeks defended, as it were, the
portals of their home with intrepidity and circum
spection; they flattered themselves with the hope
that their successes would offer their neighbours
an example and incentive to revolt, and that a
victorious incursion into Macedonia would enable
them to hold out the hand of fellowship to their
liberated kinsmen.
, The Turkish Battalions advanced to attack the
obstinater defended mountain positions with the
calm equanimity which natural disposition and
custom impose on the individual soldier.
7 The principal attaCk was directed against the
centre of the Greek position. The 2‘11 and the 42“
Division together with a Squadron and six Batteries,
in all about 15,000 men, set out on the two hours’
march up a gradient of about 30° from Elassona
to the pass. The advantages of the country were

entirely on the side of the Greeks as the ground falls in
a steep descent to the north. At the head of the
pass, two blockhouses which served for the
accommodation of small garrisons stood opposite
each other. The Greeks had brought a few pieces
of Field Artillery into their blockhouse, and artillery
men hastily put into rifle uniforms were told off
to serve them. Soon after the beginning of the
fight they opened a shell-fire on the opposite block
house, and set it on fire. The Turks in consequence
evacuated the building, which was immediately
occupied by the Greeks and burnt to the ground. ‘
From this point the attack was renewed on the
following day, and the guns pointed at a small
erection crowning a height somewhat further back
on the Turkish side.
On this elevated point several batteries had
been massed by the Turks before hostilities broke
out; and in conjunction with the fire of a neigh
bouring battery, which gave substantial help, a
stop was here put to the Greek ofl'ensive. On the other
hand the Greeks stormed the nearest blockhouse
of the Gritzovali frontier fort; then the undecided
conflict swayed to and fro for a time. The
struggle at length, after continuing twenty-two
hours without intermission, by degrees exhausted
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 12 5.
the strength of the combatants, so that it seemed

as if on both sides the small arms must gradually
cease firing; only the thunder 0f the guns announced
that the fighting continued, and indeed the number
of guns firing upon the Greek position was con-
stantly increased. Edhem Pasha, accompanied by
Riza Pasha, commander of the reserve Artillery,
had proceeded to the heights above the road in
order to observe the effect of the firing. This
went on with admirable coolness and accuracy;
the range varied from 7000 to 8000 paces and
more, but in spite of the distance the good effect
bore testimony to the keen observation and skill
of the Turkish gunners.
The heavier fire of the guns of the Turks, soon
turned the blockhouses held by the Greek Infantry
and their intrenchments into heaps of ruins, and
silenced their batteries, and thus the brave defenders
of the pass were gradually compelled to give up
the positions previously held by them.
On the afternoon of the 192 of April after the
blockhouse of Kriechova, the focus of the final scenes
of the conflict, had been evacuated by the Greeks,
the Meluna Pass, with the exception of a few
Greek positions on the southern slope of the defile,
was in the hands of the Turks.
The English correspondents who were present
during the phases of the two days’ fight praise

the discipline of the Turkish troops and their
calmness under fire, both when skirmishing, and
in close order. As the field narrowed and the
parties of fighting men concentrated all their efforts
on the same object, the zeal and impetuosity of
the soldiers burst out afresh. Among the regiments
arriving from Trebizond, Saloniki, and Albania, a
rivalry set in, which was only put an end to by
the exhaustion of the men after the pass was
taken. Their leaders set them a brilliant example
and encouraged them to deeds of devotion and
valour. The glorious death of one of the oldest
commanders in the army, General of Brigade
Hafiz Pasha, who remained on horseback, in spite
of the entreaties of his orderly Officer, in the rush
into the defile of the pass, who would not leave
his men even after he had been struck by two
balls, and who was killed by a splinter from a
grenade, roused universal enthusiasm among men
little given to showing signs of feeling.
With the taking of the road over the pass, the
continued defence of the Gritzovali intrenchment
became impossible. The 2000 men stationed there
were gradually compelled by the troops of the
531‘ Turkish division to yield this important point.
On the morning of the 19Lh of April the Greeks
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. . 127
began the retreat to Tyrnavos while the Turks

attacked the surrounding heights, the Parna moun
tain Papa Livadia with its blockhouses, and pushed
forward to Mati where, however, they were repulsed
by the Greek brigade under Dimopulo. In the
conflicts round the Meluna pass and Gritzovali on
the 18$.h and 19Lh of April, the Turks brought up
30 Battalions, about 24,000 men, with 14 Field
batteries. The defenders had approximately only
16,000 men to oppose to them.
One of the foreign correspondents states that
the Turks lost 56 dead and 160 wounded, while
the Greek losses are said to have been far higher.
According to the account of experts, the Turkish
shells were very destructive to the enemy. The
projectiles exploded as if at the word of command
on the very spot where cover or protection of any
kind still remained.
Almost simultaneously with the fighting in the
centre, in which, as has been shown, Edhem Pasha
had succeeded in driving back the Greeks upon their
principal line of retreat, contests of equal obstinacy
and determination were carried on on both wings.
The greatest difficulties, comparatively speaking,
were encountered on the left wing by the 62‘
Turkish division under Hamdi Pasha. The scene
of conflict here offered the best possible position
to the defenders; they stood on elevated and

commanding ground, under favourable cover, from
which the Evzones, the Greek hunters of the
mountains, calmly and quietly delivered their fire.
The Greeks were 8000 strong under Colonel
Kaklamanos at Nezero, besides 1000 volunteers,
and were posted on the most inaccessible heights
covering the pass, while the Turks were detained
at the foot of the Analypsis mountain, and could
not deploy for a powerful attack in face of the
strong position of the enemy. Thus both sides
remained in the defiles of the mountain till the
202 of April, without any result being attained.
The encounters which took place on the right
wing upon the heights commanding the passes were
of the same indecisive character.
As the advance of Hakki Pasha’s division was
slow and hesitating, the Greek division under
General Mauromichalis at Asprakilissa was for the
greater part drawn towards the centre i. e. to
Bughasi and Raveni. These troops reached their
new positions in time to take part in the sangui
nary skirmishes which began on April 192. Here
the Greeks immediately attacked the Turkish
blockhouse at Bughasi in order to keep the enemy
in front occupied; at the same time they marched
upon the Raveni pass, crossed it and deployed in
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 129
the plain of Damassi, placing their Artillery on

the heights, from which they could fire upon the
Turkish battery at Vighia at the northern end of
the valley. When the Greeks subsequently succeeded
in placing two mountain batteries on the terraces
of the Kitiri Mountain to the east of Vighia, every
attempt on the part of the Turks to force the
pass was fruitless. One of the English correspondents
who was present on the Greek side states, that
altho’ the Turkish 6” and 31/2” guns fired with
automatic regularity, being exposed meantime
almost without protection to a“ perfect hail of Greek
bullets, they nevertheless achieved but little, as
their range was faulty, and their shells did not
explode. Under the circumstances the Turkish
guns were gradually silenced and the contest
ceased without any result. The fighting that
went on during the 192 and 202 of April in this
part of the mountains may be termed a duel of
Artillery, in which the Greeks proved themselves
superior, and both sides maintained their former
positions. About 18,000 Turks were opposed to
12,500 Greeks. The losses of- the latter in their
highly favourable position were comparatively slight,
they are said to have been 100 dead and wounded,
while the Turks lost many more.
The Commander in Chief of the attacking army,
9
Edhem Pasha, in face of the fact that the wing

divisions had gained no ground up to the 202 of
April, held to the plan, that immediately after
securing possession of the Meluna pass the enemy’s
centre in the mountains must be driven back,
and an opportunity afforded to the wings to move.
The subsequent conduct of the operations of
the main army were a consequence of this plan.
Thus the very opposite of the original plan was
carried out. It had originally been intended to
occupy the enemy while acting on the defensive
in the centre, until the right wing should have
outflanked the Greeks after taking the passes of
Beydermen and Kalamaki, and advanced to Larissa
in their rear. Had such an advance been made
with rapidity and determination, it would have
struck the enemy in his most vulnerable part.
I On the 21it of April the two adversaries stood
opposed to each other on the south of the Meluna
defile, the Greeks at Mati, the Turks at Karadere
near the entrance to the mountains.
In this position sanguinary contests followed on
the 21it and 22“_‘1 of April, in which the Greeks
sought to fall on the right flank of the enemy
and thus drive him back upon the mountains.
A thrilling episode of these contests was a
reconnoitring ride undertaken by 300 Circassians.
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. [31
With heroic courage and the ardent confidence of

fatalism they galloped to the centre of the Greek
position and were sacrificed to the sharp-shooting
of the Evezones, so that only a poor remnant was
left to make retreat.
The Greek position at Mati had been strengthened
by earthworks, gun and rifle pits. The right wing
was under the command of Mauromichalis,
whose division, as already stated, had been moved
from Asprakilissa to the centre; the left wing was
commanded by Colonel Mastrapas. Besides the
14,000 men of both divisions, 36 guns and 5 squadrons
occupied a position in the centre.
The Turks had here 9000 men, 3 squadrons,
and 22 guns under Hakki Pasha. The approaches
to the Reveni pass were defended by Colonel
Smolenski.
The contests of the 2221 and 2 3L‘1 of April may
be summed up by stating that an attempt was made
by the Greeks, strongly reinforced in their position
at Kritiri, to cut off the Turkish line of retreat
over the Meluna pass; it failed because adequate
forces had come up on the Turkish side to meet
every aggressive movement.
On the following day, the 2 3L(1 of April, Nechat
Pasha’s division supported by 36 guns, attacked
desperately the right wing of the Greeks. The
9.
impetuosity with which this attack was carried out,

especially by the Albanians, who bore the brunt
of it, bears testimony to their military spirit and
intrepidity. From the movements of large numbers
who came down the mountains towards the Greek
positions, there was no doubt that some decisive
contest was at hand. The Greek position lay
across the road to Tyrnavos, like the base of a
triangle of which the entrance to the Meluna pass,
which had been so hotly contested within the last
few days, was the apex. The Turks had their
point d’appui on a rising ground, on which stands
the village of Karadyalu, which had already
suffered severely from artillery fire.
Behind Kritiri, a rocky hill upwards of 50 ft.
high and over 90 ft. long, which rises out'of the
plain, the Greek infantry lay protected; in front of
it were rifle pits for a distance of 450 yds. and on
the right and left batteries were planted. The
Turks made a combined attack with cavalry and
infantry which was resisted without difficulty.
Then followed an artillery duel that lasted with
little interruption from 8 in the morning till 5 in
the afternoon. The Turkish shot thundered across
the field, but in consequence of being badly
directed showed a decided preference for a large
freshly prepared wheat field, which will certainly
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. I33
need no further ploughing to yield a good harvest

of shrapnel. The Greek artillery, 3 field pieces
and 1 mountain battery, at first fired rather slowly,
but as soon as they got their range set to work
in earnest. Before long, the Greek supports, 2500
men with two mountain batteries were brought
into action on the heights of Losfaki, against
Gritzovali, where the Turkish right wing was
posted. For hours a heavy fire, mostly of shrapnel,
was kept up; and the Greeks were fortunate in
suffering a loss of only about 20 men, including
1 Officer killed and 3 wounded, in spite of up
wards of 1000 rounds having been fired. About
3 o’clock in the afternoon it was clear that the
enemy had withdrawn the greater part of their
artillery into the defile of Ligara below Meluna
and Menexe; the Greek mountain battery of 3”
guns especially attracted the enemy’s fire; it occu
pied the extreme left wing in the plain, and taking
no notice whatever of the Turkish artillery, poured
its fire upon Gritzowali with obstinacy and accuracy.
The steadiness of the Greek fire in this artillery
encounter was especially surprising. At 3 o’clock
in the afternoon the enemy’s fire seemed to be
coming more from Ligara, and the Greeks there
fore diverted their fire in that direction; firing
salvos of artillery to prevent any concentration of
134 THE \VAR BET\VEEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
the Turks in that quarter. But the crafty Turk

made the most of circumstances; under pretence of
withdrawing his artillery, his infantry hastened
along the foot of the heights to the entrance of
the Tempe pass, and occupied the village of Deleria
exactly at the right moment, anticipating Colonel
Mauromichalis who was marching on this point
with two Battalions of Infantry and three Squadrons.
\Vithout firing a shot Colonel Mauromichalis rapidly
retreated upon Kritiri. At almost the same moment
the commander in Losfaki heliographed to Larissa
that the Turks were executing a movement to
outflank his position, and that unless he were
immediately reinforced his retreat would be cut off.
These two movements, whereby the Greek
position at Mati was threatened on both flanks,
determined the commander at Head-Quarters at
Larissa to prepare for a general retreat. In answer
to the Crown-Prince’s request by telegram for
instructions from Athens the king replied: “If
possible, hold Larissa; if not, act according to
circumstances." Upon this the evacuation of the
town was determined on. The retreat began at
the approach of darkness, in spite of the fact that
a short time previously reinforcements consisting of
several Battalions and three batteries, among them
those of Prince Nicholas, were seen marching
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. I35
across the plain from Tyrnavos. The order to

retreat at the very moment of apparent victory
spread consternation. and indignation among the
troops. Then the disastrous report was circulated
that the Turks were advancing through the Bughasi
pass in order to cut off the retreat, and a complete
panic set in. When the order to retreat was
given, the regiments separated in companies, and
as the order had been very urgent, the retreat became
disorderly. While long lines of Infantry, ammunition
waggons, trains of beasts of burden hurried along
the road towards Larissa, the cry was raised that
Turkish cavalry were in pursuit. Immediately
isolated companies turned to the right about and
fired volleys into the night, killing and wounding
their comrades in the rear before their Officers
could dispel the false alarm.
The correspondent of the “Times” spent the
night in the deserted town of Tyrnavos, and on
the next day found the place desolate and the
road to Larissa silent without a sign of a human
being. In Larissa itself confusion and despair
reigned supreme. Every moment fresh troops
arrived. The streets were blocked with columns of
war material destined for Pharsala. The inhabitants
were leaving the town with carts and mules
bearing their moveables; a long train of aged men,
women, and children, followed on the way to Pharsala

and Volo. It was a piteous sight. The people,
who eighteen years ago had been under Turkish
rule, conjured up in their imagination the horrors that
awaited them if they fell into the hands of the enemy.
On the left wing of the line of attack i. e. in
the defile of Nezero and Analypsis, Hamdi Pasha
had been unable to carry the pass, owing to the
carefully conducted defence. It was only after
Edhem Pasha had sent him reinforcements that
he again made a fresh advance, and thanks to his
superiority in numbers, he drove the opposing
brigade (Koklamanos') and the Volunteers back far
beyond the mountains, so that they were absolutely
scattered and fled wildly, part to the coast to the
east of Ossa, and part in disorderly retreat upon
Larissa. On the 22'1‘.l of April the marching
columns of the 62 division continiied the movement.
The districts nearest to the mountains Rapsani
and Dereli were occupied, and on the 2311 of April
the advanced guard of the division reached Mussaklor
and Deliler, and thus approached the right flank of the
main position of the Greeks. It was here, ashas already
been related, that the bloody but indecisive battle
of Mati had been fought, which had not succeeded
in dislodging the Greeks from their strong position
at the entrance to the mountains. Parts of the
‘ THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 137
721 division, which had been responsible for the

protection of the coast between Katerina and
Platamona had joined the 693 under Hamdi Pasha,
so that on the evening of the 23Ld of April the
main body of Edhem Pasha’s army, that is to say,
6 divisions of Infantry and an independent brigade,
as well as a division of Cavalry, was assembled
along a line of about 19 miles between Mount
Ossa and the river Xenias. The Turkish General
on the 232 made all arrangements and preparation
for an attack on the 24Lh of April; this attack was
based upon a concentric movement of the columns
descending from the mountains into the plain; in
the event of success, Tyrnavos was to be occupied
and the Head-Quarters established there. The first
part of the task had already been performed,
and Edhem Pasha now proposed by the capture
of the passes over the Thessalian mountains to
concentrate all the outlying detachments of his
army, drawing in the Train, Ammunition, and
Commissariat columns, and to continue operations
on the 25Lh of April after a day’s rest. The town
of Larissa was then to be the first object of attack.
In looking back upon the first stage of the war,
occupying about 9 days, one gains the impression
that the Greeks, under cover of their positions in
the mountains, stood definitely on the defensive,
and avoided all offensive action against the enemy,

who were moving in various columns of route. It
is possible that this restraint was prompted by the
idea that every misadventure, even the most trifling,
should be avoided, and defeat in face of a
numerically larger force should on no account be
risked, as it would act as a check on any possible
rising of the people of Macedonia, and render the
interference of Servia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro very
doubtful; -—- it was a matter of the liveliest and most
urgent importance to secure the assistance of allies.
Judged from this point of view, the leaders
chosen to defend the several positions assigned to
them, such as Mauromichalis, Mastrapas, Smolensk,
Makris, and Kathinolis, carried out their orders
with prudence and resolution. On the other hand,
the Commander-in-Chief cannot be absolved from
the grave charge of having broken up his forces
and scattered them over far too wide an area,
thereby losing the necessary cohesion as well as
the possibility of achieving a marked success at
any given point. Such a result alone would have
had a stimulating and encouraging effect on the
sources from which outside help and support were
to be expected. In addition to all this, the Greeks
were making a false estimate of the spirit and
morale of the Turkish army, and of their whole
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 139
military development. It had escaped the notice

of the superior Greek officers that the Ottoman
military system had become essentially different
since the Russo-Turkish war of 1877——78, not only
in regard to its tactical training but also in its
conduct. Athens was under the delusion that the
Turkish soldier could act only on the defensive,
could discharge his duty with devotion and self
sacrifice only in a defended or fortified position,
that he could not be depended upon for a resolute
advance against protected positions and mountain
heights, and that a vigorous offensive first against
the mountain passes, and then against the intrench
ment along the rivers Xenias, Salamvria &c. would
not be to the taste of the Turk, whose religion
certainly inculcates implicit obedience to law, but
whose natural disposition is capable neither of
initiative nor élan in the field.
This mistaken estimate on the part of the Greeks
is responsible for much consequent miscalculation.
During the first nine days of the war, days of
privation and exertion of every kind, which taxed
all ranks of the Turkish army to the uttermost,
it was perfectly evident that if not the superiors of
the Greeks in discipline, fortitude, warlike spirit,
courage, and self-control, they were at the very
least quite their equals.
140 THE WAR BET‘NEEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
The advance into and occupation of

Thessaly.
A great surprise awaited the Turkish commander
on the 242 of April. Instead of finding the enemy
strongly posted on his front, his advanced parties
soon made the discovery that they had retired in
the direction- of Larissa and evacuated all their
positions among the mountains. Indeed, the Greeks
had retreated in the night by command of the
Crown Prince Constantine so rapidly, that they
had completely vanished by break of day. The
little town of Tyrnavos was immediately occupied
by Hairi Pasha’s division from Damassi, and
Head-Quarters were transferred to Kazaklar.
Hakki Pasha’s division, which had advanced
from Dissikata, received orders to advance to
Trikhala and to occupy this important railway
centre, as also the railway bridge across the
Salamvria.
THE ADVANCE INTO AND OCCUPATION &c. 14!
When the Turks entered Tyrnavos they were met

by the sight of an almost entirely deserted town, in
which, altho’ the Greek troops had already been
quartered for weeks, large stores of ammunition and
provisionswere found. Ofthe latter there were plentiful
supplies especially of biscuits, sardines, wine, brandy,
flour &c. Edhem Pasha immediately appointed a local
commandant with directions to place a guard before
the shops, and to prevent all marauding and robbery.
In strict obedience to orders, great quantities
of wine were painfully dragged up by the soldiers,
without its occurring to a single Moslem to help
himself.
By degrees Greek soldiers appeared, venturing
forth from their hiding-places, begging for their
lives with fear and trembling, and relating how
the report had been spread among the Greeks,
that every prisoner falling into the hands of the
conquerors was a dead man. They were re-assured,
refreshed, and fed, and then set free. Watch and
Patrol duty went on punctually and in order; the
churches were treated with care and reverence
Larissa now lay before the Turks as the next
object of attack, and it was universally known
that the town had been strengthened by earth
works, and armed with Krupp guns at the command
ing points.
I42 THE \VAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
With its beautiful, well cultivated gardens which

surround the town, with the white minarets of its
26 mosques— now for the greater part closed -—
8 Christian churches, and a picturesque bridge, the
impression made by Larissa is very attractive.
The types of the Thessalian peasant to be met
here are extremely interesting, and their waggons,
to this day, retain a resemblance to the ancient
Greek classical models. The market with its corn,
tobacco, hides, and other native produce is very
animated, while the wines of Larissa have a good
reputation. Dyeing is an important branch of
industry. Altho’ the population of Larissa numbered
some 30,000 about 20 years ago, there are at the
present time only 20,000 inhabitants; —— 5000
Moslems, 3000 Jews, the remainder orthodox Greek
Church Christians.
The position of the Greek army which had
fallen back from the mountains and was con
centrated at Larissa to the number of 25,000 was
eminently favourable, both flanks were protected
by the course of the Salamvria, and the general
countour of the ground was specially adapted for a
defensive position.
It was expected at Turkish Head-Quarters that
under these circumstances the enemy would offer
an energetic resistance, altho’ as has already been
THE ADVANCE INTO AND OCCUPATION &c. [43
stated, all touch had been lost with the Greeks

after the encounter at Mati. It may not be out
of place to insert here an account written by
Grumbkow Pasha, Prussian Artillery-Instructor to
the Ottoman army.
Grumbkow Pasha had been sent to the army
to supervise the armament and ammunition, as
well as to report on the general state of the army.
but without holding any definite command. Autho
rised by the Commander-in-Chief, General von
Grumbkow set out at dawn on the 25$!) of April
with 10 weak squadrons, numbering about 400
mounted men, and a horse-artillery battery, to
reconnoitre the enemy’s position. About 7 o'clock
he reached the great stone bridge over the
Salamvria. Perhaps we had better give the details
of the bold 'stroke by which he took Larissa, in
his own words:
“The Greeks fled in despair, as tho’ they had
lost a decisive battle instead of merely a fight.
After the taking of the Meluna pass I went on
reconnoitring, without encountering any opposition,
with a regiment of cavalry as far as Tyrnavos.
As it was evacuated I took possession. I remained
there for the night of the Greek Easter Sunday,
and started at half past two in the morning for
Larissa. With the reinforcements that had come
up I had 1450 sabres, viz. three regiments of

Cavalry, and one horse-artillery battery. We soon
met a captain of horse who had ridden up to the
walls of Larissa and who brought good news. He
announced that a terrible panic was raging in
Larissa, and that all were in full flight. I deter
mined to make the most of the situation at once
and to push on to the town, which we could ride
round as a reconnoitring party if we met with any
strong opposition. As we approached the town we
were received by a sharp rifle fire opened upon
us by 400 criminals, whom the Greeks had let out of
prison and armed. We replied with a round of
shrapnel as much as to say, “No nonsense, boys,
here’s the Artillery”. The bandits immediately
ceased firing and fled. As I was on the
point of crossing the stone bridge, an old
man came towards me and called out: “Take
care, Pasha, the bridge is mined”. I ordered 30
soldiers with cannon to cross a pontoon thrown
across by the Greeks, but I myself rode across the
stone bridge in spite of the warning. Arriving
safely on the opposite side, I ordered Pioneer
Major Sabil Bey to search for the cases of
dynamite. Three were found and thrown into the
water. At the same time a shot was fired, and
the old man who had warned me fell, struck by
THE ADVANCE INTO AND OCCUPATION &c. 145
the bullet of a Greek bandit. I had him seized

and ordered him to be placed against the wall
and shot. My men, however, informed me that
an Imperial Iradé was necessary for the execution
of a prisoner. The murderer remained alive”. “In
Larissa”, says the Pasha in continuation, “many
Mussulmans came to meet us enthusiastically shouting
Q? /for joy. The» had had to endure terrible suffering
,/ and torment from the armed Greek criminals.
I immediately appointed my adjutant Colonel
Mustapha Bey to be provisional military commandant
and governor 'of Larissa. It is to his toleration
and energy that Larissa owes its rapid return to
order and immunity from robbery and pillage.
All the families that had fled, returned to Larissa.
It is a beautiful town. I went into the Crown
Prince’s palace, which showed all the signs of
having been abandoned in great haste. Letters
and papers were lying about. I read one letter from
the minister of war, a reply to a complaint about
the miserable army supplies. “The celebrated
occupation of Larissa did not cost a single life.
Edhem Pasha did not arrive till two days later,
on Tuesday the 27Lh of April, upon which I returned
to Constantinople. In Saloniki I saw Ghazi Osman
Pasha, who stays there for the present. I shall
not return to the theatre of war”. In reply to a
10
correspondent asking whether Larissa was well

fortified, Grumbkow Pasha answered: “Everything
in Larissa had been abandoned. It is inexplicable.
All the three high roads leading to Larissa between
the two streams were remarkably well defended
by redoubts, but all had been hastily abandoned.
Everything was left behind, only the cannon were
not there. I must remark that the Greek engineer
corps is worthy of all praise. In the fortifications
of Larissa I found as I rode up the steep ramparts
over stone steps, six 12 cm. Krupp guns without
vent-pieces; these were later on found near the
railway. Also ample provision of ammunition and
carriages, provisions, forage, hospital stores &c.
If these six guns had been worked by sixty
artillerymen we should have been completely
crushed”.
Concerning the Turkish army Grumbkow said:
“The army now in the field is one of the finest
that the Ottoman Empire has ever placed there.
The men are beyond all praise”. In regard to the
Officers, Grumbkow said they were excellent. “All
officers who have been through the school of Goltz,
whose efforts are now bearing important fruit, are
on active service. Seifullah Bey is an excellent
Chief of the General Staff. Nearly all the
Commanders of Division are splendid fellows,
especially Hakki Pasha, Colonel Enver Bey, and

the former Artillery Commandant, who is now
gone to Germany, Ali Risa Pasha, who was in
defatigable in his efforts for eight weeks so that
the Turkish artillery might do themselves justice,
was always conspicuous where the fire was heaviest.
The spirit of the troops is excellent, We met a
new Battalion of Redifs. My Adjutant Mustapha
Bey asked them: “are you not sad at leaving your
families”. “What do you mean by sad?” was the
answer. “We are happy at being able to sacrifice
our miserable lives for the Padishah”. Others
called out: “Were we not born for this sacred day?”
Aman of seventy, a “Notable” from Prizrend, came
into the camp with his five sons as volunteers.
He brought a dozen horses and presented them to
the state saying: “we can fight on foot”. A
wealthy inhabitant of Seres-Hadji undertook the
transport and care of the wounded at his own
expense. Everywhere abundant gifts of bread,
garments, tobacco, lemonade, money &c. were
given to the wounded. Riding back from Larissa
I met some newly arrived Battalions. I related
our success. Instead of jubilation, complaints were
uttered: “It’s all very well for you, Pasha, but
when are we to have our turn?” Even the badly
wounded would not allow themselves to be taken
10'
to hospital, they preferred returning to the fight.

From the General to the lowest soldier all are
conspicuous for their valour. It was grand. In
the mountains, where horse and mule could no
longer pick their way, my men in peril of their
life dragged the guns nearly up to the snow line,
encouraging one another, singing and rejoicing they
hastened on without rest and Without complaint.
Our Albanians especially distinguished themselves,
so that the sight of an Albanian white fez struck
terror into the Greeks. They went into action
rejoicing and singing war songs. Wherever the white
fez was seen the Hellenes were seized with a fearful
panic in face of the Albanian contempt of death.”
In Larissa, which was subsequently occupied
by the Turkish centre that had come up, six 4”
guns fell into the hands of the victors, as well as
a field battery.
The Turks had succeeded in debouching from
the mountain passes upon the Thessalian plain
without great sacrifice, and having concentrated they
entered the capital; with this a new section of the
operations begins. Before we pass on to these we
must take a closer view of the latest events on
the Greek side.
With the exception of the irregular and volunteer
corps, the Greek army showed a manly and deter
THE ADVANCE INTO AND OCCUPATION &c. I49
mined attitude during the struggle in the mountains,

but from the moment when the retreat was ordered
into the plain of Thessaly, the troops were sadly
shaken and suffered in cohesion and discipline.
As early as the 23E of April, the Crown Prince
had already left Tyrnavos for Larissa; at 2 o’clock
in the afternoon a heavy artillery fire was heard
there. No suspicion of danger existed in Larissa,
and preparations were being made for a solemn
religious service. At 6 o’clock the Crown Prince
ordered the retreat to Tyrnavos without the troops
having heard any reason for it. At Mati at that
time 12,000 Greeks stood opposed to 12,000 Turks.
The retreat began in good order until darkness
set in. Then the Greek cavalry approached the
retreating infantry from the rear. The Greek
infantry believed them to be Turks and fired on
their own cavalry. Indescribable confusion and
panic now ensued, increased by the darkness. The
soldiers flung away their arms and rushed in
frantic flight to Tyrnavos. The cry “Turkos”
resounded on all sides. Pushing through women
and children the soldiers ran through the streets,
and their officers were powerless to restore order.
Everything was veiled in a cloud of dust. With
faces pale as death the first fugitives arrived at
Larissa at midnight; cavalry men without horses,
unarmed infantry running through the town,

spreading the panic. In the midst of the greatest
confusion 1000 wounded were brought to the
railway station. Meantime the Crown-Prince held
a Council of War, and determined to defend the
town. In order to re-assemble the troops the
bugles were sounded in the market place, but not
twenty soldiers appeared. The panic was increased
by the report that the Turks were before the
town. It is impossible to describe the mad fear
which this report excited. Another false report to
the effect that the Crown Prince had left the town
roused terrible indignation. Every one made for
the railway station. The swiftest in the race were
the Italian volunteers; they thrust even women
aside and dashed into the train standing in
readiness. The population, enraged, fired upon
the Italians and they returned the fire. The Crown
Prince was at length successful in assembling
about 4000 men with whom he marched to Pharsala,
Colonel Smolenitz, stationed at Raveni, receiving
orders to join him there. . Many Greek soldiers
went as far as Volo in their flight.
An English correspondent describes the Greek
retreat from Tyrnavos upon Larissa in the following
graphic manner, he having been an eye-witness of
the panic which seized upon the army.
“As I returned along the high road to Larissa,

constantly stumbling over dead and dying men
and horses, I saw the most terrible scenes. The
ground was covered with ammunition boxes, broken
waggons, stores of equipments, bedding, soldiers’
blankets, and cooking utensils, which had all been
thrown away or abandoned, and lay crushed by
the hoofs of the horses which had galloped over
them. Guns and ammunition waggons, left standing
together with other vehicles, increased the disorder.
Many horses wandered about Without riders; any
soldier without a horse tried to catch one somehow,
or swung himself upon one already bearing arider.
Through this unruly mass, suddenly gone mad,
I picked my way for several miles. Many officers
did their utmost to restore order and discipline.
They had bugles sounded to cease firing, and
hurried about trying to order a halt; others com
pletely lost their heads and ran away paralysed
by fear, just like their men. I saw how one
determined officer made great efforts to bring his
men to reason, and held before them his revolver
at full cock, thundering out “Halt! halt!” But it
was like speaking to the wind. General Mauro
michalis who had gone to the Crown Prince at
Larissa came back some distance, and made every
effort to check the stream of fugitives. Two miles
I= : .a__:‘m_;flw.w¢\ NaAN/MJ
from Larissa the road crosses a dyke; here an

officer was engaged trying to form up half a
company of infantry; all his efforts were in vain,
for the disorderly stream of fugitives was too over
whelming, and grew as it moved along like an
avalanche. Panic seized the troop, and they suc
ceeded in literally dragging down from the road a
field battery in full marching order and pushing it
on one side in a meadow, in order to clear the way.
The approach to Larissa leads across a bridge
over the Peneus (Salamvria). Here, for hours the
road was impassable owing to the inextricable
confusion of waggons, cannon, horses, and human
beings. When I got to Larissa the streets and
squares presented a spectacle of unrestrained dis
order. Soldiers of all arms thrown together in
groups lay exhausted on the ground, and heeded
neither the bugle calls nor the orders given to fall
into line. All discipline was at an end. The
inhabitants of Larissa, who had received news of
the retreat at 2 in the morning, immediately took
to flight with all their moveables, and thus in
creased the mad chaos which was hurled like a
huge tidal wave upon the interior of the country.
On the road from Larissa to the south many a
touching sight might 'be seen as the fleeing in
habitants joined the broken portions of the army,
THE ADVANCE INTO AND OCCUPATION &c. I 53
mothers carrying their little ones, and casting

aside as burdens the silver and gold vessels they
had saved. The inhabitants lost literally every
thing. The excited inhabitants of Masmanly
arrested and determined to shoot some fugitive
Greek officers. Foreign correspondents interfered,
but yet the Officers were detained and locked up
in a tanner’s shed as prisoners. After miles of
marching the cry: “The Turks are upon us”
sufficed to spread terror and dismay. This sense
less flight before an imaginary pursuer was, of
course, an unmixed advantage to the Turks.
They had before them an army, chiefly composed
of a militia, which had only lately been made up
to the required strength, whose Officers had but
little authority and the men but little training. In
such an army, without cohesion, and without
discipline, troops and leaders must fail under the
pressure of unfortunate events.
The resisting power of the Greek army, never
very great, was so enfeebled by the flying retreat
to Larissa, by their shattered confidence in their
leaders, by the friction arising from political interests
among the Officers, that as an army, it could no
longer be regarded as a useful instrument. Moreover,
the élan of the volunteers after their first efforts and
failures had seriously abated, as was indeed only natural.
From Larissa to Pharsala.

Larissa was the first large town occupied by
the successful Turkish troops. The Turkish
Commander-in-Chief and his Officers were auxious
that the occupation of the town, which had so
suddenly and unexpectedly fallen into their hands,
should be completed without any excesses on the
part of the troops, and that the burden of occu
pation should be made as light as possible to the
inhabitants who had remained behind.
The foreign correspondents who looked on with
some scepticism upon _the entry of the Turks, and
probably apprehended all manner of violence from
them, are unanimous in their praise of the perfect
order and discipline which were observed in the
ranks of tho conquerors, and the consideration
with which the few police regulations necessary
for the protection of the property of the inhabitants
were carried out. As soon as soldiers were observed
FROM LARISSA TO PHARSALA. 155
carrying any suspicious burden they were immediately

called to account by their'Officers, and ordered
to return or to abandon their booty. The Albanian
regiments, mostly consisting of powerful, handsome
men, were purposely left outside of the town, as
they cannot be relied upon for correct and un
impeachable behaviour in such tempting circum
stances. This is, however, excusable if it is
remembered that the majority of them are quite
beyond the range of civilisation, and come from
regions still in a state of nature. ‘
The town and immediate neighbourhood were
immediately reconnoitred by the General Staff
officers, who verified the impression of the previous
day as to the shattered morale of the Greek army.
It was perfectly incomprehensible that the town
should have been given up without serious resistance.
The position was a remarkably strong one, with
the river Salamvria as protection in the front,
armed with twelve heavy guns and provided with
batteries and rifle pits well posted and of proper
construction. Besides this, the bridge over the
Salamvria had been prepared for destruction. Half
arranged field hospitals, with the fullest and most
complete modern appliances, had been abandoned;
while beds, medicines, instruments, all only partly
unpacked out of chests of English and .French
origin, lay in confused heaps in the houses. The

expensive antiseptic material for bandages was
used by the new-comers for towels and clusters;
superior Officers, lodged in the best houses, had
left their maps and correspondence exposed in the
most incomprehensible manner. And all this in
the face of Grumbkow Pasha’s small force of 400
cavalry!
For this reason the report that was spread on
this day at Turkish Head-Quarters, that Osman
Ghazi Pasha, the hero of Plevna, had been appointed
to the chief command of the two armies, was
received quietly and without excitement. Edhem
Pasha interviewed by a foreign correspondent,
admitted to Head-Quarters, expressed himself openly
as to the state of affairs as follows:
“The Greeks are so completely discouraged
altho’ they have not been beaten, that they did
not venture to defend Larissa, which they had but
just fortified, but fell back abandoning guns and
stores upon Pharsalus. They thus exposed the
whole plain of Thessaly with the towns of Larissa,
Trikhala, Kharditza, and what was of the greatest
strategic importance, the road to V010, the place
d’armes of the Greeks. Here was the harbour whence
the whole army had been thrown on the Turkish
frontier, and which was also of the greatest
importance on account of its direct intercourse

with southern Greece, for the bringing up of
reserves, and the provisioning of the troops. Even
if V010 is not as yet in the hands of the Turks
in consequence of the retreat of the Greeks, for
the road across the pass of Taygetos may even—
tually be defended for some time, and the town
can be defended by Greek ships, yet the line of
rail (V010-Larissa) is in the possession of the Turks,
and the line too which joins it at Velestino and
passes near Pharsalus is no longer useful to the
Greeks”.
“The Turkish army was therefore”, added the
General, “master of Thessaly, the richest and most
flourishing province of Greece, and in a position
to reinforce their army through the frontier passes
as they pleased, before attacking the second Greek
line of defence”.
It was known at Turkish Head-Quarters on
the 272‘ of April that the enemy had retreated to
a fortified position near Pharsalus, and occupied
the point at the railway junction of Velestino, to
the north west of Volo, with a strong force.
Pharsalus, celebrated as the scene of the battle
in which Julius Casar, with 22,000 men, overcame
his rival Pompey at the head of double the number
B. C. 48, lies as before stated on the spurs of the
inhospitable Othrys range, where a fertile plain

Watered by the Enipeus begins. The little town
of about 6000 inhabitants rises in terraces at the
foot of a conical circular rock, about 360 feet
high.
A mediaeval martello tower, of which the Turks
had made a prison before Thessaly was ceded to
Greece, situated high upon the rock, commands
the town and plain across which the eye can
stray to the summits of Olympus in the north,
and to Ossa and Pelion on the north-east. Pharsalus
with its white-washed houses offers little to interest
a visitor. Only on the summit of the hill the
remains of an ancient subterranean building, and
traces of the Cyclopean walls of an Akropolis are
to be found. Pharsalus was once one of the
mightiest cities of Thessaly; at present it is a
mere shadow of its former greatness. The connec
tion by rail with Volo by means of the V010
Trikhala-Kalabaka line -— the station, to be sure,
is a long way off — has been unsuccessful in
contributing to the prosperity of Pharsalus. The
dusty high road running from Larissa through the
plain is in very good condition on the whole; it
winds its way from Pharsalus, round the limestone
rocks to Domokos, a journey of 7 hours, and
thence onwards into Central Greece.
On the hilly country which crowns the plain at

Pharsalus the Greeks had taken up a favourable
position. The right wing touched Aivali, the left
curved back parallel to the line of the mountain.
At Velestinos the heights between the town and
the barracks of Pilaf-Tepe, as well as the hills of
Cynoscephalae, afforded strong points d’appui for
the position occupied.
The occupation of Larissa without either trouble
or loss naturally prompted the Turkish commanders
to start in hot pursuit of the enemy, so as to
utilise the confusion and disorder in which the
Greeks had begun their retreat, and render the
whole army powerless to continue the war, if
possible. It was perfectly plain in what direction
and with what objects operations would have to
be conducted.
The important point was to drive the Greeks
aside from Volo, i. e. away from the sea. Here
lay the main line of operations, the main artery of
the Greek army, the sole quarter from which, by
means of reinforcements by land and sea, the
confidence and the strength of the army might be
restored and the gaps filled up. That is to say, it
was necessary immediately after the occupation
of Larissa to despatch a strong force there in order
to nip in the bud all possibility of resistance.
Velestinos.
The first point of importance for the possession

of which the Turks had to take measures on
tactical as well as strategical grounds, isthe junction
of three lines of rail running in different directions.
Velestino stands where the lines from Larissa on
the north, and Trikhala on the west, join the line
to Volo on the east coast, and it commands the
only road across the mountains between the
Thessalian plain and the sea. The strategic im
portance of Velestino is heightened by the fact
that it is the point of resistance for covering the
line of retreat from Volo to the Piraeus, and if the
Turks attempted a direct march from Larissa to
Pharsalus, Velestino in the hands of the Greeks
would be a dangerous point on their left wing.
The Crown-Prince Constantine had therefore deter
mined to retain the position at Velestinos on the
flank in order to secure all the advantages that
the strong point d’appui of Volo offered. The
Greek fleet was stationed there, and all the railway
locomotives were assembled there; indeed the
Turks could make no use whatever of the line of
rail as they had no rolling stock. The troops were
so distributed that the Greeks held the fortified heights
resembling the outline of a narrow horse-shoe with
a mountain knoll in the centre where the road to

Volo begins. At the foot of this knoll on the
west lies Cephalo, which the Turks occupied, on
the other side Velestinos which was not visible from
the Turkish position. Under the steep ascent the
Lake of Karla shines in a fertile green valley,
surrounded by dense forests which here and there
open to reveal the village minarets. The barracks
of Pilaf-Tepe lie to the north-east of Velestinos,
and command at the same time the line of rail
and the excellent military road to V010, being
therefore an important strategic point for the
defence of the port and its stores. In the neighbour
hood of the Pilaf-Tepe barracks a road to the south
branches off from the V010 road, leading over Persephly
to Halmyros and thence over Surpi to the harbour of
Neaminzela. The heights of Cynocephalae belong
to the Kara mountain group. Edhem Pasha im
mediately sent out a reconnoitring party from
Larissa in pursuit of the enemy.
The first collision between the opposing forces
in their new positions took place on the 2721 of
April. The column directed against Volo under
Suleiman Pasha, 4 Battalions, 8 very weak squadrons
(the 1 31" and 142 cavalry regiment) and 1 Battery,
came upon the enemy at Velestinos. Two squadrons
sent out in support of the advance guard were
11
repulsed, and a quarter of an hour later the

Cavalry brigade came under fire from the V010
road on the front and from Pilaf-Tepe on the left.
The Turkish artillery replied with one mountain
and 2 horse batteries. The Greek fire was fairly
accurate, even the first shots fell among the gun
carriages and guns, but not a single shell burst.
The Turkish battery was soon compelled to show
a triple front. As darkness had set in, and the
left wing of the enemy was proceeding to Rizalom,
in order to cut off the retreat of the Turkish
cavalry, it was high time to let the battery return
in haste if the guns were to be saved; for there
was only one bridge open for the retreat, and
besides the Lake of Karla lay in the rear. For
this purpose the 13213 Regiment again advanced
against the enemy’s centre, and Suleiman Pasha
against the left wing. Meanwhile the batteries
crossed the bridge at a gallop and then the 1321
and finally the 142‘ Regiment retired slowly. It
is to be noted that the Cavalry fought in Circassian
fashion, i. e. firing from the saddle, which naturally
had little or no effect. The Turkish horsemen,
spite of their desperate situation, showed remarkable
courage. Only after the village lay behind them
did they set 05 at a trot and rode back to the
east of Gerelli, where they were met by the Redif
regiment “Broussa”. The regiment at once set to

work to throw up a “tabbia” or fortification, behind
which the weary troops, still sufl'ering from hunger
and thirst, encamped. On the 28}.h of April the
Redif regiment “Ismidt” came up as reinforcement,
with a field battery; on the 292 Colonel Mahmoud
Bey (son of the Chief- Commisioner in Egypt,
Ghazi Muktar Pasha) arrived, and he undertook
the direction of the attack on the 292 and 302‘.
Colonel Mahmoud acted cleverly and promptly;
meantime the enemy — for the line of rail
Pharsalus-V010 was still at his disposal — had
been reinforced by at least 8 battalions, and at
noon on the 302 repulsed the Turkish right wing
altho’ the troops had behaved gallantly; on this the
left wing also (Pilaf-Tepe and Rizomylos) had to
be withdrawn. Meanwhile 10 battalions and 2
batteries had come up as re-inforcements on the
Turkish side, but it was determined not to renew
the attack till Pharsalos should have fallen. A
brillant example of dash and determination, worthy
of notice, was individually given by the above
named Colonel Mahmoud Bey in the engagement
of the 302‘ of April.
In order to relieve the Infantry, he begged to
be allowed to advance with his regiment in an
attack on the enemy entrenched at the top of a
11'
164- THE WAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
ridge, which he carried leading his men on foot

after his valuable horse had been shot under him.
He himself was not struck, altho’ one Greek
captain aimed at him constantly. An Anatolian
corporal on horseback at length struck this captain
down, but in his fury laid hold of his rifle which
went off and killed him. Arrived on the heights
with a loss of 32 dead and wounded, without
counting horses, they unfortunately had to give
way, as they were received with Infantry fire on
3 sides, and at the same time a shrapnel fire was
opened upon them. In spite however of this hail
of bullets, they drew off in fairly good order.
The Turks did not succeed in penetrating into
the enemy’s position at Velestinos, as the plateau
of Pilaf-Tepe afforded such a strong defensive
position, and both the railway and the plain were
commanded by it. The loss of Pilaf-Tepe would
mean interruption of railway communication and
cut the army off from its supplies, leaving it in a
very serious position, as only a very scanty supply
of provisions could be found in the mountains.
Herein lay the importance of Pilaf-Tepe, and
therefore the Turks were fully determined to take
it, under any circumstances, in spite of the certainty
that the attempt would entail heavy losses. Once
over, they need leave only a small force in Volo
which would fall into their hands of itself, and

wheel round with all the available forces of their
left wing against the Greek position at Pharsalos.
The encounters hitherto at Velestinos had been, on
the Whole, mere skirmishes. Of the Greek artillery
it was said that their fire was badly aimed and
that their shells did not explode, while the Turkish
fire was very rapid and very effective. Their
gunners were much cooler and calmer.
On the whole, the losses in the fighting at
Velestinos may have reached 400 to 500 men;
here as in previous fights injuries to the extremities
were very numerous, caused by splinters of stone
struck off by shells. The Greek firing was of a
sort to make one wonder how the Turks could
have escaped with such trifling losses. Colonel
Mahmoud Bey, the bold leader of the Cavalry,
told one of the military attaches that an uninter
rupted hail of bullets fell over an area of nearly
2 square miles. ~
This heroic Officer himself fell with his horse
shot under him in a bold attack which he led on
the flank of the Greek position, and escaped with
great difficulty.
The careful and resolute conduct of the defence
of the Greek position of Velestinos was the work
of Colonel Smolensk, who here achieved. a success
166 rm: WAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
that places him beside Colonel Vassos and Colonel

Manos, and claims the warmest acknowledgment.
Edhem Pasha on advancing from Larissa was
obliged to carefully extend his forces to the west,
in order to keep up, if possible, his communications
with the troops acting in Epirus. Owing to the
rocky, rough, and impracticable nature of the
country, it was necessary to proceed most circum
spectly, especially when great distances had to be
crossed. This considerably influenced the progress
of operations on the right wing of the Turks.
It was evident that the Turkish General’s
purpose must be, to outflank the left wing of the
enemy, and thus to compel him to give up the
position at Pharsalus. Hakki Pasha's division
originally stationed at Diskata to keep open
communications between Thessaly and Epirus, had
been brought up by long marches to Larissa after
Tyrnavos and Larissa had fallen. On the other
hand, the lit division (Hairi Pasha), which had
fought at Damassi in the mountains, had received
orders to occupy Zarkos, Trikhala, Kardisha, and
Maskolpuri, and then advancing as the extreme
right of the army, to threaten the left of the
enemy’s position at Pharsalus from Puzaraki. This
movement corresponded to the advance of the five
divisions who were attacking the front of these
positions under Edhem Pasha. The advance of

the right wing was, however, very slow. The
rough mountain country, and the necessity of
marching through a population hostile to the Turks,
as well as the difficulty of arranging for the
transport of reinforcements, increased the delay.
The commissariat was greatly assisted by the
fertile country of Thessaly, especially the lovely
Vale of Tempe, which proved an unfailing source
for provisioning the army.
After the disasters of Tyrnavos and Larissa,
great changes had taken place in the Greek army,
and nearly all the Generals were replaced by fresh
appointments. In the place of the Chief of the
Staff, Sapuntsaraki, a general Stafi- Officer, Lieut.
Colonel Lambritis had been appointed to act
under the orders of the Royal Commander-in
Chief.
Against the position which the main body of
the Greeks — as has been said -— occupied on the
heights to the north of Pharsalus, the army of
Edhem Pasha had advanced slowly, so that on the
42‘ of May the Cavalry of the advanced guard
reached Subasi on the one side about 8 miles to
the north of Pharsalus, and on the other side
Miskoloruli (on the Trikhala-Pharsala line), upwards
of 17 miles to the west of the town of Pharsalus.
Immediately behind the Cavalry screen the 2‘11, 5%

and 62 divisions were massed on the north and
the north-west of the position to be attacked, with
the main body of the force still at the distance
of a short day’s march from Pharsalus. The right
wing spread far away to the west, so that the
object of outflanking the Greeks on the field of
battle must have been perfectly obvious to them
from the first. The tactical measure was com
plemented by the strategical movements which
were to be carried out by the Ii“ division (Hairi
Pasha). This division had reached the neighbour
hood of Pazaraki, about 14 miles to the west of
Pharsalus, whence . a continued advance would.
threaten the rear of the Greek position.
Behind the three divisions just named the 4%
and 7E divisions lay in reserve.
On the 59? of May a movement was observable
on the Turkish front as early as 4 o’clock. Accord
ing to instructions from the Officers at Head
Quarters, the Marshal had intended to deal his
principal blow on the 62\ of May, in order to be
quite sure of the co-operation of Hairi Pasha’s
division on the left of the Greeks. But when he
reached the field, the infantry fight had already
begun. The Greeks took up a well-chosen position
on the slopes which enclose the plain at Pharsalus
FROM LARISSA. TO PHARSALA. 169
about 12 miles to the south of Larissa. They had

strongly entrenched themselves there. Their flanks
were protected by the forest, and the greater part
of the Artillery were in position on the right
flank. At first the Greek artillery fire was very
accurate; they had probably carefully estimated
and marked their distances during the few previous
days. Towards mid-day, however, the Turks
succeeded by a brillant assault in driving the
enemy out of their position. Under the pressure
of the Turkish attack the Greeks began steadily
to retreat towards the heights rising from the plain,
during which time they were sadly exposed to the
fire of the Turkish artillery; their losses were
considerable, especially on the right, and the
rearguard sacrificed itself bravely in order to save
the rest of the force.
After the retreat had once begun, the pursuing
Turks no longer left the enemy any rest, nor did
their fire slacken or cease for a moment. When
the assailants gained the ridge of the heights
which command the plain, an encouraging sight
met their eyes. To the right and left dark masses
were observed; these were the columns of advancing
Turkish infantry. At their feet the lovely plain
stretched far away to the right. Towards Volo,
at the foot of the heights which surround Pharsalus,
the valley narrows, behind it the Othrys Mountains

rise dark and gloomy. The whole plain was
covered with Greeks in rapid movement. Their
ranks were fairly well ordered and the object
of their march was a stone bridge, crossing a
small stream. The Turkish artillery meantime
pressed forward, took up good positions, and sent
shell after shell into the fleeing columns. As the
dust rose after each explosion the fugitives in
creased their speed. The rear-guard had dug rifle
pits and kept up a hot fire, nevertheless their
intrepid resistance was overborne by the superior
numbers of the Turkish infantry. The Turks
drove the enemy from position to position, and it
was surprising to see the unflinching courage of
the troops, who despised all cover, never halting
in their steady advance, not even kneeling to fire.
While the Greeks were assembling to cross the
bridge, a shell fell into a railway train bringing up
troops from the direction of V010 and did immense
damage. When the Greeks had by degrees got
the stream between themselves and their pursuers
a short calm set in in the fighting; Edhem Pasha,
however determined after the success gained to
push on to Pharsalus without delay. He descended
into.the plain with a battery, sent a line of rifles
in front, andundertook an attack that ended in
FROM LARISSA TO PHARSALA. I7!
what was probably the most sanguinary encounter

of the day. From a little village on the right
wing the fire was so hot and rapid that the
Turkish soldiers were invisible in the smoke. The
firing of shells did the rest, and the village was
taken by the Turks. On this the fire stopped.
The Greeks moved off to Pharsalus, and without
delay six Turkish battalions were deployed for an
attack on the town. The sun was now setting,
nevertheless so long as there was daylight the
Turks threw their shells into the town. Battery after
battery came up till the town was surrounded.
Night at last put an end to the firing. The
Greeks probably evacuated their positions and
sought shelter in the mountains, since their retreat
was threatened by the Turks, who were already
masters of the road between Pharsalus and
Domokos. Next day after Hamdi’s and Memduk’s
divisions had carried the positions commanding
Pharsalus, Hassan’s brigade of Hamdi Pasha’s
division occupied Pharsalus itself. All the Crown
Prince Constantine’s baggage, six guns, and much
war material was taken. A foreign Officer who
was present as a spectator thus describes the
battles at Velestinos and Pharsalus on the 52‘ and
6% of May from the military point of view. The
three divisions commanded by Omer Nechat, Hamdi,
and Memduk advanced in échelon from the right,

each deploying separately against a second position
strengthened with rifle pits across the Karademirsi
Teke-Pharsalus road, which descends by the village
of Tatari into the plain. The estimates of the
'Greek force varied between four and eight battalions;
.a battery was posted on the left wing. Under
long continuous firing the situation remained un
changed till late in the afternoon, when the
Hellenic troops yielded, falling back from the ridge
to the plain in perfect order, followed only by
Hassan Pasha’s brigade supported by three field
batteries and a mountain battery. The Turkish
shells were well aimed, and the shrapnel could be
seen bursting over the thin line of skirmishers, yet
in spite of this no traces of any telling effect
could be perceived there next day. Indeed the
accounts of losses of any importance in these
conflicts should be accepted with some doubt, for
no wounded returned by the road, and dead were
seen only in very small numbers. The Turkish
loss was officially estimated at 230 men.
In the plain the Greeks had prepared a position
in order to make a stand, and the village of
Wasili to the west of the side of Pharsalus had
been placed in a condition of defence, and sur
rounded with rifle pits. Eight fresh battalions and
FROM LARISSA TO PHARSALA. I 7 3.
a battery were massed in reserve behind the right

wing, at the same time a column, estimated at
four battalions, came down the hill behind Pharsalus;
altogether about 23 battalions, composing two
infantry divisions, are said to have been there. The
fall of night put an end to this collision —— for it
can be called by no other name —- and on the
morrow when the Turks advanced, they found
Pharsalus evacuated. The Greeks had retired upon
Domoko.
On the same day as the fighting at Karademirsi,
there was fighting at Velestinos. After the advanced
guard action, which was unfavourable to the Turks,
they had concentrated the whole of Hakki Pasha’s
division. The Greeks held a strong tactical position
on the south-western edge of the valley, from which
they commanded the plain and the military road
to Volo. Rifle pits and breast work increased, as
already stated, its power of resistance, and a front
al attack, even by far superior numbers, would
have resulted in heavy losses. There seem to
have been more than 9000 Greeks there, for the
consuls at Volo on giving the place up to the
Turks declared that about that number had
embarked, but besides this, Hellenic troops had
been withdrawn by land in a southerly direction,
to Halmyros. Judging by the number of spent.
cartridges which lay about in heaps Hakki Pasha

must have kept up a hot fire, his troops actually
pushed forward against the steep heights along
trenches, which must have cost enormous pains to
dig out in the stony ground with a very inadequate
supply of tools. The evacuation of Pharsalus had
however given the signal for the retreat, and made
it possible for the Turks to push on there, and
threaten the line of retreat from Velestinos, where
a longer resistance would have ended in a
catastrophe. During the night of the 72‘ of May
the whole of Memduk’s division was sent to Hakki
Pasha to support the attack, but the enemy retired
and Marshal Edhem Pasha was able in the evening
to take up his quarters at the Railway Statibn of
burning Velestinos.
The retreat of the Greeks consequent upon the
loss of the position commanding Pharsalus was
principally the result of the engagements on the
right wing of the Turks; and the Greek left gave
way in consequence, Hairi Pasha’s division
threatening the line of communication in the rear.
According to Greek accounts, the retreat took
place in perfect order, and this can readily be
credited, since the retreat had been foreseen and
planned. Nevertheless, the occupation of a position
which it is intended to hold only temporarily, and
not permanently, must always be regarded as a

mistake. It could only have been advisable to
occupy this position temporarily, if the previous
retreat through Larissa had been imperilled by the
close pursuit of the Turkish troops. This was
however by no means the case, and the Greek
army might have saved itself the moral depression
consequent upon a further retreat.
The only advantage which the Greeks secured
by their occupation of the position at Pharsalus
was, that it made the holding of Velestinos easy
for Colonel Smolenski, and he was fortunate in
securing a military success, which places him beside
Manos as one of the few competent Officers in
the Greek army.
Colonel Smolenski’s detachment received orders to
retire on the evening of the 521 of May; he chose
the direction of Almyro (Kirtsini). This retreat was
the inevitable consequence of the withdrawal from
the position near Pharsalus. The main army of
the Greeks retired in the direction of Domokos,
and several guns were at once placed on the hill
there. When on the 62 of May it became certain
that the Greeks still firmly held Pilaf-Tepe, the
most praiseworthy promptitude was immediately
displayed by the Turks; one of the divisions in
the front near Pharsalus had received orders at
two o’clock to start direct for Velestinos, while

the reinforcements coming in to Larissa were
immediately got ready to join in an attack on
Velestinos. It was expected that at noon on the
893 of May, three divisions would attack the enemy’s
positions there. The demands made upon the
marching power of the Turks were astounding.
Quite early on the morning of the 821 of May two
divisions stood between Velestinos and Rizomylos
ready for battle, while the arrival of the third in
the course of the day might be expected with
certainty.
Hakki Pasha’s division remained assembled near
Velestinos to cover the left wing of the main army,
and to hold the passes near Velestinos. As a flying
column they had previously overrun the Pelion
mountain, and gained possession with their advanced
guard of the route to Halmyros at Akitsi. This
movement led to a little fighting on the slopes
descending to Halmyros, in which the Greeks
(probably a weak brigade, with two to three
batteries) were thrown back on to the plain of
Halmyros. A pursuit could obviously not be
undertaken, as the greater part of the Greek fleet
lay at anchor before Halmyros. Matters stood
thus on the Turkish left during the days from the
82‘ to the 12$.h of May.
On the 112 of May the Turkish forces were

concentrated around Pharsalus, and distributed as
follows: the 12 2&1 3E 42 and 62 divisions in the first
line; Memduk’s and Hairi's divisions in the second,
and Haidar Pasha’s in rear of the centre at Tekke.
The Head-Quarters were at Tekke itself, the
outpost line, provided by the divisions of the first
line, was a mile or so to the south of Pharsalus.
Ten battalions had been detached to occupy
Trikhala.
The 72 division, Husni Pasha’s, was fully
assembled at Larissa, having previously been
stationed at Katerina, while fresh reinforcements
kept open the communications in the rear from
the Meluna pass to Tyrnavos.
The seven divisions, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7
were thus formed in a triangle, Larissa-V010
Pharsalus, ready for operations, while the right
flank at Trikhala was secured by a strong brigade.
The troops had now had sufficient rest after
the trying exertions they had gone through from
the 5113 to the 1131‘ of May. In order to continue
offensive operations a highly popular change had
been made in the command. Mushir Edhem Pasha
had been appointed to the chief command over
all the Turkish forces, including the army division
stationed at Arta-Yanina. By this means, at length
12
the unity in the conduct of operations urgently

required was secured, and it was to be expected that
when operations were resumed, the two armies would
co-operate with a common aim in view.
Opposite the Turkish front from Pharsalus to
V010, the enemy occupied a line from Domokos to
Halmyros: At Domokos they had a weak army
corps, and at Halmyros a brigade of Infantry, a,
squadron, and 2 or 3 batteries, supported by a
strong section of the fleet.
The troops which had been stationed at Veles
tinos on the 7*.h of May, and who were embarked
at Volo the same night 721—82 of May, had been
partly moved up to reinforce the main army at
Domokos.
It might safely be presumed that the condition
of the Greek troops was not a favourable one.
An army which had for weeks been retreating,
which had more than once yielded to panic, which
had no confidence in its leaders, and which was
without any strict military training or discipline,
an army in fact, consisting for the greater part of
men hastily collected and armed, under officers
animated by political party spirit, accustomed to
any number of catchwords but not to the stern
watchword “duty”, such an army could not be
regarded as effective for military purposes.
To this must be added the perceptible diminution

of reserve supplies of munition and the marked
decrease in the number of their guns, since great
quantities of ammunition, and 1 or 2 batteries had
been left behind each time they had retreated.
Owing to the dearth of trained and experienced
Officers, the simplest tactical principles were con
stantly violated by the Greeks. Thus it was
almost a rule to place the outposts so far in
advance of the line they covered, that they had
long stretches of ground to cross unsupported in
the event of a retirement. Neither were the men’s
comforts adequately cared for.
As at Tyrnavos and Larissa, so also at Pharsalus
and Velestinos, the Greeks had been successful in
keeping open their line of retreat and their access
to the sea. Up to this time the Turks do not
seemv to have fixed their attention on either of
these two problems; they had contented themselves
with using their superiority in numbers to threaten
the enemy on one wing. But they had negleted
to cut off their retreat and thus make their an
nihilation or surrender a necessity. Had Hairi
Pasha’s division been somewhat more punctual in
its arrival at Pharsalus, the army of the Crown
Prince would have been undone. In the same
manner an attack upon the Velestinos-V010 road
12
would have touched the Greeks on the most

sensitive spot, viz. their communication with the sea.
In spite of their great numerical strength the
Turks achieved no effectual result. The weakness
of their fleet prevented its active participation in
the operations, and thus the Greeks, with their
naval power as a moveable base, succeeded again
and again in securing a new refuge and in avoiding
a decisive blow. This merely passive achievement
would have been greatly enhanced if the Greeks
had had at their disposal a firmly welded, well
disciplined army, even if not numerically strong,
capable of withstanding the wear and tear of
incessant movement and fighting.
Landings here and there — rendered every
where easy by the deep indentations of the sea —
would have made it possible to achieve numerous
tactical successes over the Turkish advanced guards,
to constantly attack and drive these back with
superior numbers, and then to vanish when the
Turks should hasten in force to the threatened
points.
As far as the Greek operations were concerned,
it was a mistake to choose two different routes
for retirement, and to direct one part of the army
to Pharsalus, the other to Volo. With the choice
of the retreat in the direction of Volo, the original
starting-point of the operations would have been

retained, the junction on the line of rail, and the
harbour from which reserves and supplies could
be sent on to the army direct — but apparently
they thought the high-road to Athens would then
be left open to the enemy.
If, on the other hand, the road to Volo were
left open, and the only line of retreat that would
cover the capital, Athens, were chosen in the
direction of Lamia, there was the comforting
consciousness at least, of not exposing the capital.
Whether Volo fell a few days earlier or later was
a matter of no importance under the circumstances.
But it is perfectly certain that the road to Athens
could not be cut off at Pharsalus, but simply and
solely in the Othrys Mountains.
The position Velestino -Pilaf -Tepe was, as
experience showed, strong, and would not have
proved too extended for the united Greek army.
Had. Colonel Manos been called to undertake the
command, and had the Greek government con
centrated all its fighting power there, it is quite
open to question whether Marshal Edhem Pasha
could have marched past and have set out on the
road to Athens. The Turkish army would doubt
less have been compelled to halt before the position
Pilaf-Tepe-Velestino-Akketshelu and to attack day
by day a camp occupied by superior numbers, and

easily strengthened and fortified.
The course of events, however, was entirely
different: the Turkish army had V010, and it lay
in their power completely to destroy the rolling
plant of the Thessalian railway which was con
centrated there; finally with their customary calm
deliberation they made preparations for storming
Domokos and the Furka Pass!
The occupation of V010 itself, in the face of the
peculiar circumstances in which it took place, was
an event of quite a peculiar nature. It happened
as follows:
A town filled with extremely hostile inhabitants,
just left by the enemy, whose warships in good
fighting trim still lie in the harbour. Beside them
the warships of the European Powers, who have
landed detachments of blue-jackets for the protection
of their subjects. No one really knows who is
master in the town; the different parties are quite
ready to fly at one another. One of the correspondents
gives the following lively and graphic details of
the scene, and writes in his Diary:
“The entrance into the town offered an inter
esting and lively picture; detachments of sailors
numbering from 10—15 each, Whose national flag
was carried in advance on high — English, French,
FROM LARISSA TO PHARSALA. 18 3
Italian -— stood in the streets, ready to give their

countrymen such protection as might prove necessary.
The gentlemen of Renter’s office threaded their
way merrily through the town, shaded by their
Union-Jack, English blue-jackets guarded us, the
English flag fluttered over us, and if the Greek
warships had taken things seriously and bombarded
Volo, we should probably have retired on English
boats to the English gunboat “Dryad”, and have
looked on at the interesting spectacle from English
territory, safe and sound.
Edhem Pasha had meanwhile commissioned the
four consuls of Volo, who had come to him in
his Head-Quarters at Velestinos, to inform the war
ships in the harbour of Volo, that he desired to
enter the town of Volo peacefully. Hereupon Nedjib
Bey was sent on with a white flag. I accompanied
him. As we approached the town, single inhabi
tants appeared and greeted us with the greatest
respect. At the gate of the town the number of
the curious increased, and we were soon surrounded
by quite a crowd. Their heads were all uncovered
and joy rather than sadness was seen in their
countenances. In the Demetri Street the crowd
had increased to several thousands. At first we
could not find the Town Hall. But my “cavasse”,
who speaks Greek, at length piloted us there. We
entered and said we wished to see the Burgomaster;

but he did not appear. After some waiting
M. Gue, who acts as substitute in the Burgomaster's
absence, came. Nedjib Bey showed him Edhem
Pasha’s proclamation, by which he placed all the
inhabitants of the town under Turkish protection,
promising security to life and property, and explained
to them that they should quietly pursue their usual
occupations.
After M. Gue had read the proclamation, we
all stepped out upon the balcony, in order that
the proclamation might be read aloud to the people.
Never in my life have I witnessed so touching a
scene as the one which now presented itself.
Before us we saw a sea of pale, upturned faces,
auxiously waiting for the words that were to
decide their fate. The Burgomaster’s substitute
began to read the proclamation aloud, but he
spoke so indistinctly that no one could understand
him. Voices were raised: “Speak louder, we can
hear nothing”. Thereupon M. Gue began afresh
and spoke louder, and at length the people heard.
As soon as they apprehended the meaning of the
proclamation a deep murmur of relief ran through
the multitude. And then suddenly all cried
frantically: “Long live the Sultan! Long live
the Turks!” During this time we could distinctly
see the black outlines of the three Greek warships

in the harbour. But the reply of the Greek Admiral
was still wanting. Nedjib Bey therefore sent me
and two other colleagues off on board the Admiral’s
ship to hear the Greek Commander’s decision. We
carried a white flag. On the landing stage, however,
we met the Captains of the international squadron,
coming to deliver the Admiral’s message. He
would remain in the harbour with his ships until
he was convinced that the Turks had really, taken
possession peaceably. In the name of the Com
mander-in-Chief, Nedjib Bey sent the reply that
the troops of the Sultan well knew how to protect
the inhabitants of a town that had surrendered to
them. Only one battalion would march into Volo
to take over police duty. The remainder of the
army would encamp before the town. The Admiral
was desired to sail out of harbour. Failing this it
was impossible to hold the Turks responsible for
possible consequences".
The Battle of Domokos.

On the 142‘ of May Edhem Pasha had collected
a considerable force in and round Pharsalus, while
the right flank at Trikhala as well as the left at
Velestinos was secured by a strong division.
On the 15311 of May, reconnaissances were
undertaken by the Officers at Head-Quarters, who
found the enemy posted in a strongly entrenched
position to the north of Domokos. The position
had a front of over six miles, on all sides tier
above tier of rifle-pits and breastworks had been
thrown up; consisting in all of six lines.
The attack was ordered for the 172 of May:
the following troops to advance:
On the right wing, Hairi Pasha’s division in
one column, to the right of the high road to
Domokos in the direction of Hadshi, Omar, and
Bekriler, upon Tsioba and Skarmitsa -— and
Netshat Pasha’s division in one column three
THE BATTLE OF DOMOKOS. 187
brigades strong on both sides of the high road to

Domokos.
In the centre Hamdi Pasha’s division, two
brigades strong in two columns to the east of the
high road across Vrysia, Vardati, Sakarobar, and
Kroloba, upon Purnari.
On the left wing, Memduk Pasha’s division over
Karatsali and Gerakli against the enemy’s right
flank and line of retreat. Haidar Pasha’s division
was to follow in rear of the centre.
On the previous day, May 162, Hakki Pasha
had already received instructions to advance against
Halmyros, so’ that on the 172 he might join the
Mushir with all his forces, for a simultaneous
attack probably in the neighbourhood of Karadanti
to the north-west of Halmyros.
According to the notes of Major Falkner von
Sonnenburg, accredited reporter at Turkish Head
Quarters, whose accounts are distinguished beyond
all others for lucidity, regard for essentials, keen
judgment and practical experience, the three divisions
ordered to make a simultaneous attack on the
enemy’s position, advanced early on the 171*.1 of
May between 4 and 5 in the morning. At 10 in
the morning the vanguard of Hairi’s division on
the extreme right came upon the enemy at Tsioba.
Although they appeared only very weak, worn-out
cavalry, Hairi deployed a complete infantry regiment

against them, and thus lost a valuable hour, since
he did not succeed in occupying Tsioba till 1 1
o’clock. The head of Hamdi Pasha’s force too,
had meanwhile engaged the enemy about 10 in
the morning, and the firing could be heard from
there till the evening.
In the centre, with Hamdi and Netshat, as also
on the right wing with Hairi, events had proceeded
as follows:
The advanced guard of Netshat’s division reached
the front of the enemy’s position before Domokos
about noon, and at 12.15. the uppermost hostile
line 4 new 4”- Krupp guns of position opened fire
upon them.
At the same time Hairi Pasha’s division at
length took Tsioba, and about 3 o’clock engaged
the enemy’s force of 4 battalions and several field
batteries which had been freshly deployed to the
front, from the heights between Tsiflari and
Balabanti, on the left to near Domokos. At the
same time the second line at Domokos opened fire
hpon Netshat’s infantry with three batteries.
At 3.15. Netshat’s advanced battery pushed
on with great bravery to within 2800 yds. of the
position occupied by the overwhelming artillery of
the enemy; at 3.30. a second Turkish battery had
reinforced them, and from 4 o’clock onwards eleven

Turkish batteries in the centre were at work, and
continued active till nightfall.
At 3.40. the Nizam brigade, the 1493 and 1593
(Adrianople) Regiments, armed with Mauser rifles
advanced by alternate rushes to the attack, with
incredible valour, against the Greek infantry positions
of the fourth, third, second and first line, here
forming a re-entering angle; of this brigade only
one regiment deployed, the other remained in
“reserve”. The attack took place on the right of
the road. At a distance of 900—1000 yds. the
advancing brigade, or rather regiment, was already
met by an overwhelming infantry and artillery fire,
and it had to advance unsupported across 1300 yds.
under artillery fire.
In spite of crushing superiority, this brave
regiment came up to within 4 or 500 yds. of the
Greeks, and stood their ground —- not a man
went back —, only the approach of darkness
brought relief to the Turks. Of four battalions,
each of about 600 men, between 600 and 800 men
had perished.
Now for the first time, about 6 in the evening
the second regiment of the brigade pushed into
the decimated ranks of its sister regiment; mean
time Hairi had at length won ground, and deployed
to the right of Netshat, while the second brigade

of this division took Purnari. About 7 in the
evening, the 31‘ brigade, Netshat’s, deployed towards
the front to resist a counter-attack which seemed
probable; this, however, did not take place.
The artillery combat ceased after dark about
a quarter to nine. The bivouac fires in the Greek
positions remained burning, but it was known
very early on the morning of the 182.h of May
that their position had been evacuated! Again
they abandoned their guns. Memduk’s pressure
on the strategically sensitive flank had done its work.
Hamdi Pasha’s division had encountered the enemy
about 10 o’clock, in the neighbourhood probably
of Dardali, and had driven him back upon his
main position. The movements of this division
had been somewhat dilatory and slow, but towards
evening it succeeded in pushing on to Purnari on
the south-east, and in halting on the night of the
189 of May on the right flank of the Greek front.
The neighbour on Hamdi Pasha’s left was Memduk,
who in the morning had driven the enemy out of
Tsiatma and had in the course of the day advanced
to Gerakli, so that as a matter of fact, he stood
.as near to the Furka pass as the Greeks themselves.
Indeed it was this circumstance that deter
mined the Greeks to move off during the night of
THE BATTLE OF DOMOKOS. I9!
the 172-— 18Lh of May. The Turks had been

deceived by the old feint of lighting and keeping
up the bivouac fires, for it was not till 5 on the
morning of the 1823 of May that they were certain
the Greek positions had been evacuated.
The picture of the battle of Domokos which
Major Falkner von Sonnenburg sketches with
military brevity may be compared with the gay
and lively description which the correspondent of
the “Daily News” sent home from Greek Head
Quarters. In his account of the battles of the
17Lh and 18.“.11 of May he says that the Greeks
did not believe that there would by any further
fighting at all, and secretly hoped that the negoti
ations already opened would lead to an armistice.
On his arrival the reporter found that things
looked very black at the rear of the army. The
soldiers lay without the protection of tents, exposed
to therain and to the mountain cold, in disorderly
bivouacs, the roads were covered with long rows
of waggons upon which the wounded, the sick,
and stores of provisions were lying; all were throng
ing hither and thither in disorder, bent upon getting
out of reach of the enemy as quickly as possible.
The Turks meanwhile were slowly moving forward
on the three roads leading from Pharsalus over
the Kassidiari heights towards the south. The
westernmost of these roads goes through the villages

of Ryzi and Karadzali, the middle one across Teterli,
and the easternmost roadthrough Kiszlar. The column
marching along the last was under orders to cut
off General Smolenski’s detachment at Halmyros
from the army of the Crown Prince, and to
threaten the right wing of the Greeks.
The position which the Crown Prince occupied
lay on the ridge and slopes of one of the chains
of hills below the Kassidiari Mountains. About
the middle of this chain is situated the village of
Domokos, and a few miles to the east of it lie
Kitzeri and Kitiki. The Greek left wing was to
hold the entrance to the Agoriani pass, where
there is a railway cutting in preparation for the
line from Lamia to Pharsalus. This wing was
threatened with the loss of the pass. The position
had the shape of a horse-shoe, of which the right
side was the shorter. Three mountain batteries
crowned the ridge upon which the left wing stood,
defended by 5000 infantry. In the centre of the
position, at Domokos and upon the hills gently
sloping down into the plain, 5 field batteries and
a few mountain guns were placed, and 12,000 to
15,000 Infantry occupied this section. On the
right wing there were 4 field batteries and also
several mountain guns distributed over the position;
the villages of Kitiki and Kitzeri were each

defended by six guns. 12,000 infantry were
stationed here, and 6000 were in reserve to the
west of Domokos, on the slope of a mountain
spur. Two 6” Krupp guns strengthened the
artillery defences; one was posted on a tower
commanding the town, the other on the top of a
hill to the east of Domokos commanding the plain.
Altogether the Greeks had from 3 5,000 to
40,000 men, including 500 cavalry. The Turks
attacked with perhaps 50,000 men. General
Mauromichalis commanded the centre, and Makris
commanded the right wing of the Greeks.
It was, says the correspondent, a glorious sight
to watch, from the heights of Domokos, the advance
of the Turks in the bright sunshine. Five squadrons
of cavalry galloped in front of the columns of
infantry, which moved forward in sinuous lines.
Presently two Turkish advanced batteries were
unlimbered in order to cover the further
advance of infantry. By this time both the heavy
Krupp guns gave the signal for beginning an
obstinate artillery fight which was carried on
with increasing vehemence on both sides, and in
which the Greeks had the advantage not only on
account of their raised position, but because they
had previously measured and calculated direction
13
and distances with the greatest care, and placed

their marks accordingly. To the artillery fire of
the defenders was added the fire from the Evzones
— mountain rifles — lying in the rifle pits.
The fight had kindled rapidly along the whole
front, the volleys of artillery roared on both sides
like heavy thunder. The fire of the Greeks was
more effective because they worked their pieces
more quietly and safely, firing from a firm and
protected position. The swarms of the Turkish
skirmishers and their supports consequently suffered
frightful loss. Towards 4 o’clock in the afternoon
the attack of the Turks against the Greek right
grew even more determined. On both sides of
the high road two batteries appeared, pushing
slowly forwards in the plain, while the infantry
with admirable coolness and determination pushed
further to the west in échelon, and directed their
fire against the works occupied by the Evzones
and Garibaldians.
In place of Ricciotti Garibaldi who was at that
time in the foreign legion, Cipriani commanded
the volunteers, who had been sent here to the
support of the “Evzones”. The contest at this
point was continued with the greatest obstinacy'l
calm and determined the Turks pushed on, calmly
and coolly the Garibaldians delivered their fire and
overwhelmed their opponents with a perfect hail

of bullets.
The vivandiere of the Italians, so the correspondent
relates, was quite a unique apparition, a brisk
little person; moving about unconcernedly in the
midst of the hottest fire, and in her coquettish red
jacket now coming to the help of a wounded man,
now handing ammunition to the combatants, and
happily escaping unhurt.
Further and further the left Turkish wing
pressed forward; the centre followed this movement;
Colonel Mauromichalis hurriedly sent off 3000 men
from the reserves to strengthen the position at
Domokos. The whole of the Greek force was at
this time engaged in the battle, which raged also
on the left wing of the defenders who had to
repulse an extremely impetuous advance against
the Agoriani pass. About ’7 in the evening the
fight abated on both sides, and at sunset died down
gradually, till only the two Krupp guns continued
firing, still hurling their projectiles against the
Turkish lines. All at once the Greek cavalry
which had been but little in action, was seen
coming out of the plain and trotting along the
road to the Furka Pass.
Up to that time the spectators in the centre of
the Greek line imagined that the assailants with
13
all their courage and superior numbers had been

unable to break into the Greek positions, and that
a renewal of the fight the next day would be
necessary to bring about a decision. These spectators
were also perfectly unanimous in considering that
the coolness and resolution with which the younger
soldiers, as well as those who were not regularly
trained soldiers at all, had fought that day, merited
unlimited praise. Meantime the extreme right
wing at Kitiki had been outflanked by superior
numbers as early as between 2 and 3 in the after
noon, and thrown back after a short resistance in
the direction of the village of Buzi. On his arrival
here, General Makris tried to make a stand until
the re-inforcements he had asked for arrived.
Owing to their non-arrival, however, he was unable
to hold his ground and had to retreat as expeditiously
as possible; by 8 in the evening this retirement
was so far completed that, as a consequence, the
position of Domokos was no longer tenable. Upon
this announcement followed the order for a general
retreat, which like the retreat from Tyrnavos and
Pharsalus of a few weeks before was very slow
and difficult. The retreating soldiers again found
the road cumbered not only with army trains,
transports for the wounded, ammunition columns 810.,
but also covered with fugitive inhabitants, driven
THE BATTLE OF oomoxos. 197
in great numbers by fear and horror at the prospect

of falling into the hands of the Turks.
Thus far the testimony of the English corres
pondent, whose statements are interesting because
he witnessed the fighting at Domokos, is distinctly
favourable to the Greeks. He certainly only saw
what happened in the centre, where it is generally
allowed that the advantage lay with the defenders.
At the close of his account he relates how the
Crown Prince watched the course of the battle
from the balcony of his quarters, 0n the knoll of
a neighbouring hill, and how he left the army
early the following morning in a carriage, escorted
by cavalry, for Taratza, but Without touching at
Lamia, where under the circumstances he ought to
have removed his Head-Quarters.
On the 182 of May Domokos was occupied in
front by the Turks, and large quantities of arms
and ammunition which had been left behind, were
found. The right wing and the centre, i. e. Hairi’s,
Nechat’s, and Haidar’s divisions, advanced beyond
Domokos into the plain of Lake Xynias which is
reached after the descent from Domokos on the
south, and which separates the heights of Domokos
from the actual Othrys mountains. The most
important pass over the mountains into the plain
of Lamia is the Furka.
On the evening of the 182‘ of May, troops

from Memduk’s and Hamdi’s divisions met before
the Furka pass which was still occupied by the
Greeks, and after some desultory fighting drove
all the Greek troops back into the pass, from the
northern end of it. Three of Hamdi’s battalions
were detailed as outposts on the night of the
182—— 192 of May, almost in contact with the
enemy.
The general position was now somewhat as

follows: Three divisions, Hairi’s, Nechat’s, and
Haidar’s, lay between Domokos and Derveni, two
divisions, Hamdi’s and Memduk’s were thrown
forward, and formed a triangular position at Derveni,
Palamas, and Furka. These two divisions, especi
ally the one on the left wing (Memduk Pasha’s)
had — as must be concluded — advanced too far
to the West, and had thus been cut off from the
front.
Quite early on the morning of the 192 of May

the outposts of Hamdi’s division found that the
Furka pass had been evacuated, so the order was
given for an immediate advance upon Lamia along
the high road. Towards noon on the 19*.'1 a further
resistance was quite unexpectedly encountered!
The last range of the southern spurs of the Othrys
mountains at Taratsa, about two miles north of

Lamia was strongly occupied by the enemy, with
a force estimated at 10 battalions with 2 or 3
batteries. This fresh development on the enemy’s
part after their retreat from the Furka pass was
in every way incomprehensible from a military
point of view. First of all, the local surroundings
of the Furka pass rendering an obstinate defence
possible, was essentially more favourable than a
position close to Lamia; moreover, a retreat from
the place chosen would be so excessively difficult,
that it was simply incredible that the Greeks
would endeavour to make a stand there. The
Greek retreat into the plain of Lamia under the
devastating fire of the Turkish artillery which
would obviously come into position on the very
last line of the heights, must lead to a catastrophe
if a passage of arms were again undertaken.
The matter was all the more astonishing because
the Greeks had really done remarkable things in
the art of retreating silently under cover of night!
It was an insoluble problem! But as Falkner
von Sonnenburg says, the wily progeny of Odysseus
soon found a solution!
The six battalions nearest at hand — mostly
Arnauts (Albanians) — were deploying for attack,
the first Turkish batteries were being brought

into position, and a hot fire was opening which
lasted for about two hours, — fresh re-inforcements
were hastening forward to the front, officers and
men were shewing the same spirit of resistance
to attack when suddenly the opinion gained grorind
that the troops opposed to them had been cut ofi'
from their line of retreat, and about 4 in the
afternoon the whole picture underwent an abrupt
change. A vehicle, on which a white flag had
been hoisted, approached the Greek lines which
were acting as a strong rearguard, to secure and
cover the retreat of the army to Lamia, and continuing
the conflict to gain time. After the vehicle had
passed through to the front, there descended from
it the Nomarch (Government President) of Lamia,
Herr von Hesslin, with several officers and officials,
who evidently had some particular mission to
fulfil. The said official, whose father had formerly
come to Greece with King Otho from Bavaria,
and who, properly an advocate at Athens, had
been appointed civil commissioner at Lamia on the
outbreak of the war, brought the announcement
of an armistice agreed to in principle by Turkey.
Herr von Hesslin had received the news early on
the morning of the 1921 of May from Athens with
the request that it might immediately be brought
to the notice of Greek Head-Quarters. He had

therefore requisitioned the first country conveyance
that came to hand, and in order to construct a flag of
truce, had torn the white cover off one of the
cushions and fastened it to a pole. The Chief of
the Turkish Stafl', Seifullah Bey, who happened to
be near, declared in reply to the announcement
made to him by the Commissioner, that the firing
should certainly cease at once, but that he should
require a formal announcement from the Crown
Prince before a cessation of hostilities could be
conceded. It may be noted as a curious fact that
these negotiations were carried on in German,
as both parties were masters of the language,
and could best make themselves understood by
using it.
It has already been stated that the Royal
Commander-in-Chief had driven to Taratza on the
evening of the 172 of May, in consequence of the
outflanking of his right wing and its consequent
retirement, after giving orders at night for evacuating
the strong position of Domokos. From there he
had transferred his Head-Quarters still further to
the rear, to Alamana. Under these circumstances
the news of the armistice agreed upon by the two
governments did not reach him till noon on the
1922 of May. As quickly as possible Officers from
Head-Quarters were sent with the news to the

front, and commissioned to treat at once with the
Turkish commander for the fixing of a neutral
zone.
Eye-witnesses describe the scenes which took
place in front of the fighting lines on the cessation
of hostilities, as much resembling the sounding
of the Halt! during peace manoeuvres. Prompted
by curiosity, the troops who had just stood opposed
to each other under fire, hastened to one another,
to exchange bread, Wine, and above all, cigarettes,
and to make themselves as intelligible to one
another as possible. On their countenances was
depicted the feeling of happy satisfaction that they
were no longer required to shoot one another,
and the general feeling was universally expressed
that they were heartily sick of the war. The
simple human feeling of relief in no longer seeing
personal enemies in their opponents, dominated
every other feeling, and national hatred as well as
religious differences seemed suddenly hushed and
silenced with the cessation of hostilities.
Admirable self-control was shown by the Turks,

who in no way played the part of the victors, or
allowed the Greeks to feel their superiority. On
the contrary, to the gravity and dignity natural to
THE BATTLE OF DOMOKOS. 20$
the Moslems were joined a self-control and modesty

in their intercourse with their opponents, which
showed more plainly than any words that nothing
was further from their minds than their own self
glorification, or even a low estimate of the army
which they had on every occasion during the war
overcome.
.204 THE WAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
The Battles at the Furka Pass and at
the Othrys range.

On the days immediately preceding the termi
nation of hostilities the Greek Commanders were
in a very peculiar position.
After the battle of Domokos early on the 1821
of May the Crown-Prince left the Army and
went to Taratza, thence on the 19Lh of May to
Alamana, without taking any part in the contests
of these two days. The consequence of this was
not only a degree of uncertainty among the leading
Commanders, but also the outbreak of a panic in
Lamia. When the people there beheld the some
what disorganized army in retreat, a large part
of the population left the city in the belief that
all further resistance was at an end, and that the
country would now be handed over to the Turks.
THE BATTLES AT THE FURKA PASS &c. 205
In disorderly flight the inhabitants and their

vehicles mingled with the troops, penetrated their
ranks, and contributed not a little to disturb their
line of march. What the state of the Greek Army
was in this retreat from the Furka Pass, can be
seen from the following occurrence.
On the 18Lh of May the 49 Regiment of
Infantry had received orders to occupy the Pass on
the Othrys ridge near the convent of Andinitza.
\Vhether from want of time or of skill, the order
was not executed, for when the Regiment arrived
on the spot, they found the Turks already in
possession. Well, the natural supposition is that
this Greek force would immediately have engaged
the enemy and endeavoured to wrest the position
from him; however, they did nothing of the kind
but took to their heels as soon as they got sight
of their enemy. As had happened several times
in this wretched campaign, the men flung away
their arms to hasten their flight, and in Wild haste
the whole Regiment ran down the heights to
Lamia, situated in the plain of Spercheios at a
distance of about 12 to 15 miles.
It seems that there was no pursuit on the
part of the Turks, nevertheless the breathless
fugitives every where spread the false report, that the
enemy was at their heels. An indescribable con
fusion immediately ensued and it is even reported

that the soldiers came to blows with the inhabitants.
Even the Head-Quarters at Lamia were contaminated
with the panic, and fled to the Pass of Thermopylae;
but after a few hours, finding that their alarm had
been groundless, they returned to Lamia. Meanwhile
Colonel Smolenski had arrived there from Surphi,
and it was owing to his merit alone that some
thing like order was restored.
In accordance with the Crown-Prince’s orders,
the Army meanwhile uninterruptedly continued
its retreat behind the Othrys range of mountains,
and beyond as far as the Pass of Thermopylae;
this defile still affords, albeit less than in ancient
times, a valuable position, whence the road to Athens
could be defended. It is protected on the one
side by the swampy lowlands encircling the gulf
of Lamia and on the other by mountains that
can only be crossed by bridle paths; to force this
passage would undoubtedly require a very great
numerical superiority.
The engagements at the Furka Pass on the
182‘ of May, and by the spurs of the Othrys range
of the 1921 of May were mere rearguard afiairs; it
was no part of the traditions of the Greek Commanders
to offer any lengthy resistance; all they aimed at,
was to give the main army a start in advance
THE BATTLE AT THE FURKA PASS &c. 207
and thus enable it to reach and occupy the Pass

of Thermopylae.
Nevertheless it made anything but a favourable
impression that the Head-Quarters of the Crown
Prince were moved so far to the rear (as far as
Alamana) that its communication with the Army
suffered by it.
Referring to this circumstance, one of the
English War-Correspondents closed his report of
these events as follows: “His Royal Highness
endeavoured to reach Alamana as soon as possible
and from there he published to the world one of
the saddest episodes in the history of modern
Greece”.
According to their own statements the Greeks
lost at Domokos 600 killed and wounded; the
loss of the Turks may be assumed to have been
three times as heavy.
The English reporter does full justice to the
cool courage and presence of mind of the young
Greek soldiers, but on the other hand all accounts
of the incidents in the Turkish attack agree, that
the Turks discharged the diflicult tasks set them
with a devotion and endurance truly heroic. After
a march of fifteen to twenty miles, without making
any lengthy rest or taking a regular meal, the
several Divisions advanced to attack a position
which was strongly fortified and commanded the

plain that had to be crossed. This position was
held by a numerous artillery force, that had
had sufficient time to distribute its guns with skill,
to measure the distances, and to utilize the most
suitable cover, from which the march of the enemy
could be watched and a destructive fire brought
to bear upon him.
Under these circumstances the Turkish Artillery
had to open fire at a distance of about 3800 yards,
so as to support their Infantry and enable it to
approach the enemy’s position to within effective
range.
The first planting of the Turkish Battery, its
subsequent advance and the direction of its fire
does high credit to the Turkish Artillery and
proves that Officers and men speedily adapted
themselves to the requirements of modern warfare.
It is well known, that in times of peace the
Turkish Artillery rarely has opportunity of target
practice, the training of the men being restricted
to drilling and manoeuvring.
Influenced by the sense of his further defeat
the Crown-Prince telegraphed to the Czar, entreating
his intervention to secure an armistice from the
enemy who was four times his superior in numbers.
The Emperor Nicholas immediately complied by
sending a personal telegram to the Sultan, appealing

to the humanity and love of peace of the Grand
Turk in the kindest and most flattering terms.
Abdul Hamid’s reply to the Czar was couched
in terms of gratitude and thanks, and the request
was added that the Czar would use his good
offices in the conclusion of peace. Immediately
afterwards Edhem Pasha was ordered to suspend
hostilities.
This telegraphic correspondence between Athens,
St. Petersburg, Constantinople, and the Turkish
Head-Quarters was carried on with praiseworthy
expedition up to noon on May the 192‘. On the
afternoon of that day the Nomarch of Lamia
received from Athens the news of the conclusion
of the armistice. Meanwhile on the 18Lh of May
the Home-Secretary M. Theotoky and the Minister
of Religion M. Eutaxias had arrived at Lamia
commissioned by government to address the troops,
to encourage them to hold their own, reminding
them of the heroic achievements of their ancestors
and to urge them with inspiring words valiantly
to defend the historic Pass of Thermopylae.
Colonel Smolenski, who in recognition of his
eminent services had been promoted to the rank
of General, according to orders received advanced
from Surpi and Halmyros and joined the main
14
210 THE WAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND GRECE.
body of the Army on the 182 of May. To him

the Crown-Prince entrusted the command of the
troops told off to defend the historic defile.
The Greek Commanders were to some extent
perplexed and embarrassed ever since the day
when Head-Quarters had been moved to the rear
as far as Alamana, and communication between it
and the several Sections of the Army had to
some extent been rendered more difficult. Add
to that the rash and hasty retreat of the Army,
the irresolute defence of the rear-guard on the
191h of May in the Othrys mountains, the panic
of Lamia, and the uncertainty prevailing with
respect to the armistice, the conclusion of which
was anxiously looked for by all who knew that
negotiations were in progress.
When the longed for news arrived at the
Othrys mountains, the Turkish Head-Quarters
returned at once on the evening of the 1921 of
May to Domokos, where the armistice concluded
early on the 20Lh of May was published.
The text of the agreement arrived at between
the Officers delegated by both sides was as follows:
“There is to be an armistice of 17 days’ duration,
which may be prolonged after the expiration of
this period. A neutral zone 800 metres (= abt.
866 yds.) wide to separate the two belligerent
THE BATTLES AT THE FURICA PASS &c. 2II
armies is to be determined within two days; its

limits shall be laid down by two Officers of the
General-Staff of each party, assisted by the military
attachés of the foreign powers”.
“During the armistice neither army is to execute
any movement either to the front or towards the
flanks”.
The Greek delegates were joined by the French
military attaché at Athens, Major Baron von
WimpEen. On the side of the Turks the indefatig
able Seifullah Pasha together with some Officers
were added to the Commission, whieh entered 011
its labours on the 211t of May. The first measure
taken was to occupy the approaches to the zone
with regular and well disciplined troops. Lamia,
being within the neutral zone, was occupied by
neither army. —— Next it was determined to
remove the Garibaldians, who had, beyond dispute,
fought bravely at Domokos, and lost 300 men, but
were on the 1893 of May, in the contest at the
rear, disgracefully left in the lurch by the Greeks,
so that they had man for man to cut their way
through the Turks, by whom they already were
partially surrounded. In consequence of this, great
tension existed between these volunteers and the
Greek troops, which nearly led to conflicts between
them in the last hours of the war.
14'
The battle on the 19Lh of May, which was

the concluding act of the contests in Thessaly
and cost the Turks about 300 dead and wounded,
had evidently been entered upon by the Greeks for
the purpose of retaining as much ground as
possible before the approaching cessation of hostili
ties and then to await the conclusion of the
armistice in some position in front of Lamia, thus
enabling them to retain possession of the town.
This position would moreover have facilitated the
retreat of the Army to Thermopylae and checked
the enemy from pursuing too eagerly; all this, of
course, on the assumption that the longed-for
cessation of hostilities would arrive in time to
prevent a catastrophe.
It actually all turned out as the Greeks had
planned and anticipated.
It was from an exaggerated regard for the

enemy that the Turkish Chief of the General Staff
ordered the suspension of hostilities as soon as he
received the Greek Officer bearing the white flag,
instead of allowing the battle to continue till the
Commander-in-Chief had given his consent and
issued the necessary orders. Ere that could have
taken place, the Greek rear-guard would presumably
have been hurled back with broken ranks upon
Lamia, and a vigorous pursuit would have put the

Turks in possession of the town.
A short study of the operations in Thessaly
leads to the following conclusion:
There were three distinct phases of the war,
each comprising a series of contests for the possession
of a portion of the country.
The first phase began with the offensive assumed
on the 15E!1 of April by the Greek regular army,
and ended with the retreat upon Larissa and the
occupation of the positions at Pharsalus and at
Pilav-Tepe-Velestinos. — The second phase com
prised the advance of the Turks from Larissa
(2 5&1 of April) to Pharsalus, the battles at that
place and at Velestinos, the retreat of the main
army of the Greeks to Domokos and of Smolenski’s
detachment to Halmyros, and the occupation of
Volos on the 82‘ of May. — The third phase
terminates with the battle of Domokos on the 172
of May, the retreat to the Furka-Pass and thence
to the Othrys mountains, where the Greeks offered
their last resistance.
The Greek Army had entered on the campaign
very inadequately prepared. There had been no
regular mobilisation, the troops had been sent to
the frontier without provision being made to replace
losses by new recruits; the communications between
the different corps'were very defective, the men

were scantily equipped, and Officers were few.
Moreover from the very beginning of the war the
Greek Army along the Thessalian frontiers was
split up into two nearly equal halves, separated
from each other by several days’ march in an
impracticable mountainous district. The forces
that each of these sections had placed in its front
line were spread cordon-fashion over a distance
of nearly 200 miles. Such an array along the
frontier was fitted neither for taking the offensive
nor for offering a determined defence; hence followed,
as a matter of course, blundering orders about the
defences of the mountain passes. Inferior to the
Turks numerically, split up into small bodies and
without subaltern officers, it was no wonder that
the Greeks were every where dogged by ill success,
in spite of the strong defensive positions they
occupied; nevertheless it is but just to dwell on
the cool courage and resolution of the soldiers
individually.
The time has not yet come for an opinion to
be passed on the conduct of the war as a whole.
What errors it can be charged with can be dis
cussed some time hence, but there can be no
doubt that the ill successes are primarily due to
the unhappy appointments to the highest posts of
command. These apportionments of responsibility form

an interesting chapter in the history of the campaign,
but although it is as yet impossible to pass a
final opinion upon them, still from a comparison
of known facts, it is clear that the authorities
either did not, or would not, know what is of
supreme moment in the conduct of a war. Many
a time the Greek Commanders did not know,
which was head and which was tail. At present
this possibly may be known, but for how long?
Since the war the government has been constantly
urged to entrust Constantine Smolenski with the
Chief Command, he alone being capable of saving
the honour of Greece in the field; and this demand
has, at length, been complied with. Rallis’ Cabinet
was forced, in order to recover some of its popu
larity, to appoint the hero of Reweni and Velestinos
to be Commander-in-Chief; pari passu with this
agitation the attacks on the Princes were carried
on after the war. The achievements of the Daily
Press since the war, aiming at the degradation of
the Monarchy, seem to other nations incredible;
e: g: An Athens paper with a wide circulation
brought out a caricature under the title: “Utilisation
of the railway in war”. It represented a train
laden with poultry, vegetables, and all sorts of
kitchen utensils, alluding to the escape of the
Crown -Prince’s baggage at the retreat from

Pharsalus. The insolent comic paper “Romios”,
written in doggerel, went so far as to represent a
puppet in Greek costume running away from
Edhem Pasha putting his thumb to his nose; and
the accompanying rhymes always ended in the
refrain: “Pursue away, you won’t catch me; I
can run faster than you”. The final hit was a
pertinent allusion to the Greek victory in the
foot-race of the previous year at Marathon. With
out any jest, but brutally and seriously, Mr. Philaritos,
a Thessalian M. P. wrote to the “Empros” demand
ing the deposition of the Crown-Prince from his
post if it was really intended to continue the
war, and he contradicted the official account that
in the battle of Pharsalus the Crown-Prince had
fought in the foremost ranks; this front rank, he
asserted, was the window of a house in Pharsalus
belonging to a family of the name of Kutsubei;
from there the Prince followed the battle, armed
with an excellent telescope. But the press did not
restrict itself to this agitation. Even papers which
were by no means opposed to the head of the
Cabinet of the day on principle reproved him
with having, spite of his past history and his
promises, accommodated himself to Court politics
and abandoned an independent, national, and war
like policy. The “Akropolis” reminded M. Rallis,

that he had begun so promisingly by dismissing
the Kings’ Adjutant in the antechamber; this
Officer having come to be present at a meeting
of the Cabinet, according to a practice introduced
by Delyannis. Since that first day however, the
paper alleged, the Ministers’ conscience seemed to
have been lulled to sleep.
That an army that had no successes whatever
to record, that had only received orders to retreat,
and even had to abandon to the enemy well
chosen and well prepared positions, such as for
example those at Larissa and Velestinos, should at
last have lost all moral cohesion and force is not
to be wondered at.
The Greek and Turkish Operations.

The Turkish Operations were carefully con
sidered, and carried out wisely and consistently,
although there could be observed a certain amount
of tardiness and hesitation, justified by circum
stances. At first the Commander-in-Chief was
restricted in his fredom of action, owing to in
fluences at work at Constantinople and to the
mission of Osman Pasha; but when Edhem Pasha
was allowed a free hand, he proved himself an
excellent Commander. He had concentrated on
the line of operations against Thessaly a force
numerically superior, and in his advance he kept
it well in hand and carefully instructed the several
Commanders of independent Army-sections as to
the objects they were to aim at. It is quite true
that he aimed more at dislodging than at destroying
the enemy.
THE GREEK AND TURKISH OPERATIONS. 219
This fault was particularly evident from the

fact that the principal attack of the Turks was delivered
by their right wing, instead of operating in the
main with their re-inforced left wing against the
right wing of the Greeks, where their communication
with the sea lay. Tactically Edhem Pasha would
have acted more wisely, if he had kept his enemy
busy in front at Pharsalus and meanwhile advanced
with a strong force accompanied by a sufficient
force of Cavalry and Artillery against the left
wing of the Greeks, to bar their retreat on the
road to Domokos, and thus force them away from
the direct communications with their base.
When, after the battle of Domokos, the further
pursuit of the enemy would have led to the same
result, namely, cutting ofi their retreat, the Greeks,
as has already been mentioned, had wisely provided
against such a contingency, by opening negotiations
for an armistice; accordingly it was impossible
strategically to exploit the tactical advantages
gained on the field.
As for details, the Turkish Army, animated by
the best spirit, fought on every occasion with the
coolest courage and devotion, which was all the
more creditable as they mostly had to assault
positions strongly intrenched and energetically
defended.
Had the whole Infantry, not only one Brigade,

been armed and drilled with the Mauser-rifle of
7.65 mm (= 8/10 in.) the losses on the Turkish
side would have been much less. The Gras-rifle
firing more slowly and of shorter range was on
a level with the Henry-Martini-rifle used by the
Turkish Infantry. Its furthest range was 1000
metres (nearly 1 100 yards); the Artillery was about
equal on both sides, i: e: they had Krupp guns,
but the ammunition was deficient. The fuses
were not always correctly timed, and their skill
in taking aim was deficient in both armies, as
was evident from the fact, that in the field-hospitals
only one per cent of the wounded were suffering
from wounds caused by shells.
_ In neither army was the Cavalry equal to its
task, principally because of the inferior quality of
the horses; nevertheless the Turkish horse was
employed in the modern tactical method of acting
.en masse and in scouting duty. The Turkish
Commissariat service was adequate, especially as
the men are abstemious and have few wants (their
daily rations consisting of 2 50 grams — a little over
.8 oz. — of flour per man) and a great number of
beasts of burden followed the troops. Every
Turkish Battalion has 200 horses allotted to it,
and every battery 15o horses; these have to carry
THE GREEK AND TURKISH OPERATIONS. 22f
all the store of ammunition, the baggage, the

tents, and the Officers’ luggage. These light
mobile columns were uninterruptedly on the move
and incessantly brought to the front the needful
provisions from Larissa, where the Greek Govern
ment had collected large stores of flour.
The Greek train service was in a sad plight;
every thing had to be improvised on the spur of
the moment, and the system collapsed in presence
of the rapid retreats of the Army and the total
absence of all preparation.
As for the hospital-service the Ottoman Bank
supplied an ambulance, which contained 220 beds
and was set up Larissa. Valuable service was
rendered to the Greeks by the Red Cross Society
of Greece, as well as by a section of the Red Cross
Society of Germany, with an equipment of 100 beds,
who were at work for three weeks in Hagia Marina
near Stylis. The German section consisted of two
Superior Physicians, six Sisters of Mercy and two
Hospital Assistants. They succoured on the whole
about 300 wounded.
The War in Epirus.

In the western theatre of War, in Epirus,
Turkey was forced by the nature of the country
to act on the defensive. Offensive warfare would
have led to no real result, and would only have
brought the army to the gulf of Corinth, without
producing any effect on the general march of
events. The main decisive position, in southern
Epirus, is that of Prevesa, and the positions of
Strivena and Pente Pigaddia are important. The
Turkish fortress of Prevesa is situated north of
the narrow defile leading to the gulf of Arta
which penetrates deep into the country and partly
separates Acarnania from Epirus. Opposite Prevesa
lies Actium on the coast, which is slightly fortified,
but Prevesa, in consequence of its position, is a
strong fortress. It is situated on a peninsula,
which is separated from the main land by swamps,
that can be crossed only by the road to Yanina.
THE WAR IN EPIRUS. 223
On this peninsula which on the whole is flat lies

a single ridge of heights, which commands the
whole country and was held by Turkish artillery.
The town itself and the main forts Hamidié,
Pantocrato, St. George and Paleosarago lie on
the flat beach by the isthmus, where the enemy
could not hold any positions worth considering,
seeing that the towering ridge of heights held by
the Turks fully commanded the place. The town
and the forts are enveloped as with a mantle by
an old dense grove of olives.
The chief towns of Epirus, where the Greek
population preponderates are Yanina, Berat, and
Korita. The principal fortress of the Greeks in
Acarnania is Arta; the outworks surrounding it
north and south make the place a comparatively
strong point (1’ appui.
The town of Arta, an old paltry, dirty hole,
but possessed of an imposing Turkish castle, lies
on the plain on the banks of the river Arachtos
or Arta, which flows in a semicircle round the
town and falls further south into the gulf of Arta.
South of Arta rises a ridge of hills to the height
of about 500 ft. which stretches along the left
bank of the Arta almost up to Kobrina. Extensive
old barracks are situated on this height, and in
front of these the Greeks had planted several
batteries of 3.4” guns and one battery of two 4” guns.

One battery was directed upon tbe bridge of Arta,
two upon Imaret and one upon Gremenitza. Oppo
site, on the Turkish side lay Imaret, Gremenitza
and Vlacherna upon the hill-slopes, which gradually
ascend towards the north. All were occupied by
Turkish Artillery and troops, perfectly commanding
the town and the Greek batterries. To counter
balance these disadvantages the Greeks on their
side had planted two batteries at Peta and
Markinada.
Since the middle of March Achmed Fevzy, a
Turkish General of Division, lay at the head of
28,000 men at Yanina, the capital of the country.
The first Division and the Staff were at Yanina,
and the second Division in the south in Luros
and Pente Pigadhia. On the whole the Turkish
Commander had at his disposal 32 Battalions of
Infantry (9 of which belonged to regiments of the
line), 8 Batteries of Mountain Artillery, and 5
squadrons of Cavalry.
At the outbreak of the war the Turks had in
front of Arta 7000 men and 12 guns, at Plaka
and Syraku 4000 men, at Pente Pigadhia 12,000
men, and in Yanina 5000 men.
The Greeks had under the command of Colonel
Manos in Arta 4 Regiments of Infantry (Nos. 6, 9,
1o, 12), 2 Battalions of Rifles (1 and 3), the second

Regiment of Cavalry, 2 field and 3 Mountain
Batteries. They were subsequently re-inforced by
3000 men (reserves and territorial troops), and
2000 Volunteers; thus Colonel Manos had altogether
at his disposal a force of about 16,000 men.
The two centres of the operations on the Greek
side were Arta and Peta, both connected by the
valley of the Arta; the line of communications for
the supply of provisions and materials of war
began at the port of Capraena. The Greek forces
were mainly concentrated at Arta, where 5000
men were assembled; in the village of Peta, situated
on an elevation at a distance of about 21/2 miles,
3000 men were placed. A second line of defence
extended from Comboti to Bani (near the gulf of
Arta), being a distance of about 71/2 miles, and
was occupied by 6 to 8000 men. To defend the
passages of the river and to cover the movements
of the army in case of war, a force of 3 to 4000
men was placed on the left bank of the river.
The line of forts from Arta to Peta was held
by 30 guns, mostly mountain artillery; the total
artillery force amounted to 68 guns. On the
whole the positions of the Greeks were chosen
and armed well; they were excellently well occu
pied and at the same time commanded several
15
Turkish positions. According to the estimate of

the Greeks the Turkish forces amounted to no
more than 22,000 men with 48 guns, 3000 of
whom were said to hold the fortress of Prevesa
with 24 guns. This fort is situated at the straits
of Prevesa leading into the gulf of Arta. Kiapha
and Philippiada formed the base of operations of
the Turkish Army on the right bank of the river
Arta, together with a position fronting the Greek
position at Arta as far as Peta. The téte du pont
at Arta the Turks held with a Battalion of
Albanians (1000 men). Another Battalion was
posted at a distance of about 4 miles from the
bridge, and was part of the force that had its
centre at Imaret and extended as far as Gremenitza
to within a distance of about 2000 yards from the
Greek frontier. The third line of defence, that
was to protect the road to Yanina, was at Pente
Pigadhia. The Greek forces were further streng
thened by large numbers of insurgents, who had
been equipped by the National League (Ethnike
Hetairia) and were commanded by men of distinc
tion and of wealth. Their Commander-in-Chief
was Skaltsodimos, former member for Agrinion
under the Trikupis ministry. All the insurgents
had a uniform of their own, but did not form part
of the regular army.
As in Thessaly so in Epirus the Turks took

the initiative and on the 18Lh of April opened
hostilities, with a three days’ bombardment of
Arta, having planted on the heights northwest of
the town a battery of sixteen 3.5” guns and during
the day maintained a hot fire for several hours.
This fire was so effective that the report spread
it was directed by German Officers.
This hot artillery fire against Arta was also
intended to prepare the way for the assault on
the bridge over the Arta and on the town itself.
On the 20311 of April at 4 o’clock in the morning,
all the Turkish Batteries planted against the town
poured shot upon the Greek intrenchments, and at
the same time a rapid rolling fire was kept up
from the rifle pits dug along the banks of the
river, and a passage over it was attempted at one
spot so as to draw away the attention of the
Greeks; but as the defenders were equally strong
the attempt failed. A stronger Turkish section
advancing against the bridge was also repulsed,
and the heroic and devoted courage of the attack
ing party, who lost several officers, led to no
result.
Towards midnight of the 27115 of April the
Turks made a third assault on the bridge which
was so bravely defended. The Turks had hoped
15'
228 THE WAR BETW'EEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
to succeed by surprising the enemy, but they

failed; the Batteries near them had supported the
advancing columns, but the attacking party mean
while returned to their positions under cover of
night. On the next morning towards 10 o’clock
an Albanian signalled to the Greeks, that the
Turks had withdrawn during the night and had
evacuated the neighbouring villages as well as the
fortresses. As a matter of fact the attacking
parties had gone back to Philippiada to occupy
the pass there, and had abandoned all the country
in front of it. When the retreat was made known
the country-people, who in that locality were
mostly Greeks, streamed into Arta and gave
expression to their joy at the departure of the
Turks. The Greek flag was hoisted over the
Batteries and on the Turkish custom-house, which
was stormed by the people. There were scenes
of the most boisterous and tumultuous enthusiasm,
as 4000 Greek troops took possession of the
Batteries and intrenchments, erected by the Turks
for the bombardment. All abandoned themselves
to the thought and to the hope that Turkish rule
in Epirus was at an end. The cry “Up to Yanina!”
was raised in loud exultation, and the mass of
country people, easily excited, believed that the
success gained was the first step for the liberation
of Epirus. The three days’ bombardment of Arta

by the Turks had produced no efl'ect worth naming;
only a few shots had reached the town and of
these the greater number did not explode.
Colonel Manos immediately ordered the pursuit
of the enemy; with a part of his Division he
crossed the Arta at Bani and turned towards
Philippiada, whilst a Brigade and 1500 Volunteers
occupied Strivena situated about 12 miles south
of the Pentepigadia pass. The Turkish Brigade,
that till then had lain before Arta, retired towards
the Luro; there leaning on the town of Philippiada
they awaited the attack of the Greeks on the 22911
of April. After a short fight, where the Turks
lost several hundred men and some guns they fell
back upon the defile of Pentepigadia, which was
in a position strongly fortified by nature. On the
2 311 of April Manos occupied Philippiada and at the
same time news arrived, that fort Imaret, the
strongest Turkish fort, opposite Arta was no longer
able to hold out. The news of the retreat to the
Pentepigadia Pass and the abandonment of the
country up to that important point caused the
liveliest dissatisfaction in Constantinople. Orders
were sent to Yanina immediately to send re
inforcements to the important defile of Pentepigadia
which commanded the road to Yanina, and also to
form two new Divisions for the scene of war in

Epirus. The report was spread that Achmed
Fevzy, the Commander-in-Chief of that district was
to be recalled. In Yanina the greatest excitement
prevailed in consequence of a mutiny having broken
out among the Albanian troops, which drew the
attention of the military authorities away from the
operations of the war. This circumstance was of
great advantage to the attacking forces. On the
2311 and 242 of April fresh collisions took place
between the troops of Colonel Manos and several
Turkish sections, that had been pushed forward in
the pass, but without any effect on the general
state of affairs. The operations of those days can
be summarized thus: the Greeks confidently trusting
that their military operations would be supported
by an insurrection of the people, had intrenched
themselves near the entrance of the pass, and
were endeavouring to distract the attention and
the forces of the Turks by making simultaneous
attacks in different places.
The reports of engagements near Pentepigadia
on the days from the 27Lh to the 302 of April at
present obtainable are still somewhat confused and
contradictory.
The Correspondent of the “Daily News”, who
was a spectator on the Greek side and was an
THE WAR OF EPIRUS. 23 1
eye-witness of several events, describes the scene

of the combats in the following words:
“Two roads through the mountains encircling
the gulf of Arta lead from the south to Yanina
The one crosses the valley of the Luro from
Prevesa to Philippiada; it is a practicable road,
available for military operations. The other road
leads from Arta via Hanopulos, Kommuzadis, and
Karvassaras to Pentepigadia, situated in the defile
of Pentepigadia. Beyond Hanopulos the road is
very difficult, but affords strong positions on both
sides. The two roads unite at the fort of Pente
pigadia, which is situated at the termination of the
pass. At about half a league south of the fort
the two military roads leading to Yanina are
united by a deep transverse valley separating two
lofty eminences, from both of which the valley is
flanked by high mountain-ridges.
After five days’ skirmishing the Greeks had
pushed forwards as far as Pentepigadia, had occu
pied it, and their forces stood somewhat scattered
in the long and narrow mountain pass intending
to advance upon Yanina and hoist the Greek
Standard there, as soon as Preveza should have
fallen into their possession.
In consequence of their forces being thus
scattered a Battalion, which had been pushed for
ward as far as the village of Kondozaki was

surprized by the Turks on the 242 of April and
all but destroyed; the Battalion losing 300 killed,
200 wounded, and 60 prisoners. On the 27311 of
April the Greeks were posted in a naturally strong
position, east of the military road crossing the
pass in the neighbourhood of Hanopulos; but it
was commanded by the fire of the Turks from
the densely wooded mountain ridge at the end of
the cleft of the valley. The key of the Greek
position was a flat-topped hill, which formed in a
manner a natural intrenchment against a Turkish
attack and being strongly occupied was very
advantageous to the Greeks.
Colonel Bozzaris held this position with 6000
men; 3000 men with 6 guns were in Kumuzadis
and at a distance of 2 km. (: 11/4 miles); and to
the south of this were 1000 men more with 8 guns.
The reserve, 1600 men and 4 guns, was posted in
the village of Karvassara. A few slight collisions
took place on the 2711 of April, but on the 28!1
and 29Lll of April sanguinary conflicts ensued
consequent on the aggressive advance of the Turks.
These contests began in the morning hours of
the 28311 of April. They were commenced by the
attack of a Turkish Brigade on the position of
Bozzaris near Hanopulos, which however led to no
THE WAR 1N EPIRUS. 2 33,
result. The Brigade, consisting of 4000 men and

some Artillery had several times attempted to
storm the ridge of hills defended by 600 Evzones
and 400 men of other Greek troops with two guns, and
600 moreEvzoneswith two gunsheldthe middle heights.
It was evident that the Greek defenders of the ridge
were in urgent need of reinforcements, as the Turkish
attack was made with great resolution. It would have
been exceedingly easy to send reinforcements, as the
Greeks had 6500 men aud 30 guns between Hanopulos
and their advanced position. Strangely enough
no reinforcements arrived at the front, and there
fore the Turks renewed their musketry-fire in the
morning hours of the 2911 of April, and this lasted
the whole forenoon. In the afternoon the firing
increased in intensity, and it was obvious that the
Turks were preparing for a vigorous attack. For
unexplained reasons the Greek Artillery placed on
the heights had meanwhile ceased firing, and when
at half past three the Turks suddenly opened a
rapid Infantry fire and concentrated their columns
in front of the right wing of the Greeks preparatory
for an assault, the Greek guns on the middle
heights also were silent and moved off after 20
minutes, intending to return to Hanopulos with all
speed. The Evzones on the ridge of the hills
bravely replied to the murderous fire of their
aggressors and manfully stood their ground against

a tenfold superior force till 5 o’clock, losing 100
men; then however they were driven down the
slope. Even now they kept up a fire upon the
pursuing Turks; these however had meanwhile
seized the ridge and poured their withering fire
upon the Greek position on the middle heights.
Now it was all over, a universal retreat was
sounded, and at 5.15 all the positions were abandoned
and the Turks pursued the retreating Evzones as
far as Hanopulos. The Greek officers in vain
attempted to arrest the headlong retrograde move
ment of their men. The troops crowded to the
bridge, but found on approach, that the road was
blocked by thousands of sheep and by the country
people; so rapidly had the panic spread. Among
the Greek troops, already deeply shaken, and
among the peasantry of the district, this energetic
attack produced inevitable discouragement and
inextricable confusion. The disorder was all the
worse, because herds of cattle were mingled with
the crowds of human beings, and the columns of
vehicles fleeing from the abandoned villages con
tributed their share in delaying and blocking the
march of the troops. The bridge over the Arta
which had previously been the starting point
of the Greek Offensive is a stone structure, barely
more than 3 yards wide, resting on three arches

supported by pillars. The side walls of the bridge
are so high that crossing it the traveller passes
as through a defile. The river at this place is of
no great Width and without any perceptible current.
The result of the engagements on the 282 and
29Lh of April was, that on the 302 not a single
Greek soldier was left on Turkish soil. The whole
Army of Colonel Manos, also known as the third
Division, was disorganized by the ill success of
the offensive movement beyond the Arta and
weakened by heavy losses. The bombardment
of Preveza and the small fortress of Niopolis had
led to no result. Nevertheless new plans were
entertained by the Greek Commanders in Epirus.
On the 3311 of May, 2500 Epirote volunteers organised
by the family Botzaris started from Athens to the
Piraeus, thence to be conveyed to Epirus. At
their head marched a Greek “Maid of Orleans” as
standardbearer in volunteer uniform, with crossed
cartridge belts and black cap. Her name was
Helen Constandini; she was 17 years of age and
was known to be an excellent shot, rarely missing
her mark. She pretended to be the patron-saint
of this troop filled with hatred of the Turks.
The operations on the Thessalian frontier having
met with such poor success, the Greek Army
having already been forced back to the Othrys

range, the material losses suffered there, the
occupation of Volo, the hasty retreat to Domokos,
the slow but sure advance of the main Turkish
Army morally exalted by the successes they had
gained, roused in the Greek Government the desire
to put an end to hostilities by invoking diplomatic
aid to secure an armistice. But before its conclusion
it was desirable to secure at least in Epirus some
compensating advantages for the province of
Thessaly which was lost and especially to take the
fortresses of Preveza and Nicopolis, which had
already been bombarded for some time. With
this intention the Prime Minister Ralli enquired
of Colonel Manos, if a resumption of the contest
in Epirus would afford some prospect of success,
and if a renewal of the struggle was possible
when the Turks were in possession of all Thessaly.
Colonel Manos is understood to have answered
this enquiry affirmatively.
Thereupon reinforcements of men were called
up, troops were raised and supplied with ammuni
tion, so as to improve the position as much as
possible during the negotiations and to secure one
or two material guarantees. With this object in
view Manos drew up his plan of campaign, the
chief aim of which was, to prevent the arrival of
THE WAR IN EPIRUS. 2 37
Turkish re-inforcements to interrupt the com

munications between the Capital Yanina and
Preveza and Nikopolis, to deprive the enemy as
soon as possible of some point of strategic importance,
and to keep possession of the road which unites
the Capital of Epirus with the two little fortified
towns Preveza and Nikopolis, situated at the extreme
southern end of the province and commanding the
entrance to the Gulf of Arta.
Comparing the reports of different correspondents,
the following may be accepted as a fairly accurate
account of the events consequent on the renewed
offensive movements of the Greeks. It was on the
1221, 1321, and 14Lh of May in the district between
the rivers Luro and Arta, which is crossed by the
great Arta and Yanina highway and contains some
strong mountain ranges with broad tops and
woodlands, fronted by open depressions and valleys,
and affording admirable defensive positions, that
these conflicts took place.
On the afternoon of the 122 of May, Colonel
Bairaktaris advanced with a column, consisting of
a Brigade of Infantry, three squadrons of cavalry,
and two Batteries, against the heights of Imaret
and there had slight skirmishes with the enemy.
At the same time a second column consisting
of eight Battalions and two Batteries and commanded.
by Colonol Golfinopulos marched via Campos to

the Luro bridge, to defend it against a Turkish
advance. A third column under Colonel Doxas
was to cross the river Arta above Plaka and make
a demonstration against the Turks there.
The free corps of Marco Botzaris were ordered
to repulse any sallies from Preveza and to take
up a strong position on the road to Yanina.
Bairaktaris had received strict orders to remain
on the defensive in the fortified position assigned
to him, so as to support, if need should arise,
the Brigade Golfinopulos, advancing over the
Luro to serve as a support to the Volunteers of Epirus.
Bairaktaris however on the 1321 of May en
gaged the enemy very fiercely by attacking the
Turkish positions at Strevina, Hanopulos, and
Gremenitza.
These positions were intrenched, armed with
Artillery, and held by a Turkish force that had
lately been reinforced by 8000 men under Saad
Eddir. After a very hot Artillery contest, in
which on the Greek side the Artillery of the
forts surrounding Arta took part, the Evzones
flung themselves with an absolute contempt of
death and perfect coolness on the hostile lines,
and drove out the enemy, who with reinforcements
just received suddenly halted, in spite of the Greek
4” guns of position which now came up and

opened fire. Darkness setting in, the fight quickly
terminated. All through this battle the Greeks
marched to victory and maintained themselves
bravely and resolutely against superior forces.
When night set in a heavy mountain rain began
to fall, but this did not prevent a murderous
Artillery duel from the two hills that faced each
other, one being held by Greek, the other by
Turkish Artillery. Mountain fogs now setting in
put a stop to all further contest there.
The rain, cold, and want of food in both
camps made it a very wretched night for both
combatants.
On Friday, the 14Lh of May, at 9 o’clock
Colonel Bairaktaris having been reinforced by a
Battalion from Golfinopulos’s Brigade resumed
the Offensive.
Three columns, one from the Kiaffa pass, the
other two from further east advanced convergingly
against Hanopulos, attacking it from the front and
from the rear. The assault was begun with energy
and seemed to promise success in its first stages;
it was an awkward circumstance, that a dense fog
shrouded the heights held by the Turks, whilst all
the movements of the advancing Greeks in the
plains below could be clearly seen by the Turks.
As Bairaktaris’ attacking force deployed more and

more, two Turkish Batteries, one being a Battery
of position of 4” guns opened a cross-fire upon
the Greek columns. The Turkish position was
further strengthened by three mountain-guns, which
now directed an incessant and rapid fire upon the
Greek Artillery, which was growing ever feebler.
The fearless advance of the Greek Infantry in
close order was under these circumstances equally
unsuccessful.
The fire of the Albanian regiments lying behind
earth works, and the shells from the batteries
placed upon the ridge of the hill, hailed down upon
the attacking Evzones and battalions of Infantry,
whose courage and fortitude have been highly
appreciated and praised by the English newspaper
correspondent who was present at the battle as a
spectator.
About 4 in the afternoon a last attack was
made by all three columns of Bairaktaris’s brigade;
a deafening fire of small arms, that met a far~
reaching echo among the hills formed, as it were,
the closing scene of the battle. Then the rain
came down as from a cloud-burst, rendering the
soil of the hilly country so impassable, that the
fire gradually slackened and finally died away.
At 5 o’clock, the 3 days’ fight had come to an
THE WAR IN EPIRUS. ' 241
end. Meantime the rain poured its floods upon

the field of battle, on which the Greeks still
maintained their original position. When early on
Saturday, the 15Lh of May, after another dreadful
night, which the correspondent of the “Daily News”
paints in the liveliest colours, a survey of the
battle fields of Gribovo and Hanopulos was possible,
the Turks were seen busily at work, digging rifle
pits and raising breastworks: detached sections of
cavalry also were seen reconnoitring in the plain.
But on both sides the fiery spirit was quenched,
and their strength exhausted. From time to time
a shot was heard from the country, over which
rain and mist hung heavily. This came from
Golfinopulos’s brigade, whose exertions had been
confined to a short fight with the enemy by the
bridge of Luro.
Altho’ the Greeks had not lost much ground
during the conflict, and maintained practically the
same positions as at the beginning, Colonel Manos
gave orders in the night for a general retreat to
the Arta bridge; it took place in good order,
and without leaving guns or war material behind.
About 5 o’clock in the morning, most of the
troops had reached the places assigned to them in
the neighbourhood of Arta, out of which they had
advanced three days before when Manos undertook
16
the ofl'ensive. Single detachments still occupied

the right bank of the river.
Doxa’s brigade was sent further north to Plaka,
and was to advance thence against the Turkish
forces and threaten their communications: it did not
however, meet with any success.
The losses of the Greeks in these battles on
Turkish soil amounted to about 700 killed and
wounded, including 25 Officers killed and 100
wounded.
We have yet to inquire into the fate of Botzaris’
free corps, which, as has already been stated, had
been told off to prevent the Turkish troops locked
up in Preveza from making a sally in the direction
of Philippiada.
After these men, 3000 strong, had landed on
the :2311 of May at the mouth of the Luro escorted
by their patron-saint, they occupied a line of points
which commanded the roads leading north. They
were attacked at all the points by the Turks and
uniformly defeated, which was to be expected
considering their small numbers.
The 152' of May which terminated the contests
at Gribovo, was also the date of their last encounter.
The complete exhaustion of the combatants, who
began to run short of ammunition, set a term on
the evening of the 152 of May to the daily sallies,
which brought no advantage to either party. It

seems, that Colonel Golfinopulos had not sent to
Botzaris’ Corps the promised support, no reason
being assigned for this neglect. The whole enter
prize of the Free-Corps ended in a catastrophe.
On the night of the 162 of May as the
volunteers, spent with weariness and privations
were falling back in closed ranks to the places of
embarcation on the coast, the news suddenly spread
that they were in danger of being surrounded.
To this was added the terrible news that the boats
were not at hand. There was nothing left but to
wade through the arm of the sea which separates
Greek from Turkish territory. Now all order and
discipline were at an end; filled with terror, wet
through and starved, many of the men flung them
selves into the water to escape capture. At that
moment the sections of the garrison of Preveza, which
had been pushed forward, noticed what washappening,
and immediately directed a murderous fire upon
the fugitives, many of whom thus lost their lives
in the water.
Completely routed, without arms or baggage,
almost succumbing to the toils of the last few days,
the remnants of the Free Corps reached the trans
port-steamers decimated and in wretched condition;
they were taken to Epirus and there put on board.
16’
Botzaris’ expedition lost about 320 killed and

wounded and zoo missing.
On the whole then it may be computed that
the last three days of the campaign in Epirus cost
the Greeks a loss of 500 killed and 1000 wounded
and missing.
After the beginning of May no Greek soldier
set his foot on Turkish soil. On the 192 of May,
hostilities had become merely formal, and on the
202 a fourteen days’ armistice was concluded.
From the beginning, an evil star ruled the
campaign in Epirus. With all the tenacious courage
which the Greeks possess in a high degree, the
result was merely negative. Rarely has any war
like undertaking, so fruitless as this, been accom
panied by such heavy losses.
The fault lay for the greater part in the
mistaken conception of the situation, and the entire
absence of plan or coherence in carrying out the
military movements.
The efforts of the Greek commander in Epirus
were mainly directed to securing material guarantees
and occupying much ground. These efiorts misled
the Greeks into splitting up their forces, which
were already numerically inferior to the Turks,
especially after two additional Turkish divisions had
arrived at the scene of war.
To obtain possession of Preveza, Nicopolis,

Pentepigadia, and Yanina with the help of popular
risings friendly. to Greece was the aim and object
of Colonel Manos, who probably shared the view
of the government, that in face of the loss of
Thessaly, Epirus might be regarded as a compensa—
tion, with which to secure an exchange when peace
was concluded.
These hopes were frustrated, not only by the
faults and mistakes already referred to, but also
by the indifference and the lack of energy of the
native inhabitants, who had no intention of sharing
in any adventure Whatever.
Soon after the the conclusion of the armistice,
Colonel Manos was withdrawn from his command
in Epirus and tried by court-martial. He was
replaced by Colonel Smolenski, brother of the brave
hero of Raveni and Velestinos. The commander
of the Turkish corps in Epirus, Achmed Hifzi
Pasha, received the ribbon of the Osmanié order
set in diamonds, and the imperial greeting to him
and to his troops in recognition of their services.
Arrived at the close of the account of the events
in both centres of the war, let us look back on
the total losses of the Turkish army.
The Minister of War has specified these to be
as follows:
In Thessaly, 900 dead and 2400 wounded;

on the battlefields of Epirus, 91 dead and 264
wounded; total, 991 dead and 2664 wounded.
Among the killed were 2 Pashas, 27 Stafi officers,
and 45 superior officers; total 74, or a per centage
of 8, -— a very honourable proof of the personal
courage of the Turkish officers.
THE OPERATIONS AT SEA. 247
The Operations at Sea.

The Greek fleet gave very little or no support
whatever to the operations on land, and limited
itself to desultory enterprizes carried out with such a
lack of persistence, that they only injured the
good reputation for seamanship enjoyed by the
Greeks.
At the outbreak of hostilities the Fleet had
perfect freedom of action and every body expected
great achievements from it. With the fleet, as
with the army, the same error was committed,
namely too much sub-division.
The Western Squadron, originally consisting
of gunboats only, opened the maritime Warfare
with the bombardment of Prevesa immediately
after the commencement of hostilities in Thessaly.
The cruiser “Miaulis”, the gunboat “Basileus
Georgius”, and subsequently the iron-clad “Spetsai”,
were detached from the Eastern Squadron and
248 THE “'AR BET‘VEEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
added to that of the west. These ships undertook

the bombardment of Prevesa from the open sea,
whilst the gunboats bombarded the place from the
gulf. The bombardment resulted in a partial
destruction of the place and of several forts. On
the 182 of April a party of 700 men landed at
Vanitza on the northern shore of the gulf, to
blockade Prevesa from the landside also and to
capture it. This is the only success to be noted
of a combined action by land and by sea. Mean
while several ships were sent northwards along
the coast of Epirus. On the 212, 222, and 23511 of
of April, they bombarded the open towns of Targa,
Murto, and Haghii Saranda; the latter place facing
the northern coast of Corfu. The men landed at
Haghii Saranda, set several buildings 011 fire, and
were then forced to retreat.
The Eastern Squadron, together with several
armed merchantmen with troops on board, only
sailed from the port of Volo on the zrit of April,
that is, six days after hostilities had officially com
menced; it then bombarded the several open towns
Platamona, Lephto Karya, and Katerina, where
the Turkish Army had their depots and magazines.
Troops were landed at Lephto Karya only; they
were speedily received by a cross fire and forced
to beat a hasty retreat. Previously, on the 202, a
THE OPERATIONS AT SEA. 249
party, landed in the bay of Leftar tried to destroy

the line of railway from Dedeagatsh to Saloniki,
but it is not yet proved that the Greek fleet is
responsible for this unsuccessful attempt.
Meanwhile at Saloniki an attack of the Greek
Fleet was expected and dreaded, as they had
nothing to oppose to it but a shore battery built
in 1885. This fear was, however, groundless; the
Greeks contented themselves with a hasty bombard
ment on the 242 of Karabrunn, a fort situated at
the entrance of the gulf.
Once a Greek torpedoboat plucked up courage
to go reconnoitring to Saloniki, the weakest point
of the Turkish base of operations, but the fleet
itself never appeared and was only once seen on
the 24Lh of April off Cape Kassandra. The only
advantage the Greeks derived from their fleet was
the transport of Smolenski’s troops on the 18$.h of
May from Nea Minzella to Stylis; moreover it took
on board the remnant of a corps of troops and
irregulars which were landed in Epirus, defeated
on the river Luros, and forced back to the coast.
Since that time nothing more was heard of the
operations of the Eastern Squadron. The flotilla
of torpedoboats under the command of Prince
George, which had steamed out of Skiathos with
sealed orders belonged to it! In spite of . the
2 50 THE WAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
Eastern Squadron being much the superior of the

two, it had performed still less than the sister
squadron, and it seems as if the evident superiority
of the Greeks at sea was not destined to lead to
any result.
Successes might have been gained, if Greek
courage had kept pace with Greek vauntings.
Even if the purposeless division of the fleet into
two sections be accepted, the Eastern Squadron
had at its disposal two landing places pointed out
by nature and by circumstances, viz: Dedeagatsh
and jalimly on the Bura G01. The former being
a place on the coast and the junction of two lines
of railway, it would have been possible, by a
thorough destruction of the lines of railway, to
interrupt the traffic on the very important Con
stantinople-Saloniki line for a considerable time,
and at the same time it was to be expected that
great damage would be done to the Turks by the
destruction of the stores they had collected there.
A landing at Jalimly would also have imperilled
that line of railway close by the shore and might
have been the next best object to be aimed at.
At neither of these two points would the Greeks
have met with the smallest opposition, either on
land or sea.
The Western Squadron also ought to have
THE OPERATIONS AT SEA. 2 51'
kept two points steadily in view, viz: the taking

of Prevesa jointly with the troops that had been.
landed, and putting a force on shore at Saghiada,
opposite Corfu. Had the Greeks established them
selves with a more considerable force at this latter
place and thereby threatened Yanina, they would
have gained the advantage of affording indirect
support to Colonel Manos’ advance, and at the
same time forming a nucleus for the ill-affected
population which was ready to rise.
On the 521 of June the armistice 'at sea was
also signed in the following terms:
1. The Greek Fleets to leave Ottoman Waters,
according to the limits settled by the law of nations.
2. Ships under Turkish or neutral flags, coming
from or proceeding to Turkish ports, as well as
those which happen to be within the line drawn
by the armistice, must not be examined.
3. These ports must not be used for the pur
pose of transporting troops, or ammunition, to the
Turkish army.
4. The Turkish fleet is forbidden to come out
side the Dardanelles.
5. No reinforcements are to be sent to the
garrisons of any of the islands of the archipelago.
At the same time or perhaps earlier — our infor
mation does not enable us to settle this point with
any degree of certainty — the Greek Government,

having informed the representatives of the Powers
that Turkey had demanded the raising of the
blockade, had been advised by all the ambassadors
but one, to yield to the demand. The Austrian
Chargé d’Affaires had as yet received no instructions,
but no doubt was entertained that they would be
in accord with those of the other representatives
of the Powers. A subsequent despatch from
Athens brought the news that the conditions of
the raising of the blockade had been accepted by
the Greek negotiators; one condition, conceding
freedom of navigation in the gulf of Arta, having
been added.
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 2 5 3.
The Conclusion of Peace.

Immediately after the conclusion of the armistice,
negotiations were entered upon by the belligerents,
the six Great Powers of Europe participating; but
the progress in these negotiations by no means
kept pace with the progress of events in the war.
It was no easy task which the mediating powers
undertook, when they arrested the arm of Turkey
in her victorious march, and declared that the
restoration of peace between her and Greece was
a matter of European concern.
The terms of peace, which the conqueror in
the full consciousness of his victory thought him
self obliged to impose, were immediately found to
be unacceptable. The Powers could not concede
the retrocession of Thessaly to Turkey with the
frontiers of 1881, as this would have been contrary
to the principle of maintaining the territorial status
guo ante bellum, and to the declaration of the
Powers at the commencement of the war, that the

conqueror was not to receive any increase of
territory; and just as little could they concede to
the Porte a war-indemnity of ten million Pounds,
which was in excess of Turkey’s actual expenditure
and of the ability of Greece to pay. It was
accepted as a general basis of the terms of peace
that the Porte was entitled to demand a rectification
of the frontier for strategic purposes and as a
protection against freebooters, and a war indemnity
corresponding to the actual expenditure and losses
of Turkey and to the resources of Greece. Finally
it was also conceded, that if the treaties annulled
by the war should require renewal, the privileges
previously secured to Greece by the Powers should
remain intact.
With much difficulty the Powers succeeded in
inducing Turkey to yield on the question of her
territorial claims, and to gain over the Sultan, who
once more shewed his moderation and wisdom, in
contenting himself with a mere strategic rectification
of the frontier, amounting to an increase of about
400 square meters (: 460 square yards) of ground;
but as this increase handed the frontier passes
over to him, it was strategically very valuable.
The resistance which the whole Ottoman people
offered to this clause in the treaty of peace was
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 255
not without justification. With emotions of pain

ful regret the nation had to face the fact, that in
spite of the bloody sacrifices made for the reconquest
of Thessaly, Turkey had no prospect of receiving
satisfaction.
The contrast of the claims on both sides created
a state of affairs more complicated than had ever
been known before in any political controversy.
The Albanian population of Macedonia, Epirus,
and Thessaly assuming a threatening attitude, put
great difficulties in the way of the Turkish govern
ment. The Albanian Chiefs demanded with daily in
creasing emphasis, not only the annexation of Thessaly
but also their own autonomy, and declared that as
the victories in the war against Greece had been
gained mainly, and almost exclusively, by the valour
of Albanian troops, the Albanians had acquired
the indisputable right of being heard in the dis
cussion concerning the settlement of the Thessalian
question. At the same time reports came in, that
10,000 well-armed Arnauts stood ready in northern
Albania, determined to fight to the last man if
their demands were disregarded. Deputations of
Albanian Notables announced their arrival in
Constantinople to represent to the Sultan the
wishes of their people. Also in Epirus there were
still 4ooo Albanians under arms, who watched the
halting progress of negotiations with anger and

indignation. These men were the Volunteers, who
had been entrusted with arms for the purpose of
employing them in the war. The attempts to
disarm this body of men failed, because they now
declared that they would not submit till all their
demands were granted. These manifestations made
a deep impression on the Bosporus, especially as
the Albanians found strong supporters among the
fanatical Turks and military party.
Meanwhile the peace-negotiations dragged their
slow length along, the bone of contention being
the amount of the war-indemnity, which led to
most animated discussions, and to the exchange
of views which were diametrically opposed to each
other.
At last an agreement was arrived at on the
basis of a memorial handed in by a Special Com
mission, consisting of financial experts of the Six
Powers; the war indemnity was reduced to four
Million Pounds, this being considered an adequate
amount. Turkey’s additional demand that the
capitulations between her and Greece be abolished
.was disallowed, both on principle and to avoid
creating an undesirable precedent.
These difficulties being surmounted, new obstacles
prevented the final conclusion of the negotiations;
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. , 2 57
obstacles, which were all the more serious, because

it was no longer a conflict between the Powers
and the belligerents, but a divergence of opinion
among the Powers themselves, which threatened
the Concert of Europe and without which a
successful result could scarcely be anticipated.
The occasion for the difference of opinion was.
that Germany on the one hand claimed the insertion
of a clause in the treaty guaranteeing Turkey the
payment of the war-indemnity, but protecting also
the' former creditors of Turkey against injury to
their interest under the altered circumstances; and
that England on the other hand objected to any
stipulation which might delay the evacuation of
Thessaly by the Turkish troops. After discussions
and explanations protracted through months, a
compromise between the governments of Germany
and England was arrived at which the other
Powers accepted; and an article was drawn up
which appeared acceptable to all parties concerned.
Formal sanction was thus given to the proposal
made by Germany, that an international commission
be appointed to exercise a certain control over the
administration of the finances of Greece till the
war-indemnity was cleared off, and to guarantee
the discharge of the debt due to Turkey by
Greece.
17
2 58 THE WAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
In spite of the incessant objections of the

Greek government to any external interference in
their internal administration, in spite of the attempts
of an extravagant press urging the rejection of the
intervention of the Powers, and of the recalcitrancy
of the war-party in Turkey and other secret intrigues,
an agreement about the terms of peace was finally
arrived at, at a meeting of the ambassadors; and now
the Sultan no longer hesitated in accepting the Preli
minaries of Peace, and putting an end to the state
of uncertainty that had prevailed so long con
sequent on the continuance of the state of war.
The treaty was signed at Constantinople on
the 192‘ of September after negotiations which had
lasted four months, the terms being discussed and
settled during the course of the summer between
Turkey and the representatives of the Powers.
Thus the labours of the ambassadors were rewarded
with a successful termination, which had repeatedly
been threatened and imperilled.
The following is the literal text of the Preli
minary Treaty of Peace as drawn up at Constanti
nople:
“Greece having entrusted to the Powers the
safe-guarding of her interests, and Turkey having
accepted their mediation, the following terms were
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 2 59
agreed upon between the delegates of the Powers

and the Foreign Secretary Tewfik Pasha:
1. The frontiers are to be rectified according
to the lines traced on the accompanying map and
in the explanatory text. Slight alterations from a
military point of view in favour of the Imperial
Government are reserved for common decision on
the spot. A mixed commission, consisting of
plenipotentiaries of both the powers and of military
delegates of the embassies will mark off the
frontiers. This Commission is to be appointed
within a fortnight after the signature of the present
treaty, and on moot points it will decide by a
majority of votes.
2. This article contains the obligation contracted
by Greece to pay to Turkey 4,000,000 Turkish
Pounds, as well as the guarantees to be offered
by Greece; but the regulations concerning the
control of the Greek finances were not yet presented
as finally formulated.
3. The privileges and immunities, enjoyed by
the subjects of Greece in Turkey before the war,
remain intact.
4. Within a fortnight after the ratification of this
present agreement, or earlier still, Greek negotiators,
possessed of the necessary powers, will arrive at
Constantinople to meet the Ottoman plenipotentiaries
17‘
for the purpose of settling the terms of the defini

tive peace, which will be concluded on the basis
of this present treaty, and will contain among
other clauses: determinations about the exchange
of prisoners, a universal amnesty, freedom of
emigration to the inhabitants of the ceded districts,
measures for the suppression of brigandage, and
compensation for damages caused by the war.
5. At the same time negotiations will be opened
for the purpose of coming to terms within three
months on the following points:
a) A Convention to regulate the question
of citizenship on the basis of the scheme
agreed upon in 1876 between Turkey and
Greece.
b) A Convention to regulate the relations
between the Greek consulates and the Turkish
courts of law based on the condition provided
for under article 3.
c) A Convention with respect to crimes
under the civil law committed on the territory
of either state, by subjects of that state, who
then took refuge on the territory of the other
state.
6. This article dealing with the terms of the
evacuation of Thessaly by the Turkish troops, and
the surrender of the evacuated territory to the
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 261
Hellenic Civil Powers has not yet been submitted

as finally formulated.
7. Immediately after the signature and ratifica
tion of this act the former relations between Greece
and Turkey are to be resumed; the subjects of
both states will be able to travel and reside with
out let or hindrance, and freedom of navigation
will be mutually restored.
8. Till regular consular service is resumed in
both countries, provisional agents will be appointed
in the consular residences, who will discharge their
functions under the protection and superintendence
of the Powers who have undertaken to protect
the interests of the subjects of Greece during the
war. Till the conventions to be formulated by the
Special Commission appointed in harmony with
the provisions of article 5 are arrived at, and
have acquired legal validity, judicial disputes between
Ottoman and Greek subjects dating back to a time
antecedent to the declaration of war, are to be
treated in accordance with the regulations which
were in force previous to the war; subsequent
disputes, according to the principles of International
Law on the basis of the convention between
Turkey and Servia dated February 262‘.1 and
May 619, 1896.
9. In case of differences arising between
Turkey and Greece during the progess of the

negotiations, the points in the dispute concerning
either one or the other of the contending parties
are to be submitted to a Court of Arbitration of
the Representatives of the Powers, and its award
is to be final. This Court of Arbitration will dis
charge its functions collectively, either directly or
by the intervention of the Special Delegates of
the states concerned.
10. The Sublime Porte reserves to itself the
right to invite the Powers to consider a proposition
having reference to the regulation of the firmans,
proceeding from the terms of the convention dated
24% of May 1881, and which are to remain in
force, except in so far as they are modified by
the present Act.
This present Act is to be submitted to the
approval of His Majesty. This consent will be
given within a week; after the lapse of this period
the Representatives of the Powers will submit the
terms herein stated to the knowledge of their
several cabinets, and these terms will then acquire
force accordingly.
On the 27Lh of September the Russian am
bassador in Athens, being the doyen of the Diplo
matic Corps, handed the Treaty of Peace to the
Greek Government.
- THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 263
This document was accompanied by a written

communication of the Powers, in which they
declared that their mediation invoked by Greece
was now terminated, and requested the Greek
Government to appoint the plenipotentiaries to
negotiate the definite conclusion of peace.
To the Peace-Preliminaries were added supple
ments to the effect, that after a previous under
standing arrived at between the Turkish authorities
and the Greek delegates, the Thessalian fugitives
would be at liberty to return, and that the Powers
had promised to offer their mediation in case
difficulties should present themselves in setting
navigation free again, and that an amnesty would
be given to all Turkish subjects who had served
in the Greek Army. This last declaration however
was made with the reservation, that eventually an
alteration might take place.
Rallis’ Cabinet having resigned and being
succeeded by the moderate and circumspect ministry
of Zaimi, the Peace negotiations made more rapid
progress. Supported by public opinion the Greek
Government no longer withheld its consent to the
appointment of a Commission of financial control,
which took into consideration the amounts to be
set aside for the war indemnity, and examined
the financial guarantees for the payment of the sums.
At the same time the newly appointed Greek

Plenipotentiaries for the definite conclusion of
peace betook themselves from Athens to Con
stantinople, in order to take part in the negotiations
at that place.
Similarly the military commission appointed to
fix the new boundaries of Thessaly assembled in
Platamona to enter on its labours.
The firm and yet conciliatory attitude observed
by the Cabinet of Zaimi, no less during the dis
cussion of the Preliminaries than towards the
country and the representatives of the people, was
a sufficient guarantee for the speedy conclusion of
a definite peace.
THE NET RESULTS OF THE WAR. 265
The Net Results of the War.

The war between Turkey and Greece has led
to the complete exhaustion of Greece. Her govern
ment, fulfilling the preliminary conditions, invoked
the intervention of the European Concert, the
mediation of the Powers. This has been conceded
to 'the Greeks, and it may be hoped that for the
near future a term has been put to the shedding
of blood in the peninsula, and a] peace has been
established which secures repose in the East and
above all, causes the “Greek” question to disappear
from the field of polities. With the “Cretan”
question Europe will be busy for some time yet,
for the affairs of this hotly disputed island have
'by no means been cleared up, even after the
departure of the Greeks, and it can be foreseen
that the European diplomatists will yet have many
a difficult problem to solve ere Crete is pacified, ere
the relations between Christians and Mahometans
are regulated, and the new public law is brought
into working order. From the very beginning of
266 THE WAR BET\VEEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
the struggle international law was not in favour of

the Greeks. They were guilty of a palpable breach
of the peace in occupying Crete; and their behaviour
on the frontiers of Thessaly and Epirus shewed
that they had no inclination to listen to the voice
of justice and of reason. Greek Irregulars repeatedly
made incursions into Turkish territory and attacked
the Turkish troops posted there; and although the
Greek government officially denied all participation
in these warlike events, yet the connection subsisting
between the “Volunteers” and the regular Greek
army was notorious, and in the last inroad of the
Irregulars the Greek army took part. Thus the
Greeks were guilty of another breach of the peace
and now the patience of Turkey being exhausted,
she replied by a declaration of war. The reason
advanced by the Greeks for this second breach of
the peace was as baseless as that of the first. To
justify the first breach of the peace the cry was
raised that national and religious motives forced
the Greeks to intervene in Crete, and in the second
case Greece advanced an alleged right to certain
Turkish territories in Epirus and Macedonia which had
been awarded to her by the Berlin Congress and
were withheld by the Porte. As a matter of fact
the Berlin Congress had only recommended Turkey
to cede certain districts to Greece, and though Turkey
THE NET RESULTS OF THE WAR. 267
fulfilled this wish of Europe only in part, still

Greece could base no legal claim thereon.
The position of the Greeks being feeble from
the outset considered from the international point
of view, it also very soon became evident that her
military power was thoroughly inadequate to cope
with the forces at the disposal of Turkey. Simply
numerically the Turkish military force was greatly
superior to that of Greece, and in addition, Greece
had practically made no warlike preparations and
could bring up no reserves worth mentioning.
Turkey on the other hand shewed even by her
mobilisation, free from all noisy theatrical scenes
such as were witnessed in Greece, that her resolves
and her military resources stood in due proportion
to each other. The Turkish administrators supplied
all the requirements of the Army ready for use
on the spot, and the extensive territories of the
Ottoman Empire guaranteed to the troops on the
Thessalian frontier a firm support to replace the
eventual losses caused by the War. The Turks
were superior to the Greeks not only in their
organisation, but also as the short war clearly
shewed, greatly superior in the quality of their
men and in the skill of their Commanders. Edhem
Pasha and his Generals proved themselves to be
skilful leaders, and fully competent to deal with
.268 THE WAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE.
the several tasks set them, and compared with

them the much-belauded Greek “heroes” proved
to be of inferior quality. In bravery, endurance,
and also in discipline, the Turks far excelled the
Greeks. That a nation like the Greeks, which in
the War of Liberation shewed such admirable
capacity for self-sacrifice, was also on the present
occasion not lacking in men of real bravery and
warlike capacity goes without saying, and the
course of the war has proved this in many individual
incidents. But on the whole, the Greek troops
have not proved themselves even remotely equal
to the tasks set them; and they have afforded one
more illustration of the truth, that in modern days,
the possession of a musket together with patriotic
aspirations, does not suffice to form a reliable
“Defender of the Country”. Accordingly the fate
of the war was decided before a blow was struck,
and every event of the war from Meluna to
Tyrnavo, Larissa, Pharsalus, and Velestinos, shewed
that in every respect the Turkish army ranked
high above the army of the Greeks, —- a conclusion
which every man of calm judgment could and did
foretell to the conquered; but the Greeks, over
weening and infatuated as they were, and specu
lating on all sorts of contingencies, would not
.admit it.
THE NET RESULTS OF THE \VAR. 269‘
It is especially to be regretted that in the collapse

of their anticipated victory they lost their self
control to such an extent, that they threatened
even their dynasty. This deprived them pretty
nearly of the remnant of sympathy which a part
of Europe still felt for them.*) True, the Greek
Cabinet may be most to blame in this matter,
having even in the events preceding the war'
achieved an unenviable notoriety for vaingloriousness,
equivocation, and unblushing egoism, and for having
during the war, published ridiculous despatches,
of victories gained, and intensified their disasters by
obstinacy and sullen defiance, still the people too
evinced a great lack of national dignity. All which
things combined led to the final result, that only
a grievous humiliation of Greece can rescue her‘
from total ruin.
Thus the events of the last few months have
led to a net result which is very sad for Greece;
she has found out that she possesses neither the
physical nor the moral force needful to play the
role in the East to which she was aspiring; the
dreadful defeat has inflicted a wound not only on
*) Our author is mistaken; English sympathies at all events

remained steadfastly with the Greeks; and even those English who,
did not love the Greeks, loved the Turks no better.
The Translator.
the material prosperity of the nation, but also on

her ambition; a wound from which she will not
easily recover. Greece staked her all on one card
and lost through her own fault. That a small
state, which has suffered such a collapse, will
continue to exist, will be due to the good intentions
of Europe, which her rulers have for so long a
time despised.
Of more importance perhaps than the losses
entailed on Greece by the results of the war, are
the consequences that force themselves on our
consideration in estimating the power of Turkey.
Once more Turkey has shewn herself to be a
military power, that has to be reckoned with. The
Sultan had no need to appeal to the patriotic, or
as in the present case, religious enthusiasm of his
subjects. Turkey succeeded without any extra
strain in placing a numerous and efficient army in
the field; an army consisting wholly of regular
troops, and restrained by discipline from all excesses
and cruelties.
The Turks suppressed every excess with an
iron rigour. Two soldiers, setting fire to a house
and taken “flagrante delicto” were brought before a
Court Martial and condemned to death. The death—
sentence was afterwards commuted for imprison
ment. Twenty other soldiers were beaten for
THE NET RESULTS OF THE WAR. 27 I
petty larceny. The Greeks in Larissa largely

supplied themselves with Fez, but no Turkish
soldier molested them. The “Times” Correspondent
in Larissa wrote in a similar strain: “The discipline,
self-restraint, and moderation of the Turks in their
hour of victory, have made a deep impression and
are beyond all praise. Their whole bearing seems
to shew that civilisation has advanced in Turkey,
whilst in Greece courage and discipline have
diminished”. Such and similar testimony has been
given by many more.
Capable and trained Commanders, brave and
hardy soldiers, skilfully ordered array, cautious
covering of the rear of the army, these are advan
tageous qualities and measures, which the Turkish
army, reorganised by Germans, exhibited in an
honourable degree. Although the military capacity
of the Turks had been previously well known,
nevertheless people were surprized to see that
Turkey, without calling out any undisciplined,
irregular bands, was able to display so great a
force. The “Sick Man” at the Bosporus has turned
out, from a military point of view, vigorous and
full of life; this is the upshot of the war as far as
Turkey is concerned, and in future this will have
to be taken into account. With respect to the
operations of the two belligerent armies it may be
observed, that the Turkish Generals issued their

orders with utmost care and circumspection. ,To
this caution is probably due a certain disinclination
to operate against the Greek lines of communication,
i. e. to force them away from the sea, which
was their main support. Instead of strengthening
their left wing and advancing with that, Edhem’s
army pushed forward with its right without gaining
thereby any notable strategic advantages. Possessed
of a numerous artillery, they nevertheless did not
often make use of heavy masses of guns; on the
other hand, they concentrated superior forces even
before they had determined to fight in a pitched
battle.
Thanks to the reorganisation of the Turkish
Army effected by General von der Goltz, Turkey
was able to mobilize her forces with a rapidity
which nobody had expected, and which received
the universal recognition of experts. The strategic
line of railway Dedeagatch-Salonichi, only finished
in the previous year, rendered very valuable service;
it made it possible to hurry forward Battalion after
Battalion in quick succession to the threatened
points, so that the Field Marshal in command
within a short time disposed of considerable forces,
and then, as is well known, advanced from victory
to victory and drove the Greeks before him, till
THE NET RESULTS OF WAR. 273
the fall of Domokos followed by the armistice, put

a temporary term to the bloody contest. These
,successes stimulated a population which previously
had been somewhat apathetic, to an ever increasing
enthusiasm for the cause of the nation’s power and
grandeur.
The main force, the Infantry, consisted right
through of the best human material for this kind
of arm. The Albanians with their white Fez stood
out to special advantage, but it is not easy to
manage these Albanians, who sternly and haughtily
rebel against all discipline. The Turkish soldier,
if he is firmly and steadily led, does not give way
and blindly obeys orders. His courage, his cool’
ness, and his silent advance to the attack beggar
all description, so that the Turks would become
invincible, if their training were raised to the level
of European Armies. — In the discipline of stand
ing under fire they are little trained, but this is
not the fault of the individual soldiers, but of the
defective skill of their officers, who lack initiative.
The Artillery horses were good, and the Commanders
of Batteries were circumspect and active; two
qualities in which the Artillery Officers were
deficient. They were not uniformly successful in
the selection of their projectiles, and in aim and in
distance-judging they were unreliable. The Turkish
18
Cavalry were well mounted on strong and hardy

horses and were led bravely and resolutely; the
shortcomings of individual horses and men were
compensated for by their brilliant horsemanship.
Had the Cavalry Division been employed more
frequently, it would, in the opinion of competent
judges, have become more closely knitted together,
and a still more manageable instrument in the
hands of its Commanders.
The Auxiliary Services were, as is well known,
inferior in extent to those of the larger European
Armies; only the field-telegraph was at the service
of the troops in their operations in the field, and
then only in the main at Head-Quarters; in the
rich Thessalian plain it was easy to feed the army,
especially as beasts of burden and camp followers
were plentiful. The traffic of the railway Larissa
Volo was very slow and cumbrous, and the field
post from Elassona southwards was irregular and
little reliable.
The Greek Commanders subordinated all their
measures to one aim, namely to gain time, and in
this they were aided by the hesitating advance of
the enemy. There was an entire absence of regula
rity in the administration and in the transport of
supplies.
In consequence of inexplicable tactics the Greeks
abandoned impregnable positions and retreated to

their base and to their ships. It is doubtful if
they acted wisely in dividing their weak forces; it
may possibly have been necessary to hold the
towns of Trikkala, Larissa, Pharsala, and Velestinos,
in order to split up the forces of the enemy;
moreover these places could not be allowed to
fall early into the hands of the enemy, on account
of the supplies they contained. That the Greeks
on their retreat hardly ever destroyed the telegraph,
testifies to the unbounded folly of Greek warfare;
in Larissa, Pharsala, and Domokos, they abandoned
large stores of Krupp ammunition. At Velestinos
they moved some heavy guns of position up to a
height which commanded a far range, kept them
there during a two days’ fight without firing a shot,
then dragged them down again with great trouble,
and sunk them in the gulf of Volo. Moreover
they never t00k any steps to check the advance
of the Turks by destroying a bridge or erecting a
barricade.
Foreign military judges, who were at the Head
Quarters of the Greeks, speak with approbation of
their skilful and careful handling of the guns in
the defensive positions. In aiming, loading, distance
judging, and use of the ammunition, the men were
well trained.
1s
The Greek Cavalry (12 squadrons) took but a

modest part in the campaign. Its main achieve
ment was the capture of two war-correspondents.
They rode neither with ease nor in closed ranks.
There must have been too a want of discipline in
their ranks, for on their marches both to Larissa
and to Pharsala they cast off their heavier accoutre
ments in order to get along more rapidly.
In defensive positions the Greek Infantry fought
bravely, but when ordered to quit their cover
and advance to the attack, they were at times
somewhat nervous. This was in part the fault
of the Commanders. Frequently their discipline
relaxed, as is apt to happen with an army that is
acquainted only with retreats.
The Evzones, a kind of light mountaineer
Infantry, were certainly the best troops of the
army. The troops of the line recruited from day
and farmlabourers had practically no war-training
at all, and lacked all esprit de corps.
The Officers, hardly sufficiently numerous, had
but slight authority over the men, because their
knowledge of the duties of their vocation was
inadequate, and in the service itself they had little
or no training. Thence sprung dissatisfaction and
discouragement, which was working against them
and mainly against the superior officers; it is
notorious that during the battle of Gritzowali, not

a single superior officer shewed himself on the
battlefield. Before the engagement had begun a
Major or a Lieutenant-Colonel did occasionally
appear amongst the men to gain popularity for the
coming elections, but they disappeared as soon as
fire was opened. Of the Orders of the Day ever
changing and issued by hundreds, one given to a
Company of the 52‘ Regiment is quoted as very
characteristic. The Company is ordered to stand
to the last man against a whole Turkish Regiment
that stood at Papaliwodos in a strongly intrenched
position. The Company saw that it was wholly
unprotected against the superior forces of the
Turks; they had seqd-a request to the Commander
in-Chief to send them an electric machine and the
necessary powder, to lay a mine to protect their
rear, but they were told that the machine could
not be entrusted to them “because it cost 1000
drachmae”.*) The men were as a rule prevented
by their Officers from making intrenchments. The
best example certainly was set by the Commander
of a Regiment at the battle of Gritzowali, which
lasted 25 hours; he simply abandoned his 4000
men to their fate and preferred the telegraph office
*) == about L40.
The translator.
278 THE WAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE,
to exposure to the rain of bullets; at the office he

occupied himself with demanding reinforcements
on all sides.
The Auxiliary Service with the Greeks was in
a miserable condition. For the supply of munition
alone provision was made by means of beasts of
burden; but the supply of provisions was blocked
from time to time as soon as the retreat from
Larissa began. Engineers were represented in
vanishingly small numbers and by no means equal
to their several tasks. The whole field-telegraph
consisted of a single wire, of which the General
Staff had almost exclusive use. As for a field-post it
hardly existed at all. The Hospital Service was
attended to by the Red Cross of Greece jointly
with an ambulance sent from Germany, consisting
of 2 physicians, 5 deaconesses, and 2 hospital
assistants.
Characteristic of the circumstances and views
prevailing in the Greek Army and at the Greek
Headquarters, is the interview a reporter of the
“Akropolis” newspaper had with his Royal High
ness the Crown-Prince in Hagia Marina. This
conversation, which was intended to be published,
throws interesting side-lights on many a point,
that previously had been obscure. It was to the
following effeth
The Prince ascribed the ill-success of the Greek

arms mainly to the want of discipline and organi
sation of the army, and for this reason had not
been in favour of war. “We did not believe", said
the Crown-Prince, “that war would ensue. I do
not hesitate, nor shrink from telling you, that I
myself, when I left for Thessaly did not believe
that any actual fighting would take place; never
theless during the twenty days that I spent in
camp I endeavoured by restless activity to fit the
army as much as possible for the conflict. The
first retreat of necessity followed the fall of Nezeros,
which put us in danger of being outflanked by
the enemy, who could always keep his ranks full,
while I had not even men from the reserves to
replace losses. To maintain Larissa was impossible;
the attempt to do so would have led to a second
Sedan, but a dishonourable one, the town being
wholly untenable, and an unconditional surrender
inevitably to be expected. Moreover the attempt
to hold the town would have been useless, for even
if we had pushed forwards as far as Elassona, we
should have had to give way before the superior
numbers of the enemy, and yet all the while
Athens was swarming with men freed from military
service! Individually, the men fought well, but it is
impossible to educate men into soldiers in the course
of a month. Where should our Superior Officers

have learnt to command brigades? and how could
I myself have gained the experience needful to
command a whole army? Thus I had to deprive
a Major of his battalion, because he proved him
self to be wholly incapable, although he was an
excellent fellow in every other respect. Then as
for Discipline, it did not exist at all. I desired
to introduce martial law, but that was unconstitu
tional. The Greeks are an excellent race, for
spite of all the sufferings that the army has under
gone and is undergoing, the men remain with the
colours, although there are no means of retaining
them by force”. The Prince had not expected
much assistance from the co-operation of the Fleet.
Was it to bombard a Greek town? And for
taking Saloniki we had no troops to land; indeed
it is a question, if the intervention of the Powers
would then have been secured. We certainly could
have occupied a few islands. To utilize the
armistice for preparations to beat back the Turks
the Prince considered impossible. “We would
have fared”, said the Crown-Prince, “as Gambetta
did after Sedan. Those who clamour for the
continuation of the war should be put on outpost
duty; then they would know what war is”. The
Crown-Prince laid stress on the necessity of devoting
/the utmost care to the re-organisation of the army,

after peace had been concluded; and he demands
that Officers should cease to be professional
politicians, and be ineligible for Parliament. To
counterbalance the great advantages conceded to
Turkey by the rectification of the frontier, he advised
strong intrenchments to be constructed along the
new frontiers. The reports lately spread by the
papers that the Prince had refused to take command
of the troops that were to occupy Thessaly after
its evacuation by the Turks, the Prince himself
declared to be untrue, as he had not so much as
been asked about it. It ought to be specially
mentioned that the Prince referred to the fact that
many Athenians had called upon the physician
Galvanis to enquire if General Mauromichalis had
been really wounded by a bullet, or if the wound
had been self-inflicted, whereby the General would
escape all further dangers of the war.
Summarizing the impressions derived by military
observers from the war, we arrive at the conclusion
that the Turkish soldier by his endurance under
hardship, his abstemiousness, his courage and self
abnegation, his strict discipline combined with
uniform readiness for, nay delight in. battle, per
forms achievements, which elicited the admiration
of the foreign Officers at the Turkish Head
Quarters during the war; achievements of which

a soldier is capable only if with natural warlike
instincts he combines patriotism, a passionate feeling
of race, and a strong religious faith.
General von der Goltz very accurately describes
the Turkish Army of the present day as levies
hastily raised, of excellent capacity, and provided
with several highly gifted Commanders, and with
a good and numerous General Staff.
After the war the Sultan conferred on the
General, in recognition of his services in promoting
the efficiency of the army, the golden Liakat
Medal, and renewed the agreement of Marshal
Kamphovener Pasha on highly favourable terms.
This is sufficient proof of how highly His“
Imperial Majesty estimated the services of the
German instructors.
The Turks will at first have to wage war
slowly and methodically, utilizing in the right
place the astonishing defensive powers of their
troops; in offensive operations they will do wisely
to restrict themselves to modest performances, to
avoid far-reaching schemes, and to aim mainly at
the results which personal valour can achieve. It
will be the business of the next generation, advancing
to high posts in the army, to carry further the
re-organisation of the army, to re-animate the
pristine aggressive spirit, and to fit the army for

aggressive warfare.
If allowed calmly and undisturbedly to develop
in that direction the army of the Padishah will in
future wars astonish the world by its achievements,
and will maintain the ancient renown which has
been accorded to it so abundantly by history.
_" MMWW“ M
Riza Pasha.
Minister of War. — Seraskier of H. M. the Sultan.
Before concluding our task we must not omit

to make mention of a man who can claim a large
share of the laurels which the Army gained on
the bloody fields of Thessaly and Epirus, although
he himself had taken no part in the actual fighting
and had not held any post of command in front
of the enemy.
This man is the Seraskier Riza Pasha, a tried
and meritorious General in every department of
military affairs. He has rendered his country most
eminent service both as Commander of troops and
as Organizer, and his name is intimately and
honourably connected with the newest development
of the Army and of War in Turkey.
To his unremitting care it is due, that the
forces told ofi for the war were assembled betimes.
. W
f” .
“l 3 mu
than“!
, .‘Ml"
Riza Pasha
Turkish Minister of War.
RIZA PASHA. 2 85
suitably organized and grouped, and duly equipped;

also that the strategic array of the army on the
frontier was carried out without any block. It
was also due to him that the Commands were
wisely regulated, and that the right men were
appointed to the right places. Silently and unos-~
tentatiously devoted to his work and to his care
for the army, he as minister of war held in his
hands at Constantinople the numerous threads,
which kept up the connection between the advancing
Army Sections and Home, and carefully he watched
that their efficiency should remain unimpaired.
Scarcely had the first lines of the Army-Corps of
all arms crossed the frontier and advanced into!
the enemy’s territory, when on the points of junc
tion of the highways the reserves stood in readiness.
to occupy and defend the conquered territory, and
ready, if necessity arose, at once to advance into
the first line themselves.
Up to his promotion to a captaincy in 1865
Riza Pasha had served in different Corps of the
Guards at Constantinople; then he was appointed
military director of the school of medicine. After
many years of successful work in this institution,
where he is remembered to this day, Riza was
appointed Staff-Officer early in the seventies and
sent to Scutari in Albania; there in the north
\
western corner of the Balkan peninsula great

masses of troops were being assembled on account
of the turbulence of the people. In the popular
risings that soon afterwards took place in Bosnia,
Herzegovina and Montenegro, and in the tedious
guerilla warfare in the mountains which gave the
Turks so much trouble, Riza distinguished himself
by his circumspection and boldness. After several
individual acts of heroism he took part in the
audacious march against the Czernagorozes, where
the Turks, after toiling across the mountains, gained
possession of all Montenegro, and the Crescent was
hoisted in Cettinje.
Riza’s bravery in those contests was rewarded
by his promotion to a Lieutenant-Colonelcy.
In the beginning of the Russo-Turkish war it
was he that commanded that expedition by water
which is almost without parallel in history, and
brought the north-west Army of Turkey from the
shores of the Adriatic to the threatened East of
the Balkan peninsula; there at the Shipka-Pass as
is well known, it solved some of the difficult
problems of the war. The circumspect defence of
this mountain-pass, in which Riza distinguished
himself several times, met with the highest approval
of his Imperial Master, who after the war promoted
.Riza to a colonelcy and appointed him Commander
RIZA PASHA. 287
of a regiment; in this capacity he was in garrison

first in Smyrna, then in Larissa and V010, and
finally he was in command of a regiment of Redifs
in Ismid.
His military skill, the unimpeachable purity of
his character, and his administrative skill pointed
him out as a fit president for a commission
appointed to investigate the accounts in the Corps
of the Guards. After the discharge of that Com
mission he was promoted to be Commander of a
Brigade at Adrianople, and some years afterwards
he was appointed to be Commander of a Division
at the same place. The Sultan Abdul Hamid,
whose personal acquaintance in the Army was
very extensive, had for some time known and
observed Riza’s unusual military capacity. He
gave him proof of his fullest confidence by appoint
ing him first as Commandant of Yildis-Kios, and
afterwards intrusted him with the Command of the
292 Division of the Guards, and made him his
Adjutant-General. In this post he found the
opportunity of still more gaining the confidence
and esteem of his Sovereign; and thence he was
advanced to be Minister of War.
What a happy hit the Padishah made in this
appointment was clearly demonstrated by the events
of the Turko-Greek War.
To Field-Marshal General Riza Pasha were

primarily due thanks and recognition for having
created and placed in array, a warlike army such
as did battle in Thessaly and Epirus. He largely
contributed to the great progress made in the
organisation of the Army. The victories in Thessaly
are the fruit of the seeds he has sown. To his
Imperial Master he is a very rock of defence
in faithfulness, obedience, and personal devotion.
One of the most powerful supports of the
Minister of War in the department of the admini
stration of the War, was Achmet Asif Pasha, the
Chief Superintendent. After having passed through
the military school of Pancaldi, he became Officer
in a Regiment of the Guards, then Captain and
Assistant of the Instructor of the Infantry. Pro
moted to be Acting Major, he was appointed
Director of the Military Academy of Kassim-Pasha.
In the beginning of the war of 1877/78 he was
employed in the army of the Danube, and thence
ordered to proceed to the Shipka-Pass; at the end
of the war he was promoted and became Full
Major.
After the war he served as Adjutant for a long
time, first with the 52‘ Corps in Damascus, then
with the 3'! Corps in Monastir. In the year 1885
he was removed to the General Superintendent’s
RIZA PASHA. 289
office and became Chief of a Section; at this post

he developed his shrewd intelligence and gained
insight into the needs of the troops. About the
year 1886 he became member of the Commission
of Military Inspection for the Turkish Empire, was
advanced in 1890 to be General of Brigade, and
Chief of the General Superintendence Office of
the Ministry of War; a post which he still holds.
Achmet Asif Pasha is rightly considered one
of the most eminent Administrators who has made
a reputation by his invariable probity and rigour in
the service. In the last campaign it Was mainly he, who
by industrious preparations, continued for many years,
and carried out under the critical eyes of numerous
foreign military correspondents, displayed a useful
activity which met with universal recognition, and
by skilful orders he made it possible for the army
to be rapidly moved forward and kept efficient.
, GOLF VON SALONHU.
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The Greco Turkish War of 1897

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The Greco Turkish War of 1897

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This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized

by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the

When renewing by phone, write new due date below

Thé Greco-Turkish War

Grtcwturkisb (ﬂaw of I897

From Ofﬁcial Sources

German Staff Officer

With 21 Portraits and 6 Maps

Germany, although not immediately concerned in

The eyes of Germany were rivetted more

The numerous military successes achieved by

In the Ottoman Army this has been repeatedly

Germans a highly honourable and important position

attach several German Ofﬁcers to the Turkish

him to see what changes were needed, before

Duringthe years I 883—i 886 Baron von der Goltz’s

plan of Army Reform drawn up by von der Goltz

Pasha made the plan and saw it carried out.

These works contain 3000 printed pages. No. 1

advantage from his animating inﬂuence and activity.

was clumsy, the cog-Wheels had no grip. Oppor

power and military efﬁciency to amighty and friendly

scattered data for the sequence of events, and

Origin and Cause of the War.

The prelude to the Turco-Greek war, which

to demand as much, as each could; the latter

So, for the time being, peace was restored to

When the war broke out in 1885 between Servia

compatible with her independence, and that she

the 21/2 millions of his countrymen with the crush

burg and Rome that the disarmament had taken

hostilities and urging the opening of negotiations for

to the Greek government. Its contents were in

agreed upon a ﬁnal solution of the Cretan question.

with artillery, riﬂes, and munition. In consequence

who landed at Athens were received with unbounded

formal proposal had been made for the appointment

house, which was bombarded. The small Turkish

The Prime Minister Delyannis on the 1321 of April

the 1 82 of April, Delyannis explained that the Turkish

The note in which the Greek Minister for Foreign

which had prompted this step, the Imperial Government

Greece before the War.

In their jeering deﬁance of the Turks, the

was advised, in order to secure an Albanian

oﬁered a strange contrast to the assurances of peace

of the resources of Turkey. “Perhaps”, said orators

members are numerous wealthy Greeks living all

submit to law, or to accept and occupy the

The Greek Army System.

relegated to garrison duty. The Landwehr Reserve can

3 Corps of from 12 to 14 Battalions, 4 Squadrons,

with 7 batteries each, and one with 6 batteries.

practice of the Infantry entirely, and to reduce

The Greek sympathy with the rising in Crete

which Delyannis after some opposition agreed.

To the Prime Minister.

best riﬂe for our army. The Government will then.

The national rejoicing, however, was somewhat

were for the end of February. At the same time

resignation as members of a military Club, founded

The Crown-Prince Constantine

the Ofﬁcers completely. The King and his sons made

Crown Prince Constantine was born at Athens on